THE BRUDERSCHAFT AND THE RIGHT-WING NATIONALIST GROUPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000900120001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 15, 1950
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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broad popular support has mi been demonstrated."
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CENTRAL INTEMTGENCE AGENCY
INTELLIGENCE qatORANDUM No. 281
2
15 August 1950
SUBJECT: The Bruderschaft and the Right-Wing Nationalist Groups
The Bruderschaft (the Brotherhood), a semi-covert, Rightist organization
seeking to control future Getman remilitarization and to achieve influence
and ultimate control over the governmental structure of West Germany is the
suzcessor to similar groups Which originated among German prisoners of war
interned in England. The Bruderschaft has both a covert and an overt program.
The overt program is designed to enlist popular support and divert =favorable
attention from the covert operations. In keeping with this division, the
Bruderschaft is itself divided, with an inner council of twelve members appar-
ently responsible for directing the activities of the larger and less secret
body, the Bruderschaft.
Although the Hruderschaft has connections, some of them extremely tenuous,
with many prominent Germans, its leadership is divided among a small group of
men. Karl Kaufmann, former Nazi Gauleiter of Hamburg, is reportedly the under,.
cover leader of the organization. The official chiefly active in political
matters and in liaison with political parties is Alfred Franke-Griekschi formerly
in the Personnel Office of Heinrich Himmleris RSHA (Reich Security Office).
A former aajor in the German General Staff Corps, Helmuth Beck-Broichsitter,
is in charge of plans for a future German army and maintains contact with groups
of ex-officers. Apparently vying with each other for c...ntrol onlnilitary
:questions are Oldwig von Natzmer, formerly commanding general of the Gross-
deutschland armored division, and ex-General Hasse von Manteuffel. Toe back-
grounds of these men are representative of the great majority of those associated
with the Bruderschaft, largely ex-Nazis, or ex-officers.
Neither the covert nor overt program is clearly formulated. Ihe overt
program may be said to be a watered-down version of the covert, with the most
anti-democratic and anti-US points deleted. The.implicatiOns of the covert
program, however, together with the political backgrounds of the leaders and
most of the members, leave little doubt that the organization espouses neo-
Nazism, with chances from the Nazi program dictated by an opportunistic appraisal
of the present international situation.
The overt Bruderschaft program rejects underground activity and extremism
of both Right and Left. It demands a genuine European Union and cooperation
with the West, but not at the cost of widening the Gast-ifiest rift in Europe.
Note: This memorandum has not been coordinated with the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air 41,.
Force.
000,112
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? Litutticr k.,
The overt ?roues specifically rejects German remilitarization. There is,
however, ample evidence that leaders of the Bruderschaft will overtly support
German remilitarization if they can secure control of the new Semen army.
The covert political program of tne Bruderschaft has not been clearly
defined even within the organization itself, but it is believed to contain
four major aims: (1) elimination of "narrow nationalism" in Europe; recon?
ciliation and alliance between France and Germany, with this alliance as the
nucleus for a European Union; (2) dissolution of the Atlantic Pact; resistance
to US and Soviet "interference" in European affairs, and elimination of inter-
national Bolshevism; (3) attainment of an independent and unified Germany under
one central government, equal to all other nations and with.its 1937 frontiers
restored; and (4) elimination of German party politics and the proportional ?
representation system, with the eventual goal of a "new state order" based
cn a so-called administrative decentralization and the acquisition a political
power by a small elite group.
The covert program thus projects a united Europe in which Germany would
presumably play the leading role I:yr virtue of its size, power, and position.
This Europe would withdraw from close political and military cooperation with
the US and, although opposing "intirnational" Bolshevism and Soviet interference
in Suropean affairs) could take a neutral position between toe US and USSR or
even enter as an equal partner into alliance with the USSR. The authoritarian
form of government envisioned for Germany, despite Bruderschaft claims that it
is ai;ainst Fascia.: and dictatorship, would presumably be extended to the other
European countries throuzit the foreign neo-Fascists with whom the Bruderschaft
maintains contact.
Available evidence suggests that the leaders of the Bruderschaft have no
intention of forming their own political party, but hope rather to secure support
for their program fros the existing parties except according to their awn
account, those on the Left and the most extreme Right. Although the Bruder-
schaft denies the legitimacy of tile Federal Government on the legalistic ground
that the aurrender of the Reich in 1945 W42 purely military and did not entail
loss of German sovereignty, the leaders of tne organization have endeavored to
establish contact with federal officials. The most notable case is tne adenauer-
Manteuffel exchange, but several instances of lower-level relationships between
the aruderschaft and regional officials of the federal coalition parties have
come to 1iht. There is as yet little evidence that governmental policy on
either federal or Land levels has been directly affected by Bruderschaft efforts,
and greater future success in thia direction will depend on the strength of the
Rightist parties and Bruderschaft influence over them.
The limited success which the Bruderschaft has encountered in its efforts
to gain influence among the moderate government parties may well underly the inc3
creasingly open steps its leaders have taken to unite some of the hightist parties
'nto one group supporting nruderschaft aims. In most instances, the ties between
Er
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'P SEUREZ
the Bruderseaaft and Rightist parties are only loose ones, and the secrecy in
which they are usually cloaked makes fine delineation of them impossible, It
has been definitely ascertained that in April 1950, prior to the Landtag election
in North RhineeNestphalia, the Iruderschaft sponsored a meeting orreiTrahl
Rightist parties for the purpose of forming a Rightist election coalition in that
Land. Several of the parties invited refused to cooperate, however, and the
coalition formed did very poorly in the election. Similar attempts by the Bruder?
schaSt may enjoy greater success in the future in vier of the many similarities
in membership and objectives between the Bruderschaft and the Rightist parties,
The Bruderschaft is also engaged in continuous promotional activity among
German war veterans, especially former officers of the aehrmacht. Although
maintaining that its work among veterans is intended solely to organize them
for securing greater veterans' benefits from the government, the Bruderschaft is
known to be conducting extensive correspondence with former General Staff members'
on German remilitarizaleion and other current military problems,
Although the leaders of the erudersehaft apparently intended originally to
remain a clandestine group for some time, the publicity they received in Feb-
ruary and March 1950 appears to have tempted them to operate openly. The
principal advantage of overt.activitya broadened support from nationalist and
militarist elements, may serve to increase Bruderschaft capacity to influence
Aghtist political parties, which desire the votes of those elements,
In general, heaever, the asuderschaft appears to have lost strength since
March, partly because of financial difficulties and partly because of differ?
ences among its leaders over future policies. Bruderschaft finances have never
been sound, The shortage of funds has recently become acute, however, and this
lack of money will increase the difficulties of Bruderschaft leaders in carrying
on their activities. The differences between Bruderschaft leaders have arisen
not only on the fundamental question of whether or not the Bruderschaft should
operate more openly, but also as whether the political Or the military goals
of the organization should predominate. In addition, personal rival:rieu among
the leaders of both the military and political cliques tend to diminish the
effectiveness of Bruderschaft efforts to create unity among German nationalists
and militarists.
The future success of the Bruderschaft in influencing and coordinating the
German aiehtists depends not only on the ability of its leaders to sublimate their
own differences and overcome other internal difficulties, but also, and even
more heavily, on the development of the Rightist parties themselves. The ability
of the Right as a tole to win broad popular support has been demonstrated. A
gradual trend toward the Right has indeed been observable in elections over the
past four years, but more noteworthy to date have been the relative moderation
of the gest GerMan electorat.i and the limited extent of Rightist gains, The Right
is thus not an immediate danger, but rather a long?term one. Tee degree of the
danger in contingent to a great extent on the indefinite continuation or the
Intensification of the mane serious problems facing the ;Iceman people at present,
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The Bruderschaft appears as less of a threat as an organization than do
tha ideas and elements it represents. As a movement) the Druderschaft is
symptosiatic of current dissatisfaction among German veterans and former Nazis
with the establtshed political parties and tne present government of West Germany,
Unless the allegiance of the bulk of these elements can be non for the Federal
Republic and the West) they will continue to support one or another extremist
group. This raises the possibility that a single, strong, Rightist party will
eventually emerge to capture their loyalty, Even more serious, however, would
be attempts by the present government or a successor to gain their support not
by efforts to solve the current social and economic problems but, through adoption
of tho programs methods, and personalities advocated by the Bruderschaft.
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