ROLE OF WFTU IN THE SOVIET DRIVE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000800220002-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 14, 1949
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 261
315744
14 December 1949
SUBJECT,: Role of WFTU in Soviet Drive in Southeast Asia 1
SMEARY
In its drive to obtain domination over Southeast Asia, the USSR has
apparently assigned. a major role to the World Federation of Trade Unions
(UFTU) and is accelerating its efforts to effect Communist control over
labor organizations throughout the Far East. Acting chiefly through the
recently established WFTU AsianI7etee. Bureau in Peiping, the USSR is seeking
to harness the resources of the well-diaciplined Chinese Communist labor
federation to the task of penetratME the labor movements of Southeast
Asia. Without decisive counteraction by non-Communist labor forces and
Southeast Asian governments, these efforts. are likely to achieve .
considerable success, particularly in Derma, Thailand, Indonesia, and .
the Philippines.- The advantages which willsocreleto the USSR, if labor
Sri Southeast Asia is successfully organized under communist control, are:
(1) substantially increased capabilities for disrupting the national
economies; (2) a strong nucleus for gaining political control over the
area by laying the groundwork for the formation of "united front"
coalitions and "national liberation armies"; and (3) increased Chinese
Communist influence throughout the area.
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Note: This memorandum has not been coordinated with the intelligence
. organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air
Force.
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ROLE OF WFTU IN SOVI..3 DRIVE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
1. Background.
The current Soviet drive for control of Southeast Asian labor uas
launched at the January 1949 meeting of the WFTU Executive Committee,
when Soviet trade unionists outlined plans for bringing Far East labor
organizations into the WFTU. At the July 1949 WFTU World Congress, the
Soviet delegate announced that the WFTU was henceforth to consider
"assistance to the trade unions of the colonial and dependent countries"
as its primary task and should call an .Asian regional conference to.
consider the means for extending such aid. The Soviet drive really got
under way in Hoverter 1949: when the WFTU held the Asian and Australasian
Trade Union Conference in Peiping to consider means for "liberating ale
oppressed peoples of Asia." The conference was attended by WFTU Executive
Bureau members and by trade union representatives from Burma, Ceylon', China,'
India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaya, Mongolia, Worth Korea, the Philippines,
Thailand, South Korea, the USSR, and Vietnam.
2. Instruments Of WFTU Penetration.
lila thus apparent that the WFTU has been assigned the principal
role in. the Soviet Unionsa drive for control of the laborforce in the
Far East. In the performance of this task, the WFTU will receive the
support.of the Communist-controlled. International Democratic Werlinre
Federation and the World Federation of Democratic Youth. Wilt capabilities
for successful execution of this drive have been enhanced by the with-
drawal of its Western elements and the complete sovietization of its
staff. The WFTU is expected to allocate a major share of its financial
resources to the Asian drive, with the Soviet Legation in Bangkok as a
possible dispersing center for these funds, (The exact extent of WFTU
financial resources is unknown; the availability of special Soviet funds
in support of the July 1949 London dock strike indicates that they may be
substantial.)
:In the Southeast Asian campaign, the WFTU will operate primarily
through its Asian labor Bureau established at the November conference in
Peiping.. The Bureau uill provide a regional center for the coordinated
planning and direction of VIFTU operations throughout the Far East. In
addition to. seeking to establish new unions in areas where none exist,
the Bureau will operate through existing Communist-controlled 'unions in
ger
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Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, and through overseas
Chinese labor unions.
The well-disciplined Comnunist all-China Federation of Labor will ? ?
have the dominant role in the new Asian Iellor Bureau, which is located L'
in Peiping, Moscor-trained Li Lisan? the leading Chinese labor
organizer, currently in charge ok the Chinese Communist trade union
training program, is expected to have an important part in directing
the Bureau. The Bureau will consequently be in a good position to
harness the resources of the Chinese Communist labor federation to the
task of penetrating the labor movements of Southeast Asia.
A major part of the Asian Labor Bureau's activities will be
devoted to gaining control over such national labor federations as the
Burmese.Trade Union Congress, the Thai Central Labor Union, the Union
of Indonesian Workers Organizations, and the Philippine Congress of
Labor. The Bureau will almost certainly instruct the Communist-dominated
unions in these countries to bring increasing pressure upon the national
organizations to affiliate with the WFTU. As part of this campaign,
and in an attempt to create further opportunities for Communist
exPloitation, these Communist elements will probably during 1950 resort
increasingly to local strikes, coordinated boycotts against '1;estern
shipping, and possibly to the use of paramilitary units. The Communist
unions will be able to engage in such activity with relative impunity as
long as the organizations to which they belong continue to be recognized
as national labor federations or to enjoy government toleration.
The UTU will be aided in its drive for control of Asian labor by
the large number of Chinese workers throughout the area. For example, in
Thailand and Malaya, the labor force is heavily intermixed with Chinese
torkers who are organized in their own unions. Similar unions of
Chinese workers are to be found in smaller numbers in Indonesia and the
Philippines. These Chinese unions will have a natural tendency to turn
for guidance and leadership to the Chinese Communist national labor
federation and hence will be more susceptible to direction by the Asian
Labor Bureau, Moreover, Chinese Communist labor agitators will probably
have greater latitude to operate throughout the area after the Southeast
Asian governments recognize the Chinese Conmautist regime.
2'or-Gel.
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244gienrir ,
3. Probable Results of WFTU Driven
Although the WFTU drive will be less effective in areas still occupied ?
by troops of the colonial powers (e.g. Malaya and French-occupied
Indochina), it may achieve considerable success in the independent countries,
especially Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Tactors
fauoring the eutess of the WFTU drive include: (1) the unfamiliarity of *
the native governments and nom-Communist labor with WFTU tactics and
policies; (2) the continued failure of the Western national labor
organizations to establish close working liaison with native labor leaders;
and (3) the comparative weakness and immaturity of the Nehru-oriented,
anti-Communist Asian Labor Federation. To the extent that the native
governments and other non-Communist forces in Southeast Asia fail to over-
corns these weaknesses and to take decisive action against Communist-led
labor union, open cooperation between the WFTU and the national labor
federationsin Burma, Thailand; Indonesia, and the Philippines hillf-result,
If the Communists succeed in establishing effective control over the
Southeast Asian labor movements, the USSR will have made considerable
progress toward politica] domination of the area. Control of the labor
force would increase the Communist potential for undermining economic
stability in these countries, and would provide the basis of support for
"united front" movements and paramilitary units, as well as for the
extension of Chinese Communist influence throughout Southeast Asia.
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