IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A001400070001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 111
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1947
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
COPY NO I ()I SR 6
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This (SR) series of CIG Situation Reports is designed to furnish to
authorized recipients, for their continuing use as a reference, analyses and
interpretations of the strategic or national policy aspects of foreign situations
which affect the national security of the United States.
In the preparation of this report, the Central Intelligence Group has
made full use of material furnished by the intelligence agencies of the State,
War and Navy Departments and of the Army Air Forces. These agencies have
also concurred in this report unless otherwise noted.
It is suggested that the recipients retain this report, since it will be
reviewed and, if necessary, revised in whole or in part each month hereafter.
WARNING
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-
TIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF
THE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U.S.C., 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANS-
MISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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1 AUGUST 1947
1.
2.
3.
4.
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IRAN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY
SECTION I - POLITICAL SITUATION
Genesis of the Present Political System
I-1
a. Establishment of the Constitutional Monarchy
I-1
b. The Reign of Riza Shah
I-1
LL. Iran during Allied Occupation
1-3
d. Initial Problems of the Present Administration
1-5
Present Governmental Structure
1-8
Current Issues
I-10
Stability of Government
I-10
SECTION II - ECONOMIC SITUATION
1111 1. Intioductory II-1
2. Genesis of the Present Economic System II-1
3. Description of the Present Economic System 11-2
a. Agriculture and Livestock 11-2
b. Natural Resources 11-3
Industry 11-5
d. Transportation 11-6
e. Finance 11-7
f. International Trade 11-9
4. Economic Stability II-10
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SECTION III - FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. Genesis of Present Foreign Policy
III-1
2. Present Relations with the USSR
111-3
3. Significant Relations with Other Nations
111-5
a. Great Britain
111-5
b. The United States
111-5
c. Other States
111-6
d. International Organizations
111-7
Document No. 0
DO Cili&GE in. Class. 0
C-2.C.77-D, TO: TS
? DT12, Apr 77
.Auth: DDiG. 77 1763
Date.:
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SECTION IV - MILITARY SITUATION
1. Genesis of Present Military Policies IV-1
2. Strength and Disposition of the Armed Forces IV-1
a. Army IV-1
b. Navy IV-2
c. Air Forces IV-3
d. Gendarmerie IV-3
3. War Potential IV-3
a. Manpower IV-3
b. Natural Resources IV-4
c. Industry IV-4
4. Military Intentions and Capabilities IV-5
a. Army Plans IV-5
b. Military Capabilities IV-5
SECTION V - STRATEGIC FACTORS AFFECTING UNITED STATES SECURITY
1. The Importance of Iranian Independence V-1
2. Factors Promoting Continued Independence V-1
3. Factors Working against Continued Independence V-2
SECTION VI - PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING UNITED STATES SECURITY
APPENDIX A - Topography and Climate
APPENDIX B - Communications Facilities
APPENDIX C - Population Statistics and Characteristics
APPENDIX D - Chronology of Important Events
MAPS
APPENDIX F - Transportation
APPENDIX G - Principal Tribes
APPENDIX H - Relative Density of Population and Traditional Provinces
APPENDIX I - Mineral Resources
APPENDIX J - Natural Products and Resources
APPENDIX K - Industrial Development
STAT
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SUMMARY
The strategic importance of Iran lies in: (a) its geographical
position in the Middle East bridge connecting Europe, Africa, and Asia;
(b) its consequent position with regard to lines of communications of
other powers; and (c) its oil resources (Iran is the world's fourth
largest producer). It is the center of an arc formed by three independent
states (Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan) which border the USSR and which
are the only nations on the Soviet periphery that, since 1939, have not
lost territory or political independence to the USSR.
The USSR constitutes the only threat to Iranian independence.
Soviet interest in Iran is political rather than economic because, as the
Soviet General Staff pointed out in 1941, "Iran is today a country of
great strategic importance since it could be used as a base for launching
an attack against the Soviet Unions" Conversely, Iran might be used by
the USSR as a base for attack against other Persian Gulf areas of vital
interest to the US.
During the Allied occupation, the Soviets gained a foothold in
northern Iran, established political and propaganda agencies throughout
the country, sponsored pro-Soviet political parties and labor unions,
furthered seditious and separatist movements, prevented the Iranian
Government from exercising its sovereign authority, and applied pressures
of various kinds on the government. The Soviets' most manifest accom-
plishments during this time were the creation of a pro-Soviet autonomous
state in the province of Azerbaijan and making preliminary arrangements
for the establishment of a joint Soviet-Iranian oil company, the proposals
for which have not yet been submitted to the Iranian Parliament for rati-
fication.
Although the Soviets gave no material support to the autonomous
regime in Azerbaijan when Iranian troops entered the province in December
1946 and reclaimed it for the Central Government, and although they
recently gave in to Iranian demands that they cease illegal air operations
in the northern part of the country, the USSR has not abandoned its
ultimate aim of securing domination of Iran. Preliminary objectives are
to establish control over Iranian territory contiguous to the Soviet
border and to install a government at Tehran subservient to Moscow. To
achieve these ends, the Soviets are seeking a preferential position in the
northern provinces by exerting pressure on the Iranian Government to ratify
the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement, to grant special air rights, and to reject
US assistance and advice. This pressure is exerted through propaganda
directed largely against the Iranian Government and the US, subversive
activities directed at undermining internal security and stability, and
threats implying the use of force. If these efforts fail, the USSR may
eventually intervene forcibly in Iranian affairs, presenting the United
Nations with a fait accompli on the pretext that Soviet security was
jeopardized by Iranian instability.
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Iran will continue to resist Soviet pressure, relying on aid and
advice from the US, and upon US support in the UN. The Shah, the army as
a whole, influential tribal chiefs, landowners, and the clergy have con-
sistently maintained an anti-Communist attitude. Iranians in general
dislike the USSR but have a strong friendly feeling for the US. The
reorganized cabinet of 21 June is further to the Right than its pre-
decessor and will strengthen the anti-Soviet tendencies of the government.
Moreover, the parliament elected in 1947 is composed almost wholly of
moderates and conservatives.
There are, however, internal factors which make for instability
and thus threaten Iran's continued independence. The tribes (many of them
well armed) are dissatisfied as a result of the government's failure to
adopt a reasonable tribal policy. Rivalry between the Shah and Prime
Minister Qavam may prompt the Shah to seek Qavam's removal as soon as he
finds a.qualified successor who will be more amenable to his wishes. Be-
cause of Iranian inexperience and maladministration, the administrative,
social, and economic improvements necessary for internal stability cannot
be effected without adequate support by foreign powers and supervision by
foreign advisers, together with the effective cooperation of the Iranian
Government. The ultimate strength of Iranian resistance to Soviet pressures
will depend largely on the extent and effectiveness of US and British
support, and Iranian confidence therein.
Iran unaided is incapable of offering effective resistance to a
military invasion. The topography of the country offers easy access from
the USSR on both sides of the Caspian, and in the event of a Soviet attack,
the Iranian forces (without immediate and substantial reinforcement by the
Western Powers) would quickly disintegrate. Because of its internal weak-
nesses and vulnerability to attack by the USSR, Iran is the most insecure
link in the chain of independent states along the Soviet border in the
Middle East.
If Iran, "peaceably,' or as the result of military invasion, should
come under Soviet domination, the independence of all other countries in the
Middle East would be threatened, and the interests of the US would be
jeopardized throughout the area. Specifically, if the USSR occupied or
dominated Iran, it would: (a) gain control of the oil resources now ex-
ploited by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; (b) threaten the oil fields in
nearby Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrein; (c) acquire additional
bases for carrying on subversive activities or actual attack against Turkey,
Iraq, Afghanistan, and India; (d) control continental air routes crossing
Iran, threaten those crossing Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Persian
Gulf, and menace shipping in the Persian Gulf; (e) undermine the will of
all Middle Eastern countries to resist aggression; and (f) acquire a base
800 miles nearer than any held at present to potential British-US lines
of defense in Africa and the Indian Ocean area.
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SECTION I
ID
POLITICAL SITUATION
1. Genesis of the Present Political System
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a. Establishment of the Constitutional Monarchy
Little within the past history and experience of Iran has prepared
the people for the development of a democratic state. The country was
ruled by absolute monarchs for more than 2000 years and over this period
displayed a remarkable continuity of culture in spite of recurrent in-
vasions, transient foreign dynasties, and territorial changes.
The political revolution which resulted in the granting of the
Constitution of 1906 was the outgrowth of public disgust with the decadent
rulers of the Qajar line, who were disposing of national resources and
independence to Great Britain and Russia, and of the fervent interest of
small but highly vocal groups of Iranians in the popular governments of
the West. The revolutionary movement, actively opposed by Czarist Russia
and tacitly supported by Great Britain, included such diverse elements as
younger liberals, the merchant class, enlightened members of the clergy,
and tribal groups. The latter bore the brunt of the limited fighting.
The Iranian people, inexperienced in democratic processes and long
habituated to despotism, made little headway with constitutional govern-
ment. Feudal lords and landowners exercised a large measure of control
over the population and the administration; during World War I the con-
stitution was virtually suspended, the legislative body did not convene,
and the cabinet proved incapable of taking any decisive action. The con-
tinuation of the government's instability well beyond the end of the war
enabled Riza Khan, an army colonel encouraged by British officials, to
march on Tehran with his Persian Cossack Brigade and turn out the
vacillating administration.
b. The Reign of Riza Shah
Riza Khan, though of humble origin and without formal education or
knowledge of the world beyond Iran, was a man of forceful character who
was determined to rouse his country from its lethargy. First, he had him-
self made minister of war, and then prime minister. Early in 1925, he
secured dictatorial powers from the parliament, and later that year a
Constituent Assembly chose him as the first Shah of the "Pahlevi" dynasty.
Riza Shah's aims were to promote national pride and unity among
the Iranians, to establish an independent Iran worthy of the respect of
other nations, and to reshape the country as quickly as possible according
to Western models. Without actually abrogating the constitution, the Shah
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ruled as an absolute monarch, controlling all phases of public and private
life by instilling among the people fear of his personal power and by
ruthlessly using the army which he had reorganized, enlarged, and trained.
Cabinet ministers and the parliament were completely subservient to him;
blundering officials and personal opponents met with imprisonment or
death. The Qajar family were made powerless; and the Moslem clergy, be-
cause of its power and influence with the people and its resistance to
change, was reduced in wealth and authority.
On the other hand, the Shah made a determined effort to Western-
ize the country, using as a model the Ataturk regime in Turkey. Some
attempt was made to industrialize the country fa number of small factories
were built, and the transportation system was improved) and to alter the
ancient social structure. The numerous class distinctions were weakened,
and a type of uniformity was established by the forced adoption of Western
dress. Efforts were made to replace sectional languages with Persian.
The religious schools were replaced by state schools with a broadened cur-
riculum,
These reforms, however, were often debased to serve specific ends.
Thus, education stressed glorification of the ruler rather than the in
tellectual growth of the student, and the development of state-guided
"thought control" worked against the rise of intelligent public opinion.
Foreign specialists employed to guide industrialization and to reform the
administrative system were gradually deprived of authority because of
Riza Shah's mounting antipathy toward foreign countries. When the govern-
ment, in the role of "supreme economic organizer," established monopolies
over imports and exports and developed state-owned factories, much of the
profit went to the Shah, whose efforts directed toward the advancement of
Iran were made increasingly subservient to his interest in building up
personal riches.
The end result of the domination of the country by Riza Shah was
the failure of officials, through fear, to take the initiative or to assume
responsibility. In addition, the dictatorship created a universal feeling
of resignation and helplessness and left a low level of moral stamina and
character which is directly reflected in present-day political life and
public activity.
Until a few years before the outbreak of World War II, the govern-
ment of Riza Shah appeared to be sound. Actually, the complicated system
of monopolies, in part supported by barter arrangements with Germany and
the USSR, was on the point of collapse; and chaos prevailed at every level
of the administration. Intolerant of possible rivals, Riza Shah had elimi-
nated the few capable administrators who had come to the fore.
During the early stages of World War II, Riza Shah continued the
employment of German technicians and encouraged close relations with Germany,
which had assumed first place in Iran's foreign trade. Despite Allied
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representations, Riza Shah did not reverse the pro-Nazi trend of his poli-
cies after the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the USSR; and
it became strategically necessary for Soviet and British troops to invade
Iran in the fall of 1941. The country was quickly occupied; Riza Shah
was deposed; and his young and politically weak son, Mohammed Riza Shah,
was put on the throne. Riza Shah was exiled to South Africa, where he
died in 1944.
?c. Iran during Allied Occupation
(1) Conduct of the Government
Allied control in Iran was limited to matters of military
necessity. and consisted largely of imposing economic measures to
regulate Iran's imports and exports, and of adapting Iran's trans-
portation facilities to the needs of the Allied supply mission.
Thus, freed of Riza Shah's dictatorial rule and only partially re-
stricted by Allied supervision, the country had an opportunity to
attempt a constitutional form of government.
The new Shah's power was restricted, and government preroga-
tive was exercised by cabinet and parliament--with only moderately
successful results. The parliament which had been elected prior
to Riza Shah's abdication was composed chiefly of deputies of long
standing who were unaccustomed to freedom of action or to responsi-
bility. Although a new parliament was elected in 1943. it showed
little improvement over its predecessor. Moreover, the cabinets,
which received little support from parliament, lacked stability:
between 1941 and 1946 the official life of a prime minister was
merely a matter of months. During the occupation, the government
was chiefly concerned with negotiating the Tripartite Treaty,*
facilitating the development of the Allied supply route from the
Persian Gulf to the USSR, and adapting Iran's economy to wartime
restrictions.
(2) The Rise of Political Parties
Political parties, a phase of public activity almost
entirely new to Iran, began to spring up during the Allied
Dated 29 January 1942, this treaty between Great Britain, the USSR, and
Iran defined their respective wartime roles in the area, and proclaimed
Soviet-British intentions to: (a) respect Iran's sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and political independence; (b) safeguard the economic existence
of the Iranian people against privations resulting from the war; and (c)
withdraw their forces not later than six months following the cessation
of hostilities.
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occupation; their formation was encouraged by the relaxation of the
controls on speech, press, and assembly, imposed by Riza Shah. Eight
or ten minor parties, as well as several parliamentary factiOns, were
soon in existence, but most of them failed to take root, mainly be-
cause there was no widespread public interest in party politics, and
the art of party organization and political pressure was little under-
stood. In general, the various parties were conservative or liberal,
or, according to popular over-simplification, pro-British or pro-
Soviet. The most prominent of these parties were the Tudeh (originally
combining liberal and leftist elements) and the National Will (con-
servative).
(a) Tudeh Party
The Tudeh or "Masses" Party was the first to appear.
Most of the founders were educated men, imprisoned as suspected
Communists by Riza Shah but released after the Allied occupation.
This group included both Communists trained by Moscow and liber-
als who were sincere advocates of social reform. The new party,
confronted with the choice of waging an independent struggle
with little hope of early success or accepting Soviet advice and
concrete support with the possibility of achieving its goal in
the near future, chose the latter course. Funds became avail-
able; party newspapers were published; and the party elected
eight members to the 14th Parliament of 1944-46. Seven of these
eight came from the Soviet-occupied section of the country, and
in parliament they achieved through solidarity a position of
strength out of proportion to their numbers. The party solic-
ited members, encouraged the formation of labor unions, and pro-
moted strikes. As a result, wages actually increased in indus-
trial towns and working-class support of the party grew.
Measures favoring Soviet influence in Iran and demands
by the USSR on the government were supported by the Tudeh Party,
under the protection and encouragement of Soviet troops. It
became increasingly obvious that the party was following the
dictates of Moscow.
In 1945 the province of Azerbaijan became the focal
point of Tudeh activity. There Soviet direction was stronger
and more apparent, while local leaders, rather than being edu-
cated Iranians, were often Soviet-trained agents. The active
revolutionary and separatist movemeht within Azerbaijan was
fostered by the Tudeh through the "Democratic Party of Azerbaijan,"
which derived from the provincial branch of the Tudeh Party.
(b) National Will Party
Opposition to the Tudeh group was furnished by Seyyid
Zia ed-Din Tabatabai, a religious and political leader who founded
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the National Will Party in 1943. His party was supplied with con-
siderable funds by wealthy Iranians and soon had its own press and
program of proposed social and economic reforms. Ziaed-Din became
the symbol of opposition to Communism. He was regarded by the
Soviets and the Tudeh Party as the tool of the British, from whom
he received advice and encouragement. He made a strenuous effokt
to win the interest of the United States in his party, using his
influence in Parliament to support the various US advisers then in
Iran. Only a few of the deputies actually belonged to his party,
but with the occasional support of other conservatives he was able
to block legislation or discussion in parliament. In general, his
aim was to preserve the political status quo and to foster a re-
vival of religious influences.
Other parties, notably the Iran (in general, an associa-
tion of young liberals) and the Mardom (a moderate group repre-
senting business interests), were politically active during this
period but lacked the solidarity and discipline evidenced by the
Tltdeh Party. By the fall of 1945, the Tudeh assumed that it would
be able to sweep the forthcoming elections in the Soviet-occupied
areas of northern Iran, and might be able to win control of the
15th Parliament. In October 1945, however, the 14th Parliament
passed, by a large majority, a bill postponing the elections until
six months after all foreign troops had left the country.
d. Initial Problems of the Present Administration
In January 1946 Ahmad Qavam, an astute statesman of long experience,
was chosen prime minister by a.majority of one vote in parliament, the Tudeh
deputies supporting his candidacy. The new Prime Minister was faced with
the tasks of (1) coming to terms with the USSR, which had failed to with-
draw its troops from Iran and was seeking to retain a foothold in the coun-
try; (2) resolving the conflict between opposing political groups in Iran;
(3) settling tribal disorders through negotiation; and (4) effecting the
return of the Soviet-dominated provinre of Azerbaijan to the Central Govern-
ment. Qavam was generally thought to be the only man acceptable to the USSR
strong enough to solve these problems. He was regarded as a clever, un-
scrupulous, and ambitious politician of the old school, but it was also
recognized that he was intelligent, energetic, and business-like, even
though harsh and dictatorial in his relations with officials.
. (1) Relations with the USSR
When Qavam took office, Iran had just protested to the Security
Council that Soviet officials and troops were interfering in the in-
ternal affairs of the country. When, in 1945, the Central Government
had sought to suppress a rebellion in Azerbaijan, Soviet forces had
prevented Iranian troops from entering the province, and a pro-Soviet
autonomous regime had been established. Moreover, a "Kurdish Republic"
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was being formed among the tribes in the southwestern part of the
province, also under the aegis of the USSR.
In February, while the Security Council was considering the
Iranian appeal, Qavam attempted to reach an understanding with Stalin
and Molotov in direct conversations at the Kremlin. No agreement was
reached, and Moscow announced on 1 March that Soviet troops would re-
main in northern and northwestern Iran pending clarification of the
situation.* On 18 March Iran protested to the Security Council re-
garding the continued presence of Soviet forces in Iran.
Finally, in April, an exchange of notes between Qavam and the
Soviet Ambassador resulted in an easing of the tension. These notes.
provided for (1) submission to parliament for ratification of an agree-
ment covering the exploitation of the oil of northern Iran by a joint
Soviet-Iranian company; (2) withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Iran
within a period of six weeks after 24 March. At the same time, the
question of Azerbaijan was covered by a communique, issued jointly by
Qavam and the Soviet Ambassador, which recognized Azerbaijan as an
internal Iranian affair. In effect, Qavam had committed himself to
sponsor a Soviet oil agreement in exchange for the evacuation of
Soviet troops from Iran (completed in May 1946) and for an opportunity
to negotiate with Azerbaijan. Having temporarily disposed of the
international crisis, Qavam was free to deal with major internal prob-
lems; and since the term of the 14th Parliament had expired early in
March, he could work without parliamentary checks and controls.
(2) Consolidation of Political Groups
Qavam demonstrated his astuteness in resolving the conflict
between opposing political parties. Feeling the necessity for initial
Tudeh backing, he first moved against the "reactionary" element, which
was quickly silenced with the arrest of Ziaed-Din (leader of the con-
servative National Will Party) and several of his supporters. Qavam
announced the formation of his own party, the Democratic Party of Iran,
and stated that the problems of the country could be solved only by the
collaboration of this new party, the Tudeh Party, and the Iran Party
(a smaller group which later split into pro-Tudeh and pro-Qavam fac-
tions). The formation of the new party, as was later revealed, was a
calculated step against the Tudeh group.
When Qavam formed a new government in August 1946, he brought
three founders of the Tudeh Party into his cabinet and assigned posts
* Under the terms of the Tripartite Treaty (see footnote, page I-3) Allied
troops were scheduled to evacuate Iran six months after cessation of
hostilities. Both Great Britain and the United States interpreted this
deadline as 2 March 1946.
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to two other ministers with pro-Soviet leanings. Later, however, with
the power of his own party increasing, he felt strong enough to order
the arrest of several Tudeh leaders involved in labor riots against
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and to oust the Governor of Tehran, who
was also a member of the party. When the Tudeh ministers remained
away from cabinet meetings in protest, Qavam resigned, was reinstated,
and then formed a new cabinet of personal followers and moderate
politicians, none of whom was affiliated with Tudeh.
After the formation of the. new cabinet, a wave of enthusiasm
arose for Qavam's party, and chapters were organized in many parts of
the country in preparation for the elections which had been called for
by the Shah. The Tudeh Party, realizing that its influence was de-
clining, announced at the end of 1946, following the collapse of the
Azerbaijan regime, that it would take no part in the forthcoming elec-
tions. In January 1947 the party eliminated some of its Communist
founders and stated that it would continue as a progressive national
party. By May 1947 nearly all the election returns were in, and the
majority of the successful candidates were members of Qavam's party.
(3) Negotiations with the Tribes
The temporary success of the movements in Azerbaijan and
Kurdistan had encouraged various tribal groups to make demands on the
Central Government.* The leaders of these groups, however, were anti-
Soviet and distrusted the apparent favoritism shown by Qavam to the
Tudeh Party. Serious armed clashes occurred in July 1946 between
Iranian Arabs inhabiting Khuzistan Province and Tudeh Party members
when the Tudeh called a general strike against the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company.
In August 1946 the tribal heads of the powerful Qashgais,
most of whom live in the southern province of Fars, told Qavam that
they would oppose any attempt of the Tudeh Party to penetrate south-
ern Iran, and presented certain demands in the form of an ultimatum
to the Prime Minister. When the demands were not met, the Qashgais
For centuries the tribal and non-tribal populations of Iran have been mutu-
ally distrustful and hostile. At earlier periods the government made efforts
to break the strength of the tribes by transferring whole groups to parts of
the country remote from their tribal lands. During the reign of Riza Shah,
tribal disarmament was carried out by large-scale army campaigns accompanied
by executions, extortion, and the establishment of martial law. Large areas
of tribal land were taken over by the government, and attempts were made to
settle groups in villages and to conscript the young men into the army. In
1942 the tribes began to agitate for the return of their lands and for free-
dom from oppression by the army and civil officials.
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moved against the government garrisons in the south and captured several
towns. The government elected to come to terms with the Qashgais rather
than risk a contest of strength. According to the agreement eventually
reached, tribal representation is to be assured by an increase in the
number of deputies elected from the area; local roads are to be im-
proved; the railway is to be extended to Fars Province; and steps are
to be taken to expand the educational system and the public health
services. On the other hand, tribal arms are to be relinquished in
successive steps, with the Qashgais retaining about one third of their
arms until the government is in a position to guarantee local security.
A similar but poorly organized attempt by the neighboring Bakhtiaris to
oppose the government was frustrated by the arrest of their leaders in
September 1946.
(4) Recovery of Azerbaijan
Qavam proceeded Slowly and cautiously in negotiating the re-
turn of Azerbaijan to the Central Government, although the USSR had
withdrawn its troops from the province in May and had agreed to let
Iran settle its differences with the autonomous regime. Finally in
June, a tentative agreement was reached between Tehran and Azerbaijan,
but the latter showed little inclination to carry out its commitments,
and the Central Government in Tehran evidenced a growing determination
to resolve the issue by force.
Qavam announced in November that elections for the 15th Parlia-
ment would not be held until Iranian security forces had been dispatched
to all the provinces to maintain order during the voting. The Azerbaijan
Government, however, refused to carry out its earlier agreement to per-
mit Central Government supervision of elections, doubtless believing that
Qavam's intentions were to secure possession of the province by force.
Urged by the Shah, Qavam decided that force must be used despite the
Soviet Ambassador's repeated warnings against military action, and opera-
tions began in mid-December. The Soviets gave only moral support to the
autonomous regime, and Iranian troops, welcomed by most of the people
and encountering but slight resistance, entered Tabriz within four days.
The provincial government collapsed; some of the leaders fled to the
USSR; some were killed on the spot or later executed; still others were
placed in custody; and the province was returned to the authority of
the Central Government. The Kurdish "Republic" collapsed at the same
time.
2. Present Governmental Structure
Although the Iranian Constitution is a modern, liberal document patterned
largely after Western European models and providing for the division of gov-
ernmental authority between legislative, executive, and judicial branches, it
has never fully functioned as intended.
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The legislative branch was to include a senate, a chamber of deputies
not to exceed 200 members, and a small group of clergy to see that all
legislation conformed to the precepts of the Moslem religion. The senate,
however, has not been convened since 1921 and the clerical group has never
functioned. Current election laws fix the number of deputies at 136.
Elections, theoretically secret and free, are in fact controlled by the
administration through an elaborate electoral procedure under the direction
of the Ministry of Interior. Ballots are cast by only a small percentage
of the electorate, and in the villages almost all voters have been bribed
or instructed how to vote. Since the abdication of Riza Shah, the parlia-
ment has taken an increasingly important part in the conduct of the ad-
ministration, although the decisive role in government is played by the
executive branch, consisting of the Shah and the cabinet.
The Shahinshah, or "King of Kings," has powers limited and defined by
the constitution. These include the appointment and dismissal of cabinet
members by royal decree; the declaration of states of war and peace; the
command of the armed forces; and the conferring of military rank. In actual
practice the exercise of power by the Shah has been determined only by the
strength or weakness of the individual. The present Shah, who took the
throne when it was stripped of most of its power, has constantly sought to
expand his authority and has added significantly to his political stature.
Since he has gained much of his influence through his control of the Iranian
Army, he has been able to exert greater influence on the course of govern-
mental policies than is prescribed under the constitution.
Qavam was selected prime minister in parliament by a poll of candidates
proposed by the deputies, and was then appointed to the post by the Shah.
Since the term of the parliament expired shortly after he took office,
Qavam has not had to face "confidence" votes but has had to placate only
the Shah. Qavam, who has had five separate cabinets since January 1946,
has usually followed the practice established by his predecessors of
choosing his ministers from among a limited number of elderly ex-ministers
who rotate through the various posts, regardless of whether they have
special training for such posts. It is not uncommon for the prime minister
to hold several of the twelve cabinet posts, and in some of his recent
cabinets Qavam has occupied the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs
as well as the premiership.
The judiciary branch, composed of a Supreme Court and lesser courts,
does not play the important role in Iran that it does in the West; in
general, the process of justice is slow and decisions are subject to politi-
cal and economic pressure. Civil liberties, though they are guaranteed by
the constitution, are frequently suppressed. Prior to 1941, freedom of
speech and of assembly was forbidden by Riza Shah; and after that time
Tehran, the vital center of public opinion, was placed under martial law,
and newspapers were suppressed for attacks on the administration and on the
Allied Powers. Martial law, briefly lifted in June of this year, has been
reinstated, and the Prime Minister has been active in banning those newspapers
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most critical of his rule. During the past year and a half, the real power
to rule in Iran has been rather evenly balanced between Qavam on the one
hand, and the Shah and the Army on the other. Qavam, by clever juggling
and by keeping his own counsel, has for the most part held the initiative,
but not without coming into much conflict with the Shah. Although the
constitution envisages a democratic government with authority eventually
resting in the people, ignorance and apathy on the part of the electorate
and the irregularities in the election of parliament have kept the popula-
tion from exercising real sovereignty.
3. Current Issues
The possibility of aggression by the USSR continues to be Iran's great-
est concern. Supplemental to this basic concern are the two most important
foreign issues now confronting the government: the Soviet oil agreement
(see page III-3) and the procurement of military supplies from the US (see
page III-6).
Vital domestic issues include: control of subversive elements; super-
vision of labor unions; reduction of unemployment and inflated living costs;
implementation of the economic development program; and settlement of the
tribal problem.
4. Stability of Government
Of the many prime ministers Iran has had since 1941, pavam has remained
in office the longest. He has maneuvered himself into a position of seeming
indispensability, and the majority of the new parliament are members of his
own party. Although Ali Mansur, a former prime minister and at present
Governor General of Azerbaijan, is most frequently mentioned as a possible
successor, it is generally believed that neither he nor any other successor
would display the ability of Qavam in dealing with the USSR while remaining
on satisfactory terms with Great Britain and on good terms with the United
States.
The 15th Parliament convened on 17 July. Qavam will now face a test of
strength when he seeks parliamentary approval of actions taken during the
interim and requests consideration of matters requiring action, such as
?decisions on the Soviet oil agreement and on the plan for procuring
mili-
tary supplies from the United States. Many of the deputies in the new
parliament were also in the 14th Parliament, and there is danger that the
new body will repeat the tendency of its predecessor to disintegrate into
small groups which intrigue against each other and against the administra-
tion. Under such circumstances, Qavam's position would be seriously
weakened.
Lack of harmony between the Shah, who is supported and encouraged by
the army leaders, and the Prime Minister, who has the support of important
political figures and powerful tribal leaders, is also a factor making for
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instability. The Shah's habit of consistently by-passing the Prime Minister
and the Minister of War in dealing directly with the ambitious and xeno-
phobic Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Ali Razmara, on matters concerning military
administration has added to the tension. Some observers regard Razmara as
dangerous to the stability of the government and as possibly desirous of
establishing a military dictatorship. The Shah might encourage such a
coup d'etat, but the creation of a military government would be generally
unpopular and actively opposed by the tribes.
Contention between the Shah and Qavam also exists over the gendarmerie,
which Qavam insists on keeping under the Ministry of Interior, while the
Shah and the generals urge that it be returned to the control of the army.
While Qavam advocates a moderate policy in dealing with the tribes, the
Shah, whom the tribes distrust because of his support of army extremists,
seems to favor severe measures in subjugating them. The deep-seated antago-
nism between Qavam and the Shah has not been ameliorated by the fact that
both of them have sought to counter Soviet influence and the spread of
Communism in Iran.
Iran is not an ideal field for the propagation of Communism, which has
made only limited headway in the few industrial centers of the country.
The tenets of Communism run counter to the basic precepts of the Moslem
religion, which still maintains a firm grip on the mass of people; and
the highly individualistic and egocentric Iranian has shown little inclina-
tion to support group movements of any sort, or to concern himself actively
with the well-being of his fellow-men. The paternalistic tribes, on the
whole, form one of the strongest bulwarks against Communism.
At the present time, it appears most likely that Qavam will continue in
office despite the Shah's declared intention to seek his removal once the
Soviet oil proposal has been disposed of. Long-term stability of the
government, however, can be achieved only through an actual rather than a
mere paper program of social and economic reforms aimed at raising the
standard of living. Furthermore, graft and maladministration in government
must be dealt with; the tribes must receive fair treatment and a propor-
tionate share in the government; and the basic problem of the poverty of
the many and the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few must be
squarely faced. The lack of honest, capable administrators militates
against the enactment of necessary reforms. No government has yet made
a determined effort to deal with these fundamental problems. Preliminary
steps taken by the current administration, however, and the growing aware-
ness of influential leaders, including tribal chiefs, of the importance
of effecting social and economic improvements as a means of strengthening
internal security and resisting external interference, indicate that the
government hopes to proceed with the carrying out of sound improvements.
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SECTION II
ECONOMIC SITUATION
1. Introductory
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While Iran's extensive oil production, the fourth largest in the world,
is of great international significance and is a substantial source of revenue
for Iran, the economy of the country is still largely based on agriculture,
from which 80% of the total population draws its livelihood. In normal years
Iran not only produces all of its essential food requirements but also has
some surplus. Exports of these agricultural items and of carpets, plus
royalties from petroleum, are sufficient to give Iran a favorable balance-
of-payments position. Recent industrialization, developed on a moderate
scale, has had little influence on the mass of the population, but the need
for imported machinery, structural and railway material, and motor equipment
has increased the country's dependence on foreign trade and necessitates
greater production for export to meet the need for foreign exchange. The
state owns and operates the most important factories and holds monopolies
over many exports and imports. Today the level of economic activity in Iran
provides a standard of living comparable to that of the Near East in general.
2. Genesis of the Present Economic System
Relatively prosperous for many centuries under a feudal system, Iran
suffered a serious deterioration of its economic prosperity after 1700.
Irrigation works fell into ruin; the population decreased; and agricultural
productivity declined. During the nineteenth century Iran became a market
for British and Russian processed goods as well as a source of raw materials
for these and other countries. Iran's customs tariffs were dictated by
Russia and Great Britain, but Western methods of industrialization and of
commerce and trade scarcely penetrated the country until the period of Riza
Shah. He placed major emphasis on the development of financially burden-
some industrial projects and non-revenue-producing municipal improvements,
and did little to expand agriculture, the principal source of national
income.
During Riza Shah's reign, laws were enacted placing all dealings in for-
eign exchange and all foreign trade under state control. The government
monopolized more than a third of the actual goods involved in the export
and import trade and supervised the remainder through a system of trade
licenses and exchange permits. Articles of both foreign trade and of
domestic consumption were placed under monopolies, some of which were
operated directly by departments of the government while others were
assigned to private stock companies, in many of which the government held
a controlling share. The textile, sugar, tea, and tobacco monopolies were
designed to protect infant industries against foreign competition, while
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other monopolies, such as that over the importation of automobiles, were
designed to assist in reducing the trade deficit and to increase the
national revenue. In the years just prior to World War II this system
was proving cumbersome and costly. Iran began to enter into barter agree-
ments with other countries, notably Germany and the USSR.
The impact of the war on Iran brought spiraling inflation, and the eco-
nomic life of the country became chaotic. With shipping space scarce and
the supply of goods limited, only the most essential items were imported
and these only through the media of Allied agencies. The rationing of
sugar, tea, and piece-goods by the government demanded a retention of
monopolistic control over these items. The government prepared sketchy
long-term plans for economic recovery, and maintained control over trade,
industry, and transactions in foreign exchange. Although no real progress
was made in implementing the recovery programs, the end of the war lessened
the immediate pressure in many fields.
3. Description of the Present Economic System
a. Agriculture and Livestock (*)
Only a third of the total area of the country is arable, and of
this only one fifth is farmed. In years of normal harvest, however, Iran's
agricultural production is ample to provide (with the exception of tea and
sugar) the simple diet to which the Iranians have long been accustomed, and
to supply a limited surplus for export. Over the past ten years, the annual
? average of this surplus, much of which goes to the USSR, is as follows:
?
Wheat and barley 12,000 tons
Rice 26,000 tons
Cotton 3,500 tons
Cereals (including wheat, barley, and rice) are the staple crops of
the country, with some 6,400,000 acres under cultivation. Wheat is raised
in all sections having sufficient moisture except along the Caspian, where
rice is extensively grown instead. Dates are grown in the region inland
from the Persian Gulf. Estimated yields for the year ending 20 March 1947
are:
Wheat 2,080,000 tons
Barley 1,240,000 tons
Rice 294,000 tons
Dates 90,000 tons
Other cash crops include tobacco, sugar beets, fruits, and nuts.
(*) All figures used are approximations, since entirely dependable statistics
are not available.
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Agricultural production is conditioned by the fact that rainfall
in most of the country is less than twelve inches a year. In most of Iran,
crops can be grown only by irrigation, water being obtained either from
mountain streams or from hand-dug tunnels (qanats) which tap the water
tables at the foothills of the mountain ranges. Many cereal crops, however,
are grown by dry farming in the slightly moister regions of northwestern and
northeastern Iran. If winter precipitation is sparse, the country suffers
from a cereal shortage. In the years between the two wars, such shortages
were met by the purchase of wheat, largely from Australia.
Most of the land is in the hands of wealthy landlords, who own the
villages, fields, and water supply, while the peasants operate as share
croppers. In 1947 a governmental regulation provided for an increased
share for the peasants, but it is doubtful whether this regulation will be
immediately effective. Sowing, plowing, reaping, and threshing are done by
hand with the aid of oxen, wooden plows, and primitive threshing equipment.
The amount of Iran's arable land could probably be doubled and agri-
cultural production greatly increased if a careful program were instituted
to extend the irrigation system and to improve farming methods. While a few
areas lend themselves to large-scale machine cultivation, a wider field of
improvement lies in the greater use of fertilizers, crop rotation, soil ero-
sion control, pest control, and in the introduction of modern farm tools and
equipment. ?
Domestic animals number some 24,000,000, of which 80% are sheep and
goats, 15% cattle, and the balance horses, donkeys, and camels. Much raw
wool is exported, but the majority of the yield is used within the country
in textile manufacture and the weaving of rugs and carpets, an important
item of export. Hides, skins, and intestines for sausage casings are ex-
ported in considerable amounts. The cattle are small and poorly nourished,
and the sheep need cross-breeding with foreign types to improve quality and
to increase the quantity of wool. The country, which needs more meat, wool,
and dairy products to provide a higher standard of living, could profit
from a program of encouragement and aid to nomadic tribes in expanding and
improving flocks and herds.
b. Natural Resources
(1) Petroleum
Iran, as the foremost oil-producing country in an area which
contains 40% of the world's proved petroleum reserves, will play an
increasingly important role in political and economic developments
which affect the world's petroleum supply balance. Oil occurs in oval
limestone domes relatively near the surface, and the wells are free-
flowing. The oil is conveyed by pipelines to a modern refinery, rated
among the world's largest, on the island of Abadan at the head of the
Persian Gulf.
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Currently, Iran's oil resources are being exploited by the Brit-
ish. Operating under a concession from the Iranian Government, the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), in which the British Government holds
a controlling interest, has developed seven producing fields in the
region near the head of the Persian Gulf (see page III-5). The AIOC
has proven reserves of 6.5 billion barrels, and the present annual pro-
duction is about 145 million barrels. The bulk of the oil is exported
from Abadan by tankers, but pipelines are now projected for delivering
the oil to a Mediterranean port. The AIOC, rather than the Iranian
Government, controls the amount of oil produced and its sale. Royalties
to Iran average between L4,500,000 and b5,000,000 annually, and produc-
tion has steadily increased during recent years.
Iran's limited internal demands for petroleum products are met
largely by a refinery at the town of Kermanshah operated by a subsidiary
company of the AIOC. The crude oil is pumped eastward to the refinery
from a field which straddles the frontier between Iran and Iraq, near
the town of Qasr-i-Shirin. Before the war the USSR also sold kerosene,
gasoline, and fuel oil from its Baku fields throughout the northern sec-
tion of the country and has again entered this market.
Iran's untapped oil reserves are probably very great. Natural
oil seepages are found in the areas adjacent to the Caspian Sea, west of
Tehran, and in southeastern Iran near Kerman. Foreign geologists have
noted the presence of typical oil-bearing formations in these and other
sections of the country, although the existence of oil in commercial
111 quantities has not been proved in any ,of these areas. Under Iranian law,
oil and other mineral resources may not be exploited by the owners of the
land but are subject to direct control by the state.
(2) Other Minerals
In addition to oil, Iran possesses varied mineral resources, al-
though comprehensive surveys of the entire country have not been made.
Deposits of coal and the ores of chrome, iron, copper, lead, sulphur,
nickel, antimony, and red oxide all have been worked in the past or are
under exploitation at the present time. The bulk of the present mining
is for coal and copper and is carried on by the government for domestic
use. Coal deposits are found in several sections of the country, and
bituminous fields in the ranges north of Tehran serve the industrial
needs of that city. Copper mines are being worked in the vicinity of
Anarak, Zenjan, and Shahrud. Some 20,000 tons of red oxide are exported
annually from the island Of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf.
The last foreign Mineral concession, granted to a Netherlands
concern, covered much of north central Iran. It lapsed during the re-
cent war, and it is unlikely that similar concessions will be granted
to foreign interests.
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(3) Forests
Less than one twenty-fourth of the land area of Iran is wooded,
and the plateau proper has only scattered and sparse stands, mostly of
scrub oak. The northern slopes of the Elburz Mountains, however, are
covered with dense forests of oak, elm, beech, poplar, box, and maple.
The forests are an important potential source of national wealth. All
cutting is theoretically under strict government control, but actually
such control is not exercised.
On the plateau the scarcity of timber is net in part by the
cultivation of irrigated groves of poplars, while willow and plane
trees are grown along the irrigation channels. Mulberry trees are
grown for silkworm culture.
?c. Industry
By 1941 Iran had, as a result of Riza Shah's efforts to make the
country industrially self-sufficient, twenty-two state-owned and-operated
factories and some 275 privately awned minor industrial plants, the majority
of which were devoted to sugar refining, textile manufacture, and processing
of metals.
Special attention was devoted to the production of sugar, for the re-
fining of which eight factories were built. These factories have a rated an-
nual production of 44,000 tons, or over one third of the amount consumed by
the country.
Textile plants were established at Isfahan and at various towns in the
north. The total output of all cotton, wool, and silk-weaving mills has at-
tained 21,000,000 yards per year. This amount comes far short of meeting the
domestic demand, and in recent years imports of cotton piece goods, with the
USSR as the principal supplier, have reached 20% of the total value of all
imports.
The erection of plants for the smelting and working of minerals has
lagged behind original plans. At Karaj (25 miles west of Tehran) a steel
mill with blast furnaces and rolling facilities had been 70% completed when
World War II broke out, and it is not yet in operation. At present, all
structural iron and steel must be obtained from abroad. Near Tehran is a
government plant which produces copper ingots and copper wire. Such mater-
ials as sodium carbonate, caustic soda, hydrochloric and sulphuric acids,
potassium bichromate, borax, alcohol, and niter are prepared in limited
quantities.
Industry other than petroleum is largely concentrated at Tehran, with
secondary centers along the Caspian coast, in Azerbaijan Province, and at
Isfahan. Few of the factories have been able to. reach, much less to main-
tain, their rated output. Basic difficulties are poor management, the
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shortage of skilled workers, and the low efficiency of maintenance engi-
neering. Foreign technicians were employed in numbers before 1941, and
the services of such technicians are needed now. Many of the factories
have curtailed or ceased operations because of inability to obtain spare
parts and replacements.
The state-owned and -operated factories are so entangled in a
system of administrative waste and graft that most of them lose money in
spite of the fact that their products, protected by high tariffs, are sold
at prices above world levels. There has been a good deal of agitation for
the sale of most of the government factories to private companies.
The number of industrial workers in Iran is about 200,000, of whom
approximately 60,000 are employed by AIC, 52,000 by textile mills, and
26,400 by the railways. Workers in these industries are largely unionized
under the Central Council of Iranian Trade Unions, which until recently was
fostered by the Tudeh Party and dominated by pro-Soviet elements. Trade
unions are now controlled by the government.
Special regulations issued in 1936 provide for governmental super-
vision and control of all workshops with motor power and of all plants of
any type which employ more than ten people. In August 1946, a Ministry of
Labor was created, which fixes minimum wage rates, settles wage disputes
by arbitration, and operates an employment bureau.
d. Transportation
Almost all of the railway system of 1,585 miles has been constructed
within the past twenty years. The trans-Iranian railroad joins the Caspian
Sea with the major Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf, and recently con-
structed manufacturing plants are located largely in relation to rail ser-
vice. Lateral lines now under partial operation east and west from Tehran
will eventually provide transportation to the northeastern, northwestern,
and southeastern sections of the country and should be more than adequate
to handle the agricultural and industrial requirements of a major portion
of Iran.
Roads, mostly with gravel and broken-stone surfaces, lead from the
principal ports on the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea to the interior
and connect Tehran with the more important towns in the provinces. Only
two major routes are surfaced with asphalt, and, for the most part, the
roads are poorly maintained. Partially improved roads and unimproved
desert tracks serve less populous and more remote areas. On the whole,
with proper maintenance and some extensions and improvement, the existing
road-net would serve Iran's present limited essential motor transport
requirements.
Iran has a small air line primarily devoted to internal traffic,
and Tehran is the terminus of several international air lines. (See
Appendix B for detailed information on all transport.)
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e. Finance
The financial position of Iran is potentially good. It has ample
currency coverage, a small external debt, and substantial guaranteed reve-
nues which provide the government with considerable amounts of foreign ex-
change. Iran's most important financial institution, the National Bank of
Iran (Bank Mein', is an efficient and sound organization. Factors of
weakness in Iranian economy are recurring unbalanced national budgets,
tightness of dollar exchange, and the maladministration of government enter-
prises and finances.
Iran nearly suffered financial collapse, during the recent war when
the hidden weakness of the financial structure came to light. Budgets had
been balanced on paper only; the Ministry of Finance had been inefficiently
subdivided and compartmentalized; a complicated system of checks and con-
trols discouraged officials from assuming responsibility or taking positive
action; no precise periodical statements of the financial balances of the
country were available; and taxes were collected inefficiently and unfairly.
Although a drastic reorganization was called for, little progress has been
made so far.
The impact of the war caused a rise in the cost-of-living index from
the 1936 level of 100 to 1085 in 1944. It fell to 726 in 1946, but has since
risen to 809. Staple food items were in short supply during the war because.
of poor crops and inadequate distribution. Moreover, large quantities were
consumed by foreign troops and substantial amounts withheld by hoarders and
speculators, while imported essential goods fell below minimum requirements.
Most important in promoting the spiraling inflation was the necessity of
furnishing rials for Allied expenditures in Iran which increased the rials
in circulation from 3i billion in 1942 to almost 74 billion in 1946.
In January 1943, the Iranian Government employed a US financial mis-
sion, headed by A. C. Millspaugh, which was given broad powers to combat in-
flation, reorganize the financial administration, establish an income tax
with graduated rates, and balance the budget. The work of the mission, how-
ever, was complicated by major difficulties brought on by the war, by the
failure of successive cabinets and parliament to give needed support, and
by disagreements with the government and dissension within the mission it-
self. As a result the mission withdrew in February 1945.
The annual budget contains two general classifications: the ordinary
and the commercial-industrial, which are approximately equal in size. The
latest budgetary figures available are for 1943-44; they show the total in-
come of the government to have been $204 million and expenditures $248i mil-
lion. The ordinary revenues of the country derived about 22% from the to-
bacco monopoly; 12% from AIOC royalties; 8% from income taxes; 8% from the
opium monopoly (now abolished); 6% from indirect taxes; 7% from customs du-
ties; 3% from the sugar and tea monopoly; and the rest from smaller items.
The major expenditures from the ordinary revenue were 25% for the Ministry
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of War; 7% for the gendarmerie; 6% for the running expenses of the tobacco
? monopoly; 5% for the running of the opium monopoly; 6% for the Ministry of
Finance; 5% for the Ministry of Education; 3% for the Ministry of Posts and
Telegraphs; a% for the Ministry of Agriculture. Commercial-industrial
budgets have consistently displayed an excess of expenditures over receipts.
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Although the currency is well protected,* the tightness of foreign
exchange has tended to undermine the position of the rial on the world
market. From 1922 until 1941 the rate of the rial fluctuated between 15
and 40 to the dollar. At the time of the Allied occupation of Iran, Great
Britain set a rate equivalent to 32 rials to the dollar, which remains the
official rate. Actually the current free market rate at Tehran hovers a-
round 60 to the dollar.
Purchase of rials by the Allies built up considerable assets in gold
and foreign currency. The USSR still holds in Moscow some $12 million in
gold and $8 million in US dollars, carried on the books of the National Bank
of Iran and due Iran for war-time advances of local currency and supply of
goods and services. The Iranian Government's demands for payment, renewed
this year, have gone unanswered to date. Available dollar assets were
largely expended, however, in the purchase of US Army surplus equipment
amounting to about $10 million. Foreign exchange continues to be tight be-
cause of the large amounts used as currency reserves, because ddllars are
scarce, and because only limited supplies are available for purchase in the
sterling area although Iran has a surplus of sterling.
The internal and foreign debts of Iran, except for the debt owed to
the National Bank, are small. There is a small issue of Treasury Bonds of
recent date. Iran's present debt to the United States is about $9 million,
and if current negotiations for the purchase of US military supplies are
completed, about $20 million will be added to this amount. On the other
hand, Iran has certain important sources of foreign exchange and gold. The
British and Soviets have yet to make payments for their use of the Iranian
State Railways during the war, although the British have made an offer of
b4 million in settlement of this claim. Further, Iran receives about b18
million a year from AIOC royalties and from AIOC purchase of rials needed
for its operating expenses in Iran. An unpublished Anglo-Iranian financial
agreement of 9 November 1946 provided for the conversion of certain sterling
balances into gold. In July 1947 certain current sterling payments were to
become convertible into dollars. Iran, which has indicated to the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development its intention of applying
for a loan of $250 million, considers that the Anglo-Iranian agreement
will provide substantial amounts for meeting obligations under such a loan.
* According to law, all notes issued since November 14, 1942, must be 100
per cent secured.
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f. International Trade
In the field of foodstuffs, Iran must depend upon imports for much
of its sugar and tea, which for the past ten years have averaged 69,250
and 6450 tons, respectively, per year. About two thirds of the cotton
piece goods required must also be imported. Transport is entirely depend-
ent upon the importation of railway and automotive equipment, rails, ac-
cessories, and spare parts. Factory construction requires imported struc-
tural iron and steel, and the machinery needed for replacement of worn-out
equipment or for new industrial enterprises comes from abroad.
From 1930 until about 1936 Iran showed a favorable balance of trade;
from 1935 to 1942 the value of imports and exports approximately balanced.
Since 1942 there has been a trade deficit; in 1944 imports amounted to $93
million and exports to $25 million (exclusive of payments derived from
petroleum). Trade deficits, however, were offset by revenues from the AIOC.
Before the recent war, barter arrangements helped to maintain a balance of
trade, and such arrangements are still in effect with the USSR. Much of
the foreign trade is conducted on a short-term basis.
The following table represents the relative share of the foreign
trade with Iran of those countries which were most active in the field:
Country
1938
1942
1944
USA
6.5
17.5
23.3
USSR
11.5
15.75
21.0
Great Britain
9.5
5.5
4.6
India
8.5
43.5
30.2
Germany
41.5
1.25
.1
India has risen to first place primarily because it was able to
supply cotton piece goods and tea during the war years. These items were
sold at very high prices, and with normal competition, India may not be
able to hold its favorable position.
Recent and current imports of sugar, cotton piece goods, and machin-
ery from the USSR have been balanced by exports to that country of rice,
wool, hides, and dried fruit. The USSR, however, has been exacting from
Iran six times the price for Soviet sugar and cotton piece goods that Iran
pays to other countries for such commodities.
Nearly all the trucks, automobiles, spare parts, and tires and
tubes bought by Iran come from the United States, and Iran also offers a
limited market for American pharmaceuticals and toilet articles, industrial
chemicals, paper and cardboard, hand and motor pumps, electric and Diesel
motors, railway equipment, electrical communication and lighting equipment,
and machine tools.
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In the past, the foundation of Iran's economy was in agricultural produc-
tion tarried on by the bulk of a population which was remote from govern-
ment authority and which made little use of imported or manufactured articles.
Recent industrial development, however, has increased Iran's dependence on
foreign trade. Moreover, thousands of Iranians, many of them former peas-
ants, have entered the ranks of labor, earned higher wages while working
for the Allies during the war, and have been organized into trade unions.
But this industrialization is not so far advanced as it is in Western
countries; consequently, Iran does not suffer the wide variations to which
highly industrialized, economies are subject. Furthermore, Iran has a con-
stant source of revenue in AIOC royalties. Thus the nation is relatively
stable economically.
A very real threat to the economic stability of the country, however,
arises from the political situation vis-a-vis the USSR. Soviet interest in
the northern provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazanderan, Gorgan, and Khorasan
will continue. If these provinces, or even Azerbaijan alone, were to be de-
tached from Iran or to come under the control of the USSR, Iran's economic
structure would be in danger .of collapse because of the large concentration
of population and resources in these areas.
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SECTION III
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. Genesis of Present Foreign Policy
In modern times Iran's foreign policy has been largely dictated by two
circumstances: (1) the nation has not been able to defend itself against
an attack by a major foreign power, and (2) it has been the scene of con-
flict between Russian and British interests in the Near East. Relegated to
the role of an impotent buffer state between Russia and territory controlled
by Britain, Iran has traditionally attempted to play off one power against
the other. During and since World War II, its efforts have been largely
directed toward resisting Soviet aggressive policies and actions.
Action by Russia and Great Britain in the nineteenth century forced Iran
to relinquish control over extensive territory and to assume its present
boundaries. As the result of two wars (in 1825 and 1827) with Russia, Iran
lost areas which are now within the Azerbaijan, Armenian, and Georgian Soviet
Socialist Republics. During the second half of the century Russia took over
Turkistan, which had been under Iran's suzerainty. Great Britain. forced Iran
to recognize the complete independence of Afghanistan as the result of a brief
war in 1856 and assumed control over Baluchistan in 1870.
In 1907 Russia and Great Britain agreed, without regard to Iranian sover-
eign rights, to set up respective spheres of influence in northern and south-
eastern Iran. Following this agreement, both powers continued to exert pres-
sure upon the Iranian Government, and each party carried on economic and
political activity outside its sphere of influence. In World War I Iran was
a battleground for the opposing armies of the Turks and the British and
Russians, and, at the end of the war, the scene of conflict between British
and Bolshevik forces.
After World War I, the new Soviet Government's preoccupation with its
internal affairs,* and the strong stand of Riza Shah secured for Iran com-
parative freedom from foreign political influence.
Under the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship of 1921, the USSR renounced
all concessions and privileges gained in Iran during the Czarist regime,
cancelled Iran's debts to Russia, and relinquished all private and state
holdings (including the Russian-built Julfa-Tabriz Railway) except inter-
ests in the Caspian Sea Fisheries. The USSR did reserve "the right to
advance its troops into (Iran) for the purpose of carrying out military
operations necessary for its defense" should a third party threaten the
frontiers of Russia and should Iran not be able to put a stop to such
menace after having been once called upon to do so by the Soviet Union.
A later exchange of notes defined the "third party" as partisans of the
former (Czarist) regime or a foreign power seeking restoration of the
regime.
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This phase ended in the fall of 1941 when the Allies found it strategi-
cally imperative to occupy Iran. From this time on, the USSR vigorously
pursued the advantages offered by Allied occupation to prepare for peace-
time domination of the northern provinces then under its jurisdiction, not-
withstanding pledges incorporated in the Tripartite Treaty of 1942 (see
page 1-3) and in the Declaration of Tehran* to respect Iran's integrity
and independence. Violation of treaty obligations occurred in both the
political and economic spheres and seemed to reflect a program designed
to undermine the position of the Iranian Government and the confidence of
the Iranian people in their government.**
The USSR finally withdrew its troops from Iran, but only after (1) Iran
had presented its case to the United Nations, and (2) Qavam had agreed to
present Soviet oil demands to parliament for ratification. The failure of
the USSR to give more than moral support to its puppet government in.Azer-
baijan when Central Government troops entered the province in December 1946
greatly diminished Soviet prestige in Iran and accounts, in large part, for
Tehran's subsequent firmness toward Moscow.
Confronted by the aggressive attitude of the USSR during and following
World War II, Iran at first followed a policy of procrastination, evasion,
and compromise, while it sought external backing for resistance to Soviet
aims. A swing toward Great Britain would have been the traditional move;
but in view of the decline of British power and influence in the general
*
Issued in December 1943, this declaration is an expression by the USSR,
Great Britain, and the United States of the Allies' desire for Iranian
economic welfare and political independence. The statement was made at
the Big Three Conference in Tehran.
In the political sphere the USSR made use of its troops to create an au-
tonomous regime in Azerbaijan, to halt the movements of Iranian Army and
Gendarmerie units, to protect meetings of pro-Soviet groups, and to ex-
pel "unfriendly" Iranian officials, Through diplomatic channels demands
and threats were conveyed to the Iranian Government. Through propaganda
the growth of pro-Soviet political and labor groups was fostered, and
press attacks were carried out against the government by local papers
supported by the USSR and by the Soviet press and radio services. In
the economic field the USSR was equally active: it interfered with the
shipment of foodstuffs within the country and with the movement of offi-
cials charged with economic functions, operated truck and bus services
with rates below those set by the Iranian Government, forced Iran to ac-
cept unfair contracts covering the supply to the USSR of rice and local-
ly manufactured arms and ammunition, seized large quantities of cattle,
grain, and timber, refused to make payment on important suns owed to
the Iranian Government, and interfered with customs inspection and col-
lection.
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area, and continued suspicion of British intentions, Iran turned toward the
United States and the United Nations. Following its appeal to the Security
Council and the successful resolution of the Azerbaijan affair, Iran
stiffened its stand against demands made by the USSR and received assurances
of US support in protecting and maintaining the independence and sovereignty
of the country. This turn toward the US has evoked a Soviet campaign of
propaganda and diplomatic pressure directed against Iran and US activity in
the area.
2. Present Relations With the USSR
The Soviet Union now views Iran as a possible base for an attack against
the USSR and particularly against its vital Baku oil fields (which British
troops occupied at the end of World War I); moreover, it recognizes the
strategic and economic advantages of controlling land in the Persian Gulf
area. Therefore, it will attempt to establish Soviet control over Iran, and
is determined to prevent any other foreign power or interests from gaining
predominance in the country, especially in the northern provinces. Iran,
alert to Soviet activities, is attempting to resist penetration without
provoking direct intervention by the USSR.
The insistence of the USSR on ratification of the oil agreement, its
demand for air rights, its disregard for Iranian customs regulations, its
subversive activities, and its opposition to US assistance in Iran are the
most immediate problems confronting Iran in its relations with the Soviets.
41 The current Soviet oil proposal provides for the establishment of a
joint company for fifty years, the stock to be 51% Soviet-owned and 49%
Iranian-owned for the first 25 years and owned in equal parts for the
second 25 years. Iran would permit the exploitation of the northern prov-
inces, with the exception of a narrow strip of territory along the Turkish
and Iraqi frontiers; and the USSR would contribute machinery and technicians
and would pay for operations. Qavam agreed to bring these terms before
parliament for approval within seven months after 4 April 1946 but was
unable to do so because of the delay in electing the 15th Parliament.
The Iranians fear not only that they will fail to benefit financially
from the operation of a mixed company (in view of their experience with the
similarly constituted Soviet-Iranian fisheries), but also that the Soviets
desire oil rights primarily to advance their political penetration of Iran,
an inference reinforced by the opinion among oil experts that Iran's
northern oil resources are not extensive and, in any event, cannot be
economically developed at this time.
Since May 1946 Soviet officials have pressed for the creation of a
joint air line which would have a monopoly on all flights in the northern.
provinces and in which the USSR would hold up to 50% of the stock. The
Iranian Government has pointed to the conflict between this proposal and
the terms of the Chicago Air Convention and has more recently stated a
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general policy which limits foreign financial participation in Iranian
companies to a maximum of 25%. TWA owns a 10% interest in Iranian Airways,
an Iranian corporation, and also has a managerial contract covering the
operations of this company. In the spring of 1947, TWA threatened to
withdraw from the operation of Iranian Airways because of non-payment of
obligations by the company. Had not TWA agreed to continue operations for
the time being the Iranian Government would have been placed in an awkward
position, because of the desire of the Soviet Union to replace the United
States as a participant in Iranian commercial aviation.
Following the cessation of hostilities in World War II, the USSR oper-
ated an illegal air service between Tabriz, Tehran, and Meshed, and between
Tehran and Moscow. Supported by Soviet subsidies, this service cut into the
revenues of Iranian Airways. The Iranian Government, fearing violent Soviet
reaction, did not take effective steps to halt this illegal activity until
July 1947, when, following several protests by the government, the Soviets
agreed to cease operations.
Soviet violation of Iranian customs regulations began during the war and
continued even after the evacuation of Red Army troops from Iran. In Febru-
ary 1947 the Iranian Government finally obtained a written commitment that
the USSR would henceforth respect Iranian customs in the movement of Soviet
goods into Iran. In spite of this agreement, the Soviet trade delegation
continues to sell illegally imported sugar, textiles, and other items di-
rectly to Iranian merchants at greatly inflated prices.
Current Soviet political pressure follows the pattern established during
World War II. Both the Foreign Office in Moscow and the Soviet Ambassador
in Tehran have, by implication, threatened that the USSR would resort to
forcible action if Iran failed to grant desired concessions. Moscow had
complete control over the two Communist members of the three-man delegation
sent by the World Federation of Trade Unions to investigate labor conditions
in Iran in April 1947, and the report filed by the delegation denounced
actions of the government and supported the pro-Soviet faction within the
labor movement. The USSR continues to encourage dissident tribal elements
in Azerbaijan. Propaganda hostile to the Iranian Government is broadcast
over nearby Soviet radio stations by leaders of the erstwhile seditious
Azerbaijan Government. Information programs beamed from Soviet stations,
attacks broadcast from illegal transmitters within Iran, and inflammatory
material printed in Iran's Leftist press are part of the Soviet campaign to
discredit the present administration and to vilify the United States. Many
Iranians now fear that unless the USSR is placated, it may take drastic
action. Thus, the Iranian Government, unless convinced of the effective
support of friendly powers, may tend to appease the USSR by granting the
Soviets a larger share of activity in Iran or by reducing US influence.
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? 3. Significant Relations With Other Nations
a. Great Britain
To counterbalance the USSR, Iran has sought to maintain friendly
relations with Great Britain despite a long-enduring suspicion of British
imperialistic intentions in the area. British policy towards Iran is based
on the strategic interests of Great Britain, involving political and eco-
nomic commitments throughout the region of the Persian Gulf and vital lines
of communication in the area. Specifically, Great Britain must protect the
wells and installations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company* in southwestern
Iran and must safeguard such other British interests in the country ad
banking, shipping, trade, and insurance investments.
Under the pressure of domestic difficulties, the British may be
forced to participate less actively in Iranian affairs. They will, however,
stand ready to protect their vital interests, as in July 1946 when, follow-
ing serious labor troubles at the AIOC installations, British military
forces in nearby Iraqi territory were strengthened notwithstanding Iran's
protest that such action constituted interference in Iranian internal
affairs. Moreover, the British supported Iranian efforts to secure the
evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran early in 1946 and may be expected to
intervene in the event of a Soviet movement into northern Iran. On Iran-
ian issues of international importance, the British Government may be ex-
pected to coordinate its policy closely with that of the United States.
10 b. The United States
?
Iran's friendly attitude toward the United States, appreciably
heightened by US support of Iran's appeal to the Security Council, is
largely motivated by two factors. Most informed Iranians believe that the
United States, a moderating influence on the historic Anglo-Russian rivalry
in Iran, pursues a policy that serves the maintenance of Iran's integrity
and independence. These Iranians also visualize the possibility of re-
ceiving direct support and assistance from the United States in the solu-
tion of current political and economic problems.
The AIOC concession, first granted in 1901, displayed its value in 1908
when oil in large quantities was discovered 125 miles north of the head
of the Persian Gulf. In 1914 the British Government purchased a con-
trolling interest in the company. After World War I the Iranian Govern-
ment became dissatisfied with the amount of revenue it was receiving from
the profitable operations of the company. In 1932, after unsuccessful
negotiations with the company, Riza Shah ordered the Iranian Government
to cancel the concession. This drastic, unilateral step was followed by
discussions resulting in a revised contract, which provided that the area
covered by the concession would be reduced, that Iran would receive a
larger guaranteed annual revenue, and that the concession would extend to
1993. Again in 1940 the Iranian Government was able to obtain an increase
in the proportion of its revenues from AIOC operations.
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The Iranian Government has prepared an ambitious program of eco-
nomic development and is seeking assurances of support from the United
States for its proposed application for a $250 million loan from the
International Bank.
Most Iranians, with the exception of Leftist elements, welcome
the presence of US Military Missions to the army and gendarmerie (see
pages IV-2 and IV-3). The Iranian Government, urged by the Shah and
military officials, has sought to obtain from the US military supplies
(including combat weapons) for use in maintaining internal security. An
Iranian purchasing commission arrived in the United States in April 1947
to select materiel which will cost an estimated $20 million. It is be-
lieved that Parliament will approve the purchase contract, despite oppo-
sition by tribal leaders, Leftists, and those moderates who believe that
the money should be allocated to public health and welfare projects.
Both the Shah and Qavam have expressed their desire for closer
relations between Iran and the United States. As long as the two leaders
believe that the US Government will support Iran's political and economic
objectives, they will continue to maintain a friendly attitude toward the
United States, although both Qavam and the Shah hope eventually to achieve
complete freedom from all foreign influence.
c. Other States
In general, Iran maintains good relations with its neighbors and
is bound to Turkey, Iraq, and Afghanistan by the Saadabad Pact.* Iranians
show only passive friendship for Arabs in general; and while Iranian dele-
gates will be inclined to vote with Moslem co-religionists in the United
Nations, the government has displayed little interest in Palestine, the
Arab League, or the plan for Greater Syria.
Iran claims sovereignty over Bahrein Island on the ground that
Iran controlled the island during most of the eighteenth century. Bahrein
is now an independent sheikdom having close treaty relations with Great
Britain. At intervals since 1927 the Iranian Government and the local
press have urged the validity of Iran's claim, and during the last few
years Soviet-sponsored newspapers in Iran have lent vigorous support to
this claim. There have been some recent indications that Iran may place
the claim before the United Nations.
Signed at Saadabad Palace in Tehran on 8 July 1937, this pact provides
for the annual meeting of the countries' Foreign Ministers and for
consultation in the event of external threat to any members. Only
two meetings have been held. The pact was automatically renewed in
1942.
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d. International Organizations
Iran was an active participant in the foundation of the United Na-
tions. The country is also a member of the International Civil Aviation
Organization, the International Labor Organization, the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, and
the World Health Organization.
Iran was the first nation to submit an appeal to the Security Coun-
cil of the United Nations. In January 1946 the Iranian representative re-
quested the Security Council to investigate Soviet interference, through
the media of its officials and armed forces, in the internal affairs of Iran.
Consideration of the complaint took place at that time and again in March,
but the evacuation of the forces of the USSR from Iran in May caused the
Council to adjourn discussion of the question until a later, unspecified
date. In December 1946 the Iranian Government reported to the United Nations
on the state of affairs in Azerbaijan and announced its decision to send
troops to supervise elections in that province. It requested that the
Council remain seized of the original Iranian complaint.
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? SECTION IV
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MILITARY SITUATION
1. Genesis of Present Military Policies
The present military organization is the outgrowth of the policies of
Riza Shah, who thought of the armed service not only as an instrument of
personal power and for crushing the nomadic tribes but also as the symbol
of a renascent, independent Iran, which would re-establish the country's
former prestige. Prior to the advent of Riza Shah, the army had been little
more than a rabble; but under his direction it was reorganized and trained
and a large proportion of the national income was allocated to strengthening
the military forces. Intermittent tribal disorders were successfully dealt
with by the army, and the tribes were generally disarmed and pacified, or
at least restrained. The Army was incapable, however, of offering effective
resistance to the small British and Soviet forces which occupied the country
in August 1941, although a few units commanded by junior and non-commissioned
officers held out for a brief period. During the war the Iranian Army was
neither inclined nor able to give military support to the Allies other than
by helping to maintain internal stability, which was largely insured by the
mere presence of Allied troops.
The formation and operation of the US Military Mission to the Iranian Army
and the growing stature of the young Shah, who has become increasingly inter-
ested in military affairs, give some promise of a sound reorganization of
Iran's armed forces, although problems of equipment, efficient leadership,
and modern training methods remain to be solved. The Shah's determination to
build an effective fighting force is widely supported by old-guard military
leaders; and the army gained some temporary prestige in the recovery of Azer-
baijan, although that campaign was hardly a test of army strength.
Iran's present military policy, essentially that developed prior to the
war, is to build an army capable of (1) maintaining internal security,
particularly by disarming and pacifying the tribes; and (2) furnishing Iran
with a symbol of independence. The army also considers as a major objective
the delaying of any superior invasion force until Iran could secure help
from friendly nations (see IV-5).
2. Strength and Disposition of the Armed Forces
a. Army
The strength of the Iranian Army is currently placed at 113,000.
This includes approximately 2,300 men and officers of the air forces and navy,
both of which are part of the Iranian Army. Of the army troops, about 60%
may be considered effective, 23% recruits, and 17% administrative personnel.
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The army is organized into ten infantry divisions and four independent
brigades. The First and Second Infantry Divisions, totalling about 25,000
men, are stationed in Tehran and are considered the best troops in the
service. The Third and Fourth Infantry Divisions have a combined strength
of approximately 16,000 and are stationed in Azerbaijan. The remaining
infantry divisions and the independent brigades are scattered in smaller
units throughout various provinces.
Army strength is maintained by compulsory military service, males
reaching the age of twenty-one being subject to conscription for two years'
service. Widely abused, conscription is often evaded by the peasants, who
give little support to the army, and by the tribesmen, who from time to
time actively oppose it. One third of the total standing army at any period
consists of recruits with less than six months' training. The army main-
tains a training school for officers, but its Staff College was recently
discontinued on grounds of inefficiency and expense. In spite of the fact
that a considerable number of the older officers were trained in European
military academies, their lack of leadership is one of the greatest weak-
nesses in the military force.
Some improvement in the army has resulted from the efforts of the
US Military Mission* to the Iranian Army, which was established as an
advisory body in October 1942 at the request of the Iranian Government,
and which has for its primary function the improvement of the army's
supply and administrative services. Currently it is engaged in assisting
with the selection and purchase of surplus military supplies from the
United States.
b. Navy
The Iranian Navy, most of which was destroyed in a surprise attack
by over-enthusiastic British forces in August 1941, is in the process of
being re-established. Its current strength is estimated at 300 officers
and men. Before the war, it had a few gunboats and patrol vessels, pur-
chased from Italy; and its operations, limited to patrol activities in the
Caspian Sea and in the Persian Gulf, were aimed at checking smuggling and
gun-running to the tribes. Current plans call for the purchase of small
ships from the British and for the division of the service into Navy
South and Navy North, the former to be based at Khurramshahr at the head
of the Persian Gulf and the latter at Pahlavi on the Caspian Sea. The
navy is not likely to be any more than a small coast guard unit, incapable
of mining strategic areas in the Persian Gulf or of offering resistance to
an amphibious invasion along the shores of the Caspian.
* Headed by Brig. Gen. Robert W. Grow and composed of seventeen officers
and seven enlisted men.
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c. Air Forces
Iran's air force personnel numbers about 2,000 officers and men,
organized in three regiments (bomber, reconnaisance, and ground attack)
and two battalions (training and maintenance). The number of aircraft is
approximately 250, of which 175 are obsolete. The flying ability of the
Iranians is comparatively good, but their knowledge of maintenance is rudi-
mentary. The effectiveness of the air forces against any but the most prim-
itive kind of defense would be negligible.
The air forces have recently acquired 34 Hurricanes (which will be
a strong weapon against dissident tribes) and are planning to buy from the
United States 30 Harvard type training planes. They are also exploring the
possibility of purchasing 45 Douglas A-26C (Invader) attack planes, and have
undertaken to make arrangements for training Iranian pilots and mechanics in
the United States. Efforts to build up the air forces are due largely to the
enthusiasm of the Shah.
d. Gendarmerie
The gendarmerie, separate from the army and from the police forces of
the large towns, numbers approximately 24,300 (23,000 men and 1,300 officers).
Current plans call for its gradual reduction to 15,000. Most of the gendar-
merie are stationed in small groups at posts along the highways and in rural
areas, particularly on the fringes of the tribal regions. The force is re-
sponsible for general security and aids in the collection of taxes.
Since August 1942, a US Military Mission* to the gendarmerie has
assisted in improving methods of training, increasing supplies, purging the
force of dishonest elements, and arranging for the purchase of adequate
modern equipment, including a share of the surplus US military supplies which
the Iranian Government is buying.
The gendarmes do much fighting against bandits and tribal groups, and
have frequently proved more able in combat than the army itself. In time of
emergency the gendarmerie may give direct support to the army.
3. War Potential
a. Manpower
Although Iranian law theoretically provides for a strong reserve by
making every male liable to twenty-five years of military service (two on
active duty, four in the Army Reserve, fourteen in the First General Reserve,
* Headed by Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf and composed of eight officers
and five enlisted men.
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and five in the Supplementary Reserve), the organized reserve force would
be of scant military value in war. Not only would faulty communications
and inadequate transport facilities prevent it from being called together
in time to meet a specific emergency, but the small number of Iranians
willing to bear arms even against the most flagrant foreign aggression
indicates that whatever force Iran could mobilize and equip would not be
capable of repelling an attack.
Of Iran's estimated 3,800,000 males between the ages of 15 and 49,
only about half may be regarded as available and fit for military service.
The hardy tribes, already accustomed to bearing arms, might be made an
important adjunct to Iran's military force were the Army's oppressive
policy toward them modified. In the past the tribes have opposed conscrip-
tion and have been reluctant to subject themselves to army discipline. At
present, there is some indication that military leaders will seek their
cooperation with a view toward securing their aid in the event of attack by
the USSR.
b. Natural Resources
Iran normally has sufficient food supplies to maintain the armed
forces: and the army, as a rule, stores considerable quantities of grain.
The southwestern oil fields and the refinery at Abadan are an ample source
of fuel supply, assuming in the event of war that the British, as allies,
would continue operations. The Iranian Army, however, lacks adequate dis-
tribution and storage facilities for the oil.
c. Industry
Despite the fact that both privately owned plants and those owned
by the Government are capable of supplying many basic needs of an army of
100,000 men and of equipping it for operations against a force not well
provided with modern weapons, the country's industrial war production is
dependent upon imports of machinery, machine tools, and unassembled me-
chanical equipment. The Sultanatabad Arsenal, just north of Tehran, pro-
duces telephone wire, shell cases, shells, and ammunition, and the Tehran
Arsenal has a daily output of 250 rifles and can make castings and forg-
ings for the repair of heavy equipment. A machine gun plant at Tehran has
an annual capacity of 1,200 light and 300 heavy machine guns. The govern-
ment-owned plant at Parchin, 30 miles east of Tehran, produces sulphuric
acid, ether, and a daily total of two tons of explosives. Glycerine is
made in another Tehran plant. The aircraft assembly plant at Tehran is
now engaged in repairing aircraft parts: if equipped with proper machinery,
it could turn out a limited number of smaller aircraft, including combat
types. Textile mills at Isfahan manufacture blankets and cloth for uni-
forms, and shoes are made for the army, largely by hand, at Tehran. All
automotive equipment and artillery and nearly all communications equipment
must be imported.
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? 4. Military Intentions and Capabilities
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a. Army Plans
The Iranian General Staff limits its military planning to the main-
tenance of internal security and to the defense of Iran's frontiers, par-
ticularly those which would be in the path of an invasion from the USSR.
Soviet invasions could be readily launched through Azerbaijan, along the
shores of the Caspian Sea, and through Khurasan, and they would probably be
accompanied by parachute drops in the Tehran area and at other strategic
points in the interior.
Although the Saadabad Pact (see page 111-6) provides for consulta-
tion by the signatory powers in the event of an attack on any one of them,
there is little possibility of mutual military support between Turkey, Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Iran if one is attacked by the USSR. Iran's own strategy
for defense against the USSR is based on plans to fight a delaying action
pending arrival of assistance from the United States, Great Britain, or,
in the future, the military forces of the United Nations.
The armed tribes have always been the most important internal prob-
lem. The army, which has long used the tribes as a proving ground for
military tactics and as a source of plunder, has heretofore advocated a
policy of enforced disarmament. Recently the Iranian Chief of Staff has
sought the cooperation of the tribes, viewing them as a possible adjunct to
the army in the event of an attack by the USSR. Such cooperation, however,
cannot be secured unless the army changes its traditional tribal policy.
b. Military Capabilities
Because of poor morale, lack of trained personnel, inadequate
modern equipment, and friction within the command, the Iranian Army would
have great difficulty in carrying out specific military plans. It is un-
able to withstand aggression by a large power or a combination of small
powers, and unless foreign military support were forthcoming within a few
days, the army would quickly disintegrate. It is unable to maintain over-
all internal security, and a disarmament campalign against the tribes could
be successful only in isolated areas; an extensive attack against the
tribes would meet strong resistance and would succeed only in driving the
tribesmen's arms underground to await use as soon as heavy concentrations
of army troops were withdrawn. The army's low morale may be attributed
to maladministration, insufficient and irregular remuneration, inadequate
combat experience, lack of individual responsibility toward the national
interests, and disregard on the part of officers for the welfare of the
troops. Friction in command has developed from the Chief of Staff's
practice of by-passing the Ministry of War and dealing directly with the
Shah as commander-in-chief of the army. It is anticipated that purchase
of surplus US military supplies may enable the army to keep internal
security under favorable conditions but not to increase measurably its
ability to counter substantial foreign aggression.
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? SECTION V
STRATEGIC FACTORS AFFECTING UNITED STATES SECURITY
1. The Importance of Iranian Independence
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An independent Iran serves as an obstruction to Soviet expansion in the
Middle East. If Iran came under Soviet domination, the independence of all
other countries in the Middle East would be threatened, and the interests
of the US would be jeopardized throughout the area. Specifically, if the
USSR occupied Iran, it would: (a) gain control of the oil resources now
exploited by the AIC: (b) threaten the oil fields in nearby Iraq, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, and Bahrein; (c) acquire additional bases for carrying on
subversive activities or actual attacks against Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan,
and India; (d) control continental air routes crossing Iran, threaten those
crossing Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Persian Gulf; and menace
shipping in the Persian Gulf; (e) undermine the will of all Middle Eastern
countries to resist aggression; and (f) acquire a base 800 miles nearer
than any held at present to potential British-US lines of defense in Africa
and the Indian Ocean area.
2. Factors Promoting Continued Independence
The principal factors favoring continuation of Iranian independence at
the present time are the existence of an anti-Soviet bias in the government
and among a large portion of the people, and the fact that Iran is receiving
US aid and advice.
The reorganized cabinet of 21 June is further to the Right than its prede-
cessor and will strengthen the anti-Soviet tendencies of the government, which
continues to hold in check the Tudeh Party and pro-Soviet labor leaders. More-
over, the parliament elected in 1947 is composed almost wholly of moderates and
conservatives. The Shah, the Army as a whole, influential tribal chiefs, land-
owners, and the clergy have consistently maintained an anti-Communist attitude;
Iranians in general dislike the USSR and have a pronounced friendly feeling for
the US.
The fact that the Shah and responsible leaders rely largely on the US for
aid and advice is in itself evidence of Iran's willingness to continue resist-
ance to Soviet pressure. The continued presence of the US military missions
serves as a stabilizing influence; TWA's participation in Iranian Airways
acts as a barrier to Soviet control of air operations. The US offer to sell
Iran military materiel has nullified moves made by the USSR to furnish the
needed supplies. The US Government's interest in a sound economic program,
and its probable support of an Iranian application for an International Bank
loan, will undoubtedly strengthen Iran's will to make economic improvements.
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Other favorable factors are the determination of the British to protect
their strategic and commercial interests in Iran and adjacent areas, British
support of US policy in Iran, and Iran's insistence on maintaining good re-
lations with neighboring countries whose policies vis-a-vis the USSR and
the US are similar to those of Iran.
3. Factors Working against Continued Independence
The chief external factors working against an independent Iran are:
(a) Soviet propaganda, subversive activities, pressure, and threats; (b) the
relative weakening of British influence in Iran and in the Middle East gen-
erally; and (c) the possibility that Great Britain would become more tolerant
of Soviet demands for a dominant position in northern Iran if the British
believed that their own interest in southern Iran would thereby be safe-
guarded. The principal internal considerations are: (a) the possibility
that morale will be weakened by the growing fear among Iranians that the
USSR will take forceful measures against them and that in such an event
their Western friends would not be able to give them effective support;
(b) the adverse effect upon internal stability brought about by the army's
traditional belligerent attitude towards the tribes; (c) friction between
the Shah and the Prime Minister and between the Ministry of War and the
Chief of Staff; and (d) corruption and inefficiency in the administration
of government.
Although Iran, with Western support, is determined to oppose Soviet
aggression to the extent of its abilities, it is incapable of offering
? effective resistance to a military invasion. The topography of the
country offers easy access from the USSR on both sides of the Caspian. In
the event of attack by Soviet troops and in the absence of immediate and
substantial reinforcement by the Western Powers, the Iranian Army would
quickly disintegrate. Iran, therefore, because of its internal weaknesses
and vulnerability to attack from the USSR, is the most insecure link in the
chain of independent states--Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan--along the Soviet
border in the Middle East.
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IP SECTION VI
PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING UNITED STATES SECURITY
The USSR will endeavor, as a prelude to complete domination of
Iran, to secure control of Iranian territory adjacent to the Soviet Union
and to install a government at Tehran which will be subservient to Moscow.
To achieve these ends, the Soviets will seek a preferential position in the
northern provinces of Iran by exerting pressure on the Iranian Government
to ratify the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement, to grant special air rights, and
to reject US assistance and advice. This pressure will take the form of
propaganda directed largely against the Iranian Government and the US, sub-
versive activities directed at undermining internal security and stability,
and threats implying the use of force.
If the USSR fails to obtain the oil concession, it will intensify
its propaganda and subversive efforts to replace the present Iranian Gov-
ernment with one friendly to Moscow. Failing to accomplish this purpose
through peaceful measures, the USSR might eventually intetvene by force,
presenting the United Nations with a fait accompli on the pretext that Soviet
security was jeopardized by Iranian instability.
The Soviets will further their efforts to create internal insta-
bility and to undermine the government by promoting and exploiting dissatis-
? faction and dissension among the tribes and by capitalizing on the failure
of the government to implement promised social and economic reforms. The
USSR will seek especially to create serious disturbances by encouraging
Kurdish tribes in Azerbaijan to resist the army's efforts to disarm them.
The proximity of these tribes to the USSR makes Soviet penetration and
assistance easy. The Soviets will also work to promote dissatisfaction in
the industrial areas and among the peasants, and will continue to harbor
dissident Iranian elements in Soviet territory, training them for subversive
operations in Iran.
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Internal tension, making for instability, will also persist. The
Iranian Army may be expected to resist efforts on the part of the government
to adopt a reasonable tribal policy. It will probably continue to insist on
unqualified and ruthless disarmament despite recent overtures for tribal
cooperation. Tension between the Shah and Qavam will undoubtedly continue.
The Shah will seek the removal of Qavam from the premiership as soon as he
finds a qualified successor who will be more amenable to his wishes. If the
Shah is unable to replace Qavam and persists in following the advice of the
ambitious Chief of Staff Razmara, a military dictatorship may eventually re-
sult.
Administrative, social, and economic improvements necessary for in-
ternal stability will hardly be effected unless strongly encouraged and
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IP supported by the Western Powers. Moreover, the successful implementation
of a program of economic development will depend on adequate foreign super-
vision because of Iranian inexperience and maladministration.
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The Shah may be expected to remain friendly to the US and welcome
its suggestions regarding resistance to Soviet pressure. He will, for the
most part, follow US advice (especially if it is to his personal advantage)
and will doubtless seek technical and financial assistance in attempting to
develop Iran's economic program. Qavam, or any likely successor to the
premiership, may be expected to do likewise. The ultimate strength of re-
sistance to Soviet pressure, however, will depend to a considerable degree
on the extent and effectiveness of US and British support, and Iranian con-
fidence therein. It will also be affected by Iran's estimate of the pre-
vailing balance of power between the United States and the USSR.
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40 APPENDIX A
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TOPOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE
Iran covers an area of about 628,000 sauare miles, approximately
equalling in size that part of the United States east of the Mississippi
River. Most of the country is an upland plateau, sloping from elevations
of about 6,000 feet in the West to 1,500 feet in the East. Lofty mountain
ranges stamp a great "V" on the country, with the apex of the "V" in the
northwestern corner of the country and the area between the open ends cov-
ered by extensive salt deserts.
The lower arm of the "V" is represented by the Zagros range, which
runs southeast and roughly parallels the Iraqi frontier and the shores of
the Persian Gulf. The upper arm is composed of the Elburz range, which
forms a great wall stretching westward toward Turkey and eastward toward
Afghanistan. Within the two major systems are many connecting and isolated
ranges whose axes run generally in a northwesterly-southeasterly direction.
The region of Khuzistan, below the lower arm of the "V", is an extension of
the low plains of Iraa. Above the upper arm of the "V" are the shores of
the Caspian, which are below sea level and form a separate climatic zone.
The major mountain ranges have altitudes over 11,000 feet, with
Demavend in the Elburz range rising to a height of 18,375 feet. The major
and minor ranges run in roughly parallel lines, and between these lines
are countless long mountain valleys and upland plains. Villages cluster
along the rims of the broader valleys, where water is more plentiful,
rather than along the center lines, where the roads run. The principal
topographical obstacles to movement of ground forces are the Elburz and
Zagros ranges and the extensive salt deserts, traversable in but few
places. On the other hand, the open plains and valleys of the Iranian
plateau would facilitate airborne operations.
Drainage is to the Caspian Sea, to Lake Urmia, to the Persian
Gulf, and to the interior salt deserts which absorb much of the spring run-
off from the mountain streams. The deserts of Iran stretch across the
plateau from nortnwest to southeast for a distance of nearly 800 miles.
Approximately one sixth of the land area of Iran is desert.
Precipitation over much of Iran is confined largely to the period
from November to April; over most of the plateau the annual precipitation
is less than 12 inches, or about that of the state of Nevada. The deserts
and southeastern section of the country receive less than 4 inches, the
northwest up to 30 inches, and the Caspian littoral at least 40 inches,
distributed throughout the year.
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The plateau has mild winters and hot summers, while less temperate
conditions prevail in the Persian Gulf area and in the interior deserts,
where summer temperatures of over 1200 F. are not infrequent. The Caspian
littoral ranges from temperate to hot throughout the year, with an average
humidity in winter of 90 and in summer of 75. The Caspian Sea area ex-
cluded, Iran has only about fifty days during the year which are overcast.
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APPENDIX B
COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES
1. Water Transport
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The principal ports along the Iranian shore of the Persian Gulf are
Abadan, Khurramshahr, Bandar Shahpur, Bushire, Jask, Bandar 'Abbas, and
Lingeh. Only at Abadan, Khurramshahr, and Bandar Shahpur can ocean-going
vessels dock, the other ports being open roadsteads. Abadan is the export
point of Anglo-Iranian's oil production and has numerous loading facilities.
Bandar Shahpur, the southern terminus of the Iranian State Railway, has two
long wooden wharves with a total of 5 berths, while Khurramshahr, which is
serviced by a new branch rail line from Ahwaz, has developed into the
leading general cargo port of Iran. Of its seven berths, six were con-
structed by the United States during the recent war.
Navigation on the Caspian Sea is monopolized by Soviet ships. Iranian
ports along the Caspian include Pahlevi, Nau Shahr, Babul Sar, Bandar-i-Gaz,
and Bandar Shah, but these are not deep-water harbors and are hampered by
silting and the gradual recession of the sea. Pahlevi and Bandar Shah are
the leading ports, the latter being the northern terminus of the trans-
Iranian railway.
The Karun River, the only navigable river in Iran, flows into the Shatt-
al-Arab near the head of the Persian Gulf. Small steamers can go as far as
Ahwaz, some 70 miles from the river's mouth, and smaller boats can navigate
about 60 miles beyond the Ahwaz rapids.
2. Roads
Although Iran's road system is considered poor by Western standards, all
important sections of the country are accessible by motor transport. Main
highways connect Tehran with the larger towns of the provinces, with the
principal ports (except Bandar Shahpur), and with various points on the
frontiers of Iran. There are approximately 6,000 miles of main roads, of
which about one sixth are surfaced with asphalt and the balance with gravel
and broken stone suitable for heavy two-way traffic Almost all the main
roads cross high mountain passes, but maximum grades are generally limited
to 8%. High passes may be closed by winter snows for periods of a week or
more. There are also about 15,000 miles of partially improved and unimproved
roads, which serve as through routes in less travelled areas and as feeders
to the main highways. Some of these roads can also handle heavy two-way
traffic, while others are narrow, or mere desert tracks, and are often im-
passable after spring rains.
During the recent war, British and US engineering units supervised the
asphalting of long stretches of the supply routes leading from the head of
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the Persian Gulf to the Caspian. Since the end of the war the Iranian
Government has asphalted an additional 150 miles of road.
3. Railroads
In 1938 the single-track, standard-gauge trans-Iranian railway was
put in operation from the Persian Gulf through Tehran to the Caspian Sea,
a distance of 861 miles.
By 1938 work was under way on three.other main lines. One line, which
is to connect Tehran with Tabriz, was .completed to Mianeh, about two thirds
of the way to Tabriz, in 1942. Some gi-dding has been done on the line be-
tween Mianeh and Tabriz. Another line branches off at Garmsar, a point
sixty miles east of Tehran. By 1941 trains were running to Shahrud, nearly
half way from Tehran to Meshed, and the roadbed is partially completed be-
tween Shahrud and Meshed.
A third line is projected from Qum, in a southeasterly direction,
through Kashan and Yezd to Kerman. This roadbed is in place from Qum to
Kashan and almost to Yezd. The line may eventually be extended through Barn
and Zahidan to connect with the 5 ft. 6 in. gauge line which runs through
Baluchistan to India proper.
An older line is the Russian-built single track, 5 ft. gauge line con-
structed in 1916 from Julfa, on the Soviet frontier, to Tabriz, with a
branch line to Lake Urmia.
During the recent war the British, US, and Soviet forces took over the
operation of different sections of the Iranian lines. Scores of locomotives
and hundreds of cars were brought into the country, and some 3,000,000 long
tons of supplies were delivered to the USSR by rail through the Persian
corridor. The average net haul was increased from less than 1,000 tons per
day to about 6,000 tons a day. The British built a new line from Khurram-
shahr to join the Trans-Iranian at Ahwaz and a spur from this line to
Tanuma on the Shatt al-Arab opposite Basra, Iraq. The length of rail lines
now in operation within Iran is 1,585 miles.
4. Air Lines
During World War II a large airfield was constructed by the Allies on
.the island of Abadan, and the two fields at Tehran were expanded. Tehran
now serves as a terminus of international services operated by British
Overseas Air Corporation, Swedish Airways, Air France, and non-scheduled
flights of Skyways International (US). Pan American Airways is contem-
plating stops at Tehran on its Europe-to-India run. The USSR operated a
passenger service across the northern part of the country between Tabriz,
Tehran, and Meshed with scheduled flights between Tehran and Moscow, but
this service was never legalized and was terminated in July 1947 following
protests by the Iranian Government. An Iranian company, Iranian Airways,
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with the technical and financial cooperation of TWA, runs an extensive
domestic service and conducts scheduled flights to Cairo via Baghdad and
Basra. This company has also made flights to Paris in anticipation of
scheduled service between Tehran, Paris, and London.
At present the field at Abadan, purchased by the Iranian Government
from the Allies, is little used because through traffic between Europe,
Africa, and Eastern Asia moves by way of Dhahran on the east coast of
Arabia. The two fields at Tehran have concrete runways of adequate length
for four-engine planes but lack adequate lighting and communication facili-
ties; and at Zahidan a large field with surfaced runways was developed by
the British during the war. Several smaller fields between Tehran and the
head of the Persian Gulf have asphalted runways, and nearly every large -
town in the country has a landing field, usually with a packed earth or
gravel surface.
5. Telegraph and Radio Communications
There are about 25,000 miles of telegraph lines in service within the
country. Messages written either in the Latin alphabet or in Persian
characters are transmitted over this network. Long-distance telephone
service is available between Tehran and most parts of the country.
Broadcasting stations are located only at Tehran and Tabriz, except for
the sending stations operated by the Iranian Army. The government station
at Tehran maintains a daily short and standard-wave program service and also
handles commercial traffic by means of directional antennas beamed at Europe
and the US. The transmitting power is adequate to maintain constant contact
under average atmospheric conditions.
The UK, US, and Soviet Embassies, and possibly other foreign representa-
tions, maintain theii own radio communication facilities.
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APPENDIX C
POPULATION STATISTICS AND CHARACTERISTICS
Local sources place the population of Iran as high as 16,500,000
while some responsible foreign sources place it as low as 10,000,000. The
total population of the country is probably about 14,000,000. Of this
number about one fourth are tribal peoples, of whom possibly 1,500,000 be-
long to either semi-sedentary or nomadic tribes. Approximately one fifth
of the people live in towns with more than 30,000 inhabitants. Tehran with
about 600,000 people and Tabriz, Meshed, and Isfahan, each with a population
of around 200,000, are the largest cities. The bulk of the people are tenant
farmers living in at least 90,000 small villages of fifty or more houses.
This mass of illiterate, hardworking peasants forms the backbone of the
country and has always been aloof from the changing political scene. At
least 80% of the population of Iran is illiterate. On the other hand, the
country now claims more than 8,000 elementary schools with an enrollment of
264,000 pupils and 1,740 secondary schools with more than 26,000 students.
A bill for universal compulsory education was passed in 1946. Hygienic
conditions are poor, and disease is prevalent throughout the country.
The majority of the Iranian population derives from ancient Indo-
European stock. Large groups of Arabs entered the country during and after
the seventh century and settled in the Southwest and the East. Turkish or
Turanian peoples moved into Iran in large numbers between the eleventh and
fifteenth centuries.
Between one half and two thirds of the inhabitants speak Persian.
Nearly one third of the population (living in Azerbaijan and in a wide
wedge of land stretching from that province south towards Tehran) speak a
Turkish dialect. Arabic is spoken by the Arab tribes inhabiting southwest
Iran and by scattered Arab tribes in other parts of the country.
The more important of the nomadic tribes are the Kurd, Lur,
Bakhtiari, Qashclai, Khamseh, Shahsavan, Arab, and Baluchi. The first five
of these groups are found principally in the Zagros Mountain chain. Smaller
nomadic tribes of importance are the Afshar, Inanlu, Baghdadi, Kuh Galu, and
Mamassani. Certain tribes have veered towards a settled farming life, but
the true nomads have a pastoral economy. Their flocks are the source of food
and clothing and of cash income. The tribes migrate in spring from low-lying
plains and valleys into the high mountain areas where sufficient grazing can
be found throughout the summer, and in the fall they move back to the warmer
regions. Cereal crops are sown on the plains and in the lower valleys, and
members of the tribes remain behind to reap the harvest. Tribal boundaries
are fairly well defined, and in recent years inter-tribal raiding and warfare
have declined. The nomads represent the hardiest, most aggressive and inde-
pendent element of the Iranian population. They have always furnished the
stiff backbone of the Persian armies, and several dynasties had their origin
in tribal stock.
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The Kurds, Lurs, and Bakhtiaris speak dialects which may be related
to Old Persian or another Indo-European language; the Arab tribes, largely
inhabiting the area at the head of the Persian Gulf, speak Arabic; the
Qashclais and Shahsavans speak a Turkish dialect; the Khamseh speak Arabic
and Turkish dialects; the Baluchis speak a dialect of Persian. The Turkomans,
in northeastern Iran, speak a form of Turki.
Ninety percent of the Iranians are Moslems of the Shi'a sect in
contrast to the Near East as a whole, where members of the Sunni sect pre-
dominate. Iran possesses relatively few minority groups, and racial or re-
ligious discrimination has never developed to a marked degree. In the north-
west there are some 20,000 Nestorians, while the Armenians, numbering about
150,000, inhabit various sections of the country. Jews, numbering about
40,000, are settled in towns and in certain ancient farming communities.
Parsis, largely concentrated at Yezd and Kerman, total 15,000. These Iran-
ians hold to the national religion established by Zoroaster in the Achaemenid
period.
Iran's rich cultural tradition may be regarded as the country's
principal unifying force. Patriotism and national unity are expressed
chiefly through pride in and appreciation for national culture, which has
consistently demonstrated its resilience and ability to assimilate the foreign
invader throughout Iranian history. In the modern political sense, however,
Iran is scarcely a nation. Its lack of political cohesiveness may be attributed
to the Iranians' highly developed sense of individualism, which has as its
concomitants reluctance to accept individual responsibility for the welfare
ID or future progress of the state, and failure to extend allegiance to the govern-
ment or dynasty.
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APPENDIX D
CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS
1813, 1828 Treaties of Gulistan and Turkomanchai, in which Iran ceded areas
west of the Caspian Sea and north of the Araxes River to Russia.
1857 Treaty of Paris, concluding British-Iranian hostilities and in-
corporating Iran's acknowledgment of Afghan independence.
1880, 1893 Irano-Russian border east of the Caspian Sea fixed by treaties
unfavorable to Iran.
1901 William D'Arcy granted oil concession in southwestern Iran, later
to be developed into rich Anglo-Iranian Oil Company fields.
1906 Demands upon the Shah result in the granting of a Constitution
and the founding of a National Assembly (Majlis).
1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement, in which the two Powers divided Iran
into zones of British and Russian influence with a neutral zone
between them.
1909 Civil war follows attempts of Mohammed Shah to abrogate the con-
stitution; the Bakhtiftri tribe, in support of constitutional
government, occupies Tehran. Ahmad Shah takes throne.
1911, 1912 Mohammed Shah attempts to recover the throne, with Russian
assistance; Russians demand expulsion of US financial mission;
Russian troops occupy northern Iranian cities.
1914 Iran declares neutrality upon the outbreak of the War, but sub-
sequently becomes the battleground for British, Turkish, and
Russian troops.
1921 Riza Khan marches on Tehran with the Cossack Brigade and turns
out the vacillating administration.
Treaty of Friendship between Iran and the Soviet Union signed.
1925 Riza Khan has himself declared Shah, thus replacing the Qajar
rulers with his own "Pahlevi" dynasty.
1933 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession terms revised to Iran's
advantage.
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1937 Amiranian Oil Company, a United States interest, is granted
concession in northeastern Iran, later abandoned because of
unfavorable economic and political conditions.
Saadabad Pact, treaty of friendship between Iran, Iraq, Turkey,
and Afghanistan, signed.
1938 Operation of Trans-Iranian Railway inaugurated.
1941 USSR and Great Britain simultaneously invade Iran
and Iran capitulates four days later.
Mohammed Riza Pahlevi named Shah on 16 September,
his father, Riza Shah, who was sent into exile.
on 25 August,
succeeding
1942 Tripartite Treaty entered into by Iran, Great Britain, and the
USSR in January.
Tudeh Party formation announced on 30 January.
US Military Missions to Iranian Army and Gendarmerie established,
and in December US service troops arrive in Iran.
1943 Declaration of Tehran signed by Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt.
1944 ?
Soviet Union demands oil-prospecting concession in northern Iran
in September; concession refused.
1945 Iran makes $10 million US surplus supply purchase, consisting
principally of railroad equipment.
14th Parliament passes bill postponing elections for the 15th
Parliament until six months after evacuation of foreign troops.
Autonomous regime set up in Azerbaijan in December.
US troops evacuate Iran by the end of the year.
1946
19 January Iran protests Soviet interference to the Security Council.
27 January Ahmad Qavam named Prime Minister.
5 February Kurdish Republic proclaimed at Mahabad.
18 February Qavam goes to Moscow to confer with Stalin and Molotov, but later
announces that Iranian differences not solved.
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Deadline for withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran under
Tripartite Treaty of 1942.
Iran renews appeal to the Security Council, protesting non-
evacuation of Soviet troops.
Agreement between Iran and the USSR regarding removal of Soviet
troops, consideration of oil proposals, and settlement of Azer-
baijan affair announced.
9 May Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran completed.
22 May Security Council adjourns discussion of Iranian question
indefinitely.
30 June Qavam announces formation of his Democratic Party of Iran.
14 July Strike at Anglo-Iranian Oil Company called; results in clashes
between Arabs and Tudeh Party members.
11 August Qashqai revolt flares up following inclusion of Tudeh members
in cabinet; British garrisons in Iraq reinforced.
27 September Central Government begins negotiations with Qashclai after having
averted uprising among the Bakhtiaris by arresting tribal leaders.
18 October Qavam re-forms Cabinet without Tudeh members.
4 November Qavam issues instructions to complete preparations for parlia-
mentary elections.
14 November US tentatively agrees to sale of US military supplies to Iran.
11 December Central Government troops enter Azerbaijan, and autonomous re-
gimes collapse.
1947
21 June
8 July
Qavam forms new Cabinet, increasing orientation toward West.
Qavam suppresses opposition press as martial law re-established
in Tehran.
17 July Parliament convenes.
19 July Soviets cease illegal air operations.
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Document tio. DO /
10 CHANCE in Class. El
DI'CrA:-3STFIED
la . C ::1D TO: TS S C
MA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: _DDA REG. 77 1763
Date: By: D asamp.mos00...6,
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1703-8-1947
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NOTICE TO HOLDERS OF CIA REPORT ON IRAN (SR-6)
"Soviet Activities in Iran" consisting of a condensed text and three Annexes of
source material is issued as Appendix "L" to SR-6 Iran (1 August 1947) with special
reference to Section VI "Probable Future Developments Affecting United States
Security."
Holders of SR-6 are requested to insert this Appendix at the end of the report, fol-
lowing Appendix K?"Industrial Development" map, and to make appropriate note
of this addendum in the Table of Contents.
For information on the validity and date of information contained in this Appendix,
see note at bottom of page L-1.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Navy, and Air Force
have concurred in this study; the Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, has
concurred in the sections having military implications.
Central Intelligence Agency
7 April 1948
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APPENDIX L TO SR-6 IRAN
SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN IRAN
1. IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET POLICY 1
2 DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENTS USED IN IMPLEMENTING SOVIET OPERATIONS . 3
3. CONDITIONS EXPLOITED IN IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET POLICY 4
a. Geographical Proximity 4
b. Ethnic and Religious Relationships with Soviet Population Elements 4
c. Dissident Population Elements 5
d. The Iranian National- Character 5
e. Economic Dependence 6
4. LOCAL CHANNELS EMPLOYED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES 6
5. SOVIET AGENCIES EMPLOYED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES 8
6. EFFECTIVENESS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET POLICY 9
a. USSR 9
b. Iran 10
c. UK 11
d. US 11
ANNEX I ? DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENTS EMPLOYED IN SOVIET OPERATIONS
1. THE SOVIET-IRANIAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP I-1
2. THE SOVIET-IRANIAN TREATY OF GUARANTY AND NEUTRALITY 1-2
3. THE TRI-PARTITE TREAT-Y. OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE USSR, GREAT BRITAIN,
AND IRAN
4. THE US-BRITISH-SOVIET DECLARATION ON IRAN OF TEHRAN 1-3
5. SOVIET-IRANIAN OIL AGREEMENTS 1-4
ANNEX II ? LOCAL CHANNELS EMPLOYED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES
1. THE TUDEH PARTY II-1
2. DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AZERBAIJAN (DPA) 11-2
3. COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS 11-5
a. The Society of Friends of Soviet Azerbaijan 11-5
b. The Freedom Front 11-5
c. The Iran Party . . . . ............ 11-5
d. The Jangali Party 11-5
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4. PRO-SOVIET LABOR GROUPS
5. PRO-SOVIET ELEMENTS WITHIN THE IRANIAN ARMY
6. PRO-SOVIET ELEMENTS WITHIN THE IRANIAN STATE RAILWAYS
7. TRIBAL ELEMENTS 11-8
a. Remnants of the "Kurdish Republic" 11-8
b. The Barzani Kurds 11-8
c. Elements of the Jalali Kurds 11-9
d. Herki Kurd Renegades 11-9
e. The Picheranlu 11-9
f. Disaffected Elements Among the Khuzistan Arabs II-10
8. MINORITY ELEMENTS II-10
a. Armenians II-10
b. Assyrians II-11
9. THE QAJARS II-11
10. INTELLIGENTSIA AND STUDENTS II-11
11. RUSSIAN EMIGRES 11-12
ANNEX III ? SOVIET AGENCIES EMPLOYED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF SOVIET POLICY
1.
2.
3.
POLITICAL
a. Embassy and Consular Establishments
b. Satellite Representation
INTELLIGENCE
a. Military
b. Espionage Agents
COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL
III-1
III-1
111-2
111-2
111-2
111-3
111-3
a.
Torgpred (Soviet Trade Delegation)
111-3
b.
Commercial Agencies of Satellites of the USSR
111-4
c.
Russo-Iranian Bank
111-5
d.
Irano-Soviet Fisheries Company (Shilat)
111-5
e.
Caspian Sea Navigation Company
111-6
f.
Iransovtrans
111-6
g.
Iransovnaft
111-7
h.
Gosstrakh; Gosfehl
111-7
i.
Sovkino
111-7
j.
Intourist
111-7
k.
Irano-Russian Forestry Exploitation Company
111-8
4.
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
111-8
a.
VOKS
111-8
b.
Irano-Soviet Cultural Relations Society
111-9
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c. Cultural Relations Societies of Satellites of the USSR 111-9
d. Soviet Medical Organizations III-10
e. Study Missions in Iran III-10
f. Religious Missions to Iran III-10
g. Soviet Films and Theater Groups III-11
h. Junkets to the USSR III-11
5. Plass AND PROPAGANDA 111-11
a. The Soviet Press and Radio III-11
b. The Soviet-Inspired Iranian Press 111-13
c. The Coordinated Operation of the Soviet and Soviet-Inspired Press 111-13
ANNEX IV ? Map ? Channels Exploited by the USSR
ANNEX V ? Map ? Soviet Agencies in Iran
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APPENDIX L
SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN IRAN
1. IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET POLICY.*
The USSR, in its efforts to achieve its objective of dominating Iran, exploits
geographic, economic, and population relationships between Iran and the Soviet Union,
as well as Iranian national characteristics and weaknesses; it enlists the support of
discontented Iranian groups, and penetrates local organizations; it violates or manipu-
lates Irano-Soviet diplomatic instruments to its own advantage. These operations
are directed and supported by numerous Soviet official agencies, which employ ap-
proximately 1,000 Soviet nationals and an undetermined number of covert agents.
The activities of the USSR in Iran during the war years served to promote the
efforts of the Soviet Union to achieve a postwar position of ascendancy. Since the
USSR continues to pursue the same aim and to utilize many of the same techniques
adopted during 1941-1946, a brief survey of Soviet wartime activities will provide
guidance in assessing the current operations of the USSR in Iran.
From September 1941 until May 1946 all northern Iran, encompassing one-fourth
of the total area and one-half of the population of the country, was under Soviet
military occupation. The USSR utilized its occupation forces to consolidate its political
and economic position and to prepare the ground for a postwar position of ascendancy
in much the same manner as Soviet troops have been employed more recently in
Eastern Europe. The USSR not only established complete military and political con-
trol of northern Iran, which nullified the Iranian Government's authority in the area,
but even extended its influence beyond the northern provinces and into the central
government itself.
Soviet activity from 1941 through 1946 falls into two main categories. The first
consists of activities resulting from the exigencies of war such as the maintenance of
occupation troops and the operation of the northern section of the Allied supply
line to the USSR. Although Soviet needs did not differ materially from those of British
and US agencies in Iran, the means employed in filling such needs were greatly different
and were designed to shift to the Iranian Government a great part of the cost of
Soviet operations in Iran. Thus, housing and administrative buildings were requi-
sitioned without remuneration to their owners; food agreements were imposed on the
Iranian Government, giving the Soviet authorities virtual control of northern food
* The present report is based on material dating between 1944 and 1947 which is available to
US intelligence agencies in Washington. Much of the information is fragmentary or obsolescent.
While this material is sufficient to permit a general assessment of the nature and effectiveness of
past Soviet operations, no critical estimate of the future course of Soviet activities is at present
possible.
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surpluses and creating country-wide hardship; currency requirements were filled by
profits from black market transactions and by refusal to pay customs fees on imports
or taxes on goods in transit; the efficiency of the supply line was increased by road and
railroad construction and maintenance financed by funds extracted from the Iranian
Government.
These practices, which ceased for the most part with the termination of hostilities,
served to lay the groundwork for the application of the techniques falling into the
second category. These involved long-range aims which had no justification in war-
time needs and were designed to promote the postwar ascendancy of the USSR in Iran.
The Soviets, for instance, encouraged social and regional separatism with the aim of
securing the fragmentation of Iran prior to its ultimate integration into the Soviet
sphere of influence. Techniques included the promotion of civil disturbances, the
formation of pro-Soviet labor organizations, and the organization of political groups,
culminating in the establishment of two autonomous, interrelated regimes in northwest
Iran, one (the Azerbaijan National Government) regional-political in character, the
other (the Kurdish People's Republic) tribal-political.
A simultaneous and closely related activity was the policy of organizing and
extending the influence of political groups favorable to the USSR, of which the Tudeh
Party and its provincial offshoot, the Azerbaijan Democrats, received political, military,
and financial support from the USSR. Because of the political immaturity of the
Iranian people, the organizers largely disregarded Communist ideology, seeking instead
to encourage pro-Soviet tendencies, together with verbal devotion to "progressive" and
"democratic" principles. This policy served at the same time to promote the negative
aims of discrediting and undermining the authority of the central government, which
was already embarrassed and harassed by wartime economic difficulties, by the activi-
ties of the Soviet Army, and by intensive antigovernment propaganda of both Soviet
and leftist Iranian origin.
Another major policy, which existed throsughout the war but which was intensified
with the cessation of hostilities, was the undermining of the British and US positions
in Iran through virulent propaganda and diplomatic pressures and through such spe-
cific devices as labor agitation in the British oil concession area and obstructionism
directed against the operations of the US advisory program.
While endeavoring to reduce the scope of US and British influence, the Soviet
Government also devoted its efforts to securing pre-emptive and compensatory con-
cessions and advantages of an economic and commercial nature. This category in-
cluded demands for oil rights and a railroad concession; unauthorized operation of a
Soviet air line in northern Iran; demands for an air monopoly in northern Iran; opera-
tion of a commercial truck transport service in open competition with that of the
Iranian Government; forcing Soviet goods on the Iranian market, thus drawing Iran
away from Western producers; and refusal to honor Soviet financial obligations, thereby
depriving Iran of needed funds.
The acquisition of economic and commercial footholds was also designed to provide
means of installing large numbers of Soviet personnel in Iran on a long-range basis,
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so as to provide successors to the Soviet troops who exercised such extensive influence
on Iran. As a corollary, efforts were made to infiltrate Soviet and Soviet-trained agents
for covert activities.
The withdrawal of Soviet troops in May 1946 served to reduce the range and
effectiveness of Soviet operations, and the collapse of the autonomous regime in Azer-
baijan in December 1946 was a serious setback to Soviet aims and prestige. Despite
strenuous Iranian Government efforts to resist Soviet pressures and to halt Soviet
illegal activities, however, the USSR continues to employ many of the long-range
methods adopted during 1941-1946, with some variations in emphasis.
As a result of its loss of popular support in Azerbaijan in December 1946, the USSR
will probably place greater reliance in the future on clandestine activities, with special
reference to the continued infiltration of agents to expand the espionage network
and greater employment of Soviet official agencies in Iran for covert activities. The
USSR will probably endeavor to make greater use of its satellites, of whom Czechoslo-
vakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia are officially represented in Tehran.
The USSR will intensify its efforts to undermine the present government. Although
it will continue to support Iranian groups which are sympathetic to Soviet aims, it is
unlikely to depend upon them in the future as primary instruments for establishing
control over the Iranian Government. Instead, the Soviet Union is expected to lay
greater emphasis on the exploitation of all elements of internal weakness in Iran, by
capitalizing on the Iranian Government's failure to execute essential reforms and by
manipulating influential individuals and population groups having differences with,
or grievances against, the central government. The Soviets will make capital of the
government's alleged inability to maintain internal security, with the implication
that the security of the Soviet frontiers is thereby threatened. While attention is being
called to this condition through propaganda, the Soviets may endeavor to give sub-
stance to such charges by instigating guerrilla warfare and civil disturbances, which
in turn might provide an excuse for direct Soviet intervention.
Finally, in accordance with its policy elsewhere in the world, the USSR will in-
tensify its efforts to discredit and reduce the US position and US prestige in Iran, and
will continue its efforts to bring about the decline of the British position, giving special
attention to promoting the eventual expropriation of the British oil concession by the
Iranian Government.
2. DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENTS USED IN IMPLEMENTING SOVIET OPERATIONS.*
Certain diplomatic agreements contain conditions preferential to the USSR or
include outwardly equitable conditions which in practice have been manipulated to the
advantage of the USSR. The Treaty of 1921 stipulates that Soviet troops may enter
Iran if a third power attempts armed intervention in Iran or seeks to make Iran a
base of operations against the USSR, provided the Iranian Government is unable to
deal with the situation. Prior to the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941, this treaty
was invoked by the USSR because of the presence in Iran of a large number of German
? * Consult Annex I for further details.
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agents; it may be invoked in the future with less provocation. While the same treaty
provides for withdrawal of Soviet troops as soon as "the danger has been removed," it
is noteworthy that this commitment, as well as a further obligation to evacuate Iran
contained in the Tri-Partite Treaty of 1942, was ignored by the Soviet Government
in 1946. The USSR is now violating the treaties of 1921 and 1927 by harboring in
Soviet territory groups whose object is to engage in hostile acts against Iran. (See An-
nex I-1 and I-2.)
The 1927 convention covering joint exploitation of the Caspian fisheries by the
two countries has actually been operated through Soviet manipulation to the disad-
vantage of the Iranian Government. (See Annex 111-3. d.)
The Irano-Soviet Financial Agreement of 18 March 1943, which was in part designed
to facilitate the supply of Iranian currency to the USSR during the war, expired on
2 March 1946. On this date the USSR owed Iran an amount of gold equivalent to
$12,600,000, and in addition carried a credit of approximately $8,400,000 to the account
of the National Bank of Iran. Repeated Iranian requests for repayment (in accord-
ance with the agreement) have been ignored by the USSR, which presumably intends
to use this sum as a political and economic lever against Iran.
During the course of the last war, the Soviets forced Iran to sign unfavorable con-
tracts and agreements for the supply of rice, canned goods, and small arms manufac-
tured in government factories at Tehran, and thus gained control of Iranian food
surpluses and an important part of its industrial capacity. They also proposed oil,
air, and railroad agreements which, if accepted, would have given the Soviet Union
a firm foothold in Iran. The USSR may be expected to press for similar agreements
in the future.
3. CONDITIONS EXPLOITED IN IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET POLICY.
a. Geographical Proximity.
The geographical proximity of the two countries, with their long common
frontiers, facilitates access to Iran from the USSR by both land and water.* At the
same time, the geographical affinity between Iran's northern provinces and adjacent
Soviet territory and the mountain barriers which isolate the Caspian provinces from
the Iranian plateau favor the extension of Soviet influence in northern Iran.
b. Ethnic and Religious Relationships with Soviet Population Elements.
The ethnic, cultural, and linguistic identity of population elements in the
frontier regions is an aid to Soviet operations. To the west of the Caspian, the Turki-
speaking peoples of Iranian Azerbaijan are related to those of the Azerbaijan SSR; to
the east of the Caspian, the Turkomen tribesmen have links with Turkomen elements
of the Turkomen SSR. These ethnic and cultural relations are strengthened by
common participation in the Moslem faith. A significant element of the Armenian
minority of Azerbaijan (as well as many Armenians elsewhere in Iran) is oriented
toward the Armenian SSR, by virtue of common faith and culture and nationalistic
* The land frontiers total 900 miles in length; the Iranian-Caspian coast line is 400 miles long.
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sentiments toward the Armenian "homeland." The Soviet Government exploits these
relationships by means of propaganda and cultural relations activities, designed to
strengthen the bonds between the Soviet and Iranian peoples and to promote dis-
affection by emphasizing the contrasts between conditions in the Soviet Union and in
Iran.
c. Dissident Population Elements.
The prevailing poverty of the mass of the Iranian people and the government's
failure to implement essential reforms contribute to the dissidence among important
sections of the population. Three discontented population groups, the tribes, minority
elements, and labor, represent especially fertile fields for Soviet exploitation.*
The Iranian Government's traditional policy toward the tribes, which consti-
tute approximately one-fourth of the estimated population of 14,000,000, has been one
of division and repression rather than an effort to secure their loyalty to the central
government or effect their assimilation into a national entity. Recently there have
been indications of a modification of this policy. However, unless this new attitude
persists, the tribes will continue to constitute a potent divisive force which can be ex-
ploited by the USSR against the central government to further the separatist tenden-
cies inherent in the tribal patriarchal system, despite the fact that the majority of
Iran's tribal groups are basically anti-Soviet.
Iran's minorities, particularly the 65,000 Armenians ** and the 20,000 to 30,000
Assyrians (Nestorian Christians), have been discriminated against by the govern-
ment *** and disliked by the Moslem population, and are occasionally the victims of
persecution and extortion at the hands of Iranian civil and military officials. Both
the Armenians and the Assyrians have traditionally sought Russian protection against
Moslem depredations and discriminatory tactics, and they are, therefore, susceptible
to political exploitation and direct subversion by the Soviets.
Although Iran's industrial laboring class numbers only about 200,000 and,
as an organized group, is relatively recent in origin, it is steadily becoming more articu-
late and more conscious of its potential power. It also suffers from governmental
neglect and, unless it receives the benefits of tangible reforms, can be expected to
become increasingly responsive to Soviet agitation and manipulation.
d. The Iranian National Character.
In the political sense, the individualism and egocentricity of the Iranian result
in an absence of social consciousness and a lack of devotion to the national interest on
the part of the mass of the population. Personal ambition and self-interest permeate
all levels of Iranian officialdom. In the Iranian governmental structure, these deficien-
cies result in parliamentary disorganization and irresponsibilty, lack of governmental
* The relatively small intellectual and student class, which includes a number of pro-Soviet
individuals, is also exploited by the USSR.
** Other estimates reckon the Armenian minority as exceeding 100,000.
** * Iranian discrimination has been intensified by acts of disloyalty on the part of Armenian
and Assyrian individuals and groups.
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continuity, absence of local self-government, and political factionalism in all branches
of the central and provincial administration.
These factors are reflected in an attitude of inertia on the part of most of the
population and the government toward critical internal conditions and the need for
executing long overdue social and administrative reforms. Because of the lack of
standards of public morality, moreover, public officials, press representatives, and
influential private citizens are in many cases susceptible to outright subversion for
personal profit.
In consequence, the Soviet Government is in a position to capitalize upon
Iran's failure to cooperate in the national interest or to carry out reforms essential
to internal stability; moreover, the USSR will have the opportunity to exploit the cor-
ruptibility of individuals and organs of public opinion.
e. Economic Dependence.
Although the closely interlocking barter agreements which tied Iran to the
USSR prior to and during the last war no longer exist, northern Iran will probably
continue to remain in a condition of relative economic dependence on the USSR by
virtue of its geographical proximity and the absence of other profitable outlets for
north Iranian produce, which is customarily exchanged for Soviet manufactured goods
and processed foods. The USSR is in a position to exploit this situation by the impo-
sition of commercial boycotts on northern Iran designed to wrest concessions from the
Iranian Government, a procedure which it has employed in the past. The general
factor of northern Iran's economic dependence on the USSR has a special significance
because of the probability that the USSR will seek, as a prelude to ultimate domination
of Iran, to detach northern areas from the control of the central government.
4. LOCAL CHANNELS EMPLOYED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES.*
Specific local channels exist which the USSR uses assiduously to exploit the
favorable conditions outlined in the preceding section. Since the activities within
these channels are largely clandestine in character and since US intelligence coverage
in Iran is inadequate, available data present only a fragmentary picture of current
operations.
Certain political and labor organizations, originally developed under Soviet aegis,
which have provided effective support to the USSR in the past, are still being utilized
by the Soviet Union. These include the Tudeh Party, which is now being reconsti-
tuted throughout Iran; remnants of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, the Tudeh's
provincial offshoot; remnants of the militant Central Committee of Trade Unions,
identical with the Tudeh in policy and leadership. These organizations include trained
Communist organizers and agitators, indoctrinated Iranians until recently in exile in
the Soviet Union, leftist and liberal elements. Although these organizations have
been subjected to restrictive and suppressive measures by the Iranian Government,
residual elements are now active throughout Iran and in refuge in adjacent Soviet
* Consult Annex II for further details.
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territory, and may be expected to expand their activities. These elements for the
most part have a revolutionary political orientation, are dissatisfied with the existing
Government of Iran, and have received material benefits from their Soviet affiliations.
Although the tribes as a whole maintain an anti-Soviet attitude and the majority
of influential Kurdish chieftains have reasserted their allegiance to the central govern-
ment, disaffected elements of the Kurds and other tribes are still particularly suscepti-
ble to Soviet propaganda and are cooperating with Soviet agents. These include certain
elements of the former Kurdish Republic and disaffected individuals and renegades
among the Jalali, Herki, and Iraqi Barzanis in the northwest, as well as the Picheranlu
in the northeast. The USSR is also endeavoring to exploit other dissident tribal groups,
notably sections of the Arab tribes of southwestern Iran.
Certain minorities are also made use of by the Soviets in their operations. The
USSR has enlisted the active support of White Russians in Iran as agents for various
subversive purposes. The Armenians are utilized as a propaganda instrument in
connection with Soviet charges of discriminatory treatment of minorities by the Iranian
Government. Individual Armenians are employed as active agents. The current Soviet
repatriation of Armenians to the USSR is expected to provide a supply of indoctrinated
Armenians for reintroduction into Iran as Soviet agents and propagandists. While
most Iranians are not receptive to Soviet ideology, some of Iran's intelligentsia and
students consider Soviet ideology as a means of effecting improvements in Iran's social
and governmental structure. They accordingly represent an instrument of informed
? public opinion for the dissemination of Soviet propaganda. Another small but influen-
tial group consists of certain members of the former Qajar dynasty, whose political
aspirations are encouraged by the Soviets with a view to promoting regional movements
and to undermining the authority of the present regime.
In accordance with the Soviet practice elsewhere of seeking to obtain control over
local transportation systems, in Iran the Soviets are reported to be meeting with some
success in infiltrating muhajirs,* Tudeh Party members, and other leftist elements into
the ranks of the Iranian State Railways organization.
While the Iranian Army is, for the most part, loyal, it contains some pro-Soviet
elements, including a few high-ranking officers. The Soviets are not only seeking to
win additional sympathizers but are training young Iranians in their espionage school
at Baku for penetration of the army. The USSR aims to obstruct the enactment of
needed army reforms and to hamper the army's mission of maintaining internal
security.
Soviet operations through these diverse channels are designed to discredit the Gov-
ernment of Iran; to undermine the confidence of the people in their leaders; to foment
disturbances; to encourage separatist movements and other forces which might have a
divisive and disruptive effect on Iran's tenuous unity; and to support political groups
aiming to establish a government subservient to the Soviet Union. They serve, more-
over, as an effective means of facilitating the official and covert operations of Soviet
?
* Consult Annex 11-2 for discussion.
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agencies throughout all levels of Iranian society and throughout all sections of the
country.
5. SOVIET AGENCIES EMPLOYED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES.*
The USSR maintains a large variety of official agencies in Iran engaged in diplo-
matic, commercial, cultural, and propaganda activities. The number of Soviet
nationals employed (estimated at 1,000)** is considerably larger than official duties
would require, and it has been established that they are also engaged in extraofficial
activities, such as intelligence and espionage, labor agitation, political indoctrination
and the dissemination of propaganda, unauthorized commercial transactions detri-
mental to Iranian interests, and covert political activities directed against the Iranian
Government and against the position of the Western Powers in Iran.
Activities of a covert political nature are carried on by the Embassy and the thirteen
consular establishments *** throughout Iran which dictate the policies and provide the
directing force for the local channels through which Soviet agencies operate, such as the
Tudeh Party and its affiliates, local labor elements, and disaffected population groups.
Little is known about the extraofficial activities of the four Soviet military attaches,
whose operations are reportedly headed by an important civilian official engaged in
espionage activities in Iran.
Agencies engaged in political indoctrination and the dissemination of pro-Soviet
and anti-Western propaganda include the Soviet Embassy, VOKS (All-Union Society for
Cultural Relations) , the joint Irano-Soviet Cultural Relations Society, and Polish and
Yugoslav cultural and informational organizations. Such agencies provide films, press
releases, and radio programs, and subsidize certain sections of the Iranian press with
money and newsprint. These agencies have sponsored Moslem and Christian religious
missions to Iran from the USSR and promoted junkets to the USSR to win the support
of selected Iranians. Soviet entertainment groups have in the past periodically toured
Iranian provinces and gathered intelligence. Certain other agencies help in the dis-
semination of propaganda and function as covers for agents. These include Intourist
(Soviet travel agency) , Iransovtrans (Soviet commercial transport service) and Tass
(Soviet press agency).
Several agencies maintain or seek to expand Soviet commercial and economic foot-
holds in Iran, frequently in a manner prejudicial to Iranian interests, in contravention
of Iranian law, or in open competition with Iranian Government agencies, e.g., the
Irano-Soviet Fisheries Company, Torgpred (the Soviet Trade Delegation) , and Iran-
sovtrans. These and other commercial agencies, through their large staffs and through
their branches or representatives in the provinces, are also in a position to engage in
activities of a noncommercial nature, e.g., Sovkino (Soviet film distributing company) ,
* Consult Annex III for further details.
** In contrast, the US maintains a diplomatic and consular staff of some 30 US representatives;
a US mission to the Iranian Army consisting of 24 officers and men; and a mission to the Iranian
Gendarmerie of 14 officers and men. Thus US official personnel in Iran total less than 70.
*** In addition to an Embassy, the US maintains two consular posts; one at Tehran and one at
Tabriz.
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Iransovnaf t (Soviet petroleum marketing company) , the Caspian Navigation Company,
and Torgpred. Others, concerning whose activities little is known, may exist primarily
to service various Soviet operations, e.g., the Russo-Iranian Bank and Gosstrakh (Soviet
insurance agency) .
Despite the fragmentary nature of available information, it is known that all Soviet
agencies, regardless of their normal functions, engage in, or further Soviet covert
activities.
6. EFFECTIVENESS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET POLICY.
Although Soviet agencies have assiduously exploited the most likely Iranian chan-
nels in their operations, they have thus far failed to achieve any significant, enduring
successes. The Soviets have unquestionably succeeded in building up groups of political
supporters who will aid their future operations. These supporters, however, drawn
chiefly from the minorities, isolated tribal elements, and leftist and labor ? groups, can-
not be relied upon to act as an effective, disciplined organization comparable to the
European Communist parties, and, since many are motivated by self-interest rather
than by conviction, their cooperation will vary in accordance with the prevailing suc-
cess of Soviet operations against the Iranian Government. With the exception of these
groups, the USSR has failed to achieve political gains. The Iranian cabinet is composed
entirely of conservatives and moderates, and but very few members of the recently
elected Majlis are leftists.
? In the cultural field, it is only among students and intelligentsia, a small group
in Iran, that the Soviets have achieved some success. Attempts to build up pro-Soviet
sentiments among the mass of Moslem Iranians have thus far failed. The extent to
which dissidence has been encouraged by Soviet cultural activities is difficult to esti-
mate, although it has probably been affected more profoundly by the short-sighted
policies of the Iranian Government than by systematic Soviet efforts.
On the economic side, the USSR has likewise met with little success. The Soviets
have achieved no long-term commercial arrangements comparable to the prewar system
of interlocking barter agreements or to their current treaties with Eastern European
countries, which might lead to Iran's economic dependence upon the USSR. More-
over, consistent endeavors since 1941 to exact economic or commercial concessions
which would further long-range political objectives have met with stubborn resistance
on the part of the Iranian Government.
A number of factors have contributed significantly to the failure of Soviet objectives.
?
a. USSR.
The period of the Soviet occupation of Iran, from September 1941 to May 1946,
left a deep and unpleasant impression on nearly all classes of Iranian society. Large-
scale requisitioning by the Red Army, the imposition of unfavorable commercial con-
tracts and the employment of disadvantageous commercial techniques by Soviet offi-
cials, and the harsh diplomatic and propaganda pressures exerted against Iran have
alienated a significant part of the population.
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Soviet tactics in Iran since the formal evacuation of troops have not contributed
to the success of Soviet policy. Despite the withdrawal of the troops, the intensity of
the diplomatic, propaganda, and military pressures (such as troop movements opposite
the Iranian frontiers) which the Soviet Government has continued to exert against the
Government of Iran have served to alienate influential Iranian officials and other
informed Iranians who are well aware of the fate of countries which have yielded to
Soviet pressures. The Soviets have repeatedly violated their diplomatic agreements with
the Iranian Government and have shown no inclination to render disinterested assist-
ance in the solution of Iran's wartime or postwar problems. Iranians have not failed
to note the discrepancy between Soviet expressions of friendship in the cultural field
and the consistently hostile tone of the Soviet press. Finally, the abuses carried on by
Soviet-supported local groups, during their period of influence, were deeply resented by
Iranians of all classes.
b. Iran.
As a result of these factors, Iranian determination to resist Soviet encroach-
ment and domination has probably been greater during recent months than at any
other time in the history of Soviet-Iranian relations.
Current measures to resist Soviet penetration include rejection of the Soviet-
Iranian oil agreement; establishment of a security zone along the frontiers in which
travel by foreigners is permitted only by written permission of the Iranian Government;
the rounding up and arrest of elements suspected of subversive activities such as muha-
jirs and certain minority elements; and an effort to suppress the operations of Iran-
sovtrans.
In addition to the Iranian Government's active policy of resistance to the USSR,
there are certain factors inherent in Iran's social, religious, and political background
which offer obstacles to the success of Soviet objectives.
The apathy generally prevalent among Iranians to theoretical political doc-
trines has acted as a barrier to Soviet efforts. Moreover, the majority of the population
lives under controls which would deter it from engaging in any movement designed to
change the existing social structure. Wealthy landowners maintain semifeudal eco-
nomic control over the mass of the farming population and influence its voting in
national elections. Among the settled and nomadic tribal groups, where the patri-
archal system remains at the basis of the social structure, tribal leaders exercise com-
parable controls over almost one-fourth of the population.
Iran's parliamentary deputies, politicians, and government officials are drawn
largely from the landholding and merchant classes, and accordingly their political
attitude is rightist or conservative. As such, they constitute a strong anti-Soviet and
anti-Communist force.
The country has been subjected many times throughout Iranian history to
invasion, foreign pressure, and foreign control. The traditional Iranian devices of
evasion and procrastination and of reliance upon the support of other powers, which
served as successful weapons against foreign domination in the past, still perform a
useful purpose as a defensive weapon against Soviet encroachment.
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While continuing its traditional support of conservative forces within Iran, the
UK is encouraging the Iranian Government to undertake reforms necessary for internal
stabilization, and thereby acts as a deterrent to Soviet expansion.
A relatively large force of diplomatic and consular officials and agents, many of
whom are well trained through long experience in the country, is charged with the
execution of British policy in Iran. Their operations are aided by an extensive pro-
gram of cultural relations through the medium of the British Council and by important
British commercial agencies in Iran. A number of key officials in the Iranian Govern-
ment, as well as influential tribal leaders, actively cooperate in the execution of British
policy and in the furtherance of British interests.
During the recent Irano-Soviet oil dispute, the UK was inclined to favor an
Iranian policy of appeasing the USSR, as a possible means of protecting the British
oil concession in southwestern Iran. However, the UK will cooperate actively with the
US in countering Soviet pressures against Iran, particularly if these pressures threaten
vital British interests, and thereby will continue to be a factor supporting Iran's
integrity and independence.
d. US.
In recent years the Iranian Government has endeavored to use the US as an ob-
stacle to Soviet expansion in Iran and as a guarantee against any possible Anglo-Soviet
agreement for the partition of Iran into spheres of influence. The Iranian Government
has accordingly solicited US diplomatic support and, with US encouragement, has suc-
ceeded in resisting Soviet pressures and demands.
Although US commercial interests in Iran are relatively limited, the US has
major strategic and political interests in this country where present conditions con-
stitute a potential threat to world peace. The US, therefore, encourages the Iranian
Government to bolster its internal stability by means of appropriate reforms in order to
render Iran less vulnerable to Soviet encroachment. To this end the US has supplied
military missions to increase the efficiency of the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie, has
agreed to provide surplus military equipment to Iran,* and views with favor Iran's
interest in applying for a World Bank loan to be used in carrying out a long-range
development program. In recent years, moreover, the US has consistently provided
Iran with strong diplomatic support and has sponsored Iran's case against the USSR
in the Security Council. At present, therefore, the US probably constitutes the most
important single factor militating against the successful execution of Soviet policy in
Iran.
Although these internal and external influences, which inspire Iran's policy
of resistance to the USSR, have resulted thus far in vitiating the effect of Soviet activi-
ties and in frustrating Soviet aims, Iran's continued ability to maintain a strong and
vigilant stand against future Soviet penetration and pressure would be adversely
affected by the following developments:
? * The Iranian parliament accepted the US arms credit offer on 17 February 1948.
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(1) Failure of current efforts by the Iranian Government and Army to gain the
effective cooperation of Iranian tribal groups;
(2) Failure of the Iranian Government to improve the loyalty, morale, and
efficiency of its security forces, and to obtain the equipment necessary for the mainte-
nance of internal security;
(3) Continuing failure on the part of the Iranian Government to resolve inter-
nal political conflicts and to execute administrative reforms and economic-social devel-
opment as means of reducing susceptibility to Soviet penetration;
(4) Failure of the Iranian Government to suppress the country's reactionary
and antiforeign tendencies, which threaten to counteract Iran's limited democratic and
material progress and to discourage acceptance of foreign aid;
(5) Psychological reverses arising from any reduction in US willingness to
extend moral and material aid to Iran, or from any setback to the US in maintaining
its balance of power with the USSR, either of which might result in Iran's adoption of
an untenable policy of isolationism;
(6) Continued failure of Iranian and foreign intelligence agencies to secure
adequate information concerning the activities of Soviet agencies and Soviet-supported
local groups, in order to assess correctly the course of future Soviet efforts to dominate
Iran.
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ANNEX I
DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENTS EMPLOYED IN SOVIET OPERATIONS
Diplomatic documents which contain articles involving Soviet guarantees of, or
interest in, the maintenance of Iran's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and inde-
pendence include: (1) the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship of 26 February 1921; *
(2) the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Guaranty and Neutrality of 1 October 1927; * (3) the
Tri-Partite Treaty of Alliance between the USSR, Great Britain, and Iran of 29 January
1942; and (4) the US-British-Soviet Declaration of Tehran of 1 December 1943.
1. THE SOVIET-IRANIAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP; 26 FEBRUARY 1921.
Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Treaty of Friendship of 1921 have current political
significance.
Article 4
"Recognizing the right of each people to the free and unhindered settlement of its
own political fate, each of the High Contracting Parties disclaims and will strictly
refrain from interference in the internal affairs of the other Party."
Article 5
"Both the High Contracting Parties bind themselves:
"1. Not to permit the formation or existence on their territory of organizations or
groups, under whatever name, or of separate individuals, who have made it their object
to struggle against Persia or Russia, against the States federated with the latter, and
similarly not to permit on their territory the recruiting or mobilization of persons for
the armies or armed forces of such organizations.**
"2. To forbid those states or organizations, under whatever name, which make it
their object to struggle against the other High Contracting Party, to bring into the
territory or to take through the territory of each of the High Contracting Parties any-
thing that may be used against the other High Contracting Party.**
"3. By all means at their disposal to prohibit the existence on their territory or on
the territory of federated States of the troops or armed forces of any third State what-
soever, the presence of which would constitute a threat to the frontiers, interests, or
security of the other High Contracting Party."
* Excerpts from this treaty are taken from J. Reeves Childs, Perso-Russian Treaties and Notes
of 1828-1931.
** These clauses are applicable to the action of the USSR in harboring in Soviet territory
Azerbaijan Democrats and Barzani Kurds, some of whom brought their arms into the USSR at the
time of entry.
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Article 6
"Both the High Contracting Parties are agreed that in case on the part of third
countries there should be attempts by means of armed intervention to realize a rapacious
policy on the territory of Persia or to turn the territory of Persia into a base for military
action against the R.S.F.S.R., and if thereby danger should threaten the frontiers of the
R.S.F.S.R. or its federated associates, and if the Persian Government after warning on
the part of the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. shall prove to be itself not strong enough
to prevent this danger, the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. shall have the right to send
its troops into Persian territory in order to take necessary military measures in the
interests of self-defense. When the danger has been removed the Government of the
R.S.F.S.R. undertakes immediately to withdraw its troops beyond the frontiers of
Persia."
Article 7
"In view of the fact that the provisions contained in Article 6 are applicable as
regards security on the Caspian Sea, both the High Contracting Parties are agreed that
should there be subjects of a third government who may make use of their presence in
the Persian fleet for purposes unfriendly with regard to the R.S.F.S.R., the Govern-
ment of the R.S.F.S.R. shall have the right to demand from the Government of Persia
the removal of the said harmful elements."
A clarification of the above-quoted treaty is contained in a Soviet note of 12 Decem-
ber 1921 (appended to the treaty as Annex II) which reads in part:
". . . Articles 5 and 6 of our Treaty have only in view an active and armed assault
upon Russia or its Allies amongst the Soviet Republics on the part of partisans of the
overthrown regime and their proteges amongst foreign powers which, in addition to the
extension of assistance to the enemies of the Workers' and Peasants' Republic, may
under any pretense or with armed forces occupy a part of Persian territory and there
organize a base for a direct attack with their own or with counterrevolutionary forces
against the Soviet Republics or Russia itself."
2. TiE SOVIET-IRANIAN TREATY OF GUARANTY AND NEUTRALITY, 1 OCTOBER 1927.
Article 2
"Each of the Contracting Parties agrees to refrain from attacks and from any
aggressive act against the other party, or from introducing its armed forces on the
territory of the other Party.
"If either of the Contracting Parties should be attacked by one or several third
Powers, the other Contracting Party undertakes to maintain its neutrality during the
entire period of hostilities; and the Party attacked may not violate this neutrality not-
withstanding any strategical considerations, tactical or political, or benefits that might
be derived therefrom."
Article 4
"According to the stipulations provided in Articles 4 and 5 of the Treaty of Febru-
ary 26, 1921, each Contracting Party, intending not to interfere in the internal affairs
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? of the other Contracting Party and not to carry on propaganda or warfare against the
government of the other Party, shall strictly forbid such activities to its employees in
the territory of the other Party.
"If the subjects of one of the Contracting Parties in the territory of the other
Party should engage in propaganda and warfare forbidden by the authorities of the
other Party, the Government of this territory shall have the right to put an end to the
activities of these citizens and to employ against them the established sanctions.
"By virtue of the aforementioned articles, moreover, both Parties agree not to admit
on their territory the formation or activity of:
"(1) Organizations or groups under whatever name whose purpose is warfare
against the government of the other Contracting Party, either by violence, insurrection,
or stealth;
"(2) Organizations or groups arrogating to themselves the role of the government
of the other Country or a part thereof whose purpose is also warfare against the gov-
ernment of the other Contracting Party by the above-mentioned methods, or an
attempt against its peace, security, or territorial integrity.
"On the basis of the foregoing both Contracting Parties also agree to forbid in their
territory recruiting, as well as the importation of armed forces, arms, ammunition, or
any other war material, for the organizations mentioned above."
?
?
3. THE TRI-PARTITE TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE USSR, GREAT BRITAIN, AND
IRAN, 29 JANUARY 1942.
The Tri-Partite Treaty remained in force until the evacuation of UK and Soviet
troops from Iran in 1946. During a period of more than four years the USSR repeat-
edly violated clauses of the treaty which bound it to "respect the territorial integrity,
sovereignty, and political independence of Iran"; to "disturb as little as possible the
administration and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the
normal movements of the population, and the application of Iranian laws and regula-
tions"; and to "safeguard the economic existence of the Iranian people against the
privations and difficulties arising as a result of the present war." Between 2 May 1945
and 23 November 1945, the Iranian Government sent twenty-four notes of protest to the
Soviet Embassy at Tehran and eventually presented charges of violation in detail in
Documents submitted to the Security Council at its third meeting, 28 January 1946, by
the delegate of Iran.
4. THE US-BRITISH-SOVIET DECLARATION ON IRAN, TEHRAN, 1 DECEMBER 1943.
Paragraphs 4 and 5:
"With respect to the postwar period, the Governments of the United States, the
USSR, and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any
economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full con-
sideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or
international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.
"The Governments of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom are
at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the inde-
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pendence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the partici-
pation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of
international peace, security, and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the
principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed."
The USSR has flagrantly violated this agreement by threatening Iran's inde-
pendence, by infringement of its sovereign rights, by attempts to violate its territorial
integrity, and by unscrupulous economic exploitation. (See also above under 3.)
5. SOVIET-IRANIAN OIL AGREEMENTS.
Soviet efforts to acquire oil rights in Iran, which have up to the present been unsuc-
cessful, date back to 1925 when the USSR took title, at third hand, to rights in a con-
cession covering the Kavir Khurian region in the district of Samnan. Following the
Allied occupation of Iran, the Soviet Ambassador in a letter to the Iranian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs asserted the claim of the USSR to this concession. During the occu-
pation, Soviet Army units were observed drilling for oil within the Kavir Khurian area
and also near Shahi and Bandar Shah on the Caspian coast, but no information is
available on the results of these drillings (MA Tehran R-36-46, 4 March 1946) .
In October and November 1944, when US and UK oil companies were attempting
to obtain concession rights in southeastern Iran, the USSR seized the occasion to press
for a concession in the north. A special mission, headed by S. I. Kavtaradze, Soviet
Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, came to Tehran and presented a proposal covering
exclusive oil and mineral exploration rights in an area of 200,000 square miles in
northern Iran. The decision taken at that time in the Majlis to grant no foreign con-
cessions of any kind until after the end of the war drew bitter comments from Soviet
officials and the press of the USSR.
On 4 April 1946 Prime Minister Qavam exchanged notes with the Soviet Ambassador
at Tehran which provided for the formation of a joint Iranian-Soviet oil company. A
draft agreement was to be submitted to the Majlis for ratification within seven months
from 24 March 1946. During 1947, the USSR displayed considerable irritation over
the delay in ratification of the agreement and dispatched bitter notes of protest to
Prime Minister Qavam and added oral threats. Finally, on 22 October 1947, the Majlis
by an overwhelming majority passed a resolution which invalidated the draft agree-
ment, barred the granting of any concessions to foreign nations or interests, and
envisaged exploitation of any northern oil reserves by Iran, which can enter into negoti-
ations for the sale of this oil to the USSR.
The USSR may at any time press its claim to the Kavir Khurian region or may
renew its attempts to gain an oil concession elsewhere in northern Iran.
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ANNEX II
LOCAL CHANNELS EMPLOYED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES
1. THE TUDEH PARTY.
The Tudeh or "Masses" Party, which enjoyed unquestioned Soviet support and
guidance and served as the Soviets' principal Iranian political instrumentality is cur-
rently displaying a resurgence of activity in all important towns of Iran.
A general account of this party, compiled from unrestricted sources, is given by
G. Lenczowski, "The Communist Movement in Iran," in The Middle East Journal, I,
1 (January 1947), pp. 29-45.
In 1937, during the reign of Riza Shah, fifty-three persons accused of being Com-
munists were given long terms of imprisonment. Released after the Allied occupation
of Iran, they formed the nucleus of the Tudeh Party. Organized early in 1942, the
, party soon became very active. Its leaders included two types of individuals: those
who were sincerely devoted to the improvement of conditions within Iran, and those
who were sympathetic to Communism and who would welcome Soviet domination of
Iran (MA Tehran, R-35-45, 31 March '45) . Not only did the latter group become the
stronger, but the leaders realized that the party could make little progress unaided.
Thus, the Tudeh Party accepted financial aid, support, and direct guidance from offi-
cials and agents of the USSR. In 1945 the membership of the party had reached an esti-
mated 70,000 (MA Teh. R-89-45, 27 Aug. '45), a relatively high figure for Iranian politi-
cal organizations.
Party agitation stressed the familiar communistic themes, and practical action
predominated over theoretical education. The party spoke out against low standards
of living, low wages in industry, the oppression of peasant farmers, the concentration
of wealth and power in the hands of a few, and the "corrupt and reactionary" govern-
ment. Party speakers and publications pictured the USSR as the sincere friend
of Iran.
In the Majlis eight Tudeh deputies carried out disruptive tactics in attempting
to monopolize debate, insulting other members and government officials, and delaying
action on legislation. Upon occasion, following Soviet instructions, the party was
prepared to sacrifice national interests. Thus, in 1944 the party held a number of
demonstrations in favor of Iran's granting an oil concession to the USSR. One such
demonstration was in Parliament Square at Tehran (OSS A-43653, 1 Nov. '44) and others
were at Arak, Isfahan, Meshed, Resht, Tabriz, Ardebil, and Maku (MA Teh. R-89-45,
27 Aug. '45).
Specific evidence of direct Soviet support of the Tudeh Party is not lacking. Sub-
jects of the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan led a Tudeh demonstration at Tabriz (OSS
4-60742, 28 June '45) . The Soviet consul at Zabul aided in the formation of a branch
of the Tudeh Party there and attempted to establish the party at Zahidan (Teh. 1100, 10
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Aug. '46) . The party was presented with forty-nine military cars and trucks by
Iransovtrans (SSU A-69310, 16 May '46) . Tudeh Party meetings were protected by
Soviet troops, and party members were transported to demonstrations in Soviet vehicles.
The power and influence of the party declined in the fall and winter of 1946 follow-
ing repressive action by the central government. In early 1947 the eleven-man Cen-
tral Committee resigned and was replaced by a Temporary Committee of seven members.
Its members were Dr. Riza Radmanesh, Dr. Feridun Keshavarz, Khalil Maleki, Ehsan
Tabari, Dr. Yazdi, Nushin, and Frutan. Of this group only Drs. Radmanesh and
Keshavarz had been on the earlier committee. This action and the accompanying
reorganization were represented as a "nationalization" of the party, and the party
claimed that extreme and irresponsible elements had been dismissed; in actual fact,
however, many sincere liberals left the party while the known Communist sympathizers
remained (MA Teh. R-10-47, 20 Jan. '47) .
In the summer of 1947 Tudeh activity was resumed on a considerable scale. Prime
Minister Qavam appeared concerned and invited the Tudeh leaders to a meeting (SO
7164, 18 June '47). Members were enrolled in large numbers at Abadan and its vicinity
(SO 8250, 26 Sept. '47) , and the Iranian military intelligence claimed that there were
179 Tudeh Party cells in Abadan (Basra 21, 16 Sept. '47) ; security officers of the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company estimated that there were about 3,000 Tudeh Party members in
Abadan (MA Teh. R-116-47, 7 Oct. '47) . Members were advocating the formation of
a joint Irano-Soviet oil company in northern Iran. Khurramshahr was the center
from which Communist literature was distributed to Basra. Tudeh leaders at Ahwaz
visited some of the oil producing fields (Basra 21, Sept. '47) .
Farther north, the Tudeh Party was revived at Kermanshah under the auspices of
VOKS (CIA 35474, 28 Aug. '47) . At Tehran heads of the party, including Dr. Rad-
manesh, Dr. Yazdi, Dr. Jowdat, and Keshavarz, met with the Soviet Ambassador (SO
8180, 26 Aug. '47) . Also at Tehran the Javanan-i-Tudeh, or "Tudeh Youth," was
headed by Dr. Radmanesh and had a membership of about 800. Group meetings,
held under the guise of studying Russian, were taught Communist doctrines (SO 8162,
6 Aug. '47) . Each group consists ideally of 25 members, and the age of the members
is between 15 and 25 years (Iraq Command Intelligence Review #23, 14 Aug. '47) .*
Throughout 1947, Tudeh Party newspapers and affiliated leftist organs (see III-
5, c) have continued to appear, despite occasional suppression by the Iranian Govern-
ment. These papers, which receive subsidies and newsprint from Soviet authorities,
present a consistently leftist and pro-Soviet point of view.
2. DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AZERBAIJAN (DPA) .
Remnants of the DPA, which had active Soviet support in the establishment of
the autonomous regime in Azerbaijan, still exist within Iran and in adjacent Soviet
territory.
* Despite reports of a split in the Tudeh Party by the secession of a faction called the Iranian
Tudeh Socialist Party under the leadership of Khalil Maleki, Anvar Khamei, Ismail Zenjani, and
Zavesh (Teh. desp. 597, 19 Jan '48) , the return of this faction to the Tudeh was publicly announced
in January (MA Teh. M-127, 30 Jan. '48) .
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General and specific examples of Soviet participation in the autonomous regime
established by this party are contained in the following material: ORE 19, Develop-
ments in the Azerbaijan. Meeting, 28 January 1946, by the delegate of Iran; George
Lenozowski, "The Communist Movement in Iran," The Middle East Journal, I, 1 ( (Jan-
uary 1947), pp. 41-45;) OSS A-48470, 19 Jan. '45; and OSS A-56368, 5 June '45; MID,
Azerbaijan, a case history of Soviet infiltration, 23 Jan. 1946.
This thorough participation by the USSR included such activity as the use of
Soviet troops to prevent the movement of Iranian Army and Gendarmerie units
within Azerbaijan; the use of Soviet troops to halt Iranian forces dispatched from
Tehran toward Azerbaijan; direct interference with the work of Iranian officials and
the issuance of orders for their departure from assigned posts; the presence of Soviet
officers and soldiers and of nationals of Soviet Azerbaijan in the ranks of the DPA
(SSU A-64531, 30 Jan. '46) ; the infiltration of large numbers of Soviet subjects (esti-
mated at over 10,000) ; the furnishing of arms, printing presses, a broadcasting station
originally sent to the USSR under lend-lease (Teh. 60, 21 Jan. '47) , and other material
to the DPA; the presence of two Soviet generals at the meeting in Tabriz when a treaty
between the DPA and the Kurdish Republic was signed (SSU A-67635, 6 May '46) ;
the refusal to allow nationals of other powers to visit Tabriz; and repeated warnings
to the Central Government of Iran not to use armed force against the Azerbaijan re-
gime.
? In spite of the fact that the export of foodstuffs from the province was forbidden
by the DPA, Soviet officials made a persistent attempt to strip the area. At least 60,000
tons of grain and thousands of head of cattle were rounded up by Soviet Trade Dele-
gation agents for dispatch to the USSR (Tabriz, unnumbered, 21 Aug. '47). The
Tabriz-Julfa railway line was used for the shipment of much of this material (MA Teh.
R-216-46, Aug. '46). At Tabriz a Soviet canning factory was set up to process mutton
and beef for the USSR. Soviet trade officials attempted to continue the movement
of cattle across the frontier even after the collapse of the DPA regime (Teh. 264, 15
Jan. '47). At Astara merchandise collected in the looting of the entire bazaar was
trucked across the adjacent Soviet frontier by DPA army members (Teh. 264, 15
Jan. '47).
The supply of arms by the USSR to the DPA is a separate subject in itself. In an
effort to bolster the DPA regime, on the night of 10 December 1946, the Soviets sent
ten truckloads of small arms and ammunition from Julfa to Tabriz (MA Teh. R-265-
46, 16 Dec. '46). Within a few days after the occupation of Azerbaijan by central gov-
ernment forces, some 20,000 rifles had been collected and it was believed that the number
would reach 100,000. This material included arms taken by the Soviet forces from
the Iranian Army in 1941; rifles made during the war for the USSR at the Iranian
Government factory in Tehran; 1,000 American Colt automatic pistols and 500 Ameri-
can tommy guns supplied to the USSR under lend-lease; and 1,000 German machine
guns and Belgian pistols which could only have come from the USSR (MA Teh. R-265-
46, 16 Dec. '46; Teh. 1, 2 Jan. '47; and MA Teh. M 3006, 7 Jan. '47).
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After the collapse of the DPA on 11 December 1946, the Soviet vice consul at
Tabriz went to the frontier bridge at Julfa and gave instructions to the Soviet officials
and guards stationed there. That day and the next the bridge was opened for the
passage into the USSR of 110 trucks and at least 2,000 DPA leaders, officials, army
members, partisans, and muhajirs.* The number included Pishevari, Prime Minister
of the regime; General Ghulam Yahya, Minister of War; Elhami, Minister of Finance;
General Panahian, Chief of Staff in the DPA army and formerly a colonel in the Iranian
military school at Tehran; and Padegan, assistant head of the Tudeh Party at Tabriz
and later secretary-general of the DPA and vice president of its parliament (MA Teh.
R-21-47, 6 Feb. '47; MA Teh. R-265, 16 Dec. '46) .
The bulk of the Ardabil DPA garrison marched in formation into the USSR. The
DPA members of Maku crossed into the USSR at Pul Dasht. At Astara on 15 Decem-
ber, approximately 800 DPA soldiers who had previously crossed into the USSR returned
under "General" Danishian and entrenched themselves south of the town. Later in
the day they fought against the arriving Iranian forces. On the morning of the 16th
they had withdrawn to Astara and under the direction of the Soviet trade agent were
looting the bazaar and trucking the loot across the frontier. Shops were set afire and
nineteen Soviet soldiers and an officer crossed into Iran under the pretext of putting
out the fire. At noon the Iranian forces moved into the town and, after stiff fighting,
the DPA members crossed over into the USSR (MA Teh. R-21-47, 6 Feb. '47). General
Danishian had been commander of the DPA garrison at Zenjan and later Under-
Secretary of the Ministry of War in the Azerbaijan regime. Most of the DPA members
who fled to Bandar Pahlevi were arrested, but some escaped to the USSR in boats of the
Caspian Fisheries Company (MA Teh. R-24-47, 11 Feb. '47).
On the night of 23 December, Pishevari, speaking from an unidentified Soviet
radio station, appealed to the DPA not to give up the fight (Teh. 1624, 24 Dec. '46) .
Early in January 1947 the Iranian Minister of Propaganda informed the press
that the Iranian Government had made a request of the USSR for the extradition of
Pishevari and other DPA leaders (Teh. 10, 7 Jan. '47) . The Soviet Embassy was reported
to have informed Prime Minister Qavam that Pishevari and his groups could not be
located (Teh. 89, Feb. '47). However, in October 1947 Pishevari and Yahya were
reported to be in the vicinity of Baku (MA Teh. M 71, 21 Oct. '47) while some 2,000 for-
mer DPA members were near Astara (MA Teh. M 39, 14 Aug. '47) .
In spite of the collapse of the autonomous regime a considerable number of muha-
jirs remained in Azerbaijan (Tabriz, 18 Aug. '47) and several thousand more are
believed to have entered the province in recent months (Teh. 929, 25 Sept. '47).
* Muhajir: an Arabic term meaning "one who flees or emigrates." The term, used in connec-
tion with elements active in the DPA movement, refers to: (1) Soviet-indoctrinated Iranian
nationals who fled to the USSR during the reign of Riza Shah; (2) refugees from the USSR who
entered Iran prior to 1941 and received Iranian citizenship; and (3) Turki-speaking Soviet nationals
who were sent into Iran primarily from the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic or, in smaller numbers, from
the Trans-Caspian Soviet Republics.
Muhajirs are also active in other Soviet-inspired disruptive activities within Iran; such activity
is noted in this paper under other headings.
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In September 1947 the Iranian Army initiated vigorous measures to round up
muhajirs, during the period of the Soviet-Iranian oil dispute. Several thousand per-
sons were rounded up and interned in southern Iran, at Bandar Abbas, Bushire, and
Burujird. After being screened, a number were released and permitted to settle in
designated areas of southern Iran, others were assigned to public works projects under
guard, and others were imprisoned on Hormuz Island (MA Teh. 53, 20 Sept. '47; MA
Teh. R-110-47, 20 Sept. '47).
Attempts of the Iranian Government to round up these people drew unfavorable
notice from the Soviet press, indicating the continued interest of the USSR in these
groups.
3. COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS.
No recent information is available concerning the few known Iranian political
parties which in the past served in varying degrees as Communist front organizations.
The only Communist front organization believed to be active at present consists of rem-
nants of the left wing of the Iran Party.
a. The Society of Friends of Soviet Azerbaijan.
The Society of Friends of Soviet Azerbaijan was organized at Tabriz in 1946
(SSU A-66682, 29 March '46). Its branches throughout the province of Azerbaijan
were headed by muhajirs, and its members included all the prominent officials of the
DPA (MA Teh. R-247-46, 9 Nov. '48) .
b. The Freedom Front.
The pro-Soviet Freedom Front active in Tehran between 1943 and 1947 was a
loosely affiliated group of the owners or editors of some thirty-one publications, many of
small circulation and occasional issue, printed at Tehran and in the provinces. The
Tudeh Party papers belonged to this group, and its other members displayed varying
degrees of cooperation in stressing a pro-Soviet line. Moreover, Soviet officers
attempted to organize a Freedom Party at Meshed (OSS A-56273, 2 June '45; OSS A-
59844, 2 Aug. '45).
c. The Iran Party.
In 1946 the Iran Party was won over to pro-Soviet beliefs to such an extent
that its leaders, including Allahyar Saleh, signed an agreement with the Tudeh Party
providing for the formation of a "liberal front" (Teh. 919, 1 July '46). Later the Iran
Party split into two factions; the right-wing joined Qavam's Demokrat-i-Iran Party.
d. The Jangali Party.
In December 1945 a coalition was formed in the Caspian coastal area between
the Tudeh, Jangali,* and Mihan Parties (MA Teh. R-34-46, 21 Feb. '46). The Jangali
Party, heir to a long tradition of opposition to central government control, was a left-
wing group not specifically pro-Tudeh in character. In the autumn of 1946, the party
? * The party comprised Jangali tribesmen of Gilan province in northern Iran.
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split into two factions in Resht, and the larger faction united with the Tudeh (MA Teh.
R-23-47, 11 Feb. '47).
4. PRO-SOVIET LABOR GROUPS.
Although the Iranian Government has undertaken extensive restrictive measures
during 1946 and 1947 against the Central Committee of Trade Unions, a nucleus of the
Committee still exists which retains considerable influence among the industrial
workers of Iran.
Prior to 1941 unions were not permitted in Iran and regulations covering working
conditions in industry and hours of labor were not generally enforced. After 1942
the Central Committee, directed by a flagrantly pro-Soviet leader of the Tudeh Party,
Riza Rusta, was very active among the 200,000 industrial workers of Iran. Tudeh
Party leaders were active in the formation of the Central Committee and held the key
positions in the Committee organization. The two organizations consistently pursued
identical policies.
The Committee directed the formation of labor unions in the industrial centers of
Iran. Labor agitators, some trained in the USSR, made inflammatory appeals to mass
emotions, and as a result there were bloody clashes between unionists and their oppo-
nents at industrial centers, including Abadan, Khurramshahr, and Isfahan. The
USSR maintained training schools which offered six-week courses for labor agitators;
one school was located ten miles north of the frontier of the province of Azerbaijan, and
another was north of the frontier of Khurasan (OSS A-3173, 16 June '44) .
By 1946 the Committee, through its affiliated unions, had succeeded in obtaining
considerable political power by carrying on activities which were directed toward under-
mining the Iranian Government. By spring of 1947, the Iranian Government had suc-
ceeded in suppressing the organized activities of the Committee, had taken most of
Iran's unions under the general jurisdiction of the newly formed Department of Labor,
and had removed or arrested most of the Central Committee's former leaders, including
Riza Rusta.*
Direct Soviet labor activity included support in seating Committee and Tudeh-
sponsored representatives from Iran in place of the official delegates sent by the Iranian
Government at the WFTU meeting held at Paris in 1945 (Report of the World Trade
Union Conference, Congress, Sept. 25-Oct. 8, 1945, Paris).
In 1947 two Communist members of a three-man WFTU mission sent to inspect
labor conditions in Iran spoke out strongly against the role of the Iranian Government
in the labor movement, and demanded the release of former Committee leaders still
under arrest. These charges were echoed by the press of the USSR and by the WFTU
secretariat.
5. PRO-SOVIET ELEMENTS WITHIN THE IRANIAN ARMY.
Although the Iranian Army could offer no effective resistance to Soviet attack,
the USSR endeavors to hamper its reorganization, to subvert its officers and men, and
*Rusta was released from jail in November 1947.
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? to collect data relative to its battle order, internal administration, and individual offi-
cers. Efforts to penetrate the army are carried on at every level: Tudeh Party mem-
bers and Soviet agents work to win new party members or Soviet sympathizers, while
Soviet officials maintain social contact with the higher echelons.
The USSR has endeavored to play a part in the arming and training of the Iranian
Army, and opposes the strengthening of the force by any other power. The USSR
refused to return arms taken from the army in 1941, and a number of these weapons
were later found in the hands of the DPA.
At the time of the Tehran Conference, Stalin offered the Shah tanks and aircraft.
The Shah accepted the offer, until he learned that Soviet instructors were to accom-
pany the materiel (CID 736600, 8 May '44). In the summer of 1946 an offer to supply
military equipment was made to Prime Minister Qavam (Teh. 1431, 2 Nov. '46). The
USSR inspired and launched press attacks against the two US military missions in Iran
and against the proposed purchase by the Iranian Government of US surplus military
supplies.
During the period of the autonomous regime in Azerbaijan, Soviet influence was
demonstrated by the fact that small groups of officers and men of the army and air
force deserted to join the DPA forces. Some of these officers and men came from units
which had been stationed in Azerbaijan. A larger group deserted from a unit stationed
in Khurasan, and some of its members made their way across country to Tabriz. Some
deserters came from Tehran, other points in central Iran, and from as far away as
southeastern Iran where certain officers known to hold pro-Soviet views had been
? assigned to distant posts in order to lessen their opportunities for political activity.
Several members of the Iranian Air Force flew army planes to Azerbaijan.
Following these incidents, efforts were made to weed out pro-Soviet officers from
the Iranian Army, although some divisional commanders assert that such elements are
still present in their units. Several ranking officers of the Iranian Army are known to
have strong pro-Soviet views. Typical of this group is General Amanullah Mirza Jahan-
bani, who attended the Imperial Russian Military Academy, speaks Russian, is married
to a Russian, and has been active in the Irano-Soviet Cultural Relations Society.
?
6. PRO-SOVIET ELEMENTS WITHIN THE IRANIAN STATH RAILWAYS.
Soviet penetration of the Iranian State Railways is carried on principally by placing
muhajirs in positions on the railway, and through the medium of the Tudeh Party.
The effectiveness of the propaganda activity of Tudeh members and Soviet Army
officers in charge of personnel on the northern section of the railway was demonstrated
at the time of the autonomous regime in Azerbaijan. Numerous employees left their
posts in north-central Iran for Azerbaijan, where they operated the section of the
Iranian railway controlled by the DPA.
After the Soviet evacuation of Iran the Tudeh Party managed to arrange the trans-
fer of a considerable number of the employees of the northern section of the line to the
central and southern sections (SSU A-69310, 16 May '46) . The party was especially
active in the union of railway employees, managed to win over some of the top officials,
and in 1946 was fairly close to winning control of the organization.
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In the summer of 1947 Tudeh Party members and sympathizers were reported to be
employed in a number of key stations throughout the railway system, notably at Ahwaz,
Qazvin, and Arak (CIG SO 7854, 2 July '47) .
7. TRIBAL ELEMENTS.
As early as 1927 the Soviet Government proposed to make an "independent repub-
lic" for the few Kurdish tribal elements within the USSR, but later on this plan was
dropped in favor of activity among all the Kurds (G. Agabakov, The Russian Secret
Terror, 1931, p. 101) .
One purpose of such activity is clearly stated in a USSR handbook. ". . . the
Kurdish part of the population can represent, with clever political preparation, a factor
which would contribute to the sucesses of the Red Army. . . . An extremely dis-
agreeable political situation can develop for the enemy in Iranian Azerbaijan and
Kurdistan, since the inhabitants of these provinces are not only under class oppression,
but are also suffering from ruthless national oppression. Consideration of the national
movement and unfolding of a corresponding political propaganda would contribute to
the success of the USSR" (Survey of Iran. High Command of the Armed Forces
(USSR) , Office of Foreign Countries Defense; Foreign Countries in General, 1941, p. 57) .
Although the tribes as a whole maintain a strong anti-Soviet attitude, certain
elements among the Kurds have proved receptive to Soviet manipulation, have accepted
guidance and support from Soviet representatives, and have aided in implementing
Soviet policy.
a. Remnants of the "Kurdish Republic."
No current information is available concerning the activities of former leaders
of the so-called "Kurdish Republic," who escaped execution at the hands of the Iranian
Government and fled from Iranian territory, or of those who remained in Iran.
Soviet support and direction of this short-lived regime is amply documented
(A. Roosevelt, Jr., "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," Middle East Journal, I, 3 (1947) ,
pp. 247-269; ORE No. 19, Developments in the Azerbaijan Situation, 4 June '47; Docu-
ments submitted to the Security Council at its third meeting, 28 January '46 by the
delegate of Iran; SSU A-61562, 22 Sept. '45; and SSU A-67635, 6 May '46) . After its
dissolution in December 1946, some of its leaders asserted their allegiance to the
Iranian Government. However, the Iranian Government's execution of certain leaders
who had figured prominently in the regime so embittered others that they fled to the
USSR and Iraq or remained in contact with Soviet representatives in Iran. These ele-
ments can be expected to provide active support to Soviet operations in the future.
b. The Barzani Kurds.
A group of the (Iraqi) Barzani Kurds, which, together with members of the
DPA, numbers 6,000 to 8,000 men,* is now assembled in the USSR across the border from
Azerbaijan. These Barzanis, a restless, aggressive element of the Kurds, entered north-
western Iran under pressure from the armed forces of Iraq. Reaching the area south-
* This figure is provided by the Iranian Chief of Staff.
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? west of Lake Urmia, their leaders went for advice to the Soviet consul at Rizaiyeh. In
the spring and summer of 1947 the Iranian forces attempted to round up and disarm the
Barzanis. However, a number estimated at 650 to 1,500 slipped through, or bribed their
way through, the army cordon and crossed the Araxes River into the USSR (MA Teh.
M 06, 27 June '47) ; a number of these elements took their arms into the Soviet Union.
They are now held by the Soviets near the frontier across from Iranian Azerbaijan (MA
Teh. M 39, 14 Aug. '47) . Despite reports suggesting that the Barzanis are dissatisfied
with their treatment in the USSR (Teh. A-164, 31 Oct. '47), it is possible that the
Soviets may send some of them back into Iran if a situation favorable to the spread of
internal disorder develops within Azerbaijan. The Barzanis now in the USSR, together
with those in northeastern Iraq and Iranian Kurdish sympathizers, constitute an ele-
ment which could be exploited by the Soviets in connection with guerrilla activities or
other inspired disturbances (MA Teh. 531, 31 Oct. '47).
?
?
c. Elements of the Jalali Kurds.
In the summer of 1947 the Jalali, a Kurdish tribe in the Maku area of north-
western Iran, were reported to be harboring muhajirs and Soviet agents, and in return
were receiving arms from the USSR (Teh. 379, 15 May '47). Because of their geo-
graphical proximity and the pro-Soviet orientation of at least one of their tribal chief-
tains, the Jalali are in a position to render considerable service to the Soviets in facili-
tating the infiltration of agents into Iran.
d. Herki Kurd Renegades.
The present whereabouts of Zaro Beg Bahaduri and his Kurdish, Armenian, and
Nestorian followers is unknown.
After twenty-five years in exile, Zaro Beg returned to Iran immediately after
the Allied occupation of the country in 1941. With Soviet aid he recovered villages
confiscated from him and thereafter killed gendarmes who entered the area. Although
wanted by the Iranian Government, he frequently visited the Soviet consul at Rizaiyeh
(MA Teh. R-164-46, 22 July '46) . He was a marshal of the forces of the Kurdish Repub-
lic (Teh. 130, 25 Feb. '47) and took part in the signing of the treaty between the
Kurdish Republic and the DPA Government (Tabriz 146, 7 May '46, and Teh. 178, 14
Nov. '46). Later, aided by the Begzadeh tribe, he resisted Iranian Army forces (Teh.
145, 1 March '47) and in April 1947 crossed over into Iraq accompanied by renegade
Herki elements and several thousand Barzanis (Teh. 294, 18 April '47).
e. The Picheranlu.
This Kurdish tribe, located in Khurasan not far from the Soviet-Iranian fron-
tier, is suspected of having connections with Soviet and Tudeh Party activities in the
area. The high command of the Iranian Army has accordingly ordered the arrest of
the two leading chieftains of the tribe (MA Teh. M 73, 22 Oct. '47). Nothing further is
known concerning the nature or extent of Soviet activities among the tribes of north-
eastern Iran.
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f. Disaffected Elements among the Khuzistan Arabs.
Disaffection among the Arab tribes of Khuzistan is intense because of the
oppressive measures of the Iranian Government, which has persisted in treating these
people as undesirable minorities. Their close connections with Arab tribes in Iraq tend
to develop among them separatist inclinations whenever governmental oppression
becomes severe. Soviet agencies desiring to exploit this disaffection have at various
times made contacts with the tribal leaders. In 1942 the Soviet consul in Kermanshah,
together with other Soviet agents, participated in a meeting with leaders of the Bani
Turuf tribes, but without achieving any success.
8. MINORITY ELEMENTS.
The official Soviet view with regard to minority groups within Iran is contained in
the Soviet Survey of Iran. "The dissatisfaction among various nationalities and tribes,
such as the Turks of Azerbaijan, Kurds, Turkomen, Armenians, and Jews, is intensified
also by the fact that in spite of a thousand barriers, the truth about- the condition of
the national minorities in the union of the USSR, especially in Soviet Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Turkmenistan, and Tadzhikistan, seeps through. It follows from the above
that in the areas in which these national minorities and tribes live those in charge of the
Iranian Government cannot count upon the political unity and firm support of the
province."
a. Armenians.
Elements of the Armenian minority in Iran continue to provide a useful chan-
nel for Soviet exploitation. In general, the Armenians maintain nationalistic senti-
ments toward the Armenian "homeland" and traditionally look upon Russia as their
protector against Moslem discrimination. These factors result in a sympathetic
orientation toward the Soviet Union and, in some cases, in active defection vis-a-vis the
Iranian Government, manifested by the support which Armenians gave to the Soviet-
sponsored Azerbaijan Republic.
The USSR, in December 1945, announced throughout the Middle East that
Armenians resident in the several countries of this area would be welcomed as immi-
grants to the Soviet Republic of Armenia. The Soviet consulate at Tehran handled
applications for Iranian Armenians and dispatched the emigrants directly to the USSR
without clearance through Iranian governmental channels. Recruiting stations were
set up at Isfahan, Arak, Tabriz, and elsewhere. More recently, with the re-establish-
ment of frontier control, the Iranian Government is making it difficult for Iranian
Armenians to emigrate to the USSR (Teh. 515, 6 Oct. 1947) . Soviet authorities state
that 25,597 Armenians emigrated from Iran during 1946 (OIR-DRN Inf. Note No. 131,
7 Nov. 1947).
One confirming bit of evidence in relation to the success of Soviet propaganda
among the Armenians is the fact that the Armenian bishop of Julf a (Isfahan) is a
notorious Soviet agent (OSS A-3173, 16 June '44, and MID WDGS 3144.0300, 28 Oct.
'46).
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? b. Assyrians.
Some 20,000 to 30,000 Assyrians (Nestorian Christians) live in the region just
west of Urmia. This minority proved receptive to activity of the Tudeh Party among
its members, and individuals also took part in the DPA movement. (OSS A-57974, 2
June '45, and ciss A-55537, 19 Apr. '45.)
During the disorders in the Assyrian villages near Rizaiyeh and Shahpur in
reprisal for Assyrian sympathy with the DPA after the fall of the Azerbaijan regime (13
December 1946), Soviet consular officials were active in gathering evidence of outrages
against the Assyrians. Statements were signed by people who had been robbed or
attacked; devastated villages, looted houses, and the bodies of murdered Assyrians were
photographed; and testimony was taken from witnesses (Tabriz 23 June '47; 14 August
'47; 29 September '47).
9. THE QAJARS.
Influential members of the Qajar family have strongly supported Soviet policies
and are in close contact with Soviet officials. Recent reports suggest that the USSR
may be lending encouragement to the dynastic and political aspirations of the
Qajars in order to promote regional movements or to undermine the authority of the
present anti-Soviet regime.
The Qajar dynasty ruled Iran from the end of the eighteenth century until Riza
Shah ascended the throne in 1925. At this time the constitution was amended to bar
? members of the Qajar family from the royal succession.
When Iran adopted the Western practice of family names, .branches of the Qajar
line assumed a number of different family names; hence, their names do not always
identify them as Qajars.
Active Qajar leaders of the Tudeh Party include Abbas Iskandari and Iraj Iskan-
dar. Abu Nasr Azod is an intellectual leader of the Tudeh Party who shuns publicity.
Muzaffar Firuz was originally high in the councils of the so-called anti-Soviet party of
Sayyid Zia ad-din Tabatabai, but deserted this party and came out with pro-Soviet
views. In 1946 and 1947, as a close associate of Prime Minister Qavam, he held several
official posts including that of Iranian Ambassador to Moscow and was vocal in support
of Soviet policy toward Iran. He recently went to Europe, where he may be plotting
for the restoration of the Qajar dynasty. Muhammad Vali Mirza Farman-Farmayan
was deputy in the XIVth Parliament and in 1946 was appointed a provincial governor.
He holds strong pro-Soviet views. Qajars within the Iranian Army who have given
strong support to pro-Soviet policy include General Muhammad Husain Firuz and
General Amanullah Mirza Jahanbani.
?
10. INTELLIGENTSIA AND STUDENTS.
Soviet contacts with these elements are largely through cultural organizations.
However, the general attitude of the two groups inclines to be pro-Soviet even without
special encouragement, motivated in part by the belief that the US and UK lean toward
preservation of the status quo in Iran
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The basic complaint of the younger, well-educated Iranians is the slow progress of
the government, the lack of social improvements, and the older generation's monopoly
of positions of importance. During the reign of Riza Shah at least one hundred
Iranian students were sent abroad each year to complete their higher education. A
large percentage of these students became dissatisfied after their return to Iran and
have never become reacclimatized to Iranian life.
Thus, this group and the Iranian student body in institutions of higher education
are receptive to any ideology which would alter the present situation and incline toward
the so-called "democracy" of the Soviet system. The student body of Tehran Univer-
sity includes a considerable number of pro-Soviet sympathizers. The University faculty
also contains pro-Soviet individuals. This is particularly the case in the College of
Medicine where the close contacts established by Dr. Baroyan, former head of the Soviet
Hospitals in Iran, have proved valuable. In one technical high school at Tehran 75
percent of the students favor the Tudeh Party line. The attitude of the students has
been reflected in demonstrations and in resistance to staff authority.
11. RUSSIAN EMIGRES.
No information is available concerning the present activities and political affilia-
tions of Russian emigres in Iran.
A large number of Russians, probably totaling more than 4,000, reside in Iran in
nonofficial capacities, employed in small commercial enterprises. These individuals,
concentrated chiefly in northern Iran, include White Russians holding Iranian or inter-
national passports. Prior to World War II, many of them were identified as or sus-
pected of being Soviet agents. It is probable that a number are now in the service of
the USSR, in accordance with the Soviet practice of using White Russians as agents
throughout the world.
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ANNEX III
SOVIET AGENCIES EMPLOYED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET POLICY
. POLITICAL.
The continued efforts of the USSR to dominate political relations with Iran are
well documented (OIR 4304, Soviet Interference in the Internal Affairs of Iran from
January 29, 1942 to December 13, 1946. Not released as of 1 Jan. '48).
The USSR consistently fails to treat Iran as a diplomatic equal. It has violated
existing treaties, forced unequal treaties and agreements upon Iran, interfered in
internal Iranian affairs, ignored Iranian diplomatic representations and protests, and
has pressed certain demands with threats that failure to comply will result in Soviet
enmity toward individual Iranian officials and toward the Iranian Government.
In October 1944 the cabinet of Prime Minister Saed refused to grant oil concessions
to the USSR. Saed was attacked vigorously by Soviet officials and press, and finally
resigned. In late 1945 Prime Minister Hakimi offered to go to Moscow to discuss out-
standing differences, but his offer was never even acknowledged.
On 23 November and 11 December 1946 the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran warned
Prime Minister Qavam and the Shah against sending Iranian forces into Azerbaijan.
In August and September 1947 the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran warned of the bitter
enmity which the USSR would feel toward Iran if the proposal for the establishment
of a joint Iranian-Soviet oil company were not approved.
a. Embassy and Consular Establishments.
The total diplomatic and consular representation of the USSR in Iran is known
to be larger than that of any other foreign power. The accredited diplomatic personnel
of the Embassy alone numbers twenty-four officials, and there is probably at least twice
this number of subordinate staff members. Soviet officials in Iran engage in activity
outside the scope of their diplomatic duties.
The Soviet Union maintains consulates general in Tehran, Tabriz, Meshed, and
Resht. In Tabriz, the staff consists of the consul, a vice consul, and three clerks; in
Meshed, a consul, two vice consuls, one "secretary and publicity assistant," one passport
officer, and a "trade agent"; in Resht, a consul, two vice consuls, and two clerks.
Consulates are maintained at Isfahan, Kermanshah, and Shiraz. The Isfahan
staff consists of a consul, a "vice consul and VOKS representative," a consular secretary,
and one interpreter; in Kermanshah, a consul and two vice consuls; in Shiraz, a consul,
a "consular secretary," a vice consul, and a secretary.
The USSR is also represented at Ardebil, Rizaiyeh, Maku, Ahwaz, Gurgan, and
Shahpur. At Ardebil the establishment consists of a vice consul and a "polifical offi-
cer and trade agent"; at Rizaiyeh, a vice consul and a "secretary and political officer";
at Gurgan, a consular representative; at Shahpur, the representative is called a "trade
agent" (Teh. desp. 588, 31 Dec. '47).
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Direct contact between the Soviet Government and its officials in Iran is main-
tained through radio transmitters located in the Embassy and in the consulate at
Rizaiyeh.
During World War II the USSR maintained nineteen consular offices in Iran.
Twelve of these nineteen posts were within the Soviet zone of occupation, and their
personnel, exclusive of minor Soviet and Iranian employees, numbered at least forty-five
officials. The offices in Azerbaijan were staffed by able men who were specialists in
Iranian affairs, spoke the local languages, and seemed to possess considerable author-
ity, but some of the offices in other parts of the country were headed by men who
seemed to have no specialized background and who were unfamiliar with the language
of the country.
Nearly all of the officials of the Soviet consulate general at Tabriz (6) and those
of other consular offices in the province of Azerbaijan were Soviet Azerbaijanis (SSU
A-64104, 1 Nov. 45). At Meshed the staff of the consulate general was larger than
that of the long-established UK consulate general (OSS A-57111, 7 June '45). In
1946 the Soviet Consul at Isfahan, who had been two and a half years in the post, was
assisted by two vice consuls. One was a Soviet Moslem, and both knew the Persian
language well (MID WD 7231, 9 Aug. '46).
During 1946 and 1947 the offices at Zahidan, Zabul, Sari, Bandar Shah, Bandar
Pahlevi, and Qazvin were closed.
b. Satellite Representation.
In addition to Soviet diplomatic representation, the Polish, Czechoslovakian,
and Yugoslavian Governments maintain small diplomatic staffs in Tehran. No infor-
mation is available concerning their staffs and extraofficial activities.
2. INTELLIGENCE.
It is probable that all Soviet agencies assist in the collection of military and
related intelligence. Such intelligence deals with Iran's internal conditions and
Iranian activities, and also places emphasis on the activities of foreign powers in Iran
and the possible use of Iran as a theater of military operations.
a. Military.
The staff of the Soviet Embassy at Tehran includes four military attaches.
Information regarding the nature and scope of their activity is not available.
Soviet military intelligence is primarily concerned with possible operations in
the Iranian theater. A study produced by Soviet intelligence, Survey of Iran (High
Command of the Armed Forces, Office of Foreign Countries Defense; Foreign Countries
in General, 1941) envisaged a conflict in northern Iran between the USSR and British-
Iranian forces. Routes of attack against the USSR are described in this publication,
but attention is concentrated upon projected Soviet operations in the area. Continued
intelligence activities along these lines are indicated by the fact that Soviet Army units
were engaged in map survey work directly northeast of Tehran and in the province of
Khurasan in 1946.
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b. Espionage Agents.
Details relative to current Soviet espionage in Iran come principally from
statements made by the several agents captured by the Iranian Army. In view of the
weakness of Iranian counterintelligence operations, it is probable that a large number
of agents carry on undisturbed activity. Agents at work in Iran include Soviet
nationals, Iranian nationals, and muhajirs.
Within recent months a considerable streath of muhajirs has been brought
into Iran by Iransovtrans trucks which are not inspected by Iranian officials (CIG SO
6495, 3 June '47) and by other means (Teh. 929, 25 Sept. '47). The Iranian Army
captured three Soviet nationals north of Meshed. One carried a detailed letter of
instructions covering espionage on Iranian Army units at Meshed (MA Teh. R-57-47,
12 May '47) .
A transmitter-receiver unit and its Iranian national operator, admittedly in
Soviet pay, were seized by the Iranian Army near Gurgan. The operator was to report
any activity of an unusual nature to a radio center across the frontier (MA Teh. M 40741,
10 Dec. '46).
An Iranian national trained as a Soviet agent and recently taken by the Iranian
Army has testified to the existence of an espionage training school at Baku attended
by Iranians, and of a radio station at Lenkoran which maintains contact with Soviet
spies in Iran. He also stated that Soviet agents are instructed to make friends with
personnel of the Iranian general staff and especially with the typists of the staff (MA
Teh. M 71, 21 Oct. '47).
Soviet "weather stations," meteorological posts equipped with radio transmit-
ters, were maintained in northern Iran in connection with Soviet air-line operations in
the area. When the air line ceased operations in the summer of 1947, the weather sta-
tions at Tehran, Bandar Pahlevi, Meshed, and Tabriz continued in service (Teh. 666,
24 July '47).
3. COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL.
Consistent with Soviet practice in other countries, Soviet commercial organizations
in Iran maintain a personnel much larger than the volume of business requires, and
certain members are engaged in covert activities.
The commercial exploitation to which the USSR subjected Iran during the years
of occupation by Soviet troops (September 1941 to May 1946) has been covered by
official reports of US representatives in Iran. A. C. Millspaugh, Americans in Persia,
presents considerable evidence on this subject. This background material has been
extensively used in assessing the current activities of the individual Soviet commercial
and financial agencies in Iran, since insufficient data is available on their present
operations.
a. Torgpred (Soviet Trade Delegation: Torgovoye Predstavitelstvo).
At the present time the USSR Commercial Agency, more generally known as
the Soviet Trade Delegation, maintains a head office at Tehran, with branches at
Bandar Pahlevi, Tabriz, and Meshed (see also III-1. a). The establishment of this
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agency was provided for by the Irano-Soviet Treaty of Commerce of 25 March 1940,
which also stipulated that additional branches could be opened with the consent of the
Iranian Ministry of Commerce.
The present head of the Soviet Trade Delegation is also the second ranking
diplomatic official of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. Torgpred exercises control over
the following departments and subsidiary agencies: export department; import depart-
ment; Russo-Iranian Bank; Iransovtrans; Iransovnaft; Sovkino; Gosstrakh; and In-
tourist. The head officials of these departments and agencies are directly responsible
to the Trade Delegate, although in nonpolicy matters they operate on instructions from
the central Soviet agencies which they represent.
The Import Department is composed of various commodity divisions, for sugar,
textiles, et cetera. The Export Department includes separate divisions for transactions
in rice, wool, dried fruits, et cetera. A number of the officials in both departments are
understood to be primarily political agents. Moreover, the activities of the Import
Department have a political aspect, notably in respect to the sale of commodities such
as sugar and textiles, the profits of which have been used to provide funds for political
or propaganda activities (Teh. desp. 588, 31 Dec. '47).
In 1946 the total personnel of the Tehran office of Torgpred was said to be 700
employees. Salman Assadi, formerly Director General of the Industrial and Mining
Bank of Iran, quoted the above figure on the size of the Delegation Staff at Tehran
(Teh. 151, 10 Dec. '46). In spite of possible exaggeration, the size of the Tehran staff
is certainly greater than the amount of trade between the two countries warrants (Teh.
111, 12 Feb. '47). Representatives of the Delegation were active at Bandar Pahlevi
(MA Teh. R-24-47, 11 Feb. '47) and at Julfa (MA Teh. R-21-47, 6 Feb. '47), while the
Meshed office had between 20 and 30 Soviet members (OSS A-57111, 7 June '45).
The Soviet Trade Delegation conducts operations in Iranian currency, which
makes available funds for Soviet official and covert expenditures in Iran, and makes it
possible to offer Iran commodities otherwise obtainable only by payment in foreign
currency. The wartime operations of the Soviet Trade Delegation are fairly well docu-
mented (MA Teh. 232, 2 Feb. '44 and A. C. Millspaugh, Americans in Persia, pp. 109,
118, 177, and 182). Postwar activities of the Soviet Trade Delegation are exemplified
by their offer made in 1946 to supply the Iranian Government with 20,000 tons of rails
required to bring to completion the Mianeh-Tabriz section of the Iranian State Rail-
ways, provided that it be constructed in the Soviet five-foot gauge, although the Iranian
State Railways is a standard gauge system. Since the old line from Julfa (on the Irano-
Soviet frontier) to Tabriz is of the Soviet five-foot gauge, acceptance of this offer would
have extended the Soviet gauge system 200 miles into Iran (SSU A-71080, 14-20 Aug.
'46).
b. Commercial Agencies of Satellites of the USSR.
A Yugoslav economic delegation to Iran proposed a draft agreement covering
the exchange of agricultural, industrial, and other products to Iranian authorities, but
no action was taken on the proposal by the two countries (Teh. 769, 23 July '47). It
was learned that Yugoslavia had in view the establishment of a shipping line from a
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Yugoslavian port to Basra, Iraq, and it appeared that the delegation also desired this
proposed line to call at Iranian ports. The delegation demonstrated keen interest in
securing facilities for the transit of goods through Iran. It would appear that such
facilities, if granted, would be more useful as a means of Soviet political-commercial
penetration than for their direct commercial benefits to Yugoslavia.
c. Russo-Iranian Bank.
The Russo-Iranian Bank maintains its main offices at Tehran with 12 Soviet
employees. Branch offices operate at Tabriz, Meshed, and Bandar Pahlevi, with smaller
branches at Quchan and Sabzawar. (Previously branches were maintained at Bandar
Shah and Gurgan, which are now believed to be closed.) This bank began operations
in 1924 with the announced purpose of financing trade between the two countries, and
it continues to function as the financial and accounting department of Torgpred (Teh.
desp. 588, 31 Dec. '47) . In 1925 it had a capital of 5 million gold rubles. (Details
relative to the early operations of the bank are taken from the Guide to the Soviet Union,
Moscow, 1925.) the Russo-Iranian Bank, STAT
aside from its commercial transactions, engages in financing espionage activities and is
acquiring foreign exchange, especially sterling and dollars, in large quantities on the
open market. The Tabriz branch of this bank employs six Russians and two Iranian
interpreters, one of whom is Armenian; it works closely with the Torgpred office in
Tabriz. Its volume of business is reportedly larger than that of the Tehran office (Teh.
1160, 25 Nov. 1947; MA Teh. R-24-47, 11 Feb. 1947) .
d. Irano-Soviet Fisheries Company (Shilat).
The head office of the Irano-Soviet Fisheries Company (Shilat) is at Bandar
Pahlevi, with branches at Astara, Babul Sar, and Bandar Shah and probably at other
coastal points. This joint company in which Iran and the USSR each hold 50 percent
of the shares, was established by an agreement between the two countries on 1 October
1927. The company has a monopoly, effective until 1952, on the sale of the output
of the fisheries along the Iranian shores of the Caspian.
Ninety percent of the produce of the company is sold to the (Soviet) Chief
Administration for the Sale of Fish (Glav-Riba) , which pays low prices to the company
and redistributes the produce at high figures, thereby absorbing profits which should
be made by the company itself. The remaining 10 percent of the produce is sold by the
company within Iran. The company has shown a loss on its operations almost every
year (Teh. desp. 588, 31 Dec. '47).
The company is directed by a board of three Soviet and three Iranian mem-
bers; by means of the manipulation of one or more of the Iranian members, all decisions
are made to conform with Soviet proposals. By agreement the manager of this com-
pany is to be alternately a Soviet citizen and an Iranian, but when, in 1944, the manager
should have been an Iranian, the Soviets insisted that one of their nationals be named
to the post (A. C. Millspaugh, Americans in Persia, p. 175). The unilateral operation
of this joint company is an illustration of the manner in which proposed Irano-Soviet
concessions or companies would be conducted to favor the interests of the USSR.
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e. Caspian Sea Navigation Company.
The head office of this company in Iran is at Bandar Pahlevi (MA Teh. R-24-47,
11 Feb. '47) . There is a branch office at Bandar Shah and probably at other ports along
the Iranian coast. The company's fleet operates between Baku and the Iranian Cas-
pian ports. These vessels are reportedly used to smuggle agents into Iran. By August
1946 Moscow had not given the company permission to turn back installations at
Bandar Shah to the Iranian Government (SSU A-71080, 14-20 Aug. '46) . Operations
of this company were covered in an agreement between Iran and the USSR of 1 October
1927. Article XI of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921 declares that navigation on the
Caspian Sea is entirely free for both countries. In actual practice Iran has failed to
make use of these waters except for locally owned fishing boats. The USSR maintains
warships on the Caspian in addition to its commercial fleet.
1. Iransovtrans.
The Iransovtrans transport organization, set up during World War II as a
company provided with its own capital but subordinate to the Soviet Trade Delegation
in Iran, is continuing its operations in Iran. Its main office is in Tehran, and it main-
tains a branch in Tabriz. The locations of other branch offices, if any, are uncertain.
The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recently made a formal request for the
liquidation of Iransovtrans.
During the war its purpose was to transport lend-lease goods and local Iranian
produce through Iran to the USSR. It operated fleets of trucks and some passenger
busses and managed local freight shipments on the northern section of the Iranian
State Railways. At first the company contracted for the use of Iranian-owned trucks
but later added a fleet of lend-lease trucks.* In its operations the company consist-
ently violated Iranian regulations. For example, it charged rates for freight and
passenger transport which were below those officially fixed by the Iranian Government.
It also obtained preferential treatment in its contract with the Iranian Office of Road
Transport, for the contract failed to set penalties for delays in shipment by Iransov-
trans (MA Teh. 232, 2 Feb. '44, and Teh. 1448, 8 Nov. '46) . After the end of the war the
company refused to permit Iranian inspection of its traffic and violated frontier control
regulations (CIG SO 6495, 3 June '47).
Negotiations in 1946 with the Iranian State Railways for a two-year renewal
of leases on storehouses owned by the railway indicate that the company intends to
maintain operations on a substantial scale (CIA SO 3341, 1 Dec. '46) .
In 1947 representatives at Bandar Pahlevi (MA Teh. R-24-47, 11 Feb. '47) and
Julf a (MA Teh. R-21-47, 6 Feb. '47) were active, and the company was engaging muha-
jirs, principally Armenians who spoke Turki. By the end of June 1947 some 400 former
* More recent information (Teh. desp. 588, 31 Dec. '47) states that Iransovtrans no longer main-
tains its own trucking organization and now conducts its business chiefly through local garage
agents and contracts made with individual drivers. However, the Iranian Government has recently
banned the movement of 500 vehicles owned by Iransovtrans and Iransovnaft in the frontier area
(MA Teh. 134, 14 Feb. '48) , which suggests that extensive operations are being continued by
Iransovtrans.
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employees had been reinstated and stationed chiefly in Tabriz, Zenjan, Shahrud, and
the province of Khurasan (SO 8177, end June '47).
Iransovtrans is also reported to be engaged in carrying Soviet agents over the
Iranian frontier, and is considered an ideal cover organization for dissemination of
Soviet propaganda. During 1947 the company's storage area in Tehran was used for
Tudeh Party meetings (London, SO 9282, 17 Aug. '47).
g. Iransovnaft.
Iransovnaft, an agency for the marketing of Soviet petroleum products in
Iran, is again active and maintains representatives at Tabriz and Bandar Pahlevi.
The Treaty of Commerce between Iran and the USSR of 25 March 1940 provides
that the Soviet Trade Delegation and economic organizations of the USSR shall have
the right to set up filling stations in Iran and to construct storage tanks and other
buildings necessary for dealing in petroleum and its products. The terms of the treaty
do not restrict this privilege to any particular section of Iran. Prior to World War II
this agency sold considerable quantities of gasoline and other petroleum products
throughout northern Iran for the same prices charged by the AIOC for these items.
This company was very active at Tabriz during the period of the autonomous
regime in Azerbaijan and brought in petroleum products from the USSR on which no
customs duties were paid (SSU A-64104, 1 Nov. '45). In 1947 the company maintained
a representative at Bandar Pahlevi (MA Teh. R-24-47, 11 Feb. '47).
h. Gosstrakh; Gosfehl.
Gosstrakh, which shares an office in Tehran with Intourist, deals with insur-
ance matters relating to Irano-Soviet trade, and also conducts a general insurance
business. Its rates are reported to be more favorable than those of most other agencies
in Iran, particularly in cases where premiums are payable in foreign currency (Teh.
desp. 588, 31 Dec. '47) . It also has a Tabriz branch (Tabriz, 10 Nov. '47). Gosfehl, also
a Soviet insurance company, is reported to maintain an office in Tehran (Teh. 328, 26
Apr. '47). No further information concerning these agencies, which may be identical,
is available.
i. Sovkino.
Sovkino, the Soviet Film Agency, distributes Soviet films throughout Iran and
supplies operators and equipment for cinema shows given by VOKS and the Irano-
Soviet Cultural Relations Society (SSU A-64104, 1 Nov. '45). The agency, which is
administered by VOKS, is known to have representatives at Tehran and Tabriz (see
also 111-3. a and 111-4. g).
j. Intourist.
Intourist, the Soviet Travel Agency, now maintains offices at Tehran and
Meshed. The Tabriz office was closed in 1947.
It is known that the personnel of this agency engages in covert activity; more-
over, a Soviet colonel, who had headed the personnel department of the northern section
of the Iranian State Railways, reappeared in civilian clothes as director of the Tehran
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office of this agency (SSU A-69561, 28 May '46). The current director of Intourist is
also head of Iransovtrans (SO 8177, end June '47). Intourist is currently reported to
have hired a number of muhajirs.
k. Rano-Russian Forestry Exploitation Company.
This company, which has its central office at Pahlevi, owns a private telephone
line along the Caspian coast, between Pahlevi and Karganrud (Teh. desp. 136, 25 Sept.
'46) . No further details concerning this company are known.
4. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL.
The Soviet program of cultural relations, on which the USSR spends large sums,
is not designed for the mass of the population, but for the rather restricted number of
intelligentsia of Iran. Its success has been greatest among school teachers, college
students, and younger writers, some of whom have been attracted by the offer of jobs
or of grants for writing and research. Since 1946 smaller numbers of Iranians have
been attending Soviet cultural programs, but current Soviet efforts, expenditures, and
personnel are maintained at the earlier levels.
The Soviet program, the most extensive program of its type in Iran, is divided in two
parts: the informational activities are conducted by the Soviet Embassy, and the cul-
tural by the Consul General in Tehran, acting through VOKS (All-Union Society for
Cultural Relations) (Teh. desp. 588, 31 Dec. '47).
In addition to its general cultural relations program, the USSR has employed such
devices as medical facilities, religious missions, and groups of entertainers to foster
good relations in the cultural field. Such activities are also known to have provided
opportunities for the collection of intelligence and other clandestine operations in Iran.
a. VOKS (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations: Fse-Soyuznoe Obshchestvo
Kulturnoy Sviazi).
VOKS, which is in charge of Soviet cultural relations with all foreign countries,
maintains a "House of Culture" at Tehran, opened in January 1945, in the spacious
former Japanese Legation (SSU A-68630, 14 May '46, and Teh. 35, 29 May '46) . At the
end of 1946 its staff numbered at least twenty Soviet citizens.
The organization contains nine sections for the following cultural activity:
science, medicine, sports, music, fine arts, theater, films, rural reconstruction, and
industrial arts. Each section is supervised by a Soviet national, and in Tehran in 1946
at least eight staff members were teaching the Russian language to some 800 students
(MA Teh. R-247, 9 Nov. '46) .
VOKS maintained representatives at Meshed and Resht, at Tabriz (SSU
A-66174, 26 Jan. '46) , at Bandar Pahlevi (MA Teh. R-24-47, 11 Feb. '47) , Kermanshah
(CIA 35474, 28 Aug. '47), Isfahan, and Ahwaz. There were reading rooms in several
towns (MA Teh. R-8-44, 9 Sept. '44) , including Quchan, Darajaz (?) , and Rizaiyeh (Teh.
desp. 588, 31 Dec. '47) ; that at Tabriz was in operation in the summer of 1947 (Tabriz,
21 Aug. '47) . The chief representative of VOKS in Iran is automatically a member of
the board of directors of the Irano-Soviet Cultural Relations Society.
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? b. Irano-Soviet Cultural Relations Society.
?
?
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The Irano-Soviet Cultural Relations Society, which cooperates closely with
VOKS and, in some of the provincial centers, is almost indistinguishable from the
latter, has its headquarters in a large building at Tehran. Information is available
concerning the general organization and purposes of the Society (SSU A-68630, 14 May
'46) , the 1946 membership of the board of directors (SSU A-68657-c, 29 April '46) , and
the location of provincial branches at Meshed, Isfahan, Resht, Tabriz, and Rizaiyeh
(MA Teh. R-8-44, 9 Sept. '44).
According to its constitution, the Society has as its primary goal the develop-
ment and extension of cultural relations between the peoples of Iran and the USSR in
the fields of science, art, literature, and sports. It is intended to conduct programs
which include lectures, motion pictures, theatrical presentations, etc.; to publish
papers and periodicals and sponsor translations of scientific books; and to sponsor
tourist travel groups, congresses, and archaeological work in Iran and the Soviet Union.
The majority of these activities were being carried on during 1945-1947.
In the spring of 1946 the majority of the board of directors of the Society at
Tehran consisted of Tudeh Party members or strong pro-Soviet sympathizers, such as
Said Nafisi, Mme. Sayah, wife of the Iranian Ambassador to the USSR, and Dr. Yazdi
(II-1) (SSU, A-68630, 14 May '46). The amount of money spent by the USSR in
support of this Society probably averages at least $75,000 a year.
Most of the programs held by the Society through 1946 were "rather heavy
going." Long speeches were standard while the lectures usually lacked popular appeal,
offering accounts of obscure Russian writers or programs in commemoration of various
anniversaries. The monthly magazine of the Society, published in Persian and entitled
Payam-i-No ("New Message") , contained lengthy, dull articles. In September 1947
Soviet sources claimed that some 800 people attended a meeting of the Society held to
celebrate the 800th anniversary of the founding of Moscow (Radio Moscow, Home
Service, 18 Sept. '47).
A Soviet school opened at Tabriz in 1944 was a unit of the local branch of the
Society. Directed by a Soviet Azerbaijani, the school had an enrollment of 750 students
during its first year, and 1,000 in 1945. The school ranged from the first through the
tenth grade and gave instruction in various subjects in the Russian, Persian, and Turki
languages. There were also evening classes for adults (OSS A-62974, 29 Oct. '45; SSU
A-66174, 26 Jan. '46; and OSS A-40757, 28 Sept. '44) .
c. Cultural Relations Societies of Satellites of the USSR.
Cultural and informational activities are also carried on in Iran by Soviet
satellites.
During World War II an Irano-Polish Cultural Relations Society was estab-
lished at Tehran, which published at least two books. In 1946 a Yugoslav-Iran Cul-
tural Relations Society was active at Tehran (SID Iran, Chap. VII, Subversive) . The
president of the Society was a leading Iranian figure, Allahyar Saleh, head of the Iran
political party (MA Teh. R-247-46, 9 Nov. '46). In August 1946 the Information Sec-
tion of the Yugoslav Foreign Office at Tehran distributed pamphlets in Greek which
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attacked the Greek Government and US support of these "Fascists" (SO 7022, 8
Aug. '47).
d. Soviet Medical Organizations.
The Soviet hospital at Tehran, now called the "Hospital of Soviet Red Cross,"
was opened in May 1943 (SSU A-68630, 14 May '46) with a staff of ten doctors. Treat-
ment was good, but charges for medical service and hospitalization were much higher
than at Iranian Government hospitals. The branch hospital at Tabriz operated mobile
dispensaries (OSS A-48905, 11 Jan. '45) . On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of
the hospital at Tehran, mention was made of its branches at Resht, Meshed, and else-
where (Radio Moscow, Tass. Soviet overseas in English Morse to North America, 25
May '47). A nursing school is attached to the hospital.
Dr. Ohannes Baroyan, head of the Tehran hospital until recalled to Moscow
in June 1947, was believed to be the head of Soviet political intelligence in Iran, and
possibly in the Middle East as a whole (Teh. desp. 588, 31 Dec. '47). A colonel in the
Soviet Army and the representative of the Soviet Red Cross in the Middle East, he was
the organizer and director of the hospitals at Tehran, Meshed, Qazvin, Tabriz, and
Resht. He claimed to have 600 persons engaged in hospital work outside the USSR.
His personal influence was exerted on Iranian doctors, and he and his staff were active
in medical conferences held at Tehran and in the publication in Persian of a medical
journal at Tehran (OSS A-64295, 20 Nov. '45; OSS A-63759, 5 Dec. '45; MID R-213-46, 16
Sept. '46; Addis Ababa, US Legation No. 245, 21 Sept. '46; Teh. 1301, 1 Oct. '46; CIG
SO-6775, 9 July '47).
e. Study Missions in Iran.
No recent Soviet study missions to Iran have been reported.
During World War II the USSR sent several special missions to Iran whose
members traveled extensively throughout the country. Lieut. Gen. Dr. Pavlovski led
three medical study missions in two years and by 1945 had prepared 100,000 words of
text for early publication (SSU A-68630, 14 May '46).
In 1945 a Soviet mission studied plants and fruit, and a delegation of Soviet
trade-union leaders toured Iran at the invitation of the Central Committee of Trade
Unions (MA Teh. R-89-45, 20 Aug. '45).
f. Religious Missions to Iran.
No recent religious missions to Iran have been reported.
During the war, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church and a number of
Soviet Moslem leaders made visits to Iran during which they stressed the freedom of
their religions within the Soviet republics. In the case of the Moslem leaders, efforts
were made to indicate the compatibility of Communism with Islam.
Alexi, Patriarch of Moscow and of the USSR, passed through Tehran in May
1945 on his way to Syria and Palestine (SSU A-68630, 14 May '46) . The Shaikh al-Islam
of the Caucasus, Ali Zadeh, came to Iran in June 1945 to make a pilgrimage to Qum
and Meshed, and in November of the same year fourteen ulemas of the USSR reached
Tehran on their way to visit the Near East and Mecca. The group included Babkhan,
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? Shaikh al-Islam, the Grand Mufti of Tashkent, and Moslem leaders in Kazakistan,
?
Turkmenistan, and Kirgizstan (SSU A-68630, 14 May '46).
g.
Soviet Films and Theater Groups.
Sovkino operates one theater in Tehran, and is said to control one in Resht.*
Three or four other cinema houses at Tehran are believed to be Soviet controlled (OSS
A-48905, 11 Jan. '45), and the Cinema Rayak chain, in which the USSR Embassy has
a 25 percent share, specializes in Soviet films.*
One cinema house at Meshed also specializes in Soviet films (OSS A-62974, 29
Oct. '45), which are also shown in Azerbaijan, in the Caspian provinces and, less fre-
quently, in central Iran. In Ahwaz, one of the cinema houses is owned by a syndicate
of Tudeh sympathizers; it shows only Soviet films and may be Soviet subsidized; films of
Soviet origin are also shown in a cinema house in Burujird.* Soviet films, because of
their lack of entertainment value, are not as well attended as US films.
During and following World War II, theater groups visited Tehran, Azerbaijan,
and the Caspian region every few months. These groups included Red Army choral
groups, singers, orchestras, dancers, and a Soviet circus. Such presentations were very
well attended. There is no information concerning the current activities of these
groups.
h. Junkets to the USSR.
Groups of professors, journalists, and religious, tribal, and political figures have
been taken from Iran to Moscow or to the capitals of other Soviet republics to attend
special celebrations. Most of the members of such parties were pro-Soviet Iranians
whose sympathies were supposedly strengthened by these tours. Others were brought
to the USSR for pro-Soviet indoctrination. The Mayor of Tehran was flown to Moscow
for the 800th anniversary of that city (Radio Moscow. Soviet Home Service, 18
Sept. '47).
5. PRESS AND PROPAGANDA.
In the field of press and propaganda activity, the USSR follows a persistent policy.
The Soviets carefully guide a segment of the Iranian press in an attitude hostile to
other foreign powers and to the Iranian Government, and friendly toward the USSR.
Then the Soviet press and radio quote these inspired sentiments to the world at large
as the true opinions of Iranians toward local and international affairs.
a. The Soviet Press and Radio.
(1) Soviet Radio.
Soviet broadcasts to Iran include music, news items with the distinctive
Soviet slant, and often a fifteen-minute commentary offering selections from the Soviet
and Iranian press or a specially prepared talk on some current subject.
? * Teh. desp. 588, 31 Dec. '47.
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Stations at Moscow and Baku broadcast to Iran in Persian and Turki;
those at Yerevan and Tbilisi use Turki and Armenian; Baku also makes use of Armenian
(MA Teh. R-247-46, 9 Nov. '46). Tashkent also broadcasts to Iran in Persian.
The USSR uses certain of its stations to incite separatist tendencies
among the population of Azerbaijan. In such cases the transmitter is not identified
by its regular call letters but by a name appropriate to the cause which it sponsors.
Such broadcasts began shortly after the collapse of the DPA regime (MA Teh. M-3007,
7 Jan. '47). A station operating on a frequency of 790 kilocycles, with a power of
probably not less than 2,000 and not more than 5,000 watts (FBIS) , displayed con-
siderable activity beginning in late 1947. This station, probably located in Soviet
Armenia or Soviet Azerbaijan not far north of the Iranian frontier, called itself the
"Azerbaijan Democratic Association Station" when broadcasting in Azerbaijani, while
in Kurdish it was announced as the voice of "Independent Kurdistan" (Teh. 1183, 2
Dec. '47) . Its attacks against the Iranian Government and US activity in Iran were
quoted by the pro-Soviet press at Tehran (Teh. 1179, 1 Dec. '47).
The Soviet Embassy at Tehran also conducts a Russian and Persian
language program over Radio Tehran, the Iranian Government station. This program
includes four periods weekly: on Sunday a half hour of music; on Monday a fifteen-
minute political program, on Wednesday a half-hour cultural program; on Friday a
half-hour political program (MA Teh. R-247-46, 9 Nov. '46). The Russian language
section of this program includes attacks on the Iranian Government (Teh. 902, 26
June '46).
(2) The Soviet Press.
Tass, the official Soviet news agency, maintains representatives at Teh-
ran and Tabriz. In addition to their official duties, these representatives are known to
engage in clandestine activities, as is true of Tass representatives in other countries.
The USSR publishes a newspaper in Persian called Dust-i-Iran (Friend
of Iran) . Originally a weekly published by the Soviet Embassy at Tehran, after Novem-
ber 1945 it appeared as a biweekly, issued by the Tehran office of VOKS.
After November 1945 Dust-i-Iran contained Moscow press releases on cur-
rent events in Iran which gave the line for editorials in the Tudeh Party press (Teh.
1571, 9 Dec. '46). This paper was also used to spread anti-American propaganda (Teh.
1633, 27 Dec. '46).
Russian-language papers published at Tehran include the Moscow Tele-
gram (Moskovskaya Telegramma) and News of the Day (Novesti Dnya) , a daily issued
by the Soviet Embassy. Moreover, a number of papers and periodicals printed within
the USSR find their way into Iran, including Pravda and Izvestia; the Communist,
published at Baku in Turki; and Armenian papers published at Yerevan and else-
where (MA Teh. R-89-45, 27 Aug. '45 and MA Teh. R-247-46, 9 Nov. '46) . During the
war, Vatan Yolinda, an official Soviet paper for Turki-speaking Soviet troops in occupa-
tion of Iranian Azerbaijan, was widely distributed in that area (OSS A-62994, 29
Oct. '45).
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? During the period of the autohomous regime at Tabriz a monthly maga-
zine, Azerbaijan, printed in Turk!, was very popular. The magazine, of large format
and lavishly illustrated, was distributed by the Society of the Friends of Soviet Azer-
baijan and was _probably printed at Baku. It was printed in Azerbaijan Turkish
(Turki) in Arabic characters and hence aimed specifically at Iran since both Turkey and
the USSR now use other alphabets in writing Turkish (MA Teh. R-247-46, 9 Nov. '46) .
The USSR maintains a large book store and novelty shop at Tehran. Its
stock, however, contains very little material in Persian on the USSR.
b. The Soviet-inspired Iranian Press.
A segment of the Iranian press, both at Tehran and in the province, receives
funds and newsprint from the USSR. Although documentary evidence of such support
is scant, the charge is supported by statements of neutral Tehran editors and by known
gifts to pro-Soviet editors (A. C. Millspaugh, Americans in Persia, p. 178) . Convincing
evidence, moreover, is supplied by the tone, attitude, and timing of this press, with its
reliance upon biased news items and articles, and its coordinated emphasis upon simi-
lar themes. The majority of the papers of this segment of the press have a circulation
of only a few hundred copies, while some appear at irregular intervals. They are obvi-
ously operated at a financial loss which could not be borne by the Iranian owner and
editor. Their principal value to the USSR is for quotation for propaganda purposes
(Teh. 1571, 9 Dec. '46) .
These papers include the Tudeh Party organs Mardom (which also appeared
? under the names of Rahbar and Razm) ; leftist organs of which Iran-i-Ma, Shahbaz,
Nejat-i-Iran, Bastan, and Mard-i-Imruz are currently the most prominent; and other
papers formerly affiliated with the Freedom Front. A number of pamphlets containing
selected articles from this press may be assumed to have had Soviet financing.
Soviet-sponsored regional movements, the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan and
the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, were supported by a strongly pro-Soviet press. The
Kurdish movement issued a paper and a monthly political magazine, both called
Kurdistan, and two literary magazines, Havar, and Hilal, published on a press donated
by the Red Army. In an effort to establish controlled press relations with a minority
group in Iran, Soviet officials are known to have proposed to an Armenian editor at
Tehran that he publish an Armenian-language paper which would be supported and
guided by the Soviet press representatives (SSU A-70361, n.d.). The pro-Soviet
Armenian newspaper Veratznound is currently published in Iran (Teh. desp. 558, 4
December 1947).
c. The Coordinated Operation of the Soviet and Soviet-inspired Press.
(1) General Policy.
The Iranian press is supplied with a mass of material by the Soviet press
and radio, and by Soviet officials in Iran (MA Teh. R-247-46, 9 Nov. '46). A good deal
of this material comes from Pravda, Izvestia, the New Times, and Tass press releases,
and is distributed in Russian texts or Persian translations by Soviet officials. This
material falls into several categories: material hostile to the Iranian Government; mate-
?
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rial indicative of the Soviet attitude toward current international affairs; and material
on the political, economic, social, and cultural activities of the Soviet Union. Material
of the first two categories is used by the pro-Soviet press of Iran, but material of the
last category also fills considerable space in the neutral press, which has a larger
circulation.
The value of the pro-Soviet Iranian press to the USSR is not only the part
it may play in influencing local opinion, but the fact that it furnishes a steady stream
of material for quotation and world-wide distribution by the Soviet press and radio.
Such quotations, bolstered by appropriate commentaries, are represented as expressing
the true state of Iranian opinion. This same material is also redirected toward Iran.
(2) Attack on the US.
The concerted policy of the coordinated Soviet and Soviet-inspired press
includes attacks on various foreign powers, but those directed against the US are of
special interest (OIR 3619.5, Recent Press and Radio Attacks on American Activities in
Iran, Situation Report, 11 March 1947) .
These attacks represent the US as a menace to world peace and order,
and charge it with actions and intentions prejudicial to Iranian interests, and with
interference in Iran's internal affairs. The US is accused of endeavoring to establish
in Iran a base of operations against the USSR, a charge based upon the presence of
two US advisory military missions in Iran. The US is also charged with attempts to
control Iran's oil resources, and with efforts to dominate Iran in the economic field by
forcing a loan on the Iranian Government.
Such attacks are designed to discredit the Iranian Government by imply-
ing that it is under US control; to discredit US efforts to sustain Iranian independence;
to hamper US efforts to aid Iran, and to give currency to the idea that Soviet collabora-
tion in Iran is needed to offset US designs and activity.
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