POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS AND MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE VULNERABILITIES IN THE EVENT OF WAR BEFORE JULY 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000900190002-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 9, 1950
• Content Type: MEMO

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Sr CONFIDENTIAL 26
CENTRAL leiEetemegg egamy
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 288
9 May 1950.
SUIJECTs Political Alignmenta and Major Psychological Warfare
Vulnerabilities in the Event of War before July 1951
Notes This memorandum was prepared at the
request of the Interdepartmental Foreign
Document Noes, Information Staff as a summary estimate
NO MIN5rt.4 of political alignments in the summed
event of war before July 1951 and a pro-
liminary analysis of salient psychological
warfare vulnerabilities. A MOWS compre-
bonnie? analysis of psychological warfare
factors is in propose.
SUMMAR!
1. The outbreak of a general rar before July 1951 is assumed for
the purposes of this estimate.
2. /n the assumed circumstances, the. immediate Soviet purpose in re-
sorting to war would be to smash the supposedly hostile alliance of the
Western Powers and to ensure the security of the USSR by military occupa-
tion of Western Europe and the Near East.
3, The USSR regards political and psychological warfare as integral
rather than incidental in the waging of war. Not only would considerable
Soviet capabilities in this respect be exploited to the utmost 'to facili-
tate military operations, but the military operations themselves would be
designed to support and facilitate political revolution.
4. In important respects the USSR is itself vulnerable to political
and psychological Warfare, but these vulnerabilities arc latent and could
not be eXploited fully until the mechanism of Soviet police control had been
disrupted and effective Allied support of disaffected elements was at hand.
5. The allies of the' USSR would be the European Satellite States (East
Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and AlbaniaL,
Outer Mongolia, North Korea, and China. Several of these Soviet allies are
vulnerable to psychological warfare, and their proximity to Western base
areas increases the potentialities for exploitation.
Notes The intelligence organizations of the Departments; of State, Army,
Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report. /
oeCUMENTNO.
WPC NO CHANGE IN CLASS 0
0 OrAtiSSIMED
CS
CONFIDENTIA LAS OHNISED TO: TS 1640,/ to
L NOR REVIEW DATE
7.2.170-2
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CONFIDENTIAL.
6. Several nations are at present and still in 1951 probably.
mill be aligned with the West, but either their firm adherence to the
West is subject to doubt or their ability to maintain their position
is uncertain. Communist-led insurgents already are well established in
Indochina and Burma. These countries may be brought under Soviet control
before July 1951, jeopardizing other parts of Southeast Asia. Other
areas mhos? alignment is comparatively precarious are Yugoslavia, Western
Germany, Austria, and Japans .
7. The nations allied or aligned with the United States would be:
g. The Borth Atlantic Treaty States: Canada, Iceland, Norway,
Denmark, the Matted Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, '
Luxembourg, France, ItaIyvand Portugal, with their over-
seas poaseasions.
ht. Other recipients of US military aid: Greece, Turkey, Iran,
Southern Korea, and the Philippines.
g. Other members of the British Commonwealth, not signatories
of the North Atlantic Treaty: South Africa, Ceylon, Australia,
and New Zeeland.
The British Arab allies: Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq.
k. The other American republics.
8. All other nations Mould probably be initially neutral. None would
to sympathetic with the USSR or likely to join it in aggression. West would
be disposed to resist Soviet attack, and would look to the United States
for aid in that case. A few might eventually be persuaded to become bellig-
erent allies of the United States, OVBB if not attacked. '
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POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS AND MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
VULNERABILITIEZ IN THE EVENT OF WAR BEFORE JULY 1951
THE USSR
1, Assumptions,
The Outbreak of a general war before July 1951 is assumed for the
purposes of this estimate. Such an occurrence is conceivable only as
the result of Soviet initiative. The assumption of a Soviet decision
to resort to mar ithin the period under consideration implies the
further assumption of conviction on the part of Soviet leaders that:
(a) the progressive economic recovery, political coalescence, and military
rehabilitation of Western Europe, in alliance with the United State's,
posed 'an intolerable threat to the security of the USSR; (b) it had be-
come imperative to act before the relative strength Of the West had, been
further enhanced; (c) the trend temard the strengthening of the West could
be reversed by a mar envisaged as limited in time and scope; and (d) the
USSR had sufficient military power to min such a var.
2. Soviet War Aims.
In the assumed circumstances, the im..ediate Sovife, purpose in re's
.
? sorting to mar.rould be to smash the supposedly hostile alliance of the
Western Pomers.and.to ensure the security of the USSR by militaryoccupation
of Western Europe and the Near East. Corollary objectives mould be to seize
and convert to Soviet use the resources of the conquered area, thus greatly
enchancing the potential strength of the USSR in relation to that of the
surviving capitalist states, and. to reconstruct the states of Western
Lierope as Satellites on the EaStern European model.
3. Capabilities for Political and Psychological Warfare.
. In the Soviet concept, a state of political and psychological warfare
is the normal relationship betmeen Communist and capitalist states.
Armed conflict is mereIY the employment of additional means in the conduct
of this continuing struggle. Thus, even in the event of A resort to
military aggression, political And psychological uarfare mould be regarded
as integral and basic rather than incidental to the business of waginm war.
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In conducting political and psychological marten, the. Kremlin has
at its disposal not only the apparatus of the Soviet state, but also ?
that of the international Communist movement, in uhich every disciplined
Communist is required to pay primary and undeviating allegiance to the
interests of the USSR.
The agencies of Soviet propaganda, Soviet diplomacy, and Communist
agitation are constantly at work trying to spread disillusionment and
disaffection in the non-Soviet world, discredit non-Soviet governments,
create antarpnisms among them, and undermine the nil and capacity of
non-Soviet peoples to resist in the event of mar. Thus the uay mould
have been prepared for presenting the USSR in time of mar as the
invincible champion of the peace-loving and oppressed masses, compelled
by the machinations of capitalist wirmonrers to act in self-defense for
the secure establishment of peace and democracy. The USSR would seek to
paralyze resistance by inciting labor disturbances, desertion, mutiny,
and rebellion. Rd particular targets mould be industrial labor, the
idealistic intelligentsia, self-conscious minorities, colonial populations,
and the armed forces.
, The USSR ueuld also seek to cripple resistance through sabotage of
military installations, transportation and communications facilities, other
public utilities, -mar industries, and stocks of essential commodities.
ConhunistpermAraticn of industrial labor has been Conducted with this end
in viem and, despite all precautions, mould presontHa serious threat.
In areas under direct Soviet attack the hard core of militant
Communists must also be expected to provide active fifth-column aupport for
Soviet military operations. The strongest capabilities in this respect
exist in Italy and France.
Finally, in the make of the Soviet advance the surviving Communists
mould emerge as collaborators in the establishment of police control and
civil administration. Despite the absolute pomer of the USSR as military
conqueror, every effort mould be made, as previously in Eastern &trope, to
present conquest as liberation and the resultant Communist regime as the
product of a genuine popular revolution. The purpose would be to convert
the conquered communities into allies as quickly as possible through the
familiar device of the Satellite state.
4. Psychological Readiness for War.
The Russian peoples recent experience of vier has given them reason
to dread it, despite the ultimate triumph of the USSR. They have been
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tauffht? however, to expect attack by the 'capitalist uorld and are prepared
to resist Such attack. Matever the actual case, the USSR would attribute
the war to capitalist aggression, and feu Soviet sitizenrtould be in a
position to knou better. Under the supposition that successful prosecution
of the war uas essential to their national survival, reinforced by the
Coercive pouer of their totalitarian state, the Soviet people would support
the Soviet mar effort.
5. Potential Sources of Disaffection;
In addition to the reluctance of the Soviet people to undergo the
rigors of a new mar, three principal bases of potential disaffection exist
in the USSR:
a. General disillusionment, and resentment as a result of the
exactions, repressions, and personal insecurity characteristic of the Soviet
state. Despite the fact that the Rusaians have never known liberty and are
inured to despotism, no other people in modern times have been so closely
controlled and systematically exploited? for so long.,
. b. The peasant& reeentment of collectivization. The German Army 'found
that the rural population mould support even 'a foreign invader in anticipation
that he mould abolish the collective farms and distribute the land on a basis
of private ounership.
c. The hostility of minority nationalities toward great Russiant
domination. For instance, resistance efforts still occur sporadically' in the
nerly annexed western Ukraine. The main. areas of potential disaffection are
the Baltic States, the. Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Soviet Central Asia.
6. Vulnerability to Psychological Warfare.
These potential sources of disaffection normally are kept under
effective control through isolation of the Soviet people', internal
propaganda, economic coercien? Communist monopoly of political power,
.and? above all, police terrorism. However, the unrepresentative
character of the government, ite high degree of centralization, and
its ultimate dependence on police coercion are specific weaknesses of
the Soviet system. Should the mechanism of close governmental control
be broken, by atomic bombardment for instance, disintegration mould set
in.
.So long as Soviet military operations appeared to be meeting with .
complete success and the internal see'rity mechanism remained intact, no
serious hindrance to the Soviet war effort would result from the latent
disaffection witiin the USSR. If Soviet internal propaganda were dise
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proved bY events.?especially if Allied capabilities proved greater than
expected, An0 oviet capabilities less?Soviet morale uould be adversely
affected, but the effect uould not be decisive. The latent disaffection
existing Uithin the USSR could bring about a crippling disintegration_of
the Soviet ear effort only if the Soviet control mechanism ,ere thoroughly
disrupted and if effective Allied support of disaffected groups rem
immediately at hand.
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SOVIET SATELLITES
7. 2aUfazaSakllt1,te States.
At the outset of wary and so long as Soviet operations were success-
ful, the European Satellite governments would of necessity support the
MR. Wholesale defections from the Satellite armed forces would 'be unlikely
to occur in these circumstances, but the reliability of the forces would
be questionable, and their utility would be strictly limited.
The vast majority of the people of the Satellite States, however, are
thoroughly hostile toward the USSR and the Communist regimes imposed on
them. Many of them would welcome war in the hope of eventual liberation.
The outbreak of hostilities might occasion sporadic acts of open resistance,
which would, however, be ruthlessly suppressed, In the circumstances, most
popular resistance would be passive, consisting of slowdowns, comealmont
of produce, draft-dodging, and other forms of non-cooperation. Active
resistance for the most part would hire the form of clandestine counter-
propaganda, espionage, sabotage, nnek acts of terrorism, Substantial
guerrilla resietanco could be expected only in Poland, where a large
security force would be required to keep it within bounds.
This situation would be radically altered if the USSR were to appear
to be losing the war and if advancing Allied forces were in a position to
render effective support to popular resistance in the Satellite States.
The Satellite armed farces, and even the rank-and-file of Satellite Com-
munistsy would become increasingly unreliable. Defections and popular
insurrection would occur wherever there was prospect of immediate All
support and early liberation by Allied armed forces. The Satellites in
proximity to Allied base areas and to the lines of approach of Allied armies
would becoms distinct liabilities rather than assets to the Soviet war
effort. In the face of the rising tide of patriotic anti-Communist reaction,
however, Satellite officials would perceive no future for themselves apart
from the fortunes of the USSR and would accordingly try to maintain a
desperate resistance as long as possible.
8. yS). malgatisa.
The Soviet position in the European Satellite Statce is vulnerable to
psychological warfare aimed at exploiting the deeporooted resentments that
mist in varying degrees throughout the Satellite arca. First among these
is resentment against the enforced subordination of Sate/lite national wel-
fare to Soviet interests. Even in Communist circles there is some dis-
content over the forceful transformation of the economic structure of
Eastern Europe to fit into Soviet master-plans, the lowering of standards
of living, and the failure of the USSR to meet the industrial needs of the
Satellite econcedes. In addition, there will be far many years lasting
resentment on the part of leaders and members of the various religious
organizations (particularly on the part of the Catholic Church) currently
under attack in the Soviet campaign to neutralize religious influence thnough-
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out the Satellite States. A third form of strong anti-Soviet feeling is
the resentment of the peasantry against the initial steps that have been
taken and especIntly against the blueprint for eventual widespread
coileotivizationLof agriculture. All these sources of dissatisfaction
uith Soviet domination blend in with the strong undercurrent of national
sentiment that opposes foreign control simply because it is foreign.
Vbscov-managed purges of the satellite Communist partiee indicate the
Kremlin's awareness of the dangers inherent in Eastern European nationalism,
but the basic causes of discontent mill be augmented rather than eradicated
in this control-tightening process. A rupture of Soviet controls, there-
fore, would permit widespread anti-Soviet activities.
Albania, by virtue of its exposed geographical position and the re-
lative instability of the present regime, is the most vulnerable of the
Satellite States to Western efforts to loosen the Soviet grip in Eastern
Europe. Poland, with 95 percent of its population Catholic, and with
the tnquenchable nationalism of the Polish people making itself felt even
in the highest councils of the local Cnnmapest party, probably is most
vulnerable to psychological pressures and Tray uoll be the most enduring
source of disaffection in Eastern Europe. On the other side of the.scale,
Rumania, there Soviet control already is virtually complete, is least
likely to brenk away from the Soviet yoke until liberation is a fact rather
than a hopeful prospect.
9. The Ear EaSagas_Atllite.
Outer Mongolia and northern Korea are proof against any outside
pressure Short of clearly impending Soviet defeat. In that extremity,
Korean nationalism might assert itself, but only under the protection
of Allied forces.
10.
The Chinesettuniat regime is in a position to pursue a compere:0.
iively independent policy, but it is firmlyaligned with the USSR and would
prove a reliable ally in the event of war daring 1950-51.
Mho Tse-tung and his group have come to Power mainly by their own
efforts in a "revolutionary situation" (not as a result of Soviet military
occupation and police control, except in NenchUria). The regime has been
? able, initially, to capitalise upon the force of Chinese nationalism, and
in China proper it still controls the armed forces, the police, the media
of internal propaganda, and the machinery of administration. In such out-
lying areas as Manchuria and Sinkiang, however, Soviet influence is strong.
The influx of Soviet technical advisers in time may establish effective
Soviet control over the whole of China. Nevertheless, the process cannot
move too rapidly or too obviously without arousing Chinese national re-
senttent and encountering serious resistance, including resistance from the
Chinese Communists. Nevertheless, the Chinese Communists are genuine
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Communists. They respect the revolutionary leadership of the Kremlin
and the powerful support of the USSR. They are pledged by the terms
of the 1950 treaty of alliance to eeeport the USSR in war. In all
probability China mill remain through 1951 a calling ally of the USSR.
On this basis, the resources and facilities of China mould be freely
available to the USSR in the event of tar, and China weuld become the
belligerent ally of the USSR if Soviet policy were to require it. Strictly
strategic considerations tread not necessarily load to each a requirement,
particularly if Soviet strategy in the Per East were defensive. Given
the nature of Soviet control inibmeheria and North Korea, the USSR already
holds an adequate defensive position confronting Saipan. In fact a friendly,
non-belligerent China mould serve to cover an extensive Soviet front, vhile
a co-belligerent China night peeve a strategic liability.
Despite these considerations, the USSR probaldervould require China
to enter the war as a categorical act of political loyalty. Moreover,
the Chineee themselves night be tempted to engage in imperielistic
adventures, particulerly in Hong Kong, Mew, and Southeast Asia, aiming
to take advantage of the attenuation of the anti-Communist ndlitary
position in the For East that would probably develop as a result of
ear in Europe.
In this event, the actual benefits the USSR would gain from Chinese
belligerency might be severely limited by the vulnerability of the Peiping
regime to external propaganda attack, which might weil be supported by
internal subversive activities. The most profitable theme for such an
attack on the Peiping regime would be the contention that Chinals in-
volvement in war was a result of the Peiping regimels subjection to foreign
control. Popular acceptance of the Chinese Communist regime has been based
in part on the promise of peace to an utterly mazegeary people. There are
already suggestions of dissatisfaction with the degree of Soviet control
in China, particularly in the Chinese border areas of Yenchuria? Mongolia,
and Sinkiang. The combination of mar-weariness and powerful anti-foreign
sentiment on the part of the Chinese populace would constitute a serious
vedknEss in the event China found itself at war on the aide of the USSR.
This geaknoas could be exploited effectively to neutralize the Peiping regimats
ear effort, especially if, in the meantime, Soviet economic relations with
China had operated in such a way as to convince the Chinese that they were
being exploited for the advantage of the USSR.
The facts of economic life in the USSR and China will strongly in-
cline the Kremlin to drive hard comnercial bargnine, as it has in Eastern
Europe, and to sacrifice Chinese domestic welfare to long-range Soviet
plans. At the same times, the Peiping regime itself will have incurred
considerable hostility from the peasantry, on which its strength hitherto
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has been based, if it Proceeds seriously eith Corammiat schemes for
industrialisation and the development of an urban proletariat. As a
result of all these factors, China probably would he one of the most
venSable elements in the Soviet camp in the event of mar in 1951.
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NATIONS PRMARIOUSLY ALIGNED
no ?20.11S".0.2la.
The situation in Southeast Asia is precarious, partienlerly so in
Indochira and Burma. A Communist triumph in either of those Countries
would have repercussions throughout the region. Conversely, a stabiliza-
tion of the situation in those countries would have stabilizing influence
elsewhere.
The situation is most critical in Indochina, where a nationalist
insurrection under Communist leadership is well established. /f the
Vietnamese can be convinced that the Bao Bei regime can achieve a real
rather than a counterfeit independence, and that the Communist alter-
native involves :subservience to the USSR or to China, that situation May
yet be saved. The time for action is short, however, and the possibility
remains that all or most of Indochina will have passed under Communist
control by. July 1951.
In Burma there is complex civil strife verging upon anarchy, a con-
dition propitious for the advancement of Communism regardless of the
outcome in Indochina? Thailand probably will accommgdate itself to the
prevailing force, whether Western or Soviet, but would hesitate to take
any action involving risk and probably would not become an active belli-
gerent in any case. The atatus of Malaya will depend mainly on the status
of British power in the area, but police control of the local Communists
would become much more difficult if Communist influence became entrenched
in Thailand.
The most powerful political force in Southeast Asia, however, is not
Communism, but an intense nationalism directed initiallyragainst European
imperialism. Communism hasflourishedmainly because of its identification
with this force. By the same token, were Communism to become identified
with Chinese imperialism, or, more remotely, with Soviet imperialism, the
force of nationalism could be turned against Communism.
12. Ibmoslavi.g.
The Tito regime in Yugoslavia occupies an awkward and precarious
position as the only Communist regime to reject the role of Satellite
and survive. In political theory and to some extent in foreign pollen
Yugoslavia exists in a limbo between orthodox Stalinist-Communist society
and the capitalist world.
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The USSR is seeking actively to overthrow the Tito regime, having
hemnered home in its propaganda the theem that Tito has become a "Faccist
tool" of "Western imperialism." Probably the USSR will be able to pre-
vent the spread of the Titoist heresy to other areas within the Soviet
sphere, but if defection threatened to 'spread, especially in the Satellite
area, where the theory of independent Communism would have considerable
appeal, the USSR might resort to extreme measures to destroy the Tito
government. It is more probable that the USSR will stop short of eirect
military aggression, and that Tito will succeed in maintaining and con-
solidating his position against all subversive efforts.
Even though it has become an anathema to Mhscov? the Tito regime
still finds that ideological considerations prevent open allianoe with
the Western Powers. Titocs aspiration ultimately to establish an in-
dependent Communist power-grouping is reflected in recent Yugoslav
preoccupation with the status of nen Tse-tung in China and Ho Chi Minh
it Indoch4re,
in outbreak of general hostilities probably would find Yugoslavia
still trying to follow a policy of neutrality, but Soviet pressure and
Ingoslaviags need for economAc assistance probably would have brought
Tito into a comparatively close association with the West. Ir. any event,
if attacked by the USSR, the Yugoslays would offer stubborn resistance?
130 Germane'.
The German people in general, including those in the Soviet sore of
Eastern Germany, are strongly anti-Communist0 nevertheless, they are acutely
conscious of the partition of Germany., the subordination or their national
interests in the current great-power conflict, and the exposed position
Germany would occupy in the event of var. Distressed by these circumstances,
many Germans are inclined to play the USSR and the Western Powers off.
against one another in an effort to reunite Germany, restore its strength,
and achieve a relatively independent position in international affairs.
Despite the considerable popular appeal of a policy openly directed
toward rebuilding a strong, independent Germany, the present West German
Government, probably because Rhineland-Catholic influence is dominant in
it, is predisposed to participate fully and cooperatively in the Western
European community. Moreover, the main (Socialist) opposition group also
is irrevocably anti-Soviet. This common inclination toward a Western
alignment is reinforced by dependence on the United States for dollar aid
and for protection against Soviet aggression. Integration with the West,
however, presents difficult problems, particularly in relation to Freud:
apprehensions regarding a resurgent Germany. In these matters -- control
of the Ruhr and the Seer, level of industry, freedom of trade, rearmament --
the Germans will demand equality of consideration as free and equal members
of the community?
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Pow' Germans have any illusions regarding the puppet character of the
East German Government. On that account it cannot compete 'with that of
West Germany as a means of achieving national independence. The USSR,
however, holds potentially important leverage in its power to bargain
more effectively than the West regarding the reunification of Germany.
It can also offer access to former Germannorkets in the East. Few Ger-
mans would wittingly pay the price of subservience to the USSR in order
to gain these benefits. Some, however, are capable of entertaining the
illusion that a reunited Germany could hold its own in partnership with
the USSR. To the extent that the West Germans are frustrated and dis-
illusioned by their relations with the West, and are unable to solve press-
ing economic problems, the number milling to take this gamble will increase.
The fate of Berlin has important bearing on the general situation.
So long as the Western Powers remain there, they 'will retain some identi-
fication with the concept of Germany as a whole. .Moreover, their stand
in Berlin has become a symbol of their eill and ability to protect West-
ern Germany. Regardless of the actual situation Western withdrawal from
Berlin probably would be taken to signify not only that the partition of
Germany was final so far as the West was concerned but also that the West
leaked the mill or ability to protect even Western Germany. Such con,-
elusions would be a powerful atinnine toward accommodation 'with the USSR
for the sake of personal and local security as well as national unity.
in sum, the probability is that the West German GoVernment will remain
aligned with the West and the East German Government with the East. The
alignment of the German people however, will depend on their confidence
in the eventual acceptance of Lin into full membership in the Western
community and in the power of the West to protect them from the USSR.
German opinion as a whole in the event of mar is likely to be disorgnnined
and semi-paralyzed in the effort to calculate national and personal inter-
ests under the stress of wartime.
14. ApintrUi.
Comeau/umis a lees effective force in Austria than in Germany. The
only serious vulnerability of the fundamental Austrian inclination toward
at open alliance with the West would be. the considerable sense of hope-
testiness concerning the possibility of military resistance to the USSR,
15. japan.
In the event of war before July 1951, the Japanese, acutely conscious of
the vulnerability of their position, unuld be forced to look to the United
States for protection. If assured of effective support, they would willingly
take an active part in the War in the hope of regaining their position as
a' major power, If denied such a role, their attitude might become passive.
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ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS
16e The North Atlantic Treaty States,
The nations adhering to the North Atlantic Treaty (Canada, Iceland, Nor?
way, Denmark, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Preece,
Italy, and Portugal, with their oversew) posseasions) would honor their com_
mitments in the (mat of war although most of them will press the US to maim
ever* reasonable concession to avoid war? The effectiveness of their resis?
tance would depend upon considerations of morale as moll as organisation and
arm-mei:Ito The morale factor is likely to be critically teak with respeot to
the continental states direetly exposed to Soviet attack in force? For the
daort term under cqnsideration the means of resistance available to them will
be strictly iirtted, Md they tfl be acutely conscious of their vulnerability,
Their determination cannot be sustained by premises of eventual liberation and
ultimate victory* but will depend on confidence in prompt and decisive ndli?
tary support?
Militant Ceramanict olmento in these states oust be expected to serve
as an active fifth column supporting the Soviet attack? Their strength is
ootianted at approrimately 200,000 in Italy, 70,000 in France, 13,000 in
Belgium, sad 9,000 in the Netherlands? The numbers to could be expected to
engage in open violence, hoar, would be less, and, unless they reecived
prompt Soviet ndlitery support, they could probably be controlled? With re
?
exact to Norway and Denmark, local Communist capabilities are limited to
espicmage and sporadic sabotage? In Portugal the CommuuUt organization is
small and ineffective?
Except for Indochina (see LI above), the colonial territories of the
North Atlantic Treaty powers are generally secure, although Cott guer?
rilla activity continues in Malaya and there is some unrest in Franca North
Africa, British West Africa, Cyprus, Eritrea, Madagascar, Macao, and HOug
Kong?
170 Other Recipients of US Military Aid,
As recipients ofUS military aid, Greece, Turkey, Iran, :southern Korea,
and the Philippine,: look to the United States for nupport and protection
against Soviet aggression, In common accretion* however, none would be
willing to take any action on behalf of the United States deemed likely to
precipitate an otherwise avoidable Soviet attack upon itself? Thus, if the
USSR chose to direct its offensive effort elsewhere, each would wish to re?
main nonctolligerento The Turks, howeeer? who strongly believe in the in?
evitability of Soviet attack or envelopment, could be expected to be cautiously
cooperative vdth the West, In all probability each of these nations (nith
the possible exception :of the Philippines) would be attacked immediately an
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the outbreak of war, in which case each would defend itself as beat it
couldnhile calling for US aid. Military weaknesses, not psychological
weaknesses, would determine the duration of resistance.
V30 The American Republics.
The other American republics would be aligned with the United States
In various degrees of effective cooperation. The Rio Treaty requires:
(1) immediate assistance to an American state attacked in the Western
Hemisphere as defined, the form of assistance to be whate=reach other
state desum appropriate; (2) consultation regarding appropriate action in
the event of an attack on an American state outside of the Hemisphere.
Thus co-belligerence is not required, and vide variation may exist in the
action tdken by various states. Soma (e.g., Brasi).) would be disposed
to accept active military roles. None of the American =publics would
favor the USSR.
la, The Arab States?,
The British treaties of alliance with Egypt, Jordan9 and Iraq would
be operatiVe in the event of rar before July 1951. Egypt and Iraq have
shown, in the, past, a disposition to repudiate this alliance, but ia &AY
case the British would utilise their bases and fortes actually in the
three countries as the occasion required. There might be popular dis-
turbances in Egypt and Iraq, but it is probable that those governante
could control the internal situation and that they would render at least
passive support to Great Britain. There is no question about Jordan, which
is dependent on the British for its existence, Saudi Arabia would expect
the United States to defend Dhahran and would cooperate to tin limited
extent that Arabian capabilities permitted. Syria and Lebanon are too
weak to pursue an independent policy and probably would adopt a passive
role in alignment with the West. The Arab states in general would provide'
comparatively little military strength for the area under any circumstances,
but they would align themselves with the West in preference to 'the USSR.
20. Conammmealth Natio= Other than India and Pakistan.
Although the other Commonwealth governments .are not committed in any .
=fly the adherence of the United Kingdom and Canada to the North Atlantic
Treaty in the event of Soviet military aggression, prompt belligerent
support of the UH probably wouldto givenbyAustralia, New Zealand, South
Africa, and Ceylon?
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21. )2&1aantan.
India and Pakistan probably would remain non-belligerent for the
tins being, although otherwise cooperative. They would expect Common-
wealth support if they should be themselves directly threatened, and
would resist Soviet or Chinese attack.
22. Modoneele.
Although the solution Wan long delayed and its viability has yet
to be tested fully, Indonesia, like India, appears to be tins toward
a constructive solution of the Asiatic colonial problem.' Had Indonesian
nationalism been frustrated as in Indochina, Indonesia probably mould
have been rendered as vulnerable to Communism. Indonesian aspirations
being satisfied, the continued alignment of the area with the West is
probable, if not assured, Indonesian policy will probably parallel that
of India, for similar reasons rather than becalms of Indian influence.
In both countries, the fundamental weaknesses are economic rather than
psychological. The basic drive is toward an independent status, wherein
the urgent problems of national economic: development can be worked out.
23. Finlned.
The Finnish people are stubbornly anti-Soviet, but Finland is in no
position to defy the USSR. The Finnish Government, therefore, without
repudiating the Soviet-Finnish mutual assistance treaty, would seek to
remain neutral, or at least to avoid Soviet occupation of Finnish territory.
The Finns would not willingly assist the USSR, and, if Soviet forces entered
ths4r territory without wrens permission, they mould fight. In any ease,
Soviet forces entering Finland would be in hostile territory.
24. Other RurOesan Neutral : Sweden. Switeerland. Ireland. and Spain.
Sweden andSwitzerland are ideologically anti-Soviet, but both cling
to a traditional neutrality in the hope of avoiding Soviet attack. If
attacked, both would resist to their utmost ability.
The government and people of Ireland are strongly anti-Soviet in centi-
ment, but the government is disposed to hake any formal alignment with the
North Atlantic Treaty Powers conditional upon the cession of Northern Ireland
to the Republic of Ireland.
The Franco regime is conspicuously antiopSoviet? but is ideologically
unacceptable to Western %rope, In the event of war, Spain, having no
wish or hope for accommodation with the USSR, would seize any occasion to
escape from isolation and enter a defensive alliance with the Atlantic
Posers, but might remain non-belligerent unless attacked.
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25. kmal.
Israel's potation is one of deliberate neutrality between the East
and West? Western ties are actually predominant? however, and, if Israel
were compelled to take sides, it monad align itself yith the West?
26. Afahminten.
In dangerous intuaraity to the USSR and remote from succor, Afghanis?
tan would remain neutral Unless attacked, in which ease effective re?
sistance could not be prolonged?
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