THE COMMUNIST THREAT TO TAIWAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000800100001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 15, 1949
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL XNTEI&IOENCE AGENCY
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 249
SUBJECT: The Co let Threat to Taiwan
Numlbarr
15 November 1949
in44.,1/4,, PIC
The principal military threat to the Nationalist position ?ri Taiwan
comes from Communist forces on the mainland. This threat is enhanced by the
inherent basic weaknesses of the Nationalist establishment on the island; the
same basic weaknosnea which contributed so heavily to the Nationalist Collagee
on the China mainland. The anti?Nationalist feeling among the Taiwanese,
while detracting from the ability of the present regime to resist a Communist
operation against the island, lacks the leadership, organization, and armed
strength necessary to. overthrow the. Nationalists.. Communist infiltration of
the island, both among the disaffected native population. and Nationalist
armed forces, is proceeding, but in itself is probably not strong enough to
unseat the Nationalist regime. Although the Communist mainland forces are
capable of assaulting Taiwan at any time during the coining winter months, a
major Communist effort probably will not occur before March, by which time
the Communists are expected to have completed certain preliminary operations
such as the capture of the Chushan Islands, the securing, in a military sense,
of East China, and the massing of sufficient forces,. supplies and transport
of the Fukien coast. In the face of such a major Communist assault, compounded
by the effects of native disaffection and Communist infiltration, the Nationalist
probably could not hold the island.
Document No. 00
2. Nationalist Forces on Taiwan NO CH7,E in Cluqu.
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Nationalist ground forces on Taiwan number well over 100,000
and are supported by an air force of approximately 250 operational airdraft,
a navy with about 50 combat ships afloat, alia an armored force of over 200
tanks, The navy and air force suffer from shorages of fusl and spare parts,
but the ground forces have adequate stooks of weapons and equipment. The
weakness of the Nationalists arises fres' divergence of purpose, Lick of will
to fight, tendency toward defection, the ineptitude which resulted in their
defeats on the mainland, and Communist infiltration.
3. Communist Forces for an Assault on Taiwan
The Communists are committed to taking Taiwan and have already
assigned the 1400,000'-strong force of CHEN Ti to the task. CHEN's forces have
had some amphibious experience -- but they have not yet faced problems
comparable to those involved in an assault upon Taiwan. They have the
capability of concentrating and equipping a force ?of sufficient size to
assault the island. The major obstacle to the Communists is the Taiwan Strait,
Which ranges in width from 75 miles in its northern part to over 200 in the
south: The crossing would in all like lohood be made by a junk armada which
the Communists are already assembling. These junks, some of which have
enxiliary motor power, maybe supplemented by elements of the Communist navy,
made up of es?Nationalist ships and men.
U. Weather Conditions
During the coming winter and spring months, weather in the Taiwan
Strait, which could be a controlling factor, will not, except for sporadic
gales, preclude a crossing. Strong favorable winds continue through the 'inter.
Stain
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With spring the velocity of the winds diminishes, and there are recurring
'periods of low visibility *Itch would facilitate undetected crossings. '
5, The Probable Course or the Campaign for Taiwan
During the period of favorable winds, junks under sail poser along
could cross the strait in about 30 hours. Motorpowered junks and vessels of
the Communist navy could cross under cover of darkness and disembark advance
elements to establish a beachhead in anticipation of the arrival of the main '
junk-borne force. Nationalist defenses appear to be organized upon three key,
or control, points from which they hope to meet any Communist threat with
flekibls counteraction. However, the launching of the Communist operatiOn
against Taiwan will probably precipitate native uprngs, Gemmunistsinspired
sabotage, and Nationalist defections. The cumulative effect of a continuing
flow of Communist re-enforcements, the disruptive actions of the native
Taiwanese, and the weaknesses inherent in the Nationalist Military establish-
ment makes it likely that the Communists can control Taiwan 90 dap after the
first landing.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/29 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000100100001-1? .
Project: 114.249'
?- ? ? OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(11400044AI
falatta
Date: I Hew 49
To: D/r3
Publications
From:, fftekintlignimmeavision, Projects Planning pa.
Subject: Probable. developments In Taiwan
ptatement of ftoleet
gaxAs: Interdepartmental poordinatinm Staff (NOrbere)
Pro?lottTO provide a current estimate on probable developments in Tai-
wan
.ddoncs The reciuest atoms from plans to place a UWE unit On Taiwan,
and seeks informatiOn which would relate to the Safiatif and ability
of personnel to derry out functions there. Particular interest
is centered on the Aiminti of anticipated Otenteo nuch as ooknunist
.attacks internal collapse, etc..
A brief estimate is requested.
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