AN INTERPRETIVE ACCOUNT OF RECENT SPANISH HISTORY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A001500030001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 69
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 15, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
ItESTRICTED JOIN1 IN1ELLINENCE GROUP,JOINT STAFF
AN INTERPRETIVE ACCOUNT OF
RECENT SPANISH HISTORY
SUPPLEMENT TO SR-11 (SPAIN)
Published 15 November 1948
(-.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C.. 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of Its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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AN INTERPRETIVE ACCOUNT OF RECENT SPANISH HISTORY
(Supplement to SR-11 (Spain)
Published October 1948
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NOTE: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army,
Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this Supplement to SR-11.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1.
Introductory
1
2.
The Nineteenth Century
2
3.
The First World War to the Republic
6
It.
Pressure on the Republic
10
5.
The Left in 1934 Fights the Extension of
Rightist Power
15
6.
Appearance of the Popular Front
19
7.
The Conflict between Right and Left
Stimulates Violence
23
8.
The Civil War Begins
26
9,
Francisco Franco Heads the Right; the Left
Becomes more Revolutionary
29
10.
Collapse of the Republic.
33
11.
Franco Consolidates His Victory
36
12.
The Spanish Government's Partiality for the Axis
39
13.
Serrano Surierls Dismissal Diminishes German
Influence
45
14.
Monarchist and Leftist EleMents Seek Franco's
Removal
50
15.
The Franco Regime Survives the Jolt of Germany's
Defeat
54
16.
The Internal Opposition Seeks to Organize
57
17.
France's Monarchist and LeftiSt Cpnonents Search
for a Basis of Cooperation
60
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1. Introductory.
For a century and a half the Spanish people have struggled
against oppression. Their history during this period is a
record of poverty, insurrection, administrative incapacity,
class warfare, declining world influence, and determined resis-
tance to foreign domination: above all, a conflict between
authoritarians and liberals, between the desire el the Church,
the Army, and the propertied classes to preserve the medieval
Spanish Catholic tradition by the discipline mf a powerful
State machinery, and the wish of anti-clerical intellectuals
and impoverished workers to free Spain from misgovernment and
mass ignorance. Since 1800, the Spanish people have undergone
Much brutalizing violence; they have fought two of the bloodiest
civil wars of modern times. Although they stood apart from .
both the world wars of this century, they had more years of
fighting in the 19th century than any other people in Europe?
Since 1800, five monarchs (from three different dynasties) have
been obliged to quit their thrones and leave Spain. Two liberal
republics have been short-lived and unsuccessful experiments.
Military dictators, such as Espartero (1840-43) and Primo de
Rivera (1923-30), have had to abandon power and take refuge
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abroad. Stability has thus at best been measured by decades,
rather than by generations, and instability has gone so far that
in one year (1873) Spain had five chiefs of state.
This record of changing governments is the outward manifesta-
tion of deep maladjustments. Spain has never recovered from the
economic and political dis-equilibrium of its past. The Emperor
Charles V (1517-1556) laid down a sceptre that had swayed the,
greatest empire of his age -- an empire assembled in part by dynastic
accident, enriched by gold inpouring from the Americas, and governed
by principles of power politics that were the undoing of territorial
Spain. Spain did not have the resources to maintain this fortuitous
eminence. The Emperor's son, Philip II (1556-1598), with his armies
and his wily stateCraft, was a power and a threat in Europe, but
from the end of the 16th century Spain rapidly declined. Its
monarchs were inferior in capacity, the Inquisition abated intellectual
vigor) foreign enemies were numerous, the machinery of the state was
corrupt rather than competent, and the rich colonial-revenues were
lavished upon court and church luxury rather than applied to basic
commercial, industrial, and agricultural developments.
2. The Nineteenth Century
The Spain which the armies of Napoleon invaded in 1808 was mis-
governed, impoverished, and at the nadir of international authority.
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Yet the common people of Spain, rising spontaneously against the
invader, revealed a remarkable vitality. Napoleon could not sub-
due them. Their constant harassments, aided by British forces
under Wellington, drove the French out of the Peninsula in 1813.
The promise shown by this popular determination to maintain Spanish
independence dwindled away, however, during the 19th century.
A major responsibility for Spain's failure to emerge more
quickly from its backwardness is attributable to the Bourbon
monarchs. Ferdinand VII, returning to Spain frcm captivity in
France, forswore his oath to uphold the liberal constitution which
had been drawn up in 1812 during his absence by the Cortes of Cadiz.
Arbitrary rule and fanatical vengeance against the liberals who had
framed the constitution marked Ferdinand's reign. On his death,
Spain was torn by a damaging civil war (1833-1839), fought osten-
sibly on the issue of dynastic succession but in reality a conflict
between liberals and reactionaries. The latter, misdoubting the
attitude of the Queen Regent, rallied behind the claim of Ferdinand's
brother, Don Carlos, that he, as the nearest male heir, was right-
fully the sovereign in place of his niece, the baby Queen Isabel II.
Although the reactionary Carlists were defeated, nothing in
the reign of Isabel II gave aid to the growth of representative insti-
tutions, efficient government, popular education, or economic
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opportunities for the poorer classes. The Army was the one stable
institution, aside from the domineering Church) and until Isabel
was forced to leave Spain in 1868, the country was run by clerics
and rival generals in conjunction with the tyrannical and immoral
queen. The arbitrary intervention of Army officers in national
affairs became a habit.
The confusion and instability of the brief first republic
(February 1873 to January 1874) reflected the political inexperience
of the Spanish people. Spain had fallen behind the general progress
of Europe. The Industrial Revolution was very late in affecting
Spanish economy. Medieval attitudes and institutions persisted,
impervious to the radical notions of a few Spanish intellectuals.
The restoraticn of the Bourbon monarchy in 1875 represented a settling
down after a confused) unsuccessful effort to try something new and
different in government -- first a semi-liberal military dictatorship,
then a different dynasty, a republic, federalism, anything but the
tyranny of Isabel. Isabel was not personally restored to the throne.
1
Her son, Alfonso XII (1874-1885) had the fortune to be guided to-
ward constitutional rule by a relatively enlightened conservative,
Canovas del Castillo.
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The comparatively stable decades which followed'were in part
the result of a private arrangement between the Conservative and
Liberal parties to alternate power between them. These parties
differed little in program. The electoral system was so arranged
that the government in office, through the Interior Ministry and
bosses in the municipalities, absolutely controlled the elections.
No government in office ever lost an election. This system conveniently
eliminated from politics the peasants and the laboring classes in the
growing urban centers, while voluntary rotation afforded the appear?
ance of change and gave politicians a technique of escape from
awkward responsibilities,
Spain was dealt a rude shock by the Spanish?American war in 1898,
which arose out of the restlessness of ill?governed, mistreated colonials
and the vigor of the United States' interest in neighboring remnants
of Spain's colonial empire. The loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the
Philippines awakened the younger generation in Spain to critical ana?
lysis of their country's plight. "The Generation of 198" produced
the first large group of distinguished, progressive intellectuals
and writers Spain had known since the great epoch.
Meanwhile two industrial areas were developing, the populations
of which were to expand considerably in the present century: the area
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in Catalonia centering on Barcelona, in which grew up a large textile
industry, and the Bilbao area in the Basque country, where an iron
and steel industry developed. As both these regions were progressing
more rapidly than the rest of Spain, they tended to develop, on the
basis of ethnic and language differences, Basque and Catalan move-
ments for autonomy: In Catalonia, moreover, the anarchist ideas
of Bakunin found wide response among the uneducated workers attracted
to Catalonia from less prosperous provinces. In Madrid, at the
same time, Pablo Iglesias, influenced by Karl Marx, was founding
the Spanish Socialist movement. Both the anarchists and the socialists
developed trade unionism.
3. The First World War to the Rapublice
The 1914-1918 war, although it did not directly involve Spain,
affected Spanish life because it provided an artificial stimulus
to industry. An expanding industrialism widened the influence of
the anarcho-syndicalists and the socialists, and accentuated the
contrasts in Spanish society. Leftist intellectuals began to point
out that the monarchy rested on three pillars of reaction: the
Church, the Army, and the aristocracy. These groups, they said,
governed the country in their own interest. The people received
neither education nor good wages. Capital was squandered abroad by
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rich ne'er?do?wells, while Spain was economically exploited by
foreigners, and the Spanish wealthy classes devoted neither time
nor enterprise to the utilization of Spain's resources. Property
inheritance was very unequal. One per cent of the population owned
50% of the land) while two million agricultural workers (40% of the
total) owned no land at all.
These problems were intensified by the economic bad times
which followed the war boom. Matters were made even worse by the
drain upon the treasury from the war against the Riffs in Spanish
Morocco. The Army, top?heavy with officers since the loss of the
American colonies, wanted to exploit Morocco. Campaigns against the
Moors satisfied Spanish traditions of military honor and provided
officers opportunities for graft. However, the War in the 20's was
fraught with disaster for Spanish arms, and the people were angered
by the high casualties. A parliamentary investigation into the
catastrophe at Annual in 1921, when 20,000 advancing Spaniards were
massacred by the Moors, was apparently about to implicate King
Alfonso XIII (1885-1931) for having personally ordered the fatal
march. The incriminating parliamentary report was squashed by a
quick political maneuver. General Miguel Primo de Rivera, Captain
General of Catalonia, with the King's connivance, took control of the
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government in September 1923 from the constitutional prime minister.
This marked the end of the parliamentary system established by the
Constitution of 1875. Hitherto during his reign, Alfonso, an inter?
fering, rather astute authoritarian politician, had had thirty?three
ministries. Alfonsols refusal to summon a new Cortes three months
after the coup didtat opened him to the charge of having violated
his coronation oath.
The Primo de Rivera dictatorship had a certain success. During
the world boom Spain was prosperous. New highways were built. Like
Mussolini, Primo de Rivera got the trains to run On time. With the
military help of the French he made peace in Morocco. Being a dic?
tator, he handled Spain's fundamental problems by eliminating
opposition criticism and imprisoning subversive elements. The
groat CNT anarcho?syndicalist trade union, for example, formally
dissolving itself in anticipation of forcible suppression, main?
tained its existence only in secrecy.
But although this Andalusian general had a flamboyance and
moral laxness that somewhat endeared him to the people, he had no
constructive political ideas. The intellectuals attacked and ridi?
culed him. The Spanish Army upon which he relied was no proper
vehicle, with its deplorable record in Morocco., for governing a
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country with problems requiring the highest quality of imaginative
statesmanship.
The world economic depression destroyed the prosperity which
had buoyed up the Dictatorship. The Army deserted Primo do Rivera,
who in January 1930 was dismissed by the King and departed for
exile in Paris. King Alfonso was now in an unenviable position,
For over a year he struggled to rule with different ministers. But
by this time many of his former ministers and friends had become
republican. Opposition to the monarchy was strengthened in August
1930, when the republicans entered into a pact with the advocates
of Catalan autonomy (rigidly opposed by the Dictatorship), whereby
Catalonia was to be allowed to establish its own government in the
event of Alfonso's overthrow. On April 12, 1931, the royal govern?
ment, fooling its way cautiously toward more representative govern?
ment, held elections in several important municipalities. A coalition
formed by the socialists and republicans was victorious. The King
thereupon sent an emissary to the leader of the republicans, Niceto
Alcalk Zamora, who had formerly been a royal minister but already
looked upon himself as head of a provisional government. Alcaln
Zamora replied to Alfonso on April 14 that he must leave Spain at
once. To avoid bloodshed, the King departed immediately. Meanwhile
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in Barcelona the leader of the major Catalan autonomy party pro-
claimed. a Catalan state, which he intended should have independence
within a federation of Iberian peoples.
4. Pressure on the Republic.
Spain thus abruptly became a republic. The masses were hardly
prepared for their new responsibilities because they had never ex-
perienced a genuinely free election and had always been ruled from
above either by an individual, a clique, or a governing class. The
Provisional Government had the weakness of a coalition that contains
unharmonious elements, for in it were conservative Catholics, Social-
ist, and anti-clerical republicans.
Nevertheless, on December 3, 1931, a liberal constitution was pro-
mulgated which created two legislative chambers, enfranchised both
sexes, recognized Spain's obligations to the League of Nations, and
provided for compulsory free education, freedom of opinion, freedom
of worship, and the disestablishment of the Church. The first presi-
dent under the new constitution was Alcall Zamora; the first prime
minister was Manuel Azalia.
The full promise of the Constitution could not be realized.
Almost immediately the Government issued a Law for the Defense of the
Republic which allowed a minister at discretion to cancel constitutional
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guarantees of freedom. The Government was pressed for reform on all
sides. It made an attempt to solve the basic agrarian problems and
to provide for the autonomy insisted upon by Catalonia. Parlii-
mentary discussion was interminable. The situation was troubled,
moreover, by strikes and insurrection. In 1932 both leftists
(anarchists and Trotskyists) and rightists rose against the authority
of the Government. The abortive attempt of General Sanjurjo to get
the Army to overthrow the Republic was a forerunner of his more ela-
borate and successful effort in 1936. Azna was personally determined
that the moderate Republic should show no weakness. Both monarchists
and anarchists were alternately the victims of the Government's
drastic powdrs. The prisons filled; the armed police were overnumerous;
censorship was applied. Despite its progressive intentions, the
Government was antagonizing large sections of the middle class without
satisfying the peasants and factory workers. The full force of the
world economic crisis contributed to its troubles as it tried to
withstand the importunities of extreme radicals while defending the
young Republic ag.linst rightist intrigues.
Tho general elections of 1933 reflected the unpopularity of the
Government. The Electoral Law of the Republic was designed to facili-
tate the formation of two main groups in the Cortes, inimitation of
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the English party system. It thus tended to give the victorious side
a representation in the Cortes out of all proportion to its actual
vote. As a rasult, the number of rightist deputies in the, Cortes
increased after the 1933 elections from a previous 42 to 207. The
defeat of the leftist parties was due partly to the new vigor and care-
ful organization of the rightists and partly to leftist dissensions.
The Socialist Party, having achieved only a tiny fraction of its
program, refused to collaborate with the Left Republican Party of
Azaria, thereby sacrificing the advantage it might otherwise have en-
joyed as a big political grouping under the new electoral law. The
anarchists, moreover, ordered their followers to abstain, thus with-
holding a large proletarian vote from the Left. They and their
followers had been antagonized by censorship, the remoteness of the
social revolution, and the administration of the Republic's labor
program by a Socialist, Largo Caballero, in the obvious interests of
the Socialist trade union, the UST, at the expense of their awn trade
union, the CNT. The Left thus failed to achiove its maximum strength
in the Cortes, and two years of rightist rule followed which were to
be known as the Bienio Negro, or black period, because the management
of the Republic was in the hands of men and parties opposed to prole-
tarian interests.
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The CEDA, a party financed by the landlords and devoted to the
interests of the Church, had obtained the greatest quantity of de-
puties in the Cortes, although lacking a majority. Its leader was
Jos6 Maria Gil Robles, student of Hitler techniques at the Nuremberg
Rally, protege of the Jesuits and of a rich father-in-law, authori-
tarian and a reactionary, but not at the time a monarchist. The
President of the Republic, Alcalh Zamora, although a conservative
Catholic himself, determined never to entrust power to Gil Robles,
because he doubted Gil Robles' loyalty to the Republic. The conduct
of government was thus placed in the hands of the Radical Party, a
corrupt, illiberal political organization headed by the demagogue
Alejandro Lerroux. Within a few weeks after taking office, the
Government, which had to depend on the good will of Gil Robles,
either repealed or allowed to lapse all the legislation fixing wages
and conditions of employment that had been passed by the Previous
Cortes; it dropped the guarantee to tenants against unjustified evic-
tion, and some 19,000 tenants were evicted from big estates in
Extremadura where they had been settled; educational expenditures
were sharply reduced; and anti-clerical legislation was withdrawn as
far as possible. The Government likewise prepared an amnesty bill '
granting full pardon and restoration of rank and property to those
convicted of conspiring against the Republic, the purpose of which
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was to liberate everyone arrested in connection with the monarchist
revolt of August 1932, This amnesty bill was adopted in April 1934
and led to Sanjurjols release and an influx into Spain of royalist
self-exiles. Among these was a brilliant and forceful debater,
Calvo Sotelol who became the recognized leader of the monarchist
faction) and pushed Gil Robles hard for control of the Right.
These rightist measures provoked an early reply from the extreme
Left. The anarchists, who had counseled abstention from voting, felt
that the rightist electoral victory required revolutionary counter-
action. In villages in Aragon a rising occurred in December 1933 on
behalf of libertarian Communism. The Government suppressed the in-
surrection in four days.
The regime's next trouble came from the Catalans and Basques.
Moderate leftist elements had control of the Catalan Autonomous
Government) whose powers had been recently established through the
Statute for Catalan Autonomy pushed through the Cortes by Azaria. It
was well known that the Spanish Right had no sympathy for such con-
cessions to regional autonomy. In June 1934 a high Madrid court)
many of whose judges were rightist appointees, annulled a law passed
by the Catalan Parliament. This act led to Catalan charges of
Madrid despotism and to a wave of strikes and disorders. The national
Government was meanwhile antagonizing the Basques by forbidding them to
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hold an assembly in Bilbao to discuss their regional grievances.
5. The Left in 1934 Fights the Extension of Rightist Power,
Gil Robles now withdrew his support from the Radical Prime Minister
of the day, Ricardo Samper, who resigned at the beginning of October
1934. The next cabinet, Gil Robles demanded, should contain a
majority of ministers from his CEDA party. This proposal was in- .
tolerable to the leftist parties, who had watched the gradi sabotage
of all their social legislation and now feared that the Constitution
itself would be destroyed. They warned the President of the Republic
that they would consider the inclusion of a single CEDA minister as
a declaration of war upon them. The President, however, rejected
their recommendation that the Cortes should be dissolved and instead
asked Alejandro Lerroux to form a government containing three unimpor-
tant CEDA members. This decision cost Alcalh Zamora the sympathy of
the Left. It was also the signal for a nationwide general strike
called by the Socialist trade union, the UGT, on the following day,
October 5,
A revolutionary movement broke out in three separate areas in
Spain: in Barcelona, Madrid, and in the northern mining area of the
Asturias. The Madrid rising was a complete fiasco. In Barcelona,
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Lluis Companys, the President of the Catalan Autonomous Government,
prematurely yielded to pressure from the extreme separatists of
the Catalan nationalist movement. He proclaimed the independence
of the Catalan state. This was rash because the anarchc-syndicalist
masses in Catalonia had been antagonized by the separatist leader
who forced Companys' hand. They consequently did not rise to pro-
'vide support for the independence move, It was thus an easy matter
for the local commander of the Civil Guard, who remained faithful
to the national Government, to surround Companys and his councillors
and carry out Madrid's order for their arrest.
In the Asturias there was no such ignominious failure. For
several years 35,000 Asturian coal miners had been reduced nearly
to starvation by the paralysis which had overtaken heavy industry
in Spain. Aided by the difficult nature of the terrain) their
armed resistance to the Government now developed into a savage and
protracted fight. Not until the central Government sent in rein-
forcements, including the tough Foreign Legion and semi-savage
Moorish troops brought from North Africa) were the Asturian miners
overcome. Under the command of General Francisco Franco the Govern-
ment forces) behind a screen of strict censorship, systematically
and cruelly mopped up the revolting strikers, Demands for the death
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penalty for all the leaders were made by many rightists, but the
Government acted more leniently. The Army's dissatisfaction with
this leniency gave rise to strong rumors that it would establish
a military dictatorship under General Franco.
Despite dissensions among the rightists, the Army had no
need yet to intervene. After the October revolt the Lerroux
Government enforced a "state of alarm" over Spain until the spring
of 1935, and a "state of war" in the Asturias. Many of the principal
republican leaders, such as ex-premier Aza?ia, were imprisoned, and
of the 56 Socialist deputies, sixteen (including Largo Caballero)
were put in jail on charges of treason. The stern press censorship
practically eliminated political activity by groups professing
republican sympathies. Gil Robles, acclaimed by the Right, ranged
about the country making prOvocative speeches insulting the Repub-
licans. His pressure for greater power never relaxed.
The brutal action of the Government in repressing the Asturian
revolt, plus its attempt, for which there was inadequate evidence,
to incriminate Largo Caballero and Azarla, tended to swing popular
feeling away from the Right. The sentencing of President Companys
of Catalonia to 30 years imprisonment in a convict prison was un-
popular. The courage shown by the miners had thrilled the working
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classes, who were particularly impressed by the fact that in the
Asturias all three working class organizations, the Socialist
UGT, the anarcho-syndicalist CNT, and the Communists had united
in a Worker's Alliance a few days prior to the uprising. The
Asturian revolt had great significancebecause it sharpened the
conflict between the classes, prematurely eliminated a body of men
prepared to die for the Republic, and yet pointed out the way of
cooperation to the leftist groups.
A rebirth of leftist political activity was carefully watched
by Gil Robles, who had obtained for himself the Ministry of War,
where, with General Franco to assist him as Chief of the General
Staff, he set about weeding from the Army all officers suspected
of leftist sympathies and obtaining volunteers of rightist sympathies
from. the ranks. In the spring of 1935, Azarla, no longer a prisoner
but now a great popular hero, reopened the republican campaign by
a speech to 100,000 in Valencia attacking Lerroux for ',opening all
the doors of the Republic to the enemies of the regime.0
:Economic conditions meanwhile had worsened. Spain's unfavorable
trade balance for the first eight months of 1935 had risen from 94
million pesetas during the corresponding period of 1933 to 196 million
pesetas. Strikes and civil disturbances had their hampering effect
upon commerce and industry, while the failure to develop foreign
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markets seriously affected agricultural production. Those economic
difficulties caused Lerroux to resign in September 1935. His
Finance Minister, Chapaprieta, replaced' him as premier for the
purpose of balancing the budget, Lorroux accepting the Ministry of
State. However, the coalition between the Radical Party and Gil
Robles' CEDA, which had controlled Spain since the 1933 elections,
was suddenly flung upon the rocks by the disclosure of two scandals
involving corruption and bribery in high places. The leaders of
the Radical Party, the two ex-premiers Lerroux and Scamper, were im-
plicated. Lerroux resigned; the Radical Party was discredited.
The moment might have seemed logical to ask Gil Robles to form a
government, but two things militated against this; the antipathy
of President Alcala Zamora for the CEDA leader, and an attack upon
Gil Robles by Calvo Sotalo, who denounced him for having endangered
the rightist program by his. connections with Lerroux.
6. Appearance of the Popular Front
Mth the break-up of. the CEDA-Radical coalition, the Cortes
became unworkable. A parliamentary dissolution and a general
election early in 1936 seemed the only solution. The President of
the Republic selected a progressive with rightist connections,
portela Valladares, to form an extra-parliamentary cabinet to pre-
pare for the general elections that would be held within 60 days
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after the dissolution of the Cortes. Alcala Zamora hoped that his
new prime minister would be able to construct a broad center move-
ment and eliminate the increasingly dangerous cleavage between
the Right and the Left. Attacked from all sides, however, Portela
Valladares, efforts were unsuccessful. The electoral law, being
unfavorable to minority parties, worked against him.
In advance cf the elections the left-wing parties -- Republi-
cans, Socialists, anarcho-syndicalists, and Communists -- formed a
pact by which they agreed on the distribution between them of the
seats in the Cortes that would accrue to their Popular Front ticket.
By means of a Popular Front coalition, they intended to avoid the
error made in 1933 and this time obtain the maximum benefit from the
electoral law. To a certain extent they agreed upon a common legis-
lative program in the event of victoryj but there was no mention of
forming a Popular Front government. Gil Robles, for his part,
persuaded the leaders of the right-wing parties that they must
make common cause with the CEDA and the monarchists. He launched a
tremendous propaganda campaign to convince the propertied classes
that a victory of the Popular Front would lead to Communism. The
Catholic clergy joined in urging the faithful to vote for the Right.
Portela Valladaresi efforts to control the elections of February
16, 1236, failed. The Popular Front gained 4,700,000 votes,' the Right
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3,997,000 and the Center 449,000. This meant a catastrophic defeat
for the Right, because the.Popular Front obtained 267 deputies and
the Right only 132. The elections on the whole had been orderly,
yet both the Right and the Left could claim that in certain dis-
tricts their supporters had been intimidated or bribed. The triumph
of the Left appeared remarkable in view of the open hostility of
the Church, the large sums of money spent by the Right, and the
Government's support in many provinces of Rightist candidates. Grow-
ing unemployment, the Government's refusal of amnesty to the political
prisoners taken in the Asturian revolt/ and the scandals in which the
Radicals were involved no doubt contributed considerably to the
rightist defeat.
Two days after the election, the leader of the Left Republicans/
Manuel Azana0 became premier for the third time. His cabinet con-
tained no Marxists. He at once freed the 30/000 political prisoners
and dismissed all 50 incumbent provincial governors. General Franco,
who/ according to testimony later offered by Portela Valladares,
had proposed a military coup to the outgoing premier before the new
Cortes could meet, was hastily ordered to the Canary Islands, and
General Coded, Inspector General of the Army/ was sent to the
Balearics. The native Moroccan troops garrisoned in the Asturias
by Gil Robles were sent back to North Africa. Further evictions of
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farm tenants by landlords were stopped. The educational program
was resumed and autonomy was restored to Catalonia and promised to
the Basque Provinces,
On March 16 the new Cortes convened. It plunged at once into
an expose of the evils of the previous rightist regime. Socialist
demands for vengeance on the military created resentment among
Army officers, The Civil Guard, afflicted by the political uncer-
tainty, became hesitant about taking action against violators of
the public order lest it be rebuked and punished by the new republi-
can authorities. The general populace, made heady by the leftist
victory and irritated by frequent rumors of a possible military
coup, got more and more out of hand. Churches were burned. While
the police stood by, disinclined to interfere, bomb throwings,
murders, and other outrages were increasingly committed. Fights
between the Civil Guard and the Socialist-Communist Youth gangs
multiplied. The Government seemed supine in the face of these dis-
orders.
The Cortes was meanwhile absorbed in vengeful politics. One
of its first acts was to impeach the President of the Republic, who
was removed from office on April 7. AlcalA Zamora had antagonized
both rightists and leftists. His removal made necessary, 'under the
terms of the Constitution, an election of presidential electors
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?
within a certain span of days. The holding of additional elections
(on May 10) further stimulated Political passions that were already
dangerously high. Many well-to-do Spaniards fled abroad, fearful
that the revolutionary wing of the Socialists would seize the
government. The Popular Front was unable to agree upon a presi-
dential candidate. At the last moment Azaha consented to be a can-
didate and was elected almost by default. The Government was thus
deprived of the active leadership of one of the ablest men in
Spanish public life, for the Presidency of the Republic offered
limited opportunities to control the course of events. A member of
his party, Santiago Casares Quiroga, succeeded him as Prima Minister.
7. The Conflict Between Right and Left Stimulates Violence.
Labor troubles had now spread like wildfire. The workers were
even defying union leadership. Bloodshed increased. The growing
violence shown by the leftist masses was matched by the calculated
violence of a fascist body under the leadership of Jos?ntonio
Primo de Rivera, son of the late dictator. The Falange Espanola
had been inaugurated in Madrid in the autumn of 1933. It was Jos?
Antonio's
idea that Spain should effect a political revolution so radical that
it would carry the nation beyond the entire experience of the liberal
parliamentary age, whose characteristics Jos?ntonio abhorred.
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Through this drastic revolution which he desired, a political machinery
was to be developed, strong enough to ride the crest of the social
f`
upheaval that he, Jos? Antonio, believed to be pending and inescapable.
The strong-arm technique of fascism was needed to accomplish this end,
In February 1934 the Falange joined officially with another organi-
1
zation founded by Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, an enthusiast for prole-
tarian justice and deeply influenced by Nazism.
Ledesma was anticlerical, and thus, until the 1936 rising, the
Falange considered the Catholic groups led by Gil Robles as competi-
tors. The Falangist shock troops were dedicated to a battle against
"decadent liberalism" and "corrupt capitalism", and sworn to kill
two Socialists to every one of their numbers slain in street brawls.
Despite financial contributions to the Falange from monarchists who
were friends of Jose Antonio, the Falange; because of its revolutionary
principles, was suspicious of and unsympathetic to the monarchists
and the Army, Its main link to the traditional Right of Gil Robles
and Calvo Sotelo was its deadly antagonism to Marxism.
As the political situation deteriorated after the 1936 elections,
the Falangefs appeal grew. Between February and July 1936 more than
1
Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (Councils of the National-
Syndicalist Offensive). The new name became Falange Espanola y
de las JONS.
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50,000 new recruits joined its ranks. The leadership of the Right,
however, did not accrue to Jose Antonio) who for some months had
been imprisoned on charges arising out of the murder of two
Socialists in retaliation for the bombing of fascist headquarters
in Madrid. The Falange remained a conspicuous but minority or-
ganization. Gil Robles, as a result of the elections, had so lost
prestige that Calvo Sotelo became the leader upon whom most rightist
hopes were pinned.
Meanwhile, behind the scenes, Army officers were busily lay-
ing the groundwork for a military rising. They had decided to
terminate the Republic with its constgnt strikes and projects of
reform. General Sanjurjo, anxious for greater success than in
1932, was among the more active plotters. Preliminary soundings
in Berlin and Rome were favorably received. .Franco and other
generals were brought into the scheme) which did not include any
large-scale prolonged warfare. The military leaders believed that
they could quickly gain control of the country with the exception
of Barcelona and perhaps Madrid.
A deed of violence unexpectedly precipitated the rebellion.
On July 13) in retaliation for the murder of a leftist by the
Falangists, men in police uniforms took from his home and murdered
Calvo Sotelo. Four days later) on July 17, the Army mutinied in
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Spanish Morocco under the leadership of General Franco, who had
flown there from his post in the Canary Islands. -
8. Civil War Begins,
The revolt spread at once to the mainland. Garrisons through-
out a large part of Spain rose on July 18 against the Republic.
Most of the Civil Guard joined them, and so did the Requetes, or
Carlist militia. But only in the traditionally Carlist province of
Navarra did the rising become a popular movement. Although the
.Government was caught unprepared and could scarcely find a hundred
loyal officers in the Army, the proletariat swarmed to its defense.
In Madrid the barracks of the rebel General Fanjul were stormed by
armed trade unionists, who thus extinguished the revolt in the capital.
In Barcelona two days of fighting ended with the victory of anarcho-
syndicalists over the garrison. The rebellion succeeded in a wide
swathe of Spain from Galicia on the Atlantic through Le6n, Old
Castile, to Navarra and part of Aragon. But to the north of this
area, a strip along the Biscayan coast, including the conservative
Basque provinces) was loyal to the Republic. Central Spain, from
Badajoz on the Portuguese frontier across to Valencia on the Medi-
terranean, was loyal. So was all of Catalonia) but it was flanked
by Majorca in the hands of the insurgents. Most of Andalusia re-
mained loyal, but not its principal cities, Sevilla, Granada and C6rdoba.
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The ill success of the rising astounded the Army; it found itself
faced with civil war. Passions flamed up, and the resentful people
murdered and pillaged with terrifying fanaticism. In both the Re-
publican and Nationalist zones, untold crimes were committed.
Casares.Quiroga promptly resigned as Prime Minister, President
Azaria hoped to heal the breach in the nation by entrusting a moderate
republican, Diego Martinez Barrio, with the formation of a new govern-
ment. The extremists of the Left would not consent, however. Jose
Giral, a Left Republican, thereupon formed a republican government
which proved itself incapable of restraining the aroused people.
The war was in full swing: the Army, the wealthy classes, the Church,
the monarchists, and the fascists allied themselves against the
Popular Front, which had numbers, small arms, and zeal, but lacked
discipline, organization, and training.
To the rebels it was evident that they had to act quickly.
An emissary from General Franco flew to Germany, where he speedily
obtained from Hitler a fleet of planes with which the Moroccan troops
under Francols command could cross to the mainland and thrust north
to effect a junction with troops under the command of General Mola,
coming from the north. The surrounding and capture of Madrid was a
main objective.
The military details of the Civil War need not be treated here.
Fighting lasted from July 18) 1936 to March 29, 1939 and aroused the
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utmost bitterness throughout the world. Enough mob crimes Were
committed in the Republican zone to convince conservative people
that the Spanish "Reds" were nothing but criminals. So obvious,
on the other hand, was the Nationalist effort to substitute tyranny
for democracy, and divert Spain from progressive social reforms,
that everywhere liberals joined to condemn Franco and pledge faith
in the Republic.
Foreign intervention soon became a major issue. From the out-
set Hitler and Mussolini were unqualifiedly on the side of the re-
bellion. The astonishing defense of the capital by the plain people
of Madrid converted what might have been a short campaign by the
generals into a protracted war. The German and Italian Governments
had to increase their commitments. Hitler sent the Condor Legion,
sample new weapons, and technicians in rotation to give them field
experience for the international war he knew was coming. The value
of the debt to Germany contracted by Franco was later set at 400
million ReichsMarks. Ciano, the Italian Foreign Einister, once
complained to Hitler that originally Franco had told the Italians
that "if he received 12 transport planes or bombers, he would have
the war won in a few days. These twelve airplanes became more than
one thousand airplanes) six thousand dead) and 14 billion lire."
Such was the contribution of the Axis to the war against the Spanish
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Republic. For the defense of the Republic, the USSR sent officers,
political commissars, and arms, using the Spanish Communist Party
as the vehicle of its aid. Thus this party) which had numbered
only a few thousands when the rebellion broke out, became in-
creasingly powerful and rapidly more numerous in the Republican
Zone. Volunteer International Brigades were recruited abroad by
Leftist sympathizers. France, Great Britain, and the United States,
largely blind to the strategic implications of the conflict, pursued
governmentally a policy of non-intervention which might have been
unobjectionable if the Axis Powers, although giving lip service to
this policy to which they officially subscribed, had not flagrantly
flouted it in practice) The consequence was that the Government of
the Republic, well-stocked with gold, could not buy arms or munitions
for its defense against a foe constantly being fortified by German
and Italian aid.
9. Francisco Franco Heads the Right; the Left Becomes More Revolutionary)
In- all probability the leader of the rebellion would have been
General Sanjurjo, but as he flew from his exile in Portugal to take
command, he was killed in the crash of his plane. A subsequent plane
crash took the life of General Mole. The ranking generals conferred
supreme authority upon Francisco Franco) whose Moroccan forces were of
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vital importance to the campaign. Franco assumed formal headship
of the rebellion on October 1, 1936.
Aside from fighting the war, he had to construct a government.
To serve as an intermediary between the people in the Nationalist
zone and the Army leadership, he selected the Falange Party, which
became the organization through which the new bureaucracy was built
up. The Falangefs acceptability to his German and Italian allies
no doubt influenced Franco in this choice. It is doubtful that he
th=oughly grasped the Falangist political philosophy beyond seeing
that it was in line with the totalitarian trend in Europe. By the
Act of Unification of April 19, 1937, he welded the Falange to his
Carlist supporters, whose reactionary politics and militant Catho-
licism made them strange bedfellows with the radical revolutionaries
of the Falangist nucleus. The execution in the Republican zone of
the captive Jose" Antonio andthe deaths or captivity of many other
original Falangists very likely facilitated the transition of the
Falange from a revolutionary minority to the sole official party
of Francols new state. Jos6 Antonio) instead of a rival for politi-
cal leadership, became of the utmost value to Franco as a martyr
and symbol of the "Glorious Movement." The assignment of organizing
and controlling the party Franco placed in the hands of his brother-
in-law, RamOn Serrano Surier, a former supporter of Gil Robles.
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As the war progressed, the politics of the Republican side ex-
hibited a growing radicalism, culminating finally in the near
dominance of the best organized and outside-supported group. Giralls
cabinet of republicans had given way after a few months to a Popular
Front Government headed by Largo Caballero/ who had been hailed in
Moscow as the Spanish Lenin. The influence of President Azaria
shriveled to nothing. In the Largo Caballero Government were repre-
sentatives of the anarcho-syndicalist trade union, the CNT, which
hitherto, for doctrinaire reasons, had refused direct participation
in politics. The unruly, individualistic anarchist masses were
among the most enthusiastic wagers of class warfare, but their indis-
cipline and violence complicated the conduct of the war and shocked
the middle classes. Although Largo Caballero had been the most pro-
vocative and pro-Communist of the Socialist Party loaders and had
fought tenaciously within the party against the two more conservative
Socialist leaders, Indalecio Prieto and Juli?m Besteiro, his ex-
perience as premier turned him more and more against the owing
Spanish Communist Party and the representatives of the USSR. In the
end he could not play ball with them. Nor was he capable of direct-
ing the war efficiently. In May 1937, he was eased out of the premier-
ship by a joint effort of his party rival Prieto and the Communists.
The Finance Minister, Dr. Juan Negrin, a well known medical man who
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was a Socialist but had not had a political career previous to the
war, became Prime Linister. Negrin was a man of resourcefulness
and energy, who relied increasingly upon Communists for the conduct
of the war, especially as the Communists stood for discipline and
order, two qualities greatly needed in the Republican zone. The much
better known Prieto, Negrin's Minister of National Defense, grew
increasingly suspicious and opposed to this Communist infiltration.
It shocked him and others that Soviet agents often overrode the de-
cisions of Spaniards. Negrin accused Prieto of defeatism. The break
between them led to Prietols embittered withdrawal from the Govern-
ment. Henceforth Negrin was the driving force of the Republican side.
Although Madrid did not fall to Franco until the last day of the
war, the Nationalist armies gradually spread more widely over Spain.
By December 1937 they held all the Spanish territory bordering on
Portugal, whose Government sympathized with and aided them; they had
conquered the Basques and thus held all the Atlantic and Biscayan
coasts. Burgos, their capital, could comnunicate through their
territory with Andalusia, an area governed by the picturesque General
Queipo de Llano, who shouted fiery threats over the microphone and
brought both disrepute and publicity to the Nationalist cause. The
Republic still held the greater part of the Mediterranean coast and
a considerable quantity of the interior as far inland as besieged
Madrid.
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Between April 1938 and March 1939 the Franco forces made a dis-
tinctly important advance. Recovering the ground they had lost in
the Ebro offensive launched by the Republican Amy, which had by
this time developed into a real military machine instead of the dis-
organized workers' battalions of the early days of the conflict,
France's troops thrust forward with the aim of capturing Barcelona,
now the seat of the Republican Government, and of splitting the Re-
publican zone in two. Energetic action by Dr. Negri(
n, aided by new
aircraft and armaments obtained through France, saved Barcelona for
the time being. But by April 1938 the southern column of the
Nationalist forces had reached the nediterranean at Vinaroz and
driven a wedge between Barcelona and Valencia. Eight months more
ensued, with hunger mounting in the Republican zone and the weight
of foreign armaments increasingly benefiting Franco, before Spanish
and Italian troops marched into Barcelona on January 26, 1939 after a
. swift offensive of 34 days,
10. Collapse of the Republic.
TheINationalist occupation of the rest of Catalonia required but
a few days. - In the castle at Figueras, bn February 1, a remnantt
(62 deputies) of the Cortes convened for the last time on Spanish
soil. Dr. Negrin, still defiant of the enemy, was confirmed in office.
He reiterated certain of the conditions for peace which he had first
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formulated in April 1938. But Franco, as before, was determined
on nothing short of total victory, Amid a disorganized mass of
hundreds of thousands of refugees, President Azarial Companys of
Catalonia, and the Basque President, Jos6 Antonio de Aguirre,
crossed into France on February 5, The Republic was almost ex-
tinguished. Negr(n was determined, however, to carry on the fight
from the remaining central zone. It was his conception that the in-
ternational situation would soon lead to a general war, through
which the Spanish Republic would derive support from the allies
opposing Germany, Azaria, Partinez Barrio, and many other moderate
republicans favored an immediate peace. In Paris, on February 28,
1939, kzaria resigned as President of the Republic. Nartinez Barrio,
who, as President of the Cortes, should have been his constitutional
interim successor, declined to accept the office, partly because of
the impossibility of complying with the constitutional provisions.
for holding an election.
Negrin, with several of his cabinet officers, had flown from
France to the central zone to continue the battle. With the dis-
appearance of the Presidency, it was contended by many that Negrinis
mandate of power had automatically expired. Negrin took the contrary
view that he and his cabinet were thp legitimate heirs of the execu-
tive power. In the central zone, Ivir-weariness and despair had gained
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ground, however. Communist insistence on continuing the struggle
increased the unpopularity of a party whose tactics, police methods,
rigid discipline, and foreign connections made it naturally irri-
tating to the Spanish temperament.
The focus of the discontent with the Negrin resistance policy
was the commander of a Republican army, ,Colonel Casado. Judging
that the war should end, and considering that Negrin no longer had
legal authority, Casado refused Nogrinis promotion of him to be a
general. By a coup dHetat he took over authority, Threatened
with arrest, the Negrin Government was obliged to flee the Republi-
can zone by plane. In Madrid, a week of heavy fighting occurred
between the Communists and Negrin's supporters against anarcho-
syndicalist, socialist, and ALrmy elements. This civil war within
a civil war was won by CL..sado. On March 5 a Defense Junta had been
established, of which General Miaja, the hero of the earlier defense
of Madrid, was made President. Several prominent Socialists joined
the Junta. It was this body, rather than any constitutional organ of
the Republic, which surrendered unconditionally to Franco. Casadols
efforts to secure a politicalemnesty from Franco failed. On March
28 the Nationalist troops marched into Madrid. The ending of the
Civil War was announced by Franco on April 1, 1939.
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11- Franco Consolidates His Victory.
The effects upon Spain of this conflict, which has lasted for
two years and 254 days, were immeasurably serious. Over
Spaniards had lost their lives. Half a million had gone
a million
into exile,
and nearly as great a number were in prisons and concentration
camps. There was hardly a family in the country which had not ex-
perienced death and destruction. The transportation system was
badly afflicted. Industrial and agricultural production had been
disastrously affected. Madrid and many other cities and towns had
undergone devastating physical damage, the repair of which was to
be handicapped by material shortages and the loss
Benevolence and charity at the seat of gayer
to heal an exhausted country. It was not General
however, to forgive his enemies. The man who had
of skilled labor.
nment were needed
Franco's intention,
overwhelmed the As-
turian strikers with Moorish troops was essentially a soldier trained
in the primitive conditions of Morocco. He was prepared to lead,
not restrain, Nationalist demands for revenge against the ',Reds," and
based many acts of his regime on that policy. The Army had begun
the war to safeguard its interests and to suppress all who wanted to
smash the old class prerogatives and reduce the Army's power. The
harsh terms of France's Law of Political Responsibilities of February.
1939 call for no surprise. Every political party which had opposed
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the Nationalists was outlawed. Seventeen distinct categories of
"criminal acts" were established, with penalties even for such
vague guilt as arose from "acts contributing to the anarchy pre-
vailing before the Nationalist Movement." Punishments fo/4 the
politically responsible included death, imprisonment, fine, exile,
or loss of citizenship, as determined by military law, together
with permanent disqualification for holding public jobs or execu-
tive posts in private business, thus shutting the defeated out of all
but minor white-collar positions or menial work, A Tribunal for
the Repression of Freemasonry and Communism completed the outlawry
of political dissidence.
The purpose of these decrees and of the elaborate police
machinery created to enforce them was the eradication of the
Spanish Left. One of the most tragic consequences of the Civil
War is the setback Francots victory has given to the development
of political experience among the Spanish people. The persecution
of every Spaniard favoring modern representative government, the
elimination of every liberal, the abolition of free expression, and
the perversion of history, have been tasks the Franco regime has
set itself. In consequence the slow, upward struggle of the Spanish
people toward economic independence and political maturity has been
dealt a rude shock. The leaders who might guide Spaniards toward
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moderate progressivism are now absent or muzzled. Franco had pur-
posely kept alive two antagonistic Spains: his Spain and "Rod
Spain". "In every sphere," as an authoritative student of the
Franco state has put it, "it has been the consistent policy of the
Spanish regime to extol itself as the victor of 1939) to evoke all
1
the loyalties and passions and fears which the Civil 7Iar aroused."
Simultaneously with this smothering of the Left) Franco has
worked incessantly and astutely to hold together the divergent forces
which supported him in the Civil War. This has been a difficult
task. The militant Falangists, with their radical totalitarian
point of view, have often greatly angered the old-fashioned officer
class and the aristocracy. Control of education has been contested
between the Falange and the Church. From time to time the prospect
has loomed that the nrmy, which conferred the office of Chief of the
Government of the State upon Franco, would move to take it from him.
Franco has surmounted these difficulties by Outmaneuvering his' ene-
mies. He has mollified the Army by privileges, promotions, and oppor-
tunities for black market profits) has prevented any other general
from emerging as his serious rival by timely shifts of command, and has
never relinquished his unique advantage in relation to the other
generals of being the head of the only authorized political party in
1
Emmet Juhn Hughes) "Report from Spain", p. 148. Now York 1947
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the state. The Church! has been kept in line by demonstrations of
piety) the conferment of privilege) and protection against the anti-
clericals. The severe repression of all subversive elements, al-
though it has kept hatred alive in the country, has served to reinforce .
France's great propaganda theme: that Spain must obey him or be sub-
mersed by Asiatic Bolshevism.
12, The Spanish Government la Partiality for the Axis.
The outbreak of the second World War in September 1939) only
five months after fighting ceased in Spain, unquestionably complicated
France's task as ruler. The Spanish Catholic rightists were
enormously shocked by the understanding reached by their German
allies with the USSR. The Falangists from the start were pro-Geruan.
In the first few months of the war, Spain's official neuirality was
the obvious policy for a nation already devastated. ? FpaTh needed
peace for her recovery and could contribute little to Germany. But
after Germany's rapid conquest of France) the arrival of 0-3rman forces
at the Spanish frontier in June 1940 altered Spain's stxr.tegic rela-
tionship to the war. On June 12, two days after ItalYis entrance
into the war, Franco adopted. for Spain an ambiguous new status,
non-belligerency. Like most Spaniards, Franco was convinced of the
certain defeat of the Allies. For the next several years he held
the conviction that Germany could not be militarily defeated. Thus,
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no matter what the sympathies of Spaniards and. the Government, the
German presence at the Pyrenees frontier called for a policy that
would avoid provoking a German invaeion, against which the Spanish
Army could not hope to resist successfully. Franco and his colla-
borators went far beyond this, however, because most of them desired
a German victory, and were favorably disposed toward contributing
to it militarily, The occupation by Spanish troops of the Interna-
tional Zone of Tangier on June 141 1940, indicated the temper of the
Spanish Government. This was a violation of an international agree-
ment. An excuse was offered in advance to the French, that it was
a temporary measure to forestall Tangier's seizure by Mussolini,
but the Falangist press chauvinistically trumpeted the move as an
Allied defeat and a forerunner of the expansion of Spain's African
empire. The Falangists simultaneously began to demand. Gibraltar
from the British. In June also the Spanish Government notified
Germany that it was ready, under certain conditions, to give up its
position as a "non-belligerent" and enter the war on the side of Ger-
many and Italy. The conditions Spain mentioned were unenticing,
because they involved Spain's acquisition of Gibraltar, French
Morocco, and Oran, plus the donation by Germany of considerable
military and economic assistance to enable Spain to carry en the
war.
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Through the remainder of 1940, discussions took place between
the German and Spanish Governments concerning a prospective attack
on Gibraltar. The relations between Berlin and Madrid wtre drawn
closer by France's dismissal on October 17, 1940 of a Foreign Minister
who personally detested the Nazis. Serrano Suner, the incoming Foreign
Minister, a ilonth befcre his appointment had discussed with Hitler
the problems involved in an attack on Gibraltar.
Although the Spanish Gnvernment was never loath to express its
spiritu21 union with Germany, the Spaniards had a tendency to main-
tain that they had already made a substantial contribution to the
common cause through their Civil War sacrifices. They did not hesi-
tate, therefore, to make their belligerency contingent upon a very
considerable amount of assistance from Hitler. The Fuehrer viewed
with considerable misgivings their demand for French Morocco, which
he thought would be better defended against the British if it re-
mained in the hands of the French. Hitler suggested that he and
Franco should meet for a personal discussion. This conference took
place on October 23, 1940 at Hendaye. According to a letter Hitler
subsequently wrote to France, flat our meeting we agreed that Spain
declare its readiness to sign the Three-Power Pact and enter the
war. In setting the Cate, periods in the far future were raver con-
sidered or oven mentioned, but instead the conversation always was
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concerned with a very short time Unit within which you, Caudillo,
still believed that you could carry out various economic measures
favorable for your country Germany was ready tu furnish supplies
to the Spanish Government at the moment when the final date for enter-
ing the war was determined."
On December 7, 1940 a representative of Hitler informed Franco
personally of "Germany's wish to undertake attack upon Gibraltar
within a short tine in connection with which German troops are to
march into Spain on January 10." Franco replied to Hitler's emissary
that Spain could not enter the war so soon, and he confessed that he
could name no definite data when Spain would be prepared. A letter
written by Hitler on February 6, 1941 reproached Franco for his re-
fusal, charging that it was not until the request to begin the march
against Gibraltar on January 10 had been made that "for the first
time our negotiators were unequivocally informed that such an early
date could not be considered and this was again motivated by economic
factors." Franco replied that he was unshakably loyal to "the common
historical destiny" which he shared with Hitler, but that Germany had
only recently begun to make effective her offers of food supplies)
and the time was not propitious to ask further sacrifices of the
Spanish people. He also stressed that, although the closing.of the
Strait of Gibraltar was undoubtedly necessary to improve Italy's posi-
tion and perhaps to end the war, it was also essential that the Suez
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Canal be closed at the same time. If it were not, and the war should
be inordinately prolonged, the situation in Spain wpuld bedome ex-
tremely difficult. France's procrastinating attitude on this and
later occasions reflected his native caution, the war-weariness of
the Spanish people, Hitler's unwillingness to promise him North
Africa, and the further fact that the populace did not share the
Government's pro-Gernanism.
Since the Allied victory, Franco has tried to cpitalize on
his statesmanship in keeping Spain out of the conflict. It is pro-
bable, however, that this achievement was largely accidental. Lord
Templewood, British.Ambassador in Spain during the war, has written:
"With the warning of Mussolini before his eyes, Franco
was always reluctant to act. Being incredibly complacent
and believing himself infalliblet, he remained convinced
that he could choose his own time for intervention. The
doctrine of perfectionism lost him his chances. When Hitler
wanted him in,' he wished to be out, and when he was ready to
move, Hitler's fortunes were so much in the ascendant that
Spanish help become a matter of indifference to the Axis."1
Hitler's decision to attack the USSR in June 1941 lessened the
probability of a campaign against Gibraltar and reestablished the
anti-Comintern alignment that fitted so well with France's policy.
The falange at once recruited "volunteers" to fight against the USSR.
The Spanish Blue Division, expecting perhaps to earn easy glory in
1
Sir Samuel Hoare, Viscount Templewood, "Ambassador on Special
Mission", p. 95. London, 1946
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another of Germany's blitz campaigns, was instead terribly mauled
by the Russians. Through 1941 and 1942, however, the position of
Germany, despite the unexpected difficulties in Russia, continued
.to seem unassailable to. the Spanish Government. Consequently, in
its propaganda and in its diplomatic relations with the Allies, it
never wavered from support of the Axis. The US and UK Governments
had to keep constantly in mind the possibility that France would open.
the Iberian Peninsula to Hitler, or that Hitler, disregarding Francols
wishes) would march in anyway,
After Japan had attacked the United States, Franco adopted a
curious line of argument with American diplomats to the effect that
there were two distinct wars. In the Far Eastern war, despite con-
gratulating Japan's puppet in the Philippines, Franco claimed that
Spain's sympathies were with America, but he unequivocally insisted
that in the European war the true enemy of Christendom was "barbarous
and oriental, communistic Russia." He denied the Allied contention
that Germany was a threat to the independence of other nations.
For strategic reasons the US and UK Governments adopted a policy
whose primary principle was to keep Spain out of the war. It was
considered inadvisable to seek the overthrow of the Franco regime,
Allied diplomacy was therefore directed at persuading the existing
Spanish Government to resist to the utmost any German attempt to
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occupy the Peninsula. Competition was constant with the Axis for in-
fluence in Spain and for the material resources Spain possessed
that might be of use in waging the war.
13. Serrano Sulierls Dismissal Diminishes German Influence
An internal struggle between the militant Falangists and the
Army led to an incident in August 1942 that was accidentally to favor
the Allied effort. The War Minister, General Varela, the chief oppo-
nent of the Falangists in the cabinet of Serrano Surier, was the tar-
get of a Falangist-thrown bomb. He escaped harm. Inquiry revealed
that the outrage was the work of intimate associates of the Foreign
Minister. Two of Serrano Surierls Falangist colleagues., unscrupulously
determined to embroil him with Franco in their own interests, trapped
the ForeigniAinister into defending the organizer of the crime and
then taking issue with Franco for refusing to commute the death sen-
tence pronounced by a court martial. Franco mat this dangerous crisis
by a characteristic maneuver. He dismissed Serrano Surier from all
his offices to satisfy the Army hierarchy and simultaneously removed
General Varela to appease the Falange. In the person of Serrano
SUrier there disappeared from the Government, for purely domestic
reasons, the leading Falangist, the most outstanding pro-German, the
hated symbol of Party dominance, and the pliant friend of the German
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.Ambassador., His successor. as Foreign Minister was Count Jordana.
Franco had apparently had no intention of changing the character of
his policy toward the war, but he now had as his adviser an individual
with a different approach to the international situation. Jordana
.
was more experienced in foreign affairs than Serrano Su;,enr, and he
had a reputation for patriotism, honesty, and common sense. He
wanted, moreoveri-to keep Spain out of the clutches of Germany. He
further had the capacity to inspire confidence in both the British
and American Ambassadors, who soon established friendly relations
with him that would have been impossible with his predecessor.
The importance of this change was appreciated on the critical
occasion when -11ied forces landed in North Africa on November 8,
1942. The US Ambassador was instructed to notify Franco personally on
the eve of these landings and to convey assurances that Spanish terri-
torial integrity would be respected. The danger existed that Spain
would permit German forces to swarm through the Peninsula, or that
the large Spanish armies. in Spanish Morocco -- 150,000 strong
would attack the :flied landing forces before they were firmly estab-
lished. This was the crucial test of Spaints non-belligerency. Chance
obliged the Ambassador to reveal the Allied intention to Jordana before
it was conveyed to Franco. Jordana received the news quietly and pre-
pared Franco for a similar complacent reaction. In the session of
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the Council of Ministers later that day, several Germanophil minis-
ters argued for Spanish intervention. The British Ambassador has
since expressed the conviction that if the discussion in the
Council of Ministers had taken place a year previously, when
Serrano Suribr was still Foreign Minister, and before the US and UK
Governments had inaugurated their large-scale program of preclusive
buying from Spain of commoraties much needed by Germany, the inter-
ventionist ministers would have won the debate and influenced Franco'
1
to declare war. , Jordana's counsels of moderation, however, triumphed.
The consolidation of the Allied occupation of French North
Africa marked another turning point in Spain's strategic relation-
ship to the war. Henceforth Spain was situated between the Contend-
ing forces. In the following six or eight months the Spdhish
Government winked at the passage through Spain of volunteers, chiefly
Frenchmen, who sought active service with the Allies in Africa, the
number of whom eventually reached 25,000. It allowed the evacuation
through Gibraltar of several hundred force-landed Allied aviators.
It turned over to Allied authorities the secret equipment of their
crashed planes. It also countenanced the US-British econoMic cam-
paign, highly profitable for Spaniards, to buy up wolfram, mercury,
1
Viscount Templewood, op'. cit., p. 182
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fluorspar, skins, woolen goods, etc., in order to prevent thes6
conic:Cities from being exported to Germany.
From July 1933 to May 194/4 the Spanish Government moved from
"non-belligerency" toward "neutrality", gradually increasinc7, the
facilities accorded the Allies. It modified somewhat the anti-Allied
tone of the press, withdrew the mutilated Blue Division from the
Eastern Front, permitted the commercial sale of American propaganda
magazines (many a Spaniard had earlier been arrested and beaten up
merely for reading the American Embassy news bulletin), granted the
Allies control of all passenger traffic between Spain and Spanish
Morocco, and withheld recognition frem the Government Mussolini set
Up in North Italy after the Italian armistice.
These concessions indicated no fundamental change of heart.
Behind the backs of the Allied Governments, the Spaniards made an
arrangement whereby Germany undertook to send Spain immediately
quantities of arms and war equipment, in return for which Germany ob-
tained credits essential to her competitive effort to get strategic
materials. The German and Spanish Governments on February 10, 1943
signed a secret protocol affirming Spain's determination "to resist
every entry by Anglo-American forces upon the Iberian Peninsula or
upon Spanish territory outside of the Peninsula -- and to ward off
such an entry with all the moans at its disposal." No such guarantee
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to resist a German entry had ever been given the US and UK Govern-
ments in return for permitting imports far more vital to Spain.
On December. 3, 1943, the German Ambassador complained to Franco of
the concessions Spain was making to English and American pressure.
The Caudillo replied that he "was hoping with all his heart for the
victory of Germany", that he wished it to come as soon as possible,
and that he knew that an Anglo-Saxon victory would mean his own
annihilation. He pointed out, however, that Spain's recovery from
the Civil War depended upon imports of gasoline and cotton, which
he could procure only from the United States and with the permission
of Groat Britain. The Anglo-Saxons were making deliveries contingent
upon Spain's discontinuance of matters "indisputably unneutral."
The withdrawal of the Blue Division would not terminate Spain's
continuing struggle against Bolshevism, Communism, Jewry, and Free-
masonry. Despite a somewhat more neutral attitude in the Spanish
press, he went on, the press "was still quite predominantly appre-
ciative of Germany and sympathetic to Germany." Having defended
one by one Spain's eoncessions to the Allies, Franco assured the
Ambassador that Spain would not go beyond comparatively trivial con-
cessions. He expressed the opinion that it was in the interest of
Germany as well as of Spain that his Government should avoid a
serious conflict with the Anglo-Saxons, because a neutral Spain
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could furnish valuable commodities, such as wolfram, to Germany,
whereas, because of economic and military weaknesses, a belligerent
Spain might become a liability.
14. Monarchist and Leftist Groups seek Franco's Removal
The growth of Allied might and the pro-Axis record of the Franco
Government now enabled the Spanish monarchists to exert /pressure on
Franco for a restoration of the Monarchy. Alfonso XIII's son, Don
Juan, was in exile in Switzerland, where he was critical of the
"quality of partiality" displayed in the Spanish Government's attitude
toward the war. The aristocratic, conservative group of monarchists
in Spain had never shared the exuberant pro-Germanism of the Falangists.
In July 1943 they therefore circulated a petition to the Caudillo
requesting an imediate restoration of the traditional Catholic
Monarchy which they argued would be "free from all foreign pressure
and influence" and uncompromised by too close association with the
Axis. Despite its sponsorship by the Duke of Alba Franco's Am-
bassador in London, this monarchist effort to seize the political
initiative from the Caudillo failed miserably. Franco learned pre-
maturely of the petition and had it withdrawn from circulation. Of
the 26 signatories, four disloyal Falangists wore punished by expul-
sion from the party. Sympathizing army officers were berated. But
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the monarchists had been fearful of the personal consequences of
signing, se no really important general or prelate was compromised.
The petitionts argument was simply ignored, and because of his dip-
lomatic usefulness the Duke of Alba was not even dismissed. In rela-
tion to the monarchial question Francots policy was established to
assert his own monarchist sympathies but to insist that the restora-
tion should occur only when he judged it expedient.
The trend of concessions to the Allies was accelerated by the
Allied liberation of France in the summer of 1944. Franco after this
had his back to the wall, for he was physically cut off from his Ger-
man friends, and Spain was surrounded by Allied forces. For all his
hatred of the USSR and his declared sympathy for Germany, he could
henceforth do little more than try to win tolerance from the Allies.
"From July, 1944," the former US Ambassador has written, "the Spanish
Government repeatedly indicated, by word and likewise by deed, that
1
its policy toward us was one of 'benevolent neutrality." The con-
tessions made under this policy scarcely need be detailed, although
the effect of their success upon Spanish politics was noteworthy.
Carlton J. H. Hayes: "77artime Mission in Spain", p. 300, New York,
1945
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Scattered through many countries, the exiled leaders of the de-
funct Republic had been prevented during the war from easy communi-
cation with each other. Dr. Negrin resided in London with several
members of his cabinet. Disposing of considerable funds belonging
to the Spanish Republic, he maintained that he headed the legal
Government of the Republib, and could not divest himself of authority
because there was no one to whom he could submit his resignation.
The majority of exiles disallowed his claim. In Mexico Negrin's
determined enemy, the Socialist leader Prieto, also controlled
large funds of the Republic. In 1942 he and Martinez Barrio, the
ex-President of the Cortes, joined with other leading Republicans
and Socialists to form a Spanish Committee of Liberation to serve
as a focal point in the fight against Franco. This committee ex-
cluded the Communists and opposed Nagrin.
Such Spanish leaders as had remained in France in 1940 were
either taken prisoner by the Germans. (as happened to Largo Caballero),
handed over to Franco for execution (the fate of President Companys
of Catalonia), or forced into obscurity as was Rodolfo Llopis.
Numerically France still contained the greatest body of exiles, per-
secuted and shut off from both Spain and their old leaders. The
refugee colonies abroad in Mexico City, Havana, London, etc., con-
tained many men whose Civil War prominence had mad& them afraid to
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linger on a Nazi-threatened continent. Their party differences and
personal animosities multiplied in the vacuum of exile, where they
had neither responsibilities to bear nor a public opinion to face.
Their disunion was intensified by the NegAn-Prieto feud and the
absence of a generally recognized and respected Republican Govern-
ment, Ex-President Azdha had died. Only the Basque Autonomous
Government existed in exile as an entity, largely because of the miracu-
lous escape of President Aguirre from German-occupied Europe.
For reasons of Allied security and war pressure, the liberation
of France was not followed for many months by the opening of com-
munications between the scattered groups of leaders abroad and the
hundred thousand or More Spaniards in France. These latter had
suffered severely. Many of them had joined the French Resistance
movement and fought valiantly against the Germans. ?Then the Germans
left, the one thought of a segment of these fighting elements was to
take their arms, cross the Pyrenees, and overthrow Franco. Exaggerated
stories of the number of armed Spaniards spread. Although border
incidents occurred, Franco concentrated large enough forces near the
frontier to prevent these sporadic incursions into Spain from be-
coming a serious threat. His position was actually strengthened by
the alarm felt in Spain and many circles abroad at the thought of
vengeful mobs of Spanish leftists penetrating into the Peninsula.
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Meanwhile in France the Communists had organized a much
publicised Spanish National Union, advertising itsas the medium
by which Francots downfall would be encompassed. They unscrupu-
lously pretended that the other Spanish leftist parties participated.
They linked it moreover with an equally spurious all-party under-
ground organization inside Spain called the Junta Suprema, or
Supreme Council of National Union.
Perceiving that the Spanish Communist Party was out to get con-
trol .of the trade unions and the whole opposition movement, the
Spanish Socialist, Republican, and CNT leaders in France hastily
formed executive committees for their own organizations and also
created a joint anti-Communist alliance, which they called the
Spanish Committee of Liberation in France to signify its sympathy
with the Prieto-Martinez Barrio. group in Mexico.
15. The Franco Regime. Survives the Jolt of Germany's Defeat
Although the belief was widespread among the exiles that Ger-
many's defeat would be followed at once by Francols collapse, the
exiles overestimated Allied sympathy for the Republic and under-
estimated Francots tenacity. So far as the US and UK Governments
were concerned, the Spanish Government, by its new compliance, pre-
sented no obstacle to winning the War. Franco had broken relations
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with the Japanese. To attempt to force him out might create military
liabilities. In Preference to the support of any revolutionary move-
ment aimed mssentially at reversing the outcome of the Civil liar,
it seamed wiser to urge the current holaers of power in Spain to
liberalize their regime. The alternative to Franco was, moreover, far
from clear. The Spanish Left did not appear at the time capable of
obtaining power peacefully and maintaining it with unity. If the Left
were to try to take over, some rightist groups were certain to resist.
The tragedy for Spain was that no democratic middle croup, uncommitted
to victors or vanquished in the Civil 'jar, existed with enough
strength inside Spain to step forward at this crucial moment and bring
Spain into harmony with Allied principles. Francols brutal elimina-
tion of all opposition paid off at this crisis.
The Spanish Church also played a significant role in upholding
the Caudillo. It controlled one of the few large organizations in-
dependent of the Falange -- Catholic Action, an efficient, ostensibly
non-political organization to which 350)000 puople mod allegiance.
Its lay leader, MartAn _rtajo, might have spoarheaded a rightist
movement to change the regime'. But already in 1944 the Church had
had a showdown with the Falange over the educational law, and the
Church had won. When, upon the eclipse of fascism, Franco found it
politic to move the Falange into the background, Catholic Action stood
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ready to supply him with a new prop. With the approval of the
Primate, Martin Artajo entered Franco's cabinet as Foreign Minister
in July 1945. In September, the Primate issued a pastoral letter
defending the legitimacy of the Franco regime and all its works.
In preparation for the day of Francols fall, the exiles sub-
merged their controversies to the extent of reconstituting the
machinery of Republican Government in the late summer of 1945. A
formula saved the face of Dr. Negrin, who formally resigned as Premier
after it had been agreed in Mexico that Marti1
nez Barrio should be
elected President of the Republic. . Proceeding as closely as possible
along constitutional lines, Martinez Barrio consulted representatives
of the various leftist parties, and then appointed a Left Republican
ex-Premier, Jose Giral, to constitute a Government. Giral's coali-
tion cabinet presented its program which was approved, to a trun-
cated meeting of the 1936 Cortes convened in Mexico City in November
1945. This was the first meeting of the Cortes since the deputies
fled from Spain in 1939. The tone of the new Government was strongly
anti-Communist, reflecting the majority feeling among the exiles and
also designed to obtain Anglo-American sympathy. Despite this, no
major power considered that Giralls Government-in-exile had suffi-
cient backing from the Spanish people to be of serious consequence.
The argument of the exiles that the Republic had been the first victim
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of Axis aggressien and therefore had a moral right to be reinstated
was ignored. Only Mexico and a handful of Latin American countries
extended it diplohatic recognition.
That the Allied Powers disapproved of the Franco regime was
already, however, of public record. During the Potsdam Conference,
the USSR, UK, and US Governments declared on August 21 1945 that they
would oppose
"put forward
founded with
any application for membership in the United Nations
by the present Spanish Government which, having been
the support of the Axis, does
gins, its nature,
aggressor States,
such membership."
not, in view of its ori-
its record and its close association with the
possess the necessary qualifications to justify
The first session of the UN General Assembly en-
dorsed this attitude.
16. The Internal Opposition Seeks to Organize
Opposition elements within Spain had meanwhile begun to make
themselves more evident. Despite years of intensive police activity,
the Franco Government had not succeeded in extinguishing any of the
five broad movements of the Spanish Left; republicanism, socialism,
anarcho-syndicalism, communism, or the demand for regional autonomy.
Although the resistance council advertised by the Communists, the
Junta Suprema, was largely fraudulent, a joint effort by the anarcho-
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syndicalists) socialists, and republicans had created clandestinely
in October 1944 a political union under the name of Alianza Nacional
de Fuerzas Democraticas (National Alliance of Democratic Forces).
This organization was to work to re-establish the Republican order,
create a democratic government to assume power until the people had
expressed their will through universal suffrage, maintain the public
order, revise the judicial system) and provide for the gradual ex-
tension of public liberties. Its organizers were handicapped by police
persecution and by their own inability to communicate copiously with
the Government-in-exile, despite the latter's transfer early in 1946
from Mexico to France. The customary rivalry for leadership between
underground and exiled organizations has seriously plagued efforts
for a coordinated leftist opposition program.
Despite the much increased post-World War activity of Franco's
opposition, it has had singularly little effect on the stability of
his regime. The primary reason is the size and loyalty of the Spanish
Army. Just as it was the Army which organized the rebellion, so it
has been the Army which sustained the Government through very trying
post-war circumstances. Quite aside from the reviving activities of
Spanish leftists and the intrigues of the monarchists) the Spanish
Government has had to struggle with the seriously adverse economic
effects of a several-year drought and with the badgerings of foreign
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governments insistently calling for a change of regime. The control,
via the flrmy and the police, of all force in Spain has been France's
salvation. His adroitness has made this resource paramount, for
he has known how to thrive upon the suspicions existing between
his rightist and his leftist opponents, and he has converted a
world-wide effort to denounce him through the United Nations into
a rallying of rightist patriotic sentiment against what he has alleged
was a Communist-inspired attack upon Spain itself.
The French, US, and UK Governments on Earch 4, 1946, publicly
urged "a peaceful withdrawal of Franco, the abolition of the Falange
and the establishment of an interim or care-taking government under
which the Spanish people may have an opportunity freely to determine
the type of government they wish to have and to choose their leaders."
This was coupled with a promise not to intervene, From it, there-
fore, Franco had nothing to fear, and he could even take comfort at
its implied repudiation of the basis upon which the Government-in-
exile had been established. The subsequent effort of the Polish
Government to persuade the UN that the Spanish Government constituted
a threat to international peace served in the end to fortify France's
position, because the Spanish people well knew that they were in no
position to launch a military attack on France or any other country,
and the directing influence of the USSR behind the POles was so
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visible that it tended to confirm Francols thesis that Spain should
unite strongly behind him to defend itself against Moscow. The UN's
study of the Spanish problem was protracted and acrimonious. The
US and UK Governments led a large bloc of nations unwilling to
apply economic sanctions to Spain. The action finally taken by the
UN in December 1946 consisted merely in a decision to keep Spain out
of international organizations connected with the UN and to recommend
to UN members that they withdraw their ambassadors and ministers
from Madrid. The decision of the Argentine Government i which had
retently rescued Spanish economy by a large loan, to send a new
Ambassador to Madrid almost simultaneously with the passing of the
UN resolution enabled Franco to smuther\the international rebuff he,
had received under the effusive grandeur of his welcome to the Ar-
gentine envoy.
17. Franco's Monarchist and Leftist Opponents Search for a Basis
of Cooperation
The fiasco in the UN brought to a head the dissatisfaction of
many moderate leftists with the policies of the Giral Government-in-
exile. Giral was accused of having neglected the underground. His
failure to obtain recognition from inthortant foreign Governments,
the ill success of his arguments before the UN, and a discernible
tendency of the Government-in-exile (which after its arrival in France
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/lad taken in a Communist minister) to draw closer diplomatically to
the USSR, led to a revolt by the Socialist, CNT, and conservative
Catholic ministers, Giral resigned. The new Government-in-exile
was headed by Podolfo Llopis, a Socialist leader distinctly unsym-
pathetic to the Communists, although he felt impelled, partly be-
cause of the political atmosphere in France, also to take on a
Communist minister.
The significance of this change in the Government-in-exile was
its possible bearing upon the most important political problem facing
Franco and the opposition in 1947. This was the problem -- the solu-
tion of which Franco had to forestall -- of drawing together elements
from the leftist opposition and from the rightist (or monarchist)
opposition in order to submerge the enmities of the Civil War long
enough to create a moderate leadership capable of appealing to
Spaniards from both sides: the building, in short, of a strong moderate
center able to .withstand pressures from the political extremities.
Franco's strategy had always been to prevent this union of his. ene-
mies and to foster hatred between the monarchists and the leftists.
The Communist Party's strategy is essentially the same, for ComMunism
can succeed in Spain only if there is a head-on shock between the Right
and the Left.
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Secret negotiations, as the Government-in-exile knew, had been
going on for many months between representative monarchists and
anarcho-syndicalists and socialist leaders inside Spain, belonging
to the flianza Nacional de Fuerzas Democraticas. The doctrinaire re-
publicanism of most of Giralls cabinet made it unsympathetic to a com-
promise With the monarchists. Llopis, on the other hand, represented
a trend among the Socialists to favor a working 'arrangementwith the
Hmonarchists provided no concession be made which would lead to the
installation of a non-Republican regime prior to a free, open con-
sultation of the Spanish people.
Don Juan) the Pretender, had transferred his residence from
Switzerland to Portugal early in 1946. Llthough this hartbrought
him under the influence of the reactionary Gil Robles, now a monar-
chist, the prince perceived that the monarchist cause needed bolster-
ing by support -- or at least tolerance -- from strong labor elements.
Thus the growing awareness of both monarchists and leftists
that neither grouping was strong enough alone to eliminate Franco
tended to favor their rapprochement. The Communists made plain their
opposition) with the result that negotiations took place, as far as
possible, without their knowledge. For Franco the prospect of a
genuine accord between rightists and leftists carried the most serious
implications) as it would almost certainly lead to disloyalties in the
army, and thus to the first real threat to his power.
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Hitherto Franco had treated his monarchist opposition with a
gentleness strongly contrasting to his suppression of the Left.
This mildness resulted largely from his desire to retain the
support of the vague pro-monarchists who, inattentive to the
strained relations between the Caudillo and the Pretender, still
believed Franco was sincerely preparing for a restoration. Now the
possibility, however vague, that the monarchists might obtain a basis
of proletarian support led to increased persecution of active monar-
chists by the Franco Government. Francols next act was a brilliant.
maneuver to divide the monarchists and yet keep the loyalty of
their following. He announced a Law of Succession which simultan-
eously declared Spain to be a kingdom (with himself as Chief of
State), outlined a procedure for the succession which allowed some
hope to the wishful that Franco would be replaced by a King, and
yet ensured Franco full control of the state for as long as he de-
sired. A provision of the law required Franco's successor, whether
a king or a non-royal regent, to swear allegiance to certain
"fundamental laws" incorporating the essential character of the
regime as it has developed under Franco. Don Juan, who had for
long made clear that he had no intention of accepting the liabili-
ties of a direct inheritance from Franco, promptly issued a manifesto
repudiating the succession law and asserting his dynastic rights to
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the throne. After this insubordination it became possible for
Franco's propagandists both to apnlaud the institution of the
monarchy and to attack Don Juan.
Franco culminated this maneuver by a concession to foreign
democratic suggestions that he permit an election. For the first
time during his rule he went through the motions of consulting
popular opinion. A referendum, which gave no opportunity fora
genuine test of the peoples' attitude, was held on July 6, 1947,
the voter simply being asked whether he ratified the Law of
Succession. The vote was rigged, and over 60% of the votes were
announced to have been in favor of ratification. Even had the
vote gone differently, the Franco regime would have continued
unmodified.
In mid-summer 1947 Franco could congratulate himself on the
apparent stability of his Government and tha growing tendency
abroad to overlook his faults and to view his country as a poten-
tially useful strategic ally. The increasing embitterment of the
Spanish masses, although it lay beneath the surface, nevertheless
pointed toward an eventual upheaval.
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litilli0Lml'Etl
U. N. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
' 3122-II-1P48
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