CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A001600070001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 59
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 23, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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,;COPVINO 295
FOP THE DE,PUTY DIRFCWR,
JOI T JO rNT r A-FP
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tL? 6114.1,ign TO: TS.,
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BY'
,
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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DISTRIBUTION:
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SR-39
CUBA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY
CHAPTER I?POLITICAL SITUATION
1.
2.
3.
GENESIS OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SYSTEM .
STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT .
a. The Executive Branch
b. The Legislative Branch
c. The Judicial Branch .
d. Local Government .
POLITICAL PARTIES .
1
2
2
3
3
3
4
a.
Cuban Revolutionary Party (Autenticos) .
4
b.
Republican Party .
5
c.
The Liberal Party .
5
d.
Democratic Party .
6
e.
Cuban People's Party.
6
f.
Popular Socialist Party (Communist)
6
4.
OTHER INFLUENTIAL GROUPS .
a. Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) .
b. Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU) ?University Student Fed-
7
eration . . .
7
c.
Socialist Revolutionary Movement (MSR)
8
d.
Accion Revolucionaria Guiteras (ARG)
8
e.
Other Politico-Terroristic Groups .
8
5.
CURRENT ISSUES .
9
a.
The Racial Problem .
9
b.
Failure to Develop Rural Areas.
10
6.
STABILITY OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION
10
CHAPTER II?PRESENCE OF SABOTAGE AND SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS IN CUBA
1. COMMUNIST . 12
a. Juan Marinello . 12
b. Bias Roca . 13
c. Lazar? Pena 13
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d. Fabio Grobart . .
e. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez
2. NON-COMMUNIST
CHAPTER III?ECONOMIC SITUATION
13
13
14
1. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT ECONOMIC SYSTEM 15
2. PRESENT ECONOMIC SITUATION 17
a. Agriculture 17
b. Mining . 20
c. Manufacturing 20
d. Domestic Commerce 21
e. International Trade 21
f. Transportation . 22
g. Public Utilities . 23
h. Public Finance . 23
3. ECONOMIC STABILITY 24
CHAPTER IV?FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT FOREIGN POLICIES 25
2. OPERATION OF PRESENT FOREIGN POLICY 26
CHAPTER V?MILITARY SITUATION
1. GENESIS OF PRESENT MILITARY POLICIES . 29
2. STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF THE ARMED FORCES 29
a. ' Army. . 30
b. The National Police . 31
c. The Navy . 32
3. WAR POTENTIAL. 32
a. Manpower . 32
b. Natural Resources, Finance, Industry, and Science 33
4. MILITARY INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES . 33
CHAPTER VI?STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY 35
CHAPTER VII?PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS . . 37
APPENDIX A?Topography and Climate 39
APPENDIX B?Population Facts . 40
APPENDIX C?Biographical Data 41
APPENDIX D?Statistical Data . 44
Map of Cuba
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SUMMARY
The fundamental importance of Cuba to the US derives primarily from (1) its
ability to fill US sugar requirements, and (2) its tactical relationship to US plans for
defense of the Panama Canal and the US itself. Any state at war with the US can
expect concurrently to be at war with Cuba. Since Cuba is physically incapable of
protecting itself from any such potential enemy, and since the US cannot afford ade-
quate protection to the Panama Canal and its Caribbean interests without the as-
surance that Cuba is friendly, the two countries have, through the years, by treaty and
informal relationship, closely bound themselves to one another.
The two countries are also most intimately linked by their economies. Twenty-
eight percent of Cuba's national income is derived from the sale of sugar to the US.
In 1947 the US took 92 percent of Cuba's exports and supplied that country with 84
percent of its imports. Cuba's prosperity depends almost entirely on the demand for
sugar in the world market in general and in the US in particular.
The Cuban Government consists of a superstructure modeled principally on US
political institutions and rests on a foundation of Roman law and procedure inherited
from Spanish colonial times. At present, the Cuban Government affords the people
a relatively high degree of democracy and, aside from a certain amount of endemic
corruption, it constitutes, by Latin American standards, a relatively adequate instru-
ment for the execution of public policy.
Cuba's international position, as a result of the close ties with the US and as a
result of the basic fact that Cuba is small and weak and the US large and powerful,
is subordinate by force of circumstances to that of the US. It is this situation that
forms the basis of all problems inherent in fundamental relationships between the
two countries.
Cuba's spirit of nationalism now requires that any government in office?if it is
to survive politically?must (1) deny any inference of inferiority to the US and (2)
strive to promote its position as a sovereign and completely independent country
within the family of nations. Cuba is well aware, however, of the benefits derived
from especially close ties with the US and is consequently reluctant to press its
independence beyond the point which might jeopardize the support and benefits for
which it must depend on the US. A consequent ambivalence in Cuba's attitude toward
the US results, which makes it the more difficult for each administration in Cuba to
formulate its basic policy somewhere between the urge to assert sovereign rights and
the expediency of recognizing the realities of Cuba's relationship to the US. Since
the opinion which particular Cubans and individual political parties and groups adopt
toward the problem varies, the relationship between the two countries is not constant,
Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force
have concurred in this report.
The information herein is as of 1 September 1948.
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but continuously subject to re-examination and reorientation according as one or the
other of the two objectives seems more relevant.
Cuba's military establishment has limited potentialities and is concerned primarily
with maintaining domestic law and order and serving as a final arbiter in matters of
major political importance. Within this limited scope it is capable of performing its
duties with relative efficiency and is a protection against extensive sabotage by Com-
munists or other subversive groups. In the event of a joint US-Cuban war against
the USSR, the Cuban Army would probably need little help from the US in controlling
an integrated program of sabotage by Cuba's 150,000 Communists.
The regime of President-elect Prio should enjoy relative stability for the next two
years, and can be expected fully to support the US in its anti-Soviet policies. Iri other
matters, however, US-Cuban relations will probably become embroiled in a series of
vexatious disputes arising from President-elect Prio's and his associates' desire to
assert Cuba's sovereign rights rather than accept the more expedient course of deferring
to the US.
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CHAPTER I
POLITICAL SITUATION
1. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SYSTEM.
Cuba, the last of the Spanish colonies in the New World to gain independence and
the only one to obtain it by virtue of direct US help, became a republic in 1902. After
nearly four centuries as a Spanish colony (1511-1898), Cuba was closely bound to
the US as a result of the joint war against Spain and the subsequent four-year period
of US military government. Until the abrogation of the Platt Amendment in 1934
Cuba was, to all intents and purposes, a quasi-protectorate of the US. The Platt Amend-
ment gave the US intervenient rights "for the preservation of Cuban independence" and
"the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and
individual liberty." Cuba was further estopped by its terms from entering into treaties
detrimental to its independence and from incurring foreign debts that could not be
amortized from "normal current revenues." Cuba further granted the US military
bases on Cuban territory. The peculiar political bonds then existing between the two
countries were further tightened by an exclusive agreement reducing tariffs on each
others' products 20 percent or more below standard rates.
Between 1902 and 1933 the US intervened in Cuba three times. On two oc-
casions the newly established democratic institutions were unable to function at election
time, and on one occasion racial animosities became so aroused as to require forcible
repression. In 1933, when the Cuban people rebelled against President Machado, the
US offered its mediation in an effort to forestall bloody revolution. Nevertheless, there
were extensive disorders until a strong leader?Sergeant Batista?emerged from the
confusion and seized control of the government, which he held until defeated in fair
elections by' Grau San Martin in 1944.
A significant element in the 1933 revolution was the rising tide of Cuban national-
ism. The US recognized this and, as a consequence, agreed to the abrogation of the
Platt Amendment in 1934 and thus allowed Cuba to assume a more independent role
among the family of nations. Despite this technical abolition of political ties between
Cuba and the US, the principle of special economic treatment for Cuba by the US
continues?its latest expression being an exclusive trade agreement effective 1 January
1948.
The unique US-Cuban relationships since 1902 have produced important effects
on the government of Cuba as well as on its national character and international at-
titudes. The following are significant:
a. The possibility of US intervention, prior to 1934, limited the revolutionary dis-
orders that otherwise would have developed from inherent political rivalries and gave
Cuba a false sense of political stability.
b. Many Cubans developed a tendency to hold the US responsible for the welfare
of Cuba and obligated to initiate action in order to correct unfavorable conditions.
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c. A large number of Cubans, as a result of their reaction against US domination,
developed an exaggerated sense of nationalism which, when translated into political
and economic programs, has been harmful to basic Cuban as well as US interests.
d. Cubans have developed an exceptional knowledge of US Government and in-
stitutions. This enables Cuba, probably better than any of the other American re-
publics, to understand the US and has, as a consequence, engendered in many Cubans
a feeling of hopelessness before the task of raising Cuban economic and political stand-
ards to those of the US. The inferiority complex, thus induced, has produced a great
variety of attitudes toward the Cuban Government?as well as toward the US?that
has resulted in a marked degree of inconsistency and conflict.
. STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT.
The Cuban Government consists of a superstructure modeled principally on US
political institutions but rests on a foundation of Roman law and procedures inherited
from Spanish colonial times. There have been two constitutions. The 1901 con-
stitution provided for the familiar division into executive, legislative, and judicial
branches and for autonomous municipal and provincial government. The centralizing
tendency inherited from Spain reduced the power of the local governments and in-
creased the powers of the executive beyond that of the US. In 1928 the Machado regime
amended the 1901 constitution to permit a six-year presidential term instead of four.
After Machado's fall in 1933, government was by "constitutional laws" until the adop-
tion of the present constitution in 1940.
Although this constitution maintains the Spanish tradition of a strong executive,
reaction to the despotism of Machado led to the inclusion of a "semiparliamentary"
cabinet appointed by the President but removable on a vote of lack of confidence by
either house of Congress. Local government remains autonomous in theory. Many
advanced social and economic concepts with national agencies for their implementa-
tion are propounded in the new constitution. The governmental branches are:
a. The Executive Branch.
The President, who must be a native Cuban at least 35 years of age, is elected
for a single four-year term and cannot be a candidate again until eight years have
elapsed since the end of his first term. Nominating and electoral procedures have
been complicated to an extraordinary degree in a vain effort to reduce political cor-
ruption. The power of the Chief Executive greatly exceeds that of the legislature and
the judiciary, and is derived from extensive control of patronage, the right to issue
decrees, the right to initiate and to veto legislation, and the power to declare states of
national emergency in which presidential power is supreme. The Executive also has
the power, when government income exceeds budgeted expenditures, to disburse all
excess funds without congressional approval. The Vice President is of no importance
whatever except in the event of the President's death.
A council of ministers consisting of a prime minister and other ministers are
appointed by the President to aid him in his executive duties. Some assume charge
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of specific executive departments; others are without portfolio. The constitution pro-
vides that all ministers shall be subject to interpellation by the Senate or House of
Representatives and may be forced to resign, individually or as a body, by a vote of
lack of confidence of either house.
b. The Legislative Branch.
The Cuban Congress, like that of the US, consists of a Senate and a House
of Representatives. There are nine senators from each of Cuba's six provinces, and
they serve a four-year term. The anti-militaristic tradition in Cuban political life
is evidenced in a constitutional provision that declares ineligible candidates for the
Senate who have served in the armed forces within two years of the time they seek
office. The Senate, like that of the US, besides its regular legislative duties, ratifies
treaties, and approves the nomination of chiefs of diplomatic missions and other high
officers. It serves as a court in impeachment proceedings against the President or pro-
vincial governors.
The House of Representatives consists of 136 members; one for each 35,000
of the population. Half of the members are elected every two years for a four-year
term. A system of proportional representation assures the more significant minor
parties seats in the Congress.
C. The Judicial Branch.
The administration of justice in Cuba is primarily a federal function, and
provincial governments are denied virtually all judicial power. There are a Supreme
Court and inferior federal courts, including superior provincial courts and subsidiary
civil and criminal courts. The judiciary, in its methods and its philosophy, retains its
essentially Spanish colonial character. The new Cuban constitution, in an effort to
modernize the judicial process, provides for special courts of final jurisdiction, such as
a Court of Constitutional and Social Guarantees. These additions to the traditional
system, however, remain largely theoretical. Only the Superior Electoral Court has
been established, and such other plans for modernization as were enunciated in the
new constitution exist only on paper.
d. Local Government.
The national constitution expressly guarantees to the Cuban people the
right of provincial and municipal self-government and establishes three alternative
forms for the latter. The federal judiciary enjoys the right of review over local regu-
lations and has power to remove provincial and municipal elected officers. Each
province elects a governor and a provincial council; the latter enacts provincial adminis-
trative regulations within the limits set by the national constitution. (There are no
provincial constitutions.) Each province is divided into a number of municipalities
that include both urban places and the surrounding countryside.
Although the theory of the constitution?save for new social and economic
principles that have not yet been implemented by law?is respected in practice, con-
stitutional government is not on a firm footing in Cuba. The Cuban people do not
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place so high a value on observance of the law as do Anglo-Saxons. Furthermore,
there is an influential group within Cuban political life that rejects authority and sub-
scribes to anarchism. Political bickering and graft are traditional in Cuba and con-
tinually subject to trial the constitutional life of the Republic.
Freedom of assembly, of speech, of the press, and of religion are guaranteed
by the constitution and observed for the most part by the government. Freedom of
assembly is curtailed on occasion by police regulations; but freedom of speech and of
the press are enjoyed to a degree unusual in any part of the world.
The Cuban constitution in effect rejects the doctrine of laissez faire. The
"inalienable" right of the individual to work is protected. There are also constitutional
provisions for social security, the eight-hour day, the right of workers to organize and
strike, and the prohibition of child labor. The state sponsors the organization of pro-
fessional societies, membership in which is a prerequisite to the practice of nearly all
professions; Cuban citizenship is usually a requirement for membership.
3. POLITICAL PARTIES.
Both the composition and the alignment of Cuban political parties have under-
gone constant change since the downfall of the Machado regime in 1933. Division and
recombination continue. The ease with which parties may be organized under the
electoral code, Spanish-American personalism, and the inability of the two traditional
parties to readjust to post-Machado conditions have caused the development of a multi-
party situation. At the present time, it is possible to identify six national political
parties.
a. Cuban Revolutionary Party (Autenticos).
As the major political support of the Grau (and the forthcoming Prio) ad-
ministration, the Autenticos regard a program of economic nationalism and social re-
form popularly known as Cubanidad as the embodiment of their guiding principles.
Born of the struggle to overthrow Machado, this party emerged from the revolution
as a loosely knit combination of semi-independent groups of students and workers.
Some were anarchist-terrorists who masked criminal activities by avowed allegiance to
popular, anti-Machado political and social beliefs. Others were idealists honestly seek-
ing a solution of their nation's problems. In the revolutionary period and after, a
complex of nationalistic aspirations was developed. It was during his four-month
term as provisional President after the fall of Machado that the Autentico Dr. Grau
San Martin formulated these aspirations into the program of Cubanidad. As a result,
Grau became the symbol of the new revolutionary movement and its nationalist aspira-
tions, though minor leaders maintained control over the various sectors of which it
was composed. Cubanidad, plus Grau's personality, provided enough appeal to hold
the party together and bring it to a triumph in the 1944 elections after a decade of
suppression at the hands of General Batista, and was a source of popular appeal in 1948.
Four years as the government party, however, have been more disastrous to
the Autenticos than ten years in opposition. Rivalries for personal advantage and for
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the party's presidential nomination have split the party into three main factions.
Eddy Chibas, senator and popular radio commentator, at one time Grau's spokesman,
led a personal following out of the party in 1947 and joined with a non-Autentico revo-
lutionary group to form the "Cuban People's Party." Disagreement during the Au-
Untie? national convention in 1948 precipitated the withdrawal of a third of the dele-
gates, who unsuccessfully endeavored to make a deal with various opposition groups
and finally returned to the fold after winning concessions from the Autentico leaders.
The remaining group includes within itself a tightly organized patronage coterie, the
BAGA, made up of former Minister of Education Alemdn, his protector Paulina Grau
Alsina?the Cuban "First Lady"?and her relatives and palace associates. The future
of this group under the forthcoming Prio administration is in doubt.
But whatever may be the final results of Autentico schism and recombination,
the ideals of Cu'banidad, with its stress on nationalistic legislation designed to protect
the Cuban masses and middle class from foreign competition and foreign interests,
will remain to play a lasting part in Cuban politics and, because of their popular
appeal, will no doubt be used with frequency and intensity. As the political party
in power, the Autenticos are the most influential party in Cuba. Their leader is
President-elect Carlos Prio Socarras. The party registered 793,115 votes for the 1948
elections.
b. Republican Party.
This is the personal party of Vice-President-elect Alonso Pujol and other of
his close associates who cynically trade votes for a good share of important electoral
offices. Its views on issues rather than personalities have never been formulated.
The party was founded in 1944 by a group of dissatisfied members of the older Demo-
cratic Party who preferred to join with the Autenticos and support Grau rather than
continue collaboration with Batista. They gave as the reason for their shift Batista's
coalition with the Communists. With 284,914 members registered for the 1948 elec-
tions, the Republicans are essentially a politically opportunistic group without distinct
convictions.
c. The Liberal Party.
The Liberal Party, sole survivor of the pre-Machado parties, is second only
to the Autenticos in numbers, and has a well-disciplined provincial and local organiza-
tion. Its association with Machado and its traditionally conservative and retrospective
outlook, together with its lack of a popular program that appeals to young people, cost
it membership after 1933, but it still plays an important part in affairs and seeks to
become dominant by obtaining the support of minor opposition parties and/or dis-
illusioned or disgruntled followers of Cubanidad; it has been unable to accomplish this
purpose. It stands for stability and sound business methods in government. It regis-
tered 358,881 members for the 1948 elections and is under the command of Ricardo
Nunez Portuondo, an uninspired but highly respected leader whose honesty and per-
sonal integrity are admitted even by his political enemies who consider the Liberal
Party the bulwark of conservatism in general and the sugar magnates in particular.
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d. Democratic Party.
This is a smaller political party which bases its appeal to the voters in terms
indistinguishable from those of the Liberal Party but which has refused to join with
the latter in a permanent coalition for historic reasons, despite the seeming logic of
such a decision from the standpoint of identity of platform. Saladrigas, who was
backed by Batista for the presidency in 1944, is a leading member as is vigorous young
Raid Menocal, ex-mayor of Havana and son of a former President. The 193,700
registered members represent primarily business and middle-class interests and the
political tradition of the Menocal Conservative Party?one of the two pre-Machado
political parties.
e. Cuban People's Party.
This party, still lacking adequate organization, was formed by Senator Eddy
Chibas when he bolted the Autentico Party in 1947. It originally comprised his per-
sonal following, plus several disparate groups that joined the new party for reasons
of political strategy. Chibk, despite internal differences that threatened the existence
of the new group within a few weeks of its creation, refused to compromise with dis-
sident factions and maintained his view that the People's Party should not combine
with the traditional enemies of the Autenticos but should stand for pure and uncorrup-
ted Cubanida,d and integrity of administration. His surprising success in attracting
votes in the 1948 campaign indicated that a large segment of the Cuban population
approved his position. Success at the polls has guaranteed Chibas' political future,
whether in the continuance of the People's Party or by its reincorporation with the
parent Autentico Party. The People's Party registered 165,000 voters for the 1948
election and, although double that number actually voted for Chibk, most of the ad-
ditional voters were Autenticos without permanent loyalty to the new party.
f. Popular Socialist Party (Communist).
The Communist is the smallest Cuban party in point of numbers, but its dis-
cipline, influence, and international connections make it important. The party follows
the usual practice of making propaganda in the language of economic determinism
and the class struggle on behalf of themes fashionable in Moscow. Because of large
US investments in the Cuban sugar industry, this policy commits it to noisy appre-
hension over the fate of the Cuban sugar workers who, it argues, endure a miserable
existence because of the machinations of US capitalist-imperialists. In an effort to
attract national support, the Communists also propagandize in favor of national con-
trol of foreign investments, a merchant marine, and independence for Puerto Rico.
Batista allowed the Communists to establish a legal political party in 1939 and used it
as a counterforce to the Autenticos, who were his consistent opposition after 1934.
Communist control over the major labor. federation (CTC) down to 1947 provided the
Communists with an influence in Cuban affairs beyond that which their numbers
deserved. The chief leaders of Cuban Communism?Blas Roca, Lkaro Pefla and
Juan Marinello?have held positions as representatives, senators, and even, on one
occasion, a cabinet post. The Cuban system of proportional representation and favor-
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able political alliances enabled the Communists to place a sizeable delegation in Con-
gress in 1946 (three senators, nine representatives). The registration of the Com-
munists for the 1948 elections was 158,755. Their actual vote in 1948 was, for the first
time, less than the registered number of party members, and today, as a result, the
Communists have nine representatives only, having lost their three senators and their
favorable relations with the government parties. This will necessarily reduce the
party's influence on Cuban political life.
4. OTHER INFLUENTIAL GROUPS.
The following organizations, though not primarily political, are sufficiently in-
fluential to merit attention in any survey of Cuban political life.
a. Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC).
From 1925, the year of its founding, until 1947, the Cuban workers' confed-
eration was dominated by Communists who used it for political purposes and who are
thus able to claim for themselves credit for many of the economic benefits the CTC
won for the workers. Communist control of the confederation was contested from the
moment it was organized by Autenticos who sought to use the organization for their
own political purposes. This rivalry ultimately resulted in a split early in 1947 into
Communist and Autentico factions, both of which maintain the use of the CTC name,
and claim to be the legitimate representative of the workers. The government, how-
ever, has recognized the Autentico faction as the official one and thus has given it the
advantage over its Communist rival.
The two rival CTC factions claim a total membership of over 500,000. The
component unions include such important groups as the sugar workers and long-
shoremen. The strength of the organization, combined with a sympathetic attitude
towards it by the Grau regime until the 1947 split, resulted in genuine economic gains
for many types of workers. The average Wage of sugar workers, for example, has more
than doubled since 1944. The total wages paid in private industry increased 32 per-
cent from 1946 to 1947. In general, organized labor in Cuba has been able to maintain
or improve standards of living and real wages in the face of rising prices for consumers'
goods. The success of the CTC in bringing this about has also increased its political
influence and, regardless of any ultimate decision concerning the present split in
the ranks of labor, the authority of unions organized on a national scale will continue
as one of the basic realities of Cuban economic life.
b. Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU)?University Student Federation.
This highly influential group is the semi-autonomous student government or-
ganization in Cuba and is composed of representatives from all the departments and
delegates from each academic course of the National University. It maintains close
contact with similar organizations in the secondary schools. The effective political
activity of university students in the 1933 revolt and thereafter made this organiza-
tion an important political force which, by means of demonstrations, strikes, and dis-
orders has frequently influenced government action. Its leaders, unlike those of similar
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organizations in the English-speaking world, are not only students but full-time pro-
fessional organizers and politicians who, by one device or another, have won a per-
sonal following among the highly inflammable and politically conscious student body.
The organization reflects?and to a great degree shapes?the political thinking of the
nation's future professional men whose increasing measure of control over affairs begins
while they are still in school. There are relatively few Communist students in the
University, but several of the leaders of the FEU are party members, and they have
exploited the nationalist-patriotic tendencies of the students to steer them into pro-
grams that embarrass US interests. Meetings have been inspired on behalf of Puerto
Rican independence and propaganda lines such as "Get the Americans out of Guanta-
namo", "Prevent US economic oppression of Cuba", are repeated with monotonous
frequency. These themes cannot, of course, be called exclusive Communist property,
but they are actively supported by the Communists, and the protests they produce
among the excitable student body are not without effect on Cuban official policy.
c. Socialist Revolutionary Movement (MSR).
A unique feature of Cuban political life is the Socialist Revolutionary Move-
ment, popularly known as the MSR. Although claiming five to ten thousand ad-
herents, the MSR is in reality a far smaller organization dominated by militant anarch-
ists and student gangsters who first won political influence by their participation in
the violent overthrow of the Machado regime. This group has maintained its original
organization in order to perpetuate this power. Organized extortion and strong-arm
methods are frequently employed. The MSR is now closely associated with certain
Autentico leaders and aspires to be an independent political party. It has given a
socialistic slant to parts of the original Cubaniclad doctrine and is now waging a bitter
attack on the Communists who are, they claim, a perversion of true Socialism, and the
mere agents of Russian imperialism, a development as dangerous to Cubans as US
imperialism. Former Communists and Trotskyites are active in the MSR, but the real
control remains among the old student gangsters who received their baptism of fire
in the 1933 revolution. Its most ambitious recent project was participation in the
much-publicized Dominican invasion attempt.
d. Acci6n Revoluckmaria Guiteras (ARG).
A revolutionary group, formed originally to oppose Batista, the ARG has be-
come actively anti-Communist and thus able to enlist a measure of support from
individuals who previously looked askance at it because of its terroristic activities.
Still largely composed of gangster elements, the ARG is endeavoring to infiltrate the
labor unions dominated by Communists and favors the forcible liquidation of the Com-
munist leadership of Cuba by strategic assassinations or other use of violence.
e. Other Politico-Terroristic Groups.
The "revolutionary" sanction of recent years has permitted groups of men who
in other countries would be regarded purely as brigands to carry on their illegal ac-
tivities without interference so long as they propagandize in behalf of their political
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rather than their personal criminal intent. Among these is the MSR's rival the UIR
(Insurrectionary Union), also originally a student group which vies for advantage with
the MSR by means of assassinations and machine-gunning. Ideology is but the cloak
for the desire for gain on the part of its leaders, who measure their success in terms
of either the number of political sinecures they obtain or their return from protected
rackets and extortion. Even such ostensibly plausible groups as the "Anti-Communist
League" are basically this type of organization and have on occasion imitated the
strong-arm and predatory tactics of their better-known rivals.
5. CURRENT ISSUES.
Cuba's postwar prosperity has precluded the development of serious economic
issues. Scarcities, high prices, black-market operations, a general decline in the effi-
ciency and dependability of labor, coupled with extravagant wage demands by some
unions, have been a source of controversy and partisanship, but the unparalleled in-
crease in national income has been distributed to all sectors of the population well
enough to make it possible for the effects of these conditions to be absorbed without
overwhelming difficulty. Political pressure, therefore, from dissident elements has
been slight.
Issues stated in the 1948 election campaign were superficial and ephemeral. The
rapid shift in political alignments with little reference to ideology made it impossible
for basic issues to emerge. The Autentico administration, now in power, was under
attack for its more obvious shortcomings, and intuitive popular disappointment in a
government from which so much was expected and so little accomplished, led to cynical
appraisal of all campaigners who spoke in terms of progress and reform. Because of
the lawlessness and disorder that the Grau government permitted, opposition to the
government spread from those who originally for one reason or another opposed it
to a large number of the middle and lower classes from which it once drew its greatest
support. Instead of capitalizing on these defections, however, the opposition parties
were content to conceal their lack of a stated program with oratorical bows to the
precepts of Cubanidad. Only the Liberals, since for them it would have been manifestly
absurd, sought to avoid the well-worn phrases of "progressive", "revolutionary", and
"Cuba for the Cubans." Consequently, they hoped to gain the most from votes of
protest against Cubanidad.
Several basic issues are connected with the economic and political relations that
exist between Cuba and the US and will be discussed in Chapter IV, Foreign Affairs.
Other problems implicit in the situation did not become open issues in the 1948
elections. These are:
a. The Racial Problem.
The percentage of colored population of Cuba is from 25.6 percent (Cuban
census 1943) to 50 percent, depending on the source reporting and the criteria used.
Although surface aspects of racial discrimination are much fewer than those observed
in the US, complete harmony does not exist. Colored people are endeavoring to obtain
a more equitable share of all jobs, especially governmental. Commercial and public
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racial discrimination is prohibited by law, but the whites, especially of the middle and
upper classes, employ various expedients and indirections designed to deny the blacks
equal rights. The Communist Party has endeavored, with some success, to capitalize
on the colored people's feeling of discrimination for the purpose of creating unrest.
Other parties make every effort to show complete impartiality. Although the other
parties would openly deny discrimination, the fact remains that they have never gone
so far as the Communists in advocating measures for the advancement of the colored
people. The Morua law, enacted after a negro revolt in 1912, prohibits political organi-
zation on the basis of race, so that the various social organizations for negroes, in-
cluding some founded by the Communist Party, are the main channels for the drive
of the colored people to improve their relative economic and social status.
b. Failure to Develop Rural Areas.
Neglect of the country and the provincial cities by successive national govern-
ments has created dissatisfaction among the country people, who point to heavy gov-
ernment spending in Havana and other urban areas as evidence of discrimination
against them. Although recent agitation by various provincial towns, protesting their
neglect, appears on the surface to be merely an expression of exaggerated local pride,
it is in fact indicative of the failure to plan governmental spending in relation to the real
needs of the country. All parties recognize this around election time, but poor organ-
ization makes the protests of the peasantry ineffective and the victorious party soon
forgets all about agricultural improvements, rural sanitation, farm-to-market roads,
and many other measures that would promote the prosperity and well-being of the
entire nation. The peasantry, sunk in poverty and ignorance, remains politically
impotent and consequently unable to inject its problems onto the national political
scene to the degree necessary to guarantee their solution.
6. STABILITY OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION.
The election on 1 June 1948 of the Autentico candidate Carlos Pub o Socarras and
a substantial majority of his followers to both houses of Congress will probably assure
Cuba a stable government for the next two years. The popularity of the Autentico
candidates at the polls is believed indicative of the basic strength of their present po-
sition in Cuban political life, and it is not expected that such popularity as they, now
enjoy will diminish within the next two years to a degree sufficient to permit individuals
or groups hostile to the regime to oust them from power by illegal means. In the past
it has been believed by many that General Batista is the greatest single threat to the
stability of an Autentico regime, and this may still be the case. It is doubted, however,
that even he, whatever may be his personal motives and ambitions, would endeavor to
overthrow the present government by illegal means with the popular mandate that
the Autentieos received at the polls still so fresh in people's minds. Admittedly, the
Autenticos received fewer votes than the total vote of the opposition, but no analyst
of Cuban election results can avoid the basic fact that many of the opposition votes
were in fact an endorsement of the tenets of the Autenticos even though they clearly
implied criticism of individual Autentico party leaders. General Batista has always
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been too much the opponent of the Autentico party program to derive direct benefit
from such sentiments.
In 1950, the Autenticos will be faced with a congressional election at which they
will seek popular endorsement of their conduct of Cuban affairs. At such a time Cuba
may be faced with serious economic problems resulting from a decline in the price
of sugar. If the Autenticos have failed to meet such problems boldly and if, as many
people believe, they also will have been guilty of gross dishonesty and corruption, it is
possible that they may receive a sufficient setback at the polls to endanger their control
of the executive branch of the government. For under such conditions many of the
elements now unwilling to risk the penalties of frustrated subversive action against
them may well come to feel that, either individually or by combined action, the pos-
sibilities of success are too great to forego the gambit especially since, under such con-
ditions, the AutOnticos could not count on continued army support.
Such opposition could develop from the following elements in Cuban political life:
1. The conservative forces including General Batista and his personal following
in the army.
2. The Communists.
3. Certain of the dissident extreme nationalists alienated from the Autenticos by
their corruption.
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CHAPTER II
PRESENCE OF SABOTAGE AND SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS IN CUBA
1. COMMUNIST.
Because of its wealth, size, and power, Cuban Communism (cf. Chapter I, pages
6, 7) constitutes the most significant sabotage threat in Cuba to facilities vital to the
US in case of war with the USSR. Most important of these facilities are the means of
production and shipping of sugar, the US naval base at Guantanamo and military
bases in Cuba that would be made available to the US in the event of war, and chro-
mite, nickel and manganese mines. Vital for effective operation of the foregoing are
the highways, railways, bridges, ports, and installations for the supply of fuel, water,
food, and power.
For sabotage activities in Cuba, the USSR will count on the various Cuban Com-
munist organizations now in Cuba. Besides the Communist Party (Partido Socialista
Popular) with its official registration of 158,755 members, there are the Communist-
dominated labor unions (200,000 members), as well as various "front organizations"
that support USSR-inspired or -directed activities. In July 1947 the Executive Com-
mittee of the Communist Party is reliably reported to have resolved to take action
in favor of Russia in the event of armed conflict between that country and the US.
Since, however, Communism in Cuba is a mass movement rather than an integrated
and disciplined organization of selected pro-Soviet revolutionaries, it is estimated that
the Party itself does not expect, in the event of a US-USSR conflict, complete coopera-
tion from its whole membership. Article 77 of the Communist Party statutes carefully
distinguishes between "militant" and associate or intellectual Communists. The Article
specifically defines "militant socialists" as those "who work regularly in the party, who
actively take part in the carrying out of the tasks set out by the Assemblies and Com-
mittees, which create propaganda for the party line, its ideals and program, and who
try to apply its principles in an effective manner." CIA estimates, therefore, that it
is from these "militants", rather than from associate or ideological members that
saboteurs will be recruited. There is no reliable information available at present as
to the total number of "militants" in Cuba. The figure 50,000 has been reported, but
CIA estimates that this is somewhat high. Neither is there reliable information that
describes the covert organization of the militant saboteurs and the methods used to
correlate their activities in Cuba, one with another, and with the overt Communist
organizations in Cuba.
The principal leaders of the Communist overt organizations are:
a. Juan Marinello, president of the Partido Socialista Popular?poet, intellectual,
and a presidential candidate in 1948. As member of the Cuban Senate, and, for a while,
of the Cabinet, Marinello serves as a propagandist and intellectual leader frequently
called on for lectures and speeches in other Caribbean countries.
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b. Blas Roca, Secretary General of the Partido Socialista Popular, the most im-
portant political official. He has been a member of the Cuban Congress since 1940
and is the author of a book used as a text for the indoctrination of Cuban Communists.
c. Lazar? Pena, labor union leader who dominated the Cuban labor confedera-
tion from 1935 to 1947. Peria is vice president of the Latin American Confederation
of Labor and is influential in labor circles in Cuba and in the Caribbean in general.
(See also Appendix C.)
d. Fabio Grobart, a Polish immigrant, reportedly a liaison agent between the
USSR and Cuban Communists, assigned to Cuba to organize Cuban Communists.
e. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, director of propaganda agencies and activities.
All of these men enjoy great influence and prestige, not only in Cuba, but through-
out the Caribbean and have made their party the model and guide for Communism
in many of the other Latin American republics.
Despite reports listing various residents of Cuba as covert USSR sabotage leaders,
CIA estimates that, in the events of war with the USSR and a Communist decision
to resort to sabotage, it is likely that none of the known leaders will have direct control
over this branch of Communist operation, and that the operation will take two forms:
(1) destruction of special facilities vital to the US?the sugar industry, Guantanamo,
mines of strategic or critical minerals; and (2) that made possible by control of labor
such as strikes, sit-downs, and slow-downs. The Cuban Government at present believes,
and CIA concurs in this estimate, that Soviet agents to direct or participate in the
destruction of special facilties vital to the US will filter into Cuba prior to the out-
break of hostilities while over-all plans and programs for sabotage will, for the most
part, be established by Cuban Communist leaders, in agreement with USSR directives,
prior to hostilities. The Communist-dominated Latin American Confederation of
Labor, of which Pella is vice president, has already labeled sugar?Cuba's principal ex-
port to the US?at the No. 2 strategic material which labor must strive to withhold from
the US in the event of a US-USSR conflict. But who the sabotage experts will be who
would endeavor to withhold sugar from the US in the event of war remains unknown.
Communist ability to impair industrial activity through action of the unions, in
contrast to sabotage activities designed to destroy special facilities vital to the US,
has been reduced considerably since the labor movement split into Communist and
anti-Communist factions in 1947. Communist labor leaders, however, are experienced;
and because of the economic gains they have won for labor, they still have great in-
fluence over many workers. Besides their direct control of a large number of the
labor unions, the secretary of the Communist federation has instructed the members
to infiltrate the anti-Communist unions. Their future influence over the labor move-
ment will depend on their success in this infiltration and in reuniting the labor move-
ment?at least for specific strikes or other labor objectives. Their chances of re-
uniting labor have been reduced by the electoral victory of the Autentico Party?the
party which forced the split and strengthened the anti-Communist faction with political
help.
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2. NON-COMMUNIST.
Sabotage agencies and possibilities in Cuba are not restricted to those under Com-
munist control?though only these are highly significant from a strategic standpoint.
The terroristic organizations mentioned in Chapter I, page ?, frequently resort to
sabotage to further their political, criminal or economic purposes. Since 1930 many
Cubans, as students or revolutionists, have mastered the techniques of making and
using bombs, burning canefields, or disrupting transportation. The resort to malicious
violence is a common measure by which individuals or groups attempt to attain their
ends. Few months go by in Cuba without the bombing of a store or plant or the as-
sassination of some business or political leader who has incurred the enmity of some
individual or group. Most of this is unimportant to the US while, as at present, the
majority of Cubans are sympathetic to US aims, but the propensity to violent action
and the existence of secret groups devoted to such activities increase the sabotage po-
tential in the country by providing a reservoir of experienced saboteurs and can, from
this standpoint, be dangerous to US interests.
As a protection against extensive sabotage, whether by Communists or non-Com-
munists, stands the Cuban Army, which?under its present Chief of Staff General
Perez Damera?appears able to control the situation and is increasingly aware of the
dangers involved. Although General Perez appears to be more concerned with Com-
munistic activity than with the terroristic acts of peripheral members of the party in
power, the increasing authority he has assumed (since late 1947) and the high morale
and discipline of the army are strong factors tending to contain and control the opera-
tions of the various sabotage agencies existing in Cuba. It is estimated that once Cuba
and the US are allied in a common war effort, the present Cuban Army would need very
little help from the US in controlling the sabotage efforts made in that country. It is also
estimated, however, that in spite of awareness of this danger on the part of the present
Cuban Army command the period prior to open hostilities, though somewhat less impor-
tant from a strategic standpoint, presents greater sabotage opportunities to subversive
agencies than the war period itself.
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CHAPTER III
ECONOMIC SITUATION
1. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT ECONOMIC SYSTEM.
Cuba has a highly developed money economy based primarily on the production of
raw sugar that is sold in one principal market?the US. The sugar industry gives direct
employment to about a third of the working population, and sugar and other cane
derivatives normally comprise three-fourths to four-fifths of the value of all exports.
The US since 1938 has bought from 64 percent to 92 percent of Cuba's sugar exports.
Cuba's sugar industry developed rapidly after the 1903 reciprocal treaty under which
the US granted tariff preference of 20 percent or more on all Cuban products. The
highest annual sugar production prior to 1898 (in 1894) was doubled by 1912 and
doubled again by 1920. This growth?disproportionate to that of other Cuban indus-
tries?has created the pattern of monoculture that makes the Cuban national economy
subject to the vagaries of the foreign and world sugar market and thus to conditions
largely independent of the Cuban economy itself. Awareness of the risks inherent in
this pattern of productive activity has inspired efforts in behalf of diversification
designed to reduce the relative importance of sugar in the national economy. But these
become general only when sugar is relatively cheap and the attempts to develop sec-
ondary crops die down when sugar prices are generally profitable. Sugar continues to
dominate the economy of Cuba despite the fact that Cuba has enough land to accom-
modate a wide range of other crops without detriment to the maintenance of a large
sugar industry. Whatever the outcome of these efforts, a certain amount of war-born
mining and manufacturing activity will remain and will partially cushion the shock
that will result from the world sugar glut that many believe inevitable.
A distinguishing feature of the Cuban economy is the large proportion of properties
either owned by or mortgaged to US interests. US investments increased with par-
ticular rapidity after 1903 and especially during World War I. The 1914-1920 sugar
boom stimulated extensive US purchases of sugar mills and large loans to finance
expansion of the productive plant. This boom ended in bitter depression during the
early 1920's. The resulting bankruptcies, foreclosures, forced sales, and reorganiza-
tions increased the US share of ownership of sugar-manufacturing facilities. By 1934
over 68 percent of Cuban sugar was produced in US-owned mills. Prior to 1939, this
trend alarmed Cuban nationalists and inspired consideration of protective legislation.
Nothing was actually done, however, to reduce the extent of US control of the industry.
The World War II sugar boom reversed the trend, and has permitted an increase in the
percentage of the industry owned by Cubans (from 28 percent in 1939 to 45 percent in
1946) . Should the present boom be followed by a slump comparable to that following
World War I, however, the accompanying bankruptcies and foreclosures by US mort-
gage holders would probably stop the trend toward Cuban ownership.
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Sugar will remain "king" for some time to come in Cuba despite restrictions on
imports by the major sugar-producing countries. Natural advantages plus modern
technology still enable Cuba to compete effectively in world markets. The US Sugar
Act of 1948 gives Cuba the largest quotas granted any non-US producer and Cuba now
supplies approximately 42 percent of US ordinary requirements, or about three million
tons. Although this is a severe cut from the 5.725 million tons sold the US in 1947,
the remaining portion of the 1948 bumper crop (6.7 million tons) will probably be pur-
chased with US dollars under the Economic Cooperation Administration or otherwise.
Although Cuban modern thinking agrees with the Spanish colonial tradition in
rejecting laissez faire and accepting the authority of the state as absolute in all fields,
systematic government control of the economy has been even less pronounced in Cuba
than in the US. The 1940 Cuban constitution establishes the norms for centralized
and systematic control of economic life by government. To date, however, specific
legislation has been largely limited to efforts to protect Cuban labor and capital from
foreign competition, and business operations have been relatively free of direct govern-
ment controls and taxation. Instead, the major industries?sugar, tobacco, and cof-
fee?have evolved a system of joint industry-government control boards that implement
the terms of international agreements negotiated by the government on behalf of the
producers of these commodities. In the case of sugar, a control board known as the
Cuban Institute for Stabilization of Sugar apportions production quotas among the
Cuban producers, acts as agent for global sales of Cuban production, and supervises the
fixing of wage rates in relation to sugar prices. In the case of tobacco, the board
attempts to stabilize production and farmer income by buying and storing tobacco when
foreign markets decline. The object of the coffee board is to stimulate domestic produc-
tion to meet domestic demand, importing and distributing foreign coffee only in the
amount necessary to cover deficiencies of local production.
Despite the present nature of these control boards, the acceptance by Cubans of a
legal and social philosophy that recognizes the right of the state to seize, operate, and
control the means of production whenever considered necessary for the general welfare
represents, because at any time it can be put into practice, a constant threat to US
commercial interests in Cuba and is a source of vexation in their activities. This
theory of economic statism also creates difficulties for any Cuban government that
desires to encourage development of national resources. Foreign private capital is
necessary to Cuba if its full potentialities for the production of wealth are to be realized.
And venture capital cannot be attracted without guarantees that would run counter to
existing economic policies. As a matter of practical politics, pressure organized by
proponents of Cubanidad constitutes an almost insuperable obstacle to any Cuban gov-
ernment that would seek to insure a favorable climate for foreign investment capital.
Meanwhile, Cuban capital is not sufficiently concentrated to finance major projects,
and Cuban disinclination to enter corporate businesses in Cuba in the role of minority
interests causes available Cuban capital to flow principally into local real estate or
foreign investments.
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2. PRESENT ECONOMIC SITUATION.
The present cold-war heavy demand for sugar at high prices has made Cuba very
prosperous. Total 1947 exports of all products (92 percent of which were sent to the
US) were valued at 746.5 million dollars in contrast to imports valued at 520 million
dollars. Five years of highly favorable payments balances have permitted Cuba to
accumulate gold holdings and short-term dollar assets of 831 million dollars, which, in
relation to Cuba's population of approximately five million people, is an enormous
amount.
The Cuban national debt is less than the value of gold deposits to Cuba's account in
the US and is considerably less than the governmental income for 1947. Furthermore,
the funded Cuban debt is 90 percent in Cuban hands.
Employment is high, and wage scales have advanced in terms of purchasing power
since 1939. Cuba's terms of trade with the US appear reasonably favorable, and notable
increases in Cuban wealth in nearly every category have been registered since 1941.
Individual Cubans have made substantial investments in US properties and securities.
Although US investments in Cuba amount to approximately one billion dollars, this
figure does not appear undesirably high in terms of Cuba's present capacity to trade on
favorable terms.
Despite all these favorable factors, however, a sudden and precipitous decline in
the price of sugar would soon create severe imbalance in Cuban economic life.
a. Agriculture.
Cuba does not produce its own food because of present emphasis on sugar
production. Potentialities exist for self-sufficiency except for small requirements of
certain temperate-zone bread grains. About one-third of all Cuban soil is arable, but
less than one-sixth is actually cultivated. Of this, 57 percent is devoted to sugar
culture. Principal food staple imports in 1947 were rice, wheat, lard, and beans.
Except for wheat, all could be produced in Cuba; but at present Cuba imports 85 percent
of its rice requirements, and 64 percent of its bean requirements. Even poultry and
eggs have been among recent imports from the US. Practically all lard is imported.
By necessity, and with the efforts of US and other companies, locally produced peanut
oil has replaced high-priced and highly regarded Spanish olive oil in the Cuban kitchen.
While fruit and vegetable products in wide variety supply part of the local
demand, they are usually inefficiently produced on a small scale. Winter tomatoes,
pineapples, and truck produce are exported from a few intensively developed and spe-
cialized farms. Some attempt has been made recently to export some produce in frozen
form.
The principal reasons for the lack of domestic food production are the profita-
bleness of sugar, the Cuban preference for urban life, and the system of rural land-
holding. The sugar harvest hands?the largest single agricultural labor group?
remain in the country only for the harvest, returning to urban centers for the rest of
the year. While most sugar mills encourage the growing of food crops, the effects of
this effort reach only the permanent mill staff. Tobacco and coffee growers, though
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resident in the country, tend to follow a similar one-crop system of farming and buy
their food rather than grow it themselves. Both the Batista and Grau governments
have made efforts to distribute farms to landless rural workers, but these moves have
failed because the workers were not prepared to undertake subsistence farming.
Sugar is grown in all Cuban provinces, but half the production is in the two
eastern provinces of Oriente and Camaguey, principally in the former. The 161 oper-
ating mills are large-scale enterprises, valued at from 2 to 5 million dollars each. The
average sugar central resembles a small town with adjoining houses for the permanent
staff, barracks for the hands who are there for the harvest only, independent electric
and water facilities, commissaries, and other services?in some cases, its own port?and
the mill complex with an average of 100 miles of railway trackage to the cane fields.
Less than a third of total Cuban cane is grown on company land?"administration
cane"?and the balance is cultivated by colonos?growers who sell their cane to the mill
for the equivalent of about half the sugar product. This gave the caloric's a gross return
of about $116 an acre in 1947 and company growers about $235 an acre. The Cuban
Government assures a definite share in the total production to the colortos, who thus
cannot be displaced by increases in "administration cane." In addition to permanent
staffs, both at the mill and in the independent farms, over 500,000 transient workers
go to the country for the sugar harvest, which usually takes place in the first four
months of each year. The dates for commencing and terminating the grinding of
cane are rigidly controlled by the sugar control board. Wages were tied by law on a
sliding scale to the average market price of sugar. In 1948, however, wages were kept
fixed on the basis of the 1947 price of sugar in order to prevent their falling in propor-
tion to the decline of sugar prices. Tax concessions were granted the mill owners to
compensate them for the loss caused by failure to lower the wage scale.
Sugar is grown with great ease. The same planting can produce from five to
twenty successive crops and only a little cultivation is required. With present prices,
and the fertility of the Cuban soil, it is a very profitable crop. To date income of the
colonos has been sufficient to maintain them as a rather stable rural middle class
assured of the political influence necessary for the protection of their position.
Despite the present prosperity of the Cuban sugar industry, there is resent-
ment over US determination to limit the importation of refined as opposed to raw sugar
from Cuba. Cuba would be greatly benefited, it is claimed, were it permitted to refine
the great bulk of its sugar production before export to the US. The 61 million dollars
worth of refined sugar that Cuba sold the US in 1946 is regarded as but a small portion
of what could be sold if there were not a US quota of 375,000 tons for refined sugar.
The raising and processing of Cuban tobacco, known throughout the world
because of the fame of "Havana" cigars, is a moribund industry. There has been a
downward trend in its importance in relation to sugar for some time, but the present
depressed state of the industry is due to the shortage of dollars among the European
nations where a large part of total production was formerly sold and to the sudden ter-
mination of US military purchases. Formerly about 60 percent of production was
exported, and the remainder consumed locally in the form of cigars and cigarettes.
With the large German, Dutch, and British markets now gone, the US becomes the only
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important customer for Cuban tobacco. Spain, Canada, and Switzerland buy only
small amounts. Furthermore, the cigar industry has been handicapped by the US
tariff policy which favors the importation of unmanufactured tobacco.
Faced with an inability to market the present tobacco crop, the stabilization
board decreed a ceiling on 1947-48 production and administers a fund to purchase,
store, and ultimately, it is hoped, sell excess tobacco. Future prospects are not good,
though Cuba looks hopefully to ECA as a means of enabling European nations to buy
more Cuban cigars.
Coffee is grown in Cuba, though at greater cost than in Brazil and other Latin
American countries. A protective tariff policy inaugurated in 1930 stimulated pro-
duction. Though the 1947-48 crop was one of the largest on record, increased Cuban
purchasing power caused the supply to be insufficient, and Brazilian and Dominican
coffee was imported. Importation and distribution of imported coffee are controlled
by the government to prevent competition between imported and domestic coffee.
Production for 1947 was 589,000 bags (132.276 lbs. per bag) as compared with 381,000 in
1946.
As a result of wartime scarcities, as well as the intermittent search for new
industries in Cuba, efforts have been made to grow various plants as possible sources of
fiber for cordage. Most successful to date has been henequen, to which 38,000 acres
have been planted. Production reached a peak of over 30 million lbs. in 1946, but
declined slightly in 1947. A US cooperative fiber research project has endeavored to
develop the growing of kenaf as a material for the making of sugar bags. Prospects
for commercial operation are considered good. Ramie and other plants have been tried
without much success.
Bananas and plantains, though important to the domestic food supply, are of
minor importance in Cuba's international trade. Plantations for organized export
exist in Oriente province. In 1947, 4.2 million bunches of bananas were exported, val-
ued at $2.7 million. One and three-tenths million lbs. of plantains were exported also,
valued at $26,000.
Root crops such as yuca and malanga constitute important items of the Cuban
diet but are rarely exported in any form. Yuca is also an important source of commer-
cial starch.
Peanuts have become an important field crop. Peanut oil is now used as a
substitute for olive oil, formerly imported.
Cattle-growing has always provided a large share of Cuban agricultural in-
come, though exports are insignificant. Normally, the number of livestock per capita
in Cuba is exceeded only in Australia and Argentina. Meat production, however, has
barely met domestic requirements for years, leaving scant margin for export. Higher
prices for cattle in the early years of World War II stimulated export so that the total
number of cattle in Cuba was reduced. This fact, plus the reluctance of growers to sell
at the unrealistically low ceiling prices imposed by the Cuban government, has led to
periodic meat shortages in Havana and to the importation of $2.7 million of meat
products in 1947. Cattle growers have received little technical aid or advice from their
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government. Much could be done to improve breeds, pasturage, types of food, and
methods of distribution. Dairying is also deficient and underdeveloped. These two
related fields constitute one of the most promising areas for development to stabilize
and improve the Cuban economy.
b. Mining.
Mining plays a small part in Cuban economy, and its importance as an indus-
try is derived largely from the strategic value to the US of the products exported. All
production is exported. The total value of mineral exports in 1946 was $26.2 million,
only 5.2 percent of the value of total exports in that year. Principal minerals mined in
1946 were nickel, manganese, copper, and chromite.
Most Cuban mines can be economically operated only in periods of high prices
resulting from wars or other unusual conditions. Cuba became, during World War II,
the principal Latin American producer of chromite--necessary for armor-plate produc-
tion?and was second in Latin America in the production of manganese and nickel?
also strategic metals. Nickel mines in Cuba were closed in March 1947 at the conclu-
sion of US Government purchases. Both manganese and chromite production declined
in 1947, but increases in copper production, combined with high prices, held up the total
value of mineral exports. Many other minerals?including gold, lead, light-gravity
petroleum, barite, stone, salt, and asphalt?are also extracted. Extensive iron deposits
exist in Cuba, but they are not exploited because of their low quality and divergence
from the type usually processed in the US. The primary importance of Cuban minerals
is their variety and their proximity to the US for emergency use in case of wartime
interference with normal sources of supply. For example, of US imports of minerals in
1939, the following percentages came from Cuba: manganese, 15 percent; chromite, 16
percent; and nickel, none. In 1943, the corresponding percentages were 20 percent, 25
percent, and 10 percent, respectively.
c. Mcmufacturing.
Despite increases since 1941, manufacturing in Cuba is a secondary activity,
and employs but one-eighth of the total gainfully employed labor force. Aside from
processing of the two major agricultural products?sugar and tobacco?significant
manufactures include textiles, cement, boots and shoes, beer, soft drinks, dairy products,
and canned and processed foods. Nearly all Cuban manufacture, save sugar and
tobacco products, is for domestic consumption for which it is in most cases insufficient.
War conditions stimulated manufactures, though some of the development seems des-
tined to succumb to postwar competition. Production of textiles, including both
rayon and cotton goods, provides a living for over 6,000 Cuban families. The number
of spindles-30,000?is small even by Latin American standards, but tariff protection
has been extended, and it is possible that this industry will be able to survive postwar
readjustments. Cement production from local stone increased to meet the building
industries' wartime demand but the arbitrary imposition of high taxes has handicapped
operations during the past year. Manufactures, in general, if unsupported by special
tariff protection, will have difficulty surviving postwar competition. The only type of
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manufacturing likely to continue and expand is the finishing of raw and semi-manu-
factured materials for local consumption. Cuba cannot at present compete on a price
basis in the manufacture of semi-processed goods?other than sugar and tobacco?even
for its own domestic market. Despite this fact, the extent to which Cuba in the past
has depended on imports of fully finished consumers' goods provides a wide area for the
profitable expansion of manufacturing activities.
d. Domestic Commerce.
One-tenth of all Cubans gainfully employed are occupied in the distributive
trades. Spanish-born and their first generation descendants dominate trade and they
are rivalled only by Chinese and more recent European immigrants. The Spanish
concept of retail merchandising involves small turnover, high mark-ups, and quickness
in capitalizing on goods shortages. The result is an expensive system of distribution
that lowers the real wages of the Cuban consumer. At the same time, shopkeeping
has supported and enriched most of those who comprise the substantial middle class in
Cuba who, as a result of these profits, have become the owners of most urban real
property and investors in many other enterprises. Attempts to establish US distribu-
tion techniques would not only run counter to established patterns of buying but would
be opposed by the middle class, which has great political power. Another obstacle to
any change is the fact that labor difficulties, which are not a problem to small family-
operated neighborhood stores, would have to be faced by large-scale enterprises. The
Cuban Government has given some encouragement to consumer cooperatives among
rural workers, but the idea has won no great success as yet.
e. International Trade.
As is the case with all countries that devote their major economic effort to the
production and marketing of a single commodity, foreign trade is of paramount impor-
tance to Cuba. Cuba's exports in 1947, 90 percent of the value of which were sugar
and derivative products, amounted to nearly 40 percent of the value of gross national
production. The US took 88 percent of the total Cuban sugar production and the sugar
industry provided a living for over one-third of those gainfully employed in Cuba. It
is thus clear that foreign trade in general, and sugar sales to the US in particular, con-
stitute the most important single factor in Cuba's economic life. As a corollary of this
situation, any debate in the US Congress and any consideration given by the Executive
Branch of the US Government to the position of Cuban sugar in the US market is fol-
lowed in the greatest detail by the Cuban Government and its citizens, whose welfare is
dependent in such large part on decisions which the US makes regarding its imports of
Cuban sugar.
The US Sugar Act of 1948 is the latest in a series of attempts during the last 30
years both by the Cuban and US governments to control and stabilize non-US and US
sugar markets. After World War I, sugar-consuming countries imposed restrictions
on imports, and, as a result, Cuba's war-expanded sugar industry could not dispose of
its total production. In an effort to solve the problem of the then-existing sugar glut,
the Cuban Government first placed limits on its production of sugar and later adjusted
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this production quota to (a) the amount of sugar it could sell in the US plus (b) the
amount of sugar it could market in other countries in accordance with international
agreements. Three international sugar arrangements were tried with varying success
between 1928 and 1942, the last being the 1937 International Sugar Agreement. Mean-
while Cuba's position in the US market was improved by lower tariffs and favorable
quota treatment. World War II caused the suspension of all previous sugar quota
arrangements, and Cuba agreed to sell to the US its entire crop. This arrangement was
repeated during six years (1942-47) ; production restrictions were removed, and the
total crop reached an all-time high.
By the 1948 Sugar Act the US prewar quota system was reimposed on Cuban
sugar. US producers?continental and non-continental?as well as the Philippines
were given tonnage quotas greater than their previously demonstrated capacity to pro-
duce. At the same time, Cuba was given a quota of 28.6 percent of estimated US con-
sumption, plus a share of the amount by which other areas may fail to meet their quotas.
In effect, Cuba was given permission to market larger amounts of sugar in the US if
US consumption estimates should be adjusted upward or if, as appeared likely, other
producers should not fill their quotas. Cuba's 1948 share of the US domestic market
amounts to 2.8 million tons as compared to 5.7 million tons it sold the US in 1947.
While a drastic readjustment might have been involved, Cuba has been able to place a
total of 5.6 million tons this year by virtue of sales to the US Government for use in
Europe (1.3 million tons) and direct sales to other nations (1.5 million tons) . Cuban
production in 1948, however, was greater than in 1947 so that an unsold surplus will be
carried over to 1949. Although ECA plans call for continued heavy sugar purchases
from the Western Hemisphere, Cuba's task of selling future crops may become increas-
ingly difficult unless new limitations of production are placed in effect.
(A detailed statistical study of Cuba's foreign trade and Cuba's sugar sales to
the US which constitute so important a factor in over-all Cuban economic relations will
be found in Appendix D.)
1. Transportation.
Transportation within Cuba is provided by air, railway, and highways. The
8,700 miles of Cuban railways include both common carriers and lines maintained by
sugar centrales to provide connections with ports. The largest of 22 public-service rail-
ways is the British-owned United Railways, which is in poor financial and physical
state. (It lost nearly six million dollars in 1946.) The other railways are owned by
Cuban and US capitalists. Five of the nine largest railways showed losses for the latest
fiscal year reported. Bus and truck lines, making use of the central highway system,
transport an increasing share of passengers and freight, though most of the sugar still
moves to port by rail. An increase in rail rates was allowed in March 1947 to apply to
passengers and certain categories of freight. Results have not been reported yet, but
standards of service and equipment on most railways in Cuba are so poor as to require
more extensive changes than even the higher rates will permit. Expansion of highway
construction by the state, already initiated by the government, seems the only practical
solution at present to Cuba's problem of inadequate internal transportation facilities.
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Cuba has, by Latin American standards, a large number of automotive units,
and development of travel and transport by motor has been notable in the last decade.
Urban public transportation in Havana?both streetcar and bus?has deteriorated
since 1941.
g. Public Utilities.
The principal electric and telephone services in Cuba are supplied by US-owned
companies. Public utilities have been made a political issue by the nationalists who
seek to make political capital out of the rates, high as compared with those of the US,
and the indifferent services. One of President Grau's first acts as provisional Presi-
dent in 1933 was to force a cut in electric and telephone rates. At present a campaign
is being waged in the press and courts against the US-owned power company. Rates
are, indeed, much higher than those of most US cities, but the cost of higher production
and the unstabilized "peak" loads may justify the difference in rates. There is, how-
ever, a strong undercurrent of hostility to the electric company that will become even
more significant in a period of economic stringency. US investments in Cuban public
utilities and railways total more than 300 million dollars.
Inadequacy of municipally owned water and sewage plants is a perennial
public scandal in Cuba, and President Grau's reported refusal to allow foreign capital
to be used in improving the Havana water system was followed by the suicide of the last-
elected mayor, who had been publicly jeered because of his failure to provide a new
water system.
Domestic telegraph service is a state monopoly under the Department of
Communications, with low levels of service, but rates less than those charged in the US.
h. Public Finance.
Government finances have been so managed that a modest surplus has been
shown at the end of each of the past several years. Revenues in 1947 were $303,544,127,
an increase of 25 percent over 1946. An additional $4,500,000 in proceeds of the national
lottery was deposited in pension fund accounts or given to charity. While official
figures are not yet published, expenditures in 1947 were about 290 million dollars. Two
hundred million dollars constituted funds drawn from the regular budget. Because
the Cuban Congress has failed to enact a new budget since 1938, that budget has been
extended annually as the "regular" budget, and additional revenue, depending on
availability of funds, goes into an "extraordinary" budget established and expendable
by executive decree. Main sources of revenue are excise and land taxes, 19 percent;
customs revenues, 16 percent; gross sales tax, 15 percent; and lottery profits, 14 percent.
Principal items of expenditure are education and national defense. In spite of the fact
that President Grau promised a budget before taking office, none was approved during
his incumbency, and public spending, though on a vast scale, has remained unplanned
and without legislative approval.
The Cuban public debt, as of 31 December 1947, consisted of outstanding bonds
in the amount of $91,551,220; $12 million owed to the US Export-Import Bank, and a
50 to 90 million dollar "floating loan" (non-funded obligations contracted by previous
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administrations). The funded debt is 90 percent held by Cuban owners and is subject
to amortization in accordance with statutory requirements. The Cuban peso is pegged
to the US dollar at one for one. Currency is 98 percent covered by gold bullion and US
dollars, exchanging freely at par for US currency within the country. No Cuban paper
money was issued until 1935; as a result, the amount of US currency in circulation in
Cuba usually exceeds that of Cuban currency, as many prefer US currency for saving
and hoarding.
3. ECONOMIC STABILITY.
Cuba's present cash and credit position is sufficiently sound to withstand, for at
least a year, a fairly severe decline in sugar sales and prices. Were a decline in the price
of sugar to be extended beyond that time, however, severe economic distress would
result, especially if, as is likely, a decline in the price that Cuba pays for its imports
should lag behind sugar prices. This would immediately affect Cuba's terms of trade
adversely, and cause a decline in the real income of a substantial majority of Cuban
people.
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CHAPTER IV
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT FOREIGN POLICIES.
Cuba's foreign policy is essentially a compromise between its desire to obtain maxi-
mum benefits from its special relationship to the US and the increasing desire of the
Cuban people for international prestige and a freer exercise of sovereignty than the
nature of their dependence on the US permits.
Under the Platt Amendment the US prevented Cuba from signing treaties with
foreign powers which might impair Cuban independence and from incurring excessive
debts. These restrictions, plus the grant to the US of a permanent lease for a naval
base and the basic economic relationships established between Cuba and the US, made
Cuba a quasi-protectorate of the US. Cuban public opinion originally accepted this
situation for the sake of the benefits it conferred.
Dissatisfaction with what the Cuban regarded as their "semi-colonial" status grew
slowly and did not become a positive political force until 1920. This discontent, particu-
? larly acute during the post-World War I slump, tended to be forgotten when President
Machado's US-financed public works program alleviated existing economic distress.
The world-wide economic crisis of 1929 and the resulting cessation of US loans to
Cuba, however, reawakened the latent dissatisfaction which was in turn aggravated
by the repressive practices of the Machado regime. There was thus generated among
the Cuban people widespread and bitter hostility, not only to the regime itself, but also
to the ties that, in their opinion, made Cuba so dependent on the US that a change in
the latter's tariff policy could plunge Cuba into poverty and suffering. Thus to many
Cubans the revolution against Machado in 1933 was not only designed to put an end to
a tyrannical domestic regime, but also to terminate Cuba's economic and political sub-
servience to the US of which Machado was regarded as the principal symbol. The
abrogation of the hated Platt Amendment in 1934 represented to the successful Cuban
nationalists a substantial, but only partial, attainment of objectives.
Consequently Cuban nationalists have not been content with this important gain
but continue to exploit every opportunity at international and inter-American con-
ferences to make patent Cuba's sovereignty and to try to win for Cuba enhanced inter-
national prestige by initiating independent, and sometimes anti-US moves. Majority
opinion in Cuba, however, opposes this conduct whenever it threatens US relations from
which Cuba derives so many obvious economic benefits such as favorable tariff and
quota treatment. The resulting conflict of interests has thus turned Cuba toward
nationalistic domestic regulations as a device by which to demonstrate complete
sovereignty.
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2. OPERATION OF PRESENT FOREIGN POLICY.
Despite the anti-US aspects of Cuban policy mentioned above, Cuba would align
itself solidly with the US in case of war with any possible group of states led by the
USSR. It will also support the US position in any serious situation short of war. This
attitude is determined by Cuba's basic economic interests, its location, and the convic-
tions of the vast majority of its people. The Communist minority cannot maneuver
pro-Cuban nationalists, who in foreign policy are its logical allies, into a position where
they would support the USSR against the US, though there are many intermediate.
positions where anti-US policies would be acceptable as "the legitimate defense of Cuban
interests."
Cuba, next to the special US economic ties which make possible its prosperity, is
most interested in developing bi-lateral and multi-lateral relations with other American
states. It is one of the leaders in the inter-American movement because it thus gains
a measure of international prestige and develops a counterbalance to complete depend-
ence on the US. The United Nations has had little practical effect on Cuba but serves
as a useful forum before which to ventilate Cuban protestations of equality and inde-
pendence vis-a-vis the US. Cuba is certain to remain an active participant in the UN;
but it will continue to rely for its security upon the armed forces of the US.
Spain, because of the traditional and cultural ties of Hispanidad, is the only nation
that could become a strong competitor with the US and other American states for
Cuba's sympathy. Close ties are, however, at present impossible because of the con-
tempt which most Cubans have for the FranCo regime. Spanish Republican intellec-
tuals who are refugees in Cuba maintain the prestige of Spanish culture although, at
the same time, they reinforce the sentiment against Franco and dictators in general.
The appeal of Franco-led His panidad is thus limited to a minority composed of the
wealthy and the ultra-montane. This group, although anti-US during World War II,
now favors the US because of its present attitude toward the USSR.
Cuba's opposition to "dictators" also influences its position within Caribbean
balance-of-power alignments. Both the present Cuban Government and a majority of
public opinion are opposed to the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic. Though
less interested in Central America, Cubans also oppose Somoza of Nicaragua and Carias
of Honduras. Their sympathies, less strong than their antipathies, are with the present
governments of Venezuela, Guatemala, and Haiti. In the event that the present divi-
sion within the Caribbean area continues, Cubans can be expected to maintain their
hostile attitude toward the present governments of the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua,
and Honduras and to support jointly with Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Guatemala con-
spiratorial and propaganda activities designed to overthrow the "dictatorships" and
embarrass their leaders. To date no formal alliances or agreements have been made to
implement this policy which will probably be continued on the basis of informal under-
standings among the leaders of the "democracies."
Cuban aversion to "dictators" also makes it difficult for Argentina to gain converts
in Cuba to its "third position," though Cuban anti-US ultra-nationalistic sectors would
otherwise be attracted to such an idea. To the highly individualistic and emotional
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Cuban, absolute rule by a majority represents a tyranny equally as repugnant as that
of a repressive government by an organized minority. Cuba's own experience as a
Spanish colony, exploited, taxed, and persecuted at the hands of a corrupt metropolitan
power, has been the major factor in determining its attitude toward European posses-
sions within the Western Hemisphere. It opposes the continuance of European sov-
ereignty over such areas. There is also much sentiment in Cuba for political inde-
pendence for Puerto Rico. As a consequence, Communist propaganda in behalf of
Puerto Rico independence, no matter how inaccurate, is effective in creating anti-US
sentiment among the ebullient Cuban youth.
Recently, Cuba has evolved a "doctrine" for international relations which seems to
satisfy both aspects of its foreign policy?a demand for favorable treatment in the US
market, and a desire for an international reputation for leadership and independence.
The US Sugar Act of 1948 provided that the US could withhold or withdraw increases in
sugar quotas, as provided in that act compared with the 1937 Sugar Act, from "any
nation that denies free and equitable treatment to the nationals of the US, its com-
merce, navigation or industry." Guillermo Belt, Cuba's Ambassador at Washington,
charged that this represented "economic aggression" and proceeded to campaign at
subsequent international conferences in favor of an agreement that would prohibit such
"aggression." As a result of his efforts, a variant of this so-called "Grau Doctrine" was
adopted as Article 16, Chapter III of the new Charter of the Organization of the Ameri-
can States. It provides that "no state may use or encourage the use of enforcement
measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of
another state and obtain from it ad,vantages of any kind." This appears to have been
primarily an attempt to circumscribe the US in its use, for political ends, of the economic
power it derives from its dominant position in the Cuban economy. It is also signifi-
cant as a projection of the aims of the Cuban ultranationalist groups into inter-
American and international affairs, and as an indication of the type of maneuver that
is to be expected in the event that Cuban-US economic relations become less favorable
to Cuba than they are at present.
Cuba's foreign policy is in such delicate balance between nationalism and depend-
ence on the US that it lacks both stability and consistency and is peculiarly subject to
changes in international conditions and Cuban public opinion. Reduced economic
activity and difficulty in economic relations with the US stimulate nationalism since, to
Cuban public opinion, the immediate gains to be derived from ultranationalistic moves
rather than the long-term gains derived from economic cooperation with the US, seem
the greater when trade relations with the US decline in value or become unfavorable to
Cuba. Furthermore, control of the government by the political parties partial to
nationalism rather than cooperation can swing Cuban foreign policy toward a nation-
alist viewpoint even when economic conditions are favorable to cooperation.
Cuban-US relations are so close that the task of maintaining US interests in Cuba
can be made more difficult and complicated if Cuba merely fails to cooperate willingly
and wholeheartedly. Though Cuba is not likely, within the near future, to adopt
foreign policies seriously adverse to major US interests, the degree of cooperation could
decrease rapidly if a radically nationalistic government came to power in Cuba or if
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US-Cuban economic relations declined in value and advantage to Cuba. In such a case
the cost of maintaining US interests in Cuba would increase proportionately. For
example, lessened demand for Cuban sugar in the US market, with consequent depres-
sion in Cuba, will stimulate nationalistic agitation to expropriate foreign-owned proper-
ties and will cause onerous controls to be imposed on foreign economic activity.
The most extreme and unfavorable turn Cuban policies could take, from the stand-
point of US interests, would be to oppose continuance of the naval base at Guantanamo
or to refuse additional bases in case of an emergency. Both Communists and ultra-
nationalists advocate the termination of the base lease. As early as 1935 the US Foreign
Policy Association took account of Cuban popular sentiment to this effect and suggested
that the US give up Guantanamo. Though events since that date have convinced both
Americans and the majority of Cubans of the necessity for the base, as well as other
bases in time of war, anti-US forces in Cuba seize on the theme of lease-cancellation
as a means of embarrassing the US. Any rise in anti-US feeling, however produced,
may be reflected in greater efforts to force the removal of the US base from Cuban soil.
It is estimated, however, that in the foreseeable future, anti-US feeling in Cuba will not
increase to the point of depriving the US of these necessary privileges, though it could
reach the point where it would become necessary for the US to grant Cuba concessions
of one type or another in exchange for Cuba's continued cooperation in this respect.
This would especially be true in a period prior to a war in which the US would be
engaged, rather than during hostilities themselves.
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CHAPTER V
MILITARY SITUATION
1. GENESIS OF PRESENT MILITARY POLICIES.
Cuba's armed forces have never served away from home. Their proudest military
traditions derive from their bloody guerrilla-type struggle for independence from Spain
between 1868 and 1898 and the subsequent early days of the republic during which
the claim of military leaders to political power was confirmed. Although Cuba
promptly followed the US lead in entering both World Wars, its military action was
largely confined to cooperation with US forces in anti-submarine patrol of the Cuban
coasts and adjacent waters.
The Cuban Army, though now large and well trained by Latin American standards,
was organized by its founders for the purpose of maintaining domestic law and order
and serving as a final arbiter in matters of major political importance. Its efficacy
for these uses only was emphasized during World War II when General Batista, elevated
to the presidency solely through his army connections, frankly stated that the Cuban
Army was unable to repel any but the most mediocre of invasion forces. Recent Carib-
bean tension has forced Cuba for the first time to consider its armed strength in
relation to its Latin neighbors. There is no evidence, however, that this has become
a serious strategic consideration. The Cuban armed forces are primarily designed to
meet the specific needs of an island republic close to the protection of a friendly major
power ? the US ? but subject to an endemically difficult domestic political situation.
Any attempts, therefore, to establish a completely professional Cuban Army, Navy, or
Air Force divorced from domestic political decisions is contrary to Cuban traditions and
is therefore unlikely as a permanent achievement.
As an armed force, the value of the Cuban establishment cannot be judged from
the standpoint of its ability to wage an aggressive war. The appropriate standards are
those of a Latin American island republic and from that point of view the question is,
can it, on the basis of existing training, organization, and equipment, and through its
control over all arms and weapons, maintain law and order in normal conditions, and
"protect the established Government" in times of stress. The military estimate in the
following paragraphs is made from this standpoint:
2. STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF THE ARMED FORCES.
As of 1 July 1948, the Cuban Armed Forces ? Army, Navy, and National
Police ? had an estimated strength of 27,181 officers and men. Air forces, connected
with the army and navy, are included in this figure. The separate services are as
follows:
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a. Army.
The ground forces of the Cuban Army include 1,392 officers and 14,200 enlisted
men ? a total of 15,592 personnel. There are one infantry regiment, one artillery regi-
ment, and seven "rural guard" cavalry regiments. The first two regiments are known
in Cuba as the "regular army" and are stationed in Havana together with the General
Staff and the specialized services ? constituting together 26 percent of the army ground
forces. These units, stationed as they are in the center of the Cuban political power,
constitute the nexus between the military and the civilian establishment and exert a
pervasive influence over the civilian political scene. The seven "rural guard" regiments
are stationed in small detachments throughout the interior of the Republic where they
perform the functions of rural police. Only in Santiago, Cuba's second city, is there any
large unit of the "rural guard" in one garrison.
The Havana-stationed "regular army" is considered to be good, the "rural
guard" regiments inferior. The quality and training of Cuban Army personnel in
general are adequate. Equipment and armament are obsolescent and insufficient for
purposes of combat againts a US or European army of comparable size, but are adequate
for the police and political functions of the Cuban Army. Maintenance of equipment
and training in its use are sufficient. Present armament includes 20 light tanks (12
M3A1) , 23 Schneider 75's (1909 Model) , 5 88-mm. anti-aircraft guns, 6 antiquated field
guns, and 4 15-cm. Ordoflez Coast Defense guns. Infantrymen and rural guards are
normally equipped with Springfield rifles and/or Colt automatics of which there is an
ample supply. Artillery and special service units are also equipped with Colts.
In spite of the traditional political pattern of the Cuban Army, the present
Chief of Staff has endeavored to make the army a non-political force and has empha-
sized law enforcement functions. In line with this policy, a large proportion of the
officers have received US training, and a genuine attempt has been made to instill
professional pride throughout the army. Graft has been reduced. It is estimated,
however, that these disciplinary achievements are temporary. The army's political
potential is so high that despite several years of reform, the army will undoubtedly be
drawn into politics. President-elect Prio is already reported to be looking about for a
new Chief of Staff who can the better assure him of army support.
Cuban army officers and enlisted men are drawn primarily from the rural
regions of Cuba where the peasants consider the army a career more promising than
any they could expect at home. Though one-year enlistments are legally possible,
most enlistments are for longer periods, and there is a high proportion of re-enlistment.
As a result, a majority of the army are veterans with 5 to 20 years service. Most of the
officers are former enlisted men who obtained their present rank as a result of the
reorganization of the army that stemmed from the 1933 revolution. Both officers and
men, consequently, come from the same general social stratum. In contrast to other
Latin American republics, in Cuba few of the upper classes now elect army careers.
Since the total army strength has been reduced since 1943, the year of peak war
strength, the present army ? except for officers named by the Grau regime and replace-
ments in the ranks ? is substantially the army General Batista turned over to his
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successor in the presidency. Places in the regular army are so eagerly sought that there
is rather rigorous selection, and new recruits are far superior physically and educa-
? tionally to existing personnel.
Training for recruits, as well as for non-commissioned officers and officer
candidates, is given at an army school established at Managua, Havana Province.
This school?apparently well-equipped and well-managed?has a present enrollment
of 76 cadets and over 500 in the other categories. The officer in command, a deserter
from the US Army during World War II, is proving to be an excellent commandant.
Many Cuban officers have taken advantage, at one time or another, of courses in US
Army service schools, and the effect of this training in improved efficiency is noticeable
throughout the Cuban Army.
The air corps of the Cuban Army is relatively less efficient and useful than the
ground forces, though improvement has been noted in the past two years. The air
forces have not, as yet, established the character of the service they may render, in
relation to the ground forces or to the republic at large. They have the double problem
of training personnel and fitting the corps' functions into those regarded as the normal
functions of the ground forces. The present air forces have 446 officers and men
organized into three squadrons (fighter, bomber, and maintenance) . There is a total
of 72 aircraft of which all but 25 can be classified as training and liaison planes with
little tactical significance by US standards. The 25 include 5 B-25's, 6 P-38's, 1 B-24,
and several B-34's and transport planes. Since the proper role of the air corps in the
Cuban scene has not been determined, the relative value to Cuba of different types of
? planes cannot be estimated. Although a proposed US Air Mission will aid greatly in
technical proficiency, neither it nor any foreign air mission can be expected to solve for
Cuba the fundamental problem of what an air corps can do for a country where the
military establishment is used primarily for political and police purposes.
?
b. The National Police.
The national police with a total strength of 7,231 men is second in importance
only to the army with which it is closely associated. The commander of the national
police must be selected by the President from among the senior officers of the army
and occupies, by virtue of his position, a sub-cabinet post. A large proportion of the
personnel are former soldiers. The organization is military in character and is divided
into seven divisions, of which the most important is stationed in the city of Havana.
This division is split into 14 units, each with separate motorized equipment. The other
divisions are stationed in the smaller cities of the interior where their work is supple-
mented by that of local municipal police who have only subordinate authority. The
national police, through their commander, is subject only to the orders of the President
of the Republic.
The national police now includes gangsters, who in the guise of sincere revolu-
tionaries primarily fought the repressive police of Machado and Batista, and use their
present position under the Autenticos to extend immunity or actual protection to male-
factors of all kinds. Recent shooting frays in Havana reveal that gangster rivalries
have thus penetrated the national police, and its members, because of their intimate
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personal connections with rival gangs, have factionalized the force to the point where
its groups are prepared, on occasion, to engage in bloody combat with one another.
Following a particularly spectacular battle in a residential suburb of Havana,
a new commander of the police was appointed who, it was hoped, would put an end to
the lawless activities of the police. The hoped-for reforms have not been accomplished,
so that the police does not honestly perform its prescribed function of enforcing the
laws of the Repubilc. Despite these faults, however, the national police would, in
time of national emergency, make a definite contribution toward defending the Republic
itself.
c. The Navy.
Cuba maintains a navy principally because it feels that one is necessary to its
national prestige. The navy is seldom used for any practical purpose, and Cuba does
not regard its presence as a necessary protection against naval attack by any of its
neighbors. There are 41 vessels, including 7 gunboats, 13 modern submarine chasers,
and 14 vessels acquired from the US during 1947 (3 PF's, frigates; 2 ATR's, ocean tugs,
rescue; 5SC's, subchasers 110'; 2 PCE's, patrol vessel escort 183'; and 2 PT's, motor
torpedo boats). The operating condition of all units ? except those recently obtained
from the US?is uniformly low, and most vessels spend months and even years
anchored in one place. The terminated US Naval Mission (21 September 1946) accom-
plished little during its tour of duty in Cuba. The mission was utilized principally by
the Cuban Navy as a means of acquiring vessels and equipment during the war period,
and when the submarine menace declined, the Cuban Navy resumed its accustomed
indifference toward progress and improvement. The 3,755 naval personnel, under the
command of a Commodore, the highest officer in the Cuban Navy, are subject to political
influences similar to those that corrupt the police force. Though greatly inferior in
numbers and importance to the army, the navy is not directly controlled by the army
and at times pursues an independent course. Since the Cuban Navy does not serve any
well-defined peacetime purpose and since its wartime role is indefinite, it would appear
to be difficult to establish proper discipline and efficiency. Cooperation with the US
forces on submarine patrol during World War II and anti-submarine training received
at Miami by some of the personnel were excellent morale builders for which there is
no corresponding peacetime activity.
The Navy Air Arm, consisting of 19 planes and 144 men, is considered to be
"largely inoperative" at the present time, and is inferior in every respect to the army
air forces.
3. WAR POTENTIAL.
a. Manpower.
The present armed forces of Cuba constitute 1.5 percent of the total population.
It is estimated that Cuba could mobilize 30,000 additional men within 180 days of the
beginning of mobilization. An Emergency Military Serivce recruitment system is in
effect for which all males register in the month of August following their twentieth
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birthday, thereby entering military. Class One (ages 20 to 24) , subject to conscription.
No conscripts are being added to the army at this time though there are plans to select
6,000 from the 16,000 who registered in the fall of 1947 and give them six months'
training. Army reserves consist of those who have completed emergency military train-
ing and who are still in Class One by reason of age (20 to 24) . The laws provide that
Classes Two (ages 25 to 34) and Three (ages 35 to 50) also constitute reserves, though
no conscription has been applied to these classes. The full quotas needed by present
training plans are met by those in Class One who volunteer for service. No training
is now given the various reserve classes. In view of the relatively favorable career
offered by the Cuban Army, there is no difficulty in filling present quotas with satis-
factory volunteers. For this reason, the present Cuban Army is considered above the
Latin American average in regard to physical condition and education.
b. Natural Resources, Finance, Industry, and Science.
From the standpoint of natural resources, it is improbable that Cuba could
maintain its own defense forces even if it decided to make the attempt. Although its
budgetary position would probably permit large-scale acquisition elsewhere, its industry
could not, within the foreseeable future, supply the necessary weapons and equipment.
Similarly, the level of both scientific research and production are such that no signifi-
cant war service in this respect could be rendered by Cuba.
4. MILITARY INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES.
As an armed force, the Cuban military establishment is capable of making a con-
tribution in any struggle in which Cuba finds itself allied with the US against the USSR.
There is no evidence of extensive Communist infiltration in the army, the national
police, or the navy. Such limited infiltration as has occurred is under the close scrutiny
of the military chiefs who can be counted upon to suppress it with vigor immediately
upon the outbreak of hostilities. Consequently, the military establishment can be
expected to serve as (1) an effective device to prevent such Communists as are at present
in Cuba from obtaining control of the government and (2) as an adequate police force
to assure ultimate production and delivery to Cuban ports of such strategic and critical
materials as Cuba is capable of supplying. It could not, however, prevent temporary
dislocations of production and delivery. In a period prior to the outbreak of hostilities,
the military establishment can be counted on to give maximum support to any program
which the government might adopt for the surveillance or suppression of Communist
activities, although it would not, so long as the Communists enjoy the benefits of Cuba's
democratic tradition, independently attempt to suppress the Communists.
The political influence of the Cuban military establishment on the government has
for the present been reduced. It is axiomatic, however, that it will again become a
determining factor in a period of stress. At such a time, tendencies toward division
within the army into pro-Batista and pro-Autentico factions would not, it is estimated,
be sufficient to neutralize the army as a political force. On the contrary, in a time
of stress, one of the two factions would emerge ascendant and would, by open espousal
of particular issues, win for itself sufficient support from the Cuban civilian population
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to enable it to take control of the government. Such a situation, it is estimated, could
evolve from disputes over domestic rather than foreign issues. No matter which army
faction came to power, it would probably not be anti-US but more favorable to the US
point of view than the present majority of Cuban civilian politicians. At present the
Autentico faction, backed as it is by the high command of both the civilian and military
establishments, is in the ascendancy. It can be expected to maintain its position for
another two years when a new election, changed economic conditions, and the results of
General Batista's present political maneuvers in Cuba may bring about a shift in rela-
tive positions.
Although the functions of the Cuban military establishment are now limited to the
maintenance of law and order in normal times and the "protection" of the government
in times of stress, other contributions would be possible during a joint war with the US
against the USSR. With the appropriate US direction and equipment, the military
establishment could be counted upon to assist in the aerial and surface patrol of Carib-
bean waters and could dispatch to Europe or Asia a small land and/or air expeditionary
force, as well as garrison units. The combat abilities of such expeditionary forces as
Cuba might contribute, would be strictly limited. They would, however, serve as an
important morale factor within Cuba and would indicate Hemisphere solidarity and
inter-American unity of action against the designs of a non-American power.
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CHAPTER VI
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY
Because of the role of Cuba in the defense of the Panama Canal, in the protection
and patrol of US lines of communication, and as a source of strategic materials, Cuba
and thus Cuban foreign policy are of importance to the US.
In general, Cuba's constitutional democratic system of government, its Western
cultural orientation, and its well-defined political and economic ties to the US render
very unlikely any Cuban political development unfavorable to US security.
Specifically, there are, however, two elements at work in the political life of Cuba
that could conceivably impede the ability of the US to meet its strategic requirements
by (a) making of Cuba a base of operations for Communist groups which the Cuban
government could not control, and (b) causing Cuba to deny-in a period preparatory to
conflict between the US and the USSR, air bases and expanded naval facilities deemed
necessary by the US. These two elements are the Popular Socialist Party and anti-US
nationalists. In this connection, the relevant problems are whether either of them,
acting independently or together, could (a) lessen the Cuban government's degree of
cooperation with the US and impede its capacity to associate with it, in support of the
US, a substantial majority of the Cuban people, and (b) reduce Cuba's ability to main-
tain public order.
The Popular Socialist Party ? the Communist Party of Cuba is inimical to US
strategic interests in the area. Although, at present, it does not have sufficient strength
at the polls to capture control of any branch of the government, Cuba's republican form
of government and multi-party system, in combination with Cuban traditions of purely
fortuitous and expedient political alliances and "deals" are such as to afford the Com-
munist Party an opportunity to influence Cuban policy to a degree beyond that which
its numbers or its popularity at the polls might warrant. Furthermore, much of the
Communist propaganda in Cuba is presented in terms of nationalism and consistently
attributes Cuba's misfortunes to its subservience to US commercial and political in-
terests. The appeal of propaganda of this nature is not confined to those in Cuba who
are communistically inclined, but also to the anti-US nationalists who, no matter how
strongly they may reject the philosophy of economic determinism and the class struggle,
find, on individual issues at least, that they are on common ground with the anti-US
Communists. For this reason there is, in Cuba, always the peacetime possibility of the
combination of these two political forces for reasons of expediency. The existence of
such a possibility thus enhances the Communists' opportunity to lessen US-Cuban
cooperation and Cuba's support of US foreign policy. Accordingly, a substantial in-
crease in the number of adherents of the Communist Party, even if less than that neces-
sary to afford the party a majority at the polls, could jeopardize US interests by imped-
ing the ability of the Cuban government to associate with it, in support of the US, a
majority of the people.
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(From the standpoint of the ability of the Cuban government to control the revolu-
tionary aspects of Communism, see Chapter II, Presence of Sabotage and Subversive
Elements in Cuba.)
Anti-US nationalists?particularly numerous among the adherents of Cubani-
dad?favor ambitious schemes to reduce Cuba's economic dependence on the US.
Because of the peculiarly close economic ties between the two countries, they pose
many vexatious problems for US-Cuban relations. Since there is general confusion in
the minds of Cubans as to the difference between US commercial and strategic interests
in Cuba, the anti-US nationalists thus interrelate the two to a degree beyond that which
the reality of the situation deserves. The expediency of terminating US ownership
of a utility company, for example, despite all logic, becomes involved in general dis-
cussion of the expediency of terminating all US special interests in Cuba. Although
it is most unlikely that, in the event of an armed conflict between the US and the
USSR, the nationalists would oppose the US, it is a fact that they have in the present
period prevented cooperation from running relatively smoothly and have demonstrated
their ability to impair US-Cuban relations by a series of acts or group of circumstances
each unimportant in themselves. And in a period preparatory to a US-USSR conflict,
the gravity of which would escape anti-US Cuban nationalists who would remain pre-
occupied with the superpatriotic precepts of Cubanidad, the anti-US nationalists, acting
alone or even in combination with the Communists, might cause Cuba to deny addi-
tional military installations to the US.
Cuba's principal contribution to the US is cheap sugar. Advanced technology, in
combination with natural advantages, has made of Cuba the greatest single sugar
producer in the world and the only country capable of meeting US wartime require-
ments. Cuba is also capable of supplying the US with important quantities of nickel,
manganese, copper, and chromite. Other minerals, including gold, lead, light-gravity
petroleum, asphalt, salt, barite, stone, and iron ore, are present in Cuba and available
for emergency use. A limiting factor in their utility to the US, however, is relatively
low quality and, in the case of iron ore, divergency from the type usually processed in
the US.
At present Cuba has a joint industry-government system of control over sugar
production. This system enables the US ? in the event of an emergency ? to nego-
tiate and regulate the flow of sugar to the US with greater facility than would be the
case if it were necessary to deal with a multiplicity of nonintegrated, individual pro-
ducers. For this reason, it is estimated that US security interests would not be
jeopardized even if Cuba acted to increase state control of its economic life as is possible
under the provisions of its present constitution which expressly rejects the principles of
laissez faire.
The Cuban armed forces, including the national police, are at present capable of
keeping under observation, and containing during a US-USSR shooting war, most ele-
ments within the Cuban population regarded as hostile to basic US interests. As such,
they make a contribution to US security interests. They are not capable, however, of
protecting Cuba from invasion by any major power or of contributing substantially in
any joint US-Cuban effort against a common enemy.
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CHAPTER VII
PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
Cuba's economic and political future will be determined principally by a factor over
which Cuba itself has little control ? the condition of the world sugar market. Pros-
pects for good prices and disposal of large proportions of the Cuban production are far
less promising now than they were at the close of hostilities. The majority of Cuban
sugar experts foresee a further decline both in the amount of sugar Cuba will be able
to sell as well as in the price. They are thus much concerned over the necessity for
downward readjustments in wage levels and reduced production goals. To date no real
progress has been made in this direction. But if sugar prices continue to decline, these
readjustments will become a compelling necessity which the government of President-
elect Prio will have to face.
Since Prio's announced program calls for increased economic self-sufficiency for
Cuba and a vigorous defense of the Cuban worker's standard of living, there are only
two principal means by which these objectives can be attained in the face of a further
decline in sugar prices: diversification of production with emphasis on food products,
and increased demands on foreign-owned enterprises in Cuba. The first will be ex-
tremely difficult to accomplish, and the second will have limited practical value because
excessive government impositions would cause foreign corporations to resort to meas-
ures costly to Cuba. A theoretical third solution of the difficulty, borrowing money
from the US in order to subsidize Cuba's present level of employment and prices, would
not be easy for Prio to adopt since it would be contrary to his publicly espoused goal of
economic self-sufficiency.
Despite any difficulties that might arise from a decline in sugar prices, popular
support and the state of disunity of the opposition will probably enable the Prio regime
to survive for two years at least. By 1950, however, the opposition might be able to
join forces sufficiently to defeat him in the scheduled by-elections. Were this to happen,
it might well be the first step toward more direct efforts to overthrow the government
since it would be irrefutable evidence that the Autenticos had lost their mandate from
the people. In such a period, the principal threat to the Prio government would be the
conservative opposition which might combine under a strong leader like Batista.
President-elect Prio is supported by a substantial majority of the Cuban people in
his pledge to support the US against the USSR and to give all possible aid in the event
of a war. The Prfo administration's preoccupation with policies that tend to increase
Cuba's independence, however, will influence its relations with the US in matters not
directly connected with US-USSR rivalry so that cooperation will not be continuously
smooth. Difficulties will become proportionately greater if Cuban-US commerce de-
clines and it appears to the Cuban Government that there are more immediate advan-
tages in anti-US nationalistic moves than in long-term economic cooperation with
the US.
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Cuba's nationalistic urge to assert its independence can be expected to be especially
strong at international conferences and congresses. Such a course would not be dic-
tated by obstructionism, since Cuba wholeheartedly supports the UN and inter-
American organizations, but rather by a desire to show that Cuba is not subservient to
the US.
Cuba will probably continue to oppose the Caribbean "dictatorships." Since both
the US Government and the provisions of inter-American agreements are opposed to
one republic's interference in the domestic affairs of another, Cuba's efforts will probably
be confined to (a) surreptitious aid to and tolerance of the activities of revolutionary
groups, and (b) the further development of friendly relations with the Caribbean
"democracies" with the end in view of jointly pursuing a hostile policy toward the
"dictatorships."
Prio's past performance as Secretary of Labor and his statements as President-elect
indicate that his government will continue to repress Cuba's Communists. As long as
he is in power, therefore, it is estimated that Communist strength will decrease politi-
cally and within the labor unions. Only if Prio were to abandon his stated program of
defense of the Cuban worker could the Communists hope to gain strength, and this is
considered extremely unlikely because it would signify the reversal of all Prio's major
policies and would alienate the very group on which the government depends for
support.
Two other domestic problems have been mentioned as major in Cuba: the racial
problem and the need to develop rural areas. The government under Prio?one of the
most liberal members of the Autentico Party?will be in an excellent position to win
the confidence of the colored people, and it can be expected to strive to reduce racial
discrimination in Cuba. Efforts in this direction should be helpful in forestalling Com-
munist attempts to win additional negro support.
In public statements, Prio has recognized the need to develop rural areas and has
already proposed the construction of farm-to-market roads as a step toward its solution.
His ability to devote a significant amount of money to these purposes, however, will be
greatly limited if sugar markets decline. Furthermore, his corrupt associates can be
expected to divert a considerable portion of such funds as may be appropriated to other
purposes. It is estimated that little will be accomplished to solve the rural problem.
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TOPOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE
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Cuba, an island republic, is over 700 miles long with an area equivalent to that of
Pennsylvania. In form, it is a great shallow crescent, one horn of which partially
closes the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico, while the other extends southeastward to
the Windward Channel. The northern coast of Cuba begins at Cape San Antonio, some
150 miles off Yucatan, curves northward to within 90 miles of Key West, Florida, then
curves southeastward continuing in this direction more than 400 miles to end in Point
Maisi, about 50 miles from Haiti. The concavity of the south coast includes the shallow
waters of the Gulf of Batabano, the Isle of Pines, and myriad islets. Both northern and
southern coasts of Cuba are fringed with coral reefs in most places, making access by
sea difficult except from the west or through a few safe passageways. There are, how-
ever, several excellent natural harbors?Guantanamo, Havana, and Santiago.
With an average width of 60 miles, Cuba has no significant rivers or lakes, but
there is, nonetheless, a wide range of types of terrain?from the swamps of the south-
ern Zapata Peninsula to the mountains of Oriente which contain peaks higher than any
in eastern US. Smaller mountain ranges in western and central parts of the island
cause a high percentage of the area to be hilly or rolling. Several different types of
? soil are found, some maintaining their fertility for dozens of harvests without artificial
fertilization. The deforestation of the island which has been rapidly advanced within
the past decades is a threat to the long-range maintenance of some soils.
Although Cuba is located within the northern limits of the tropics, a combination
of favorable ocean and wind currents helps create a very equable and pleasant climate.
The Gulf Stream curves north of Cuba as a water barrier against the effects of cold
northern winds while the eastern trade winds temper the heat of summer. The mean
annual temperature is 75? F. with a difference of less than 11? in the average tempera-
ture of the coolest (February 70.6?) and the hottest month (August 810). The most
extreme temperatures ever officially recorded in Cuba were 36? and 96?. Annual rain-
fall varies from a mean of 40 to 60 inches. Heavier rains usually take place in certain
interior areas. The greater amount of rain falls in the months from April to November,
the winter months being relatively dry and sunny.
While Cuba's temperature and evenness of climate disqualify it as one of the areas
regarded as stimulating to human achievement, the more harmful secondary effects
of the tropics?diseases, etc.?are controlled to a remarkable degree for a tropical
country by public health and sanitation measures. Cuba's leadership in this field has
continued since the enotable work initiated there by Americans during the war with
Spain. While malaria and intestinal parasites are still common in Cuba, yellow fever,
cholera, typhus, smallpox, and various other diseases are effectively controlled. Com-
? plete eradication of many of these is scientifically, if not economically and politically,
feasible.
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POPULATION OF
APPENDIX B
POPULATION FACTS
CUBA, BY PROVINCES, IN 1903,
1933, AND 1943
1943 1
1933 2
1903 2
Pinar del Rio
398,794
346,667
181,604
Habana
1,235,939
961,905
440,523
Matanzas
361,079
343,775
211,650
Las Villas
938,581
826,386
375,742
Camaguey
487,701
414,187
95,049
Oriente
1,356,489
1,071,946
353,746
TOTAL CUBA
4,778,583
3,964,866
1,658,314
The 1943 figures indicate a population density of 108 per square mile.
The Cuban population is 54.5 percent urban, 91.8 percent native born, 78 percent
literate, and the average age is 24.9 years. The percentage of white population, accord-
ing to the 1943 census, is 74.4 percent. Of the working population, 42.23 percent are
employees while 57.77 percent are self-employed.
1 Cuban census of 1943.
2 Cuban Department of Public Health.
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APPENDIX C
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, President-elect of Cuba, is a product of the revolu-
tionary movement which overthrew Machado but did not gain full control of the gov-
ernment until ten years later in 1944. Prio was born in Pinar del Rio, Cuba, in 1903, of
middle-class parents, and went to the University of Havana where he had a distin-
guished record as a student politician. He became a leading member of the famous
revolutionary committee of 1930 and took an important part in the formation of the
Autentico Party. Exiled by Batista in 1935, Prio later returned to Cuba to participate
in the Constitutional Convention and was elected to the Senate in 1940 where his per-
sonality and youthful vigor won for him an influence beyond that of his associates.
Prfo served as Prime Minister under President Grau from October 1945 to April 1947.
Later he became Minister of Labor and gained prominence by forceful measures that
eliminated Communist control of the officially recognized confederation. Despite the
fact that Prio was elected President in 1948 with the support of Grau and the palace
clique, and although he has long been associated with the terroristic and revolutionary
elements of his party, there are indications that he may attempt to restrain the violence
of former associates and give Cuba a less corrupt government. His intentions and
capabilities in this respect will be subjected to severe tests when he takes office 10
October 1948 and on the outcome, to a large degree, depends the future of his regime
in the event that economic conditions deteriorate to a point where sound and efficient
administration become necessary.
FULGENCIO BATISTA, a former President of Cuba who long was and is possibly
destined to be again the most influential person in Cuban politics, was born 16 January
1901 of plebeian parents in Oriente Province, Cuba. He received no formal education
and worked at a series of lowly jobs until he entered the Cuban Army. There by virtue of
outstanding initiative and self-discipline, he advanced slowly, grade by grade, until he
became sergeant and typist at Army Headquarters. After the fall of Machado in 1933,
Batista led a coup of non-commissioned officers who purged the army of pro-Machado
officers and made him their Chief. At first, Batista coordinated his efforts with those
of other revolutionary groups; later, he readjusted his position to one more acceptable
to the US Embassy in Havana and to conservative Cubans. This shift caused dissen-
sion and revolt among the revolutionaries which Batista suppressed quickly and
cruelly. He thus became the supreme power in Cuba and forced all branches of the
government to carry out his orders, which included the impeachment of the legally
elected President who had refused to be subservient. As Commander of the Army,
Batista governed unofficially from his headquarters at Camp Columbia until 1940 when
he sought and obtained the presidency for himself. In 1944, to everyone's surprise, he
permitted the holding of honest elections, accepted defeat at the polls gracefully and
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went into voluntary exile. He plans to return to Cuba as a senator in November 1948,
and probably intends to run for the presidency in 1952.
Batista has an intuitive understanding of Cuba and its people. His political astute-
ness is a product of this understanding in combination with great native intelligence.
Upon his return to Cuba he will become a significant factor affecting the island's future.
While he performed a great service in bringing Cuba from revolutionary chaos to repub-
lican stability, he appears to lack idealism or any integrated concepts for his country's
future. His talent appears to lie in the conciliation of opposing forces in the interest of
order, stability and the peaceful maintenance of the status quo. His political develop-
ment has been in the direction of increasing conservatism, but realistic political oppor-
tunism remains stronger in him than devotion to a particular ideology.
EDUARDO RENE CHIBAS Y RIVAS, known as "Eddy" to practically everyone in
Cuba, has always been a colorful figure, provocative of headlines, controversies, and
duels, but only recently has he proved at the polls that his influence over a significant
sector of the Cuban population is decisive. Chibas was born in 1907 in Santiago de
Cuba where his father was a prominent engineer closely associated with US military
government activities. Chibas' inherited wealth has enabled him to adopt the inde-
pendent role he so strikingly manifests in political affairs. He became a follower of
Dr. Grau during the revolution against Machado and acted as Grau's unofficial spokes-
man until 1947. His first important political post was as delegate to the 1940 Consti-
tutional Convention, after which he served as representative and, most lately, as sena-
tor. The increasing popularity of his weekly radio chats and public speeches gradually
created for Chibas a special following within the Autentico Party. Although he is in-
clined to go to extremes in wringing the full publicity possibilities from each passing
incident, Chibas does have certain beliefs to which his loyalty is more or less continuous.
One is that the economic and political self-determination of Cuba should be advanced
by all possible means. Another is that the Cuban masses should be given fair treat-
ment by an honest government which should consistently support the ideals of the 1933
revolution. His break with Grau in 1947 came ostensibly because he felt that the Grau
regime had become corrupt. Actually, the fact that President Grau did not decline
renomination until a late date was a weighty though unadmitted reason for the break,
since Chibas coveted the nomination for himself.
Chibas' success in attracting more than 300,000 votes in his independent presiden-
tial campaign is proof that he is a leading Cuban political figure and that he will be a
principal contender for the presidency in 1952 if he is able to maintain the support of
the group which voted for him in 1948. Previous to his success at the polls many
Cubans considered him merely a radio commentator and publicity seeker.
GENEVEVO PEREZ DAMERA, Chief of Staff of the Cuban Army, represents a per-
sonal link between the Army and the revolutionary student groups of 1933. Born in Ma-
tanzas, Cuba, in 1910, Perez attended the University for a short time during which he es-
tablished several important friendships with those who later were student leaders. Hav-
ing entered the army as a private, he became a second lieutenant as a result of Batista's
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"Sergeants'" revolt of 1933. As the friend of Dr. Grau, he was assigned to his staff as
a military aide during Grau's short provisional presidency. When Grau left the presi-
dency, Perez was able to remain in the army under Batista, receiving one or two routine
promotions in the ten years between 1934 and 1944. When Grau was elected president
in 1944, however, promotions came rapidly until Perez became Grau's Chief of Staff in
1945.
Prior to this last appointment few people?except perhaps Grau himself?took
Perez very seriously as an army officer and he was the butt of many jokes based on his
obesity and his supposed lack of manly qualities. His surprisingly vigorous and deter-
mined action as Chief of Staff, however, has won him respect. Army efficiency and
morale have been improved, and the army has been most effective in maintaining order
during elections and in controlling Communist-inspired labor difficulties. General
Perez has developed into a key figure in Cuba. Although opposed by certain members
of the palace clique, Perez is the best military figure the Autenticos have produced so
that, despite repeated rumors that he will be replaced by President-elect Prio, his ability
to control the army is increasingly valuable at a time when opposition military men like
Batista and Benitez are returning to the country.
LAZARO PEA. Of the publicly known leaders of the Cuban Communists, Lazaro
Pena is the most popular and effective in organizing support among non-Communist
groups. His efforts as secretary general of the Cuban Workers Confederation from the
time it was organized until its division in 1947 won him influence among non-Commu-
nist workers and the Cuban masses in general. The fact that he is a coal-black negro
has increased his popularity among the Cuban colored population. This advantage has
provided a favorable background for Pefia's undeniable astuteness, energy and ability as
organizer and public speaker. He was born in Havana in 1911 and earned his own liv-
ing from the age of ten. Despite the fact that he had held a variety of menial jobs, he
was able to enter the cigar-makers union?traditional stronghold of the more elite and
best-organized of Cuban workers. Later he became secretary of the Havana chapter
of the union and gained the confidence of General Batista who allowed him to form the
CTC. As secretary general of the new confederation he cooperated with the Batista
regime politically at the same time that he increased Communist control of labor?the
one was, in fact, the means to the other as Batista's political enemies were also Pefia's
rivals within the labor organization. At the same time that he advanced the cause of
Communism, he won economic gains for the workers which probably explains his popu-
larity with non-Communist workers.
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APPENDIX D
STATISTICAL DATA
SUGAR STATISTICS
TABLE I
RATIO OF
YEAR 1 PRODUCTION
CUBAN
.1
(in 1,000
short tons)
WORLD
PRODUCTION
(in 1,000
short tons)
RATIO OF
CUBAN TO
WORLD
PRODUCTION
US CON-
SUMPTION 6
(in 1,000
short tons)
CUBAN PRO-
DUCTION TO
US CON-
SUMPTION
1930-34 Average
2,847
? 29,919
.095
6,572
.432
1935-39 Average
3,183
34,710
.091
6,702
.475
1940-41
4,134
30,543
.135
6,763
.611
1941-42
4,516
28,489
.158
7,350
.615
1942-43
3,240
30,781
.105
6,102
.531
1943-44
5,643
28,110
.201
5,569
1.013
1944-45
3,923
26,692
.147
6,158
.637
1945-46
4,476
30,049
.148
5,107
.876
1946-47
6,448
31,984
.202
5,558
1.160
1947-48
6,674
34,147
.195
6,790
.981
1 Crop year 1 July to 30 June.
2 Variability of Cuban production. ?
'Increasing importance of Cuban production in relation to world production and to US con-
sumption.
Relative stability of US consumption.
5 Calendar Years.
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SUGAR STATISTICS
TABLE II
YEAR
CUBAN SUGAR
EXPORTS TO US
(in 1,000
short tons)
TOTAL CUBAN
SUGAR EXPORTS
(in 1,000
short tons)
RATIO CUBAN
SUGAR EXPORTS
TO US TO TOTAL
CUBAN SUGAR
EXPORTS
RATIO CUBAN
SUGAR EXPORTS
TO US SUGAR
CONSUMPTION 2
1930-34 Average
2,055
2,978
.690
.313
1935-39 Average
2,029
2,942
.690
.303
1940-41
1,901
2,332
.815
.281
1941-42
2,884
3,586
.804
.392
1942-43
1,850
2,006
.922
.303
1943-44
3,352
4,163
.805
.602
1944-45
3,882
4,352
.892
.630
1945-46
3,813
4,475
.852
.746
1946-47
5,725
6,081
.941
1.031
1947-48
2,850'
.420
1 Crop year 1 July to 30 June.
'Increasing importance of US as a market for Cuban sugar and of Cuba as a source of supply
to US up to 1948, abrupt change in 1948 reflecting termination of US wartime global purchases of
Cuban sugar.
'Estimated.
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VALUE -CUBAN EXPORTS
(in, millions of dollars)
TABLE III
1935
89.8
74.1
.825
128.0
101.5
.793
1.98
1936
122.4
91.7
.749
154.8
121.8
.787
2.39
1937
127.2
112.0
.880
186.0
150.1
.807
2.36
1938
99.6
80.5
.808
142.6
108.3
.759
1.94
1939
105.8
82.3
.781
147.6
111.1
.753
1.79,
1940
79.2
66.5
.840
127.2
1.04.9
.825
1.69
1941
137.8
119.0
.864
211.4
181.2
.857
2.04
1942
107.6
99.3
.926
182.3
164.1
.900
2.65
1943
226.0
181.8
.804
351.5
295.6
? .841
2.65
1944
237.2
210.8
.890
433.0
379.9
? .877
2.65
1945
259.2
192.8
.744
409.9
323.3
.789
3.10
1946
314.6
197.5
.628
475.8
320.6
.674
3.67
1947
609.5
398.6
.654
746.5
688.1
.922
4.96
1 Predominance of sugar in total exports and in exports to US. Consequent significance of
changes in the price of sugar as a factor affecting value of exports.
TABLE IV
CUBAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS-1946
Gross balance, merchandise account
223.2 millions of dollars
Net credit balance after interest, dividends, in-
surance, etc. + 135.9
Capital movement (Cuban investments abroad or
purchase of foreign-owned properties in Cuba) - 71.5
Gold and silver purchases - 34.9
Donations and payments international
organizations - 4.3
Net residue not accounted for - 25.2
(possibly undeclared exports US currency
for investment or expenditure abroad.)
TOTAL 135.9 -135.9
Note: Until 1946, the Cuban Government did not gather balance-of-payment statistics so that
there is no basis for comparison with previous years.
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TABLE V
CUBAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS-1947
(figures rounded)
Exports of Merchandise
Imports of Merchandise
+ 780,786,179
? 519,890,404
+ 260,895,775
I.
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS AND SERVICES
Favorable merchandise balance + 260,895,775
1. Freight charges
? 38,215,244
2. Insurance
? 2,949,467
3. Interest, dividends and rent
? 10,429,626
4. Services and commercial, banking and
professional fees and commissions
+ 18,391,599
5. Remittances to relatives and
students
? 9,856,581
6. Other personal remittances and
travel expenses
? 30,942,488
7. Payment to diplomatic and consular
service
807,576
8. Capital yield not expressed in in-
terest or dividends
? 63,000,000
Sub total
+ 19,199,175
? 155,393,407
II.
GOLD AND SILVER
9. Net gold imports
? 65,164,283
III.
UNILATERAL TRANSACTIONS
10. Lend-lease payments
? 2,400,000
IV.
CAPITAL
11. Net purchases of foreign bonds, bonds of
the Republic of Cuba, stocks and other
securities, and payments on public debt
? 10,143,983
12. Net increases of balances in favor of
Cuba abroad and net currency imports
? 44,919,814
Net residue unexplained
? 2,073,462
+ 280,094,950
? 280,094,950
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OTC.110 iiOLDERS OF CIA REPORT ON CUBA iSR-29)
tid SR-2=7,1 are teques)ted, to insert tiis nap at
e,w,1 of %'t,c! .report, fc,riovr nig Appendix D--":3tattstAcal
Central intelligence
8 February 1049
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00)
Slaz . 0
1.;
TO: TS S C
1,:cr.o, 4 Apr 77
D REG. 77 1763
Date: 5D 71? BY3
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
3232-S-I048
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NOTICE TO HOLDERS OF CIA REPORT ON CUBA (SR-29)
Holdersf SR-29 are requested to insert this map at
the end of the report, following Appendix D,--"Statistical Data."
Central Intelligence Aguley
8 February 1949
1)9enzwat go.
B9 CalIGE in Class. E3
DEcLASSIFIED
ass. CaANGED TO: TS S
'DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA RE. 77 1763
Date:
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