INDIA-PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A001600010001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 76
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 16, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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uvrt NV.,UU
FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
JOINT INTELLIGENCE (JROU1-,JOINI 8TAFF
INDIA -PAKISTAN
SR-21
Published 16 September 1948
re 1
LA,L
11-2-C.1
1)-
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Auth: D' ' 77/1763
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Published September 1948 SECRET
SR-21
INDIA-PAKISTAN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY
SECTION I ? POLITICAL SITUATION
1. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SYSTEM I- 1
2. PRESENT GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE . I- 7
3. POLITICAL PARTIES AND CURRENT ISSNES I- 8
a. The Indian National Congress (Congress Party) I- 8
b. The Moslem League . I- 9
c. The Hindu Mahasabha . I-10
d. The Scheduled Castes Federation I-10
e. National Liberal Federation . I-10
f. The Socialist Party . I-11
g. The Communist Party of India I-11
h. The Socialist Republican Party of India 1-12
4. MINORITY AND OTHER SPECIAL GROUPS 1-13
a. The Sikhs 1-13
b. The Pathans . 1-14
c. The Indian Princes 1-14
d. Labor 1-15
5. STABILITY OF THE PRESENT REGIMES 1-15
SECTION II? ECONOMIC SITUATION
1. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT ECONOMIC SITUATION .
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE PRESENT ECONOMIC SYSTEM
a. Agriculture
b. Natural Resources
c. Industries
d. Finance
e. International Trade
3. ECONOMIC STABILITY .
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SECTION III ? FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. PAKISTAN III-1
a. General III-1
b. Relations with Afghanistan III-1
2. INDIA . 111-2
a. General 111-2
b. Relations with the USSR 111-3
c. Relations with the Orient 111-3
3. RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 111-4
SECTION IV ? MILITARY SITUATION
1. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION IV-1
2. STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF THE ARMED FORCES IV-2
a. The Army IV-2
b. The Navy 1V-3
c. Air Forces IV-4
3. WAR POTENTIAL IV-4
4. MILITARY INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES IV-5
SECTION V ? STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY
SECTION VI? POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY
APPENDIX A ? Georgraphy
APPENDIX B ? Population
APPENDIX C ? Significant Biographical Data
APPENDIX D ? Principal Officials of India and Pakistan
APPENDIX E ? Chronology of Significant Events
MAPS:
Transportation and Political Divisions
Distribution of Largest Communities, 1941
Distribution of Muslims, 1941
Density of Population, 1941
Languages
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SUMMARY
The strategic importance of India lies in its geographical position, its vast size and
population, and its economic productivity. It dominates both the Persian Gulf ap-
proaches to the Near East oil fields and the sea lane from Europe to the Orient. It has
an area of more than a million and a half square miles and has a population of some
400 million persons. It ranks first or second in world production of jute, cotton, tea,
mica, manganese, monazite, and beryl. It is a major source of iron ore, coal, and
bauxite.
Political control of virtually all of the subcontinent is vested in the Dominions of
India and Pakistan, which came into being upon the withdrawal of British rule over
India on 15 August 1947. With the exception of the great principality of Hyderabad,
all of the Princely States (once directly under the British Crown) have now acceded to
one or the other of the dominions. Both India and Pakistan, at present ruled by
provisional governments, profess adherence to Western concepts of democracy and civil
liberty, and their constitutions are expected to provide for responsible representative
government on a federal basis.
Neither dominion, however, has as yet attained political stability. Because the
division of British India followed communal lines, the Moslem League has unchallenged
political leadership in Pakistan, and the predominantly Hindu Congress Party (though
potentially fissiparous) dominates the political scene in India. Nevertheless, the under-
lying Hindu-Moslem tension and the bitterness which attended the creation of an
independent Moslem state still remain, aggravated by the widespread communal mas-
sacres which followed partition and by the sharp inter-dominion rivalry over such
Princely States as Junagadh and Kashmir. Additional sources of disorder are: (a) the
belligerently anti-Moslem Sikhs, who lost part of their Punjab homeland to Pakistan;
(b) the Pathan tribesmen of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province; and (c) the
small Communist Party, which has a controlling position in the Indian labor movement.
The dominions are also unstable economically. Under the British, India had an
assured market for its principal exports and had built up a growing industry, but it
suffered from overpopulation and recurrent famine. The division of India into two
independent states and the disorders and mass migrations which followed have brought
new problems. The Dominion of India inherited most of the mineral-producing fa-
cilities and factories but became dependent on Pakistan for part of the food and cotton
and most of the jute needed to keep its industry running. The smaller Dominion of
Pakistan, although more than able to feed itself, is industrially weak and at present
does not even possess facilities for processing its jute and cotton. In addition, Pakistan
has been handicapped by the loss of commercial skills and capital resulting from the
exodus of the Hindu business community. The governments of both dominions have
? Note: The information in this paper is as of May 1948.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force
have concurred in this report.
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suffered loss of revenues at a time when financial demands on them are high.
India and Pakistan have not yet developed firm foreign policies, but they will
probably follow distinctive paths. Moslem Pakistan has supported the Arab states in
the UN, is strongly anti-Communist, and (despite its opposition to "imperialism")
appears less bitter about the UK's record in India than does its sister dominion. The
Dominion of India is a vigorous opponent of "colonialism," aspires to leadership among
the non-white peoples of the Orient, and at first welcomed Soviet support on colonial
issues. There is reason to believe, however, that it would cooperate with the US in the
event of a war with the USSR despite its present official policy of neutrality. Both
dominions have criticized US-UK action in the UN over the Kashmir dispute.
Militarily, lack of equipment and training makes India and Pakistan weak. Their
combined forces are incapable of resisting assault by a first-class power. Even an
inter-dominion war would be hard for them to sustain for any length of time.
Future developments depend primarily on the outcome of the continuing hostility
between India and Pakistan, particularly over the Kashmir issue. Actual war between
the two dominions remains a possibility. Its outbreak would probably lead to victory
for India, but the accompanying disorders might entail the breakdown of all central
authority.
The present political and social unrest and the possibility of inter-dominion war
threaten US interests because of the potential loss to the US of bases and critical mate-
rials and the favorable opportunities for Communist activity they involve.
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SECTION I
POLITICAL SITUATION
1. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION.
The great Asian peninsula known as India has never attained true political unity.
At present, following the withdrawal of British control in August 1947, its two main
subdivisions are the independent Dominions of India and Pakistan, but it also contains
the independent border kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan, some tiny seaport areas under
Portuguese or French authority, and the large principality of Hyderabad, the only one
of the myriad of autonomous and semi-autonomous Indian Princely States which has
not yet acceded to one or the other of the two dominions.*
Behind India's political divisions is a complicated pattern of social disunity. Its
more than 400 million inhabitants include eight distinct racial types and speak more
than 200 different vernaculars. They are divided by cleavages, religious in origin but
in effect social, which cut across political and geographical boundaries to a point where
the adherents of a particular faith belong primarily to a society limited to their co-
religionists and regard as alien the members of any other religious community. The
Hindu community, the largest of these religious groups, is further divided into a multi-
plicity of castes and sub-castes which have but little mutual intercourse. The Moslem
community, the second largest religious group, has existed since about A.D. 800, when
a series of Moslem invasions began which eventually established the rule of the Moslem
Mogul dynasty over the greater part of India, reduced the preponderant Hindu popu-
lation to a secondary position except in the extreme south, and resulted in the con-
version to Islam of much of the old population. Regionalism is another divisive
factor.**
Such political cohesion as has obtained in India was until recently imposed from
above?by individual princes or chieftains or by the British. Not until the end of the
19th century did the forces of nationalism begin to develop, and while nationalist feel-
ing finally attained sufficient strength to compel the withdrawal of British rule, its
cohesive power was not sufficient to prevent the division of British India on religious
lines into two dominions. Even now, after the division, the two dominions are honey-
combed with religious minority communities; whether the nationalist concept has
penetrated sufficiently to permit the establishment of strong and stable governments
in the two dominions remains to be proved.
India's modern history began in 1600, when Queen Elizabeth granted a charter to
the trading association later known as the East India Company to establish the British
connection with the area. For 150 years the East India Company was primarily con-
cerned with protecting its trading interests and made no effort to supplant the power
* According to recent reports, the insignificant state of Piploda in Central India also has
"neglected" to accede.
** See Appendix B.
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of the Mogul emperors at Delhi or of the local potentates elsewhere. However, after
the Battle of Plassey in 1757 (in which Company troops defeated an attack by the
French-supported native ruler of Bengal) the Company found itself compelled to take
over the governing of Bengal in toto, and thereupon it embarked on a relentless policy
of territorial expansion. Simultaneously the British Parliament tended increasingly
to interfere in the Company's Indian affairs.
In 1857 the Company's native troops revolted and, aided by large segments of the
population, tried to massacre or expel all Europeans in India. The "Great Mutiny"
was suppressed, but in 1858 the British Parliament transferred to the Crown all of the
Company's governmental responsibilities in India.
This transfer of authority to the Crown perpetuated the division of India (except
for Nepal, Bhutan, and the inconsequential French and Portuguese holdings) into two
political categories. Territory which had been directly ruled by the East India Com-
pany became British India, which was thenceforth governed by Parliament through the
various Government of India Acts. The remainder of India, made up of more than
560 separate states known as Princely India, was joined to the UK by the feudal alle-
giance which its rulers owed to the British Crown, and indirectly controlled through
residents and agents appointed from the Indian Civil Service. Its inhabitants were
subject to the laws of neither British India nor the British Parliament.*
The survival of the Princely States, a result initially of the East India Company's
practice of forming alliances with friendly and cooperative chiefs, was favored by the
support that many of the princes gave the British at the time of the Mutiny. After-
ward, British policy supported the divide et impera theory (first expounded officially
by Lord Canning, India's first Viceroy) that the UK could best maintain its position
in India by keeping in power a number of native rulers amenable to the Imperial will.
As a result, while the people of British India were gradually permitted greater participa-
tion in government, internal administration in Princely India remained the function of
the native rulers and has been, for the most part, entirely personal and autocratic.
Before 1921, Crown control of British India was absolute in every important branch
of the government?central, provincial, and local. The administrative machinery was
dominated by the Indian Civil Service, at that time almost exclusively British. While
this organization maintained an exemplary standard of honesty and justice, it de-
veloped a bureaucratic tradition and an attitude of racial superiority. Its administra-
tion was capable and efficient but far from sympathetic toward the Indian population.
Demands for liberalization of the government, particularly during World War I,
resulted in the so-called Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, contained in the India Act of
1919 and implemented when that Act became operative in 1921. Designed to introduce
gradual self-government to British India, they provided for partially responsible gov-
ernment (known as dyarchy) in the provinces, and more representative (but not re-
sponsible) government at the center.
* In 1947 British India comprised 865,446 square miles and had a population of approximately
300 million. Princely India contained 716,964 square miles and approximately 100 million
inhabitants.
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Constitutional reform was materially advanced by the India Act of 1935, which
established fully responsible self-government in the eleven provinces of British India.
The act also provided for a federation of India, which was to include both the provinces
and the Princely States, and contemplated partial responsible government at the center
of the dyarchical basis which had previously existed in the provinces. The portion of
the constitution affecting the provinces became effective on 1 April 1937, but, though
efforts were made to achieve the Indian Federation, especially by Lord Linlithgow
(Viceroy and Governor-General, 1936-43), they were blocked by disputes between the
British and the principal Indian political party (the Indian National Congress) as to
the terms by which the Princely States would be allowed to enter the federation, as well
as by growing misgivings by the states themselves regarding the ultimate implications
of the federal scheme for them. On 11 September 1939 the Governor-General an-
nounced that the British would defer further steps to implement the plan until the end
of the war, and when the question of India's government was considered in 1946, the
differences between Hindu and Moslem leaders and the growing demand for full inde-
pendence prevented any consideration of the 1935 plan. Thus until creation of the
two new dominions on 15 August 1947, British India continued to be governed in part
by the Act of 1919 and in part by the 1935 constitution.
The UK's difficulties over the Indian constitution during the three decades follow-
ing World War I reflected the development of a sense of nationalism in India which
rendered the gradual acquisition of self-government, as proposed by the British, in-
creasingly unsatisfactory to ever-growing segments of the Indian population. The
organization which most successfully fostered this relatively new concept was the
Indian National Congress, commonly called the Congress Party or the Congress. At
first moderate in its demands, it passed in 1927 a resolution defining complete inde-
pendence as the aim of the movement. By the end of World War II its strength through-
out the country, combined with Britain's weakness at home, had become such that
prompt British withdrawal from India was clearly inevitable.
The Congress Party advocated a strong centralized government under majority
rule. Until June 1947, when it realized that such a government was not immediately
attainable, it insisted upon a single and united India which would include both the
provinces and the states. Although it aspired to represent all groups in India and num-
bered many prominent Moslems as members, the Congress became in effect the Hindu
party of India. As the one effective non-Moslem political organization, it also received
the support of most of the minor political and religious groups.
The Congress Party's near-monopoly of Indian nationalism was challenged, par-
ticularly in the decade preceding Britsh withdrawal, by the rise in strength of the
reorganized Moslem League, which came to represent the great mass of Moslem opinion
in India. In demanding India's independence, the League further maintained that the
Moslems, outnumbered three to one by the Hindus, should not be subjected to Hindu
domination. In 1940 the League officially adopted the principle that the Moslem
majority areas of India should be free to form an independent Moslem state.
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The British decision to grant India's demands for independence was announced
by Prime Minister Attlee on 15 March 1946, and a British Cabinet Mission (composed
of Lord Pethick Lawrence, Secretary of State for India; Sir Stafford Cripps, President
of the Board of Trade; and Mr. A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty) was im-
mediately sent to India to implement the decision.
On its arrival in New Delhi, the Mission was faced with the diametrically opposed
demands and threats of the two major political parties. The Congress Party vehe-
mently opposed any arrangement that entailed the division of India and claimed that
the existing communal strife would continue only so long as the British remained in
India. On the other hand, the Moslem League refused to consider any plan for a unified
central government, which the League claimed would place the Indian Moslems at the
mercy of the Hindu majority. The League became more and more insistent upon the
creation of an independent Moslem state made up of the Moslem majority areas of the
northwest and northeast and threatened armed resistance if Moslem wishes were
disregarded.
After lengthy discussions with all of India's major political leaders, the British on
16 May 1946 proposed a plan for the transfer of power (the Cabinet Mission's and Vice-
roy's Award) which was meant to satisfy both the Congress and the Moslem League.
Although it did not provide an independent Moslem state, the plan specified certain
safeguards for the Moslems and called for the grouping of British India's provinces in
three semi-autonomous sections, with the two predominantly Moslem sectors in the
northwest and northeast separated from the remaining, predominantly Hindu terri-
tory. British paramountcy over the states was to end, and the proposed Union of India
was to include both the provinces of British India and the Princely States on a federal
basis, with central government functions limited to foreign affairs, defense, communi-
cation, and the necessary fund-raising for these activities. The plan provided for a
Constituent Assembly, made up of provincial and states delegates, to frame the new
Union of India's constitution and for a fully representative interim government to
function prior to completion of the Constituent Assembly's work. It emphasized that
the proposed Union would be entirely free to decide whether or not to remain within
the British Commonwealth.
This plan, containing what the Moslem League called "the germ of Pakistan," was
at first acceptable to the Moslems, but the Congress delayed acceptance and (despite a
pretense to the contrary) apparently wanted to evade fulfillment of the plan's condi-
tions. Thus, though at one time or another both the League and the Congress signified
acceptance of the plan in full or in part, they never agreed on it simultaneously. De-
spite the best efforts of the Viceroy (Lord Wavell) , announcement of the plan served
only to intensify the disagreement between the two parties. Throughout the populace,
communal disorders broke out which threatened to develop into country-wide civil war.
By March 1947 it was evident that a compromise acceptable to both major parties?
a necessary prerequisite to a stable Union of India government?was unobtainable.
Lord Wavell was recalled and Lord Louis Mountbatten was named Viceroy on 24 March
1947. The new Viceroy made a last attempt to obtain an agreement on the basis of
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the original plan, then announced on 3 June a new solution which recognized recon-
ciliation of the two groups as impossible. The British discussed the new plan with both
factions but made it clear that in any case they would relinquish authority on 15
August 1947.
The new plan?the one under which India finally obtained freedom?was in the
main a supplement to the original scheme which had been proposed more than a year
previously; its principal new provision was that British India be divided into two sep-
arate political entities, Hindustan and Pakistan. As before, these two new states would
at first be given dominion status to facilitate the immediate establishment of self-gov-
ernment, but they would be free to decide whether or not they remained within the
British Commonwealth. As for the Princely States, British overlordship (paramountcy)
would definitely end. They could individually accede to either of the two dominions
as their governments chose, on whatever grounds were mutually agreeable, but except
as constituent parts of either dominion would no longer remain in the British Common-
wealth.
A Constituent Assembly remained part of the modified plan, but each of the provin-
cial legislatures would decide whether its representatives would continue therein or
join a second Constituent Assembly. The original Constituent Assembly would draft
a constitution and provide an interim government for an independent Dominion of
India (Hindustan) . The second Constituent Assembly would serve similarly for an
independent Dominion of Pakistan.
Special consideration was given to the religious division which existed geographi-
cally within three of the provinces. The Hindu majority districts of the Punjab and
Bengal (both predominantly Moslem provinces) were allowed to join the Dominion
of India. In Assam, the Moslem majority district of Sylhet was similarly allowed to
secede to join Pakistan. Thus the original Constituent Assembly for the Dominion
of India was made up of representatives of Bombay, Bihar, Orissa, the Central Prov-
inces, the United Provinces, Madras, Assam (minus the District of Sylhet) , and the
new provinces of West Bengal and East Punjab. (To the Dominion of India were al-
lotted also the several small Commssioner's provinces of British India, including the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands.) Participating in the new Constituent Assembly for
Pakistan were Sind, the North West Frontier Province, and the new provinces of West
Punjab and East Bengal. The Moslem-majority district of Sylhet, having seceded
from Assam, became part of East Bengal, on which it bordered.
Baluchistan, just west of India proper, was also included in the settlement. The
British part, almost entirely Moslem, was permitted to join Pakistan. The princely
Baluchistan States, also almost entirely Moslem, later acceded to Pakistan.
The actual establishment of the two new dominions focused attention on the de-
cision confronting the Princely States and on the widely divergent attitudes of the
Congress Party and the Moslem League toward them. The Congress had long con-
demned the princely order as despotic and anachronistic and, through Congress factions
within the States, had strenuously though unsuccessfully endeavored to force re-
sponsible, democratic government on their rulers. Upon the withdrawal of the British,
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the Congress insisted that all states join one of the new dominions, and Pandit Nehru,
the Congress leader and Prime Minister of India, even went so far as to announce that
India would consider foreign recognition of any state as an unfriendly act. Congress
also insisted that accessions should represent the will of the people. The Moslem
League, on the other hand, never indicated hostility to the princely governments. Mo-
hammed Ali Jinnah, the Moslem League leader, declared officially as Governor-General
of Pakistan that its government considered any state free to establish itself as an in-
dependent country if it did not wish to accede to either dominion and added that
Pakistan would gladly form an alliance with any state which might decide to maintain
its independence. Pakistan has, however, put pressure for accession on some states.
Fears that a large number of states would refuse to accede to either dominion and
thus bring about a Balkanization of India were soon dispelled, however, with most states
acceding to either India or Pakistan even before the transfer of power on 15 August.
In general, accessions have followed the lines suggested by both the religious loyalties
of the princes and geography: states with Hindu rulers, or so situated geographically as
to fall naturally within the sphere of the Dominion of India, have acceded to that do-
minion, while the Moslem-ruled states adjacent to Pakistan have acceded to the latter.
This usually meant that states with predominantly Hindu populations acceded to India
and Moslem-majority states acceded to Pakistan.
That the great majority of rulers were willing to accede to the new Dominion of
India, despite the traditional hostility of its dominant political party, resulted in part
from realization by the princes that, shorn of British support, most of them were open
to economic and military sanctions which would compel their eventual accession in
India on far from favorable terms. Another factor was the unusual attitude of com-
promise manifested toward the princes by the Congress Party, which apparently realized
that earlier failure to agree to certain minimum concessions to the Moslem League, as
provided in the British Cabinet Mission's Plan, had resulted in the creation of Pakistan.
Accordingly, India usually permitted acceding states to retain control of local affairs,
surrendering to the central government only their powers over external affairs, defense
(but not internal security), and communications.* The rulers, on their part, infor-
mally indicated a willingness to hasten constitutional reforms within ther domains and
promised that one-half of their states' representatives to the Constituent Assembly
be elected by popular vote.
States acceding to Pakistan similarly retained autonomy in local matters, relin-
quishing only the external powers which had been held by the Crown under the prin-
ciple of paramountcy.
Thus the status of acceding states differed little from their former position under
British rule, although the powers of many princes were later curtailed by India. Hy-
derabad, the most powerful of the states, is the only one which has still refused to ac-
cede to either dominion. Surrounded by Indian territory, Hyderabad's Moslem Nizam
* In recent months the Dominion of India has completely absorbed a great many minor
Princely States which had acceded to it although allowing the princes concerned to retain their
titles and honors.
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has postponed a decision by means of a one-year "standstill agreement" with India
which in effect authorizes continuance of the status quo. Enjoying self-government
but neither international recognition nor economic self-sufficiency, Hyderabad has an
undefined status somewhere between true independence and autonomy.*
2. PRESENT GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE.
Constitutions for the two new Dominions of India and Pakistan have not yet been
completed by their respective Constituent Assemblies, and their governments are there-
fore still in the formative stage. As members of the British Commonwealth of Nations,
each has a governor-general appointed by the British Crown as titular head of state,
with administration entrusted to a prime minister and cabinet which?it is expected--
eventually will be responsible to a dominion legislature. (Jinnah, as governor-general
of Pakistan, is in effect the actual rather than merely the titular head of state.) At
present the two Constituent Assemblies, made up of delegates elected by the provincial
legislatures, serve as interim legislatures as well as constitution-drafting bodies, but
(except as modified by them) the laws in effect immediately prior to the British with-
drawal will continue in force until the new constitutions become effective. In the
interim, too, the judiciary remains unchanged.
The basic structure of the two dominions, inherited from the former British Gov-
ernment of India, is of the federal type. The nine provinces forming the Dominion of
India and the four provinces of Pakistan have a status similar to that of a state in the
US, although they possess somewhat greater autonomy. The titular head of each
province is a governor appointed by the dominion governor-general upon advice of the
federal cabinet, but the provincial government is administered by a ministry responsible
to the local legislature, which is elected by means of a greatly restricted franchise.
Each dominion includes two other types of territories besides the provinces:
Princely States, and small areas called Commissioners' provinces or agencies, which
were formerly administered more or less directly by the British central government.
The acceding Princely States are included in but are not integral parts of the domin-
ions. India has modified the status of most of the states which acceded to it, but their
internal administration continues to rest in part with their own rulers. The Commis-
sioners' provinces and agencies, on the other hand, continue under the direct control
of the federal governments.
Civil liberties as understood in the US are officially recognized within both domin-
ions and in all probability will continue to exist under the governments now being
created. As presently planned, the constitution of India will contain a bill of rights
guaranteeing to all citizens equal treatment before the law and insuring a wide degree
of personal liberty. The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan has thus far done little
more than to indicate that the constitution which it will draft will be based on Moslem
traditions and Moslem law as set forth in the Koran. It can be expected, however, to
include legal provisions for non-Moslems and foreigners.
* See page 1-16.
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3. POLITICAL PARTIES AND CURRENT ISSUES.
The political pattern in India and Pakistan, like the constitutional framework, is
still in a transitional stage. Both dominions at present are virtually one-party states,
with the Indian National Congress the dominant party in the Dominion of India and
the Moslem League without a significant rival in Pakistan. Both parties were active
throughout India during the years preceding independence, but since partition the
Congress Party has done little more in Pakistan than to encourage Hindus to migrate
to India. The Moslem League's recently established independent organization for
India (the Indian Union Moslem League) will endeavor to protect Moslem interests
in India. The few small minor parties are still organized on an all-India basis but
are strongest in the Dominion of India.
With both dominions still concerned with establishment of stable regimes, the
continued friction over the existence and strengthening of an independent Pakistan,
which ranges Pakistan against the Dominion of India and the Moslem League against
the other Indian parties, is the only major issue. Internal political differences have
not developed into major issues in either dominion, and even the Communists at first
agreed to cooperate in getting the new governments on their feet. The political issues
and alignments which may emerge in the future may best be anticipated by consid-
eration of the present parties individually.
a. The Indian National Congress (Congress Party).
Since its formation in 1885, the Congress has been the most powerful voice of
Indian nationalism. Its main objective, of course, has been to secure the complete in-
dependence of India from the British. It has also, however, consistently advocated a
united India (including the Princely States and Moslem-majority districts) and still
hopes for the eventual consolidation of India and Pakistan. Favoring a highly cen-
tralized type of government based on majority rule, the Congress Party calls for an
over-all nationalism which cuts across differences based on religious or racial affiliation
or on socio-economic views. It feels that the religious and economic rights of minor-
ity groups can be adequately protected by the state and subscribes to Western con-
cepts of civil liberties. Its economic program favors further industrial development
of India, to be accomplished in part by private enterprise, but largely through state
ownership of transportation and through state promotion of new industries. It be-
lieves in the usefulness of trade-unionism and fosters social legislation. While it con-
demns totalitarian ideology, there is increasing evidence of fascist tendencies within
the party, especially in South India, and of a disposition toward arbitrary action.
Despite its emphasis on a pan-Indian nationalism, the Congress is predomi-
nantly Hindu and has been led mainly by caste Hindus of the professional class. The
most notable of these leaders was Mahatma Gandhi, the elder statesman of Indian na-
tionalism, who was assassinated by a Hindu fanatic 30 January 1948. Gandhi's efforts
were mainly responsible for the conversion of the Congress from an organization of the
intelligentsia to the guiding force in a movement of the people, and his prestige helped
account for the paramount political influence which the party wields over most Hindus.
Although he had held no party office since 1934 and technically was no longer even a
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party member, Gandhi represented a spiritual force of immeasurable strength in the
party and was characterized by Pandit Nehru as in effect its permanent super-president.
The Congress Party's great weakness stems from the widely divergent social and
political ideologies it contains. The members of many of the minority parties described
below are usually also members of the Congress, and they thus can influence Congress
policy from within. As for general Congress Party policy, Gandhi's moralistic advocacy
of a handicraft economics has been supplanted by acceptance of the machine age
under the socialistically inclined Nehru. Despite its mass support and its genuinely
liberal attitude toward social legislation, however, the Congress Party's leadership
remains generally conservative. The Indian industrialists are extremely influential
in its councils, and the party boss, Sardar Patel, is considered their spokesman. No
longer brought together by common opposition to British rule, the conservative and
radical wings of the party will probably split openly in the not-too-distant future, and
the minority may be forced to form a separate party.* Furthermore, the sectional
and caste rivalries existing within the organization materially strengthen its fissiparous
tendencies.
b. The Moslem League.
Founded in 1906 to protect Moslem interests against the threat of Hindu domi-
nation involved in increasing native participation in government, the Moslem League
has emerged, under the vigorous leadership of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, as a first-rate
political power. Dur'ng most of its existence the League was a middle- and upper-class
organization which advocated more representative rule for India, with special safe-
guards to assure participation of Moslems in the government and the retention of
Moslem communal rights. However, after the notable victory of the Congress Party's
candidates (including some Moslems) in the 1936 elections, the Moslem League worked
hard and successfully to arouse the religious and communal feelings of the Moslem
masses, charging that the Congress Party displayed a strong pro-Hindu bias. By
1938 the League's attitude had become more anti-Congress than anti-British, and by
1940 its autonomist leanings had developed to the point where it repudiated any ver-
sion of a united India and demanded that the Moslem-majority areas of the northwest
and northeast be granted complete political independence. The League's doctrine
that the Moslems of India constituted a separate nation rather than a minority to be
accorded a special position in a united India was termed the principle of Pakistan; it
resulted, as has been noted, in the establishment of the Moslem dominion under that
name.
The attainment of Pak'stan has so monopolized the Moslem League's attention
that its social and economic views have not been formulated in detail. There are in-
dications, however, that a moderately conservative economic and social policy, prob-
ably including some form of "etatism," will be adopted. The League has wide popular
support and now includes the vast majority of politically conscious Indian Moslems,
with the large Moslem landowners prominent in the party councils. Since the Moslem
* Since the drafting of this report, Patel has been seriously ill and the Socialists have departed
from the Congress. These events may postpone a party split.
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community is largely agricultural, and since the membership generally appears to ac-
cept unquestioningly the leadership of Jinnah, the party possesses far greater unity
than does the Congress.
c. The Hindu Mahasabha.
The Hindu Mahasabha was founded in the early 1900's but was not organized
on an all-India basis until 1928. It is a highly conservative and militant Hindu or-
ganization which has always strongly opposed any concession to the Moslems, has firmly
supported the caste system, and has emphasized the glories of Hindu power in the past.
It currently opposes the non-communal attitude of the Congress, which it describes as
both unrealistic and dishonest, and !s bitterly opposed to the Moslem League's policy
of partition. It has also opposed Gandhi's theory of non-violence and, as early as 1938,
was demanding universal military training, largely as a means to offset the preponder-
ance of Moslems then in the Indian Army. Many of its members are also members of
the Congress, and their philosophy, however contrary to Congress Party declarations,
has undoubtedly influenced the Congress' practices in India, although the Mahasabha
fell into official disfavor after Gandhi's assassination. Because of its bitter anti-Moslem
attitude, the Hindu Mahasabha presumably will be unable to operate openly in
Pakistan.
d. The Scheduled Castes Federation.
The Scheduled Castes Federation, claiming to represent the 50,000,000 "un-
touchables" of India and Pakistan, is led by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, an Indian "untouch-
able" who is a graduate of Columbia University. Actually, because of the profound
ignorance, inarticulateness, and apathy generally prevailing among the Scheduled
Castes, only a small percentage of their number actively supports the Federation. In
the past the Federation has opposed the Congress, on the grounds that the latter was
dominated by caste Hindus and aimed to perpetuate the disabilities of the depressed
classes. This allegation persisted despite Gandhi's well publicized efforts on behalf
of the "untouchables" and despite the fact that the Congress-dominated India Constitu-
ent Assembly formally outlawed untouchability on 27 April 1947, in a resolution
which stated that "untouchability in any form is abolished and the imposition of any
disability on that account shall be an offense." Politically, the Federation favors a
united India with a strong central government but with minority rights and represen-
tation adequately protected by law. Its activities center on the social and economic
advancement of India's depressed classes. It is radical in the social field but not in the
economic field. Both the Congress and the Moslem League have recently indicated
a desire to secure the support of the depressed classes, and the first cabinet of each
dominion includes a minister chosen from the Scheduled Castes.
e. National Liberal Federation.
The National Liberal Federation, an association of scholarly individuals, is
extremely small in membership but owing to the calibre of its members has consider-
able prestige. Its main purpose is to promote reason in government and to diminish
communal strife. As all of its members are believed to reside in the Dominion of
India, its activities will presumably be limited to that dominion.
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f. The Socialist Party.
The Socialist Party, led by Jai Prakash Narain, was until recently a militant
left-wing element of the India National Congress, and was formerly known as the Con-
gress Socialist Party. The elimination of the word "Congress" from the party name
appears to have resulted originally both from Congress Party allegations that the So-
cialists were trying to exploit their connection with it and from a belief by the Social-
ists that they might thus strengthen their appeal to non-Congress elements in the
population, especially in Pakistan. Narain continued to maintain, however, that the
Socialist Party remained a part of the Indian National Congress, and it was with obvi-
ous reluctance that the Socialists announced in March 1948 their decision to estab-
lish themselves as a completely independent party. This decision has been occasioned
both by a decree of the Congress that subsidiary parties may no longer be affiliated
with it, and by a realization on the part of the Socialists that they could not, as they had
hoped, gain control of the Congress in the near future.
Strongly leftist in economic philosophy, the Socialists vigorously oppose the
Communists as being agents of a foreign power, and?though approving Prime Minister
Nehru's proclamation of Indian neutrality vis-?is the USSR and the Western bloc?
they have characterized the spread of Communism as a major danger to world peace.
Narain probably envisages a close relationship among India, the labor governments in
Great Britain and other dominions, and the US as an effective means of combating
Soviet aggression.
g. The Communist Party of India.
The Communist Party of India (whose general secretary for the past twelve
years, P. C. Joshi, was replaced in March 1948 by B. T. Ranadive) is a comparatively
small but highly disciplined party capable of causing considerable disruption. It pos-
sesses the most efficient body of labor agitators and strike engineers in the country. A
few of its experienced leaders have been trained in Moscow.
The party claims to have about 90,000 members. Its greater strength !s, of
course, in the Dominion of India, where the number of industrial workers is larger, but
peasant groups in the Pakistan provinces of East Bengal and West Punjab have also
come under its influence. The poorly organized labor unions in Pakistan are also
inclined toward Communist ideology. The present announced membership of the party
is almost triple the number claimed in 1945 and about nine times that claimed in 1943,
but there is little evidence of a marked expansion in trained cadres. The bulk of the
trained members are found in Madras, Bombay, West Bengal, and East Bengal, but the
Punjab branch of the party is also important because it includes a comparatively large
number of Soviet-trained members who have worked in other parts of the world under
the auspices of the Ghard Party. The mass migrations in the Punjab, however, have
disrupted party organization there.
While the party claims "unquestioned leadership of the majority of the organ-
ized working class in the big industrial centers," party candidates were badly defeated
by Congress nominees in many labor constituencies at the start of 1946, and the party
appeared to have lost ground throughout the trade-union field. It recovered sharply,
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however, by exploiting the strike wave which swept through industry during the first
eight months of 1946; in June of that year it almost brought about a nation-wide rail-
way strike, and it did obtain a walkout on the South Indian Railway. The Communist
Party is strongly entrenched in the labor hierarchy: when the general council of the
All-India Trade Union Congress?India's principal trade-union organization?m0 in
November 1946, 42 of its 56 members were Communists.
The Communists have also successfully penetrated the Kissan Sabhas (or
peasant organizations). Membership in these organizations is probably about 100,000-
200,000 rather than the three-quarters of a million the Communists claim.
Although prior to the establishment of a Soviet Embassy in New Delhi in Decem-
ber 1947, no evidence existed of direct contact with Moscow, the Communists followed
the Soviet line meticulously in international affairs, using the Communist Party of
Great Britain as a channel and possibly receiving occasional instructions by way of
Afghanistan or Tibet. Direct contact is now provided by the Soviet Embassy, and the
Ambassador is known to have established clandestine relations with Communist leaders
in India immediately after his arrival.
The Communist Party's current program seeks to increase sentiment against
the US and the UK and to extend its influence with labor and peasant groups. Presum-
ably to strengthen good will among the Indian people, it at first indicated that it would
cooperate with the new Governments of India and Pakistan in the problems confront-
ing them. With the recent appointment of Ranadive as general secretary, however,
the policy of the party is believed to have undergone a revolutionary change, which
has already resulted in activities cited by Prime Minister Nehru as dangerous to India's
security services. It is anticipated that the party, which claims to have recognized
as a mistake its efforts to "differentiate between the various national bourgeois leaders
as progressive, reactionary, and neutral," will now launch its attacks against all mem-
bers of the government and will not support Nehru or spare him from criticism as it
has done in the past.
The Communists face the open hostility of the Congress Party as well as that of
the Moslem League, despite the fact that they have infiltrated into the Congress and
have occasionally influenced its policy. The conservative right wing of the Congress
naturally opposes them, while even extreme left-wing elements are suspicious of their
pro-USSR bias and specifically consider them traitors to the national cause for their
failure to participate in the attempted expulsion of the British in August 1942.
h. The Socialist Republican Party of India.
The most extreme form of nationalistic radicalism to emerge in modern India
was that of Subhas Chandra Bose, a Bengali Hindu who was elected president of the
Congress Party in 1938 and 1939 and then?after being forced by the conservatives to
resign?formed the Forward Bloc as a rallying point for the radicals. Never possessing
strong popular support, the Bloc was composed mainly of Bengalis bound together by
little more than attachment to Bose or dissatisfaction with the Congress Party leader-
ship; Bose himself, after heading the "Free India Government" set up by the Japanese
and (as head of the Indian National Army) participating in the Japanese thrust into
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Manipur in 1944, is believed to have died in a Japanese plane accident. The Socialist
Republican Party, founded in mid-1947, avowedly follows the Forward Bloc's policies
and is led by its late leader's brother, Sarat Chandra Bose. (The Forward Bloc itself,
although never formally disbanded, is not active, and its name is chiefly important as a
rallying cry.) The Socialist Republican Party's principal aims are the creation of a
united India free of all foreign influences; the termination of autocratic rule in the
Princely States; and the organization of India into federated socialist republics set up
on the basis of language. Despite his considerable following in Bengal, Bose's influ-
ence elsewhere is dubious, and his party is important chiefly as a potential nucleus for
extremists, particularly in the event of a campaign against the moneyed, landowning
class. Since his political philosophy is revolutionary, Bose?although a nationalist?
may play along with the Communist Party.
4. MINORITY AND OTHER SPECIAL GROUPS.
a. The Sikhs.
A militant sect that first dissented from Brahmanical Hinduism in the 15th
century under the impact of Islam, the Sikhs constitute a compact, highly volatile
minority of real importance in current Indian politics, despite their numerical insignifi-
cance in terms of over-all Indian population.* Most of the six million Sikhs in India
are concentrated around the principal India-Pakistan frontier?four million of them in
the Punjab and approximately one and one-half million of them in nearby Princely
States. What is more, they possess an intense and belligerent group loyalty and are
noted for the courage and fierceness of their warriors.
Sikh political aspirations have been expressed principally through the
Panthic Akali or Sikh League, which was originally an organization for religious reform.
However, there are also some Congress Party supporters and radical elements among
the Sikhs. Like most of the other groups in India, the Sikhs have favored freedom
from foreign domination; what has distinguished them, however, is their fierce and
virtually unanimous determination that the Moslem League should not dominate them
or their homeland. During British rule, this feeling resulted in general support of the
Congress Party's program (though relatively few Sikhs belonged to it) and in whole-
hearted support of the Congress' efforts to stave off establishment of an independent
Pakistan. Since then, Sikh anti-Moslem sentiment has led to some of the most violent
disturbances which have grown out of the new pattern of Indian government.
With the division of India and the partition of the Punjab, about half of the
four million Punjab Sikhs found themselves on the Pakistan side of the frontier, along
with many of the Sikh holy places. Their group reaction was immediate. Thousands
of Moslems were massacred in Amritsar, and thereafter communal killings on both sides
of the border, by both Sikhs and Moslems, developed to such an extent that millions
of persons were forced to flee from one dominion to the other. (On the Sikhs' part,
the depredations appear to have been well organized, presumably by the Panthic Akali
* The Sikhs, however, make up the fourth largest community in India, being slightly fewer
in number than the politically inconsequential Indian Christians.
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with assistance from the rulers of several of the Sikh Princely States, and were appar-
ently unopposed by Minister of Home Affairs Patel.)
There is reason to believe that many Sikhs ultimately hope for the creation
of an autonomous Sikh state in the central Punjab. Such a territory would include
the several Sikh Princely States and the districts of East and West Punjab, which the
Sikhs regard as their homeland. This solution is unlikely. Pakistan would violently
oppose the cession of vitally important lands to a Sikh state, as would also India. Thus,
unsatisfied Sikh aspirations appear to constitute a long-run problem for both dominions,
not only because of the direct effects of Sikh outbreaks but also because of the spark
such outbreaks would provide to inflammable Hindu-Moslem relations.
b. The Pathans.
The North West Frontier Province contains for Pakistan another continuing
minority problem: that of the Pathans. A wild and sturdy hill folk of the Moslem
faith, the Pathans number about three million and reside in the arid, mountainous
districts along the Pakistan-Afghan frontier. They are closely related to the million
and a half Afghan tribesmen who live on the other side of the border. The fierce inde-
pendence of these people is indicated by the fact that neither the British nor the earlier
Sikh rulers of northwest India were ever able to establish strong direct administration
over their lands. The Pathans are essentially nomadic tribesmen with a questionable
allegiance to any government. Agitation for an independent "Pathanistan" has
recently arisen, fostered by elements in Afghanistan and by anti-Moslem League lead-
ers of the North West Frontier Province, but?except when they are stirred up by reli-
gious fervor?the tribesmen's fundamental interest lies in being permitted to occupy
their lands free of interference and to secure a livelihood. Pakistan's problem is, on
the one hand, to provide sufficient restraint to prevent raids into the settled districts
without undue interference in tribal life, and, on the other, to provide a means of liveli-
hood?by subsidy or otherwise?whereby the tribesmen are not economically pressed
into making raids upon the more prosperous areas to the east and south. Failing
this, increasing restlessness among the tribes would develop, tribal depredations would
be committed further and further afield, and finally all semblance of stability in north-
west Pakistan would disappear.
c. The Indian Princes.
The Dominion of India gained by accession well over 500 principalities, the
rulers of which at first retained their local authority. Under the able direction of
Sardar Patel (who holds among other portfolios that of States Affairs) the Dominion
of India is fast reducing this formerly large number of ruling princes and chieftains
to about 25. This has been accomplished through the amalgamation of many petty
states into new and larger states under constitutions providing governments responsi-
ble to the people of the areas involved, and in some instances (notably n Orissa) through
the incorporation of small states into an adjacent province. While the vast majority
of the princes and chieftains have thus been relieved of their ruling powers, their per-
sonal honors and substantial private incomes have been left to them.
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The princes appear to feel that they have been treated somewhat more gen-
erously than might have been expected, in vliew of the inevitability of reform,
? and hence little opposition to the program has been manifest. They all realize, how-
ever, that to the extent which circumstances permit the Government of India will
abolish even that remnant of the Princely Order which thus far has retained its powers,
and the more powerful and ambitious of the survivors can be expected to cooperate
with the Government of India only on the basis of expediency.
To the extent that the relative power of the Government of India increases,
the princes in question will be amenable to direction from New Delhi. If the Govern-
ment's authority should begin to disintegrate, however, some of the princes will
undoubtedly take steps to further that disintegration. In the event of war or other
crises, none of the princes would immediately manifest disloyalty to the government.
However, many of them would see advantages in a collapse of central authority; if
such a collapse appeared probable, the more powerful princes could be expected to
attempt to augment their personal power instead of bolstering the central government,
even to the extent of using military force to acquire new and larger domains.
Pakistan, on the other hand, does not possess any such potential threat to
its integrity. With the possible exception of the Khan of Kalat, who acceded to Pakis-
tan largely as a result of pressure from Pakistan, exerted through his subjects and
vassals, the acceding princes view the Government of Pakistan as the protector of
their privileges and powers and can be expected in return to give that government their
? firm support.
d. Labor.
The Indian labor movement is still in its infancy; the largest group of labor
unions?the All-India Trade Union Congress?possesses only about half a million
members. In transportation and communications and in the important textile indus-
try, however, the unions have considerable power, which is wielded, for the most part,
by the Communists. Both the Indian National Congress and the Socialist Party are
strenuously endeavoring to supplant the Communists in the trade-union movement
and to that end are supporting, with only moderate success, rival labor groups known
as the Indian National Trade Union Congress and the India Labor Congress, respectively.
?
5. STABILITY OF THE PRESENT REGIMES.
Each dominated by a single party, neither India nor Pakistan faces a serious
internal threat to its political stability at present. A real danger to both does exist,
however, in their continuing mutual hostility. Based on the deep-seated communal
differences which separate Moslems from Hindus and Sikhs, and accentuated by the
bitter communal feeling occasioned by the creation of an independent Pakistan, and
the widespread riots which followed, this hostility has been especially evident in inter-
dominion rivalry over certain Princely States.
The strategically important and predominantly Moslem State of Kashmir is the
notable example of this rivalry. In late September 1947, a Moslem revolt broke out in
the Poonch district and resulted in the formation of the Azad Kashmir Government
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(under the leadership of Mohammed Ibrahim Khan) . This government declared its
intention of acceding to Pakistan. Although the Maharajah's troops attempted to
quell the revolt, popular demand for accession to Pakistan within Poonch and neigh-
boring districts continued to grow. In October when it seemed probable that the
Hindu Maharajah of Kashmir might accede to India, well armed Pathans and other
Moslem tribesmen swarmed out of Pakistan into western Kashmir in support of the
Azad group. The Maharajah hastily acceded to India and requested Indian aid, which
was furnished immediately in the form of Indian troops. With India and Pakistan
backing rival parties in the state, continuing armed conflict has resulted. The Kash-
mir case was placed before the UN Security Council in January 1948. After months of
discussion the SC decided to establish a Kashmir Commission to investigate the dispute.
There is no indication that a solution acceptable to both sides will be achieved in the
near future.*
Another point of issue is Junagadh State, on the Kathiawar peninsula, which orig-
inally acceded to Pakistan but, after the subsequent flight of its ruler, came under
the control of India. Junagadh is not important enough to tempt Pakistan to go to
war, but India's ultimate acquisition of this state in what Pakistan considers to have
been a highly improper and illegal manner will continue to rankle with the Pakistan
Government.
Hyderabad's one-year "standstill agreement" with India, negotiated in November
1947, was intended to postpone the issue of accession. However, India's determination
to obtain Hyderabad's accession (and Congress Party agitation in Hyderabad) con-
tinues, while the state's Moslem government, which bitterly opposes accession, has
looked toward Pakistan as a potential champion. Hyderabad's Razakar extremists
have raided Indian territory and assaulted Hindu travelers inside Hyderabad. India
in turn has applied economic blockade against the land-locked state and has hinted
armed intervention. Both governments have issued sharp accusations and recrimina-
tions, with the result that negotiations have broken down and the relationship between
the two governments has deteriorated. Thus the Hyderabad case might come to rival
the Kashmir situation in urgency and might be brought before the UN.
While war between the dominions has threatened almost since their establishment,
there are powerful deterrents from the point of view of both governments. First among
these is the realization that, regardless of the outcome, a war would have extremely
serious social and economic consequences to both and, in view of the increasing dis-
regard for law and order since the departure of the British, might result in anarchy
throughout the subcontinent. A second factor of importance is the apparent realiza-
tion by Pakistan, which considers itself the more aggrieved party, that India now pos-
sesses a decided military superiority. A third factor of consequence is the sensitivity
of both governments to world opinion and the realization that an internecine war
would result in great loss of prestige abroad by the Indian peoples.
Despite full appreciation by both sides of the disadvantages of war, the possibility
that open conflict will develop between the two dominions cannot be entirely discounted.
* See also Section 111-4.
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Either India's need for prompt, successful termination of its military activities in
Kashmir or depredations by tribesmen into Indian territory might result in Indian
Army attacks against concentrations of tribesmen in Pakistan, almost certainly entail-
ing retaliatory action by the Pakistan Army. There exists also the possibility of new
flare-ups between the Hindu and Moslem communities living side by side throughout
both dominions, or of Sikh incursions in force into West Punjab, in retaliation for
what they will long consider as the theft of much of their homeland. Communal war-
fare could thereby develop, despite the governments' best efforts, into full-scale conflict.
The division of India into two sovereign states has raised economic and financial
problems which also might lead to crises of the first magnitude, particularly if aggra-
vated by economic sanctions by one dominion against the other. The predominantly
more agricultural Pakistan, while capable of feeding its own population, will be weak
in government finances until it develops its tax-collection system. In addition Pakis-
tan badly needs coal and cloth from India, while India needs food and other items of
agricultural produce from Pakistan. Ill will and suspicion on the part of the two
governments continue to hamper the exchange of these items and thus to aggravate
the resentment already existing.
A contributing but less important factor making for political instability is the
nationalistic desire to throw off all vestiges of dependence on the British. This feeling
has resulted, especially in the Dominion of India, in the premature dismissal of most
British officials and a consequent weakening of administration.
Assuming that Pakistan survives the dangers presented by its economic and finan-
cial problems and by the possibility of war with India, its present ruling group may be
expected to remain in power for a long time. The leadership of Jinnah and his lieu-
tenants is at present unchallenged: there is no significant opposition group to focus
criticism on the government or to take power itself. Furthermore, although the retire-
ment or death of the 72-year-old Jinnah would be a severe blow to the government,
Moslem League leaders (most of them from the well-to-do landowning class) appear
to agree generally on both political and economic issues, thus assuring a continuity
of policy.
India presents a different picture because of cleavages both within the Congress
Party and within the dominion at large. The liberalism of Prime Minister Nehru
seriously weakens the personal support which, as India's leading statesman, he would
otherwise receive from the conservative and capitalistic elements within the Congress,
headed by party boss Patel. (Patel is Deputy Prime Minister and holder of the impor-
tant office of Minister of Home Affairs.) Similarly, Nehru's non-communal attitude
antagonizes the large and influential element (with which Patel is also sympathetic)
which believes that India should be governed in a manner primarily advantageous to
the Hindus. With Gandhi's support of Nehru now removed, reactionary elements in
the party might utilize a crisis brought about by reverses in Kashmir, communal dis-
order, or economic distress to oust Nehru from the premiership. Acquisition of com-
plete control of the government by those elements would, of course, result in the
heightened hostility of all left-wing groups and would increase the government's diffi-
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culty in maintaining law and order throughout the country. At the same time, the
increased official emphasis on Hinduism which would result from Nehru's displace-
ment by Patel or by any other representative of the reactionary groups would damage
Hindu-Moslem relations on both the inter-dominion and local communal levels.
Conversely, those sympathetic to Nehru's liberalism, both in and out of the Con-
gress Party, also constitute a potential source of opposition to his administration,
because of the influence wielded in it by Patel and other conservatives. However, none
of the Indian factions can make a direct appeal to the people until the first elections
are held under the new constitution (which from present indications will not be oper-
ative for another year) . Until then the cabinet is responsible only to the Constituent
Assembly chosen in the summer of 1947. Hence, unless some cataclysm such as war
results in the breakdown of all authority, any change in India's government before the
new constitution becomes operative will be within the framework of the Congress
Party as now constituted, with Congress control of the country continuing. The prob-
lem of winning new elections, when it arises, can be expected to induce a shift from
the present composition of the Congress and the Indian Government, with conserva-
tive influences displayed by those of the growing left wing. The death of Patel, who
is now in ill health, would make such a change especially likely.
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SECTION II
ECONOMIC SITUATION
1. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT ECONOMIC SITUATION.
In spite of their more than 1,500,000 square miles of territory and the possibilities
for the creation of wealth contained in their varied natural resources and fertile lands,
India and Pakistan are in most respects extremely poor countries. Ravaged by periodic
famines taking a total of millions of lives, the two dominions face the fundamental
problem of raising the standard of living of their people, most of whom live in abject
poverty. Until this is accomplished, there is scant possibility of their assuming
positions of power in the world.
Developed as a colonial area, though never technically a colony, the Indian Empire
remained largely a producer of raw materials, with textile and iron and steel manufac-
ture the only industries developed on a scale comparable to that of the western world.
In the division of India into the Dominions of India and Pakistan, the Dominion of
India obtained almost all areas in which industrial development of any sort had taken
place and almost all of the subcontinent's mineral resources.
The dominant feature of the two dominions' economy is agriculture, upon which
approximately 75 percent of the population depend directly for a livelihood. Two
factors conspicuously affect this economy: (1) the monsoon rains (upon whose time-
liness and adequacy the yield of agr!cultural products depends) ; and (2) the persistent
demand of the outside world for India's raw produce. When the rains fail, as they do
occasionally, the periodic famines develop which have plagued India throughout its
history. In general, however, there is a surplus of most items of produce other than
food, and a ready market always exists for India's jute, cotton, oil seeds, hides, and
other raw materials. In return, the subcontinent absorbs large quantities of oil,
machinery, certain metals, and many types of manufactured goods. A considerable
quantity of food, mostly rice, must be imported, for even in the years of good harvest
there is not sufficient grain produced to feed the Indian population. With partition,
Pakistan has emerged as a surplus food area, with the deficit of the Dominion of
India increased accordingly.
To what extent the new governments will endeavor to exercise economic control
is as yet undetermined. The old Government of India exercised widespread control in
many fields, and there is every reason to believe that the new governments likewise
will undertake to direct the respective economies of the two countries, with the state
controlling such vital industries as transportation and communications. The need
for outside capital (especially in Pakistan) can be expected, however, to assure the
continuation and encouragement of private enterprise in many fields. In both domin-
ions such control as may be adopted will be occasioned by governmental realization
of the economic backwardness of the country and by the belief that economic advance-
ment can best be assured through state control and direction. Socialistic ideology will
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play a greater part in the Dominion of India than in Pakistan, and should the leftist
political groups there gain control, an advanced form of socialism may be invoked.
In Pakistan, the objective is expected to be purely that of increasing the strength and
well-being of the country generally, and the means adopted may be similar to Turkey's
policy of "etatism." In the Dominion of India the procedure followed will probably
be the result of popular demand; in Pakistan, it will be that deemed best by the
chosen leaders of the country.
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE PRESENT ECONOMIC SYSTEM.
a. Agriculture.
The total area of cultivable lands in India and Pakistan is about 358 million
acres exclusive of forest area, which accounts for about 250 million acres. The great
bulk of the agricultural effort is carried out in small plots of ground cultivated by
peasant farmers, constituting about 80 percent of the population. Each farm tends to
be a self-sufficient unit, with but a comparatively small proportion of the cultivated
area utilized for the so-called cash crops such as jute, cotton, and tobacco. Crop yield
is extremely low, principally because of the cultivators' financial inability to use suf-
ficient fertilizer or to employ modern agricultural implements. Thus an acre of land
in India normally produces only about two-fifths of the cotton, one-half of the rice, and
three-fourths of the wheat produced by an acre in the US.
(1) Food Crops.
(a) Rice.
Although rice is the crop cultivated most extensively on the sub-
continent, occupying about 28 percent of the total cultivated area, production has
never been sufficient to feed the population satisfactorily. Annual prewar importations
varied from one and one-half to two and one-fourth million tons, or on the average
about 9 percent of total rice utilization. These importations were secured for the most
part from Burma, Siam, and French Indochina.
With a population ratio to the Dominion of India of roughly 1 to 4,
the area that is now Pakistan produced in 1944-45 approximately 32 percent of the
total rice crop of British India. Pakistan will normally have a considerable surplus
available for export.
(b) Wheat.
Wheat accounts for about 10 percent of the total area under culti-
vation in India and Pakistan combined. Production has normally ,been sufficient to
meet the subcontinent's needs with a small exportable surplus in good years. Nearly
42 percent of the total British India production for the year 1944-45 was produced in
the area that is now Pakistan; hence Pakistan's exportable surplus of this grain will
normally be large.
(c) Minor Cereals.
Statistics for the production of most of the minor cereals are not
available. Pakistan is, however, also a large producer of these food items. Its produc-
tion of corn is roughly 22 percent of the total.
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(d) Sugar.
Sheltered behind adequate tariff protection, the Indian sugar in-
dustry made phenomenal progress in the years immediately preceding World War II.
The self-sufficiency with regard to sugar thus obtained has not been maintained,
however. Current demand is considerably in excess of production, which in 1946-47
amounted to 921,177 tons for India and Pakistan combined. While Pakistan produces
about one-eighth of the sugar cane, only 19,487 tons were refined in Pakistan. Thirty
thousand tons of Cuban sugar were imported into India during 1947.
(e) Oilseeds.
Oilseed production in British India covered 23 million acres, fur-
nishing an important article of export and certain essential items for the Indian diet.
Pakistan's production of oilseeds amounts to only about 6 percent of the whole.
(f) Tea.
While not a food product in the true sense of the word, tea was
British India's largest so-called item of food export and is the subcontinent's most im-
portant plantation crop. All-India production approximates 580 million pounds, of
which about 440 million pounds are available for export. Pakistan's surplus is esti-
mated at about 30 million pounds.
(2) Non-Food Crops.
Of the non-food crops, those important to the economies of Pakistan
and India are cotton, jute, and tobacco. The subcontinent also produces a small
? amount of rubber.
(a) Cotton.
India as a whole has been the world's second largest producer of
cotton, with annual prewar production averaging about 6.4 million bales.* The area
that is now Pakistan produces about 35 percent, and, in addition, the best varieties of
Indian cotton are grown almost exclusively there. In spite of the considerable quantity
of over one-inch staple cotton available in Pakistan, India as a whole has a deficiency
in the long-staple varieties and imports annually about 500,000 bales, mostly from
Egypt. It also imports some cotton from the Sudan and East Africa.
(b) Jute.
The subcontinent of India is the source of from 97 to 99 percent
of the world's supply of jute, which constituted British India's largest export. Average
prewar annual production approximated 8.2 million bales. Of this total, Pakistan
produces about 73 percent.
(c) Tobacco.
British India annually produced about half a million tons of dried
tobacco leaf, almost all of which was manufactured and consumed locally. Pakistan's
production amounts to about 30 percent of the whole.
(d) Rubber.
India produces small quantities of crude rubber in the Malabar
districts of Madras and in Assam. Normal annual production is 16,000 tons, consider-
* A bale amounts to 400 pounds net weight.
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ably less than normal minimum requirements. Pakistan produces no rubber. Both
dominions have, however, a convenient source of supply in Ceylon.
b. Natural Resources.
The subcontinent's natural resources consist not only of the ability of its land
to produce huge and varied crops, its large forest areas, and, in some localities, water
power of great potential, but also of large and valuable mineral deposits. As mentioned
previously, however, these deposits are located almost entirely in the Dominion of India.
(1) Mineral Resources (India).
The Dominion of India enjoys a comparatively strong position with regard
to mineral resources. These resources can be divided into the following four categories:
(a) Minerals of which India's supply is far beyond foreseeable needs?
iron ore, titanium ore, and mica.
(b) Minerals of which the exportable surplus forms an important fac-
tor?manganese ore, magnite (kyanite), steatite, talc, silica, gypsum, beryl, monazite
(the thorium-producing ore of Travancore), zircon, corundum, and cement materials.
(c) Minerals in which India appears at present to be self-sustaining?
coal, aluminum ore, gold, mineral pigments, and phosphates.
(d) Minerals for which India has to depend largely or entirely on for-
eign imports?copper ore, silver, nickel, cobalt, petroleum, sulphur, lead, zinc, tin,
fluorite, mercury, tungsten, vanadium, molybdenum, platinum, graphite, asphalt, pot-
ash, and chromite. (Chromite and sulphur are available in Pakistan.)
Iron Ore. India is the second largest producer of iron ore in the
British Empire, being exceeded only by the UK. About 3 million tons are mined an-
nually in India. Mining operations center chiefly in the Singhbum district of West
Bengal and in nearby states, although small quantities are also mined in Mysore. The
reserves of iron ore in India are probably the largest in the world and are said to be
superior in quality to those of any other country. In the Singhbum district alone the
reserves of iron ore with an iron content in excess of 60 percent are estimated at not
less than 3 billion tons and may amount to as much as 20 billion tons. In Bastar State
the resources are estimated at 724 million tons of high-quality ore. There are also
important deposits in neighboring districts of the Central Provinces, one of which in
the Rajhana Hills is estimated to contain two and one-half million tons of ore with a
671/2 percent iron content.
Coal. The largest mineral product of India is coal, the annual
output of which amounts to approximately 25 million tons. Although India has ex-
ported considerable coal in the past, the known reserves are not sufficient to warrant
the production of more coal than is actually needed to fill India's own demands. The
coal resources of Bengal and Bihar have been estimated at 60 billion tons, of which 20
billion are considered workable, and reserves in the Central Provinces and Berar have
been established at 17 billion tons, of which 5.15 billion are considered workable. In
addition there are coal reserves ranging from 60 to 80 million tons in the Langrin
plateau of Assam, and 70 million tons in Nongstoin. Reserves of coal suitable for the
manufacture of metallurgical coke have been established at only 500 million tons, of
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which approximately one-half will be lost in the process of mining under existing
conditions. These reserves are being consumed at an annual rate of 15 million tons
and are used largely for purposes other than the manufacture of coke. Should the
reserves of coal suitable for the manufacture of coke be developed exclusively for that
purpose, they would last for many years, even though the production of iron and steel
were greatly increased. The coking coal of India, although suitable for smelting
purposes, is not of the best quality, having a substantial ash residue. Of the annual
coal production of India, approximately two million tons are annually exported.
Titanium. Titanium occurs in India in the form of a double oxide
of iron and titanium known as ilmenite. Before World War II, most of the world's
supply of ilmenite came from Travancore, where it occurs in the sea and along the
coast. The ilmenite sands of Travancore vary somewhat in metallic content and cover
a large area which extends some distance beyond the actual beach and several miles
along the coast. Production in 1940 amounted to 236,152 long tons and exports to-
taled 200,490 tons.
Mica. India is the world's largest producer of block and sheet mica,
and is dominant in the production of mica splittings. The entire output of the Indian
mines is exported. Production in 1943-44 exceeded 16 million pounds and in the
record year of 1937 amounted to 33? million pounds.
Manganese Ore. India customarily accounts for about 30 percent
? of the world's output of manganese ore (the USSR is the largest producer, India the
second largest). Nearly 1 million tons have been mined in a single year. The iron and
steel industry of India consumes normally about 60,000 tons. The chief mining areas
are the Balaghat, Bhandara, and Nagpur districts of the Central Provinces; others in-
clude Sandar (one of the Madras States), Keonjhar and Bonai among the Eastern
States, Singhbum in Bihar, and the north Kanara and Panch Mahalo districts of
Bombay and Mysore. Reserves are believed to amount to 87 million tons.
Bauxite. There are substantial deposits of bauxite in India; re-
serves are estimated at about 250 million tons and are located principally in Bihar, the
Central Provinces, and Bombay. There are also small deposits in Madras. The bet-
ter grades of bauxite have an average alumina content of 55 percent. One of the de-
posits in the provinces of Bombay contains 750,000 tons of bauxite with an average
alumina content of 49 percent.
Monazite, Ilmenite, Rutile, and Zircon. India is the principal
source of monazite and has provided the bulk of the world's production. Monazite
occurs in the beach sands on the coasts of Travancore and Madras, along with ilmenite,
rutile, and zircon. Since monazite is the principal source of thorium, its strategic
value has greatly increased since the introduction of atomic fission for military pur-
poses. It is also a source of cerium and other rare metals which are essential to the
? production of certain optical glasses and lighter flints. All export of monazite, as in
the case of other metals found in Travancore, is subject to control by the Travancore
Government.
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Beryl. India is one of the two principal sources of supply for beryl
(Brazil is the other). The deposits are mainly in Rajputana. Beryl is used in the
production of beryllium alloys which have the remarkable characteristics of being
non-corrosive, non-sparking, non-magnetic, and highly resistant to fatigue. These
alloys were used extensively during the last war in the manufacture of aeronautical
instruments.
Corundum. This mineral, ranking next to the diamond in hard-
ness and of use in the abrasive industry, is mined in Madras, where the output is con-
sumed by local abrasive manufacturers. Deposits also exist in Rewa State and in
Mysore.
Kyanite. This aluminum silicate is used in the manufacture of
certain high-temperature refractories. Deposits occur in Bihar and Orissa and to a
less extent in Assam, Mysore, and central and northern India. India is the principal
foreign source of the US supply of kyanite; present indications are that there will be
no decrease in the US demand for Indian kyanite.
Chromite. There are deposits of chromite (the oxide of chromium
and iron) in Bihar, the Eastern States, Bombay, and Mysore. Before partition, these
deposits produced only about 5,000 tons annually. Indian consumption at that time
amounted to about 12,000 tons. Large deposits exist, however, in nearby Pakistan.
Petroleum. Of the two exploited fields in former British India, the
largest is the Digboi field located in Assam in what is now the Dominion of India. The
approximately 1,850,000 barrels produced annually in this field and the approximately
300,000 barrels produced annually in what is now Pakistan constitute only about 10
percent of British India's former requirements. Imports before the war were obtained
from Burma, the Netherlands Indies, and Iran, and substantial quantities of lubricat'ng
oil were obtained from the US.
(2) Mineral Resources (Pakistan).
Pakistan has emerged as a country almost devoid of known mineral re-
sources. It produces small quantities of coal and petroleum and has an excess only
of chromite and sulphur. According to the Geological Survey of India, its known de-
posits consist only of coal, sulphur, and petroleum.
Coal. Pakistan produces annually less than 200,000 tons of coal, and
known but unworked deposits within the country are so difficult to exploit that their
operation is not feasible at this time. Hence, Pakistan must look to the Dominion of
India for most of its coal needs.
Petroleum. The only oil field which it has thus far been feasible to ex-
ploit in Pakistan is one located at Attock in West Punjab, which produces only about
600,000 barrels annually.
Chromite. Pakistan possesses large chromite deposits in Baluchistan.
Annual production is in excess of 20 thousand tons and could be greatly increased. As
Pakistan possesses no metallurgical industries, the entire output is available for export.
Sulphur. Sulphur deposits exist in Baluchistan. Annual production of
sulphur ore amounts to about 12,000 tons.
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c. Industries.
As earlier mentioned, such industrial development as took place in British
India occurred almost exclusively in what is now the Dominion of India. There manu-
facturing enterprises have in recent years multiplied and spread, and every year are
affecting to an increasing degree the lives of the people. The greatest impetus to
India's industrial initiative came as a result of World War II. During this period many
new and varied enterprises were added to the staple industries, which were rapidly
expanded to meet the ever-growing war demand. Strong nationalist sentiment in
favor of economic self-sufficiency and a tariff policy supporting that sentiment may be
expected to result in further development of India's manufacturing industries. In
relation to its size and population, however, industrial development is slight in India
as well as in Pakistan.
The following table, which lists all the manufacturing industries of any size
in each dominion at the time of partition, indicates the extent of industrial develop-
ment within the two countries:?
INDIA
PAKISTAN
No. of
factories
Percentage
No. of
factories
Percentage
Cotton Mills
857
99
15
1
Jute Mills
111
100
Sugar Mills
176
92
15
8
Iron & Steel Mills
36
100
Cement Works
57
88
8
12
Paper Mills
19
100
Glass Works
112
96
5
4
The iron and steel industry, the cotton textile industry, and the jute industry
may be considered the most important.
(1) Iron and Steel.
India has an efficiently operated steel industry and possesses within its
borders all of the raw materials essential for the manufacture of steel. In 1939, it pro-
duced 1,757,000 tons of pig iron, of which 893,000 tons were used locally in the pro-
duction of steel. Steel production for the same year amounted to 742,000 tons. Dur-
ing the war, iron and steel production nearly doubled, with exports of pig iron reduced
to approximately one-third of the prewar quantity. The Tata Iron and Steel Com-
pany, located about 150 miles west of Calcutta at Jamshedpur, accounts for about 75
percent of the total steel production of India, and is the largest single steel plant in
the British Empire. The Steel Corporation of Bengal has the second largest plant in
India and accounts for about 17 percent of the country's production. The Government
Metal and Steel Factory at Ishapore is the third largest steel plant but during the war
produced only high-quality steel for armament. The fourth largest steel plant is the
Mysore Iron and Steel Works, which annually produces 25,000 tons of light structural
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shapes and bars. There are also small mills which operate partially or wholly on
scrap and which produce light shapes and bars chiefly for the bazaar trade. There is
currently a serious shortage of scrap iron.
(2) Cotton Textiles.
Before the war about half of the cotton produced in India was used by
local textile mills and the remainder exported, principally to Japan. Annual output
amounted to about six billion yards of cloth. The industry is centered in the province
of Bombay, which accounts for approximately two-thirds of the total production. The
two principal centers of production in the province are the cities of Bombay and Ahma-
bed. In addition to the six billion yards of cloth produced in the mills, another two
billion yards are normally produced by hand looms throughout the country. At the
present time production is insufficient to meet local requirements.
(3) Jute.
About half of the Indian jute crop is processed in India for shipment
abroad. While East Bengal in Pakistan produces 73 percent of the raw jute, all of
the jute mills, employing about one-quarter million workers, are located in the Calcutta
area of India. For the most part even the raw jute must be compressed at or near
Calcutta for shipment abroad. It is Pakistan's avowed intention to install compresses
and to build mills of its own near Chittagong in order to secure for itself, and to deny
India, the profit. Until compressing machinery can be secured and the new mills
built, however, interdependence prevails between the jute interests of East and West
Bengal. The determination of the former to end this relationship as expeditiously as
possible, with the maximum rather than the minimum dislocation to the West Bengal
interests, constitutes a serious source of friction between the two dominions.
d. Finance.
(1) India.
India emerged from World War II in what was believed to be an extremely
satisfactory financial condition, largely because of its acquisition of about ?1,600,000,000
in sterling credits, to its normally favorable balance of trade, and to its traditional
ability to balance its budget satisfactorily. Developments since the war, however, in-
dicate that India's financial position is considerably less favorable than had been
believed. It is now evident that the sterling balances will be available for conversion
in only very small installments, and that their utilization even for the procurement of
goods from the UK must be extremely limited. India's ability to purchase needed
capital goods abroad has therefore been seriously curtailed, unless resort is made to
foreign loans. Furthermore, necessarily heavy expenditures for food and decreasing
production of raw materials at home have already created a substantial adverse bal-
ance of trade and a dollar shortage. Labor unrest is having an increasingly adverse
effect on India's manufacturing enterprises. In addition, the separation of Pakistan
from the remainder of India has created a serious economic dislocation which materially
reduces revenue and internal production. The borrowing capacity of the Government
of India, however, still remains high in both the foreign and domestic fields.
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The danger to the finances of the Government of India rests in the pos-
sibility of a serious economic depression which might result from increasing labor
troubles, transportation difficulties, and disorder generally throughout the country.
Its sources of revenue, in order of importance, are customs, personal income taxes,
corporation taxes, and excise duties.
(2) Pakistan.
The immediate financial situation of Pakistan is considerably more pre-
carious than that of India. With its wealth mainly concentrated in landed estates,
with almost no industries, and with relatively fewer imports than India, Pakistan
must obtain its revenues largely from agricultural sources and from export duties on
jute and possibly other items of agricultural produce. Since partition, the disorgani-
zation resulting from communal disorders and also the flight of millions of Sikhs and
Hindus (who thereby deprived Pakistan of their capital and their services) have both
reduced the sources of revenue and made the collection of taxes extremely difficult.
Before partition, Government of India revenues from areas now constituting Pakistan
amounted to about 20 percent of the total. This revenue, supplemented by export
taxes, would normally meet the government's requirements. Under existing condi-
tions, however, it is unlikely that Pakistan can obtain as much revenue as its territory
formerly provided British India.
e. International Trade.
(1) India.
In view of the steady demand abroad for its raw produce and the low
standard of living of its population, for which only food and cloth constitute essential
items, India normally has had a substantial favorable balance of trade. This situation
could be changed by either of two factors: (1) the existence of chaotic conditions in-
creasing the need for foreign grain and reducing the production of exportable raw
produce; and (2) the importation of large quantities of capital goods for industrial
development of the country, as planned by the Congress Party and Indian nationalists
generally. Government of India authorities believe that such expenditures can be
financed by the UK, the US, or one of the international monetary agencies.
India's external trade is world-wide, and hence India is not economically
dependent upon any one country, nor is any one country economically dependent on it.
(2) Pakistan.
Possessing normally large agricultural surpluses, including food, and
(because of the primitive manner of life of its inhabitants) requiring few imports in
large quantity other than cloth and coal, Pakistan is assured of a highly favorable
balance of trade under ordinary conditions. However, serious economic dislocation
and political disorganization make it impossible to estimate the extent of Pakistan's
international trade in the immediate future.
Although the economies of Pakistan and India complement each other
in many important respects, making mutual interchange of goods on a large scale
between the two both possible and desirable, current antagonism between the govern-
ments and peoples of the two countries is such that comprehensive economic coopera-
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tion may not soon develop. Since markets for its produce exist throughout the world
and since its requirements can ordinarily be procured from sources other than India,
Pakistan is not economically dependent upon any particular country.
3. ECONOMIC STABILITY.
The economic strength of India and of Pakistan is similar: both can normally ex-
port large quantities of raw materials for which there is a world-wide demand. In both
instances they are weakened by industrial under-development, especially marked in
Pakistan, which requires the importation of most manufactured articles and, in the
case of Pakistan, of almost all minerals including coal. However, so primitive is the
manner of life of the vast majority of the population in both countries that most im-
ports could be curtailed without immediately affecting seriously more than a small
percentage of the people.
Nevertheless, the economic position of neither dominion is healthy at the present
time, and each may require assistance from foreign sources, presumably the US. Bad
harvests have accentuated the chronic food shortage of the Dominion of India, necessi-
tating the expenditure of huge sums abroad for grain. A shortage of dollars is seri-
ously restricting the importation of most articles on which import duty is paid and is
therefore cutting down government revenues. Communist-encouraged labor unrest
and undiscipline, transportation difficulties, and business dislocation resulting from
partition threaten India with a serious industrial and commercial depression, which
would further decrease corporation and individual incomes and in turn reduce govern-
ment tax revenues. Increasing social unrest among the population generally, result-
ing from the prevailing low standard of living and the widespread dissemination of
radical theories, threatens to result in political disorder unless the well-being of the
people generally can be increased. An improvement in the standard of living ap-
pears attainable only through large-scale capital expenditure by the government as
well as by private enterprise, and substantial loans from abroad may be required for
such a purpose.
Because of depletion of income in many parts of Pakistan and the government's
current problems in collecting taxes, Pakistan is experiencing difficulty in paying its
troops and civil servants, in maintaining transportation and other essential services,
and in successfully settling the millions of refugees from India upon the vital farm lands
of West Punjab. Without adequate financial facilities it may need foreign loans in
the present crisis. Furthermore, capital improvements on a large scale are necessary
to permit the degree of prosperity in the country essential to assure stability and to
permit the government to meet its heavy military responsibilities along the northwest
frontier.
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SECTION III
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
India and Pakistan, having attained independent nationhood only on 15 August
1947, have, of course, no tradition of foreign policy other than that inherited from
British India. The foreign policy now to be followed by the two dominions has scarcely
been formulated, and hence any discussion on the subject is necessarily speculative.
There are indications, however, which permit speculation and which suggest that the
foreign policy of the two nations will not be identical.
1. PAKISTAN.
a. General.
It is apparent that Pakistan, a predominantly Moslem country whose consti-
tution is to be based on Koranic law, will look more to the West than will India, and
will feel a greater affinity for the Moslem states of the Middle East than for the purely
Asiatic peoples to the south and east. It should be borne in mind, however, that pan-
Islamic sentiment has not been strong among the Indian Moslems, and hence inde-
pendence of action can be expected of Pakistan in its relations with other Moslem
countries. Pakistan's strong statements against the partition of Palestine as proposed
by the UN, and even such action as Pakistan may take in the matter in cooperation
with the Arab states, are believed to result more from a desire to curry favor with the
Moslem world than from any deep feeling for the Palestine Arabs.
British influence in Pakistan, where the continued employment of many Brit-
ish officials is probable, can be expected to prevail to a much greater extent than in
India because antipathy toward the British has never been so great among the Indian
Moslems as among the Hindus.
Hostile to Communism, aware of the vulnerability of its northwest frontier,
feeling no great unfriendliness toward the UK, and viewing the US as a power from
which much help (economic and otherwise) may be obtained, Pakistan can be expected
to adopt a cooperative attitude toward both the US and the UK, and in the event of
involvement in a world conflict to align itself with the US and UK against the USSR.*
Racial consciousness is, however, prevalent among the Pakistanis as well as among the
Indians, and hence where European domination of other Asiatic peoples appears to be
the principal issue, Pakistan's support for the Asiatic can be anticipated.
b. Relations with Afghanistan.
Pakistan's relations with its neighbor, Afghanistan, presents it with an im-
mediate problem in the field of foreign affairs. As earlier mentioned, the Pathan
tribesmen of the North West Frontier Province hold but a doubtful allegiance to the
* Pakistan's belated establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR in May 1948 probably
stemmed from disgruntlement over the US position on Kashmir and was intended to indicate
that the US should not take Pakistan for granted.
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Government of Pakistan and in their tribal relations recognize no frontier. These
people number about 3 million and are closely related to an additional 11/2 million
tribesmen on the Afghan side of the border. They thus constitute both a source of
strength for, and a threat to, the Afghan Government.
The administrative procedure adopted by the British while in control of
India assured the continued existence of the tribes as a group distinct from the people
to the east, who whether Moslem or non-Moslem are viewed with disdain by Afghans
and tribesmen alike. With the British gone and a Moslem Government of Pakistan
established, the Afghans fear that the interests of the tribes may eventually merge
sufficiently with those of Pakistan to destroy the feeling of kinship now prevailing
between the tribesmen and Afghans generally, thus weakening Afghanistan's military
potential. The tribes, on their part, have shown a marked disinclination to accept even
the limited degree of authority which had been imposed by the British, now that
Punj abs and Sindhis are in control of the government claiming sovereignty over their
lands. The resistance of the frontier tribes is generally considered to have been
largely responsible for Afghanistan's successful opposition to British encroachment.
In the early summer of 1947, immediately upon announcement that the
British would withdraw from India, agitation arose among the tribes for some form
of autonomy, and the support of the Afghan Government was solicited as a return for
past favors. It is reported that coupled with this request was a threat by the tribes
against the government in Kabul (whose overthrow is believed to be within the capa-
bilities of the tribes).
The Government of Afghanistan, therefore, championed the tribal issue and,
as a condition for the exchange of diplomatic missions and the maintenance of friendly
relations, demanded that Pakistan agree by treaty to the creation of an autonomous
Pathan "country" within Pakistan embodying what is now the North West Frontier
Province and northern Baluchistan. This demand was refused by the Government
of Pakistan, but the Afghan Government dropped the matter, perhaps because of
Pakistan's adoption of a "hands off" policy toward the tribes whereby virtual autonomy
was granted them, as well as because of Afghan dependence on Pakistan as its principal
outlet to the sea. Diplomatic relations are now established between the two countries,
and there is some indication that the tribes themselves are becoming more willing
to acknowledge formal allegiance to Pakistan. Nevertheless, the basic sources of
friction remain, and some agitation on the tribal issue can be expected to continue.
Should later difficulties develop between the tribes and the Pakistan Government,
Afghan involvement can again be expected.
2. INDIA.
a. General.
Aware that its culture, except for superficial aspects imposed by the British,
is almost completely oriental, proud in the memory of ancient glories, and ambitious
to be the leader of a resurgent Asia, India can be expected to be oriental in its outlook.
While commercial connections, economic traditions, and acquaintance with British
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political institutions constitute a continuing tie with the UK, the considerable hos-
tility toward the British which remains in India will render that dominion likely to
cooperate with the UK only to the extent which appears clearly advantageous to it.
British intentions in the East remain suspect, and the Indian's belief that imperialism
is a basic concept of British foreign policy further decreases the probability of cordial
Anglo-Indian relations in the immediate future. Despite great admiration for many
US accomplishments and appreciation of the value of the US as a friend, a strong
suspicion exists in India that the US possesses the rapacious tendencies attributed to
the British, and that in its foreign policy the US merely substitutes economic im-
perialism for the political imperialism so long practiced by the UK. India also scru-
tinizes critically US policy regarding such colonial areas as Indonesia and French Indo-
china. Thus, collaboration by India with the US likewise may be expected, for the
present at least, to be based on ad hoc considerations rather than on a conviction of
fundamental accord.
b. Relations with the USSR.
Particularly in the period immediately following India's attainment of inde-
pendence, many influential Indians believed that discord between the US-UK bloc
and the USSR did not materially affect India and that Soviet influence and support
might advantageously be utilized in connection with India's desire to champion all
Asiatic and colonial peoples in their efforts for advancement and freedom. In big
power politics India has attempted to maintain a neutral position, and the Indian
Prime Minister has publicly announced on various occasions that India would align
itself with neither the Sovfet nor the Anglo-US bloc but would attempt to act as a
bridge between the two points of view.
While this remains the official Indian position, it is apparent that the
present leaders in the Government of India are becoming increasingly dissillusioned
about India's ability either to maintain a position of neutrality indefinitely or to main-
tain its present status if the area of Soviet political domination is materially enlarged.
If world conflict develops, the growing conviction among India's present
leaders that Soviet victory over the Western world would jeopardize India's own inde-
pendence can be expected to result (after an initial attempt at continued neutrality)
!n India's alignment with the US and the UK. However, Communist strength in
certain key industries (e.g., shipping and transportation maintenance) and among
discontented elements throughout the country is such that Communist strikes and
sabotage might bring about the collapse of the government shortly thereafter, with
India's usefulness to the US and the UK nullified by the ensuing chaos.
c. Relations with the Orient.
India's current ambition is the attainment of a dominant role among the
peoples of Southeast Asia. This has been evidenced in the encouragement of regional
conferences under Indian auspices, in a conciliatory attitude towards Burma and
Ceylon, in official utterances of sympathy for the Indonesian and Vietnamese, in
restrictive measures against the flight over India of Dutch and French airplanes, in
support of Indonesia in the UN, and in official and private protestations of Indian
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concern for and support of what might be called an Asiatic renaissance. Efforts in
this direction have been impeded both by India's preoccupation with the Kashmir
dispute and with intra India-Pakistan affairs, and by a lack of enthusiasm among
other Asiatic nations?including, of course, China?about India's claims to preemi-
nence. Whether India will eventually be able to attain the position of leadership
in Asiatic affairs to which it aspires will depend primarily on its ability to render its
own domains stable and upon the willingness of its somewhat skeptical neighbors to
accept Indian influence as benevolent. In the long run, the ability of the developing
Indian economy to supplant the US and the UK in commercial leadership will also
help determine India's political role in the Far East.
3. RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN.
Of greatest importance in their foreign relations is the attitude of the two do-
minions toward each other. Relations between India and Pakistan are clouded by
a number of factors. First among these is the undisguised resentment felt by most
groups in India at Pakistan's existence. In return, the Government of Pakistan
views India with suspicion and antagonism, so that a basic hostility exists between
the two countries which makes genuinely cooperative action difficult and unlikely.
The communal outrages, with their mass killings of minority members in both
dominions, have so greatly intensified this mutual hostility that war between the
two dominions has repeatedly appeared imminent and may again. Even if war is
avoided, the heritage of hate engendered by the massacres may last for a generation.
A third factor adversely affecting the relations between the two countries centers
on the accession or non-accession of certain of the Princely States. Such rivalry,
involving each dominion's belief that accession to the other dominion is contrary
to the well-being of the people involved and to the interests of the surrounding ter-
ritory, constitute a serious source of friction, which could bring about armed conflict
between the dominions.
The Kashmir dispute has been the most serious example of such rivalry. A valu-
able prize because of its strategic position commanding the northwesternmost moun-
tain passes and because of its rich forests and fields, Kashmir is contiguous to both
dominions. Geographically, however, it is an extension of Pakistan's West Punjab,
?and the alignment of its mountain ranges makes communication with India difficult.
The Kashmiri population is predominantly Moslem but of divided allegiance; its
Maharajah is Hindu. Prime Minister Nehru's emotional interest in Kashmir (in part
the result of its being his ancestral home) has unquestionably influenced India's at-
titude.
Inter-dominion rivalry over Kashmir flared up in October 1947, when the Ma-
harajah, confronted with revolt by his Moslem subjects, hastily acceded to India and
obtained Indian military support. (Soon thereafter the Maharajah ceded certain
powers to Sheik Abdulla, a pro-Indian Moslem.) The rebels were aided by thousands
of Pathan tribesmen who swarmed in from Pakistan's North West Frontier Province,
and the onset of winter conditions found the military situation deadlocked, with the
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government of each dominion meanwhile charging the other with unfair practices.
Indo-Pakistan tension appeared to slacken momentarily in early December, when the
two domin'.ons, faced with immediate practical difficulties over finance and adminis-
tration, signed an agreement concerning disposition of the financial and other assets
of the old British regime. By the end of 1947, however, India's attitude had become
stiffer, and in early January 1948 India submitted the Kashmir case to the UN. The
Security Council has been unable to obtain a solution mutually satisfactory to India
and Pakistan, both of which have bitterly accused the US and the UK of partisanship
in the UN proceeding.*
Both India and Pakistan have agreed in principle to a UN-supervised plebiscite
of Kashmiris, but they have sharply disagreed over two principal points. Pakistan
has insisted that a fair plebiscite cannot be held so long as the present government
(with its Indian Army support) is in control, while India emphasizes the legitimacy
of the present arrangement and refuses to make any concessions. India has charged
Pakistan with supporting the tribal raiders and demands that they be withdrawn.
Pakistan, wh'ch fears to take any forcible action against the tribesmen, states that
it cannot prevail upon them to withdraw without giving them firm assurances that
the plebiscite will actually permit the people freely to vote in favor of Pakistan.
An additional problem is posed by the increasingly independent attitude of Sheik
Abdulla, who heads the Indian-supported Kashmir Government. Abdulla might at-
tempt to block a compromise acceptable to India and Pakistan, particularly if it
jeopardized his control of the Vale of Kashmir.
In view of these differences, the governments of both Pakistan and India can be
expected to remain basically non-cooperative and hostile toward each other, despite
economic interdependence and the urgent need of friendly collaboration, especially dur-
ing the critical period in which the new governments are becoming established. Until
the threat of war involved in this attitude can be removed and a reasonable degree of
cooperation established, it is unlikely that sufficient economic or political stability will
exist in India or Pakistan to permit those countries to play other than a negative role
in international affairs.
* Since the drafting of this report, the two dominions have acquiesced in the Security Council's
dispatch of a commission to Kashmir in an effort to obtain a settlement. Meanwhile, in Kashmir
itself desultory fighting has continued. Indian Army units have gradually pushed back the
rebel forces, which have received increasingly direct support from Pakistan as Indian troops
approached the Indian border.
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SECTION IV
MILITARY SITUATION
1. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION.
The armed forces of the Dominions of India and Pakistan are at present in a
transitional stage, with their eventual efficiency problematical. Created through
division of the forces of the former Government of India, deprived for the most part
of the British officers who formerly held almost all positions of trust and responsibility,
and lacking the ancillary British components which performed most of the technical
services, neither dominion's armed forces can be considered effective at this time. To
add to the ill effects of the present state of disorganization, the Army of Pakistan,
together with the navy and the air force of both dominions, !s at present sadly lacking
in equipment and materiel; while in the Army of India, communalism, with an at-
tendant decline in morale and discipline, is said to be rife.
In the two present armies, lack of experienced personnel in the field and general
officer grades will seriously retard attainment of efficiency. Before partition there
were over 10,000 British officers in the expanded Indian Army, which normally had a
total strength of about 150,000. Immediately following partition the number of
British officers in the Army of the Dominion of India fell to 1200, and since 1 January
1948, that number has been reduced to less than 300, as against the approximately
5,000 British officers in the prewar Indian Army. The Pakistan Army has retained a
far larger proportion of British officers. While junior native officers have shown
some jealousy of these British officers, it appears that both the Government of Pakistan
and the army itself realize the need for them, and that their services will be utilized
for several years.
In the Indian Navy, with an officer corps totaling 620, the number of British
officers has been reduced to 60. Of 209 warrant officers, Britishers number 70. There
are 22 Brftish officers in the Pakistan Navy. In the Indian Air Force only six British
officers remain as against 100 on 15 August 1947. The Pakistan Air Force has 21
British officers and warrant officers.
The original Indian Army had the two principal missions of maintaining peace
within India and affording the country protection against invasion from the north-
west, which, until the Japanese success in the Pacific, was considered India's only
vulnerable frontier. The army, therefore, consisted of three elements: a frontier-
covering force equipped for operation in the rugged and arid land of the northwest;
a general field army designed for use if invasions from the northwest should materialize;
and units assigned to internal security duty. The army was maintained by volunteer
enlistment only, and formerly enlistments were limited, except in time of war, to
those groups of people in India classed by the British as martial. Because the army
provided the Indian enlisted man with a higher standard of living than he could
normally expect as a civilian, and because of the martial tradition and pride in a
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military profession existent among certain groups in India, a fine type of soldier was
obtained. Ably officered by Britishers, the old Indian Army possessed magnificent
morale and undoubtedly maintained a superior degree of professional efficiency. Using
India's peacetime army as a nucleus, the UK was able, in both World Wars, to build
n India a voluntarily enlisted military force numbering several millions, from which
large contingents were drawn for defense of the Empire in various military theaters
of operation.
Following partition and the decision to divide the Indian Army between the two
dominions on a communal basis, the effectiveness of the old army was destroyed
both by dislocation of organization and by deterioration of morale, especially evident
in the new Indian Army. At first an effort was made to maintain the high order
of leadership previously prevailing; British generals were chosen (and are still acting)
as Commanders-in-Chief of both armies, and an over-all British Supreme Commander
was installed (although not given operational control of either army). However,
abolition of the office of Supreme Commander on 30 November 1947 and an increasing
trend toward elimination of British officers (especially in the Indian Army) clearly in-
dicate that dependence is to be placed largely on native leadership despite the absence
of native officers trained for such leadership.
Demobilization in the armies of both India and Pakistan may be said to be com-
plete. Immediately prior to partition, the strength of the Indian Army was approxi-
mately 525,000. The combined strength of the Armies of India and Pakistan is now
estimated to be approximately 387,000, which is inadequate for internal security needs
alone in view of the decreased efficiency of both armies.
2. STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF THE ARMED FORCES.
a. The Army.
(1) The Indian Army.
The size of the present Indian Army is currently reported to be 241,000,
with the following line units inherited from the old Indian Army: fifteen infantry
regiments, twelve armored units, eighteen and one-half artillery regiments, and sixty-
one engineer regiments.
These units are formed into five combat divisions and two independent
brigades, but it is reliably reported that only two and one-half divisions can be con-
sidered as effective. The new Indian Army has as combat soldiers the same fine type
of enlisted men as did the old army, but its officer corps is extremely weak in view
of the lack of training previously afforded Indian officers in either staff or senior
command posts. In addition it is now deprived of its supporting British technical
units. At present the Indian Army is well supplied with materiel and weapons from
wartime stocks. However, the army's equipment, which will presumably continue
for a considerable period of time to be of the type used by the British during World
War II, will become obsolete as improvements take place elsewhere. Since the Indian
is not mechanically minded and seldom has had any knowledge of machinery prior
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to entry into the army, maintenance will presumably be bad, and deterioration can
accordingly be expected to be rapid.
(2) The Pakistan Army.
In the division of the old Indian Army, Pakistan received the following
me units: eight infantry regiments, six armored units, eight and one-half artillery
regiments, and thirty-four engineer units. The army is now estimated to consist of
about 146,000 men, organized into four divisions and one brigade.
The Moslem of the Northwest has always prided himself as a fighting
man, and the Pakistan Government reportedly believes itself to possess a fine army
at this time. Actually, this is not true. While the Northwest Moslems are magnificent
combat soldiers, they are, for the most part, even more deficient in mechanical knowl-
edge and formal education than the men of the martial classes in India. Thus the
Army of Pakistan is especially weak in its technical services and (so far as its staff
and higher command posts are concerned) in its officer personnel. Recognizing in
part the latter weakness, the Government of Pakistan has encouraged British officers
to remain, and 370 such officers are reported to have signed one-to-three-year con-
tracts. While Pakistanis are now in command in all military areas except Rawalpindi,
a British officer remains as Commander-in-Chief, and Britishers will at first hold the
senior operational, administrative, and technical posts, turning these over to native
officers as the latter become trained for them. Should there be war between India
and Pakistan, however, all British officers in both armies would be withdrawn im-
mediately. Under the circumstances, this withdrawal would be the more serious for
Pakistan.
In weapons and materiel the Army of Pakistan is also weak at present,
since the vast war supplies in India at the time of partition were for the most part
located in what is now the Dominion of India. Though it was agreed that one-third of
those supplies would be turned over to Pakistan, transfer has been delayed, and equit-
able distribution under the terms of the agreement can be expected only in the event
that the threat of war between the two dominions disappears. Since the Moslem
soldier is probably more inefficient than his Indian counterpart in the maintenance
of materiel, deterioration of existing equipment can be expected to be more rapid
in the Pakistan Army than in that of India.
b. The Navy.
While the subcontinent of India produces excellent fighting men, the Indians
are not a seafaring people, and first-class seamen among them are rare. This is
especially true in the officer class. It is safe to say, therefore, that the highest standard
that can be expected of the future navy of either India or Pakistan is that required
for coastal patrol, police, and escort duties. This type of work was performed very
creditably during the last war by a majority of units of the old Royal Indian Navy.
The Indian Navy as it existed prior to partition was, like the army, divided be-
tween the two dominions, with the following ships allotted to each:
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INDIA PAKISTAN
6 Sloops
4 Frigates
2 Corvettes
17 Fleet Mine Sweepers
6 Small Mine Sweepers
6 Motor Mine Sweepers
8 Harbor Defense Motor Launches
2 Sloops
2 Frigates
4 Mine Sweepers
2 Trawlers
4 Motor Launches
It is reported that the Dominion of India expects to acquire from the British
Government a cruiser, HMS Achilles, and three destroyers in 1948. The cruiser and
the destroyers are understood to have already been purchased, and it is believed that
they will be brought to India in the near future. The Government of Pakistan is re-
ported to be considering the purchase of several destroyers from the UK.
The present strengths of the two navies is estimated at 5,500 for India and
3,300 for Pakistan.
c. Air Forces.
Upon the partition of India, the former Royal Indian Air Force was divided
in the following manner:
INDIA PAKISTAN
7 Fighter Squadrons 2 Fighter Squadrons
1 Transport Squadron 1 Transport Squadron
The two air forces are barely operational, and rapid deterioration of all fa-
cilities, communications, airfields, and airplanes can be expected, now that the RAF
has departed. Most fighters are of the now obsolete Tempest II type. The Royal
Indian Air Force has at the present time about 20 operational C-47 planes for transport
use, and the Royal Pakistan Air Force perhaps half as many. Neither air force has
enough trained crews to operate or maintain properly even these few transport planes,
inasmuch as the RAF did not include Indian Air Force pilots or Indian mechanics
in its training program on multi-engine aircraft. At its inception after 15 August
1947, the RPAF reportedly had only one pilot qualified to fly multi-engine planes.
Estimated strengths of the two Air Forces are: India, 14,682; Pakistan, 3,500.
3. WAR POTENTIAL.
Neither India nor Pakistan is at present capable of fighting an unassisted war
against a country not similarly undeveloped economically, although?within the limits
prescribed by small arms and light artillery?both could indulge in organized strife
involving many millions of people, by virtue of their large populations, simple economy,
and fanatical beliefs. Despfte over-population and lack of industrialization, which
would permit vast numbers of men to be recruited for army service without material
effect on the national economy, the two dominions now have only inconsequential or-
ganized military reserves. The volunteer quasi-military organizations which exist
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in both dominions (mainly organized along religious lines) are capable of only primitive
types of fighting. Pakistan is entirely deficient in natural resources, while India's
vast potential is largely undeveloped, thus making local manufacture of military sup-
plies in bulk beyond the present capacity of either dominion. Neither dominion is
financially in a position to support a war requiring more than local operations, and, if
their present minor war in Kashmir were to develop into one of national proportions,
it would place a severe financial strain on both governments.
4. MILITARY INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES.
If a spirit of cooperation were to exist between the two dominions, the basic
mission of both armed forces (except for internal security) would be the protection
of the subcontinent from possible attack from the northwest. As long as the British
Navy controls the Indian Ocean, a friendly India and Pakistan have nothing to fear
in the way of attack by sea. Defense of the subcontinent depends principally, there-
fore, on guarding certain passes against land assault. Of these passes, the principal
ones are the Quetta Pass through Baluchistan from southern Iran, the Khyber Pass
through the North West Frontier Province from Afghanistan and Iran, and the more
difficult and less frequented routes from Sinkiang into Kashmir and from Tibet through
Nepal and the Indian State of Sikkim into the United Provinces and West Bengal.
Strategically, the routes from Tibet appear to offer little hazard. The Burma Road
from China provides an additional avenue of approach to territory adjacent to India.
? However, defense of that approach must rest primarily with the Government of Burma,
and in any event conditions in the Far East and the nature of the Indo-Burman frontier
render danger of attack from that direction slight at the present time.
The crucial avenues to be defended are therefore normally the northwest passes,
and adequate defense of these passes requires not only that defensive military forces
operate in greater depth than that provided by Pakistan territory alone, but also that
these forces be more effective than the combined forces of India and Pakistan at the
present time. For nearly the entire past century, the Afghan border has been
guarded by the British, and Afghanistan itself has acted as a buffer state between
Russia and British power in India, the latter acting as a counterweight to Russian
pressure from the north. With British power withdrawn from India, the USSR may
be expected to increase its pressure against Afghanistan at a propitious time. Should
Afghanistan be brought within the Soviet sphere of influence, the danger from the
north to the subcontinent would be very real and imminent and beyond the present
capabilities of India and Pakistan to resist.
The threat of internecine war between the two dominions presents the armed
forces of each with a more pressing mission. This mission is the protection of the
India-Pakistan boundary in its most vulnerable sector, that separating the East and
West Punjab.
? The number of effective Pakistan troops is less than that possessed by India, but
this disparity is offset somewhat by the greater dispersion of Indian troops. More
than half of India's effective combat troops are presently employed in Kashmir, while
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others are in Junagadh, in Tripure and elsewhere near East Pakistan, and near Hydera-
bad. However, while Pakistan might immediately be able to face India in the Punjab
with an equal or even larger force, the serious shortage of materiel (including am-
munition) from which the Pakistan Army is suffering would render it unlikely that
that army could withstand an attack by India. It is estimated by military observers
in India and Pakistan that under existing conditions of supplies the Pakistan Army
would become inoperative within a matter of weeks.
Inasmuch as a similar problem of supplies would exist in the event of Soviet
invasion, resistance by the Pakistan Army could be expected to be only momentary.
While such an invasion at the present time would undoubtedly result in joint resistance
by the armies of both dominions, transportation difficulties would prevent effective
assistance from India. It is believed that India's ability to resist would be promptly
dissipated by the general disorganization and widespread disorder which would ensue.
In the event of general warfare?either between the two dominions or jointly by
them against a foreign invader?it is expected that neither army would be capable,
at its present strength and efficiency, of maintaining internal security. In the event
of war with the Soviets, it is possible that the Communists could promptly effect a dis-
location of transportation and bring about the uprising of dissatisfied elements over
widely dispersed areas. In any war between the dominions, communal massacres
would probably occur throughout both dominions, and the Sikhs would raid West
Punjab.
A further factor complicating the task of the Indian Army in a war with Pakistan
would be the possibility of independent action by the more powerful of the Indian
Princes. Indian States Forces (that is, the private armies of the Princes) total about
77,000 men, with the Nizam of Hyderabad, who is unfriendly to the Government of
India, possessing some 40,000 of these. Were the Indian Army engaged in war with
Pakistan, its simultaneous efforts to maintain the integrity of India in the face of
unfriendly and concerted action by several of the larger states could be expected to
be feeble and ineffective.
The Army of Pakistan is faced immediately with the double task of protecting
Pakistan against a possible invasion from India and of maintaining some semblance
of control over the North West Frontier tribesmen. Developments in Kashmir and
the recent withdrawal of troops from the tribal areas indicate that, for the time being
at least, the Pakistan Army will not attempt the latter task. Such success as Pakistan
might have in preventing an Indian invasion would, in fact, depend in large part upon
how much spontaneous support the tribesmen give its army.
In any event, war between the dominions could be expected to develop soon into
a conflict waged by irregular bands bent on the destruction of Moslems or non-Moslems
as the case may be, without regard to civil or military status, and terminating only
when common exhaustion rendered further pillage impossible.
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SECTION V
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY
The subcontinent of India has strategic importance for US security because of its
geographical position, its vast potential in manpower and natural resources, and its
continuing economic value to the UK (and thus to the rest of the Western economic
system) . Its position astride the sea route from Europe to the Orient and its prox-
imity to the strategically important oil fields of the Near East make it a potentially
important base for either side in the event of global war between the US and the USSR.
Its manpower potential is second only to China's and almost double that of any other
country 'n the world. It ranks first or second in world production of such critical ma-
terials of war as cotton, mica, manganese, monazite (a source of thorium), and beryl,
and is a major source of iron ore, coal, and bauxite. It continues to be an important
market and a source of raw materials, investment income, and carrying charges for
the UK, thus strengthening the UK's and Western Europe's efforts toward the economic
recovery essential to US security.
Under governments unfriendly to the US, India and Pakistan would require im-
portant changes in US military planning. On the other hand, a healthy, friendly
India and Pakistan would constitute a stabilizing force throughout Southeast Asia,
an area for profitable investment and trade, and an important asset in event of war.
Of immediate concern to the US are the continuing Hindu-Moslem communal dis-
orders and the strong possibility of war between India and Pakistan. Economically,
continuation of the current strife will result in curtailed production of much-needed
Indian export commodities, destruction of property (some of it British-controlled) , and
weakening of the economy as a whole. Actual war between the two dominions would
not only intensify the economic damage but might also lead to the collapse of all
existing government, ultimately resulting in either continued anarchy or seizure of
power by interests unfriendly to the US.
Soviet attempts to gain power in India are not noticeable at present, despite
strong Communist influence in the labor unions. However, continued deterioration
of internal security and of the economic situation and the possibility of a devastating
inter-dominion war make India a promising field for increased Soviet activity and
an eventual Communist attempt to seize power.
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on the Soviet list of priorities, and an attempt at penetration is not expected in the
near future unless the USSR considers its current emphasis on Europe unfruitful.
Soviet penetration of India and Pakistan if attempted would probably be undertaken
as part of a scheme for domination of all Southeast Asia.
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APPENDIX A
GEOGRAPHY
1. TOPOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE.
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India and Pakistan form a geographical unit separated from the continent of Asia
on the north by the wall of the Himalayas and extending south into the central
Indian Ocean. To the east they are separated from Burma by almost impenetrable
jungles, mountains, and swamps, and to the west from Afghanistan and Iran by
deserts and rugged mountains. The former Indian Empire contained 1,581,410 square
miles of territory within which is found almost every type of climate and topography.
The subcontinent is divided into three main geographical areas: the Himalayan
mountain zone in the north; the Hindustan Plain, including the Ganges and Indus
river valleys; and the plateau or uplands region of the peninsula itself.
The most important area is the so-called Hindustan Plain. This region, includ-
ing the cities of Calcutta, Delhi, and Bombay, contains about half the population.
Through it flow the subcontinent's three greatest rivers, the Indus, the Ganges, and the
Brahmaputra, together with their tributaries. These river systems are of crucial im-
portance to irrigation and agriculture. The bulk of the population is concentrated
in the eastern part of the plain area, between Delhi and Calcutta, and is heavily con-
centrated in the provinces of West and East Bengal and the lower Ganges valley. Due
to the heavy rainfall, conditions in this last region are most conducive to the intensive
agriculture necessary to support such a population.
South of the Hindustan Plain lies the great V-shaped peninsula of India called
the Deccan. Coastal mountain ranges known as the Ghats rise abruptly in the west
and slope gradually toward the east.
Pakistan is composed of two areas on the Indian peninsula, known as Western
Pakistan and Eastern Pakistan, which are separated by more than a thousand miles
of territory belonging to the Dominion of India. Western Pakistan, including the affili-
ated Baluchistan States, contains about 312,000 square miles. Eastern Pakistan
measures about 54,600 square miles, giving the whole of Pakistan as now constituted a
land mass of 366,600 square miles, or about 23 percent of the Indian subcontinent's
total area.
The climate of the subcontinent is known as a monsoon climate, or one determined
by seasonal winds. Nearly nine-tenths of the rainfall occurs from June to October, as
a result of the summer monsoon, which blows from the southeast and brings moisture
accumulated in crossing thousands of miles of warm ocean water. During this time
the climate is basically tropical. During the winter monsoon, from October to Febru-
ary, the wind blows from the northeast, bringing cooler days and dry weather. As a
result of these seasonal winds, there are actually but two seasons in India.
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2. TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS.
a. Ports.
Prior to the last war, India ranked about tenth among the tradin,g nations of
the world. Its total annual foreign commerce aggregated approximately 22 million
tons, divided about equally between imports and exports. Despite this volume of
commerce and despite the subcontinent's extensive coast line and many seaports, only
a few ports are considered suitable for use throughout the year owing to extreme tidal
variations. Seven of them account for more than 75 percent of the total foreign trade:
Bombay, Cochin, Madras, Vizagapatam, and Calcutta in India, and Karachi and Chitta-
gong in Pakistan. Of these, only the west coast ports (Karachi, Bombay, and Cochin)
have natural harbors. Extensive additions and improvements were necessary to fit
Indian ports for World War II operations.
b. Waterways.
Inland waterways are of importance in the provinces of East and West Bengal,
Bihar, Assam, and in parts of Madras. Steamers and small manually propelled boats
carry on extensive trade on the river systems of these areas, transporting to urban
centers sugar, grains, and molasses from the Ganges Basin, tea and jute from East
Bengal, and tea from the Brahmaputra and Surma valleys in Assam. With the ex-
ception of a few companies operating steamers in East and West Bengal and in Assam,
transportation on Indian waterways is unorganized and individual boat-owners pre-
dominate.
c. Roads.
The subcontinent of India does not possess an adequate road system, as was
only too well proved during the last war. Extensive planning has been undertaken
for the improvement and enlargement of the road systems, but thus far few of the
plans have been implemented. At the beginning of World War II, there were less than
100,000 miles of all-weather motor roads within the country, and the mileage today
probably does not greatly exceed that figure. The four principal highways are the
trunk roads which extend from Calcutta to the Khyber, from Calcutta to Madras, from
Madras to Bombay, and from Bombay to Delhi. These through roads parallel the
railways, as do other main roads.
d. Railways.
Railways are by far the most important means of transportation in India and
Pakistan and are estimated to carry more than 98 percent of all land-borne traffic. It
was estimated in 1942 that the ton-miles then being borne by the railroads was 28
billion, as against 450 million for roads.
There are nearly 50 railway systems within the two dominions, all government
owned. Thirteen are Class One roads, each with normal earnings in excess of $1,500,000
per annum. Together the Class One roads control most of the equipment and track-
age, with route mileage in excess of 40,000, most of it single track. More than 20,000
miles of the Class One trackage is broad gauge (5 ft. 6 in.) , with meter-gauge lines
(3 ft. 3% in.) accounting for approximately 16,000 miles, and narrow-gauge lines
(2 ft. 6 in. and 2 ft. 0 in.) for approximately 4,000 miles. Broad-gauge lines serve all
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of the important ports except Chittagong, connecting these ports with each other and
with the important industrial centers. The meter-gauge lines, which were first intro-
duced many years ago (principally for the sake of economy) constitute an important
supplementary system. They operate chiefly in northeastern India, in Rajputana,
and in the extreme south. The narrow-gauge lines operate largely as feeders to the
broad gauge.
e. Aviation.
Ten domestic airlines link all the main cities of India and Pakistan and ex-
tend to Rangoon in Burma and to Colombo in Ceylon. As of 30 June 1947, nine of
these airlines were Indian, operating scheduled services over 21 routes totaling 15,000
miles. Pakistan's single airline flies scheduled services on routes totaling 4,365 miles.
A second Pakistan airline is expected to commence operations by the end of 1948, with
scheduled services to Colombo, Jidda, Damascus, Cairo, and other Middle East cities.
A bilateral air transport agreement embodying the principles established by
the International Commercial Aviation Organization was concluded in Delhi between
India and the US on 1 November 1946. The agreement exchanges rights of operation
of US and India air services over territories of the two parties, and includes, to a limited
extent, the so-called fifth freedom (the right of either party to transport passengers
and freight between the territory of the other party and a third country) . This agree-
ment has been accepted by the Government of Pakistan. Pakistan has likewise ac-
cepted similar agreements entered into between India and the Netherlands on 31 May
1947 and between India and France on 19 July 1947.
Foreign airlines serving Pakistan and/or India are Pan American, TWA,
BOAC, Quantas, Air France, KIM, and China National Airways.
f. Electronic Communications.
Radio, telephone, and/or telegraph communications link all important areas
of India and Pakistan. Direct cable communication is available, and radio telephone
communication has been established between the important cities of India and Pakistan
and certain other parts of the world, including the UK, South Africa, Australia, Kenya,
Barbados, Bermuda, Canada, Mexico, and Cuba.
Radio broadcasting is a function of the government exclusively. The Govern-
ment of India operates nine broadcasting stations, with Delhi as the central All-India
station. The Government of Pakistan expects to open two 50 kw broadcasting stations
at Karachi in the near future. At present the Government of Pakistan operates me-
dium-wave stations at Lahore, Peshawar, and Decca. These stations, however, are
satisfactory for broadcasting only in the immediate vicinity of the three cities.
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APPENDIX B
POPULATION
1. GENERAL.
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In 1941, when the last census was taken, the population of India was slightly under
398 million. Since the population was then increasing at a rate of approximately 5
million a year, the total population of India just before partition on 15 August 1947
was estimated at about 414 million, or greater than that of the USSR, the US, and the
UK combined.
2. COMMUNITIES.
One of the most significant aspects of Indian life is the division of the population
into religious or racial groups known as communities, each of which regards every
other community as somewhat alien. For the most part the communities are tolerant
of one another on religious matters. Nevertheless, the distinctive manner of life
within each community and the feeling of kinship which exists among its members have
given rise to jealousies and rivalries which are in large part responsible for the troubles
which beset India today. These troubles are aggravated by the fact that the division
into communities exists throughout the subcontinent. Certain communities do pre-
dominate in particular areas, but seldom are the communities sufficiently set apart to
permit satisfactory boundaries to be drawn between them.
The following table indicates the division of population by communities in 1941:
Hindus
Caste Hindus .
Scheduled Castes (Untouchables).
Moslems
Moslems . . .
Tribal Groups (Anim!sts)
Indian Christians
Sikhs
Joins
Buddhists
Anglo-Indians (Eurasians)
Europeans (civil and military)
Parsees
Jews (non-European)
^ 255,081,000
? (206,271,000)
^ (48,810,000)
94,389,000
25,441,000
6,041,000
5,691,000
1,449,000
232,000
140,000
135,000
115,000
22,000
Less than
5%
The three groups important politically are the Hindus, the Moslems, and the Sikhs.
The Hindu socio-economic caste system has set the norm for community organ-
ization throughout the subcontinent, except for a few areas along the North West Fron-
tier and in Central India which are organized along tribal lines. Under the Hindu
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system, the community is divided into multi-tiered groups or castes, each permanently
assigned economic tasks and social status. Intimate social contact is confined within
the caste; its members are supposed to eat and drink only with members of their own
caste, to marry only within the caste, and to regard other Hindus as spiritually superior
or inferior according to their caste. There are four main caste divisions: the Brahmins
or priestly group; the Kshatriyas, originally the military and government group; the
Vaisyas, businessmen, artisans and agriculturalists; and the Sudras, originally the
servants and laborers for the other groups. These four caste groups are themselves
divided into many subcastes, little intimate social intercourse taking place between
orthodox members. Below the four caste orders are the outcastes, or Scheduled Castes,
popularly called untouchables. The Scheduled Castes are descendants of stock which,
predating the Hindu incursion, was converted to Hinduism but kept out of Hindu
society proper. To its members (and their descendants) were relegated those occupa-
tions considered unclean in the religious sense, as, for example, that of scavenger,
laundryman, fisherman, and butcher. Temples, shops, village wells, and market places
in many parts of the country were closed to them and remain so even now, despite
efforts by the present Government of India to abolish untouchability by legal decree.
Rivaling the Hindus, but outnumbered by them nearly three to one, are the Mos-
lems. Moslem communal groupings, supported by strong social sanctions, roughly
parallel the Hindu castes. Since actual religious taboos are lacking, however, divisions
in urban society are much less sharply drawn, and individual progress up the social
scale is somewhat easier than among Hindus.* Although most Moslems are descend-
ants of converted Hindus, they have viewed the Hindus with disdain as idolaters and
as a people conquered by the early Mogul invaders (to whom the present-day Moslem
considers himself heir) . Finding themselves sinking under British rule into a posit! on
secondary to the Hindus, and finding the Hindus all too prone to view themselves as
the rightful masters of India, the Moslems developed an antagonism toward and a fear
of the Hindus which resulted in the demand for the creation of Moslem-ruled areas in
India. This demand culminated in the establishment of Pakistan, but it also left the
Moslems remaining in the new Dominion of India an uneasy and somewhat fearful
minority.
The Sikhs, few in number but concentrated geographically and possessed of great
energy and sectarian zeal, have already been described as comprising a protestant and
warlike sect of Hinduism. Politically, they have made common cause with the Hindus.
The alliance is, however, an uneasy one, since many Hindus fear that the Sikhs may
some day fight them as fiercely as they have fought the Moslems with a view to the
establishment of complete Sikh rule in the Punjab and adjacent areas.
Of the other communities, none plays a significant political part in the life of India
today. The Europeans, now shorn of power, are irremediably and determinedly alien;
the Anglo-Indians, descendants of mixed parentage and formerly more pro-European
* The integral position of both Hindus and Moslems in the village caste system was sharply
illustrated in East Punjab by the flight of large numbers of the menial castes who were Moslems
and in West Punjab by the forced detention (and in some cases conversion to Islam) of outcastes
who were predominantly Hindu.
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than the Europeans themselves, are now belatedly attempting to make their peace
with the dominant Hindu community. The Indian Christians, who are for the most
part converts from Hinduism, feel more akin to the Hindus than to the Moslems and in
general have identified themselves politically with the larger community. The Jains,
Parsees, Buddhists, Jews, and animists have each their place in Indian society and
economy, and accept Hindu political supremacy. They add diversity to the Indian
social picture but constitute no problem.
3. REGIONALISM.
Another divisive factor is the existence of some 18 regions, generally set off from
one another by fairly distinct geographic features and possessing distinctive social
outlooks. Within a region the people share a common language and cultural tradition,
common social and racial traits, and a common historical tradition; the regions gen-
erally conform to the areas of control under the old regime of local princes. While
religion and caste cut across geographical and cultural lines to link up individuals in
villages and cities throughout the subcontinent, the region cuts across religious and
caste lines to group individuals on the basis of cultural affinity and geographic
proximity.
The 18 regions are as listed below:
AREA
1. Kashmir
Province
2. Homeland of
Pathans
3. Baluchistan
4. Punjab
5. Sind
6. Rajputana
7. Gujarat
LANGUAGE
Kashmiri
Pushto
Baluchi
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS ?
Valley and surrounding hills. Non-militant shep-
herds, cultivators, and artisans, largely Moslem.
Approaches and hills of Indo-Afghan border. Mili-
tant, individualistic Moslem tribesmen.
Semi-barren reaches between sea and Afghanistan.
Tribesmen, peaceably inclined, who obey tradi-
tional leaders.
Punjabi Plains between Indus and upper Ganges Valley.
Independent, settled cultivators. Politics largely
run by leading landed families of Hindus, Moslems,
and Sikhs.
Sindhi Plains of the lower Indus. Large estates with
landless tenants; politics run by leading landed
Moslem families.
Rajasthani Arid, hilly country southeast of Indus plains.
Militant castes with traditions of chivalry; politi-
cally semi-feudal organization under princes.
Gujarati Coastal plain of Kathiawar peninsula and North
Bombay.
Experienced in commercial and legal negotiation.
Politically, in part semi-feudal and minutely sub-
divided; in part industrialized modern Indian na-
tionalist population.
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8. Maharashtra Marathi Arid west section of Deccan plateau and adjoining
coast.
Mixed commercial and industrial development with
independent cultivators, who are militant and en-
terprising. Contains modern nationalist elements
with administrative experience.
9. Goa Konkani Coastal plain south of Maharashtra. Fishermen
and small cultivators. Largely under Portuguese
control.
*10. Karnatica Kanarese Watered section of Deccan south of Maharashtra.
Prosperous cultivators and small traders. Mixed
state and provincial area, politically not advanced.
*11. Kerala Malayalam Southwest coast of Indian peninsula. Indepen-
dent, small fishermen, cultivators and toddy grow-
ers. Politically important are the large literate
element?both Hindu and Christian and the Mop-
lahs, a turbulent group of Moslem traders and
tenant cultivators.
*12. Tamiland Tamil South and eastern coastal section of the peninsula.
Independent cultivators. Commercial and some
industrial development. The people are argu-
mentative and quick-witted, with important cul-
tural traditions. Politically, business conservatives
and nationalists, with some radicalism.
*13. Andhra Telegu Eastern Deccan and coast north of Madras city.
Poor, independent cultivators. Some commerce.
Population more docile and backward than the
Tamil. Politically conscious in province; largely
apathetic n state area.
14. Orissa Oriya Eastern Hills area. Small cultivators and labor-
ers. Population is backward, strongly Hindu, and
hard-working.
15. Bengal Bengali Delta region of the Ganges and Brahmaputra.
Population convivial and argumentative, possess-
ing a strong literary and cultural tradition. Politi-
cal forces include radicals, business conservatives,
and semi-feudal landlords.
16. Assam Assamese Brahmaputra Valley.
Independent cultivators, including a large influx
of plantation labor. Opposed to extension of out-
side political influence, especially from Bengal.
* Belong to the group of Dravidian languages and culture which distinguishes South India.
Important anti-Brahmin political trend in recent years.
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17. East Tibetan Eastern Hill area between Assam and Nepal. Small
Himalayas cultivators and tradesmen recognizing traditional
leaders.
18. Hindustan Hindustani Plains of Ganges extending from the lower Him-
alayas to the hills of central India. Mixed pattern
of rural cultivation under large landlords and
urbanization with important middle-class na-
tionalist elements. Hill groups generally more
backward.
4. LANGUAGES.
Although the Simon report of 1930 listed 222 vernaculars as spoken in India, the
principal languages number only 13. The so-called Indo-European languages of north-
ern India are spoken by approximately 280 million persons; they are all derived from
Sanskr:t and, with the exception of Bengali, are closely akin. Of these, Hindustani,
the official language of the Congress Party, is spoken (with variations) by approxi-
mately 140 million people. Bengali is spoken by about 60 million. The official lan-
guage of Pakistan is also a variant of Hindustani known as Urdu. It is the principal
tongue of Western Pakistan and has been widely used by the Moslem intelligentsia since
Mogul times.
In southern India, the languages are of Dravidian origin, the most important being
Tamil, Malayalam, Kanarese, and Telugu. The Dravidian languages are spoken by
nearly 80 million people.
English, while it is spoken by comparatively few persons, is the one language
known in all sections.
5. POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND LIVELIHOOD.
Pakistan's total population is estimated at 69,900,000 persons, 28,200,000 of them
(or 40 percent) living in Western Pakistan and some 41,700,000 (or 60 percent) in East-
ern Pakistan. Thus, while the country's western portion includes about 85 percent of
the total land area, its eastern zone has the predominance of the population. However,
standards of liv:ng are considerably higher in the west, where Pakistan's main com-
mercial activities (including 77 percent of its factories) are now located. The majority
of Pakistanis are Moslems, who make up about 76 percent of the population in Western
Pakistan and 71 percent in Eastern Pakistan. An estimated 85 percent of the popula-
tion is directly engaged in agriculture, with less than one percent in organized indus-
tries, about four percent in crafts and cottage industries, and the remainder following
other pursuits such as commerce and the professions. About 91 percent of the people
live in rural areas.
About 75 percent of the Dominion of India's population is Hindu. It is in that do-
minion that most of the members of the minor communities reside, with the Sikhs
concentrated in East Punjab, the Jains in Kathiawar, and the Parsees in Bombay. In
addition there are over 40 million Moslems residing in the Dominion of India, or nearly
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as many as in Pakistan. The greatest Moslem concentration, numbering some twelve
millions, is in the United Provinces.
Eighty-five percent of India's population resides in rural areas. Seventy-three
percent is estimated to be directly dependent on agriculture for a livelihood; nine per-
cent is engaged in cottage industries; one and one-half percent works in organized
:ndustry; and some 16 percent is engaged in other occupations.
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1.
APPENDIX C
SIGNIFICANT BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
ABDULLA, Sheikh Mohammed
Present Position:
Place and Date of Birth:
Education:
Political Affiliations:
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Prime Minister of Kashmir
Kashmir, 1905
Aligarh University, M.S. 1930
Leader of the Kashmir Nationalist Conferences; pro-
Indian National Congress
Moslem
REMARKS: Sheikh Abdulla is at present the virtual ruler of Kashmir. The or-
phaned son of a petty Kashmir tradesman, he began his career as a schoolteacher and
soon attained prominence in Kashmir through his opposition to the corrupt and oppres-
sive local government. He affiliated the Kashmir National Conference with the Indian
National Congress and enjoys the confidence and friendship of Nehru and other Indian
political leaders. He secured his appointment as Prime Minister from the Maharajah
by virtue of support from the Congress and his position as the most popular figure in
Kashmir opposed to Pakistan. He is alleged to have had dealings with Soviet agents
and, while denying Communist or Soviet affiliations, advocates a policy compatible with
the Communist line. Sheikh Abdulla is a man of fine physique, commanding person-
ality, and great persuasiveness. Although Abdulla has been imprisoned twice because
of his strong political convictions, some consider him opportunistic. There are indica-
tions that Indian leaders have recently lost some of their confidence in him.
2. BAJPAI, Sir Girja Shankar
Present Position: Secretary General, Department of External Affairs and
Commonwealth Relations, Government of India
Place and Date of Birth: India, 3 April 1891
Education: Muir Central College, Allahabad, B.S.; Merton College,
Oxford; B.A.
Political Affiliations: Career Public Servant
Religion: Hindu (Brahmin)
REMARKS: Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai has long been a member of the Indian Civil
Service and is an accomplished public servant of the career type. He is a scholar and
an excellent linguist, although his brilliance is reported to be of a somewhat superficial
type. Bajpai was formerly viewed by the Indian nationalists as a British "stooge," but
his knowledge of foreign affairs and protocol has made him a highly valued official of
the present Government of India. Though oversuave and not above the use of guile,
he is believed to be genuinely friendly to the US and to be convinced that India's well-
being requires collaboration with the US and the UK on vital issues. He served as Agent
General for India in Washington from 1941 to 1946.
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3. BOSE, Sarat Chandra
Present Position: Leader of the Socialist Republican Party, Government of
India
Place and Date of Birth: Calcutta, India, September 1889
Education: Ravenshaw College, Cattack and Presidency College, Cal-
cutta, M.A., 1908 and LL.B., 1911. Called to the bar in
England.
Party Affiliations: Socialist Republican Party
Religion: Hindu
REMARKS: Sarat Chandra Bose is an alert and well-informed lawyer, of a volatile
and impassioned nature. He is an ardent nationalist and bitterly antiforeign. His
invective, however, has been directed against the British rather than the US. While
preaching a near-Communist doctrine, he claims to be anti-Communist and anti-Soviet.
Formerly a Congress Party member, he is now anti-Congress because of Congress accept-
ance of the partition of India. From 1942 to 1945 he was imprisoned for alleged rela-
tions with the Japanese. He has some influence among his fellow Bengalis but is not
liked outside his own province by other than extreme radicals; in general, he is a far cry
from his late brother, Subhas Chandra Bose, who headed the Japanese-instigated "Free
India Government." Recent reports indicate that his influence and prestige are de-
clining.
4. H.E.H. The Nizam of Hyderabad (Mir Daman Ali Khan)
Present Position:
Place and Date of Birth:
Education:
Political Affiliations:
Religion:
Ruler of Hyderabad State
Hyderabad, India, 1886
Private, by English tutors
Pro-Pakistan, Anti-India
Sunni Moslem (with predilections toward the Shia sect)
REMARKS: Astute and autocratic, austere even to the point of miserliness, the
Nizam represents perhaps the last of the great Indian Princes. On the whole his state
has been well run and the condition of his people is, on the average, probably somewhat
better than that of the inhabitants of the surrounding provinces of India. Criticism of
him is centered principally on his insistence on autocratic and feudal rule and on the
favored position which he has given the small Moslem minority within his state, while
his unwillingness to accede to the Dominion of India is the most obvious cause of
hostility toward him in Indian government circles.
5. JINNAH, Mohammed Ali (Quaid-i-Azam)
Present Position:
Place and Date of Birth:
Education:
Party Affiliations:
Religion:
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Governor General of Pakistan
Bombay, India, 25 December 1876
Secondary school in Bombay and Karachi; studied law at
Lincoln's Inn, London
Moslem League
Moslem (unorthodox Shia)
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REMARKS: Mohammed Ali Jinnah, son of a wealthy Bombay merchant, is the
outstanding Moslem of the Indian subcontinent and through his complete control of
the Moslem League is now the ruler of Pakistan. Quick, exceedingly clever, vain, sar-
castic, and colorful, Jinnah is at the same time an able administrator and a man of
broad vision and integrity. He is invariably legalistic in his approach to any problem
and respects decisions based on sound legal considerations. Though he has been an
ardent nationalist since his youth, he respects the British and in turn is respected by
them. Upon the establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan, he indicated a clear
intention to collaborate with the UK and the US. He has become, however, slightly
resentful at what he believes to be lack of appreciation by the UK and the US of
Pakistan's friendly disposition. He thoroughly distrusts the Hindus and the Congress
and is convinced that only the creation of Pakistan has saved the Indian Moslems from
complete domination and persecution by the Hindus.
6. KHAN, Liaquat Ali
Present Position:
Place and Date of Birth:
Education:
Political Affiliations:
Religion:
Prime Minister of Pakistan
United Provinces, India, 1 October 1895
Mohomedan Anglo-Oriential College, Aligarh; Exeter Col-
lege, Oxford, M.A.; Inner Temple, London, LL.B.
Moslem League
Moslem
REMARKS: Liaquat Ali Khan has long been prominent in the Moslem League and
is considered the second most influential man in Pakistan. He is astute, capable, and
reliable, but is handicapped by ill health. The influence of his ambitious wife, the
Begum Roana, is said to result sometimes in his manifesting an opportunist attitude
contrary to his innate honesty. He is decidedly friendly to the US and cultivates Ameri-
cans. He is highly esteemed by those British officials who have served with him.
7. MOUNTBATTEN, Rear Admiral the Earl Louis
Present Position: Governor General of India (appointment expires 21 June
1948)
Place and Date of Birth: Frogmore House, Windsor, England, 25 June 1900
Education: Locker's Park; Osborne; Dartmouth; and Christs College,
Cambridge
REMARKS: A great grandson of Queen Victoria, Lord Mountbatten was India's
last Viceroy, replacing Lord Wavell on 24 March 1947. It was under his dynamic direc-
tion that a plan was finally agreed upon whereby the UK transferred power on 15 August
1947 to the new Governments of India and Pakistan.
An officer of the Royal Navy since 1918, Mountbatten obtained prominence in
World War II as British Chief of Combined (Joint) Operations and from 1943 until the
end of the war as Supreme Allied Commander in Southeast Asia.
Mountbatten is handsome, has a winning personality and great energy, and is a
persuasive speaker. He is thus usually able to capture the support and loyalty of those
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surrounding him. While Viceroy, he was highly esteemed by both Hindus and Moslems.
Now, however, he is viewed with extreme hostility by Pakistanis on the ground that he
has displayed a biased and unfair attitude toward Pakistan since becoming Governor
General of the Dominion of India. That Mountbatten and his wife have clearly identi-
fied themselves with the Indian cause is unquestionable; this attitude is alleged to have
resulted largely from desire for personal popularity and acclaim.
8. NARAIN, Jai Prakash
Present Position:
Place and Date of Birth:
Education:
Political Affiliations:
Religion:
Leader of the All-India Socialist Party
Sitabdiara, Bihar, 11 October 1903
Universities of California, Iowa, Wisconsin; received B.A.
and M.A. in mathematics and biology from Ohio State
University in 1929
All-India Socialist Party
Hindu
REMARKS: Jai Prakash Narain is generally esteemed as an intelligent and honest
man even by those who differ widely from him in political and economical concepts.
He has always bitterly opposed British "imperialism" but is not unfriendly to the
British. He despises Communists as agents of a foreign power and is strongly anti-
Soviet. He likes American liberalism and is well liked by Americans who have come in
contact with him. Though opposed to the Congress as being dominated by the reac-
tionary Patel, he has retained the friendship of many prominent Congress members,
including Nehru, and was respected by Gandhi. His greatest weakness appears to be a
lack of organizational ability which has retarded the development of the Socialist Party.
9. NEHRU, (Pandit) Jawaharlal
Present Position: Prime Minister of India and Minister of External Affairs
and Commonwealth Relations
Place and Date of Birth: Allahabad, India, 14 November 1889
Education: Harrow School, 1903-06; Trinity College, Cambridge,
1910; Barrister-at-law, Inner Temple, 1912
Political Affiliations: Indian National Congress
Religion: Hindu (Brahmin)
REMARKS: Pandit Nehru is India's leading statesman and a man of high ideals.
His career has been marked by his devotion to Gandhi, who designated him as his suc-
cessor in the Congress Party councils. He was president of the Party in 1920-30, in
1936-37, and again in 1946. In 1946 he was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Indian
Interim Government (the Viceroy being chairman) as well as External Affairs and
Commonwealth Relations Member. On 15 August 1947 he became Prime Minister of
the new Dominion of India. Nehru is a man of broad vision and of integrity, but his
character is weakened by a tendency toward emotionalism which at times destroys his
sense of values. He is gracious as well as brilliant, but volatile and quick-tempered.
He has been a strong supporter of tolerance toward IncE a's Moslem minority and decries
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any effort to make India a religious (Hindu) state. Though imprisoned on several
occasions by the British, he appears to bear them no animus. He is not unfriendly to
the US but is believed to deplore American "materialism" and to be of the opinion that
the US is basically imperialistic. He was an early admirer of the Soviet system and has
appeared to accept Soviet professions at face value. A recent hardening of the Soviet
attitude toward India has, however, somewhat dampened his pro-Soviet predilections.
10. PATEL, (Sardar) Vallabhabbi
Present Position: Minister of Home Affairs and Minister of Information,
Government of India
Place and Date of Birth: Karamdad, Bombay, 31 October 1876
Education: Nadia High School; admitted as Barrister-at-law by the
Middle Temple, London
Political Affiliations: Indian National Congress
Religion: Hindu
REMARKS: Sardar Patel has been a prominent Congress member since his early
association with Gandhi in 1916. In 1928 he so efficiently conducted a no-tax cam-
paign that Gandhi proclaimed him Sardar (leader) . In 1931 he became President of
the All-India National Congress and from 1935 to 1942 he was Chairman of the Parlia-
mentary Committee of the Congress. From November 1940 to August 1941 and from
August 1942 until 1945 he was imprisoned under defense regulations because of partici-
pation in Congress civil disobedience movements. Long a member of the Congress
Working Committee and "boss" of the party, he was given the important post of Home
Affairs in the Interim Government of India in September 1946 and retains that post in
the present government. Patel has shown himself to be cool, skillful in political ma-
neuvering, and ruthless in his administration and is perhaps the greatest force for
stability in the present government. He is, however, disliked by all liberals and is said
to be the mouthpiece of the ultra-conservative Indian industrialists, having close ties
with the powerful Birla interests. He has been particularly bellicose toward the
Moslems and Pakistan and has engineered India's absorption of most of the Princely
States. His control of party affairs is endangered only by his age and ill health. Cur-
rently he is recuperating from a serious heart attack.
11.
RAJAGOPALACHARI, Chakravarthi
Present Position:
Place and Date of Birth:
Education:
Political Affiliations:
Religion:
Governor, of West Bengal: Governor General designate of
India to succeed Earl Mountbatten effective 21 June
1948
Salem District, Madras, India, 1879
Central College, Bangalore; Presidency College and Law
College, Madras
Indian National Congress
Hindu (Brahmin)
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REMARKS: One of India's elder statesmen, Chakravarthi Rajagopalachari joined
the bar in 1900 and began his practice in Salem. He has for nearly 30 years been in the
forefront of the Indian nationalist movement. During 1921-22 he was General Secre-
tary of the Congress Party and has been a member of the Working Committee many
times. From 1937-39 he was Prime Minister of the Madras Presidency. Currently he
is serving as Governor of West Bengal, having been appointed to that post 15 August
1947. He was a close friend and associate of Gandhi; when the issue of India's partici-
pation in the war arose, however, Rajagopalachari opposed Gandhi's doctrine of non-
violence and non-resistance and urged an all-out Indian war effort. He insisted also
that rapprochement between Hindus and Moslems should be brought about by Congress
Party recognition of the Moslems' right to a separate state. As a result of this attitude,
the Congress ceased to desire his counsel and he withdrew from active participation in
party affairs. His differences with Gandhi were composed in 1944, however, and he
entered the Viceroy's Executive Council in 1946 as a representative of the Congress
Party.
From the western point of view Rajagopalachari is perhaps the most reasonable and
objective of all Indian political leaders. He is well liked by all, Indians and Europeans
alike, and is held in considerable esteem by the Government of Pakistan. He !s friendly
toward the US and not unfriendly to the British, and insofar as is known has never been
receptive to Soviet propaganda. He is a scholar of some note and a man of superior
integrity.
12. RANADIVE, B. T.
Present Position: Secretary General of the Communist Party of India
Place and Date of Birth: Bombay Presidency, India, 1905
Education: Holds M.A.
Political Affiliations: Communist Party of India
Religion: Hindu
REMARKS: In 1928, after receiving his M.A. degree, Ranadive joined the Indian
trade-union movement and became a member of the Working Committee of the All-
India Trade Union Congress. In 1929, 1934, and 1939 he led the textile workers' strikes
in Bombay and was imprisoned several times for strike agitation. In 1942 he became
a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of India.
Ranadive is reported to be meticulous in his observance of the Moscow party line,
and it is anticipated that under his leadership the Communist Party of India will make
no pretense of compromise with the Governmevt of India and the "bourgeois" leaders
of India. He is reported to be a brilliant academician and organizer and a persuasive
speaker.
13. SINGH, Baldev (Sardar)
Present Position: Minister of Defense, Government of India
Place and Date of Birth: Punjab, India, 1903
Education: High school equivalent
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Political Affiliations: Formerly Akali Party, now Indian National Congress
Religion: Sikh
REMARKS: Sardar Baldev Singh was appointed Minister of Defense of the Interim
Government of India on 2 September 1946 and Minister of Defense of the Dominion of
India in August 1947.
Formerly leader of the Panthic Akali Party in the Punjab Assembly and twice
Minister in the Punjab, Singh came into India-wide prominence in 1945 when he was
included as the Sikh representative in the Unionist Party's Moslem-Hindu-Sikh coali-
tion cabinet in the Punjab. As a leader of the Sikhs, he was appointed Indian Defense
Minister by the Congress Party in order to get the Pathic Akali Party (Sikhs) to join
the Congress as well as to give representation to the powerful Sikh minority.
Although Singh is a member of one of the wealthiest industrial families in the
Punjab, he is a man of little education and is commonly considered inept and of medi-
ocre intellect. Nevertheless, Singh has great energy, and, although obstinate on
occasion, he is inclined to seek superior advice and to base his decisions on carefully
acquired information. Personally he is courteous and considerate and is reported to
be both pro-British and pro-US. He is said to be much impressed by US efficiency and
the generally high quality of US products.
14. ZAFRULLAH KHAN, Chandhuri Sir Mohammed
Present Position:
Place and Date of Birth:
Education:
Political Affiliations:
Religion:
Minister of External Affairs and Commonwealth Rela-
tions, Government of Pakistan
Punjab, India, 6 February 1893
Government College, Lahore, B.A.; Kings College and
Lincoln's Inn, London, LL.B.
Moslem League
Moslem
REMARKS: After receiving his law degree from Lincoln's Inn in 1914, Zafrullah
Khan returned to India and became an advocate at Sialkot, Punjab. From 1916 to 1935
he practiced in the Lahore High Court and from 1926 to 1935 he was a member of the
Punjab Legislative Council. He was a delegate to the Indian Round Table Conference
in 1930, 1931, and 1932, and was a delegate to the Joint Select Committee of Parliament
on Indian Reforms in 1933. He was President of the All-Indian Moslem League in 1931
and was a member of the Governor General's Executive Council from 1935 to 1941. In
October 1941 he was appointed a Judge of the Federal Court of India and in 1942 was
appointed Agent-General of the Government of India to China. On 28 December 1947
he was appointed Pakistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.
He was also designated as Pakistan's delegate to the second UN General Assembly
session in September 1947 and later chief of the delegation representing Pakistan in the
Security Council discussions on the Kashmir problem.
Zafrullah Khan is an impressive speaker, a man of great dignity and superior
intellect, and is said to be regarded by the British as honest, though perhaps personally
over-ambitious. He is regarded as an author!tative spokesman on Indian problems. He
is friendly toward the US and is much interested in this country.
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APPENDIX D
PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN
INDIA
Governor-General (until 21 June 1948) Earl Louis Mountbatten of Burma
Governor-General Designate Mr. Chakravarti Raj agopalachari
Cabinet:
Prime Minister and Minister of External Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
Affairs and Commonwealth Relations
Minister of Commerce Mr. K. C. Neogy
Minister of Communications and Air Mr. Rafi Ahmad Kidwai
Minister of Defense Sardar Baldev Singh
Minister of Education Mr. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad
Minister of Finance Mr. R. K. Shanmukhan Chetty
Minister of Food and Agriculture Mr. Jairamdas Daulatram
Minister of Health Rajkumari Amrit Kaur
Minister of Home Affairs Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Minister of Information and Broadcasting Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Minister of Industries and Supply Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee
Minister of Labor Mr. Jagjivan Ram
Minister of Legislative Affairs Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar
Minister of Transport and Railways Dr. John Matthai
Minister of Scientific Research Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
Minister of States Department Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Minister of Works, Mines, and Power Mr. N. V. Gadgil
Minister of Refugees Mr. K. C. Neogy
Minister without Portfolio Mr. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar
Governors:
Madras Sir Archibald Nye
Bombay Raja Sir Maharaj Singh
United Provinces Mrs. Sarojini Naidu
Bihar Mr. M. S. Aney
Central Provinces and Berar Mr. Mangaldas Pakawasa
Orissa Mr. Asaf Ali
Assam Sir Akbar Hydari
East Punjab Sir Chandulal Trivedi
West Bengal Dr. Kailas Nath Katju
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PAKISTAN
Governor-General
Cabinet:
Prime Minister and Minister of Defense
Minister of External Affairs and Com-
monwealth Relations
Minister of Commerce
Minister of Communications
Minister of Education
Minister of Finance
Minister of Food and Agriculture
Minister of Health
Minister of Industries and Works
Minister of Information and Broadcasting
Minister of Interior
Minister of Labor
Minister of Law
Minister of Refugees
Minister of Economic Affairs
Governors:
Sind
West Punjab
East Bengal
North West Frontier Province
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Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah
Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan
Chaudhuri Sir Mohammed Zafrullal
Khan
Mr. Fazlur Rahman
Mr. Abdur Rab Nishtar
Mr. Fazlur Rahman
Mr. Ghulam Mohammed
Mr. Abdus Sattar Pirzada
Mr. Abdus Sattar Pirzada
Mr. Fazlur Rahman
Mr. Khwaja Sahabuddin
Mr. Khwaj a Sahabuddin
Mr. Jogendra Nath Mandal
Mr. Jogendra Nath Mandal
Mr. Gazanfar Ali Khan
Mr. Ghulam Mohammed
Sheikh Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah
Sir Robert Francis Mudie
Sir Frederick Bourne
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APPENDIX E
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
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1600 East India Company chartered by Queen Elizabeth.
1757 Battle of Plassey; commencement of direct Company rule.
1857 Indian Mutiny.
1858 Government of India Act: all powers formerly exercised by East India
Company transferred to British Crown.
1861 Indian Councils Act: framework of Government of India established
whereby legislature subordinated to the executive; introduction of
small non-official Indian element in Legislative Councils.
1885 Formation of the All-India National Congress.
1892 Indian Councils Act: introduction in the legislative bodies of India of
a small quasi-elective element made up chiefly of Indians.
1906 Formation of the All-India Moslem League.
1909 Morley-Minto Reforms, designed to create a constitutional autocracy,
which while in no way establishing a parliamentary system would
render the exercise of control by the British more amenable to Indian
? opinion.
1919 Government of India Act (popularly known as Montagu-Chelmsford
Reforms) : the first step toward evolution of provincial autonomy and
self-government in India.
1930 Simon Report (the Statutory Reforms Commission) : recommended
introduction of a federal structure of government for all of British
India.
1935 Government of India Act: (a) Proposed a federation of all India in-
cluding the Indian States, with increased representative government
but not responsible government at the center; (b) provided provincial
autonomy with responsible government in the provinces. (Provisions
under (b) above implemented 1 April 1937; provisions under (a) above
never implemented.)
?
1937
April 1 Burma separated from India.
1942
March Cripps Mission; offered India dominion status after the war. Pro-
posals not accepted by the Indians.
August "Quit India" resolution of the Indian National Congress; abortive ef-
fort of the Congress to force the immediate evacuation of India by the
British.
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1946
March 15
March 24
May 16
May 22
May 24
June 6
June 25
June 26
June 27
June 29
July 31
August 10
August 12
August 16
September 2
October 15
December 6
December 9
December 23
1947
January 6
January 20
February 1
February 20
March 24
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Prime Minister Attlee's announcements that India would be offered
independence either in or out of the British Empire.
Arrival of British Cabinet Mission in India.
Cabinet Mission's Plan for a free India (called the Viceroy's and Cabi-
net Mission's Award) read to the House of Commons.
Favorable reply by Jinnah to Cabinet Mission's plan.
Congress criticism of Cabinet Mission's plan.
Council of All-India Moslem League voted to accept Cabinet Mission's
plan.
The Congress Party Working Committee voted to accept the plan with
certain conditions. (No province could be forced into a group against
the wishes of the majority of that province.)
British statement that the UK cannot form an Interim Government of
India as provided in the Award.
Jinnah statement of regret that the Viceroy had postponed formation
of the interim government.
"Caretaker" Government of India established.
Moslem League withdrew its acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's Plan.
Congress Working Committee adopted resolution accepting Cabinet
Mission Plan.
Viceroy invited Congress to make proposals for the formation of the
Interim Government of India.
Moslem proclamation of Direct Action Day; rioting following failure
of talks between Jinnah and Nehru.
Interim Government formed with Moslem League not participating.
The Moslem League consented to join the Interim Government.
British Government's official interpretation of the Cabinet Mission's
Plan presented.
Inaugural meeting of Constituent Assembly, with Moslem League not
participating.
Adjournment of Constituent Assembly.
Congress Party General Committee refused to accept the British state-
ment of 6 December without reservations.
Constituent Assembly reconvened.
Moslem League Working Committee refused to recommend League
participation in the Constituent Assembly.
Announcement by Prime Minister Attlee that power would be trans-
ferred to any Indian government or governments ready to take over
in June 1948.
Viscount Mountbatten took office as Viceroy of India, replacing Lord
Wave11.
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April 28-
May 3
June 3
June 6
June 9-15
July 16
August 10
August 15
August 16
August 18
October
October 27
November
November 29
1948
January 6
January 13-18
January 15
January 16-17
January 30
February 28-
March 7
March 18
April 17
April 21
May 3
May 7
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Third session of the Constituent Assembly.
Mountbatten and Attlee announced supplemental plan whereby power
would be transferred on 15 August 1947 to two political entities (Hindu-
stan and Pakistan) .
Chamber of Princes resolved to disband.
The Moslem League Council and the All-India Congress Committee
accepted the British plan of June 3 for partition of India.
Indian Independence Bill adopted as law by the UK parliament, with
Mountbatten and Jinnah named Governors-General of India and
Pakistan respectively.
Pakistan Constituent Assembly opened at Karachi; Jinnah elected
Assembly President; Pakistan national flag adopted.
Independence Day, British rule over India terminated.
Beginning of month of extreme violence between Sikhs and Hindus
against Moslems in the Punjab over the division of the Sikh homeland.
Pakistan admitted to United Nations.
India protested Junagadh's accession to Pakistan.
Accession of Kashmir to India; Indian troops flown to Srinagar.
Indian troops entered Junagadh State; administration taken over by
Regional Commissioner of India at Rajkot.
Standstill agreement executed between India and Hyderabad.
Kashmir case presented to the United Nations Security Council by
India.
Gandhi's last fast for improvement of GOI-GOP relations.
Ayyangar, Indian Delegate to UN, presented India's case to SC.
Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan delegate, presented Pakistan's case.
Assassination of Mahatma Gandhi by member of the Rashtriya Swayam
Sevak Sang (RSSS) and Hindu Mahasabha.
Second Communist Conference at Calcutta; P. C. Joshi replaced by
B. T. Ranadive as General Secretary.
Chinese compromise settlement plan for Kashmir question presented
to Security Council.
Six-power resolution, asking India and Pakistan to agree to a plebiscite
in Kashmir, presented to the Security Council.
Six-power resolution for settlement of Kashmir case adopted by Se-
curity Council; termed unacceptable by both India and Pakistan.
Chakravarth Rajagopalachari named Governor General of India ef-
fective 21 June, replacing Lord Mountbatten.
US appointed to serve on the UN Plebiscite Commission to Kashmir.
(Other members: Argentina, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, and Colombia.)
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