RUMANIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A001500040001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 74
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 5, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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COPY NO.
FOR THE CHIEF,
RECORDS SERVICE & MANAGEMENT BRANCH
A-6 /
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SR-12
Published 5 October 1949
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SR-12
RUMANIA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY
CHAPTER I?POLITICAL SITUATION
1. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SYSTEM . . . 3
a. Historical Background of the Present Political System . 3
b. Consolidation of Communist Power . 5
2. POLITICAL PARTIES . 5
a. Workers Party 5
b. Other Parties . . . 6
3. BASIC STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT 6
a. Constitution 6
b. Presidium . . 7
c. Council of Ministers . . 7
d. Grand National Assembly (Legislative) 7
e. Judiciary . . . 7
f. Party Influence . ? . . . 8
g. Effects of the Cominform Resolution 8
4. PRESSURE GROUPS . .1 . 8
a. Public Opinion . 8
b. Resistance Groups . 9
c. Religion . . 9
d. Cultural Institutions ? . . 10
5. GOALS AND STABILITY OF THE PRESENT REGIME 11
CHAPTER II?ECONOMIC SITUATION
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND . 13
2. PRESENT ECONOMIC SITUATION . 14
a. Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry 14
b. Industry . 18
c. Transportation . 24
d. Population and Manpower 26
e. Standard of Living . 27
f. Financial Structure . 27
g. International Trade . 29
3. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS . 32
CHAPTER III?FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. DEVELOPMENT OF RUMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY .
a. Ideological-Political Motivation .
b. Strategic-Military Motivation .
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2. OPERATION OF RUMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY ? ? . 33
a. Position in the Soviet Orbit . . . ? . 33
b. Development of the Mutual Assistance Pacts . 33
c. Role in the Cominform . 34
d. The Danubian Treaty . . 34
e. Relations with Yugoslavia . 34
f. Relations with the West . . . . 35
4.. PROBABLE TREND OF RUMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY 36
CHAPTER IV?MILITARY SITUATION
1. ARMED FORCES OF THE RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT 37
a. Genesis . . ? ? ? ? 37
b. Strength and Disposition of the Armed Forces . 38
2. RUMANIAN NAVY . ?? N 39
a. Development ? ? . 39
b. Ships, Bases, and Coast Defense . . . ? 40
c. Naval Air, Submarine, and Amphibious Forces 40
3. RUMANIAN AIR FORCES 41
a. Development . . 41
b. Types of Aircraft . 41
c. Ground Facilities 42
d. Personnel . . 42
e. Rumanian Active and Passive Defenses 43
4. ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY (AAA) 43
a. General . . . . 43
5. ANTIAIRCRAFT ORDER OF BATTLE 44
a. Passive and Civilian Defense 44
b. Other Military Organizations 44
6. WAR POTENTIAL . 44
a. Manpower . 44
b. Science. . 44
c. Other Factors . . . 44
7. MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND FUTURE TRENDS 44
ANNEX I?ORGANIZATION OF RUMANIAN ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY 45
CHAPTER V?STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY 47
CHAPTER VI?PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY 51
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A?Topography and Climate . . 53
APPENDIX B?Significant Communications Facilities 57
APPENDIX C?Population Statistics . 63
APPENDIX D?Biographical Data OP
MAPS
Rumania: Terrain and Transportation
Rumania: Agriculture and Industry
Rumania: Territorial Adjustments
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SUMMARY
After the collapse of Axis resistance in 1944,
Rumania was overrun by the armed forces of
the USSR and subjected to a military domina-
tion which soon governed all phases of its
political and economic life. Under the Armi-
stice Agreement, Rumanian forces still in the
field were diverted to join the Soviet advance
into Hungary. Rumania became a rear area
of the Soviet Army. Once military domina-
tion was assured, the USSR openly favored
the organized efforts of the few Communists
in the country, aided by opportunists and
politically compromised elements, to under-
mine the King and the established order.
Moscow-trained Communists were available to
take over key positions in influential public
organizations and the government itself.
Every cabinet formed by King Mihai was un-
satisfactory to the Soviet Union. Communist
maneuvers to install a left-wing government
under their control culminated in the forma-
tion of the Groza Government on 6 March
1945, under direct Soviet pressure. It was
then believed that the USSR was motivated
only by the desire to guarantee a friendly gov-
ernment on its borders and to ensure Ru-
mania's fulfillment of its Armistice obliga-
tions, with no thought of imposing Commu-
nism on the Rumanian people. At the end
of hostilities in Europe, and after the conclu-
sion of the Rumanian Peace Treaty in 1947,
the USSR continued to maintain garrisons in
the country on the pretext that it must pro-
tect lines of communication with its troops in
Hungary and Austria. Despite the Molotov
statement of 2 April 1944, on the eve of the
Red Army's crossing of the Prut River, that
"the Soviet Government declares it does not
pursue the aim of acquiring any part of Ru-
manian territory or of changing the social
system existing in Rumania," the net result
of Soviet occupation has been a far-reaching
modification of the political, economic, and
social structure of the Rumanian state.
Kremlin-sponsored Communists now hold a
dominating position in Rumanian affairs and
are shaping the country's future to their own
ends.
Internally, Rumania has been proclaimed a
People's Democracy and is being reorganized
into a Communist state modeled after the
Soviet Union. A Rumanian People's Republic
was declared on 30 December 1947, and a new
constitution was adopted on 13 April 1948.
These provide the legal facade behind which
the Communist Party extends its control over
all political life. Although the constitution
includes broad safeguards for basic civil lib-
erties, these provisions are ignored in prac-
tice. The administrative structure at the top
has undergone thorough and effective reor-
ganization, particularly since the end of 1948.
Local government is being progressively re-
framed on the pattern of "soviets" or Peo-
ple's Councils. These People's Councils, called
into being by the Law of 12 January 1949,
were initially set up as provisional committees
consisting of Communist appointees. Al-
though theoretically established as organs for
mass participation in government, they will,
in practice, function merely as "conveyor
belts" of Party policy, in conformity with
the Communist principle of "Democratic Cen-
tralism."
In foreign relations, Rumania has under-
taken mutual assistance pacts and other
agreements with the USSR and its Satellites
Which have created a solid, Soviet-controlled
bloc in international affairs. The agreement
signed in Moscow on 18 January 1949 setting
up a Council of Economic Mutual Assistance
(CEMA) between the Satellite countries and
the USSR, reportedly for a period of twenty
years, will integrate Rumania increasingly
into the political and economic Soviet master-
plan for Eastern Europe. All of these agree-
ments commit Rumania to undeviating sup-
port of Kremlin aims and automatically align
it against the Western Powers. The campaign
of vicious propaganda directed against the
Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air
Force have concurred in this report. This report is based on information available to
CIA as of dates indicated at the beginning of each Chapter.
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West and particularly the United States, con-
tinued and deliberate violation of Peace Treaty
provisions, and open defiance of formal pro-
tests indicate Rumania's pursuit of this course.
The principal economic problem in Ru-
mania is one of rehabilitating the basic ele-
ments of the economy (agriculture and petro-
leum) which were exploited to the maximum
by the Axis, and, during the occupation, by
the USSR. Drafting of industrial plans was
begun in October 1948. A one-year experi-
mental plan for recovery and development
was announced at the end of December, and
went into operation on 1 January 1949.
The major difficulty lies in the fact that
critical items of equipment and machinery
must be obtained from sources outside Ru-
mania. Since many of these items are also
needed in the USSR as well as in other Satel-
lites, it is doubtful that Rumania will receive
more than a token amount. The relatively
slow progress achieved in meeting the produc-
tion goals already established is largely the
result of the failure to obtain these critical
materials.
The military importance of Rumania to the
Soviet Union arises from its strategic location
which makes Rumania significant in the
Soviet defense in depth. Additional factors
of military importance are: the security of
supply lines passing through Rumania; the
construction of airfields for Soviet offensive or
defensive use; the maximum use of oil fields
and other petroleum installations.
Development of Rumanian Armed Forces
will be governed by the decision of the Kremlin
as to what share in Soviet strategy can be
entrusted wholly or in part to Rumanian
troops. This decision will be based in part
on the most efficient use of Rumanian man-
power as well as on the political reliability
of Rumanian units.
The appointment in December 1947 of Emil
Bodn'ara as Minister of National Defense
marked the beginning of a program of rehabil-
itation and revitalization of the armed forces.
Under this program definite steps are being
taken to improve morale and to equip the
various units with standardized weapons.
Emphasis is being placed on political relia-
bility, particularly in the selection and train-
ing of a new officer corps. Some concrete re-
sults of the reorganization are already evident.
Future progress will depend upon the political
and economic development of the country as
well as strategic considerations governing the
employment of the army.
Rumania's importance in the East-West
struggle is closely related to the degree of its
subservience to the USSR. Rather than seek-
ing the establishment of a "government
friendly to the Soviet Union," Soviet moves
have been designed to eliminate or minimize
all factors which detract from the full use-of
Rumania's potential by the USSR and to ex-
ploit those elements which increase Ru-
mania's value as a Soviet Satellite. In subju-
gating the Rumanian people, in establishing
a Communist dictatorship and in erecting the
framework of a planned economy, the Krem-
lin has moved methodically, without devia-
tion. Such vital questions, from a national
point of view, as the rehabilitation of the
country, the establishment of a modern demo-
cratic order, and the organization of a de-
fensive army, have been wholly subordinated
to the seizure and consolidation of Commu-
nist political control. As this control became
secure, the timing of specific measures to
transform Rumania into a replica as well as
appendage of the Soviet Union was based on
a policy of gradualism and expediency. The
implications of the new order being estab-
lished in Rumania were revealed to the peo-
ple step by step. The theory of "class war-
fare" was first publicized in June 1948; the
"dictatorship of the proletariat" was publicly
proclaimed in January 1949, and it wds not
until March 1949 that the Party formally an-
nounced its program for collectivization of
agriculture.
In the face of constant Soviet pressures, the
Rumanian people have remained hostile, res-
tive and withal essentially impotent. Sur-
face cooperation with the regime is the price
of survival. Although estimates place the
opposition as high as 90 percent of the total
population, it has been thoroughly muzzled
and suppressed. Resistance to the regime is
not likely to become significant until the
threat of overwhelming retaliation is removed.
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CHAPTER I
POLITICAL SITUATION
1. Genesis of the Present Political System.
Rumania today is a police state controlled
by fanatical Communists who follow the Mos-
cow line in its entirety. While the key posi-
tions in the government are in the hands of
trusted Communist party members, the cab-
inet still contains a small number of fellow-
travelers who are being replaced as they out-
live their usefulness.
a. Historical Background of the Present
Political System.
Soviet subjugation of Rumania is but the
latest of a long series of foreign conquests
of its lands from the time in 101 AD, when
Emperor Traj an's Roman legions conquered
and colonized Dacia, north of the Danube.
Roman colonization was thorough and its ef-
fects can still be seen in the language and cul-
ture of Rumania. Although little authentic
historical evidence is available on the period
from the departure of the Romans in the lat-
ter part of the third century until the end of
the 13th century, it is generally believed that
the area was successively invaded by Ger-
manic, Asiatic and Slavic tribes. In the latter
part of the tenth century, the Magyars in-
vaded the Banat and Crisana province, finally
penetrating and colonizing Transylvania.
Magyar oppression in Transylvania resulted
in the migration of Rumanian nobility east-
ward to found the provinces of Wallachia and
Moldavia in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries. These two principalities were the
scene of frequent conflicts with Hungary,
Poland, and Turkey. In the fifteenth cen-
tury they became the tributaries of Turkey.
Frequent wars and the economic decline fol-
lowing them weakened the country and, with
the Turkish defeat of Hungary in 1526, the
Rumanians could no longer avoid complete
Turkish domination. The three centuries of
Turkish rule that followed were characterized
by corruption and general economic deteriora-
tion. Although corruption, which is common-
place in Rumania today, undoubtedly had its
foundation in this period when Greek agents?
ruled for the Turks, the Greek satraps did
expose Rumania to French culture and West-
ern ideas. From the end of the Russo-
Turkish war in 1774 until the treaty of Paris
in 1856, Russia exercised "protection" over
the provinces, although the ,Rumanians still
acknowledged the suzerainty of Turkey. In
1812, Russia annexed Bessarabia, laying the
groundwork for strong Rumanian irredentism.
Rumania was established as a unified state
in 1859 when the two provinces of Wallachia
and Moldavia elected the same prince, Alex-
ander Cuza. Under Cuza's administration
several reforms, including compulsory educa-
tion and land reform, were inaugurated. Op-
position by the wealthy landowners to the
land reforms caused Cuza's downfall and in
1866 Carol Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen took
the oath as Prince Carol I. During Carol's
rule the constitution of 1866 was adopted,
setting up a bicameral legislature and guaran-
teeing certain civil liberties, but providing for
absolute royal veto.
The Kingdom of Rumania was proclaimed
in 1881. In spite of some reforms adopted
during Carol's rule, his failure to improve the
welfare of the peasants led to the peasant re-
volt of 1907, which was followed by a minor
agrarian reform.
Although Rumania was neutral in the first
Balkan war (1912), at its conclusion it re-
ceived the Danube port of Silistra and follow-
ing the second Balkan war (1913), in which
Rumania participated, it was awarded south-
ern Dobrudja. In the years preceding World
War I, Rumania was an ally of the Central
Powers through the triple alliance of 1883.
However, in 1916 Rumania entered the war
on the side of the Allies, because of promises
of territorial rewards and the pro-French atti-
Note: This Chapter is based on information available to CIA as of 1 May 1949.
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tude of the ruling class. Although it was
early overrun by the Germans and did not
contribute notably to Allied victory, Rumania
was doubled in territory and population on the
basis of subsequent peace treaties. Rumanian
irredentism was satisfied by the annexation
of Bessarabia from Russia, Transylvania from
Hungary, and Bucovina from Austria. With
this increased territory, however, Rumania in-
herited the social problems connected with the
administration of large national minorities.
The war left Rumania with the need for social
and administrative reforms and the desire to
maintain the international status quo. Con-
sequently, Rumania undertook to guarantee
its national security against the demands of
Hungarian revisionism by joining the French-
sponsored Little Entente in 1920 and, in 1934,
the Balkan Entente.
At the end of December 1925, Crown Prince
Carol left Rumania and renounced his rights
to the throne. Because of the precarious con-
dition of King Ferdinand's health and the
extreme youth of Carol's son Mihai, a provi-
sional council of regency was appointed which
took over after the King's death on 29 July
1927.
Crown Prince Carol returned on 6 June 1930
and became King with the consent of the
government and all major parties except the
National Liberals. For the next eight years,
Carol laid the groundwork of a personal dic-
tatorship. He encouraged the pro-German
Fascist Iron Guard (founded in 1927 by the
Polish-German, Comeliu Codreanu), and used
it to terrorize the Rumanian democrats and
weaken the two "historical" parties?the Na-
tional Peasants and National Liberals. How-
ever, when the Guard's strength became a
threat to Carol's power, it was outlawed and
its leader Codreanu assassinated.
Carol proclaimed a personal dictatorship on
10 February 1938. A new constitution was
announced on 20 February 1938, all political
parties were dissolved and constitutional free-
doms suspended. On 15 December 1938, the
King founded the ,National Renaissance Front
as an all-Rumanian political party to support
his government. On 24 March 1939, a five-
year economic treaty was signed with Ger-
many.
To counteract growing German influence,
on 12 May 1939 a treaty was signed with
Great Britain, which guaranteed Rumania's
territorial integrity and independence in the
event of German aggression. The year 1940
saw Rumania forced to relinquish Bessarabia
to the USSR, Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria
and Transylvania to Hungary. Britain, with
the Wehrmacht on the English Channel, could
do nothing to help Rumania, so Carol sought
to align his regime with the seemingly invinci-
ble Axis. Under German pressure, Carol liqui-
dated his National Renaissance Front and
established the Party of the Nation, admitting
into it many recently released Iron Guardists.
The Germans remained dissatisfied with and
distrustful of Carol and on 6 September 1940
he was forced to abdicate in favor of his son,
Mihai. General Ion Antonescu, the prime
minister, who enjoyed the confidence of the
Germans became the undisputed dictator.
In 1941, under German pressure and with
the expectation of regaining Bessarabia and
additional territory, Rumania entered the war
and crossed the Prut River to attack the Soviet
Union. When Rumanian troops were sent be-
yond the Dniester, losses at Stalingrad and
other factors caused mounting opposition
within Rumania against continued participa-
tion in the war. On 23 August 1944, King
Mihai and the opposition staged a successful
coup d'etat against the Antonescu regime and
Rumania capitulated to the Allies. Soviet
troops occupied the country and an Allied Con-
trol Commission, under Soviet chairmanship,
was established to implement the armistice
and advise on the administration of the nation
until the peace treaty became effective.
The first postwar cabinet, headed by Gen-
eral Constantin Sanatescu, was a coalition of
the Communists and Socialists and the "his-
torical" Peasant and Liberal parties. The
second Sanatescu cabinet installed on 4 No-
vember did not include representatives of the
"historical" parties. The hostility between
the pro-Communists and those of opposite
views led to a prolonged crisis which was
temporarily resolved by the appointment of
General Nicholae Radescu as Premier on 6
December 1944. The truce, however, was
sh,ortlived; with the New Year, the Commu-
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nists made plain their intention to undermine
the coalition and obtain sole power. A cam-
paign to oust Radescu culminated in a de-
mand by the USSR that Dr. Petru Groza be
appointed. On 6 March 1945, Groza formed
a new left-wing cabinet which was dominated
by the pro-Soviet National. Democratic Front
established in 1944.
The US and UK, maintaining that the
Groza Government did not fulfill the require-
ments of the Yalta agreement, because there
was no opposition representation in the cab-
inet, became deadlocked with the USSR. The
Moscow agreement of December 1945 at-
tempted to resolve this difficulty by calling
for an election, which was held on 19 Novem-
ber 1946, and a "broadening" of the govern-
ment to include opposition elements.
In the election campaign the Communist-
dominated "Bloc of Democratic Parties" sup-
ported a single electoral slate. The National
Democratic Front credited itself with a sweep-
ing victory in an election characterized by in-
timidation and falsification of results. The
opposition, which is estimated to have received
approximately 75 percent of the votes, was
allotted only 35 of the 414 seats in the Cham-
ber of Deputies.
During the succeeding year the government
steadily undermined the King's prerogatives,
and on 30 December 1947, demanded his abdi-
cation. On the same day, the Rumanian Pop-
ular Republic was created by proclamation of
Premier Groza and his ministers, and "unani-
mously" agreed to by the Chamber.
b. Consolidation of ,Communist Power.
The proclamation of the republic marked
the successful culmination of the Communist
drive for complete control and enabled them
to concentrate in the months that followed
on altering the form of the state to permit a
perpetuation of their power and to purge their
own ranks of elements considered not entirely
obedient to the Kremlin's orders. With the
King removed and Communists solidly en-
trenched in the government, the new regime
was able to turn to the task of revising the
organic structure of the Rumanian State and
the consolidation of political power in the
hands of one party.
5
2. Political Parties.
a. Workers Party.
A congress of Communist and Social Demo-
cratic parties was held at the end of February
1948 which organized a single Marxist party
called the Rumanian Workers Party. Its Sec-
retary General, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, laid
down the basic political creed of the new party
and served notice that it would be purged of
all dissident elements. While Gheorghiu-Dej
said other political parties would be permitted,
he made it clear that they would exist in name
only and that the only real political force in
Rumania would be the Workers Party, which
would be the guide and master of the peasants
as well as the workers.
The congress also announced that a new
political grouping known as the People's Dem-
ocratic Front would be formed to offer a com-
mon list of candidates for election to a con-
stituent assembly scheduled for 28 March.
The Front included the Rumanian Workers
Party, the Plowmen's Front of Prime Minister
Groza, the National Popular Party, and the
Hungarian Popular Union. This grouping
included all Communist elements and oppor-
tunists faithfully following Communist direc-
tives. The National Popular Party was dis-
banded on 6 February 1949, and its newspaper,
Natiunea, suppressed on the grounds that the
present political structure in Rumania left no
place for a ."middle-class party." While the
membership of the Plowmen's Front is fairly
large, it is actually a rural branch of the
Communist organization tolerated solely to
attract peasants who distrust anything overt-
ly labeled Communist. In the Resolution of
the Rumanian Workers Party of 3-5 March
1949, the Plowmen's Front was, for the first
time, openly referred to as a "mass organiza-
tion" subsidiary to the Workers Party. Since
the March 1948 election, the whole concept of
a "Democratic Front" has been completely
moribund. In effect, Rumania is a one-party
state.
Rumania has thus reached a point where
an organization known as the "Party," claim-
ing a membership of approximately 1,500,000,
has become the most important factor in the
everyday life of the country's 16,000,000 in-
habitants. Although the official appellation
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of this organization is the "Rumanian Workers
Party," behind this facade is a solid wall of
Communists, reported at the end of 1947 to
number 600,000, who follow classic Marxist-
Leninist dogma. Total membership of the
Communist Party did not exceed 1,000 when it
emerged from the underground in 1944. The
Party has not yet become the rigidly exclusive
organization that its foster parent, the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union, contin-
ues to be. New members are being carefully
screened, however, and since November 1948 a
large-scale investigation of all Party members
has been undertaken, with the reported aim of
reducing this membership to a hard core of
170,000 loyal pro-Moscow Communists. In all
probability Party membership will not fall
below 500,000, with the completely faithful
not exceeding 50,000.
It has been disclosed that the Secretariat of
the Party consists of seven members: Gheor-
ghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the First Vice Premier of
the Cabinet, Iosef Chi?ineuschi, Ana Pauker,
Foreign Minister promoted to Vice-Premier in
April 1949, Vasile Luca, Minister of Finance,
promoted to Vice-Premier in April 1949,Teo-
hari Georgescu, Minister of Interior, Alexander
Moghioroq, Deputy to the National Assembly,
and the Socialist Lotar Retclaceanu, Minister of
Labor. Gheorghiu-Dej was reported in eclipse
late in June 1948 although subsequently his
position in the party hierarchy seems to have
been considerably regained. Iosef Chisinev-
schi, however, is believed to have emerged as
number one man in Rumania, although he
has been relatively unknown in Rumania and
only recently was formally appointed to the
Secretariat.
While the Secretariat is very powerful, the
Executive Committee of the Party, or Political
Bureau, is the real power in Rumania today.
The following are the members of the Ru-
manian Politburo: losef Chiqinevschi, Ana
Pauker, Vasile Luca, Emil Bodna raq,. Miran
Constantinescu, Teohari Georgescu, Alexander
Moghioroq,,Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe Apostol,
Gheorghe Vasilichi, Lotar Radciceanu, Stefan
Voitec, and Teodor Iordachescu.
b. Other Parties.
The three legal opposition parties which
offered candidates in the parliamentary elec-
tions of 19 November 1946?the National
Peasant Party of Juliu Maniu, the National
Liberal Party of Constantin Bratianu, and the
Independent Social Democrat Party of Con- ?
stantin (Titel) Petrescu?have been broken
by arrests and fear of arrests and do not exist
as political entities, although the last two
have never been officially suppressed by the
government.
The government has not been content with
merely destroying the three opposition parties,
but has also taken steps to eliminate potential
focal points for political opposition such as
the rich capitalist elements centered around
Gheorghe Tatarescu.
3. Basic Structure and Operation of the Pres-
ent Government.
a. Constitution.
The People's Democratic Front issued a
draft constitution, which, with a few minor
changes, became the constitution of the Ru-
manian Popular Republic on 13 April 1948.
It promised nationalization of industry? and
commerce, freedom of speech, worship and as-
sembly, the suppression of parochial s6iools,
and guaranteed to Rumania's minority groups
the right to use their own languages in schools
and courts and to preserve their ethnic in-
tegrity within the framework of the Rumanian
state.
Nationalization of Rumania's industry was
enacted on 11 June 1948. Educational and
Church "reforms" have been instituted which
render all schools and churches completely
subservient to the State and the Communist
Party. All public and private organizations,
religious, cultural or welfare, have either been
subverted or openly taken over by the Party.
Since the end of 1948 the entire administra-
tive system of the government has been purged
and revamped, with Communist control be-
coming more apparent at every step. The
courts have been taken out of the hands of pro-
fessional jurists and made instruments of the
Party class policy. The State has continued
to enter those spheres of small business over-
looked in the Nationalization Law of 11 June.
Collectivization of agriculture has now been ?
placed on the agenda as the next most urgent
task by the Resolution of the Rumanian Work.
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ers Party, which was published on 15 March
1949.
b. Presidium.
With the enactment of the constitution, the
nominal Chief of State, the High Presidium,
was enlarged from five to nineteen members
presided over by the senile and addled C. I.
Parhon. The powers of this presidium tech-
nically include the authority:. (1) to convoke
the Chamber of Deputies at the Cabinet's re-
quest; (2) to sign all laws enacted by parlia-
ment; (3) to grant pardons; (4) to nominate
and dismiss Ministers at the request of the
Cabinet; and (5) to accredit and recall Ru-
manian diplomatic representatives and to re-
ceive letters of credence and of recall of foreign
diplomats.
c. Council of Ministers.
All executive powers not specifically granted
to the Presidium are invested in the Cabinet,
or Council of Ministers. The Cabinet is com-
posed of the President of the Council (Pre-
mier) , three Vice-Premiers, the President of
the State Planning Commission, and eighteen
Ministers. Dr. Petru Groza, leader of the ag-
rarian Plowmen's Front Party, has nominally
served as Premier of Rumania since 6 March
1945 but is totally without influence. The
chief spokesman of the Rumanian Workers
Party has long been First Vice-Premier Gheor-
ghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Secretary General of the
Party and President of the Supreme Economic
Council. Since mid-April 1949, other key
Communist figures in the Rumanian Workers
Party have been promoted to Vice-Premier,
replacing non-Communist fellow travelers.
Consequently, the Party high command has
become even more closely identified with the
top posts in the government. Groza's tenure
of office is, therefore, more problematical than
heretofore, since it is now apparent that the
Workers Party has progressively dropped all
pretense of a coalition government and will,
at the propitious moment, assume open charge
of the Presidency of the Council as well as all
government departments. The few non-Com-
munist Ministers who remain in the govern-
ment are all dependable fellow travelers, if not
secretly members of the Communist Party.
d. Grand National Assembly (Legislative).
The Grand National Assembly, consisting
of 414 members, is completely subordinated
to the directives of the Communist Party.
Theoretically the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet are responsible to the Assembly. In
practice, however, the Assembly is merely a
rubber stamp, approving all legislation origi-
nating in the Council of Ministers, and elect-
ing to the Presidium persons selected by the
Communist Party.
e. Judiciary.
Legal reforms preceded the Constitution by
a few months. Their most noteworthy fea-
ture was the creation of a corps known as
"popular assessors" whose task was to assist
the regular magistrates in the dispensation
of justice. These assessors were chosen from
the trade unions and approved by the General
Confederation of Labor. A new law on court
organization was applied beginning in 1949
which greatly enlarged the powers of the
people's assessors, who now sit in all penal
and civil courts except the Supreme Court
and actively participate in the functions of
prosecutor as well as those of judge. Control
of the court's decision is assured by the pre-
dominance of assessors over regular judges.
The elections of people's assessors under the
1949 law were to begin on 16 May 1949. All
present or former employers of labor were dis-
enfranchised in the elections. The underly-
ing purpose of this system, adapted from the
People's Courts of the Soviet Union, is to in-
sure that cases are decided by political ex-
pediency on a class basis and in conformity
with the' objectives of the Communist Party,
rather than by legal precedent or judicial dis-
cretion. A 1949 revision of the penal code
embodies many concepts taken from Soviet
legal theory. The most flagrant example of
Communist control of the judiciary and their
flouting of the elementary principles of jus-
tice is found in the trumped-up trial and con-
viction of Juliu Maniu, the National Peasant
leader, as early as 1947.
Under the Decree for the reorganization of
the Rumanian courts which came into effect
on 7 April 1949, the ordinary court system is
divided into People's Courts, which may be
classed as urban, rural, or mixed, Tribunals,
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Courts, and the Supreme Court. In addition,
there are numerous special courts set up to
handle fiscal, agrarian, labor, church, and
army and navy matters.
1. Party Influence.
The conduct of Rumanian offices is dictated
by the Central Committee of the Workers
Party without attempts to conceal the origin
of directives, although the Rumanian Polit-
buro probably initially decides all major policy
questions in line with Soviet directives. The
most striking example was seen on 11 June
1948 when the government obtained the ap-
proval of a special session of the Chamber of
Deputies to nationalize almost all of Ru-
mania's industrial and commercial enter-
prises. The communique informing the Ru-
manian public of this drastic undertaking an-
nounced that the request for its enactment
was made the day before its passage by the
Central Committee of the Party. The Cabi-
net meeting which acted on the Party's re-
quest lasted a bare half hour. Similarly, the
Party Resolution of 12 December 1948 estab-
lished government policy toward national mi-
norities, the Resolution of 23-24 December
1948 introduced the concept of the dictator-
ship of the proletariat in Rumania and out-
lined the duties of the trade unions, while the
Resolution of 3-5 Maich 1949 described the
steps to be taken under Party direction to-
ward collectivization of agriculture.
In effect, the Party has become a super-
government under which the Grand National
Assembly and its High Presidium, the Council
of Ministers, the Militia and Armed Forces, as
well as all public and private organizations,
function as mere agents of the Party and its
Politburo. Since the elevation of Ana Pau-
ker, Vasile Luca and Miron Constantinescu to
the Presidency of the Council of Ministers in
April 1949, the trend has been to identify the
Party high command with the top functions
of State. The Party no longer operates in the
background, under the facade of a coalition
government, but represents both the State
and a power apart, responsible only to the
Kremlin. Regional and local government,
whose function it is to implement Party de-
crees, will administer rural areas and munici-
palities under the watchful eye of responsible
Party organs.
g. Effects of the Cominform Resolution.
From the internal Rumanian point of view,
the publication of the Cominform resolution
against the Yugoslav Communists was the sig-
nal to complete the purge of bourgeois and
"compromising" elements from the Party's
ranks. It served to show Rumanians, who
had previously engaged in wishful thinking
about the intentions and life expectancy of
the regime, exactly what the Kremlin intended
for their country. The determination to per-
mit no deviation from Moscow directives, no
matter how slight, was revealed at the same
time.
4. Pressure Groups.
a. Public Opinion.
The Rumanians are generally considered to
be an admixture of the Latin and the Orien-
tal. This may be offered as 'an explanation of
their many-sided national character. Vola-
tile and emotional in moments of stress, they
are, nevertheless, adept at exercising patient
guile and wily strategem to serve their long-
range ends. Their high degree of sinuous
adaptability and political opportunism par-
tially explains their survival as an ethnic en-
tity and as a nation, and these factors prob-
ably play a strong role in the Rumanian re-
action to their current domination by the
Soviet Union.
Most of the Rumanians live in anticipation
of the day when the Russians are gone and
the present leaders in Rumania are liquidated.
They are not capable, however, of making any
moves to upset the regime, and at present
their attitude toward it is one of hostile in-
ertia. They see no possible hope for deliver-
ance, except through a war in which the West-
ern nations would defeat the Soviet Union.
Hence the Rumanians are delighted over
every new incident marking a further deterio-
ration in USSR relations with the West.
Although the great majority of the Ruman-
ian people hate their present masters and
hope for deliverance, the firm entrenchment
of the present government and its vigorous,
unremitting endeavors to suppress and erase
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all Western ideas and traditions can be ex-
pected with the passing of the years to wear
? down to negligible proportions the will to re-
sist. Hatred may give way to helpless toler-
ance and the Rumanians may resignedly ac-
cept the new order as their blood brothers in
Soviet Moldavia have had to do for three dec-
ades. Only if some bright hope of deliver-
ance is held out to them will the Rumanian
people be inspired to contrive effective ob-
stacles and resistance to the Communist sub-
jugation of their nation. Their history dem-
onstrates that they have a rare talent for con-
founding their oppressors when independence
or deliverance from tyranny is an attainable
goal.
b. Resistance Groups.
There is no information available to indicate
that an effective and organized opposition in
the form of resistance groups is in being or
is contemplated in Rumania. The absolute
police powers of the government are sufficient
to discourage individuals or groups of indi-
viduals capable of organizing and carrying
out such a program. Introduction of the
? death penalty in mid-January 1949 for viola-
tion of national security even in peacetime,
economic sabotage, and group or individual
acts of terrorism have .provided the govern-
ment with ample power to stamp out any in-
cipient gesture of revolt.
There has been, however, a number of re-
ports which are sufficient to confirm a pattern
of small-scale and more or less spontaneous
resistance. These efforts are more in the na-
ture of reactions against the low wages and
long hours of the workers, particularly in the
railroads. The resulting acts of sabotage, in
the form of fires and disruption of railroad
traffic, are sporadic and disconnected. While
they undoubtedly irritate the government,
their value is more as a nuisance than a
threat. It is expected that such incidents
will continue and perhaps increase in scale
when the government begins its program of
collectivization of agriculture. Coordination
of the various small groups and their develop-
ment into an organized resistance cannot be
? effected under present conditions, however,
and this factor will remain a potential rather
than an actual threat to the government as
long as its ability to control the focal points of
such opposition remains intact.
c.
Until the beginning of 1948, limited free-
dom of religion existed in Rumania, although
it was steadily weakened by the gradual in-
stallation of pro-Communist priests in the
higher echelons of the Rumanian Orthodox
Church. Since that time there has been a
rapid and ruthless drive to make religious
bodies fit into and advance the program of
Communists.
It has not been difficult for the government
to remold the Rumanian Orthodox Church
into a docile instrument because it was a na-
tional church with no support from outside
the country. The government resorted to
strong measures to bring the Roman Catholic
population into line, an end not yet attained.
In this connection, the Uniate Church (Greek
Catholic) , which acknowledged the authority
of the Vatican, has been brought back under
Orthodoxy, severing a 250-year affiliation with
Rome.
Lesser sects such as the Lutherans and Bap-
tists have all felt the pressure and, for the
most part, have conformed. The Jewish Com-
munity, numbering some 350,000, has been
subjected to terrific pressure and its recog-
nized organizations have had to toe the gov-
ernment line in political and religious mat-
ters. This pressure has been exerted despite
the fact that the Jews anticipated preferential
treatment. Consequently, the desire of the
Jews has been to get out and, with the assist-
ance of various international Jewish chari-
table agencies, thousands were able, after be-
ing screened by the Communist-dominated
Jewish Democratic Committee, to emigrate to
Israel. However, following their attack
against "Zionist nationalism" in the Workers
Party Resolution of 12 December 1948, the
Communists began early in 1949 to restrict
the number of Jews permitted to leave the
country. This has amounted to virtual ces-
sation of all emigration to Israel. Strenuous
efforts have been made to "integrate" the
Jewish population in the framework of a so-
vietized Rumania. On 4 March 1949, Ru-
manian Jewry's most valuable tie with the
West was severed through the forced liquida-
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tion of the American Joint Distribution Com-
mittee's assets in Rumania. The Jewish
Democratic Committee, thoroughly purged
and reorganized under the direction of the
notorious Bercu Feldman, and the Federation
of Jewish Communities are now the twin in-
struments of Communist control of the Ru-
manian Jewish population.
d. Cultural Institutions.
To break the hold of non-Communist cul-
ture, the Rumanian Government has taken
strong measures especially aimed at the
youth. The working youth, followed by school
children and students, were among the first
to be organized. A resolution adopted at the
Unity Congress held in Bucharest on 19-22
March 1949 fused all youth organizations into
a single revolutionary Union of Working
Youth, patterned after the Soviet Komsomol
and directly subordinate to the Rumanian
Workers Party. Likewise, the organization of
children between the ages of 9 and 14 into
Pioneer groups, also imitating the Soviet
model, was undertaken shortly thereafter.
This regimentation of the Rumanian youth is
designed to make certain that leisure hours
are used for Communist indoctrination, rather
than recreation. Pressure is exerted to in-
duce them to join "voluntary" labor brigades
engaged in reconstruction work throughout
the country. Despite the hostility of the ma-
jority of young Rumanians to this type of
coercion, the Communist program will un-
doubtedly succeed in winning over to Marxist
ideology an appreciable proportion of the
youth if they continue to have no access to
other views. The Communists, certainly,
place great hopes on the future of their
"thought-control" program as it will affect
large numbers of the younger generation.
The Rumanian Government has, in effect,
given every indication that all influences ex-
cept that of the Soviet Union and its Satel-
lites are to be extirpated and prevented in the
future from reaching the Rumanian people.
All institutions representing the West,
whether cultural, religious or welfare, have
been progressively liquidated or taken over
by the Rumanian State. Denunciation of the
1929 Concordat between Rumania and the
Vatican in June 1948, abrogation of the
Franco-Rumanian Cultural Agreement and
the closing of the Institut Francais in Ru-
mania were severe blows dealt at two of the
most potent Western influences in Rumania.
Likewise, on 2 August 1948, all foreign-oper-
ated schools were closed and their property
confiscated by the State. The school reform
carried out at the same time made the study
of Russian obligatory in all Rumanian schools.
On a broader front, bitter campaigns have
been waged against Western literature, mo-
tion pictures, drama and, to a lesser extent,
art and music, all of which were formerly
considered a staple of life by educated Ru-
manians. The printing and publishing enter-
prises are now a State monopoly, with tons
of printed propaganda being disseminated
through the mass organizations under Com-
munist control. The book stores have been
purged of "capitalist" literature, which has
been supplanted by newspapers and books
eulogizing the Soviet way of life, Soviet
achievements and Soviet culture. Daily in-
doctrination in Communist ideology is man-
datory for every worker in Rumania. Zealous
Communist censors scrutinize every literary
work, every production of the theatre, concert
hall or cinema for tendencies that could be
associated with the "decadent and reaction-
ary" West. Even the Rumanian Academy has
been nationalized on the Soviet pattern.
Whereas Rumania is now linked by a whole
series of Cultural Agreements with its neigh-
boring Satellites and the Soviet Union, direct
and unofficial contact with Westerners is a
charge serious enough for imprisonment and
under the law of 13 January 1949 may even
incur the death penalty.
By the use of terror, propaganda, legal re-
forms, and widespread purges in every walk
of Rumanian life, the present government is
midway in the course of successfully eliminat-
ing Rumania's tradition of Western culture.
Through the security police (Sigurantza) , the
government has virtually suppressed all free-
dom of thought and expression, not merely
to insure the security of the regime, but to
revolutionize and reorient the ideological con-
cepts of the people.
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5. Goals and Stability of the Present Regime
Since the installation of the first Groza
Government on 6 March 1945, it has become
steadily more apparent that the Rumanian
Communists are motivated by two basic de-
sires: to prove their fidelity to the USSR and
to transform Rumania, as rapidly as is feas-
ible, into a facsimile of the Soviet Union.
There is still fear, perhaps, on the part of the
Communist leaders that their loyalty and in-
dispensability to the USSR have not yet been
fully proved. In return, the Kremlin is prob-
ably well aware that its Rumanian minions
can look for support only to the Soviet Union,
that imposition of the Soviet way of life on
the alien and profoundly hostile Rumanian
people is possible only so long as the Commu-
nist 'hierarchy is able to maintain its unity
and absolutism. Although the revolution in
11
Rumania is by now virtually complete, much
of the Communist program still remains to be
implemented, particularly in the rural areas
which comprise the overwhelming majority
of the Rumanian population. Consequently,
under the continued direction and control of
the USSR, Rumania will proceed in its domes-
tic affairs toward the 'Communist goal of a
collectivist state, supporting no ideas or poli-
cies which conflict with the wishes of the
Kremlin. Control of the organs of govern-
ment, the police and judiciary, all public or-
ganizations and the armed forces themselves
constitutes a lever of such power in the hands
of the ruthless Communist minority that any
remaining opposition can be suppressed, and
assures that the present masters of the? coun-
try will be able to maintain, by force whenever
necessary,' the stability of their regime.
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CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC SITUATION
1. Historical Background.
The Rumanian economy is geared primarily
to agriculture and the petroleum industry.
Other producing segments of the economy?
iron and steel, coke, textiles, non-ferrous met-
als, chemicals and electric power?are of rela-
tively minor importance. Among all of Ru-
mania's products, only petroleum and grain
have any international significance.
Until the consolidation of modern Rumania
was effected by the union of Wallachia and
Moldavia in the late 1850's, the Rumanian
economy was rudimentary. It was, in fact,
confined to agriculture.
In 1900, 40 percent of the land under culti-
vation was in estates of more than 100 hec-
tares (247 acres) and owned by some 5,000 in-
dividuals. In order to eke out a living, the
peasant had to work on the estates of the large
landlords, and his situation eventually became
similar to that of the serf in Russia before
1861. This led to demands for land reform
and the abortive peasant revolt of 1907.
The growing social unrest among the peas-
antry was paralleled by the embryonic de-
velopment of industry. By 1913, the petrole-
um industry, largely under the direction of
foreign companies, was producing 13.5 mil-
lion barrels of crude oil, while in other indus-
tries over 1,000 factories were in operation in-
cluding the cement, paper, cloth, textiles, tan-
ning, brick, plaster, and timber trades. After
1916, when Rumania entered the war, indus-
trial development was arrested, the oil indus-
try being almost completely destroyed in 1917.
Land reform, motivated largely by military
defeats and the Russian revolution, was finally
carried out in the early 1920's. While it gave
the peasant land, it did not provide him with
implements to cultivate it. The result was a
great reduction in agricultural production.
By the end of the 1930's, however, wheat and
corn production was well above pre-World
Note: This Chapter is based on information available to CIA as of 1 January 1949.
War I levels. This production gain was due
primarily to increase in the area under cul-
tivation, rather than to better working meth-
ods.
Rumania's great increase in territory after
World War I, doubled the capacity of an in-
dustrial system, which was still in its infancy.
In addition to petroleum, other smaller in-
dustries were developed, primarily timber, tex-
tiles, chemicals, and metallurgy. At the same
time there was a gradual organization of labor
into trade unions which, to a large extent,
worked under the supervision of foreign spe-
cialists. The lack of adequate transportation
facilities, however, plus the lack of capital
and the low purchasing power of the people
has been partially responsible for the failure
of industry to take greater advantage of the
extensive natural resources at its disposal.
In total dollar volume, Rumania's foreign
trade was of minor international importance;
but its exports of grain and petroleum were of
significance in world markets. Imports of
machinery and raw materials, though small,
were essential to Rumania's industrial de-
velopment.
With the advent of World War II, the Ru-
manian economy was almost completely sub-
verted to that of the Third Reich. The Her-
mann Goering Werke took over control of all
iron and steel production; I. G. Farben ab-
sorbed the chemical factories; and the agri-
cultural produce was mainly exported to Ger-
many to feed its armies and supply necessary
industrial raw materials. The bulk of the pe-
troleum output was also exported to Germany.
When the Communists took over after the
war, industry, agriculture, trade, and trans-
portation were seriously disrupted. Up to
1948, conditions improved only slightly under
a government policy of half-planning, half-
temporizing. The position of private capital
has steadily deteriorated and one of the final
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steps toward the establishment of a Soviet-
type socialist state came in July 1947 with the
introduction of the Interdepartmental Com-
mission for Economic Recovery and Monetary
Stabilization.
2. Present Economic Situation.
The Soviet Government, through its domi-
nation of the Rumanian political leaders and
through its management of the Joint Soviet-
Rumanian corporations in banking, transpor-
tation, petroleum, chemicals, tractors, and
timber, has virtually become the supreme Ru-
manian economic authority. While exercis-
ing this control, the Soviet Union has also at-
tempted to superimpose its own pattern of a
planned economy. Concurrently the USSR
has steadily drained Rumania by: seizure of
an estimated one and three-fourths billion dol-
lars in "war booty"; reparation deliveries; and
exploitation of the joint corporations. In ad-
dition to siphoning off production and capital
goods for the direct benefit of the USSR, the
Soviets are forcing extensive construction of
military airfields and expanded output of mili-
tary items, and have pushed to completion a
strategic railway expansion program. This
indirectly strengthens the USSR and at the
same time is partly responsible for the failure
of the Rumanian economy to regain its pre-
war production levels.
Both agriculture and the petroleum indus-
try, keys to Rumanian recovery, are signifi-
cantly under their prewar production figure.
There has been a gradual improvement in
agriculture which is expected to continue; but
petroleum has been particularly hard hit by
the lack of equipment and overexploitation.
Other industries of lesser importance, such as
iron and steel, coke, textiles, and non-ferrous
metals are also lagging. Transportation, as
in the prewar period, continues to be weak.
The consumer in particular has suffered.
Wages have not kept pace with the rapid price
increases, and living standards, although im-
proving, are below those of the 1930's.
While a good many of these economic diffi-
culties have been caused by Soviet exploita-
tion, many can also be attributed to problems
connected with the transition to a planned
economy. Forced collections of agricultural
products are stirring up resentment among
the peasants and are partly responsible for
retarding agrarian recovery. Similarly, the
attempt to follow the Soviet pattern in indus-
try has often placed power in the hands of in-
experienced managers and bureaucrats.
The Rumanian Planning Commission has
set up a One-Year Plan for 1949 in which pri-
mary emphasis has been assigned to the de-
velopment of heavy and extractive industries.
The old National Bank is now the State Bank,
and the financial side of the economy is being
reorganized under the Ministry of Finance, to
permit complete coordination with the Plan.
The earlier establishment of Industrial Cen-
ters as instruments of control over manufac-
turing enterprises, followed by the national-
ization of industry on June 1948, have already
provided the framework through which the
Plan will operate. Practically all of Ruma-
nian industry and commerce is now directly
controlled by the State.
The immediate task of Rumania's economic
planners is one of recovery rather than de-
velopment. Economic revival since the war
has been retarded, and Rumania's position is
still among the worst in Eastern Europe.
a. Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry.
(1) Agriculture.
The principal agricultural areas consist of
the important plainlands of Moldavia, Walla-
chia, Banat, and Cri?ana, which form a horse-
shoe around the less important hilly regions
of Transylvania and Bukovina. The fertile
soil of these plainlands is well adapted to grain
production, the principal crops of which are
corn, wheat, barley, oats, and rye. The soil
of the hilly regions is poor and contains a
proportionately larger percentage of forest,
meadow, and grazing land. The Transylva-
nian mountain area is the center of the sheep
raising industry, which has made Rumania
one of the most important wool-growing areas
in southeastern Europe. The Carpathian foot-
hills are fertile and produce fruits, nuts, and
vineyard products, as well as grain.
Although the greater part of the lowlands
of Rumania possesses soils of exceptional fer-
tility, crops in these regions are subject to ex-
tremes of precipitation and temperature.
Spring and fall seasons are brief. Summers
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are hot, droughts are frequent, and short,
torrential rainstorms are followed by rapid
evaporation.
? Of the total land area in Rumania, 8.8 mil-
lion hectares (21.7 million acres) , or nearly
37 percent, are arable. Meadows and pas-
tures account for 16 percent, while forests take
up 20 percent of the total area. The remain-
ing land area is made up of vineyards and
orchards (less than 1.5 percent) and non-
agricultural lands. The agricultural four-year
.plan calls for the reclamation of 300,000 hec-
tares.
Approximately 80 percent of the total arable
land is devoted to grain, chiefly corn and
wheat. Other food crops include potatoes,
vegetables, and sugar beets which account for
about 5 percent of the total arable land. The
remainder is devoted to oilseeds, flax, cotton,
soybeans, and tobacco.
Although about 75 percent of Rumania's
working population is engaged in farming,
only 35 percent of the national income is de-
rived from agriculture. This disparity is par-
tially the result of primitive methods of agro-
? technique, small farm units, and government
controls. The potentially rich soil, depleted
of natural nutrients through failure to em-
ploy crop rotation, has been further impover-
ished by the lack of animal and chemical fer-
tilizers. Rumania is the poorest of eastern
European countries in technical equipment
with an average of 1 plow for every 2.3 farms.
Mechanization is at a low level with one trac-
tor for 288 farms. Before the war, only 63
percent of the farmers had draft animals.
By February 1948, this had dropped to a re-
ported 50 percent.
As a result of population increases in the
last century and of successive land reforms,
small holders predominate. According to the
Rumanian Agricultural Census of January
1948, there were nearly 3.1 million agricul-
tural holdings owned by 5.5 million land-
holders (30 percent shared ownership) , with
about 100,000 units owned by the government
and other corporate bodies.
Approximately thre,e-fourths of the hold-
ings are below five hectares (12.4 acres) in
size. The per capita area of arable land, on
the basis of the total population in Rumania,
is 1.36 acres, which is roughly one-half that
of the United States.
Rumanian production in 1948 of the five
grains (corn, wheat, oats, barley and rye) is
estimated at 7,691,000 'metric tons, which is
?an increase of 3.2 percent over 1947 grain
production, but only 87 percent of the annual
1935-39 production average. ? The record 1947
corn crop exceeded the prewar average by
more than 800,000 metric tons or 19 percent.
While the 1948 corn crop dropped consider-
ably, it was still 93 percent of prewar. It is
expected that the production of corn will reach
the prewar level in 1949 and 1950, well before
the other important grains, and may play a
bigger role in Rumania's foreign trade than
normally expected. (See Table Ha.)
Production of potatoes in 1948 is estimated
at 1,633,000 metric tons, which is about the
same as in 1947 but nearly 25 percent over
the 1933-37 annual average. This increase is
the result of expanded acreage since the yields
of potatoes in 1947 and 1948 are estimated to
be slightly below the prewar average.
Production of sunflowers in 1948 was re-
ported to be about 500,000 metric tons which
is 32 percent over estimated 1947 production
and 586 percent over the 1935-39 annual
average. These increases over prewar figures
are also attributable primarily to greater acre-
age.
Beet sugar production in 1948 is estimated
at about 150,000 metric tons, which is 17 per-
cent over estimated 1947 production and 36
percent over prewar. Estimated production
of other less significant foodstuffs in 1948
shows a general increase over 1947.
Rumania's livestock position has always
been weak, with relatively low numbers and
productivity. The postwar deficit has been
aggravated by reparation demands, feeding of
Soviet occupation troops, and indiscriminate
slaughter of livestock because of fodder short-
age resulting from the 1945 and 1946 droughts.
Official preliminary figures based on the
January 1948 census show a total livestock
population (excluding poultry) slightly above
the 1930-39 average, and nearly 45 percent
over January 1947 numbers. ' While some
increase over 1947 may have been possible, it
is doubtful if the indicated 45 percent increase
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is probable. Official figures show that cattle
and buffalo numbers in 1948 were 15 percent
over prewar while horse numbers were 37 per-
cent below prewar. Sheep and goat numbers
were 12 percent and 54 percent respectively
above prewar, while hog numbers were 40 per-
cent below prewar.
Poultry is raised on most farms for home
consumption. The government has encour-
aged the production of poultry and eggs as a
quick source of animal proteins, but progress
has been slow. Poultry numbers in 1948 were
only 56 percent of prewar. (See Table ITh.)
With 80 percent of the 'arable land used for
growing grain, principally corn and wheat,
grain exports in prewar years always weighed
heavily in foreign trade. The postwar
droughts, coupled with Soviet demands for
reparations and requisitions, created a grain
deficit necessitating substantial imports dur-
ing the first half of 1947 from the United States
and the USSR. The bumper corn crop of 1947
permitted the export of corn in 1947-48, prin-
cipally to Poland and Czechoslovakia, in ex-
change for industrial products.
Although meat and poultry products were
exported in small quantities, this did not re-
flect true exportable surpluses, since domestic
consumption was low.
Rumanian foreign trade is now a state
monopoly and future agricultural shipments
will be controlled by state-owned companies.
The general pattern will include imports of
Soviet cotton and wool to supply the Ruma-
nian textile mills and the export of Ruma-
nian grains and forest products.
The nutritional value of the Rumanian diet,
though improving, is not high. The 1947-48
estimated per capita caloric consumption was
2,349 as compared to 1,684 in 1946-47 and the
1934-38 average of 2,755. Cereals and pota-
toes contribute about '75 percent of the caloric
intake. There is a serious deficit in meat,
eggs, sugar, and fats. The improved grain
situation and current government plans for
an increase of livestock and poultry supply
should improve the nutritional standards un-
less the government steps up food exports.
TABLE I
INDEX OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION I
1946-47
(1935-39=100)
AGRICULTURE
1946
1947
Grain Production 2
49 8
84
Corn
36
119
? Wheat
67
49
Barley
43
54
Oats
75
64
Rye
40
30
Livestock Numbers
'71
71
1 Based on production estimates given in the
tables.
2 Weighted by quantity?not an average of the in-
dividual grain indices.
Low index number due mainly to severe drought.
TABLE ha
GRAIN: PRODUCTION: TRADE AND TOTAL SUPPLY (PRESENT BOUNDARIES)
Prewar Average 1933-37 compared with Production Average 1935-39
Approximations for 1947 and 1948 and Expectancy in 1949 and 1950.
Average 1933-34
Through 1937-38 Net Trade
PRODUCTION -
(in 1,000 metric tons)
(1,000 metric tons) -I- Imports
Total
Production ? Exports
Supply
1935-39
1947
1948
1949
1950
Corn
4,128 (?) 400
3,728
4,369
5,207
4,064
4,300
4,500
Wheat
2,420 (?) 300
2,120
3,048
1,497
2,586
2,400
2,420
Barley
740 (?) 237
530
610
327
414
400
500
Oats
623 (?) 15
608
544
348
500
500
500
Rye
259 (?) 60
199
254
76
127
150
150
TOTAL
8,170 (?) 1,012
7,158
8,825
7,455
7,691
7,750
8,070
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TABLE lib
LIVESTOCK NUMBERS IN 1948 COMPARED WITH 1947, 1946 and 1930-39 AVERAGE
(in thousands of head at beginning of year)
17
Average
1930-39
1946
1947
1948
Sheep
9,736
6,799
7,100
10,938
Cattle & Buffalo
3,709
3,328
3,113
4,277
Hogs
2,430
1,389
1,384
1,459
Horses
1,500
857
787
939
Goats
371
201
238
571
Poultry
28,197
14,011
11,932
15,918
TOTAL, excluding Poultry
17,746
12,574
12,622
18,184
(2) Fisheries.
Fishing plays a minor economic role, but
is capable of development. On the Black Sea
coast and the Danube it is controlled by the
State Fisheries Administration. There is also
some fishing in inland waters. Before the
war, the domestic catch of nearly 20,000 metric
tons was supplemented by imports of 4,000
metric tons. The 1947 catch was reported to
be less than one-third of the prewar figure.
(3) Forestry.
Rumania's forests are one of its most im-
portant natural resources, contributing a large
part of the nation's requirements for fuel and
all of its requirements for constructional lum-
ber. In prewar years, timber exports took
third place following grain and oil. The tim-
ber industry was overexpanded, however, in
relation to normal yield of the forests. Over
many years, up to the outbreak of the war,
there was overcutting of the forests. The ex-
cessive demands of the war years served to
\ aggravate the situation.
Forests cover about 20 percent of Rumania.
On a per capita basis, the forest acreage is
slightly below the European average.
Exploitation of Rumania's forest resources
is even now exceeding the prewar average. To
counteract this, the government has drafted
a five-year reforestation program which in-
volves the planting of trees on 3 million hec-
tares. While this plan appears overly am-
bitious, some balance between growth and cut-
tings may result in the distant future; how-
ever, continued heavy Soviet demands for Ru-
mania's forest products together with domes-
tic requirements, will prevent an early reali-
zation of this balance.
Rumania's potential sawmill capacity is far
in excess of the nation's actual production,
despite deterioration of equipment.
(4) Government Controls.
The Groza Government and the USSR have
used the postwar food shortage to advance
their political aims, through the forced collec-
tion and controlled distribution of produce to
those supporting the regime. The danger of
hunger riots during the drought years served
to excuse increased police controls now being
used to enforce the collection program. In
addition to contributing to the general eco-
nomic deterioration of the country, the food
shortage has also served as another Com-
munist weapon against those who oppose eco-
nomic controls. It will undoubtedly be used
to justify the collectivization of agriculture,
despite peasant opposition.
Although collectivization of agriculture in
Rumania has not yet taken place, legal sanc-
tions have been provided in the new constitu-
tion and administrative steps have been taken.
The latter include the establishment of co-
operatives controlling production and market-
ing; agricultural machinery stations; state
farms created from the confiscated estates of
Germans, wealthy landowners and former no-
bility; forced collection systems which reduce
the amount of produce for sale on the open
' market; and government control of the farm
credit. These controls, in a situation where
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the agricultural population is already im-
poverished by 'war and droughts, pave the way
for the eventual collectivization.
b. Industry.
In Rumania, petroleum is the only industry
of any real significance. Efforts have been
made to utilize natural resources by expand-
ing the production capacity for iron, steel,
coal, electric power, and certain ferro-alloys
and chemicals; but progress has been slow.
The machinery and machine tool industries
are negligible. The shortage of skilled man-
agement and labor is definitely a limiting fac-
tor. Furthermore, the ouster of Western Eu-
ropean and US management, and the intro-
duction of state planning and control, will, for
some time to come, do more to aggravate than
alleviate this weakness.
Recovery in industry since the war has been
sluggish 'and by the middle of 1948 the gen-
eral level, of production (with the proper
weight assigned to petroleum and steel) was
not much over 70 percent of prewar. Among
Rumania's larger industries, only electric
power and natural gas are above their prewar
level. The most important industry, petro-
leum, is lagging far behind the 1938 position.
TABLE III
Index of Industrial Production
1946-47 (1938=100)
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION2 1946
1947
Crude Oil
64
58
Petroleum Products
62
54
Electric Power (capacity)
196
Coal
82
95
Coke
58
85
Natural Gas
69
113
Pig Iron
57
69
Crude Steel
53
66
Gold
47
Cotton Yarn
75
70
Cotton Fabric
21
15
TRANSPORTATION
(freight hauled) 70
aseon production estimates in the body of
the text.
2No satisfactory weights available for computa-
tion of over-all industrial production index but it is
roughly calculated between 60 and 65 for 1947.
(1) Fuel and Power.
For the most part, Rumania is self-sufficient
in sources of fuel and power. The large petro-
leum resources have, in recent years, formed
the foundation of Rumanian economy. While
there is an abundance of low-grade coal, the
chief deficiency is in "hard" coal, especially
metallurgical coking coal. It has always been
necessary for Rumania to import both bitu-
minous coal and coke. The natural gas re-
serves are playing an increasingly important
role commercially, partially counteracting the
decrease in petroleum production. The lead-
ing source of fuel is firewood, which, before
the war, furnished nearly 30 percent of re-
quirements. The potential power of the rivers
has been estimated at 5.5 million kilowatts,
but by 1947.only 60,000 kilowatts, or less than
2 percent, were utilized.
(a) Petroleum.
Rumania's petroleum industry, which is sec-
ond in Europe only to the Soviet Union, is im-
portant, both as a potential source of supply to
the USSR in the event of war and as a main-
stay of the Rumanian economy. Since the
end of World War II, however, this industry
has steadily declined as a result of: over-inten-
sive exploitation; extensive Soviet dismantling
of equipment; insufficient maintenance; a lack
of modern equipment and spare parts; and
inadequate exploratory and development
drilling. Although there is an excess of refin-
ery capacity for straight run distillation,
cracking capacity for high octane fuels is in-
sufficient to meet requirements. In 1948,
planned production of aviation gasoline was
60,000 metric tons, some of which undoubtedly
was shipped to the USSR. Production of crude
oil has declined steadily and in 1947 was less
than half that of the peak year, 1936. It is
extremely doubtful that the nationalization of
the petroleum enterprises in June of 1948 will,
in any way, aid in the revival of the industry.
Foreign assistance, in the form of equipment
and spare parts for both drilling and refining,
is essential to recovery. Neither the countries
of the Soviet orbit nor the Western countries
are ready to extend such aid.
In the event of war, the strategic importance
of Rumanian oil to the USSR would be one of
location rather than quantity. It has been
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estimated that the Satellite countries can
supply the USSR with only 3 to 4 million
metric tons of petroleum, of which Rumania's
maximum share would be 2.5 million. Ru-
mania's comparatively large refining capacity
would also be of some value in the production
of petroleum products.
Despite the abundance of available oil, pre-
war petroleum and petroleum products ac-
counted for only 25 percent of domestic fuel
consumption. Rumanian petroleum produc-
tion has traditionally provided a large export
surplus. From 1936 to 1940, annual exports
of crude oil and products averaged 4.9 million
tons. By 1946, the export surplus had de-
creased to about 2.3 million tons. Of this to-
tal, 1.7 million tons were scheduled for delivery
to the USSR as reparations and 276,000 tons
for delivery under the Soviet-Rumanian trade
agreement. Deliveries for support of occupa-
tion troops were reportedly 94,800 tons. The
remaining surplus (229,200 tons) was com-
mitted in trade agreements with Czechoslo-
vakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Hun-
gary. A further decrease in crude oil produc-
tion reduced exports in 1947 to 1.85 million
tons, of which the Soviet Union absorbed 1.75
million tons. It is estimated, however, that
in 1948, 2.15 million tons of crude oil and
petroleum products will be exported with the
USSR taking 1.47 million. Although the So-
viet Union forgave Rumania 50 percent of the
reparations still due in June 1948, the petro-
leum export picture will probably not be al-
tered much. It seems likely that the quantity
of petroleum and products shipped under the
Soviet-Rumanian trade agreements will ap-
proximate that taken by the USSR as repara-
tions.
Total proven and probable reserves in the
Rumanian fields approximate 67 million
metric tons. However, the Soviet policy of
draining the industry to meet immediate rep-
aration demands is resulting in premature
exhaustion of reserves for the industry. In
addition, the oil field and refinery equipment
is not only old, but also as a result of improper
maintenance, badly in need of repair. Ru-
mania urgently needs new equipment and
spare parts, but present restrictions make im-
ports from the West a practical impossibility
and the USSR and other orbit countries are
unable to provide such supplies. Failure to
discover and develop new fields, because of in-
adequate exploratory and development drill-
ing, provides another obstacle to maintaining
even present production. The exploitation of
undeveloped fields in the Banat area of west-
ern Rumania and the government's short-
sighted policy of overexploitation of existing
fields, will probably bring about temporary
improvement in annual production. Since
the peak production year of 1936, when the
output was 8,704,000 metric tons, there has
been an almost steady decline to about 3,850,-
000 tons in 1947. In 1948, production rose to
4,200,000 registering a "10 percent increase
over 1947. Output in 1949 is expected to
reach 4,750,000 tons.
Ninety-eight percent of Rumania's refining
capacity is concentrated around the Ploesti
oil fields. Refining capacity far exceeds the
crude oil production. In 1942, processing fa-
cilities were estimated at some 11 million tons,
which was nearly twice the crude output. At
the time of the Soviet occupation in 1944, the
country's ability to refine crude oil had been
reduced to about 5,200,000 tons. This was at-
tributable to bomb damage, wartime inability
to obtain badly needed technical equipment,
and failure to keep pace with foreign technical
developments. It is believed that refinery out-
put in 1947 was 1,488,000 metric tons for do-
mestic consumption and 1,846,000 for export
with 1,363,000 and 2,150,000, respectively, esti-
mated for 1948.
Before World War II, the petroleum industry
relied largely on the railways for transport.
Less than 20 percent of the oil products was
shipped to the border by pipe line and an ad-
ditional small quantity by barge. The situa-
tion today is probably not much changed. The
railroads are still the chief means of transport.
The main ports of export, Constanta and
Giurgiu, are reportedly equipped with storage
tanks with a capacity of 650,000 tons and 32,-
500 tons, respectively. There are three pipe
lines in Rumania: (1) from Ploesti to Con-
stanta, the primary port for oil exports; (2)
from Ploesti to Giurgiu, transshipment point
for west-bound Danube shipping; and (3)
from Ploesti to the Danubian ports of Galati
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and Reni. The Ploesti-Galati-Reni pipe line
was reportedly extended to Odessa in early
1946, and branches off the line to Constanta
at Faurei.
The Rumanian petroleum industry was de-
veloped largely with foreign capital and man-
agement. Before the war, the British were
the largest foreign investors, followed by the
US, French, Belgian, and Italian. From 1940
until the Armistice, the Rumanian oil indus-
try was operated largely for the benefit of Ger-
many. The USSR, after seizing oil properties
through a "liberal" interpretation of what
constituted war booty and former enemy as-
sets, used these acquisitions as a "legal" basis
to form the joint Soviet-Rumanian oil com-
pany, Sovrompetrol. The USSR and the Ru-
manian Government effectively shackled US
and British oil interests by forcing them to
produce exclusively for reparations at prices
below cost. This prevents them from export-
ing to countries which may purchase with
stable currency or are capable of providing
machinery necessary for maintenance of ex-
isting facilities. In addition, the Rumanians
have forced dismissal of key personnel to make
way for more politically acceptable appointees.
Under the nationalization law of June 11, 1948,
all petroleum enterprises are transferred to
the State. Only those shares which are still
in the hands of Rumanians, or foreign share-
holders, will be nationalized. German, Ru-
manian, and other assets acquired by the
Soviet Union under the terms of the Peace
Treaty are exempt.
Lip service is paid to the principle of com-
pensation. The law sets up a Nationalized
Industry Fund which shall issue bonds to the
owners to be redeemed from the profits of the
enterprise. If there are no profits, no pay-
ments will be made to the ex-owner.
? (b) Natural Gas.
Rumania has large reserves of natural gas.
It is produced both in association with oil and
from methane gas wells. At Ploesti over two-
thirds of the gas is utilized for the production
of casing-head gasoline amounting roughly to
200,000 metric tons yearly. In 1947, the pro-
duction of this gas was 1,164 million cubic
meters, nearly 30 percent of which went to
Bucharest for domestic and industrial uses.
The great methane fields of the Transylvania
Basin, which supply gas for space heating and
industry, have reserves estimated at 300 mil-
lion cubic meters. The 619 million cubic me-
ters produced in 1946 was more than double
the 1938 production. In 1947, the output rose
to 942 million cubic meters, 52 percent more
than in 1946. Before World War II, methane
and other gases accounted for 17 percent of
the fuel consumed in Rumania; however, there
has probably been an increase in its relative
importance as the result of the rise in produc-
tion of gas and the drop in petroleum output
since the war.
Pipe lines have recently been completed
from Ceanul Mare to Cluj and from Transyl-
vania to Bucharest. In addition, it has been
reported that the Brasov-Campina line for
supplying the industries of Prahova Valley
was completed in December 1947. The line to
Bucharest, alone, will save an estimated
430,000 metric tons of fuel oil annually
through the substitution of natural gas.
Until recently, all the methane gas fields in
Transylvania were owned by the Societatea
Nationala de Gaz Metan (National Methane
Gas Company). Eighty percent of the com-
pany's capital was actually owned by the
State. The government, however, forced the
company to divert its equipment to industrial
uses such as the production of carbon black,
formaldehyde, and other products. The wells
and gas deposits were working under a regime
of forced production, so that in 1947, in addi-
tion to the five or six necessary well's in all the
other gas areas, an additional five or six wells
in the Noul Sasesc field alone had to be
drilled to insure the consumption for at least
this year. Over-exploitation and uneconomi-
cal drilling are exhausting the known reserves
of gas as well as petroleum. In June 1948, the
privately-owned 20 percent was nationalized,
eliminating any possible opposition to govern-
mental policy.
Following nationalization, the industry was
integrated under the Methane Gas Center.
This organization utilizes 1,100 miles of gas
pipe lines and 115 producing wells, with a total
annual production of 1,200 million cubic me-
ters of gas. Gas is being supplied at the pres-
ent time to 21 towns and 40 villages, with plans
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to expand the present gas pipe-line network to
other areas.
(c) Coal.
Rumania has extensive deposits of low-grade
coal, but is deficient in coking coal. Its coal
reserves, second only to Yugoslavia's among
the Balkan states, are calculated at 2,871 mil-
lion metric tons; 2,839 million tons of lignite
and brown coal and 32 million tons of bitu-
minous coal. The most important deposits
are located in southern and western Transyl-
vania, while a few of lesser importance are in
northern Transylvania and Banat.
Coal ranks second to petroleum in value of
industrial production. From 1938 through
1942, production of all grades of coal averaged
about 2,500,000 metric tons yearly. In 1943,
output rose to 2,909,588 tons. By 1946, it had
dropped precipitously to a low of slightly over
1,970,000 tons. In 1947, the situation im-
proved somewhat with production reportedly
rising to 2,267,000 tons: 2,105,000 tons lignite
and 162,000 tons bituminous. Preliminary
figures for 1948 indicate that there was consid-
erable decline in output.
73,000 metric tons of coke were produced in
1947 compared with 86,000 tons in 1938.
47,000 tons of metallurgical coke of the over-
all production for 1947, was made from im-
ported coal and from coal mined at the Seoul
mine, the only source of metallurgical coking
coal in Rumania.
Rumania, normally, has not produced suffi-
cient coal to satisfy domestic requirements.
In 1946, it is estimated that the consumption
was only 1,881,000 of which 111,000 tons were
imported. However, in 1947 imports of coal
and coke dropped below 100,000 tons, consist-
ing of bituminous coal from Poland and metal-
lurgical coke from Russia. The railroads were
the greatest single consumer.
The chief problem of Rumania's coal indus-
try are: the lack of food and clothing for the
miners, labor-management difficulties, the
need for new mining equipment, and the
shortage of railway coal cars. Although the
first two obstacles may be overcome, Rumania
has little immediate prospect for obtaining
mining equipment and coal cars. Insufficient
foreign exchange will prevent its purchase
from the West, while the USSR is more likely
21
to export such equipment?if it has any avail-
able for export?to the far more productive
Polish mines. Rumanian coal production
may show some improvement within the next
few years but full exploitation for the nation's
coal mines seems unlikely for some time.
Meanwhile, maintenance of internal consump-
tion on a level sufficient to restore industry to
prewar levels will depend upon continued coal
imports from Poland and the USSR. Under
existing conditions, it will be difficult for Ru-
mania to export sufficient oil and other com-
modities to pay for appreciable coal imports.
The coal mining industry was nationalized
in June 1948. The effects will be the same as
those on the petroleum industry. Russian in-
terests will be paramount and the chance of
any others receiving just compensation are
slim.
(d) Electric Power.
It is estimated that the effective installed
capacity of electric power plants in Rumania,
at the end of 1947, was approximately 600,000
kw, with an approximate annual output of 2
billion kwh. Of the total production, about
15 percent is generated in hydro plants and 85
percent in thermal and Diesel plants, coal, oil,
and natural gas being the principal fuels. The
largest power plants are concentrated in the
Bucharest-Ploesti area. All public supply
power plants of 10,000 kw and over are located
in this region. Before World War II, the ag-
gregate capacity in this area was over 200,000
kw.
There is no national grid system in Ru-
mania. The plants around Bucharest and
Ploesti are integrated by high tension lines
but, throughout the rest of the country, there
is very little if any connection between gener-
ating stations.
Rumania's potential water power resources,
estimated at 24 billion kilowatt-hours, far ex-
ceed the country's foreseeable requirements.
The abundance of nearby fuel oil, gas, and
low-grade coal, however, has discouraged the
development of large-scale hydroelectric proj-
ects. In 1938, hydroelectric plants generated
181 million kwh from an installed capacity of
50,000 kw. Although a plan has been in effect
since 1943 to build additional installations
which would develop a total of 400 million
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kwh, very little, if anything, has been done.
In the fall of 1947, an agreement was signed
under which Rumania will supply electric
power to Bulgaria. First reports indicated
that a 60,000-volt line would be constructed to
Razgrad via Ruse for this purpose. Delivery
of power was to have begun in September 1948.
Latest reports indicate, however, that the
power line will not have begun operating until
mid-1949.
(2) Iron, Steel, and Ferro-Alloys.
Rumania's iron and steel industry output is
adequate for domestic needs, but production
is dependent upon imports for a large percent-
age of coke and iron ore requirements and for
all requirements of nickel and most of the
ferro-alloys. Peak production was reached in
1943, but, due to a lack of raw materials, the
worn-out condition of equipment and a short-
age of labor, there has been a sharp decline in
production, which still falls short of prewar
output. On 11 June 1948, all mines and in-
dustrial enterprises in Rumania were nation-
alized. A concerted effort is being made by
the Rumanian Government to bring the pro-
duction of the iron and steel industry back to
prewar levels.
Iron ore deposits are widely distributed
throughout the country in the Banat, Montii
Apuseni, Eastern Transylvania and in the
general vicinities of Hunedoara and Mara-
mures. The coal deposits in the same general
area have facilitated the establishment of a
small steel industry there. Metal content of
the mined ore ranges from 30 to 60 percent.
Although iron ore reserves are estimated at
26,200,000 metric tons, these reserves have,not
been greatly exploited. As a result, Rumania
must import a large percentage of the iron
ore used, most of which has been obtained
from Yugoslavia.
In Europe, Rumania is second only to the
USSR in the production of manganese, in
amounts sufficient for domestic consumption
with a large surplus for export. Reserves of
manganese and manganiferous iron ore depos-
its, estimated at 3,730,000 metric tons, are lo-
cated in northern and southwestern Rumania
in the vicinities of Bucovina and the Banat.
Average manganese metal content is about 36
percent.
Production of molybdenum-bismuth ore was
insignificant until 1939, but the demands for
ferrous-alloys during World War II raised Ru-
mania to a position of world importance in the
field of molybdenum. Production was esti-
mated at 10,000 tons in 1941, but dropped
sharply in 1943, owing to the exhaustion of
several of the ore pockets during the peak
years.
The principal chrome deposits are located
in the Banat Basin, where reserves have been
variously estimated at from one million tb ten
million metric tons, with the best reliability
credited to the lower estimate. Exploitation
of the chrome mines ceased in 1917, but in
1942, the right to develop the deposits was
granted by the Rumanian Government to the
state organization, the Trade Administration
for Mining Research and Exploitation. 500
metric tons reportedly were mined in 1942
containing iron-chromite ore assaying at 16
to 29 percent chromite.
Fifteen blast furnaces, with an estimated
annual capacity for the production of 386,000
metric tons of pig iron, are distributed among
four enterprises, which are located at Hune-
doara, Recita, Calanand Vlahita, and in close
proximity to the iron-ore mines. In the steel
industry at least thirty furnaces are in opera-
tion, including seventeen Siemens-Martin re-
verberatory units, one mazout (fuel-oil) fur-
nace, and twelve electric furnaces. Plans ex-
ist for increasing the number of furnaces,
modernizing existing plants, and improving
the methods for processing iron and steel, but
success is dependent entirely upon the techni-
cal assistance forthcoming from the USSR and
other industrial satellite countries. Informa-
tion on rolling mills has been fragmentary.
In 1937, the annual capacity of the mills was
estimated at 340,000 metric tons of rods, bars,
and rails and 70,000 metric tons of sheet metal.
Over-all production in 1947 is estimated at
140,000 metric tons.
(3) Non-Ferrous Metals and Non-Metallic
Metals and Minerals.
Non-ferrous metals are not abundant.
Copper production is small, all of it being
concentrated in Transylvania. Copper ore
production for 1947 is estimated to be under
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5,000 tons. The capacity of all processing
plants is reported not to exceed 2,700 tons.
Smelter output in 1947 was reported at 520
tons.
Lead production is not large' but sufficient
amounts are produced for Rumania's domestic
requirements.
Production of zinc in 1947 was 2,247 metric
tons or less than one-half the estimated an-
nual domestic requirements of 5-6,000 metric
tons. No plans are known for the expansion
of production facilities.
23
The gold and silver production is mostly
from copper and lead ores and is of more im-
portance than the copper, lead, or zinc values.
Both gold and silver are sold exclusively to the
National Bank of Rumania.
Bauxite production shows a definite down-
ward trend since 1942. Although official fig-
ures are not available for 1947, it is estimated
that approximately 600 tons of bauxite were
produced.
The following tables show the trend of pro-
duction since 1938:
TABLE IV
IRON, STEEL AND FERRO-ALLOYS
(In metric tons)
PRODUCT
Iron Ore:
1938
1943*
1945
1946
1947
Production
139,000
244,500
131,000**
104,000
117,000
Imports
114,500
Exports
41,000
Scrap Iron:
Production
141,000
174,000
117,000
148,000
154,000**
Imports
74,000
97,500
Pig Iron:
Production
133,000
226,500
54,000**
76,000
91,000
Imports
6,000
. .
3,000**
Crude Steel:
Production
276,500
351,000**
117,000**
147,000?*
183,000
Imports
104,500
1,000**
Ferro-Manganese
Ore.
Production
60,500
38,000
Molybdenum-Bismuth Ore:
Production
160
4,000
* Peak war year.
** Estimate.
TABLE V
PRODUCT
PREWAR 1938
PEAK WAR YEAR
1945
POSTWAR 1946
1947
Gold (troy oz.)
157,924
1941-103,397
74,686
Silver (troy oz.)
819,876
126,803
189,610
Copper (metric tons)
580
124
1,116
523
Lead (metric tons)
5,655
1944- 261
3,225
3,316
Zinc (metric tons)
4,022
802
2,247
Bauxite (metric tons)
11,806
1942- 15,041
663
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(4) Chemicals.
Despite indications that the chemical in-
dustry in Rumania is expanding, the tonnage
of its major products is insignificant. Such
basic chemicals as sulphuric acid and alkalis
are in very limited production, the total an-
nual output of each being approximately that
of the United States for one day. Basic raw
materials, with few exceptions, must be im-
ported, and consuming plants are almost non-
existent.
It is estimated that, prior to World War II,
Germany supplied at least 85 percent of the
chemicals. In the immediate postwar years,
a minimum quantity of this deficiency was
made up by the USSR. Rumanian chemical
requirements for wartime mobilization would
undoubtedly be a heavy drain on Soviet in-
dustry.
The lack of chemical fertilizers has been a
serious drawback to Rumanian agriculture
but, by increasing the sulphuric acid produc-
tion, it would be possible to increase the output
of phosphates and partially alleviate this
shortage. To date, however, little has been
accomplished.
(5) Textiles.
The total capacity of Rumania's spinning
mills is reported to be about 28,000 metric tons,
which is 5,000 metric tons below the country's
estimated requirements. Not only is produc-
tion of yarn and fabrics below prewar, but the
quality has deteriorated.
Rumania is dependent on cotton imports,
most of which have come from the USSR in
recent years; however, these imports are
largely re-exported to the USSR as processed
goods. It is reported that 60 percent of Ru-
mania's spinning mill production is intended
for export to the USSR. This, plus inability
to import textiles, is resulting in a shortage of
textiles for domestic consumption. Prospects
for any substantial improvement in the do-
mestic supply in the near future are slim.
It is estimated that the 1947 output of cotton
yarn was 11,300 metric tons, as compared with
an estimated 12,500 metric tons in 1946 and
16,500 tons in 1938. The output of cotton
fabrics in 1947 was estimated at 3,200 tons as
against 4,500 tons in 1946 and 21,100 tons in
1938.
Rumania's mechanized wool textile indus-
try is small, with two-thirds of the domestic
wool normally consumed in village handicraft.
Production of raw wool in 1948 is estimated to
be slightly below the prewar level of 18,000
metric tons. Imports of raw wool from the
USSR and Argentina are estimated at between
10 and 15 percent of domestic production.
Woolen fabrics are being exported to the
USSR, however, in return for the raw wool im-
ports. Production of wool fabrics in industry
was reported for 1947 at 1,540 metric tons, with
a possible increase in 1948.
The Rumanian textile industry has a large
number of small enterprises. Plans are being
made to reduce their number and concentrate
production in larger and more efficient units.
This may result in a higher output and im-
proved quality and uniformity.
c. Transportation.
Rumania's transportation system, although
vastly improved since the war, is moving only
approximately twenty-three million metric
tons of freight annually, 30 percent below the
prewar figure of 33,000,000 metric tons (see
Appendix B). Serviceable locomotives and
rolling stock owned by Rumania are 44 percent
and 20 percent, respectively, below the 1938
inventories, inland waterway vessels are re-
duced by 49 percent, and motor vehicle regis-
tration is off 57 percent. (See Appendix B.)
Pipe-line extensions toward the Soviet frontier
have not increased pipe-line capacity. How-
ever, fixed road, rail and river facilities are
being strengthened, and by 1952 should be
sound enough to support sustained increases
in traffic. Present new construction is very
limited. When or whether the Soviets will
expand the system in the future is conjectural.
Expansion can hardly be accomplished with-
out reducing armament and reparations pro-
duction; therefore it is not expected to be
emphasized in the near future. However, es-
sential transportation is being, and will be,
maintained.
Since midsummer 1947 the Soviets have
been integrating all Satellite communications
into one central authority under their strict
control. Under this centralization, Soviet
strategic and economic requirements govern
all transport policies, Satellite needs receiving
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only secondary consideration. Road and rail
expansion is based largely on Soviet strategic
requirements. The new lines give an alter-
nate through-route across Rumania from the
Soviet frontier to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and
Hungary, and the proposed new Danube
bridges, one reported under construction at
Corobia-Gigen, one planned for Giurgiu-Ruse,
and one rumored for Ismail-Tulcea, will give
the Soviet Union direct access to the Greek
and Turkish frontiers. This is fundamental
to any Soviet intentions toward the Darda-
nelles and the Aegean. In conjunction with
these bridges and with construction now pro-
ceeding in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, Ruma-
nia's transport network will give the Soviet
Union direct access to several points on the
Adriatic coast and the Aegean.
Another strategic gain of this centralization
is the effecting of a potential rolling stock re-
serve. Peak loading periods do not occur si-
multaneously throughout Eastern Europe, and
centralization will permit emergency shifting
of rolling stock from slack to busy areas, re-
gardless of national frontiers. Traffic can
move with a smaller rolling stock establish-
ment.
(1) Railroads.
Railways move the bulk of Rumania's
freight, 83 percent in 1938, 86 percent in 1947.
Before World War II, this traffic was mainly
in petroleum, grain, and timber shipments to
Central Europe. Today, the majority of the
traffic is in the same products shipped to the
Soviet Union.
The railways were primitive before the war,
but they were adequate for their requirements,
and for such a system, were in fairly sound
condition. Locomotives and rolling stock, if
antiquated, were in excess of demand; mainte-
nance was adequate; and capacity was suffi-
cient for the needs of the national economy.
As the economy quickened, in the late thirties,
a program of expansion was inaugurated,
which was overtaken by the war.
During the war, the system was vital to Ger-
many for moving petroleum, grain, and timber
to Central Europe as well as for east-front
logistics. It was reenforced to some extent by
German freight and tank cars, and the aug-
mented rolling stock establishment was strong
25
enough, despite heavy destruction of freight
cars, to allow large withdrawals for such mod-
ernization as air-brakes installations. ?War
destruction of railway equipment and track
was severe as was damage to marshalling
yards, shops, and stations. Rail traffic was
virtually at a standstill when Rumania was
occupied by the Red Army in 1944.
The system has largely if superficially re-
covered from the war. In the past three years,
nearly all damage has been shored up, three
new lines?begun before the war?have been
completed, and work is reported to have begun
on one of the planned Danube bridges. Serv-
ice has been restored on all major and nearly
all secondary lines. By August 1948, passen-
ger traffic was 25 percent heavier than in the
previous year and freight movements in-
creased 72 percent from January to December
1947.
This apparently healthy condition, however,
proved to be misleading. By June 1948 the
rapid rise in freight traffic had leveled off at 28
percent below prewar. Most repairs have
been temporary and all lines are now essen-
tially in bad repair. The majority of the loco-
motive and rolling stock establishment is su-
perannuated, maintenance is sub-minimum,
retirement rates are excessive, and nearly all
production is diverted to the Soviet Union.
Shortages of all types plague the rail sys-
tem, but rolling stock and particularly loco-
motives, are the critical deficiency. The loco-
motive inventory has declined more since,
than during, the war: 17 percent from 1938 to
1945 and 21 percent from then until now. The
serviceable supply in mid-1948 was 1,260 or 34
percent below prewar. However, intensifica-
tion of motive power employment has kept
traffic moving with the available locomotive
supply. This has been accomplished by in-
creased efficiency and by abusive practices
(such as increasing the length of service be-
tween overhauls) , which multiply deprecia-
tion and work against the recovery of inven-
tories.
? This intensification is consistent with the
exhaustive operating policies imposed by the
Soviets throughout eastern European trans-
port systems. If pursued, they would seri-
ously undermine the railways, but there is no
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reason to expect the Soviets to allow critical
railway debilitation in their buffer areas.
Whenever inventories approach the danger
point, the Soviets can re-divert railway equip-
ment production toward domestic require-
ments. In this respect, Rumania was allowed
to retain 24 of the 60 locomotives produced by
the Malaxa Works in 1947. All freight car
production, however, is scheduled for the So-
viet Union.
(2) Inland Shipping.
Although prewar inland shipping (prepon-
derantly Danube river traffic) was very active,
it amounted to only about 17 percent of all
Rumanian traffic. Petroleum, grain, and tim-
ber were the major shipments upstream to
Central Europe and overseas via the Black
Sea. A fifth of the total was domestic hauling.
Danube shipping suffered as much during
the war as railways. Port facilities were
badly wrecked, dredging was neglected, chan-
nels were blocked with shipwrecks, and 33 per-
cent of the total 771 vessels were destroyed.
A further 22 percent of the shipping was for-
feited as reparations and removed to the Soviet
Union, leaving the present Rumanian ship-
ping strength at only 51 percent of the prewar
registration, 396 vessels. About 40 of these
were either built or salvaged at the shipyards
at Turnu Severin, Giurgiu, Braila, and Galati.
Mines in the channel and at the river mouth
will continue to be a hazard to navigation for
several years, following low-water periods? and
Black Sea storms. Restoration of ports began
in the spring of 1947 and facilities which han-
dled 50 percent of normal prewar freight in
1947 are expected to handle 73 percent?ap-
proximately 4,000,000 tons?in 1948.
Rumanian Danube shipping has been com-
bined into one nationalized company, the So-
viet-Rumanian Navigation Company. SOV-
ROMTRANSPORT is nominally a joint under-
taking, with direction shared equally by both
parties, but the Soviets have, by various de-
vices, secured complete control of the com-
pany. With it they fully dominate all fluvial
navigation in Rumanian waters, because all
port facilities, warehouses, shipyards, and ma-
rine railways have been leased to the company
for thirty years. Maintenance of these facili-
ties, however, is not borne by SOVROMTRANS-
PORT, but by the Rumanian Government, in-
dicating the impotence of the Rumanian
members on the board of directors.
(3) Highways.
Motor transportation of freight has been
negligible in the national economy, but there
has always been some local, intercommunal
road traffic, largely horse-drawn.
The prewar Rumanian highway system was,
by Western standards, sparsely developed.
Roads of a sort connected and radiated from
the principal commercial and industrial cen-
ters, but there was only one significant inter-
national highway; it connected Hungary with
Bulgaria via Oradea Mare, Cluj, Sibiu, Brwv,
Bucharest, and Giurgiu.
The meager highway network suffered heav-
ily in the war. Warfare (which destroyed
hundreds of bridges) together with deprecia-
tion, plus heavily increased traffic and the
virtual suspension of maintenance, left the
road system in critical condition. Despite
wartime imports of first German, then Russian
vehicles, the supply remains much reduced.
However, an intensified program of recon-
struction during the past two summers has
restored the principal highways to serviceabil-
ity. Chief emphasis is on developing all-
weather, high-capacity through-routes, lead-
ing from the Soviet frontier near Iaqi and
Galati, via Bucharest, to the Bulgarian border
at Giurgiu on the Danube, and to the Hun-
garian frontier via Oradea Mare and Arad.
Strategic gains may accrue from the recent
nationalization of all public hauling under the
Regie Autonomica de Transporturi cu Auto-
vehicule, or RATA. This ministry has already
expanded bus routes from 97 to 222 and plans
?to triple its vehicle establishment by April
1949 to 1,200-odd trucks and busses. Such a
centralized ministry could easily be employed
to develop arterial highways and a motor in-
dustry according to strategic requirements.
d. Population and Manpower.
Rumania today possesses a young expand-
ing population, predominantly agrarian in
character, but Comparatively more industrial
than before the last war. The advent of the
Communist-dominated regime brought, of
course, complete government control over the
labor force, with all of the advantages and dis-
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advantages inherent in such a system?sub-
servience to government policy, offset by poor
morale, and a lack of incentive and initiative.
? This, coupled with the shortage of skilled
managers, has added to the problems of Ru-
manian economic recovery.
The population of Rumania, at the begin-
ning of 1948, totaled 15,873,000 as compared
with a 1930 population of 18,057,000. Terri-
torial changes and war losses were largely re-
sponsible for the decline. The ethnic pattern
of the population was also altered, shifting
from 72 percent Rumanian in 1930 to 86 per-
cent Rumanian in 1948.
Although the population of Rumania is
largely agrarian, the trend has been toward
urbanization. In 1948, an estimated 75 per-
cent of the working population was engaged
in agriculture, fishing, and forestry, as com-
pared with more than 80 percent in 1930. The
population of Rumania's eighteen largest cit-
ies increased about one-third from 1930 to
1948.
The decline in birth rate from 35 per thou-
sand population in 1930 to 23.8 per thousand
(still a high birth rate) in 1946, together with
? war losses, resulted in an upward movement of
the population into the higher age categories;
however, three-fourths of the population is
still under 45 years of age. The male popula-
tion decreased from 49.2 percent in 1930 to
48.3 percent of the total in 1948.
The Rumanian Communists gained control
of the labor movement in 1945, and have since
extended their position. The government
regulates employment conditions through the
various ministries and their sub-divisions (In-
dustrial Centers) . Trade union rights and
the mobility of labor are restricted. The gov-
ernment has established another form of con-
trol through the institution of labor norms.
Wages and salaries are held at a low level. As
a result, labor discipline is not good. Almost
all categories of persons, including school
children, are subject to "voluntary" labor. Po-
litical opponents of the new regime and mem-
bers of the German minority group in Ruma-
nia are believed to be in labor camps.
e. Standard of Living.
? The standard of living in Rumania today is
low, not only in comparison with the general
European average, but with the prewar Ru-
manian standard. This undoubtedly is hav-
ing its effect on the political and economic
progress of the country. Morale is low, but
may improve somewhat as Rumania's food po-
sition is improved.
Postwar inflation has played havoc with the
cost of living. Wages have not kept up with
rapidly rising costs. The monetary stabiliza-
tion of August 1947 bettered the workers' situ-
ation, but only temporarily, because recurrent
food shortages and expanding currency forced
prices upward. Living costs have increased
from five to seven times since the present wage
scale was set up. There has been little or no
adjustment in pay to compensate for the
enormous increase in the cost of living. Prices
would have risen even further had not drastic
government tax collection absorbed a large
part of the money in circulation.
Bread, sugar, meat, and vegetable oils are
rationed. Although these products are avail-
able on the free (unrationed) market, prices
are double and triple the rationed price.
Prices of most consumer goods are high and
supplies for domestic consumption severely
limited.
f. Financial Structure.
(1) Currency.
From 1945 to August 1947, Rumania suf-
fered from the effects of hyper-inflation.
Heavy occupation costs, extensive reparations
demands by the USSR, and budgetary deficits
financed by large issues of printing-press
money, coupled with serious crop failures and
low industrial production, led inevitably to a
precipitous rise in prices. Government meas-
ures to combat the inflation were first taken
in August 1947 when the old currency was
withdrawn. The total issue, by that time, had
increased from 35 billion lei at the end of 1938
to over 50 trillion, and the official foreign ex-
change rate had risen from 140 lei to over
650,000 (for non-government accounts) dur-
ing the same period, while the black market
rate reached approximately 7,000,000 lei to $1
in August 1947. The old lei was made con-
vertible, at the official rate of 20,000 for one
new "stabilized leu," and the initial volume of
the new currency placed in circulation was
estimated at between 3 to 3.5 billion lei (20 to
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24 million dollars at the new official rate of
150 lei to $1). However, inflation continued,
and by 15 October 1948 the new issue had
reached an estimated 127 billion. In terms
of the old lei at 20,000 to 1, the note issue thus
rose to 2,540 trillion. Chiefly by drastic con-
trols over prices, wages, credit and taxes, the
government has thus far prevented another
run-away inflation. If the underlying causes
of an expanding money supply and a low level
of production remain unchecked and the
USSR continues to drain off the country's
wealth, inflationary pressures are expected to
increase. The result will probably be another
period of extreme inflation, the severity of
which will depend on Rumania's ability to con-
trol a regimented economy under deteriorating
conditions.
(2) Banking.
The most significant modification in Ru-
mania's banking system came in January 1947
with nationalization of the Rumanian Na-
tional Bank. Up to this time the National
Bank held quasi-autonomous authority over
normal central banking functions. The na-
tionalization of this bank was only a prelude,
however, to the sweeping changes decreed by
the National Assembly on 13 August 1948,
when all but a few of the country's banks were
ordered dissolved. The only banks now in ex-
istence other than the Bank of the Rumanian
Popular Republic (new name for the National
Bank of Rumania) are: the National Indus-
trial Credit Society, the Post Office Savings
Bank, the Deposit and Consignation Office,
and "other banking enterprises established as
a result of an agreement between the Ruma-
nian Government and a foreign state." The
only institution falling within the latter cate-
gory to date is the Sovrombank, a joint Soviet-
Rumania organization which absorbed several
large Rumanian banks to become the largest
commercial bank in the country. All French,
German, Italian, and British interests, which
exerted considerable influence among the
large commercial banks before the war, were
liquidated by this order. The new law gives
the government complete authority over the
central bank (Bank of the RPR) , by placing
its administration and credit policy control
directly under the Finance Minister, thus in-
suring a tight hold on all banking and credit
operations necessary for integration with the
industrial plan. New controls also establish
rigid supervision over foreign trade and for-
eign exchange transactions, including the di-
version of private foreign currency earnings
within Rumania. Former Governor Aurel
Vijoli, a Communist of high standing, was re-
appointed as bank president and concurrently
assistant Finance Minister. It can be ex-
pected that this grip on banking will give the
USSR complete powers in exploiting the Ru-
manian economy.
(3) Budget.
Since 1930 the Rumanian national budget
has been unbalanced. Military disburse-
ments accounted for approximately 30 percent
of total expenditures in the prewar period, ris-
ing to over 75 percent during the war when
Rumania was actively opposing Soviet armies.
Although the war brought on increased taxa-
tion, already burdensome, it was insufficient to
cover expenditures, and large-scale borrowings
became necessary. Since the war, the Ruma-
nian budget has been dominated by expendi-
tures for national defense and war obligations,
chiefly reparations to the USSR. Of the esti-
mated more than 56 billion lei spent during
1947-48 (period following currency reform-
15 August 1947 to 31 March 1948) , 16 percent
went for national defense and 33 percent for
obligations resulting from the war, totalling
approximately half the state budget. Ex-
penditures for national defense were consid-
erably greater than the published figures.
Items hidden as allocations appearing under
various ministries for "superior interest of
state" are believed intended for specialized
security organizations within Rumania. Al-
though government figures show that 1947-48
budgetary expenditures were covered by ordi-
nary revenues, it is believed that actual ex-
penditures greatly exceeded revenues and that
the deficit was principally met through cur-
rency expansion, which was the basic cause
for increased inflation of the economy during
the period.
The published budget projected for the fis-
cal year (1 April 1948 to 31 March 1949) shows
that national defense spending will increase
to 24 percent, with war obligations taking 25
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percent, totalling about half of all expendi-
tures as they did in the previous year. The
planned 1948-49 budget calls for an outlay of
? 108.7 billion lei, to be fully covered by ordinary
taxation and operational revenues. Approxi-
mately two-thirds is to be collected from in-
direct taxes, chiefly from sales and entertain-
ment tax, stamp and legal fees and customs
duties. It is expected, however, that expendi-
tures will far exceed revenues, as in previous
years, and that deficit financing will again
become necessary.
g. International Trade.
(1) Prewar Trade.
During the decade preceding World War II,
Rumania consistently maintained an export
balance. This position was maintained dur-
ing the economic depression of the early
1930's, Rumania experiencing a sharp drop in
imports, accompanied by a lesser decrease in
exports. In the period 1937-39, imports of
the chief commodities in which Rumania is
deficient?textiles, cotton, coal, coke, iron,
steel and other base metals and their manu-
? factures, machinery, and vehicles?were on
the increase, indicating progressive indus-
trialization of the country. These classes ac-
counted for about 80 percent of all imports in
1939. Exports for the same period showed
that petroleum averaged 40 percent of the
total, cereals 30 percent, lumber 10 percent,
and the remaining 20 percent principally ani-
mal and other agricultural products. Al-
though the volume of trade did not return to
the 1929 level, it was making substantial prog-
ress, particularly in exports, when the war
broke out in 1939.
Germany was the leading customer and sup-
plier in the prewar period, while Czechoslo-
vakia was the next largest supplier and the
UK was the second largest customer. Trade
with Italy, France, and Austria was also im-
portant. Trade with the USSR was negligible.
(2) Wartime Trade.
During the German occupation of Eastern
Europe, Rumania was dependent upon that
? country for most of her trade, Italy being of
secondary importance. Germany's participa-
tion in Rumanian foreign trade jumped from
23 percent in 1937 to approximately 70 percent
in 1941 and 1942.
(3) Postwar Trade.
Since the USSR-Rumanian armistice (12
September 1944), Rumania's foreign trade has
been characterized by low volume, deficit bal-
ances, change in composition, and a shift in
trading partners from the west to ?the east,
with the USSR receiving most of the exports
through reparations and favorable trade
agreements. Even though Rumania showed
some improvement in its trade position in
1946, imports reached only 37 percent and ex-
ports 11 percent of the volume recorded in
the prewar year 1938. In 1946 the USSR
supplied approximately 50 percent of the im-
ports, chiefly coal, pig iron and cereals, while
the Soviet Union received 76 percent of the
exports, the bulk in petroleum and lumber.
Agricultural products led in exports to other
countries.
Rumania's foreign trade showed gains in
1947, although the volume was still far below
the 1938 level. It is estimated that the 1947
volume of imports was double that of 1946.
The USSR was the principal supplier, account-
ing for 64 percent of the volume and 49 per-
cent of the value of total imports. Despite
trade difficulties with, the west, the US sent
Rumania considerable amounts (largely
grains), ranking as the second largest sup-
plier with approximately a fifth of the total
value in 1947. The Soviets also took most of
the Rumanian exports during 1947, receiving
50 percent of the value of all commodities, in-
cluding 95 percent of all petroleum exports.
According to Rumanian figures, commodi-
ties in which that nation is deficient?textiles,
minerals, machinery and vehicles?dropped to
about 40 percent of the total imports in 1947,
as compared with 80 percent in 1938. Cereal
imports increased, from a negligible amount
in 1938, to about 38 percent in 1947. Petro-
leum still led in exports although it decreased
in relation to other commodities to 27 percent
of the total compared with 40 percent in 1938.
Lumber replaced cereals in second place, ad-
vancing to 25 percent in 1947. These figures
also show that cereal exports declined from
second position in 1938 to only 1 percent of
the total in 1947, a condition resulting largely
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from the postwar drought. Animal and other
agricultural products contributed substantial-
ly to exports in 1947, while exports of manu-
factured goods were negligible.
It is believed that published Rumanian Gov-
ernment export figures do not include repara-
tions to the USSR, for which -nothing is re-
ceived in return. Nor do the export figures
include Soviet takings from the output of the
joint stock corporations. These are severe
burdens on Rumania's weakened economy,
and the effects though difficult to estimate are
serious.
RUMANIAN FOREIGN TRADE - 1947*
US $ MILLION
IMPORTS
Percent
Value of total
EXPORTS
Percent
Value of total
BALANCE
Value
USSR
29.92
48.8
17.18
50.1
-12.74
US
11.40
18.6
. .
-11.40
Czechoslovakia
6.17
10.1
5.78
16.9
- .39
Hungary
3.25
5.3
3.31
9.7
+ .06
Switzerland
2.42
3.9
.68
2.0
- 1.74
Bulgaria
2.18
3.6
3.73
10.9
1.55
Yugoslavia
.82
1.3
.56
1.6
-- .26
Poland
.65
1.1
.61
1.8
- .04
Others
4.51
7.3
2.39
7.0
- 2.12
Total
61.32
100.0
34.24
100.0
-27.08
* Statistics published by the Rumanian Government. They represent only trade carried on under
government agreements, and do not include normal batter or trade between private importers and export-
ers. Dollar values are often distorted due to the use of arbitrary exchange rates and prices (commonly
based on those of 1938) .
Indications are that no substantial improve-
ment will be seen in Rumania's over-all trade
position during 1948. The deterioration in
East-West relations in 1948 resulted in the
imposition, by the US of an export license sys-
tem, which has resulted in a reduction of
strategic American goods reaching Rumania.
Rumania has also tightened supervision over
all trade functions by nationalizing major im-
port and export establishments within the
country. If Western export controls become
tighter, and foreign exchange resources re-
main low, Rumania will become increasingly
dependent upon the USSR, especially for es-
sential imports.
The development of Rumanian foreign trade
is hindered primarily by the lack of commodi-
ties available for export and in demand by
countries other than the USSR. The foreign
exchange secured by the exports of such com-
modities is believed to cover only a small par-
tion of Rumania's urgent import needs. So
long as the Soviets monopolize oil production,
the outlook for a profitable export trade will
remain poor.
(4) Trade Agreements with the USSR.
The most important trade agreements have
been those with the USSR. The first postwar
treaty with the Soviet Union was made on 8
May 1945 and covered various commodities
valued at $23.5 million, each way, extending
over a one-year period. New trade pacts have
been concluded annually and have constituted
the foundation for general trade activities be-
tween the two countries. Both Rumania and
the USSR largely succeeded in fulfilling the
terms of these agreements up to the end of
1947.
In 1948, pact commitments for each country
were increased to approximately $30 million
annually. The most important Rumanian
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exports were 400,000 metric tons of petroleum
products, 60,000 M.T. of cereals, 80,000 M.T.
of potatoes, 120,000 M.T. of cement, 25,000
M.T. of tar paper, 1,950,000 square meters of
window glass, 80,000 M.T. of miscellaneous
foodstuffs, and 200,000 M.T. of lumber. The
Soviet Union was to deliver to Rumania 150,-
000 M.T. of coal, 200,000 M.T. of coke, 65,000
M.T. of iron ore, 73,000 M.T. of refined cast
iron, 20,000 M.T. of cotton, 48,000 M.T. of steel,
42,000 ball bearings and other miscellaneous
goods.
Although both countries made substantial
Shipments, the results during the first ten
months of 1948 indicate that these commit-
ments were not fulfilled in 1948, and that this
agreement will probably be revised in 1949.
The foregoing figures, however, do not tell
the full story. It is quite likely that the
Soviets are charging Rumanians above the
world market prices for their exports, and
paying the Rumanians below the world mar-
ket prices. It is also possible that many Soviet
exports are being shipped to Rumania for
manufacture on the Soviet account and are
? not listed among the Rumanian exports to
the Soviet Union. Through this treaty the
USSR expanded further its domination and
influence on the Rumanian economy during
the year.
(5) Trade Agreements with Other Coun-
tries.
Since the war, Rumania has entered into
a number of trade agreements, particularly
with neighboring countries, the most impor-
tant being five-year pacts with Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Poland. None of these bilateral
treaties has, so far, been successfully carried
out, chiefly because, after Soviet demands
have been satisfied, Rumania has little to ex-
port that is in demand by other countries.
This failure to meet commitments has caused
the other countries concerned to withhold
machinery and finished goods badly needed by
Rumania to develop her oil and lumber in-
dustries. To a lesser extent, unstable prices
and transportation difficulties have contrib-
uted to the breakdown in treaty implementa-
? tion. Although trade with Czechoslovakia is
conducted on a small scale compared to trade
with the USSR, Czechoslovakia is Rumania's
most important treaty partner among satellite
countries.
(6) Reparations.
Under the terms of the Armistice Agree-
ment of 1944 as amended in 1945 and 1946,
Rumania is obliged to pay the Soviet Union
$300 million in reparations over a period of
eight years beginning 12 September 1944.
These reparations are payable in goods based
on 1938 prices. According to Rumanian Gov-
ernment estimates Rumania paid the USSR
$190 million in goods up to June 1948, at
which time the Soviet Union agreed to reduce,
by half, the outstanding balance of $110 mil-
lion. Total charges imposed by the Soviets,
and paid by Rumania in the form of repara-
tions, war booty, former German and Italian
assets, and the output of joint Soviet-Rumania
enterprises, are estimated to be nearly $2
billion which far exceed the amount of agreed
reparations.
(7) Foreign Exchange.
If foreign exchange reserves continue to de-
crease, Rumania will be faced with a critical
shortage of capital, which is already insuffi-
cient to meet the requirements of the econ-
omy. Lacking foreign exchange assets, Ru-
mania depends largely on the bilateral agree-
ment system, thus paying for goods with goods
and eliminating the need for foreign exchange
transfers. This procedure has definite limita-
tions, however, as far as Rumania is con-
cerned, in that the Eastern European coun-
tries?with whom the agreements have been
primarily made?are unable to supply Ru-
mania's need for manufactured goods. Ru-
mania acquires some gold through domestic
production, but it has been necessary to con-
serve gold holdings by prohibiting the export
of this metal for international payments.
These measures, however, have not prevented
Rumanian gold holdings, which make up the
bulk of foreign exchange reserves, from de-
clining from about $270 million in 1945 to
approximately $200 million on 14 September
1948. In addition, there is about $10 million
in convertible currencies, which was set aside
chiefly for the payment of essential imports.
Rumania's total foreign loan obligations
stood at approximately $54,907,000 on 1.July
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1948, of which $9,800,000 in principal and in-
terest becomes due by 31 December 1948.
Rumania's creditors are the following; Ar-
gentina $25 million, United States $12 million,
secured by gold, USSR $10 million, Switzer-
land $7.5 million, and the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements $407,000. It is believed
that these loans are chiefly long-term govern-
ment commitments, payable in dollars and
Swiss francs.
3. Future Developments.
The future of the Rumanian economy
hinges primarily on the extent of Soviet
assistance in capital goods and technical guid-
ance, and the ability to acquire foreign ex-
change for necessary imports. Also of im-
portance will be the Economic Plan objectives
for the production of capital goods as opposed
to consumers goods; the effect of collectiviza-
tion on agricultural production and distribu-
tion; and the degree of intelligent direction
of economic activity.
The question of foremost importance is the
role probably already assigned to Rumania in
its economic relations with the Soviet Union.
Thus far, Kremlin exploitation has out-
weighed its assistance. If the USSR wishes
to speed Rumanian recovery, it must supply
a sizeable part of the necessary machinery and
the technical advice. This aid is especially
important to recovery in the petroleum indus-
try. However, in view of Soviet inability to
meet the capital goods requirements of its own
industry, it is unlikely that aid will extend
much beyond administrative guidance, lim-
ited technical advice, and some high-priced
industrial raw materials.
Since sufficient assistance from the USSR
will not be forthcoming, Rumania will prob-
ably continue to receive Soviet encouragement
to trade elsewhere. This means, of course,
that the Soviet Union must first permit suffi-
cient exports, particularly petroleum, in order
for Rumania to acquire the foreign exchange
with which to purchase imports of machinery
and equipment. This, in itself, is a doubtful
assumption in the light of the Soviet desire
for oil. Even if Rumania acquired sufficient
foreign exchange, there would probably be
still another obstacle, in the form of Western
export controls on items considered as war
potential. Acquisition of many types of cap-
ital goods through foreign trade would then
depend, primarily, on the volume of ma-
chinery and equipment which could be ob-
tained from countries not participating in
the Western recovery program.
Rumania's machinery industry is negligible,
and it is highly unlikely that it will be able to
furnish any significant part of the require-
ments in this line for some time to come.
Since the planners have ordered a rapid de-
velopment of the heavy and extractive indus-
tries, considerable foreign assistance will be
needed, and the effort made will be at a
further expense to consumer goods production.
Rumanian agriculture may reach the pre-
war level of production by 1951-52, if collec-
tivization does not take place before then.
There is likelihood of significant resistance to
collectivization by the Rumanian peasants, in
the form of decreased plantings, excessive
livestock slaughterings to prevent confisca-
tion, and hoarding of produce. If collectiviza-
tion of agriculture takes place before 1951-52,
then recovery to prewar levels of production
may be delayed until sometime between 1955
and 1960.
Finally, of vital importance is the compe-
tence with which Rumania's planners direct
the economy. This will, of course, depend, in
turn, on the demands which emanate from
Moscow. Nevertheless, the mechanics of exe-
cuting the plan, once the goals have been
established, will largely be the responsibility
of Rumanian administrators. Undoubtedly
Rumania, as a neophyte in the field of eco-
nomic planning, will make many mistakes in
the establishment of goals and administrative
techniques, integrating production and co-
ordinating transportation and distribution.
All considered, it is unlikely that industry,
in the absence of substantial Soviet assistance,
will reach the general level of 1938 much be-
fore the middle 1950's and it is certain that
with the exception of petroleum Rumanian in-
dustry will add little to the economic poten-
tial of the Soviet bloc. However, it should be
remembered that Rumania is predominantly
an agricultural country and the slow recovery
of industry is not as disastrous as it would
be for a more industrialized nation.
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CHAPTER III
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. Development of Rumanian Foreign Policy.
a. Ideological-Political Motivation.
Because of the complete control of the pres-
ent Rumanian regime by the Kremlin, Ru-
manian foreign relations are based exclu-
sively on considerations supporting Kremlin
policy. The complete tie between Soviet and
Rumanian foreign policies is indicated in the
text of the Treaty of Collaboration, Friend-
ship and Mutual Assistance, signed on 4 Feb-
ruary 1948. The pact calls for "a joint ex-
amination" of all international political ac-
tion by either of the signatories, to which end
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two
countries will maintain permanent contact.
Since Rumania cannot be truly dealt with as
an independent nation, its foreign policy mo-
tivation can properly be considered only -
within the framework of Soviet objectives.
As the Soviet Union has embarked on an in-
creasingly frank and undisguised policy of
consolidating the Balkan area in its own ideo-
logical image, so the Kremlin's objective in
Rumania has been directed primarily at ren-
dering that country a servile instrument of
Soviet foreign policy. As a result, Rumanian
foreign policy, administered by Soviet vassals,
has been directed toward Soviet objectives.
It has unequivocally supported all measures
designed to facilitate the spread of Soviet in-
fluence and resisted all forces hostile to the
achievement of Soviet goals.
b. Strategic-Military Motivation.
The complete subordination of Rumania to
the Soviet Union facilitates the Kremlin's stra-
tegic plans in Europe. In these plans, the Ru-
manian part involves the use of (1) Rumania
as an advanced Soviet military base; (2) Ru-
mania's economy, particularly its oil resources
and food, as sources for strengthening the So-
viet war potential; (3) the puppet Rumanian
Government for the control of a crucial part
of the Danube River, thereby controlling a
main artery of southeastern European trans-
portation; and (4) Rumanian military man-
power to supplement that of the USSR.
2. Operation of Rumanian Foreign Policy.
a. Position in the Soviet Orbit.
As soon as Rumania's subservience to
the USSR was firmly established, through
its Communist-dominated government, the
Kremlin drew it into the satellite orbit. A
system of interlocking military, political, eco-
nomic, and cultural treaties with both the
USSR and the other Satellites subordinated
Rumania's relations with other nations to the
requirements of the Kremlin. Initially, a se-
ries of inter-orbit economic and cultural agree-
ments was concluded, to be followed by more
comprehensive Mutual Assistance Treaties.
In obedience to Kremlin dictates, Rumania, in
July 1947, rejected participation in the Euro-
pean Recovery Program. The creation of the
Soviet-dominated Council of Economic Mutual
Assistance in January 1949, on the other hand,
has as its aim the close integration of Ru-
manian economy into that of the USSR and
its Satellites.
b. Development of the Mutual Assistance
Pacts.
The close ties binding Rumania to the So-
viet bloc are best indicated by the reciprocal
network of treaties Which that country has
negotiated since the war's end. The most
important were the Mutual Assistance Pacts
with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, the
USSR, and Czechoslovakia signed between De-
cember 1947 and July 1948. A similar treaty
was concluded between Rumania and Poland
on 26 January 1949; establishment Of like ties.
with Albania will complete the net and is to
be expected. The treaties involving Rumania
form but a portion of the system of alliances
with which the Kremlin holds the Satellites in
Note: This Chapter is based on information available to CIA as of 1 February 1949.
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their orbits. Although all the treaties have
been negotiated on a bilateral basis of super-
ficial equality, actually they form a legalistic
'facade behind which the Kremlin has built
up a complete Eastern European empire.
The Soviet-Rumanian Mutual Assistance
Treaty signed on 4 February 1948 provides for
joint consultation on all important inter-
national issues, through permanent contact
of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Both
signatories agree to take joint measures
against any threat of aggression on the part
of Germany, or of any state allying itself with
Germany. In the military and industrial
sections of the Treaty, the Kremlin intention
to make of Rumania a wartime asset is clearly
indicated.
The Rumanian Mutual Assistance Treaties
with other Satellites follow the general pat-
tern of that signed with the USSR. They will
provide for military cooperation against ag-
gression by "Germany or any other state
which would unite with Germany." Although
appearances were maintained to convey the
impression that Rumania acted on its sover-
eign initiative in negotiating and concluding
these treaties, the hand of the Kremlin was
apparent in their uniformity, and the preci-
sion with which they were carried out.
c. Role in the Cominform.
Rumania, as one of the most rigidly loyal
of the Kremlin's Satellites, has taken a promi-
nent part in Cominform activities since the
official birth of that organization in Septem-
ber 1947, attended by Rumanian Communists
Ana Pauker and Gheorghiu-Dej. The only
officially announced Cominform meeting to
denounce Tito was held in Rumania with top
Rumanian Communists leading the attack.
With the fall of Tito from the Kremlin's favor,
the headquarters of the Cominform, and the
editorial offices of its Journal, were transferred
to Bucharest. In the most obvious of the
Cominform activities, the attack on arch-de-
viationist Tito, the Rumanian regime has
shown itself to be a fanatical follower of
Kremlin dictates, and may be expected to take
a prominent role in any, future plans the
Cominform may devise to unseat Tito. Ru-
mania has also closely followed Cominform
policy in aiding the Greek guerrillas, supply-
ing a steady flow of funds, food, and clothing.
It was reported in March 1949 that over 3,000
Greek children, kidnapped by the guerrillas,
were being sheltered and indoctrinated in Ru-
mania. There is, however, no positive evi-
dence that Rumania is directly participating
in the Greek war with manpower and arms.
d. The Danubian Treaty.
Despite the incorporation of a clause into
the Rumanian Peace Treaty calling for inter-
nationalization of the Danube, that water-
way, with full Rumanian consent, has fallen
under exclusive Soviet control. At the Au-
gust 1948 Danubian Conference Rumania and
the other Satellites confirmed Soviet hegem-
ony over the important Central European
commercial artery. Rumania thus rejected
internationalization of the Danube and the
consequent possible revival of the flourishing
prewar East-West trade on this waterway.
e. Relations with Yugoslavia.
(1) Period of Postwar Friendship. The
flexibility of Rumanian foreign policy, as well
as its complete subservience to the Kremlin,
is aptly illustrated by the sudden reversal of
the Rumanian Government's attitude toward
Tito since the rift with the Cominform. Pre-
viously, the postwar "democratic" regimes of
the two Satellites with the Kremlin's blessing
had carried on relations of the greatest cor-
diality. As early as June 1945, a bilateral Ru-
manian-Yugoslav trade treaty was signed
which was renegotiated and broadened in suc-
ceeding years. In January 1947, during the
height of the Rumanian famine, Yugoslavia
made a sizable wheat loan to Rumania. The
friendly trend of relations was followed in
June of the same year by the signature of a
Yugoslav-Rumanian Cultural and Economic
Agreement. The close collaboration of the
two Satellites was climaxed in December 1947
by the signing of a 20-year Treaty of Mutual
Assistance which pledged both parties "not to
take part in any action directed against one
of them."
(2) Deterioration of Rumanian-Yugoslav
Relations. In spite of the many ties binding
it to Yugoslavia, Rumania, following the Tito-
Kremlin break, has taken a prominent part in
the Cominform struggle against Tito. In
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'sharply reducing oil deliveries to Yugoslavia,
in mid-July 1948, Rumania delivered Tito one
? of the most telling blows by the Soviet bloc
thus far.
Subsequent events have marked a further
deterioration of Rumanian-Yugoslav relations.
Each country has taken action within its bor-
ders against the interests of the other, besides
mounting a high-powered propaganda offen-
sive. Continuing Rumanian policy toward
Tito will accurately mirror that of the Krem-
lin.
1. Relations with the West.
(1) US* Protests of Peace Treaty Violations.
As Soviet influence in postwar Rumania has
progressively grown, Rumanian relations with
the Western world have deteriorated. The
Western Powers have fought a losing battle
in an attempt to guarantee to the Rumanian
people a government of their own choosing.
Not only have the Western Powers been un-
able to exert any moderating influence toward
Rumanian compliance with its peace treaty
obligations, but they have been powerless to
? protect their nationals and property, and have
even been unable to maintain the legations
themselves free from persecution by the Com-
munist government. US-Rumanian diplo-
matic relations since the war have been char-
acterized by repeated, but futile, US protests
of violations, made with Soviet encouragement
and connivance, of such international agree-
ments as Yalta, Potsdam, and Moscow, the
Armistice Convention of September 1944, and
the peace treaty of 1947.
By the end of 1946 the Communist regime,
with the support of the USSR, had effectively
thwarted Western Power efforts to install a
democratic government in Rumania. Previ-
ously the US and the UK had ineffectively
protested Communist attacks on opposition
political groups, and the delay in holding a
national election. A US note challenging the
impartiality of the November 1946 election,
confirming the Communists in power, was re-
jected by the Rumanian Government. When
the opposition cabinet members installed at
? US and British insistence resigned after the
election as a protest, Western efforts to
broaden the Rumanian Government had
failed and the Communist regime was firmly
entrenched.
The US and the UK, as signatories to the
Rumanian peace treaty, have provided the
only overt, though ineffective, criticism of the
Rumanian regime's arbitrary actions. De-
spite generous US aid to Rumania during the
Moldavian famine (winter of 1946-47) , as well
as US signature of the Rumanian peace treaty
in February 1947, the Groza Government has
maintained a consistently hostile attitude to-
ward the US. US and British protests during
1947 over the dissolution of the opposition
Peasant Party and the arrest of its popular
leader Maniu were summarily rejected as un-
warranted interference in Rumanian internal
affairs.
(2) Elimination of Western Influences.
With the virtually complete elimination of
overt political opposition, the Rumanian re-
gime increasingly turned its attention to the
eradication of remaining Western interests
and influences in the country. The Western
legations themselves, and especially that of
the US, have been the objects of an acceler-
ated campaign of pressure and vilification
from the Rumanian Government. The anti-
Western drive has been characterized by vi-
cious propaganda, coupled with efforts to
cripple legation activities by attempting to
link them with anti-Communist groups within
the country.
(3) Nationalization of US Property. Al-
though the Rumanian peace treaty provides
for the restoration of legal rights and inter-
ests of American nationals to their September
1, 1939 status, the consistent policy of the Ru-
manian Government has been toward com-
plete elimination of private enterprise,
whether domestic or foreign-owned. Thus
far, the Rumanian Government has not de-
nied its peace treaty obligations to foreign
nationals, but, by successive actions, it has
relentlessly moved toward their nullification.
Governmental pressure against US-owned
business in Rumania had followed the familiar
pattern of steadily increasing repression until
the Communist regime had a legal basis for
assuming control. In the case of the largest
US-owned Rumanian enterprise, the Romano-
Americana Oil Company, the Rumanian Gov-
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ernment, besides arresting employees, arbi-
trarily fixed wages, prices, and working condi-
tions which were impossible to fulfill. In
April 1948, the government climaxed its ac-
tion against the company by expropriating it
without provision for compensation. This ac-
tion was supported by a government decree on
11 June 1948, nationalizing virtually all prop-
erty in the country.
(4) Failure to Disarm. The Rumanian
Government has evaded repeated US and Brit-
ish requests for data regarding disarmament
called for by the peace treaty. In an April
1948 note to the US, the Rumanian regime
stated that it had not "centralized" the infor-
mation desired. When this had been done,
however, and when the USSR, Great Britain,
and US, "acting in full understanding," re-
quested the data, it would be made available
without delay. With the USSR rearming Ru-
mania under the terms of the Soviet-Ruma-
nian Mutual Assistance Pact, a "full under-
standing" among the Big Three on Rumanian
disarmament is unlikely.
(5) Attempts to Enter the UN. The Soviet-
sponsored Rumanian attempts to join the UN
in 1947 and 1948 have finally presented the
Western Powers with some means of political
pressure on the regime. The Rumanian re-
quest formed part of a blanket proposal sub-
mitted on July 11, 1947, by the USSR for ad-
mittance to the UN of Albania, Bulgaria, Hun-
gary, Outer Mongolia, and Rumania.
The Rumanian application was rejected by
the UN General Assembly in August 1947, pri-
marily at US insistence. The US objection to
the Rumanian application was based on the
failure of the Rumanian Government to imple-
ment satisfactorily the human rights provi-
sions of the Rumanian peace treaty. More-
over, the United States had little interest in
giving the Kremlin an additional voice in the
United Nations.
4. Probable Trend of Rumanian Foreign Policy
Under the likely conditions of a further con-
solidation of the Communist regime in Ru-
mania, no important shift in Rumanian for-
eign policy is foreseeable. Even in the very
unlikely event of a successful "national" Com-
munist defection, a reorientation of Rumanian
foreign policy is improbable. So long as the
Soviet Union remains in a dominant position
throughout Eastern Europe and maintains
Communist-dominated governments in power
there, Western democracy will be regarded as
an "imperialist" enemy.
Only Soviet embarrassment in a major war
might provide Rumania an opportunity to
break away from Soviet control.
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CHAPTER IV
MILITARY SITUATION
1. Armed Forces of the Rumanian Government.
a. Genesis.
(1) Original Development of Armed Forces.
The Russians established the first well-organ-
ized army in Rumania in the 19th century
when the armed forces were standardized on
a national basis, conscription introduced, and
a system of maintenance at national expense
provided. Although Rumania was then un-
der Russian "protection," Turkish "suze-
rainty" was maintained. The first large mo-
bilization was achieved in the Russo-Turkish
War of 1877-78, when Rumania entered the
conflict on the side of Russia, and was able to
mobilize approximately one million men. As
a result of the Turkish defeat, Rumania
emerged as an independent state, and
launched a program of modernizing and de-
veloping an army along continental lines. In
the second Balkan War of 1913, the Rumani-
ans found that the chief faults of the new
army were the unwieldy size of units and the
lack of a sufficient officer reserve. In the
succeeding years an attempt was made to cor-
rect these defects.
(2) External Influence. In developing mil-
itary tactics, Rumania has always depended
heavily on ideas originating in other coun-
tries. Prior to World War II, French mili-
tary tactics were carefully studied. As late
as 1937, the autumn maneuvers of the Ru-
manian Army were supervised by French offi-
cers. Just before World War II, French in-
fluence over the Army was gradually replaced
by German. Rumanians fought beside Ger-
man units under German tactical control un-
til August 1944, when Rumania turned to the
Allies and fought with the Soviets against the
Germans. During the latter part of the war,
two divisions organized in the USSR from Ru-
manian PW's were trained and equipped by
the Soviets. These divisions became the
nucleus for the postwar Rumanian Army
which has been exclusively under the influ-
ence of the Soviet Union.
(3) Present Influence. After World War
II, the Rumanian military establishment was
allowed to deteriorate until its military capa-
bilities were virtually nil. In December 1947,
Minister of National Defense, Bodnaras began
a revitalization program. At the present
time, the Army is being reorganized under
Soviet direction; Soviet tactics are being
taught, and the Soviet-Rumanian Mutual Aid
Pact provides for the exchange of military
personnel to facilitate the instruction of Ru-
manians in Soviet combat techniques and the
use of modern war materiel. More emphasis
is being placed upon the use of armored and
mechanized units, and artillery is being given
a more prominent role in military planning
in contrast to the pre-World War II emphasis
on the infantry. Present reorganization- and
expansion plans are believed to include the
following proposals: (1) The activation of four
army corps; (2) the activation of six addi-
tional infantry divisions and two additional
mountain divisions; (3) the activation of a
cavalry division from the existing two cavalry
brigades; and (4) the activation of an artillery
division. In addition, the existing tank and
mechanized divisions would be reorganized,
reequipped, and subordinated to a tank com-
mand. Implementation of these plans is al-
ready started and includes the activation of
two new army corps, three new infantry di-
visions, and one artillery division. Outside
the scope of the expansion plans, a second
antiaircraft division was activated from exist-
ing brigades.
Note: This Chapter is based on information available to CIA as of 1 August 1949.
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b. Strength and Disposition of the Armed
Forces.
(1) Ground Forces. The strength of the
Rumanian Army is approximately 113,000 *,
organized into two army corps, seven infantry
divisions, two mountain divisions, two anti-
aircraft divisions, one artillery division, one
tank division; one mechanized division, three
independent brigades, and six independent
regiments.
The establishment of these units was the
result of the reorganization and expansion of
.the postwar army from late 1948 to the pres-
ent. Prior to that time, the army was organ-
ized into four infantry divisions, one moun-
tain division, one tank division, one mecha-
nized division, two independent brigades, and
nine independent regiments.
At the present time troops are disposed for
administrative purposes with no significant
troop concentrations.
(2) Quality of Personnel. With the past
few months, the discipline, morale, and effi-
ciency of the Rumanian Army have increased
as a result of the military training program,
which has reached an almost wartime inten-
sity. However, training is still largely limited
to that of small units. Maneuvers on a di-
visional level have not yet taken place.
Troops lack training and experience in the
use of modern war materiel. Successive
purges since World War II have deprived the
army of competent leadership. This defici-
ency seriously handicaps the revitalization
program for the armed forces. Recently over
3,000 purged officers have been recalled in an
effort to rebuild a capable officer corps.
The majority of the armed forces personnel
are of peasant stock. On the whole, these
peasants are obedient and hardworking. The
* This figure includes antiaircraft personnel, but
does not include 70,000 men in the Militia and 21,000
men in the Frontier Guards. For the purposes of
this paper, the Militia and Frontier Guards are not
being considered as part of the Army strength since
they are troops of the Ministry of Interior. Un-
der the terms of the Peace Treaty, the strength of
the Army, Frontier Guards, and antiaircraft troops
shall not exceed 125,000 men. Present strength es-
timates, therefore, excluding the Militia, show the
Rumanian ground forces as exceeding the Peace
Treaty limitations by 9,000 men.
educational level and degree of trained skills
among the conscripts generally are low, but
most of the conscripts have acquired a degree
of resourcefulnes fostered by the difficult liv-
ing conditions of the average Rumanian, and
are relatively adaptable to a military life.
(3) Weapons. Although there is an ade-
quate quantity of weapons in the Rumanian
Army, it lacks modern armament.
Most of the rifles rand machine guns are of
Czechoslovak design and Rumanian manu-
facture. Pistols and submachine guns are of
diverse origin, and the two Soviet-trained
mechanized divisions are equipped with
standard Soviet small arms. The Rumanian
Army may be regarded as adequately equipped
with small arms.
The basic mortars of the army are the
French-Brandt-designed and Rumanian-made
81 mm and 120 mm mortars using Rumanian-
made ammunition. In addition, the two So-
viet-trained divisions are stated to have Soviet
82 mm M 1937 mortars. Although the army
is adequately supplied with mortars, there is
no information on the availability of mortar
ammunition.
Artillery is also of diverse origin?French,
Soviet, Czechoslovak, Ruthanian, British, Ger-
man, and Swiss. It is believed that the long-
term policy for this class of materiel will in-
volve solely Soviet weapons. The two ar-
mored and mechanized divisions are believed
to be the only divisions in the army equipped
with Soviet artillery (122 mm howitzer and
152 mm howitzer) .
The army has a maximum of 75 tanks, most
of which are German Mark IV mediums. The
remainder includes small numbers of German
Mark V and/or Mark VI heavies, and possibly
a few German Lynx fully tracked armored
cars. Motor transport vehicles are limited in
number and generally in poor mechanical
condition. Attempts are being made to pur-
chase- such equipment in the USSR and
Czechoslovakia. It is likely that any vehicle
deficiency will be corrected from Soviet
sources.
Signal equipment is inadequate and in un-
satisfactory condition. Although the armed
forces have large stocks of ammunition, it is
believed that much of this ammunition is de-
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fective because of its age. Fire control equip-
ment is of simple, conventional, but outmoded
design. Rumanian antiaircraft and artillery
particularly, are incapable of delivering accu-
rate fire.
2. Rumanian Navy.
a. Development.
(1) Historical. In 1939, the entire Ru-
manian Navy consisted of 24 small warships
and 71 auxiliary vessels. During the period
1940-44, this fleet was increased to 37 warships
and 146 auxiliary craft; an expansion effected
largely by purchase, construction, capture, and
requisitioning from private owners. After the
Rumanian military "about face" on 23 August
1944 and the subsequent occupation of the
country by the Soviet Army, virtually the en-
tire Rumanian fleet was taken over by the
USSR. After considerable negotiation and
protest, a part of the fleet was returned in
October 1944, but these units were the oldest,
and from the standpoint of operational effi-
ciency, the worst. With one or two excep-
tions, none of the ships was in a seagoing con-
? dition, and most of them are still awaiting re-
pairs now held up by lack of funds, materials,
and equipment.
During the last war, the Rumanian Navy
played an active part in the Soviet-German
phases of the conflict, especially in defending
on the Eastern Front the right flank of the
German and satellite armies. It also had a
prominent role in the defense of the Danube
River lines of communication, the transport
of troops, escort of Black Sea/ convoys, and
coastal patrol work. The Navy sank a num-
ber of Soviet submarines, although the exact
total is not known. One of its outstanding
war achievements was the sinking of the Soviet
destroyer MOSKOVA off Constanza in July
1941.
(2) Strategy. Owing to the isolation of the
Black Sea from other sea or ocean areas, naval
operations in this area can be carried out inde-
pendently from the operations in other mari-
? time ,zones and cannot be directly influenced
by them. Land operations in the area, how-
ever, and particularly air operations over the
39
Black Sea, require naval forces for their proper
support because of the formation and size of
the sea.
Until the USSR gained indirect political con-
trol of Rumania and thereby control of its
armed forces, the strategy of the Rumanian
Navy was based mainly on a conflict with the
USSR. The mission of the navy was to main-
tain the lines of sea communication of Ru-
mania and its allies, to exercise control over
neutral shipping, to interrupt the enemy's sea
communications on the Black Sea, and to de-
fend the Rumanian coast. The first part of
the mission was necessary to permit Rumania
to compensate for its industrial deficiencies;
the second part to prevent the shipment of
contraband to the enemy by neutrals; the
third part because it represented the most
effective utilization of Rumania's small navy;
and the last part because the Rumanian coast
provides the best areas for landing operations
on the Black Sea. Although purely defensive
strategy would have been more in keeping with
the capabilities of the navy, the Naval Staff
envisioned offensive operations using small,
highly mobile forces, including submarines,
to carry out its mission.
Future strategy will be based on the mission
assigned by the USSR. Present indications
are that this mission will be purely a defensive
one for the support of the ground forces. The
Naval General Staff is studying a plan for a
sweeping reorganization of the naval establish-
ment, which calls for the subordination of the
naval forces to the army with a General in
? command. As the previous reorganization re-
quired the approval of the USSR, it is believed
that the present plan originated in the USSR
and is in accordance with the mission assigned
the Rumanian Navy.
(3) Strength. Peace Treaty limitations on
the Rumanian Navy set the maximum person-
nel strength at 5,000. Continuous efforts are
being made to secure the authority to increase
this maximum to 7,500. The navy's argument
is that to man their navy allowed under the
Peace Treaty, they will require at least one
man per two tons of shipping. The personnel
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strength of the Rumanian Navy as of 1 Sep-
tember 1948 was:
Officers
365
Petty Officers and Specialists
419
Enlisted men
3,930
Students
54
Total 4,768
(4) Quality. Although particular empha-
sis has been recently placed on training, the
present naval organization is incapable of pro-
ducing an effective fighting force. Material
deficiencies are a severe handicap, but more
important was the recent loss to the service
of capable, trained officers. The political
purges forced the most outstanding officers
into the reserve. Only with aid from the USSR
will the quality of naval personnel improve
in the near future. Requests have already
been made to the USSR for modern equipment
and the training of Rumanian naval personnel
in the USSR.
The results of the political purges were so
paralyzing to the navy that many purged offi-
cers are being recalled to active duty. Offi-
cers being recalled are subjected to political
screening.
Enlisted men are a good type, but they are
poorly trained. The present program of in-
tensive training will have little effect in rais-
ing the standards unless aid is supplied by the
USSR. Morale has been very low owing to the
poor condition of the fleet and the political
purges. Attempts have been made to improve
the situation by increasing service pay and
issuing new uniforms. These attempts have
met with some success.
b. Ships, Bases, and Coast Defense.
(1) Ships. The General Staff of the Ru-
manian Navy has been drafting plans for
the expansion of the fleet up to the 15,000-
ton limit imposed by the Peace Treaty. It
is not likely that the expansion plan can
be realized in the near future without the aid
of some foreign naval power. The fact still
remains that most vessels in the fleet need a
thorough overhauling before they can be put
into active use and will require extensive mod-
ernization before they will be effective fight-
ing units. At present, repair work on Ru-
manian Navy vessels is at a virtual standstill.
(2) Bases. The principal bases for the Ru-
manian Navy are Constanta, Galati, and Bra-
ila. Also, the Rumanian Navy uses some of
the smaller Danube River ports as temporary
shelters for its auxiliary units. None of these
ports is a naval base in the true sense, because
most of the berths and shelters are not specifi-
cally designated as Navy property and are
often used by commercial vessels when unoc-
cupied by naval vessels.
At present, the Sea Forces are based at Con-
stanta and the River Forces are based at Ga-
lati. Because of the crowded harbor condition
at Constanta, the construction of a naval base
on Lake Tasaul was begun in 1938. This
major project was suspended during the war
and in April 1948 a survey was made to de-
termine the condition of the work completed.
Owing to the scarcity of materials and ma-
chinery, it is not believed that the project will
be attempted in the near future. Unless
major assistance is given by the USSR, it
would require at least 10 years for completion.
(See Appendix B a.)
(3) Coast Defense. Since the termination
of hostilities, the backbone of the Black Sea
coast defense system of Rumania has been
seven batteries, with a total of 24 guns. Only
one battery has dual purpose (AA) guns. At
present, there are no other permanent coastal
defenses on the Rumanian Black Sea coast.
Recently, increased activity has been noted in
the entire coast defense system; intensive
training for all units is being conducted and
inspections by defense chiefs are being made.
c. Naval Air, Submarine, and Amphibious
Forces.
(1) Naval Air. During the early part of the
Russian occupation, the entire naval air arm
of 21 hydroplanes was flown from its base at
Mamaia (near Constanta) to Lake Snagov,
located about 25 miles north of Bucharest.
These hydroplanes, single engine Heinkels
(114) , remained at Lake Snagov until the
summer of 1947, when 18 of the total number
were put into operating condition and flown
back to Mamaia. The planes are now under
the command of the Rumanian Air Force and,
although Navy authorities have asked for their
return, the situation remains unchanged.
These planes are of little more than scrap
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value. If the planes were placed in an oper-
ating condition and turned over to the navy,
they would be capable of only limited recon-
naissance operations. It is not probable that
more than six could be maintained in an oper-
ating condition.
(2) Submarine Force. There is no sub-
marine force in the Rumanian Navy. One old
submarine, the DELFINUL, located at Galati,
is not in operating condition. As Rumania is
prohibited from including submarines in her
fleet under the limitation of the Peace Treaty,
no attempt is being made to repair the DEL-
FINUL. The Commandant has requested the
International Commission for implementing
the Peace Treaty to make a decision as to the
final disposition of the submarine. In all
probability she will be scrapped.
(3) Amphibious Units. T h e Rumanian
Navy has ? no amphibious units of its own.
Those which existed on the Danube River and
Black Sea during the last war were brought
into Rumanian waters by the Germans and
later were seized by the USSR.
3. Rumanian Air Forces.
? a. Development.
?
The Royal Rumanian Air Force, before the
last war, was patterned quite closely after the
French. In 1940, when pro-German elements
gained control of the Rumanian Government,
training, equipment, and tactical doctrines
were changed to conform to German ideas.
In spite of this drastic change, Rumania en-
tered the war as a partner of the Axis with
a relatively efficient and effective Air Force.
With the Germans directing operations, the
RRAF fought very effectively against the Rus-
sians in the Ukraine.
On 23 August 1944, when Rumania deserted
the Axis to join the USSR, operational control
of the Air Force was immediately taken over
by the Red Army. The Soviets, however, did
not employ the RRAF operationally against the
Germans, but reduced personnel. By cutting
off supplies of replacements, spare parts, and
fuel, the Red Army virtually destroyed the
effectiveness of the organization.
The Rumanian Air Force lost its position as
a separate service, when, in December 1946, it
and the Rumanian Navy were both placed
under the General Staff of the Army. Al-
though the Undersecretariat of State for Air
and the Air Staff attempted to maintain a
form of organization and operation during
this period, the condition of the Air Force be-
came rather chaotic. The efficiency of the
armed forces, and especially the Air Force, has
dropped disastrously. This is because the
ablest men of the Rumanian armed forces
have been purged, and their places have been
taken by ignorant but staunchly loyal Com-
munists with little military experience. At
the present time, the Rumanian Air Force is,
for all practical purposes, nothing more than
a paper organization with a few obsolete air-
craft.
b. Types of Aircraft.
Although the Rumanian Peace Treaty of
1947 limits the size of the Rumanian Air Force
to a total of 150 aircraft (with no more than
100 combat types) , it is estimated that 200
aircraft are still carried on hand. However,
probably no more than one-third of these
are flyable, and it is felt that even less are
operational at the present time. Flight
operations are practically at a standstill be-
cause of Communist distrust of the Air Force
personnel and lack of aircraft fuel. The latest
aircraft strength and type of figures for the
Rumanian Air Force are as follows:
Light Bombers
0
Fighters
80
Reconnaissance
34
Transports
15
Liaison
10
Training
35
Total
174
All of the above are war-weary and obsolescent
types of German, Italian, and Rumanian man-
ufacture. They are organized into tactical
units under one Air Division as follows:
1st Air Brigade
1st Fighter Rgt. 30 ME-1096 & 5 IAR-80
(Bucharest)
4th Transport Rgt. 5 Ju-52, 5 Savoya 79
(Bucharest) 5 Storch
2nd Air Brigade
2nd Information Rgt. 23 IAR-39
(Tvrda-Suit Chiol)
3rd Assault Rgt. 30 IAR-80
(Brasov)
Actually the above tactical disposition can be
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considered for all practical purposes to be a
paper organization. The Rumanian Air Force
at the present time has no combat capabilities.
c. Ground Facilities.
Although more than 200 airfields have been
in use in Rumania in recent years, only 63
are believed currently in use or usable. Of
this number, only three have to date been
equipped with permanent-type runways.
They are Bucharest/Baneasa, Bucharest/Oto-
peni, and Zilistea, the latter having the longest
runway, about 6,000 feet. It is believed these
runways have rather low weight-bearing ca-
pacities, since they were built by the Germans
at a time when the concrete used was of poor
quality.
All of the remaining airfields have natural
surfaces; these are often of no use because of
climatic conditions. Seasonal flooding is also
reported in many areas. The unserviceability
factor probably has given rise to the large
number of temporary airfields. During the
war the Germans undoubtedly selected a site,
leveled it, used it briefly, and then abandoned
it. Most of the former natural surface air-
fields are no longer used but can be treated as
potential airfields.
Topography is the greatest single determin-
ing factor in the distribution of airfields in
Rumania. It is in the southern plain of Wal-
lachia that the greatest concentration is to be
found. Bucharest and Ploesti have, or have
had, particularly dense groupings of protective
airfields. Within the Bucharest circular rail-
way lie five airfields; others lie just outside it.
In Moldavia, to the east of the Carpathians,
the density is considerably lower, but during
the war this area was blanketed with airfields,
particularly in the areas west of Galati and
north of Iasi.
The chief facilities fall roughly into four
location groups: (1) Transylvania. Arad/Ce-
ala, Caransebes, Cluj/Someseni, Sibiu, Oradea,
Medias, Brasov, and Ghimbav; (2) Moldavia.
Tecuci, Galati, Iasi, Ramnicul Sarat; (3) Wal-
lachia. Zilistea, Buzau, Ploesti/Targsorul
Nou, Bucharest; (6) , Craiova, Turnu Severin,
Calara?i, and Mizil; and (4) Black Sea Coast.
Constanta and Constanta/Mamaia.
The general standard of facilities on Ru-
manian airfields is very low. Radio facilities
are virtually non-existent; hangars and work-
shops are mostly of wooden construction and
are poorly equipped; and there is but limited
gasoline tank storage.
To remedy a situation found inadequate
even to support civil airline operations, the
Directorate of Civil Aviation has announced
long-range plans for development of 120 air-
fields under the joint sponsorship of the So-
viet Union and Rumania. Work was scheduled
to begin during 1948 on 40 airfields with the
highest priority. There is confirmation, how-
ever, of actual work on only one airfield,
Baneasa, at Bucharest, where new terminal
facilities are under construction. The an-
nounced construction plan includes new air-
fields and development of existing facilities,
with 65 airfields slated to receive concrete run-
ways and complete, modern installations. The
list obviously contains those airfields intended
for the joint operational use of the Soviet and
Rumanian Air Forces in the event of war.
The airfields currently in use are, for the
most part, those serving the larger cities, and
Maszlovet, the Rumanian-Soviet civil airline,
has done some rehabilitation and clean-up
work on these airfields. The Soviet and Ru-
manian Air Forces are also using, to a limited
extent, a few airfields.
Airfields in Rumania are currently believed
capable only of supporting sustained fighter
operations and very limited operations of
heavier aircraft.
d. Personnel.
The personnel of the Rumanian Air Force,
exclusive of antiaircraft personnel, is estimated
to number approximately 8,000 of which 400
are estimated to be flying officers. Air force
reserves are estimated to total 60,000.
The skill and training of the personnel of
the Rumanian Air Force are at the present
time very poor. Although the air force was
well trained and very efficient before the war
and throughout the period of collaboration
with the Germans, this is no longer true be-
cause of the Communist purges of personnel
and lack of equipment, spare parts, and air-
craft fuel with which to maintain flying pro-
ficiency. As the Communist regime in Ru-
mania is able to strengthen the armed forces
of the country with politically reliable per-
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sonnel, the skill and training of the members
of the air force will probably gradually im-
? prove and the general efficiency of the organ-
ization will increase.
e. Rumanian Active and Passive Defenses.
(1) General. The significance of Ruma-
nian defense against air attack is twofold. As
a buffer area fronting on the Soviet Ukraine,
Rumania is part of the USSR defense in depth.
As one of the major Soviet sources of petro-
leum products, including vital high quality
lubricating oils, air defense of the Ploe0i oil
region is a serious Soviet-Rumanian concern.
In spite of the apparent importance of Ru-
mania to the defense of the USSR, current in-
telligence does not indicate strong defenses
against air attack maintained in Rumania
either by the Rumanians or the Soviets. How-
ever, the USSR could probably quickly improve
the Rumanian air defense situation.
Information on early warning in Rumania
is meager. Although some radar equipment
is reported, the existence of an integrated
warning system has not been established.
The Rumanian Air Force has about 30 Ger-
? man Me-109G's and a smaller number of in-
ferior fighters. Air defense is apparently aug-
mented by about 50 USSR fighters, principally
Yak-5's and P-63's. The P-63's (obtained from
the United States) would be the best inter-
ceptors, having a service ceiling of 43,000 feet,
a range of about 550 nautical miles, and a
maximum peed of 355 knots, at 24,000 feet.
Rumania has only one AAA division but is
expanding to three. The heavy guns are at
present largely unserviceable and would be in-
effective at high altitudes or against high
speed aircraft.
Reactivation of normal civil defense meas-
ures has been reported as has the construction
of underground airfield facilities.
(2) Warning and Intercept System. One
of the heaviest concentrations of German
radar in Europe during World War II was set
up for the defense of the Ploe0i oil field region.
Included were early warning, ground-con-
trolled interception, fire control, and airborne
interception radars. Though the equipment
was of German origin, Rumanian personnel
were employed to a large extent in their opera-
tion and maintenance. Large proportions of
these installations were intact at the time of
the Rumanian capitulation in late 1944; their
present disposition is not known.
Although no definite information is avail-
able, it is probable that the majority of the
German early warning (EW) radars and their
associated communications equipment were
removed by the Soviet forces. The rebuilding
of the Ploe0i radar defenses by the Soviet or
Rumanian forces has not been indicated. A
few EW radars are indicated between Bucha-
rest and the Black Sea, in some instances oper-
ated by Soviet personnel. An FW radar sys-
tem, as such, is not known to exist. Rumania
is not known to have a system of sonic and
visual early warning.
No airborne interception (Al) radar is
known to exist in Rumania.
4. Antiaircraft Artillery.(AAA).
a. General.
Under the terms of the Rumanian Peace
Treaty the antiaircraft arm was limited to
5,000 officers and men. It can be assumed
that Rumania, along with other satellite states
under the guidance of the USSR will organize
its antiaircraft units along Soviet lines.
(1) Organization. (See Annex II.) There
is only one antiaircraft artillery division at
present in Rumania. It has been reported,
however, that an expansion is now taking
place. It is believed that the antiaircraft
arm will be expanded to three divisions; the
first to be employed in the field, the second
and third intended for the internal defense of
Rumania.
(a) The first division will be organized into
three brigades. Each brigade will consist of
two regiments of three battalions each. The
battalions will be composed of five batteries,
two heavy AA and three light AA.
(b) The second and third divisions will be
composed of two brigades of three regiments
each. Each regiment is to consist of four
batteries as follows: two heavy AA batteries,
one light AA battery, and one searchlight
battery. Each heavy AA battery will have six
88 mm guns, the light AA battery, nine 37 mm
guns, and the searchlight battery, 12 lights.
(2) Materiel.
(a) Heavy Antiaircraft. The present heavy
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antiaircraft armament of the Rumanian forces
is old. The guns are unable to deliver effec-
tive fire on aircraft flying at modern aircraft
speeds, nor do they have sufficient range to
operate against planes flying at high altitudes.
The heavy antiaircraft batteries are equipped
predominantly with German 88 mm, some So-
viet 76.2 mm, and a few French 75 mm guns.
Present reports indicate that these guns are
in a poor state of repair; poor maintenance
and a lack of spare parts make the majority
of them unserviceable.
Little is known of the fire control equipment
now in use. It is known that a limited quan-
tity of German fire control equipment is avail-
able, but its present condition and employ-
ment is not known.
(b) Light Antiaircraft. Light antiaircraft
weapons of the 37 Tem type are known to be
employed by the Rumanians, but nothing is
known about the equipment or technique for
light antiaircraft fire control.
(c) Searchlights. The Rumanians employ
searchlights in the AA defenses, but the extent
of employment and the origin of the materiel
is not known. It is believed that most of the
searchlights are of German manufacture.
(d) Radar. There has been no intelligence
information to indicate the presence or ab-
sence of radar for control of either guns or
searchlights.
5. Antiaircraft Order of Battle.
I.)
AA Division Hgs
1st Regiment
2nd Regiment
3rd Regiment
4th Regiment
5th Regiment
Bucharest
Bucharest
Galati
Cluj
Brasov
Ploesti
(See Annex
a. Passive and Civilian Defense.
Passive defense measures for the protection
of air equipment have been noted, including
the construction of underground airfield hang-
ar and maintenance facilities.
Noticeable measures for civilian defense in-
clude some reactivation of siren warning sys-
tems, rehabilitation of air raid shelters, plan-
ning for utilization of camouflage and black-
out materials, and indoctrination of personnel.
b. Other Military Organizations.
In addition to the regular Army troops, Ru-
mania has three brigades of Frontier Guards,
numbering approximately 21,000 men, dis-
posed along Rumanian frontiers.
The existence of former Gendarmerie units
in the newly-organized Militia is in violation
of the Peace Treaty. The former Gendarm-
erie units number approximately 60,000 of the
total Militia strength of 70,000, the remainder
being urban police. These former Gendarm-
erie units of the Militia are theoretically a
rural police organization, but actually they
are a militarized force, thoroughly trained,
and equipped with heavy infantry weapons.
In the event of war, they could readily serve
as an internal defense force.
6. War Potential.
a. Manpower.
The total manpower reserve of Rumania is
estimated at slightly over 2,800,000 men (in-
cluding men in the age group 21-49) many of
whom have had combat experience.
b. Science.
Rumanian scientific potential is practically
nil. Little experimental research is going on,
scientific equipment is obsolescent, and there
is a scarcity of trained personnel.
c. Other Factors.
For other factors affecting Rumania's eco-
nomic potential for war see Chapter II.
7. Military Capabilities and Future Trends.
The basic missions of the Rumanian Armed
Forces, at present, are: (1) maintenance of
frontier security; (2) support of the incumbent
regime; and (3) furnishing probable USSR air
and naval bases. The armed forces are capa-
ble of performing these missions.
Although substantial improvement has been
made during the past year, the armed forces
are still incapable of conducting successful
offensive or defensive military operations
against any force except that of a minor
power.
In the event of war in 1950, the armed
forces would continue to perform their nor-
mal missions and in addition would help to
safeguard Soviet lines of communication
through Rumania. Because of the more
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of politically reliable ?and competent officers,
as well as a serious shortage of modern equip-
ment. Plans for training and reequipping
? these units are basically sound and will even-
tually provide the USSR with a -small but
effective ally.
The strategic importance of Rumania, how-
ever, is not based upon the amount which its
manpower and production can add to the
?
Soviet war potential, but upon the fact that
control of Rumania is essential to Soviet de-
fensive strategy.
While the Communist regime will make
every effort to provide for maximum produc-
tion and for development of the armed forces
as instruments of Soviet power, these efforts
will be subordinated when they conflict with
Soviet strategic interests.
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CHAPTER VI
PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY
The elements of interest to US security, out-
lined in the preceding chapter, are not ex-
pected to change appreciably in the foresee-
able future. The Communist regime may be
expected to continue its efforts to solidify its
control over the people, and will remain a
loyal supporter of the Kremlin in foreign af-
fairs. Sporadic and isolated cases of resist-
ance to the government will continue to occur,
but coordination of these efforts to lift them
above the nuisance level will be impossible un-
der present conditions.
While it is possible that one or more of the
Communist leaders now holding power in the
government may be replaced, this will not
result in any basic change in the trend toward
more complete domination. Defection of the
Tito type is impossible in Rumania, where
? ample Soviet strength is available to discour-
age anti-Cominform sentiment at its incep-
tion.
Integration of the Rumanian economy into
the Soviet-Satellite program will be pursued
as rapidly as possible. The basic plan for this
action has been established and several major
steps have already been completed. Further
extension of the plan into such fields as the
collectivization of agriculture and the nation-
alization of small businesses is an essential
step which is being approached with caution
because of adverse public sentiment. While
there is little question that the Communist
regime could cope with any public disturb-
ances which might result, it is apparent that
other considerations make the execution of an
all-out drive for these. necessary objectives
inopportune at present. The manner of ap-
proach and the timing of government action
on these matters is of interest to the US as
a barometer which indicates the confidence of
the Communist regime in its ability to fulfill
its commitments to the USSR, despite the
temporary disruption in its programs which
such far-reaching measures will entail.
From a military standpoint, future develop-
ments in Rumania are not expected to change
?the situation as it affects US security. The
USSR now has in Rumania the basic elements
needed for its strategic plans; assurance of a
cooperative Rumanian Government and the
control of supply lines. It also has access to
whatever supplies may be available and,
through the government, control of manpower
including the armed forces. From present in-
dications there will be a gradual increase in
the value of Rumania as a Satellite, but the
limited potential of the country makes any
assistance of secondary value.
The extension of International Commu-
nism into Rumania and the other Eastern
European countries, and through it, the as-
sumption of Soviet control was a major Soviet
postwar objective. The full implications of
this action were not immediately apparent to
the majority of the anti-Communist peoples.
As a result, the USSR initially encountered
little outside opposition. In fact, the desire
of the Western Powers to establish the basis
for a free and peaceful world, and to make
concessions where necessary to reach agree-
ment with the USSR, made the political con-
quest of the Satellites less difficult than it
would have been had a stronger initial stand
been taken.
Anti-Communist opposition will have an ap-
preciable effect on the orbit economy. The
first indications of this are evident in the
increasing difficulties experienced by the Sat-
ellites in obtaining critically short materials,
largely because of the shortage of foreign ex-
change and curtailment of US exports. The
effect which these and other Western-inspired
difficulties will have on Soviet plans, and their
impact on interrelated political factors, are
of the greatest significance.
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The importance of this factor lies not in
the remote possibility that it will result in
revolt or even strong resistance to Communist
control in countries like Rumania, rather it
rests in the fact that such countries are, in
essence, the proving ground for World Com-
munism. They must become the show win-
dows of the new Communist world. In this
light, Rumania can be considered a liability
to the Soviet Union, rather than an asset, be-
cause the USSR cannot be content merely to
exploit Rumania. It must also' make Ru-
mania, as well as the other Satellites, politi-
cally self-sustaining members of the Commu-
nist family, economically integrated into the
Soviet orbit. Failure to achieve progress in
this direction, even in a relatively unimpor-
tant member of the family such as Rumania,
is a major defeat which threatens the whole
program of International Communism.
The value of this situation to anti-Com-
munist countries_ is apparent, for it makes
possible a serious disruption of the Soviet
timetable, without overt action. By denying
trade items which are critical to the develop-
ment of Rumania, anti-Communist countries
can delay the fulfillment of that country's
commitments under the economic develop-
ment plan. This, in turn, will delay other
economic and related political steps necessary
for the stability of the Rumanian Govern?
-
ment. As a result, a revision in Soviet plan-
ning and some reorientation in its economic
programs will be necessary.
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profitable employment of manpower in essen-
tial industry and the political unreliability of
personnel, mobilized strength would probably
not exceed 15 divisions.
Soviet utilization of Rumanian troops for
offensive or defensive missions in war from
1950 on would depend upon the Soviet esti-
mate of their political reliability. ? Recent ac-
tivities in Rumania indicate that the Soviets
intend to build up the military effectiveness
of the Rumanian forces. To accomplish this
45
aim, a "revitalization program" was launched
in December 1947. If this program is pursued
successfully, and if the USSR provides ade-
quate quantities of modern weapons, the Ru-
manian Armed Forces will overcome their
present impotence and within a few years will
have substantial defensive and even offensive
capabilities as an adjunct of Soviet power. By
1953, the Rumanian Army could be capable
of mobilizing 25 trained and equipped divi-
sions.
ANNEX I
ORGANIZATION OF RUMANIAN ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
Heavy AA Bn.
3 HAA Batteries
Antiaircraft Division (1)
Antiaircraft Brigades (2)
Antiaircraft Regiments (5)
Light AA Bn.
3 LAA Batteries
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AA Engineer Bn.
Searchlights
Radar
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CHAPTER V
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY
1. General.
Rumania, under complete Soviet domina-
tion, is of interest to US security for three
basic reasons: first, the strategic value of Ru-
manian territory in the event of Soviet mili-
tary action; second, the war potential which
Rumania adds to that of the USSR; and third,
the advantage to the Soviet Union in the use
of the Rumanian Government as a tool and
as a mouthpiece for Soviet propaganda.
2. Political.
Soviet use of Rumania in its strategic plans
is conditioned by several political factors,
basic among which are control of the govern-
ment and assurance of its loyal adherence to
Soviet dictates. Here the Kremlin victory is
complete. As a result it has been possible to
? exploit the advantages which a subservient
Rumanian Government provides in foreign
affairs. The value of such a servant was dem-
onstrated at the Danube Conference where
Rumania joined with other Communist States
to assure Soviet control of that vital waterway.
In other matters Rumania has played a small
but eager part in advancing Soviet interests.
While the Western Powers have effectively
blocked Rumania's entry into the United Na-
tions, it is due for reconsideration under So-
viet sponsorship and this fact, in itself, will
serve as a bargaining point for the Kremlin.
Another political factor, vital to Soviet
plans, is complete domination of the Ruma-
nian populace. An efficient secret police and
the proximity of Soviet troops insure the ac-
complishment of this aim for the present.
Consequently the Kremlin has been able to
consolidate its control over every phase of
political and economic life. At the same time
it has been relatively unhampered in the ex-
ploitation of this control for the benefit of
the Soviet Union.
An element of latent strategic importance
in this connection, however, lies in the im-
pact of a policy of forced domination on the
populace. Although passive acceptance of
the current situation is necessary for survival,
there is little popular loyalty to the Commu-
nist regime. The vast majority of the people
would welcome an opportunity to disrupt its
programs if this could be done without over-
whelming reprisal. Recognizing this, the
Communist leaders have eliminated or neu-
tralized all elements of society which might
conceivably provide inspiration or guidance
for resistance movements. Disaffection re-
mains, however, and must be considered in
Communist plans for further control and ex-
ploitation. Should events occur which tend
to weaken the forces dominating the people,
resistance will assume real, rather than latent,
significance.
3. Economic.
Economically, Rumania provides the Soviet
Union with certain advantages. Petroleum
is of particular importance, not only because
it represents a significant addition to Soviet
production, but also because of its strategic
location, both for war and peace. By 1947,
output had declined to almost half of the
prewar yield, owing primarily to overexploita-
ton of existing fields and the lack of replace-
ments of worn equipment. Through the in-
tense efforts of the Soviet and Rumanian Gov-
ernments, however, production in 1948 in-
creased by an estimated 7 to 8 percent. It is
unlikely that this increase will continue, how-
ever, in view of Rumania's inability to acquire
the necessary equipment. It is estimated
that, in the event of war, Rumania could fur-
nish 2,500,000 metric tons per year, either
crude or refined. In addition, Rumanian re-
fining capacity, estimated in 1946 to be about
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6,500,000 metric tons, would be of considerable
value.
Prior to the advent of the Communist gov-
ernment, petroleum was a principal supplier
of foreign exchange, as well as an important
source of fuel for domestic consumption, but,
the Soviet Government, in demanding an in-
ordinately large petroleum production, is now
delaying economic recovery.
In addition to petroleum, Rumania could
supply the Soviet orbit with agricultural prod-
ucts, timber products, manganese, molybde-
num, and manpower, as it did for Germany in
the last war.
4. Military.
Its geographic location adjacent to the So-
viet Union, and athwart Soviet supply lines
to occupation troops, makes Rumania essen-
tial as a base and supply area for Soviet offen-
sive or defensive action. The local military-
economic potential will add to the advantages
gained from such use. Certain other advan-
tages, such as the availability of sites for sup-
port of air operations in the Adriatic and
Aegean areas as well as air warning and inter-
cept positions for defense of the Soviet Union,
accrue from control over Rumania.
The actual military use of Rumania during
a future war will depend upon the scope and
nature of that conflict. In an all-out Soviet
offensive through Western Europe and the
Mediterranean area, Rumania would be an
important staging and supply area. Ruma-
nian troops would be used to assist in defend-
ing supply routes and key installations, as well
as in maintaining internal security. If, at the
time of the offensive, the Rumanian army were
sufficiently reorganized and reequipped, small
units might also be used for local offensive
operations, particularly in areas where tradi-
tional hatreds would provide an incentive for
such action. At the same time the Rumanian
economy, particularly the oil industry, would
be employed exclusively in supplying Soviet
armies. Any manpower not adaptable to
work in essential production or assignment
to the armed forces would be organized into
labor battalions.
In addition to its role as a base and supply
area, Rumania offers sites for advanced air
bases. These would be used for the support
of offensive operations in the Mediterranean
area and also as intercept bases for fighter
defense aircraft.
Disadvantages in the use of Rumania as a
base and supply area lie in the poor state of
communication facilities and the vulnerability
of such installations. Also important is the
antipathy of the people toward the USSR
which would increase the difficulty of main-
taining adequate communications. While
these factors might not affect transportation
between the Ukraine and Rumania, the Tran-
sylvanian mountain passes and the single
railroad bridge spanning the Danube at Cer-
navoda would be inviting targets for sabotage
as well as enemy attack. The Soviet Union
is seeking to overcome the transportation dis-
advantage through forcing strategic develop-
ment of the railroad transportation net to
establish through routes to the Adriatic and
Aegean Seas.
The possibility of invasion of Rumania by
an anti-Soviet power is remote, under present
world conditions, yet this possibility is given
serious consideration in Kremlin planning.
The inherently defensive-minded Soviet lead-
ers envision Rumania as a part of the buffer
system, serving as a bulwark against attack
from the West. Should such an attack mate-
rialize, several terrain factors would affect de-
fensive strategy. Rumania is open to attack
by sea from the east, where landings can be
made in the province of Dobruja on the Black
Sea coast from Constanta southward. The
western frontier with Hungary and Yugo-
slavia is also vulnerable. The Danube River
forms a defensive barrier to the south.
The importance of Rumania to Soviet mili-
tary plans is indicated by the emphasis placed
on military activities. Although the Ru-
manian peace treaty specifically limited the
number of Soviet troops in that country to a
minimum necessary to safeguard supply lines,
recent reports place a total of 26,000 men plus
2,000 security troops there. At the same time,
the reorganization of the Rumanian armed
forces is known to be handicapped by a lack
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APPENDIX B
SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES
1. Railroads.
The bulk of Rumanian rail traffic is with
the Soviet Union and moves over these lines:
a. To Lwow via the Ploeqti?Chernovitsy
line through Buzau, Focqani, Bacau, and Ro-
man. This double track line bifurcates at
Roman, entering the Soviet Union at two
places, Ungheni east of Iaqi, and Vicqani south
of Chernovitsy;
b. To Odessa via the Ploeqti-Galati line,
through Buzau and Braila, entering the USSR
at Reni east of Galati;
c. To Kiev, via the Bucharest-Faurei-Tecuci
line, parallel to the Chernovitsy line and con-
necting directly with Iaqi via Barlad.*
Main lines to the west are:
d. To Hungary via Braqov, Sibiu, and Arad;
e. To Hungary via Braqov, Cluj and Oradea
Mare;
f. To Hungary and Yugoslavia via Craiova,
Turnu Severin, and Timiqoaro.
By commodities, the main delivery routes
are:
a. Petroleum via Campina-Ploeqti-Con-
stanta;
b. Grain via Craiova-Caracal-Bucharest-
Cernavoda-Constanta;
c. Timber via Sigiqoara-Braqov-Buzau-Ga-
lati;
d. Coal via Petroqeni-Filia;
e. Ores and metals via Recita-Caransebe?-
Hateg.
Major railroad shops are at Bucharest, Bra-
qov, Craiova, Timiqoara, Arad, Galati, Simeria,
Cluj, Iaqi, Turnu-Severin, Constanta, and
Paqcani. In September 1948 these shops re-
paired and reconditioned 65 locomotives, 7,800
freight cars and 690 passenger cars. Two
plants build locomotives, the Malaxa Works
in Bucharest and the Recita in Recita. Ma-
Through traffic will be possible on completion of
Siret River bridge 27 kilometers south of Tecuci.
laxa's 1947 production was 80 percent of ca-
pacity, or 60 locomotives. Freight, tank, and
passenger cars are built by the Astra Wagon
Works' three shops, in Braqov, Arad, and Con-
stanta. Production may amount to 3,000
cars yearly:
Among the Soviets' major transport prob-
lems in Eastern Europe is the difference of
gauge between lines of the Soviet Union and
those of European railways. Transshipment
points, with numerous sidings, warehouses,
and loading platforms, were planned for Dar-
mane0i, Ungheni, and Reni, to facilitate
transloading freight from standard to broad
gauge cars at change-of-gauge points.
2. Coastal Ports.
a. Constanta.
Constanta, located on the south central
part of the coast just south of the Danube
delta, is the chief port of Rumania and the
only one capable of accommodating deep-draft
vessels. Since the end of the war the port
has been under Russian control and has served
as a transshipment point for large amounts
of European prizes-of-war en route to USSR.
At the height of the UNRRA program a great
proportion of the relief supplies for Rumania
and her neighboring countries moved through
Constanta. War damage at Constanta was
very light and the facilities of the port have
now been restored to full capacity.
(1) Harbor?Constanta's harbor is situated
on the south side of Cape Constanta and con-
sists of a 1,100-by-700-yard artificial basin, en-
closed on the south and east sides by break-
waters. The harbor entrance between the
breakwaters is 175 yards wide and 30 feet deep.
Central depths in the basin average 30 feet
and alongside the wharves, 26 feet. The ap-
.proaches to Constanta are mined and must
be traversed under the direction of a Ru-
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manian pilot, although Russians supervise the
harbor entrance control facilities.
Because of the small size of the harbor ba-
sin, anchorage is available only in the unpro-
tected roadstead outside. In spite of the shel-
tering breakwaters the north and west sec-
tions of the harbor are exposed to gales from
seaward.
(2) Terminal Facilities?The port of Con-
stanta is modern and well equipped. Berth-
ing accommodations include 12,000 linear feet
of general cargo wharves for oceangoing ves-
sels, 1,100 feet of bulk grain wharfage, and
four tanker berths. A total of 19 Liberty-
type vessels with drafts of 22 to 28 feet can be
accommodated at the wharves. All of the
wharves are served by railroad tracks and
sheds and warehouses on or adjacent to the
wharves. There are three large elevators to
handle the large volume of grain which nor-
mally moves through the port.
(3) Clearance Facilities?Constanta is
cleared by a partially double-tracked railroad
line which runs eastward to connect with Bu-
charest and the general Rumanian rail net-
work. A short distance outside the city, junc-
tion is made with a longitudinal line running
northward to the Danube delta and south-
ward into Bulgaria. Within the port, railroad
terminal facilities, including marshalling
yards, and wharf sidings, are particularly ex-
tensive.
Several highways radiate from Constanta,
but most of them are unsuitable for motor
traffic. A paved road runs south along the
coast, and a gravel road reported usable by
heavy vehicles leads northward to Tulcea on
the Danube delta.
(4) Port Capacity?The maximum unload-
ing capacity of the port is estimated to be
about 10,000 tons of general cargo per day.
This figure is exclusive of bulk grain and pe-
troleum exports.
The Rumanian Government estimates that
railroads serving Constanta are capable of
28,000 tons of general cargo, 3,000 tons of
grain, and 50,000 tons of oil products per day.
(5) Repair Facilities?A 7,800 ton capacity
drydock and some slipways are located at the
shipbuilding yard on the west side of the har-
bor.
b. Mangalia.
Mangalia is an almost negligible port lo-
cated on the southern Rumanian coast. It
is used occasionally by small patrol craft as an
overnight stopping point. Oceangoing ves-
sels can be accommodated only in the open
anchorage off the town. Port facilities are
limited to a small camber enclosed by two
moles, accessible to small craft drawing less
than 12 feet. Mangalia is connected by rail-
road with Constanta and Bucharest and is
located on the paved coastal road which runs
south from Constanta.
3. Danube River Ports.
The Danube River flows into the Black Sea
through three main distributaries, the north-
ernmost of which forms the boundary between
Rumania and the USSR. The river is navig-
able by small ocean-going vessels for a dis-
tance of some 90 miles upstream, via the
middle or Sulina distributary. Entrance to
the Sulina mouth is protected by two jetties
and has a minimum depth of 22 feet over the
bar at low water. The Danube usually freezes
for about two months a year; in the lower
part, however, it is occasionally open to navi-
gation throughout the year and only in the
most severe winters is Sulina, at the mouth,
closed by ice.
Rumania has six ports on the lower Danube
capable of receiving seagoing ships: Sulina,
just inside the mouth; Tulcea, at mile 38 on
the right bank; Isaccea, at mile 56 on the
right bank; Galati, at mile 80 on the left
bank; Ghecet, at mile 91 on the right bank;
and Braila, at mile 92 on the left bank. Of
these, only Galati and Braila are major mari-
time ports.
a. Galati.
" Galati is Rumania's principal Danubian
port, and a major transshipping point for
grain moving down the river. Wharf facili-
ties comprise two harbor basins and quays
along the river front. About 8,000 feet of
alongside berthage is available. In addition,
about 10,000 feet of berthage at offshore
wharves and landing pontoons. A depth of
20 feet prevails in the basins and 22 feet at
the river berths. Small-sized ships can reach
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Galati with berths for about 50 vessels avail-
able.
Galati received considerable damage during
the war: most of the wharf cranes were de-
stroyed, and of its formerly extensive storage
facilities only 8 warehouses remain undam-
aged and 18 were partially damaged but are
still usable.
The port is served by railroads of both Euro-
pean and Russian gauge and by several roads.
A number of marine repair yards are located
in the port. Also, there is a floating dry dock
of 1,200-ton capacity. Galati port is esti-
mated to have an unloading capacity of 10,000
tons per day.
b. Braila.
Braila is considered the head of navigation
on the Danube for oceangoing vessels. It is
the principal port in Rumania for the export
of grain. Landing facilities comprise a har-
bor basin and wharves 'along the river front.
About 6,800 linear feet of berthage is ayailable
at the quays and about 18,000 feet at the river
wharves and landing pontoons. Water depths
range from 20 feet in the basin to 22 feet
alongside the river berths. Accommodations
are available for 19 small oceangoing vessels
and numerous river craft. Braila has ex-
tensive terminal facilities, including ware-
houses, grain elevators, and wharf cranes, and
is served by both railroad and highway. Un-
loading capacity of the port is estimated to
be 5,000 tons of general cargo per day.
c. Sulina.
Sulina, which occupies both banks of the
Sulina distributary near its mouth, is a trans-
shipping point for grain arriving by river
craft from the upper Danube. Quays are
built along a 2-mile section of the right bank
and 3 miles of the left bank. Depths along-
side are shallow, and direct berthage is avail-
able only to river craft. Moorage of large
vessels is ordinarily accomplished by breast-
ing a considerable distance off the quays.
Two wharves which formerly were available
for deep-draft ships were destroyed during the
war. Sulina has no rail or good road connec-
tions, and all clearance is via river craft.
59
d. Tulcea.
Tulcea has a 3,900-foot long quay wall at
which three deep-draft berths and four berths
for river craft are available. The port is
equipped with grain warehouses and is cleared
by both railroad and highway. Port capacity
at Tulcea is estimated to be 1,000 tons of gen-
eral cargo per day.
e. Isaccea.
Isaccea is essentially a port for river craft
only, and is not readily available to ocean-
going vessels. Facilities are limited to three
pontoon wharves, thus the means of clearance
are poor.
f. Ghecet.
Ghecet, located directly across the river
from Braila, has some 15 wharves and appar-
ently serves as an auxiliary to the larger port.
Port and clearance facilities are apparently
negligible. '
4. Roads.
Of the 50,000 miles of roads in Rumania,
only 1,100 are hardsurfaced and 6,500 are sec-
ondary roads with tar or gravel surface. The
remaining 85 percent are dirt roads or cart
tracks. There is only one significant inter-
national highway; it connects Hungary with
Bulgaria via Oradea Mare, Cluj, Sibiu, Brasov,
Bucharest, and Giurgiu. Other main roads
lead from Bucharest to Constanta, Galati,
Iasi, and Chernovitsy now in the USSR. These
roads are now reported to be in serviceable
condition for the first time since the war.
Motor vehicle registration has been in de-
cline for years, but imports of Russian, Czech,
and some German trucks have reversed this
trend in the past eighteen months. In con-
junction with increased emphasis on highway
restoration and reconstruction, this has re-
sulted in a considerable increase in road traffic
since 1946.
Significant long-term expansion of highway
transport can be achieved only with difficulty
as long as Rumania depends for motor vehicles
on foreign imports. The introduction of do-
mestic motor vehicle manufacture was an-
nounced in 1947. Although this was doubt-
less a propaganda announcement, and no real
production is expected for some time to come,
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it would be dangerous to discount this under-
taking, which was based on a foundation of
existing automotive assembly plants.
5. Telecommunications.
By the standards of Western Europe, Ru-
mania's telecommunications facilities are
poor, and the supporting industry and tech-
nical training facilities are also limited. Pre-
war activities of the International Telephone
and Telegraph Company advanced the de-
velopment of the network and Rumania's fa-
cilities are better than is general in the Bal-
kans. Relatively little war damage was sus-
tained, 80 percent of which has been repaired.
All telecommunications were nationalized
early in 1948. Under the present government,
these facilities are completely at the disposal
of the armed forces, but so far there has been
relatively little interference by the military.
a. Telephone.
The Rumanian Telephone Company (So-
cietatea Anonima Romana de Telef pane, or
SART) was owned, from 1931 to 1941 by the
International Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany, which completely rebuilt and modern-
ized the system according to American
standards. I. T. & T. also had made plans
for the future expansion of the system, but in
1941 it sold its interest to the National Bank
of Rumania and withdrew its management.
Under new management, SART has continued
the program set up by I. T. & T. Growth and
improvement have continued, but at a re-
duced rate, owing to labor unrest, material
shortages, and the recent influx of inefficient
political appointees. In spite of this progress,
the present telephone system is inadequate to
handle the urban traffic demands. There is
only about one telephone per 200 population,
and almost half of the country's approxi-
mately 125,000 telephones are located in Bu-
charest. The rest of the country is evenly,
if sparsely, covered. (See Map Supplement
III.) The telephone company has always
provided some international service. Before
the war it had but few circuits to adjoining
countries, except possibly Russia, and the
major European centers. Since the war, serv-
ice has been resumed to most of the countries,
and there is at least one direct circuit to Mos-
cow. Expansion of international service is
planned.
b. Telegraph.
The telegraph system always has been un-
der the Post Office Administration. While
it covers about the same territory as the tele-
phone system, it is in poor condition; much
station equipment is antiquated, and service
is poor. There is some dual use of lines by
the telephone and telegraph companies to very
small communities.
The Post Office Administration also oper-
ates the few radio-telegraph stations in Ru-
mania (there are no radio telephone stations) .
There are low-power stations at Bucharest,
Oradea, and Cluj, and even smaller stations
at Timiqoara, Craiova, Alba Iulia, and Sibiu.
Operation is manual. It is presumed that
these stations are used for traffic to adjacent
countries. There is no indication of any plan
to improve or expand the radio-telegraph fa-
cilities.
The Rumanian Broadcasting Company has
recently been nationalized and important po-
sitions are filled by Communist party mem-
bers. The main station is the new Radio
Romania, a proposed 150 kilowatt, long-wave
station being constructed at Tancabeqti and
operated by special cable from studios and of-
fices in Bucharest. Radio Bucureqti (a 12
kilowatt, medium-wave station) , is located
near Bucharest and is operated from the city.
There are four lower powered, short-wave sta-
tions at Bucharest. Approximately 90 per-
cent of the available time of these stations is
utilized by the government for propaganda
favoring Russia and the local Communist
government.
In 1944 there were about 21 receiving sets
per thousand population. This receiver-den-
sity is less than Mexico's and is only about
1/20th of that in the United States.
The Ministry of National Defense has its
own fairly extensive telephone network (see
attached map) . It leases circuits from the
Post Office Administration to form a telegraph
network, and has started to build up its own
radio network. These facilities are adequate
for peacetime military needs, but must be sup-
plemented by additional circuits from the
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APPENDIX A
TOPOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE
1. Topography.
Rumania lies between the USSR and the
Balkan Peninsula and between the Hungarian
Plain and the Black Sea. It is roughly ellip-
tical in shape and has an area of 91,670 square
miles. The longer east-west axis is about 400
miles and the north-south about 300 miles.
An arc of mountains formed by the Car-
pathians (Carpatii Orientali) and the Tran-
sylvania Alps (Carpatii Meridionali) crosses
the country, extending south from Ruthenia
and curving sharply to ?the west in central
Rumania (see map No. 10809). The Wal-
lachian Plain lies between the Transylvanian
Alps and the Danube River. The Danube
forms the southern boundary of Rumania
from the village of Bazias, where the river
comes out of Yugoslavia, to Silistra, where
the frontier leaves the river to march south-
eastward toward Mangalia on the Black Sea.
At Galati, the river turns east again and flows
through its delta to the Black Sea. In east-
ern Rumania, there are also two low plateaus.
The Dobruja (Dobrogea) Plateau lies between
the north-flowing section of the Danube and
the Black Sea. Farther north, the Moldavian
Plateau is bounded by the Carpathians on the
west and the Bessarabian Plateau on the
north and east. It is drained by the Siret and
Prut rivers, south-flowing tributaries of the
lower Danube, the latter of which is now the
Soviet Union frontier. Inside the mountain
arc is the Transylvanian Basin, which extends
west to the Bihor Mountains. West of the
Bihor Mountains a narrow margin of the large
Middle Danube Plain extends into Rumania.
a. Southern and Eastern Plain and Pla-
teaus.
(1) Wallachian Plain. The Wallachian
Plain, economically the most important part
of Rumania, is an area of fertile soils that
support grain production, the site of the rich
Ploesti oil fields, and the most densely popu-
lated part of the country. The Plain, and
especially the eastern half, is the leading grain
(corn and wheat) producing area in Rumania
(see map No. 11140). Bucuresti (Bucharest) ,
the capital and largest city of Rumania, is
located on the Wallachian Plain. Most of the
area is nearly level and less than 100 feet
above sea level, but between Craiova and Bu-
curesti is an area of rolling land with a few
elevations as high as 400 feet. The many
tributary rivers that flow south from the
mountains across the plain to the Danube
flood their banks in spring, but become nearly
dry during the summer. The Danube mean-
ders along the southern border of a wide belt
of lakes and marshlands. In contrast, the
Bulgarian bank of the Danube is high and
slopes abruptly to the river.
The Wallachian Plain is wooded near the
mountains, but trees become increasingly
sparse from north to south and are succeeded
by grasslands.
(2) Danube Delta. The Danube River
turns east at Galati (Galatz), the chief river
port and eleventh largest city of Rumania.
Beyond Tulcea, some forty miles farther east,
the belt of marshes and lakes along the river
widens into the large Danube Delta. Most of
this triangular area is intermittently flooded
and even the exposed network of natural
levees is in no place more than five feet above
sea level. The central and straightest of the
three large river mouths, the Sulina, is the
main navigation route. The delta is of little
importance agriculturally and supports very
few people.
(3) Dobruja Plateau. The Dobruja Pla-
teau lies to the east of the north-flowing sec-
tion of the Danube. It is bordered along the
Danube and the Black Sea by cliffs 300 to 400
feet high. Constanta, Rumania's chief sea
port, is located on a small sand bar along the
Note: This Appendix is based on information available to CIA as of 1 August 1949.
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Black Sea coast. A group of high hills in the
north includes a few summits over 1,300 feet
in elevation. Extending southeast from this
group are lower hills, separated by wide val-
leys. To the south, the valleys open onto a
high, monotonously flat, steppe that is broken
on the west only by the narrow valleys of in-
termittent streams. Deciduous forests cover
many of the slopes above 650 feet in elevation
in the north, but the fiat expanses to the south
are dusty grasslands.
The Dobruja is primarily a grain producing
area but, because of low rainfall and frequent
droughts, production is low and the popula-
tion sparse.
(4) Moldavian Plateau. The Moldavian
Plateau, one of the chief agricultural areas
of Rumania, extends east from the foothills of
the Carpathians beyond the Siret River to the
Prut River to Bessarabia. Iasi (Jassy), the
sixth largest city in Rumania, is situated near
the center of the plateau. The plateau is
divided by the Pascani-Iasi depression into a
northern and a southern section. Both sec-
tions slope from high hilly areas in the north-
west to low flat lands in the southeast. In
the higher part of the northern section, val-
leys are 500 to 600 feet deep and support a
fairly dense rural population. As the general
elevation decreases, the valleys become broad-
er and shallower. The southern section of
the Moldavian Plateau is higher and is more
dissected than the northern. Its northern-
most hills rise to elevations of 1,300 feet. Far-
ther south the land is lower but deeply cut
by tributaries of the Siret. Gradually the re-
lief flattens and merges into the Wallachian
Plain near the juncture of the Prut and Siret
rivers.
Although the hills are forested, trees are
sparse throughout much of the Moldavian
Plateau. The flatter areas in the northern
section are grassland and in the southern sec-
tion include swampland like that along the
Danube.
b. Carpathian-Transylvanian. Mountains.
(1) Carpathians. The major part of the
Rumanian Carpathians consists of a series of
parallel north-south ranges. The summits
are flat or smoothly rounded, have fairly uni-
form elevations of less than 5,000 feet, and
are flanked by gentle slopes. West of the
parallel ranges are several higher and more
rugged mountain groups. At the bend of the
arc, however, the Carpathian mountains are
low and rounded, with spurs radiating from a
central mountain core.
The Oituz Pass, between the Negra and
Oituz rivers, and the Ghimes Pass, about forty
miles to the north, are two of the most im-
portant connections between the Transyl-
vanian Basin and the Moldavian Plateau.
Many other low passes join valleys that extend
into the mountains from the east and the west.
Flat-topped ridges in the Carpathians are
used as pasture for sheep in summer. Fields
and small villages occupy clearings in the
forests up to 3,300 feet in elevation.
(2) Transylvanian Alps. The Transyl-
vanian Alps, extending in an east-west direc-
tion, are higher and more rugged than the
Carpathians. The highest ridges, reaching
altitudes of about 6,600 feet, are in most cases
flat-topped but in a few areas the relief is
rougher and sharp peaks rise to elevations of
more than 8,000 feet. , The broad uplands are
dissected by valleys, most of which are deep,
steep-sided, and too narrow to be used as
routes of transportation. Toward the west,
the Transylvanian Alps are lower and include
several large valleys.
At the western end of the Transylvanian
Alps, the Danube flows for 80 miles through
a gorge averaging no more than 400 feet wide.
The only break in the cliffs is at Orsova,
where the Cerna River joins the Danube. The
stretch east of Orsova, where the river chan-
nel is narrowest, is called the "Iron Gates."
Despite canalization and dredging, a rock reef
still makes navigation in this stretch difficult.
Several routes across the Transylvanian
Alps follow either narrow river valleys or flat
uplands. In the west, a low pass joins the
Cerna and Timis valleys. The higher moun-
tains of the Transylvanian Alps farther east
are interrupted by four important passes,
which from west to east are: the Vulcan Pass
near the Jiu River; the Turmu Rosu (Red
Tower) Pass along the Olt River; the Bran
Pass connecting Campulung and Brasov; and
the Predeal Pass directly south of Brasov.
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Below 6,000 feet, there are occasional areas
level enough for farms, and the broad uplands
? provide sheep pastures during the summer.
The Rumanian iron and steel industry is lo-
cated at the western end of the Transyl-
vanian Alps at Recita and Hunedoara. Here
iron, ore deposits are located close to supplies
of coking coal or charcoal-producing forests.
(3) Mountain Valleys. Along both the in-
ner and outer margins of the Carpathian-
Transylvanian arc are several depressions
th'at parallel the trend of the arc. Most of
these can be identified on the map by the
towns located within them. On the outer side
of the arc, such towns include Targu-Jiu,
Ramnicul-Valcea, Campulung, Targu-Ocna,
and Piatra Neamt. On the inner side, two
river valleys lie between the parallel ranges
and the mountain groups to the west: (1) the
Mureq Valley, to the north, in which the town
of Gheorghieni is located; and (2) the Olt Val-
ley farther south, with the city of Mercurea-
Civc. A third large valley extends eastward
from Braqov. These sheltered valleys have
low relief and fertile soils, support thriving
agriculture, and are more densely populated
than the surrounding mountains.
c. Central and Western Basin, Mountains,
and Plain.
(1) Transylvanian Basin. The Transyl-
vanian Basin between the Carpathian-Tran-
sylvanian arc and the Bihor Mountains con-
sists of undulating hills and winding valleys.
The hills range from 2,000 to 2,300 feet in ele-
vation, and the valley floors between 1,000 and
1,300 feet. The Mureq, Some, and Olt river
systems flow through broad valleys that are
the most populous and productive parts of the
basin. The low land along the rivers, how-
ever, is customarily flooded in spring. For-
ests cover other parts of the basin and the
surrounding mountain slopes, but they are re-
placed by grasslands between Targul-Mureq
and Cluj, the fourth largest city of the coun-
try. The basin is important for its deposits
of natural gas. It is comparatively unimpor-
tant agriculturally.
(2) Bihor Mountains. The Bihor Moun-
? tains and outlying hills mark the western bor-
der of the Transylvanian Basin. The highest
mountain elevations are in the northwest,
where several peaks and ridges have elevations
of more than 5,600 feet. To the east and
south, the land becomes lower and resembles
a high dissected plateau. The mountains are
cut by the steep, narrow valleys of the Soneq
and Arieq rivers. In the southeast, a steep
escarpment overlooks the Mureq Plain.
Coniferous forests, with some clearings for
grazing, extend from valley bottoms to eleva-
tions of 5,200 feet. Fields and farms are
chiefly in the higher lands up to elevations of
4,000 feet.
(3) Middle Danube Plain. Along the west-
ern border of Rumania is a narrow strip of
piedmont slopes that merge into the Middle
Danube Plain of Hungary. The slopes are
crossed by several tributaries of the Tisa
(Tisza) River that descend from the Bihor
Mountains. Between Carei and Oradea, in
the north, an area of sand dunes extends from
Hungary into Rumania, where it is bordered
to the east by marshes. The western tip of
Rumania is poorly drained grassland, but has
excellent soils and is highly productive when
drained. The Banat area to the south is
crossed by a strip of marshy land along the
Timiq and Bega rivers. Parts of both rivers
have been canalized.
The Danube Plain ranks second to the Wal-
lachian Plain in agricultural production. It
is one of the few parts of the country where
livestock, especially pigs and cattle, are im-
portant in the local economy. The plain is
relatively densely populated and around Timi-
qoara, third city of Rumania, the density is
comparable to that of Wallachia.
2.. Climate.
The climate of Rumania varies from humid
with long severe winters in mountain regions
to semiarid with large yearly temperature
ranges in the lowlands. The main climatic
regions of Rumania, which correspond roughly
with its physical regions, are: (1) the south-
ern and eastern plain and plateaus, (2) the
Transylvanian Basin, (3) the Carpathian-
Transylvanian Mountains, and (4) the Middle
Danube Plain (Banat-Crigana area). In all
of the regions June is the rainiest month, late
summers are sunny, and snows are frequent
in winter. The average annual precipitation
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varies from 60 inches in a few mountain areas
to 15 inches in parts of Dobruja. Winters are
universally cold, averaging 20?F to 30?F in
January; and summers are hot, averaging
65?F to 75?F in July.
In the southern and eastern plain and pla-
teaus, the climate is transitional from sub-
humid oak-forest climate near the mountains
to semiarid in the Wallachian Plain, Dobruja,
and parts of the Moldavian Plateau. The
hilly margins of the region receive at least 24
inches of precipitation yearly. Bucureqti, on
the plain averages 23 inches of rain per year,
and areas farther east receive progressively
less.
The southern and eastern region, particu-
larly the Wallachian Plain, has a climate simi-
lar to that of the eastern Great Plains of the
United States as far as rainfall is concerned.
As in the Great Plains, the amount of rainfall
varies greatly from year to year, especially in
the more arid sections. In eastern Dobruja,
there is danger of crop failure due to drought
on an average of two years out of five. Maxi-
mum precipitation comes in late spring and
early summer and is followed by a sunny, dry
period in late summer. Most of the summer
rain falls in short, heavy showers, and thun-
derstorms are frequent. Winter precipitation,
though small in amount, usually falls as snow
and is associated with longer periods of cloudy
weather.
Yearly temperature ranges, as well as arid-
ity, increase progressively to the east and
south of the mountains, except in the extreme
east, where temperature extremes are moder-
ated by the Black Sea. Throughout the plain
and plateau region, temperatures averaging
below 32?F last for at least two months every
year. Spring comes suddenly with markedly
warmer weather in April and May. Blooming
seasons along the Danube River are about five
weeks ahead of those near the northern'
boundary. From June to August, most of the
plain and plateau area has average monthly
temperatures above 68?F. Heat waves with
average temperatures above 95?F and accom-
panied by dust storms are frequent.
In the Transylvania Basin, precipitation is
heavier and temperatures are lower than in
the plain and plateau region. Most parts of
the basin, however, receive less than 32 inches
of precipitation and, in the central part east
and north of Targul-,Mureq, the average is only
20 to 24 inches.
Winter temperatures in the Transylvanian
Basin average 7 to 9 degrees lower than at
Bucureqti, and usually stay below 32?F from
December to March. Spring comes suddenly,
and the mean temperature for April rises
above 50?F. Although less extreme than in
the southern and eastern areas, summers are
hot and dry. At Cluj and Sibiu the tempera-
ture averages above 66?F for two months each
year.
In the Carpathian-Transylvanian Moun-
tains, precipitation is heavier (up to 60 inches
yearly) than in the lower areas and tempera-
tures are lower. Winters are especially severe
in the northern Carpathians. Snows are
heavy and frost may occur in any month.
The climate of the Middle Danube Plain in
western Rumania resembles that of the Wal-
lachian Plain, although winters are shorter
and milder. Excessively hot summer weather
is common. The amount of precipitation de-
creases to the west?from 30 inches a year
near the mountains to 20 inches at the Hun-
garian border.
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commercial facilities in time of military ac-
tivity.
All of the commercial telecommunications
facilities are at the disposal . of the Armed
Forces when needed. An Air Warning Sys-
tem is planned, which would use the regular
telephone system with extensions by field
telephones and radios to the watch points.
The only factory of importance for telecom-
munications items before the war was Stand-
ard Fabrica de Telefoane si Radio in Bucha-
rest, owned by I. T. & T. SFTR manufac-
tured telephone sets, small manual switch-
boards, some accessory equipment, and a few
commercial radio transmitters and receivers.
Most equipment was imported, chiefly from
Germany, Belgium, England, and Hungary.
Since the war, SFTR has been nationalized,
and its production is believed to be inconsider-
able. Imports, chiefly from Hungary and the
USSR, have been difficult to obtain and very
limited.
6. Civil Air.
Civil air matters are controlled by a Depart-
ment of Civil Aviation in the Ministry of Com-
munications. A monopoly of civil air lines is
held by TARS (the Rumanian-Soviet Air
Transport Company). A joint council gov-
erns the company, with power nominally
shared equally between the two partners, but
control is actually in the hands of the Soviets,
who control five of the nine votes. Conse-
quently, the Director General of the company,
a Soviet citizen, is absolute dictator of civil
aviation affairs. In effect, the USSR has a
monopoly of all air transport in Rumania,
controls all foreign air rights in the country,
and all Rumanian air activity abroad (to the
exclusion of Rumania from international col-
laboration in air traffic), and has unlimited
rights to establish airfields and radio installa-
tions throughout Rumania. Rumania con-
tributed the bulk of capital assets to this one-
sided company, and must bear most of the
financial burden.
TARS, today, operates two external lines
(weekly to Prague and bimonthly to Warsaw)
and three domestic lines (daily services from
Bucharest to Sibiu, Timisoara, and Arad; to
Cluj, Satul Mare, and Oradea Mare; to Galati,
Baca,u, and Iasi) . There are 17 air liners and
10 3-seaters. Personnel have been purged
since 1946 from 648 to 347, only 44 of whom are
air crew members. The difficulty of finding
reliable flight personnel who will not abscond
to neutral countries with aircraft, and capable
ground crews who will not pilfer the stores, will
give TARS a manpower problem for some time
to come.. Equipment of every kind is in
acutely short supply. Finally, dearth of pay
load has kept the lines operating on a deficit
which must be borne altogether by the Ru-
manian Government.
7. Pipelines. -
Petroleum pipelines from Ploesti to Giurgiu,
Constanta, Braila, and Galati, with approxi-
mately 1,310,000 tons, yearly capacity, relieve
the rail and water ways of part of their bur-
den. The prewar capacity was virtually the
same. The Galati line is reported to have
been extended to Odessa via Reni in the So-
viet Union, but the information has not been
confirmed.
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TABLE I
FREIGHT MOVEMENTS
(In metric tons)
CATEGORY 1938
1948
TABLE II
EQUIPMENT SUPPLY
GAIN CATEGORY
OR LOSS
Rail 27,632,000 20,000,000
Waterway 5,458,000 2,785,000 2
Total 33,100,000 22,785,000 2
Pipeline 3
capac-
ity 1,110,000 1;110,000
11936.
21947.
Capacity, actual movements unknown.
GAIN
1938 1948 OR LOSS
Serviceable
?28% locomotives 1,911 1,260 ?34%
?49% Serviceable
freight cars 56,525 46,000 ' ?21%
?32% Track mileage 7,068 6,367 ?10%
Tugs and
barges 771 396 ?49%
0, Trucks? 4,700 3,878 ?18%
Busses 3,300 697 ?79%
1
Excluding 12,700 foreign-owned freight cars in
use in Rumania.
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APPENDIX C
POPULATION STATISTICS
The Rumanian population, as of 1 January
1949, is estimated to have been 15,917,000.
This represents an increase over the official
January 1948 census of 15,872,624, but a de-
crease of approximately 2,100,000 when com-
pared to the 1930 census. A breakdown of the
1930 and 1949 populations by age groups is
given below in Table I.
The ethnic distribution of the Rumanian
population, taken from the official 1930 and
1948 censuses, is shown in Table II:
TABLE II
ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF RUMANIAN
POPULATION IN 1948 AS COMPARED
WITH 1930
LANGUAGE GROUPS 1930 1948
(In percent) (In percent)
71.9 85.7
7.9 9.4
4.1 2.2
4.0 .9
, Rumanian
Hungarian
German
Jewish ,
Ukrainian, Russian,
other
Total
100.00 100.0
TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OF RUMANIAN POPULATION BY AGE GROUPS IN 1930 AND 1949
(In thousands)
AGE
GROUP'
CENSUS OF 29 DECEMBER 19301
ESTIMATE AS OF 1 JANUARY 1949 2
Number
Percent of total
Number
Percent of total
0-4
2,606
14.43
1,651
10.37
5-9
2,167
12.00
1,690
10.62
10-14
1,420
7.86
1,777
11.16
15-19
2,103
11.65
1,684
10.58
20-24
1,646
9.12
1,459
9.17
25-29
1,579
8.74
1,092
6.86
30-34
1,092
6.05
1,081
6.79
35-39
1,180
6.53
1,045
6.57
40-44
906
5.02
986
6.19
45-49
919
5.09
809
5.08
50-54
583
3.23
704
4.42
55-59
582
3.22
587
3.69
60-64
417
2.31
496
3.12
65-
769
4.26
856
5.38
Unknown
88
.49
Total
18,057
100.00
15,917
100.00
Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations, 1942-1944.
'Estimate made by ID-45, 16 May 1949.
Note: This Appendix is based on information available to CIA as of 1 August 1949.
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APPENDIX D
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
Ana Pauker, Minister of Foreign Affairs, pro-
moted to Vice-Premier on 17 April 1949; Dep-
uty in the Grand National Assembly.
Ana Pauker is a member of the Politburo
and the Secretariat of the Central Committee
of the Rumanian Workers Party. Former
member of the Executive Committee of the
Comintern in Moscow, she was also one of the
committee which brought it back into the open
with the organization of the Cominform in
Warsaw in September 1947. She is probably
the most powerful leader of international Com-
munism outside of the USSR now that the
Cominform has been transferred to Rumania
from Yugoslavia.
The first woman to be appointed a Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Ana Pauker was born in
Codae?ti, Moldavia on 13 December 1893 of a
Jewish family named Rabinsohn. She was
educated in medicine in Bucharest and Swit-
zerland, speaks excellent French and Russian,
and is ,credited with having one of the best
minds in Rumania. Originally a member of
the Social Democratic Party, she joined the
Communist Party in 1921. From that time
her life followed the revolutionary pattern of
labor agitation, strikes, arrests, and imprison-
ment associated with Communist leaders in
the Balkans. The Soviets maneuvered to ex-
change Ion Codreanu, a Rumanian prisoner
they were holding, for her in 1941. While in
Moscow she was given Soviet citizenship, was
active in the Comintern, organized the Tudor
Vladimirescu Division among the Rumanian
prisoners of war there, became a major in the
Red Army, and studied MVD methods to be
used in Rumania later. She returned to Ru-
mania with the Red Army and assumed the
unquestioned direction of the country.
Capable, very aggressive and shrewd, she is
a skillful speaker, completely devoted to the
Communist principles, and would use any de-
vice to achieve the Party's ends. Her connec-
wv.
Note: This Appendix is based on information 'available to CIA as of 1 May 1949.
tions with the Kremlin are direct and close.
She is reportedly secretly heartily disliked for
her Moscow support and is a target for the
anti-Semitic sentiments prevalent in Rumania.
Her successful suppression of nationalistic
local Communists, however, combined with
Moscow's confidence in her, makes her future
position entirely tenable. It was announced
on 17 April 1949 that she had been promoted
to Vice-Premier.
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Vice-Premier, un-
til April 1949 President of the State Plan-
ning Commission, Deputy in the Grand Na-
tional Assembly, Secretary General of the Ru-
manian Workers Party, and President of the
Supreme Economic Council, although the fact
that this Council has not recently been men-
tioned may indicate that it and the State
Planning Commission have been combined.
The most popular member of the present
regime in Rumania, Gheorghiu-Dej, emerged
in the latter part of 1948 from a period of
obscurity, during which he is said to have ap-
parently "purged" himself of the last vestiges
of what had been definite nationalistic tend-
encies, although the extent of his actual re-
turn to favor is still questionable. As a super-
minister of the country's economy he has held,
concurrently, the posts of President of the Su-
preme Economic Commission, coordinator of
the Activities of the Ministries of Finance and
Economy, and until April 1949, head of the
State Planning Commission. As Economic
Coordinator of the Finance and Industrial
Ministries, Gheorghiu-Dej presented the 1949
Economic Plan for Rumania. In his capacity
as Secretary General of the Party, although
reportedly overshadowed by Josif ChiOnevschi
and other Moscovite Communists, he enun-
ciated the Party program for collectivization
of agriculture in March 1949 and in the May 15
issue of the Cominform Journal delivered an
excoriating attack against Tito. Although he
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did not replace Groza as Prime Minister in the
spring of 1948, as had been widely expected,
it is possible that he is again being groomed
for the position, which would entirely consoli-
date Party control of the Presidency. As the
only Rumanian Communist who can count on
a degree of popularity among the lower party
echelons and the population at large, Gheor-
ghiu-Dej would appear to be a logical choice
to counterbalance the widespread feeling
against the other members of the Rumanian
Politburo, many of whom are properly re-
garded as aliens or expatriates. At the same
time, the elevation of Pauker, Luca, and Con-
stantinescu to key supporting positions has
established effective controls over the powers,
activities, and ambitions of Gheorghiu-Dej.
Born of a poor family in 1900, Gheorghiu-
Dej had a difficult childhood of deprivation
and hard work, in sawmills, textile factories
and machine shops, which greatly impaired his
health. He had almost no formal education,
but was an earnest reader from early child-
hood. He added Dej to his name in 1932
when he was organizing labor in a small
Transylvanian town of that name. At six-
teen he became active in clandestine labor
movements. Joining the Communist Party
in 1929, his activities soon cost him his
job with the railroads, but he continued work
in their unions until the disastrous Grivita
(Grivitza) strike, in which he took part in
1933. This resulted in his arrest and a prison
sentence of 15 years. The time he spent in
various prisons was filled with study for him-
self and his fellow inmates. They studied law,
Marxism, French, German, mathematics, liter-
ature, and physics. He established contacts
with Rumanian Communists outside, who were
working with representatives of the three
major parties to carry out the 23 August 1944
coup d'etat, which successfully ousted the
Antonescu German collaborators. Gheor-
ghiu-Dej escaped from Thrgu-Jiu prison ten
days in advance, with the help of Bodnaras.
He became the Party Secretary General in
1945, but was always a leader of the faction
which was pro-Rumanian, as contrasted with
the Moscow-trained clique.
Gheorghiu-Dej's lack of education and ex-
perience in statesmanship have been obvious,
although he has native intelligence and ability.
He is slow to form his opinions, but tenacious
in holding them. Of wiry physique, he has
deep-set eyes and an olive complexion. He is
sincere and unassuming and is impressed with
material achievement. He has been temper-
ate in his attitude toward private enterprise;
however, on this point he may have recanted
because of his unfavorable experience of being
in Moscow's disfavor at the time of the Comin-
form break with Tito?a repetition of which
even his popularity might not be able to
overcome.
Josif Chi?inevschi, Deputy in the Grand
National Assembly, Member of the Secretariat
and Politburo of the Central Committee of the
Rumanian Workers Party.
This professional revolutionary has gained
increasing influence in Rumania. He is now
the ideological leader of the Party in his post
as Head of the Section for Press, Propaganda,
and Cultural Activities as well as director of
the Party's training schools. Working closely
with Soviet authorities, he is often called the
real Secretary General of the Party, although
Gheorghiu-Dej, because of his popularity, is
widely publicized in that position.
Officially he is said to be the son of an abused
agricultural worker of Moinesti. A more prob-
able version is that he is the son of a Jewish
merchant named Roitman. He was born on
16 October 1905 in Bessarabia. He took his
wife's name of Chisinevschi. She became a
close friend of Ana Pauker, when they shared
a prison term, and is also very active both in
the Communist Party and the General Confed-
eration of Labor. Josif Chisinevschi was a
leader in the Young Communist Movement at
eighteen, was arrested in Bucharest in 1930
and became friendly with Teohari Georgescu
in prison. He was granted amnesty in 1932,
was made a member of the Bucharest District
Committee and started organizing the illegal
National Workers' Front. Arrested again, he
was still in prison when the coup d'etat of 1944
freed him with many other Communists. He
has been head of the educational committee
for the party since 1938. In January 1948, he
attended the meeting in Belgrade which set up
the editorial board of the Cominform Journal.
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Intelligent and talented in organizing, he
especially cultivates artists, writers, and jour-
? nalists, whom he orients toward "socialistic
realism" in a new conception of arts and let-
ters used for "democracy and freedom." It
has been said that he carries the greatest re-
sponsibility for the success or failure of the
regime.
Emil Bodnilra?, Minister of National De-
fense, Deputy in the Grand National Assembly,
Member of the Politburo of the Central Com-
mittee of the Rumanian Workers Party, and
Head of the Secret Police.
Known as Groza's direct ruler, this Soviet-
trained MVD man has, at times, threatened to
challenge Ana Pauker's position as first in
power because of the fear inspired by his secret
police and his own personal ruthlessness.
He never speaks of his early life, some of the
reported facts of which are contradictory.
One version names him Emilian Bodnarenko,
son of a German mother and Ukrainian father
of Bessarabia, where he was born in 1902 and
stayed until he became Groza's groom. An-
other version traces his Marxist career to a
boy's bitterness when his poverty-stricken
family in Campulung, Bukovina, was forced to
resort to a public collection for funds to bury
his father. Failing in his efforts to earn
enough money by tutoring to complete his
law courses at Iasi University, he entered
Timisoara Artillery Academy, where he was
commissioned a lieutenant in 1927. He openly
protested an election manipulated by the gov-
ernment in 1932, was sentenced to ten years
imprisonment by a military court, and fled to
the USSR taking secret army papers with him.
There he lived for the most part of the next
twelve years, becoming a Soviet citizen, a stu-
dent in the NKVD schools, a Red Army Com-
missar, a member of the Communist Party's
Central Committee and the Comintern. Ru-
manians in Moscow had directed the Party in
Rumania throughout the war years, Bod-
ngras, heading the military section. He re-
turned to Rumania in 1944, established con-
tact with the imprisoned Gheorghiu-Dej, and,
with him, assisted in the successful coup d'etat
? of August 23, which ousted Antonescu. He
was named Secretary General of the Presidium
of the Council of Ministers, which, together
67
with his post as head of the Secret Police, for
which he had been especially trained in Mos-
cow, enabled him to accomplish the Kremlin's
will through his stooge, Groza. He was made
Colonel General on 30 December 1948.
Bodnaxas is known as Rumania's "tough
guy." He is clever and efficient, using flat-
tery effectively in his capable handling of
people, but he has no scruples in attaining his
objectives. He has done a good job of rehabili-
tating the Rumanian Army. He dislikes
Americans, and is anti-Semitic.
Vasile Luca, Minister of Finance, promoted
to Vice-Premier on 17 April 1949; Deputy in the
Grand National Assembly. Member of the
Politburo of the Central Committee of the Ru-
manian Workers Party, and one of its Secre-
taries. On December 2, 1948, he was ap-
pointed President of the Commission for Sim-
plification and Rationalization of the State Ap-
paratus, which thoroughly reorganized the
Rumanian Government departments in the
first part of 1949.
Called a striking example of the worst fea-
tures of Eastern European Communism, Vasile
Luca is one of the important Soviet agents who
has assu,med cabinet positions in Rumania.
Born of Hungarian parents in Lemnia,
Transylvania, in 1898, his real name is Laszlo
Luka. When he was six years old he was
placed in an orphanage where he was mis-
treated. He started work for a locksmith at
13, and except for much reading during his
many prison terms, he has had no formal edu-
cation. After serving in World War I with the
Austro-Hungarian Ariny, he took part in the
Hungarian revolutionary movement of 1918,
joined the Socialist Party in 1919, but changed
to the Communist Party in 1922. Becoming
the head of a metallurgist trade union, he was
repeatedly arrested for organizational activi-
ties. Between terms of prison he went to the
USSR for Communistic training. He was
serving a ten-year sentence for activity in the
Grivita strike when the Red Army freed him
in 1940. Back in the USSR, he became a So-
viet citizen, a deputy to the Council of Nation-
alities, a major in the Red Army, and a mem-
ber of the Comintern. He re-entered Rumania
with Ana Pauker and the Red Army in 1944.
There he was made Secretary General of the
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Democratic Front and a member of the Agrar-
ian Reform Commission, which positions he
still holds. Elected a deputy in 1946, in 1947
he accumulated the posts of Chairman of the
Assembly Labor Committee, delegate to the
World Interparliamentary Congress, Chair-
man of the Navy League, Brigadier General of
the Rumanian Army and Minister of Finance.
In April 1949, he was promoted to Vice-Pre-
mier, along with Ana Pauker and Gheorghiu-
Dej.
Completely lacking in scruples, he is anti-
Semitic and fiercely Communistic, intensely
hating any element opposing that philosophy.
He has governesses for his children, six auto-
mobiles and six servants. The servants eat
with him, thus making it all very "demo-
cratic."
Teohari Georgescu, Minister of the Interior,
Deputy in the Grand National Assembly, Mem-
ber of the Politburo of the Central Committee,
and one of the Secretaries of the Rumanian
Workers Party.
A real force in the 1945 Groza cabinet,
Georgescu's influence has waned until he is
now believed to make no decisions of his own,
but merely to execute the orders laid down by
higher authority.
Born 31 January 1908 in Bucharest to a
small merchant's family of reported National
Liberals, he is of Jewish origin, although bap-
tized Greek Orthodox. His real name is said
to be Burah Tescovici. He attended only four
grades of elementary school. He became a
printer in 1923 and was active in the union.
He joined the Communist Party in 1929. He
met Gheorghiu-Dej in prison where he was
sent for his part in the Grivita strike in 1933.
He was in prison more often than not during
the next years until 1944, when the coup d'etat
freed him. He was made Under-Secretary of
State in the Ministry of the Interior. Premier
Radescu was ousted largely because of his ef-
forts, and he became the Minister of the In-
terior in 1945. Here he purged the Police
Staff, appointed political commissars to work
with the police, arrested the opposition relent-
lessly, and is claimed to have revengefully
made them experience all the trials of his own
prison life. His heyday was over when Bod-
naras, who is rumored to oppose him, assumed
the control of the police.
Hard faced and energetic he is a competent
administrator. His extravagant tastes in liv-
ing, his nepotism, the rumor that he sends
money abroad for future security, combined
with the belief that his Ministry is closely su-
pervised, have created the impression that he
is not trusted by the Moscow powers.
Miron Constantinescu, Chairman of the
State Planning Commission and former Minis-
ter of Mines and Petroleum, Deputy in the
Grand National Assembly, Member of the
Politburo of the Central Committee of the
Rumanian Workers Party and ex-Director of
its official organ, SCANTEIA.
A force to be reckoned with in the Ruma-
nian Communist Party, Miron Constantinescu
is still under 35. He wrote his Ph. D. thesis on
Social Units in the Marxist Ideology, and is
already counted among the five most impor-
tant Communists in the country.
Born in Buzau in 1917, he is better educated
? than most of his party, having earned two de-
grees at the University of Bucharest. A fiery
Communist since adolescence, he was a leader
in the Students' Democratic Front in 1935 and
Secretary of the Union of Communist Youth in
1939. He joined the Party in 1936. Gheor-
ghiu-Dej became his political sponsor after
they met in a prison to which Constantinescu
received a ten-year sentence in 1941 for illegal
activities. He is now a close associate of Ana
Pauker and shares her internationalism.
Freed after the August 1944 coup, he was made
managing editor of SCANTEIA, then ap-
pointed in quick succession as Secretary of the
Bucharest Party and member of the Politburo
in 1945, General Secretary of the notorious
Central Election Commission in 1946, member
of an economic delegation to the USSR and
Minister of Mines and Petroleum in 1948. On
23 April 1949 he was made Chairman of the
State Planning Commission, replacing Gheor-
ghiu-Dej in that function. As a member of
the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, he
will be an important member of the Com-
munist "super-cabinet."
He is described as vindictive and vain. His
rapid rise is attributed as much to a servile
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? adherence to the Soviet line as to his intelli-
gence and ability.
Alexander Moghioro?, Member of the Pre-
sidium of the National Assembly since 13 April
1948, Member of the Politburo and the Sec-
retariat of the Rumanian Workers Party.
A specialist on the nationalities problems in
Transylvania for the Party's Central Commit-
tee, Moghiorog is also used extensively to or-
ganize the coal miners.
He is of Hungarian origin, born in Timigoara
in 1909. Said to have started to work at the
age of seven, his education is negligible, with
the exception of the time he spent in the Marx-
ist classrooms. These existed in? the Ruma-
nian prisons and were attended by all of the
present leaders at one time or another. First
a leader in the Bragov Communist Youth
Union in 1934, he joined the Party about that
time and was arrested for activities in its
cause. He escaped to Hungary, where he
worked with the Hungarian Communists. Re-
turning to Rumania in 1940, after training in
the USSR, he lost his freedom again and was
among those liberated after the 1944 coup
d'etat. The new government sent him to or-
ganize the workers and MADOSZ (Hungarian
Popular Union) groups in Cluj and Dej. He
was made a member of the Central Committee
in 1945, and was later sent to organize the
miners in the Jiu Valley, where he has become
the boss. 'He represents the Workers Party in
the National Assembly.
Friend of Teohari Geprgescu, close associate
of Ana Pauker and trusted by the Soviets, his
influence has steadily increased in Rumania.
Simon Zeiger, Former Deputy Minister
charged with problems of the Supreme Eco-
69
nomic Council, made Vice-Chairman of the
State Planning Commission on 23 April 1949;
Deputy in the Grand National Assembly.
One of the most brilliant men in the pres-
ent regime, Zeiger has been the "ghost" for
the uneducated Gheorghiu-Dej and the real
boss of the country's economic program with
an influence greater than any other official of
his rank. His ability is unquestioned, even by
his political opponents. His recent appoint-
ment as Vice-Chairman of the State Planning
Commission indicates the growing importance
attached to this organ as a result of Rumania's
greater integration in the Soviet orbit under
the CEMA Agreement.
Born in 1908, he is a well-educated Jew from
Bessarabia. He met Gheorghiu-Dej in prison,
entered the government as his private secre-
tary in 1945, and was his Chef de Cabinet in
the Ministry of Communications, his Secre-
tary General in the Ministry of National Econ-
omy, where he signed Gheorghiu-Dej's name
to decrees, whether the latter had seen them
or not. He accompanied Gheorghiu-Dej as a
member of all delegations to' sign economic
agreements with foreign powers and on all his
trips to the USSR. It is rumored he engages
in large-scale personal business deals.
Of studious appearance, quiet and reserved,
he is a member of the internationalist clique
headed by Ana Pauker. He is little known,
however, in Rumania and has no particular in-
fluence in the Communist Party there. While
his importance lies in his ability in govern-
ment administrative matters, obviously con-
trolled by directives from above, he has gained
the confidence of the Soviets and acts as eco-
nomic liaison with the Kremlin.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/30: CIA-RDP78-01617A001500040001-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/30: CIA-RDP78-01617A001500040001-0
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
4123-STATE-1949
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/30: CIA-RDP78-01617A001500040001-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/30: CIA-RDP78-01617A001500040001-0
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
4123-STATE-1949
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/30: CIA-RDP78-01617A001500040001-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/30: CIA-RDP78-01617A001500040001-0
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
4123-STATE-1949
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/30: CIA-RDP78-01617A001500040001-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/30: CIA-RDP78-01617A001500040001-0
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
4123-STATE-1949
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/30: CIA-RDP78-01617A001500040001-0