REGIONALISM AND ORIENTATION TRENDS IN ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000800150001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1949
• Content Type: MEMO

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Mina BlITALLIGENCE AGENCY
12
1 December 1949
BITELLIMICE IS:MORINO. 254
SUBJECT: Regionalism and Orientation fronds in Asia
Problems
1. RgionSim.
A.
To identify and evaluate the effectiveness of the dommon
interests which tend to dram Asian governments and poples
into a regional association.
To identify the conditions under Which the various nations
of Asia might participate in a regional association.
'c. Tb estimate the willingness of the various countries of
Asia to join a Pacific Association such as outlined in
48C 48 (25 October 1949 draft).
2. Orli:Watts.
Note
07613
To estimate trends in Asia toward or avay from the US or
the USSR.
Document No. 1061 00
NO CHANGE in Class. .0
:16...DECLASSIFIED
. class. CHANGED TO: TS S C
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77'
Auth: D EmG. 77/1763
Date: / By: 0-b?
Por the purposes of this memorandum, Asia is defined as that part
of the continent of Asia south of the USSR and east of Saman? to?
gether with the major offshore islands of Japan, Taiwan, the Phil?
ippines, Indonesia, and Ceylon. .
This menorandum has not been coordinated with the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State, As4y9 Navy, and the
Air Force.
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1. Bajzfallim.
a. ppaInzterests of Asian Geyernments ana_a0122.
(1)
In comparison comparison with the West, the heritage of /attic
states has produced a much smaller degree of homogeneity and common interest.
Centuries of domination by native despotisms and theocracies - and, more
latterly, by western colonial states - have caused the development in the
Far East of compartmentalised groups of peoples, relatively self-sufficient,
and frequently with their economies geared more to the needs of a European
overlord than to those of an Asiatic neighbor. The .moll amount of free
thought or action now permitted in Asia has been a recent development?
The mere existence, therefore, of interests common to
the governments or peoples of two or more areas of the region - or even of
interests common throughout the region - does not assure that such a com-
munity of interest is recognized, and much less that it is currently an
active factor favoring regionalism. At best, most of the following common
Interests found within the region are Merely factors out of which, with
extended and patient nurturing, regionalism might develop.
(2) Bationaliam.
The inescapable demand of Asiatic nations for freedom
and self-determination, which at present is taking the Dorm of strong
nationalistic aspirations, is the only factor of common interest sufficient-
ly dynamic to be of current significance in the development of regionalism
in Asia. Typically but not universally expressed in the form of anti-
colonialism, Asian nationalism is bolstered by a feeling of mutual antipathy
toward western nations which have subjected Asian peoples to various forms
of political and social subordination in modern times. This generally
hostile reaction to western subordination is further reinforced by elf-
ferances in race, culture, and patterns of behavior that, even under the
most favorable circumstances of rapprochement with the West, will Incline
the Asians to make common caune0
governments
speaking,
long as e
common intere
regional lin
am is universal among Asian peoples and
serve most effectively as a wafting factor, regionally
common threat exists and is recognized as such. AS
of "western ilperialism" continue to exist in Asia, the
in nationalism operates to unify the several nations along
which mill be in opposition to US interests. ?
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At present, A3iMft nationalise is vulnerable to oeizure
and exploitation by international Communism in furtherance of ineeresta of
the USSR. With progressive elimination of western imperialism in Asian
however, this vulnerability to Soviet exploitationedll diminish. Whether
nationalism then will continue to be a unifying factor, or whether it will
evolve primarily as a dividing force* will depend in large measure on the
character, manner of applications and timing of US and other uestern in-
fluence. As long as nationalism is the predominant force in Asia, either
an abandonment of western interest in the area or a program of premature
and excersive orbit:elation of regionalam will render more likely the de-
velopment of sharp cleavages within the region. Lacking an extended and
patient nurturing, and in the absence of general US-USSR hostilities, z:f.
gionaliam in Asia cannot be eveected to develo t
ULecurity interests
(3) 9IllttSaM-Ra-latualta.
There are, in addition to the universal preocoupation
with nationalism already discussed, certain other interests common to
two or more Asian states. Under appropriate conditions, these interests
could provide a foundation for concerted action and therefore represent
factors favoring regionalism. One such factor is religion; another is the
familial and village pattern of Oriental life: both are inimical to the
extension of Oommunlam. The development of a threat to these traditional
and common interests could conceivably result in the development of
opposition to Conmuniam on a regional scale. In any other regional con-
texts however? these factors would not only be ineffectual but might
aetuaLly prove disruptive.
Economic forces favoring the development of regionalism
in Asia, are slight, although some elementary relationships, such as those
between the food-deficit and food-surplus countries of the region exist.
While Asia has a potential for the development of complementary economies,
particularly mith industrial expansion in Japan and India, the maSor pro-
ducts of this fundamentally agricultural resion, are exported outside the
Far East and there is only a smell amount of intra-rogional trade. Long-
range planning and the careful expansion of present primitive economic re-
lationships ? however; together with development of the regions unrealized
economic potential, could create broader, more inclusive, and more highly
developed economic patterns conducive to regional integration.
The ambitions of individual Asian states represent another
stimulus to the development of bonds of common interest among the remaining
natione. The general antipathy felt in most Asian countries toward the
Chinese, based on decades of experience with ruthless Chinese commercial
3
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exploitation, is the most important of these stimuli to the deve]opment
of regionalism. Strong in proportion to the size of the Chinese community
in any particuleze state, this sentiment is particularly intense in Indo-
china, Thailand, Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and the approach
of the Chinese Communist armies toward the borders of nearby states baa
further increased Sinophobia. A parallel situation exists in the suspi-
cions on the part of other Asian states toward the ambitions of India,
where strong Pan-Asian sentiments are accompanied by equally strong desires
for hegemony. Similar suspicions, moat intense in the countries whioh have
suffered Japanese military occupation, could be expected in the event of
a resurgence of Japanese power.
(4) z9,0"s of_Eadpaalim.
Present efforts on the part of various governments in
Asia to join in some sort of association can be expected to provide little
more than a starting point for eventual regional development. Future '
efforts can be expected to develop generally along one or a combination
of the following lines:
(a) Efforts on the part of a single nation within
the region to establish itself in a position of domination over all or
part of the region. The urge of nationalistic aspirations might prompt
some one Asian nation, such as India, to assert a position of leadership
in regional development for actual purposes of self-aggrandizement.
(b) Action by threatened nations within the region to
oppose the intra-regional threat of hegemony posed by such efforts. The
countries of Southeast Asia under Philippine leadership, for example,
might create a regional organization, ostensibly for economic cooperation
but actually as a measure of opposition to the threat of Indian domination.
(c) Acceptance of Communism by most or all of the
nations within the region as a measure for the total elimination of western
influence. Nest or all of the Asian nations night accommodate to the in-
dividual forces of Communism within their own borders in the belief that
only by this drastic action could they achieve their nationalist aspi-
rations. With political systems in common, these Communized nations of
Asia would be subject to central control and would, therefore, represent
a regional bloc.
(d) Joint action by most or all of the nations within
the region growing out of the realization that "western imperialism" is
not the only nor the greatest extra-regional threat to Asian nationalistic
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aspirations. This action would grow, primarily, from a realizatien of
Soviet objectives and a discernment of Soviet methods and instrumento
of expansion. Associated with this increased realization of the Soviet
threat would he an appreciation of the advantages growing out of continued
association with the West on a basis of mutual benefit.
(e) Development of intraregional cooperation and concord,
growing out of the realization that studiea intransigence in international
relations does not solve do:Mastic problems arising largely from economic
maladjustments. A gradual realization by former enemies, for example,
that renewed trade with Japan would provide economic benefits otherwise
-unattainable. Such a realization could lead to conscious development. of
Intra-regional trade patterns, thus fostering a regional economic union.
None of these general patterns of regional development
will necessarily emerge in the immediate future: the first three, in which
nationalism appears to be the major motivating force,, could develop with-
in the next decades the last two, in which other interests supersede
nationalism, may require considerably longer to develop, perhaps a gene-
ration or morec
Con4itio for FWA.9.12aIlaBeilleileRWIRDgieW221agone
The conditions under which the various nations of Asia
might participate in a regional association are so varied as to pre-
clude comprehensive generalizations. Any sub-regional organization
directed against a single nations threat of regional domination woad
doubtless attract those countries most immanently threatened. Additionally
it is estimated that the degree to which the several nations would find
DS approval, support, or participation acceptable would depend largely
on their desire for material assistance which would be most readily
available from the US,, Beyond these considerations, the following di-
gest of individIvA reactions best sumearizee the current appreciation:
2141a strongly-favors a regional association but only
under conditions. of Indian leadershire, Moreaver?
the character of the association meat avoid an
appearance of being an instrument of western policy
and avoid either an antieSoviet or an anti-US character.
PaktakIn at this time would only participate in a regional
association which was directed against Indian domi-
mance and still was neither anti-Communist nor anti-
Western in character.
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Ceylon would join a regional association only under pressure
of the UK and would tend to be hostile to any rove-
meat that sought to develop a community of interests
with its Asian neighbors0
bAhinistan would assiduously avoid any regional associa-
tion which the USSR might find offensive and would be
generally reluctant to join any regional association.
Southeasagla would tend toward a preference for regional
development along lines and in a form which, enjoyed
US support. Opposition to Japanese membership all
continue for some time0
ffaza under Rhee would join any non-Communist association
but would prefer that it be actively anti-Cormullist.
Japanese membership would not necessarily preclude
Koreas joining.
Japan would welcome an opportunity to join in a regional
association, particularly one enjoying US support,
both as a security measure and as a step toward
regaining a position in international affairs.
So Willineness to Participate in an lotionAA Snvisase4
in NSC 4.2 (25 October 1949 dr ft .
Based on the considerations noted above, the willingness
of the several governments of Asia to participate in an association such
as envisaged in PSC 48 (25 October 1949 draft) is estimated as follows:
aolga
would refrain from joining and would even oppose
the association.
Nktetan would refrain from joining.
Af_g_haMaan would refrain from joining0
azign would refrain from joining unless urged by the UK.
Southeast Asia in general would favor joining, with some
reservations as to the inclusion of Japan and as to
the anti-Com:mullet character of the association.
Jaren would join the association, although any lack of
security gintrantees would be a deterrent.
0 amg would join the association.
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2. 2112111=.
Trends in Asia toward or away from the US or the USSR
estimated for individual countries as follows:
India - There is evidence of a growth of pro-US orientation
and increased disaffection with the Soviet Union,
particularly during the last year.
Pakistan -Although Pakistan is believed basically pro-Western,
it has since 1947 adopted a fluid and equivocal attitude
toward the East-West dispute.
Afghanistan - Traditionally fearful of Russia, Afghanistan
remains anti-USSR. However, a distinct pro-US
orientation of some five yearse standing bzs been
conniderably lessened in recent months.
Ceylon - The pro-US orientation of Ceylon has diminished
somewhat during the past year, but strong pro-UK
sentiment continues to protect the US position.
Southeast Asia - In general, a pre-US orientation continues
in the area, with noticeable improvement in Indonesiao
Although there is little evidence of any overt align-
ment with the USSR, neither is there evidence of dis-
affection with the Soviet Union.
China - There is to evidence of change in Commuyest Chines
pro-Soviet orientation.
Korea No, significant changes in orientation.
Japan Minor indications of Japanese attitudes evidence no
clearly defined trends either toward or away from the
US or the USSR?
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CONFIDENTIAL
Dto254
DAM, DAS
Regionalism in Asia
23 km 49
sac staff (memo dated 21 Nov)
To estimate the development of regionalism In South Asia
The area comprehended by this paper is that portion of Asia
east of Iran.
The estimate should include an outline ef sommos interests;
conditions under which Asiatic nations might participate in a
Paoific essociatioa; specific estimates on attitude of Asiatic
nations ea jelaisg a Pattie Association an outlined in MS0
48 draft of 25 Oct 43; evilest, of development of pro-US cries-
tenon sad disaffection with USSR.
IM See atteehod copy of request memo.
1700 II Sow 49
DOI
0/112 ant others as necessary
1 Dee 49
Document No.
NO CHAN n
1763
D068
By; L)
NO CH GE M CUM. 0
Top Secret 0 DECLASSIFIED
CLAM CHANGED TO:
Requester, /A0 Measles NEXT MEW DATE
77
WIN ititaa:*.o.
It is considered that this estimate will be
coordinated estimate (which will include point 3 of the some of
request) to be disseminated possibly in January 1950.
Point 3 of memo of /*quest Is not lacluded in the present esti-
mate; this has been elearleir4190;egnister. /gm ?..,.,,a
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CONFIDENTIAL
STAFF EiTELLIGEDOE GROUP
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ProSec . 1M-254 Received Fran: D/FE
DRte; 30 November 1949
Priority:
Salect;/ Regionalism and Orientation Trends in Asia
D/kub
Reviewed in Pc04 by: (1)
(2)
(3)
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