CURRENT SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000900270001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 6, 1950
• Content Type: MEMO

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/30: CIADP78-01617A000900270001-2
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INTELLIGENCE 1TMORANDUM NO. 296
SUBJECT: Currant Situation in The Philippines.
21
6 June 1950
Even though deteriorating conditions in the Philippines should in the near
future cause the downfall of President Quirino, the succeeding administration
could be expected to be pro-US. If the present decline in stability through-
out the Philippines Continues for as much as ten years, however, pro.Commmnist
forces might be able to seize power.
Deterioration in the Philippines is prAcarily a result of reaknesses in
the young nationts political leadership, together with the governmentts in-
ability to halt outbreaks of CommuuliSdirected violence. Economic difficulties
constitute a secondary but savara cause of unrest.
There is a widespread and increasing loss of popular confidence in
President QuirinO, largely as a result of his administration's incompetence,
corruption, abuse of power, and inability to maintain law and order.
The Philippine Armed Forces are at present capable of preventing a violent
overthrow of the government by the Commuhist.led Hukbalahap (whose activities
are now confined for the most part to Luzon), but are unable to destroy the
Huks.or prevent their recurrent raids* If Milk capabilitieS continue to improve
and present conditions continue to lower the morale of government forces, the
.rebels may eventwa3ly.emerge victorious.
The Quirino administration is neither able nor apparently willing to in.
stitute the reforms required to halt present political and economic trends
in the Philippines. Quirinots removal from office in favor of Vice President
Lopez might temporarily improve the situation, but would not go far enough in
correcting present inequities to reverse the long-term trend toward increasing
instability. US economic and military assistance under a continuation of
present circumstances might prolong the life of pro-US regimes but even with
such aid, fundatrantal reforms would still be necessary to prevent ultimate
Comnist control*
Note: This memorandum has not been coordinated With the intelligence
Morganitations of the Departments of State, ArUn Navy, aar2,the
,Air Force.
Document No.
0 CHANGE in Class. 0
76DECLASSIFIED
ss. CIANGED TO: TS S
DA Memo, 4 Apr 77
DO
Auth: DD. -17G. 77 1763
Date 10 By:
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1. Political Situation.
The Philippine apathy toward government, largely a result of political
inT2turity and inadequate education, is changinr to active resentment
aAinst governmental inefficiency and abuses. Loss of confidence in the
government, and particularly in President Elpidio Quirino, has become
general and has extended even to the inner circle of officials ucon whom
the President has heretofore depended for support. These developments,
which handicap an already weak and ineffective administration in its efforts
to maintain law and order, Also strengthen the Communist-led !Kik movement in
Luzon. ?
a. Executive Leadership.
Strong executive leadership has been traditional in the Philippines
and continues to be expected by the Filipino people. The Philippine Constitution
delegates broad powers to the President, and the great popularity of the late
r.anuel Quezon reflected general approbation of his vigorous leadership-as first
President of the Commonwealth. Quirino, on the other hand, despite an oppres-
sive disregard Dor civil rights, has been unable to maintain law and order, and
has permitted excessive graft, corruption, and inefficiency. Loss of confidence
in 2uirino's ability has led to growing popular concern over his abuses of
power and those he tolerated among his supporters and subordinates. STAT_
STAT
It is probable that Quirino will continue to abuse his powers in an
attempt not only to quell Communist-inspired violence but to subdue legal oppo-
sition as well. This development, which would man increased loss of confidence in
and opposition to the administration. would strengthen the Conminists. In the
face of this prospect 0 it is possible that a co-STAT
alition of his political subordinates and opponents may strip him of all real
authority. General maneuvering in this direction, which has already been ob-
served, is an added source of administrative weakness and of diminishing public
confidence.
Vice President Fernando Lopez, the moat likely successor to4uirino: is
a member of the wealthy land-owning class that dominates Filipino political
life. Despite a reputed progressive viewpoint, he has always identified him-
self with wisted economic ano political interests. Lopez is becoming in-
creasingly popular and, if lie assumed office, night be able to increase
administrative efficiency somewhat and restore a reasure of popular confidence.
Lopez' background, however, suggests that ne would not be able to institute the
broad administrative, political, and economic reforms necessary to obtain
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continuing popular support.
b. Law Enforcement.
Although the Philippine Republic's law enforcement egoncies are ,presently
believed to be adequate to prevent forceful Huk overthrow of tLa government,
neither the Philippine Constabulary, the agency primarily responsible for
maintaining law and order,nor the Philippine Armed Forces has yet
demonstrated satisfactory capability for raintaining lay; and ordor or even
for preventing destructive raids by the Huks.
The sovernrent's security forces also face a difficult pmoblem because
many Filipinos have their oun firearms and because of riyiary with various
special police units which are responsible solely to local officials. 1,ide-
spread abuSes of police authority by all law-onforcing gmaps, moreover,
baize resulted in a non-cooperative attitude on the part of the general publin.
c. Government Administration.
Government instability is aggravated by administrative corruption and
inefficiency at virtually all levels. In lower echelons, this situation has
resulted primarily from inadequate pay and from inexperience. Among the small
group of wealthy landowners and entrepreneurs who constitute the Filipino
ruling clique, corruption has resulted from a lack of evic spirit, from
knowledge of economic power, and from confidence in the past apathy of the dis-
organized and uneducated mass of the people. Among the onto, personal en-
richment and the protection of vested.interests,continue to be overriding
motives for holdins public office.
d.. The Party System,
The two major Philippine political parties - Liberal an? Nacionalista-
have few differences in their platforms. Party members, and even party
leaders, shift their loyalties frequently and rapidly, depetding on their
personal assessment of relative part:: strengths. Currently, for examplc,rany
of the senators elected on President fZuirino's Liberal Party ticket have turned
against the President. TheComirrardsts, who have been quick to sense the
significance of these weaknesses and who hope to discredit the whole party
system, are continually propagandizing the Filipino people regarding the self-
interest and venality of the nation's politicians.;
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2. Economic Situation.
Economic conditions 22E se are less directly responsible than political for
instability in the Philippines, althou7h the consequences of such aspects of the
economic situation as the agrarian problem have been. felt in the political and
even the military field.
The aepublic is almost uelf-sufficient in food, a fact uhich favors ?
long-range stability.Igtandirinequalitics in the nation's agrarian system;
hcnever, have been exploited by the Communists and have not only facilitated
the development of the Huk movement in Luzon but are producing unrest else-
uhere in the archilelago. Continued failure of the Philipyine governing class --
the beneficiaries of t"is agrarian system -- to alleviate these inequities has
nrovided local Communists uith excellent opportunities to organize the otheruise
leaderless peasantry.
The nation's rapidly deteriorating financial position, although a less
deep-rooted problem, is an immediately critical one. Heavy budgetary deficits
and a serious depletion of foreign reserves have obliged the government to
tighten import controls drastically and to propose tax increases. These measures
nere necessary, but inefficient administration nill continue to reduce their
effectiveness. In addition, the resultant sharp price increases of such key
imported consumer goods as textiles and the general difficulties and un-
certainties of conducting foreign trade have increased popular doubt as to the
country's.economic future, thus aggravating the present political instability.
3. Military Situation.
The.Hukbalahap, a peasant organization which was formed during the last war to
oppose the Japanese and which is now under Communist leadership, constitutes the
main military threat to the stability of the Philippine Government. Although
Huk activity is presently confined for the most 'part to the island of Luzon, it is
expanding and growing more intensive. Total Huk strength today is estimated at
15,000, and is expected to increase. Their total armed strensth at any one time,
houever0 is believed to be between 8,000 and 10,000.
The Nuke are equipped uith weapons suitable for guerrilla operations, and
their amunition supply has been secured from abandoned stocks or through
purchases, theft, or seizure from government forces. Food and clothing, if not
willingly contributed by synipathetic peasants and villagers, may easily be
obtained by force or intimidation,
Loyalty and morale of the Huks are difficult to assess. the fact, honever,
that very fez fluke have taken advantage of past Government amnesty offers;
ineicates that the leaders have, by thatever means; been able to retain
taerence of their follow:inn.
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In the past, Huk activity took the form of.series of raids in one location
after another, followed by periods of relative quiet. Recent raids, however,
have been better coordinated and executed, indicating the development of a
more centralized control.
The military forces of the Philippines number approximately 33000. This
figure includes an Arpy of 6,000, and a Constabulary of 17,000, a Navy of 2,300,
and an Air Force of 2600. The Navy has 38 small vessels and the Air.FOrce
50 F-51 fighters and about 250 other aircraft.
Hilitary action against the Huks is the principal mission of the Army and
the Constabulary. The role of the Navy and the: Air Force in Euk operations '
secondary. Naval forces, however, are not considered adequate for patrollinb
the extensive Philippine coastline, and hence would not be capable of
preventinr outside support from reaching the dissidents.. The Air Force is
employed in tactical support of the ground forces.
The government forces: all of whose materiel is of US orizins are well?
equipped in comparison with their opponents. Corlat efficiency in both the
Army and Conatabulary suffers from lack of coordination betneen these
commands and from the failure to relieve small units long in the field. .
Althowih there is as yet little indication that the deteriorating political
situation has affected loyalty, morale in ceneral is not high. Unit leader?
ship is not of high quality, and an aggressive spirit is lacking in all ranks.
Ineffectiveness of government force b is in part attributable to.'difficult
terrain and local sympathy for the Nuks
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