VULNERABILITY OF COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN ASIA.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000600200001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 8, 1949
• Content Type: MEMO

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Project/MI.2?9
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE CF RUMS AND ESTIMATES
Lesgsteavam la_m2E?Mjal
To: B
From: Staff Intelligence Group, Projects Planning
Subject: Yulnerability of Communist Movement in Asia.
atagertugiwg,21
=law MSC Staff
Date:8 August I 9
&gun: List and discuss vulnerable points of the Communist movement
in Asia.
Agagmatgeg:
sectp4: Maybe handled along lines of CRS 72-49 but without detailed
analysis. Fairly brief paper desired.
.11Aftialrei49nAl.kjISLUglialalaw
Estrap lu, but may later take form of an CRE.
;Meg: To 0/SI by 20 August.
DrApALEgargagaultigas Draft and coordinated i
hat1gatazega3111:
$9.2412.20W-210.22thalgag:
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(Use verso of this sheet for other matter)
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,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 4.137
62
20 September 1949
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 209
SUBJECT: Vulnerabilities of Communist Movements in the
Far East
1
Executive Registry
O ? 4:1"
Communist movements throughout Asia are variously
vulnerable to military, economic, and political attack. Certain
of these vulnerabilities are common, in some degree, to all the
nations of Asia, while others are present only in one or two
countries. Effective opposition to Communism in Asia might
be based on a. single strategic pian, but ff it were to be success-
fully carried out, it would have to be oxite differently applied
In each given situation.
For the purposes of this discussion, it is believed ad-
vantageous to divide the Far East into three geographical areas:
(a) that in which the Communist movement Is or soon
will be in effective control of the, country (Soviet Far East,
China, and northern Korea.);
(h) that in which the US exercises effective control
(Japan and the Ryukyus); and
(e) that in which the Communist movement threatens
the security of the local government (southern Korea, the
countries of Southeast Asia, and the Indian Subcontinent).
--NtArE: This memorandum has not been coordinated with the
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
Army, Navy, and the Air Force.o/
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
RETURN TO ARCHIVES & RECORDS CENT[
IMMEMATELY AFTER USE
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Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763
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1. Qpmmunist Control.
In the first area, the Communist regimes cannot be
deposed by anything short of a major Western military effort.
The Soviet Far East is, of course, the most firmly under Com-
munist control, and the least susceptible to Western influence.
In China, however, the Communist, movement exhibits a variety
of internal weaknesses which, if they can be effectively exploited,
might eventually lead to the downfall of the regime, or to a
modification in its hostility to the West. If the Chinese economy
should continue to deteriorate, and should the Communists lose
popular support, anti-Communist forces may develop in suffi-
cient strength to employ Western support effectively. Other
vulnerabilities related to the Communist military effort include
the risk of inflation if the army is maintained atits present
strength, and the risk of rebellion if it is rapidly demobilized.
The Chinese Communists are harassed by manifold
economic problems, including food shortages, unavailability of
industrial materials, the presently effective Nationalist blockade,
the trade controls which can subsequently be imposed by the
West, the lack of shipping, the vulnerability of communications
to Nationalist air attacks, various inflationary pressures, and
a shortage of technicians. Politically, the Communists must
overcome the hostility of the Chinese tradition, their loss of
popular support, their default on promises, the weakening of
Party discipline, the threat of Party schisms, and territorial
and economic encroachment by the USSR. Nevertheless, it is
estimated that the Communist regime in China is not immediately
vulnerable in the sense of being deposed or altered, and that,
for the next few years, the CC P's Stalinist leadership will con-
tinue to control the Party, while Moscow will continue to control
the Party leadership.
The same eatimate is believed to be valid, in most
respects, for northern Korea: the Communist regime is vul-
nerable to the force of nationalism, to mass opposition to
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coercion, to resentment over it inability to fulfill its promises,
and to the mere existence of the Republic in southern Korea as
a symbol of nationalist aspirations. There is no prospect,
however, that. the northern regime, can be deposed by the forces
of .the Repubne, whle the Republic itself l highly vulnerable
to hostile action frt :m the north,.
2. Up.copp:01.
The special siteation of japan and the.Ryukyu.s is,
of course, a product of the Occupation, which is carried out
almost entirely by "US military authorities. The Occupation
has encouraged and supported the more Moderate elements in
Japan and has brought about the establishment of a conservative
Japanese Government determined to employ every permissible
means to oppose the Communist movement in japan. In addition,
there exists in japan a strong anti-Russian tradition, stemming
from diplomatic and military clashes which began when Tsarist
Russia pashea its eastern frontier to the Pacific. More recently,
Soviet tactics in regard to the repatriation of Japanese prisoners
of war have aroused widespread resentment in japan.
3. C:01311Talat Tiwpat.
In most of the countries cited as belonging to the
third area--southern Korea, the countries of Southeast Asia,
and the Indian Subcontinent?the Communist movement is vul-
nerable to some degree militarny, i.e., through military action
by government forces. Only in Indochina and Burma, of the
countries in the third area, does the Communist movement ap-
pear to be militarily too strong for decisive counteraction
by forces at present committed. In certain of the countries,
however:, the native or colonial government would require US -
or UK assistance in order successfully to prosecute its mili-
tau operations against Communist forces. In any event, the
military Is only one part of the problem.
3
nrcret'ir
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wigtoeftaithiim.
Communist movements throughout this third area
are vulnerable principally to the force of nationalism. The
Communist movements in most of these countries, recognizing
that nationalism is the major issue and force throughout the
area, have attempted to identify themselves with the national
movement, posing ae the champion cf "independence." In
several cases, however, the Communists are recognized by
nationalist leaiers as the instruments of another kind of foreign
aggression. Throughout the area this intense nationalist feeling
Is reinforced by steong antipathy to the Chinese, historically and
in the present day; Communist movements are vulnerable in
these countries, aneeng the non-Chinese population, to the degree
that those movemente are associated with the prospect of in-
creased Chinere lenience or control.
Additional political vulnerabilities of the Communist
movement are derived, in certain areas, from the incompati-
bility of Communism and the prevailing religion (Catholicism
In the Philippines and Indochina; Islam in Malaya, Indonesia,
and Pakistan; and Hinduism in India), and from the relative
satisfaction with life of the native peoples (e.g., in the Philip-
pines, Thailand, and Malaya). Economically, Communist move-
ments throughout the area are highly vulnerable in the sense
that no economic program has been applied or proposed by the
Communists which has any reasonable prospect of bringing
greater material benefits to the bulk of the population than
programs sponsored by the local governments. Here again,:..
the
the Communist movements are vulnerable through the wide-
spread antipathy to the Chinese, since the non-Chinese people
associate the Chinese invariably with economic exploitation.
4. Conclusion.
The vulnerability of Communist movements through-
out the Far East will be increased as colonial areas realize
their ambition for indeoendence, as independent nations realize
further stability and development, and as bc,th colonial and
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independent nations are induced and assisted to eliminate the
economic and social conditions which are most susceptible
to exploitation by the Communists, and to employ their developed
strength against the spread of Communism, in concert with the
West. A political and economic program which recognizes the
desires of national movements, and which is designed to assist
the birth and development of a democratic revolution, can effec-
tively challenge a Communist program which is committed to
the ultimate supprossion or perversion of national movements,
and which employs a revolution only in order to establish a dic-
tatorship. The general lack of understanding, by the great mass
of Asians, of the ireplications and dangers inherent in Commu-
nism, is a distinct advantage to the Communists, and will remain
so, in the absence of a Western informational program emphasiz-
ing the subordination of personal and national interests to Com-
munist objectives.
The vulnerability of Communist movements will be
increased to the degree that peoples of the Far East become con-
vinced of the ultimate success of their endeavors to gain and
maintain national independence. At the same time it appears
essential to develop in the non-Communist peoples of the Far
East the will and ability to join effectively with the peoples of
other nations in a coordinated opposition to the spread and con-
solidation of Communist control.
It should be noted that an effort by the West to
exploit these vulnerabilities would provoke Communist counter-
action, which would decrease Communist vulnerabilities. Western
success would depend on early seinure of the initiative, accurate
reappraisals of Communist vulnerabilities, and a persistent
application of a coordinated and diversified program.
More detailed discussion of the vuhierabilities of Corn-
In specific Far Eastern countries is given in the attached
appendices.
soireeeer.
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144001 %No,
AP?ENDDC A
CMNA
A Political Consultative Conference will soon meet in
Peiping to form a Communist-controlled "coalition" govern-
ment. of China. That government will proba.bly be proclaimed
before the end of 1949, and will Invite recognition as the Nation-
al Government of China. It will assert its authority over all
of China% ? and will feetually !minder at the time of its proclama-
tion, more than two-thirds of the territory and people of China
Proper.
1. 4. intUlLemye_elnerebilities.
Chinese. Communist forces currently are eapable of launch-
ing simultaneous operatiens againet the?remaining non-Commu-
niet military force s idely diseersed in the south, southwest,
northweet, and southeast cce.stal areas (including Tateren) of
China -and..eliminating effective military resistance by such
:ores. by the end of '190. The provision of extensive US poli-
tical, economic and logistic support, as well as U$ advisers,
to any or all of these non-Communist resis.nce forces, would
not prevent their eventual elimination. Even with extensive
US. support, short of major armed intervention involving the
enteioyment of US combat forces, none of the non-Cernmunist
regirees Fe mainland China can rairVilte beyond 1952. Taiwan
is the only non-Communist area of China where positie US
action could effectually prevent Communist control, but, without
US military occupation and control, Taiwan will also fail to the
Communists.
The Chinese CommuniBts, however, are increasingly troubled
by armed dissidents and guerrillas as they extend their control
over China. The Communists have already lost much of their
emill'i?ftioNeeem
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4?4011..
popalar support, a.rZ1 will net increasIng resistance ? if the ?- ? ?
t3cono147 continues' to deteriorate. ? Thera is some, possibility
that reLlsta,nce forces -will strengthen themselves. to the point
they coold effectiVely employ Western as.sistAnce. In-
t3Olar a5. the eq.:)minvaists are coMpelleci to divert their
.energies and -resource's to the suppreSsion of anti-CommuniSt
. "bandit:4," the CCP 's rrap.Vold peilitk.al and economic prob.
.: Reins will be Increased.
? The :CCP plans to maintain a military establishment of ;-
at least .2,000?000 man. The maintenance of 'such an army,
..how.ever? will drain a stibEtttial-portion of the zational in-
..civo. into unproducave 'Zie`$.ds, with a. cmksequant inflationary
7.1,ri;soure 6n the ecoyaomy. T;t4;;' CCP play ezparience
inter,Aal order,. ..Wiether. 3 chooses to risk a
OL O1E inflatIon in order to support the army, or to mlitirnize
the risks of- inglatice by reducing the army.
- With tlie railittrvals1;..)ects aZ e revolution.dimbishing
. in impoilance, the .civilian leadership of the CCP Will be in-
dined to retince.the.pr.datige and strength- of the Military
leaders, whethef.. tb,f41, milltarV le.:aderzi-resipt this .develop-;-
Ment, or?cho.ese instead to Compete with oz.c.h othe:r. for
poll-
icr new order, 'Me pres-ent 0:ZfectivoneSs
of .the Com.munist mUity 1krship May D:e ;reduced,
L. omIcVuhabi1itt.
Feod. ;
Cfna's food position is rorerrailslly frsecti.re, and the
19,1.0 huvests were, the worsib -army yank's. Import pros-
pects are, taoor' tir e in "11.7,ttle. lik;aLiht.?oti Of foreign relief.
ro:i!eign C7C11:arlge RISI;Ci170E aVe Ic ane. the
NationaWnt bloctmde will proaalily contirAue. Itlititary and
111,rtvii con;wmptiou will be hig-,:h ,Irid will require heavy do-
mestiOt evisitiolts. There will ''')e increased *4 nditry and
lin3ifienco among the peasantry -In YespirAro to the preslures
:amine and military. C2,14.; eTtiOi?-
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otroleurci product; ?'? nd awcoton are the iNVO items
icozt n..;,-.1('...ed by Ch4..2a's present ?:nduAries and transportation.
Mo 1,1xied a..io chg)micals, dye,.;1 machine tools, re ir parts,
copper wire, amer m Lel iaL Ao, the CCP consolidates
its contra at aah ve iuk1ticii sta.bility, capital require -
mt r imports ili Le. enoritgious, with railroad, power,
and mtg enterprkses Witing priority; these primv..ry indus-
trial iitaities, as it ila9pen3, are also badly needed by 'ie USSR.
3. Need to Eeort.
exL-..mive 3oviet aid to theP is unlikely,
he import neadsoi he Chinese Communis, I can be met only
insofar o..s they fi. t possible to export; unlike the National-
China uavJer the CCP will not be able to import far more
thtin its c-.!.,..-ports by :eelying? on UE credits and ECA. aid to cover
the anatvorable tr ii 4.,..lance. This vulnerability is accentiotted
ttie fact Chtn.'s prilacipal et cutlets have been the
Tit3 an other pczers. it action by the non-
Coliumuniit powergito ralse liark;RrE4 agalost Chinese exportu
/iicdd;,?,ezloaEty *cats Chine.s al,..lhity to ?lay for its essential
131port needs. 1 i',Is possiI3ke to E,aiu the cooperation of
? Plc. UK 171.nd ot.aer grovezeillase?:4t6iiisuch a measure, the US
uri7ht be able to re:.:42...ict Chiaz's foreign commerce by sup -
dag the Nationa1t2f
13. ItcansportaLoy.i.
foreJ.E,n cozliTierc 111013'0S very largely
-'oreigit ships, 1i.).1.3 vnera-c,1L,Ity .is eccatuated by the fact
most the Z'htn;:-:-:".%) 141.1tioy.e_L'ist me-in-going vvssels have
ctire t 'slappo:,,=td. t1 7,.e Nationalist blockade
lnt asrAst in deivi.veti; i)rcigrt .,:hippinc,, to the if the
Y?rger shipping i iinK ni k. be otif.erwise dir2:3nseed from.
z.r.1311ng .f Chines. ports.
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The CCP is vulnerable to attacks on domestic trans-
portation principally because so few routes are available.
This weakness can be and is being exploited by Nationalist
air attacks on rail lines and shipping. In addition, the ma-
terial needs of the rail transport system limit substantially
its carrying capacity; there is, at present, an urgent need
for rails, ties, repair parts, signalling equipment, and lubri-
cants for existing equipment. Such Communist requirements
can be denied through extending to China the system of export
licenses now applied to the Soviet bloc.
e. nlationary Pressure:
? If the CCP shows itself helpless to arrest price
Inflation, it will become as vulnerable as were the National-
ists in the field of currency management. At present, the
CC P's difficulties in controlling inflation derive largely from
their military expenses. Recognizing the dangers of over-issue
of currency, the CCP has increased taxation?leading to
scattered peasant rebellions?and has reduced expenditures
through widespread discharge ot government employees, as
well as preparing for wage reductions. However, the over-
taxed peasantry cannot be counted upon for much additional
revenue, and the benefits of layoffs and wage reductions do
not cut deeply into a budget swollen by military expenditures.
f. Shortage of Technicians.
To prosecute successful7y the CC P's plans for ex-
nding agricultural and industrial output, the unskilled
laboring population of China must have the direction of
skilled technicians, administrators, and engineers. Shortage
of skilled personnel has already handicapped the CCP in gov-
erning newly occupied cities, area important positions are
still filled by ex-Nationalist offinials. The CCP is endeavor-
ing to train its own skilled personnel, but the Party's (and
China's) facilities for such education are sharply limited.
For many years, the CCP will depend upon the services of
Chinese trained in foreign schools, as well as the services
of foreigners themselves.
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3. Political Vulnerebilities.
The CCP intends to eliminate all significant organized
political opposition, unify the nation under the dictatorship
of the CCP, gain the support of all productive elements of
Chinese society, and restrict (prior to eliminat ) Western
influences in China. As it acquires firm control of the nation,
the CCP will apply a progressively rigorous Communist pro-
gram, aiming at the total domination of the individual, and of
all elements of Chinese society, by the Slate, as represented
by the leadership of the CCP.
a. Communism andTencjikoka
The CCP has slated frankly that it "aims to destroy"
the present political, economic, and cultural forms of the
Chinese society. Although Communism is not altogether alien
to China's bureaucratic authoritarian tradition, Communism
will encounter great difficulty in attempting to transfer the
loyalty of the ordinary Chinese from the family to the State.
China's bestilations and belaavica patterns are among the oldest
and most persistent in the modern world. If the CCP proceeds
rapidly in its attack on the Chinese culture, it is certain to
encounter c isiderable active resistance. If the CCP moves
slowly, it will risk bogging down.
b. 1).2port,
CCP Chairman Mao asserts that the "revolution in
China is a revolution by tho masses of people of the entire
nation," and that, "except for imperialists, feudalists, bureau-
cratic bourgeoisie, Kuomintang reactionaries and their henchmen,
all persons are our (the CCP's) friends." The first claim has
much truth; the second does not. The Chinese people have been
less supporters of the CCP than antagonistic to the previous
regime. The CCP must enlist the support of peasantry, urban
labor, and the middle class, and must provide the social and
economic incentives which will ensure their cooperation. If
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1.0.-.10evre
the CCP adopts a flexible and moderate program, it can con-
solidate its political power more rapidly, but at a cost of
postponing indefinitely its ideological and economic objectives.
If the CCP presses rapidly toward these objectives, it risks
destroying the bases of its political power.
c. Deault on Promises.
The Chinese Communists are coming to power in the
role of social revolutionaries rather than merely as military
conquerors. Their promises of .a better life have played a
major part in their military successes, by sustaining troop
morale, weakening the resistance of Nationalist forces, enlist-
ing popular support, and diminishing popular opposition.
However, the CCP cannot hope to undertake a program of
significant economic reconstruction, or of subsequent in-
dustrial expansion, without limiting or decreasing the con-
sumption of certain social groups. The promises of lower
taxes and rents in the countryside, and of higher wages in
the cities, almost certainly will not be implemented. The
probability is high that popular discontent Will increase, and
the CC P's prestige diminish.
d. Party ,Unity.
During the process of Stalinization of the Party?con-
solidation of power, crystallization of dogma, despotism of
leadership, incessant intrigue and periodic purges?certain
elements of the CCP will necessarily be alienated and cut off.
Party unity is probably not threatened seriously, by any domestic
issue, for Party .doctrine sanctions great flexibility in domestic
policy. This flexibility does not extend to foreign affairs, how-
ever, and Party unity may encounter its most severe test
through the CC P's subservience to the USSR.
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e. Sino-Soviet Relations.
The record of agreement between the CCP and the
USSR is very Impressive, and the public pronouncements
of the two parties reveal no differences of opinion. Disagree-
ments may exist, however or may come to exist, through the
settings in which the parties operate, their positions in the
world Communist movement, the border regions which sep-
arate them, and their economic relations.
(1) Domestic Issues.
Chinese Communist tactics have repeatedly been
approved by Soviet spokesmen. It is possible, however, that
the USSR will attempt to force the CCP toward orthodoxy
more rapidly than the CCP desires, with speedy suppression
of the bourgeoisie, nationalization Of enterprise, collectiviza-
tion of the peasantry, and seclusion from the West. A Corn-
=mist program of such severity would complicate the CC P's
problems both in consolidating control and developing produc-
tion.
(2) Leadership East.
In its public pronouncements, the CCP has em-
phasized the "leadership of the USSR" in the revolution in
Asia, rather than stressing its own capacities for leader-
ship. However, such capacityexists. The CCP will control
the large and influential Chinese communities throughout
the Far East. The CCP is likely to provide direct assistance
to Asian Communist movements. Should Sino-Soviet relations
be exacerbated on other grounds; the CCP might choose to
compete with the USSR for leadership of the Communist
movement in Asia.
(3)ezTeeiji_lseeeek.
The 2500-mile frontier betWe.en China and the
USSR provides potential groamds for conflict. The CCP has
stated that its armies will "liberate" Sinkiang, but the USSR;
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PT
presently negotiating with the Nationalists for concessions
in Sinkiang, may not desire the exclusion of the Nationalists
at this time, and may prefer that the Ili government extend
its control over all of Sinkiang. In Tinier Mongolia, a satis-
factory working relation must be achieved between the CCP-
Influence Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government and the
northern Manchurian group oriented toward Outer Mongolia;
here again, a Soviet attempt to impose a unilateral decision
may meet with CCP displeasure if not resistance. Manchuria
is much the most important border region to both parties,
military, economically and politically. Unilateral Soviet con-
trol, outside the Port Arthur-Dairen area, would mean the
frustration of the Chinese desire for sovereignty over Man-
churia and the CC P's plans for financing China's economic
recovery. Unilateral CCP control is most improbable. The
most likely arrangement is that of joint Sino-Soviet control,
but there may be frequent dissension over the exercise of
authority and the allocation of Manchurian produce.
(4) Economic Relations.
Serious trouble may develop from the control
exercised by the USSR over the direction of China's foreign
trade. If the experience of Eastern European countries is a
valid guide, China will be placed at an extreme disadvantage
In trade relations with the USSR. To the extent that the USSR
cannot or will not supply China's requirements for materials
and equipment, China may feel impelled to turn to non-Soviet
sources; and, if China does not have control aver the disposi-
tion of exports, the CCP may seek credits from the West as
well. Moreover, the CCP has stated that only the "anti-
imperialist front, headed by the USSR," can be relied upon
for "genuine friendly aid." There is a possibilityof severe
disillusion over the results of Soviet "cooperation" and
"assistance."
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annallejlairm
f.
The CCP desires and needs international recognition of
the Communist-controlled "coalition" regime as the National
Government of China, for reasons of prestige, in order to ob-
tain goods not available from the Soviet bloc, and to inherit
the Nationalists' position in international bodies and in the
diplomatic field. If a common front can be maintained among
the Western powers on the question of recognition, those
powers will perhaps be able to influence to their advantage
the foreign polities of the CCP.
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imeememm-m
APPENDIX B
NOREA
The greatest weakness of the Soviet-dominated Com-
munist movement in Korea is its inherent incompatibility with
the strong, ingrained native feeling of Korean nationalism.
Apart from general resentment of foreign interference and
domination implicit in Communism, coercive Communist eco-
nomic and political policies in northern Korea have generated
mass antipathy to Communism. The possibility of exploiting
Communist weaknesses in northern Korea is limited, however,
by the strength of available Communist armed forces. Even
should the Pikeples Army prove disloyal to the Communist
regime during anti-Communist revolts or attacks, sufficient
military forces from Communist China or the Soviet Union
would probably be available to restore or maintain Commu-
nist control. As a minimum objective, however, exploitation
of Communist vulnerabilities in northern Korea might disrupt
Communist economic, political, and military progress and
thereby deter decisive action against the anti-Communist
Republic of Korea in the southern zone.
1. Political Vulnerabilities.
Independence, unification, land, and food are the principal
desires of the Korean peoples. The Communist movement
has generated mass opposition because most Koreans now
believe the Communists cannot satisfy these desires. Although
Koreans attribute some of the responsibility for the partition
of Korea to the US, they place most of the onus for the con-
tinued separation on policies of the Soviet Union, and generally
realize that a Comreunist-sponsored "unification" would result
in a complete extinction of Korean nationalist aspirations.
?
Policies of the Communist government designed to develop
socialism, and the normal police state methods used to enforce
these policies, have further alienated farmers, former landowners,
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youth and labor elements, Christians and intellectuals in
northern Korea. Communist agricultural policy and regimenta-
tion of labor are major sources of dissatisfaction. Soviet
exploitation of Korean raw materials, the export of rice to
the USSR, the shortage of consumer goods, fawning adulation
of Soviet culture, perversion of academic work to fit Commu-
nist concepts, are other characteristics of conditions in
northern Korea that offer specific fields for anti-Communist
propaganda in Korea.
The Republic of Korea offers the only alternative to Com-
munism. Although it has not yet developed a particularly
strong position among the people, its appeal to Korean national-
ism has been adequate to make it generally acceptable in south-
ern Korea and probably to a large extent in northern Korea,
as a preferable alternative to Communism.
The capability of the Republic to exploit the weaknesses of
Communism depends omits ability to surpass visibly the Com-
munist regime in satisfying the basic economic and political
requirements of the people, and on its ability to develop suffi-
cient military strength to deter a Communist invasion.
2. Milit..lam_Vul_i_eral.211.1ti.es.
Communist control of northern Korea depends entirely on
the control exercised over the population by the internal
security forces and the Peoples Army, under the direction of
Soviet advisors. Although large numbers of the Peoples Army
might prove disloyal or ineffective in action against armed
forces of the Republic, sufficient loyal Communist troops
would probably be made available from Communist China or
the Soviet Union to insure continued Communist domination of
northern Korea. So long as the Soviet Union and Communist
China continue to have the capability and desire of supporting
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the armed forces in northern Korea, the Communist regime
will remain invulnerable to Republican military action and
will be able to maintain its control in the area by police -
methods.
Communist guerrilla activity in southern Korea is
dependent on supplies and personnel infiltrated from the
north. The guerrillas receive little willing support from
the local population and create resentment by their terror-
istic methods. The Republic's' security forces, almost com-
pletely dependent on US support for equipment, are capable
of preventing large-scale and effective guerrilla activity.
3. ggagal VulnerabWat.
All political movements in Korea have suffered from
factionalism and the desire of every member to be a leader.
The strict discipline of the Communist movement has
minimized the usual Korean tendency to factionalism, but
personal rivalries and nationalist deviations continue to
weaken the Party. In northern Korea, persistent reports
hint at an internal contest for power among Kim 11 Sung,
Pak Ilun Yong, and Kim Mu song. The presence of Soviet
advisors in all government departments and the large number
of Soviet Koreans in positions of power within the government
probably is resented by native Korean Communists who have
not received equal power and privilege.
Discipline and morale probably are fairly high within the
Party in northern Korea because of the secure Communist
position in northeast Asia. Discipline and morale are probably
much lower in the southern Korean Communist underground.
The Underground has suffered severe reprisals from Republic
police action and many of its members may resent the failure
of the northern regime to fulfill promises of large.scale assist-
ance or invasion to overthrow the Republic.
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Of the minority of Koreans who actively support Commu-
nism in both north and south Korea, it is believed that relatively
few are familiar with and believers in Marxist doctrine. Com-
munism has received considerable support from Korean youth
because it offers a revolutionary solution to the problems of
a predominantly feudal society. The support of some farmers
and laborers in northern Korea is maintained by granting
favored treatment. Police brutality and government ineffi-
ciency have contributed to Communist support in local areas
In the south. A fairly large percentage of Communist support,
especially among intellectuals, businessmen, and professionals,
comes from opportunists who believe Communist domination of
all Korea to be inevitable.
4. Special Considerations.
In the final analysis, the strength of the Korean Communist
movement depends on the support of the Soviet Union and Com-
munist China. Weaknesses in the movement can be expected to
Increase only to the degree that external support is diminished
and to the extent that the Republic of Korea is able to develop
as an acceptable alternative to Communism. The basic weak-
nesses of Communism in Korea may remain constant over a
period of years but the possibility of effective exploitation of the
weaknesses depends on the survival of the Republic as a symbol
of Korean nationalist aspirations.
Possible measures of exploitation of Communist weaknesses
Include psychological warfare, propaganda, increasing the appeal
of the epublic of Korea as an alternative to Communism, and .
underground activity in northern Korea. All of these measures
are subject to Communist counter-measures, the most effective
of which would be an all-out effort to overthrow the Republic of
Korea. ?
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APPENDIX C
JAPAN
? The future of the japan Communist Party (pp) is con-
fronted by several barriers. Although favored by an inflated
economy, the Party is limited by the presence of the Occupa-
tion, is increasingly obstructed by a conservative Government,
fights an anti-Soviet tradition, and is very much embarrassed
by Soviet tactics in repatriating Japanese PWa. The ICP's hold
on Japan's largest labor federation has been weakened recently
by withdrawal of the anti-Communist Democratization League
faction which formed one-quarter to a third of the original
federation's strength. Much of the surprisingly large vote
received at the last general elections was a protest vote at
the Occupation or at the inadequacies of the middle-of-the-
road Government rather than a genuine Communist ballot.
1. Political Vulnerabilities.
The japan Communist Party is opposed by conservative
Premier YOSHIDA's government, which is adopting an in-
creasingly anti-Communist stand. The government's Diet
majority is sufficient to permit the "steam-roller" passage
of Cabinet measures which limits the opposition within the
Diet, Communists included, to vocal recriminations. The
government has cut Communist paper allocation very drastically,
forcing the Party either to reduce its propaganda output or to
resort to the more expensive blackmarket. YOSHIDA's party,
the Democratic Liberals, is in the process of organizing an anti-
Communist Youth Group organization. The YOSHIDA government
has been more than willing to meet Communist-instigated force
with police action. The government is proceeding on its anti-
Communist campaign cautiously, for fear the Occupation will
censure "undemocratic" action. Should the government feel free
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melieRANT.E.
in the future to outlaw Communism (and the recent dissolu-
tion of the leftist Korean organizations may point in this
direction), popular respect for force and authority is such
that the Party, going undergound, would find itself severely
limited in its activities.
The Socialists, the only left-of-center party giving
promise of being able to oppose the JCP, have so far cate-
gorically rejected all Communist invitations to a united
front. The Socialists have, in fact, adopted a program call-
ing for "two front" action, both anti-YOSHIDA and anti-
Communist. The Socialist attitude is making itself felt in
the field of organized labor at Communist expense.
The association, in the mind of the general public, between
the JCP and the USSR, is a point of vulnerability. The historical
Japanese antipathy for the Russians dates back to the initial
Japanese fears of aggression aroused by the Russian Empire's
arrival on the western shores of the Pacific. The Party'rE; re-
peated avowal of its independence from Kremlin direction is
indicative of the necessity for the Party to assume the defensive
on this particular point. While the JCP has thoroughly exploited
for propaganda purposes Japan's inflation, high taxes, food ration-
ing, the presence of the Occupation and a score of other issues,
large segments of the same groups to whom the Party's sales
talk appeals have been offended by the JC P's instigation of labor
unrest and reputation for recourse to violence. The Party over
the past two years has minimized its opposition to the Emperor.
With the large body of Japanese, however, the ic P would be very
vulnerable to periodic propaganda emphasizing the Party's stand
on the Emperor issue.
Perhaps the most serious "vulnerability" is the Soviet handling
of repatriation. Again the popular concept that the JCP is sub-
servient to a USSR which has employed thousands of Japanese PWs
on forced labor projects and has delayed inexcusably their repatria-
tion, has proved extremely embarrassing to the Party. Should the
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Japanese public be convinced that the USSR is retaining
thousands of Japanese after the announced completion of
repatriation in the course of a few months, the JCP will
find the issue a serious barrier to its advance.
Since japan has no land tenant problem, the JCP has
received considerable opposition from the peasants, a
traditionally conservative group. Civil functionaries and
a bcorgeosie are largely opposed to the Communists ex-
cept those businessmen who see the JCP as a means of
reviving trade with China.
2. Military Vulnerabilities,
Japan's 194'7 Constitution, with its Renunciation of War
clause leaves the country with no military strength other
than that of the Occupation. The knowledge that the Occupa-
tion Forces are available to make up for Japanese police
Inadequacies, however, acts as a deterrent to outright resort
to force. Thillt presence of the Occupation has a strong
psychological reaction on anti-Communist sentiment, en-
couraging those who fear either external or internal Com-
munist aggression.
3. ceneral.Vulnerabilities.
The JCP has several weaknesses which may prove
susceptible to exploitation. Party finances come In part
from extra-legal sources, such as the profits from smuggl-
ing or blackma,rket activities. Widescale publicity of all
cases on which adequate evidence is available could help put
the Party in a bad light, if one may take the ASH1DA cabinet
scandals as an example. There probably would be an adverse
public reaction to all cases of violence either directly attti-
butable to the Communists or to their instigation.
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The unexpectedly large vote for Communist candidates
In the January 1949 general elections, in which they received
nearly 10 percent of the ballots, is not necessarly any
criterion for judging the Communist Party's hard core.
Many individuals voted for the Party as a protest against
the ineffectiveness of the middle-of-the-road coalition gov-
ernment, or against the Occupation. In fact, in the event
that Japanese economic conditions were to improve measur-
ably in the near future, the Party's support could easily be
halved.
4. Special Considerations.
The Communists are capable of taking either direct
counter-measures against attack on their vulnerabilities,
or of mounting such distractive maneuvers as attacks on
Japanese government scandal and inefficiencies. The Occupa-
tion can easily be attacked, as no people long enjoys a for-
eign garrison. Relative to the repatriation problem, it seems
unlikely that the USSR can succeed in either convincing the
Japanese that thousands of PWs are not being held or else
that the US and the Japanese government are solely responsible
for the delay in repatriation.
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APPENDIX D
INDOCHINA
? The vulnerability of the Communist movement in
Vietnam (there are no significant Communist movements in
Laos and Cambodia) is somewhat diminished by the fact that
there is officially no Communist Party. The Indochinese
Communist Party, which had displayed a high degree of or-
ganizing ability before World War II and which had led the
anti-Japanese resistance movement during the war, voluntarily
dissolved itself in November 1945, presumably in order to
avoid conflict with the French Communist Party (which at that
time was not stressing anti-imperialism) and in an attempt
to allay the suspicions of non-Communist forces both Within and
without Vietnam. The Vietnamese Communists have in this
manner been able to disguise Stalinist objectives by subscribing
exclusively to nationalist and mildly reformist objectives in the
name of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and in alliance
with non-Communist nationalists.
So long as the war against the French forces continues,
neither the Communist nor the non-Communist group within
the resistance is In a position to carry on an extensive and
persistent propaganda against the other without splitting the
ranks of the resistance. Both groups are agreed that elimina-
tion of all French control is the primary objective. However,
yeah their long experience in the techniques of persuasion
and coercion and with their control of many of the important
governmental positions, the Communists are playing a
winning game. Since the decline of Communist strength in
France, earlier Soviet hopes that the French Empire might
be delivered into the Communist camp intact have diminished.
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1. Political Vulnerabilities.
a. OppositionGroups Allied with the CommuniSts.
The Communist movement is vulnerable in terms Of
conservative and reformist nationalists who have avoided col-
laborating with the French rather than in terms of the ex- ?
isting anti-Communist (Bao Dal) regime, which has failed to
win a popular following. However, since party propaganda is
believed to be carried on only to a limited extent within the
resistance areas of Vietnam at the present time, Communist
vulnerability under this head is probably more potential than
actual.
(1) The Democratic Party.
The two most important sub-groups within the
conservative nationalist camp are the Tan Dan Chu Dang
(Democratic Party) and the Roman Catholics., To some ex-
? tent these two sub-groups may overlap. There are evidences
that since its foundation the Democratic Party has tended to
become a real entity, in its own right. In general, its members
are wealthy and well-educated persons who are pro-IIS and
opposed to both French and Communist domination. Reports
are that it has some degree of coherent organization and the
'nucleus of a private police force, and that it controls the
Ministry of Justice of the Ho Chi Minh Government down to
the local level. The Democratic Party is the natural rallying
? point of the French-educated Vietnamese intellectuals.
(2) The Catholics.
There are at least one million native Roman
Catholics in Vietnam, both communicants and clergy, of
whom a considerable number, probably a majority, have given
their support to the Ho Chi Minh Government. The stronghold
ci nationalist Catholicism in Vietnam is the vicariate d Phat
Diem in South Tonkin under the guidance of Bishop Le Huu Tu,
who, although anti-Communist,. has supported Ho Chi Minh
and has maintained a firmly anti-colonial position., Communism
is potentially vulnerable to the influence of the Church, which
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aMeltIVIP
commands extensive material, as well as popular support, but
this vulnerability will remain virtually untested so long as the
struggle for national independence continues.
(3) Other Opposition Groups.
Some of the cabinet members in the Ho Government
who are non-Communists?ex-mandarins "independents,"
Socialists?may have popular followings. The Ministry of
Education has escaped Communist control. The administhathe
chief of the Ho Government in Cochinchina is a Socialist. The
powerful Cao Dal religious sect, which now has factions fight-
ing on both sides, would presumably be united in opposing
undisguised Communism. The same is true of the Buddhists
and Protestants, although the latter do not have coherent
organizations. In addition, the Trotskyists are reported to be
still active with a secret membership of perhaps 2000.
b. Ability of the Communists to Recruit Supporters.
Experience has shown that the vast majority of the
Vietnamese people are willing to support a revolt against foreign
rule, whether that revolt is led by the Conununists.or by any
other group. Only when Communist propaganda and action
have become 'obviously Communist and urges policies patently
ccntrary to the national interests of Vietnam will it become
vulnerable to counter-propaganda capable of eliciting a strong
anti-Communist movement. This will occur only when freedom
from French control has been achieved.
2. Militari..q.9nsideratipn.
The Communist movement in Vietnam has thoroughly identified
itself with a national liberation movement which will probably
maintain its solidarity despite French efforts to bring about its
disintegration. The forces of this liberation movement are
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capable of continuing to resist the French indefinitely, and are
steadily improving their military prowess and egaipinent. The
Communist movement, as such, is therefore not vulnerable
to military counter-measures undertaken by, or at the in-
stance of, French forces which can be committed.
3. Qepsigl Vulnerabilities.
a.Pa_AV. j_dt
The whole question of the extent to which the Vietnamese
Communists are united in pursuit of ultimately Stalinist objectives
is a matter for conjecture. The dissolution of the Indochinese
Communist Party in 1945 may have been designed largely to
mislead the Kuomintang and the US, but it is partly attributable,
as well, to the first head-on clash with the "Russia First"
outlook of World Communism. This took the form of a memorandum
delivered by the French Communists of Indochina to the Vietnamese
Communists urging the latter to delay the national liberation
movement, penaIng Soviet approval.
At the time of the formation of the Republic of Vietnam in
1945, the Indochinese Communist Party probably did not contain
more than 2,000 members. Some of this support may have been
opportunistic, in the sense that the expression of antipathy to
French rule was scarcely possible except through clandestine
action. Ho Chi liffinh state& that he was a member of the Com-
munist Party before World War II because in no other way could
he fight for Vietnamese independence and at the same time pro-
tect himself from the Ftench authorities. Nationalism has always
been an incomparably more dynamic force lit Vietnam than has
Communism. The stress imposed on the Communist movement
?under cceelttons rA politica), independence, whtch v.vo224! further
tend tCi brikg to the surface the fundamental incompatibility of
Commumb n, and nationalism, could preelece a further dis-
integration cr.' the "hard core" of the Communist movement.
_
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asiiimelopm
The prospect of Chinese Communist domination of the
Vietnamese can be expected to provide a vulnerability in attempts
to 'communize Vietnam. The historical dislike for the Chinese
may prove even stronger than ideological affinity with the
Chinese Communist Party. There is already some evidence
that the Indochinese Communists have failed to cooperate with
CCP attempts to provide directives regarding party regulations
and procedures. Because of the antipathy to the Chinese, it
can be expected, at least for the present, that a formal acknow-
ledgment of CCP support would split the resistance movement
Instead of adding strength. In the long run, however, raced by
a continuing war with the French for control of the country, the
Ho Government might choose as its only alternative full coopera-
tion with the Chinese Communists in its efforts to win complete
control of Vietnam. Should French troops withdraw from Indochina,
the chances of Sino-Vietnamese cooperation would become much
less probable.
b. Counter-measures b the US and Western Governments.
There is almost no effective manner in which Western
governments unilaterally through the French can oppose the
trend favoring theConununists so long as the indigenous, pot-
entially anti-Communist forces accept predominantly Communist
leadership in order to eliminate French control. Within the
setting of the jr esent military stalemate, Western policies
which are not readily susceptible to Communist counter-measures
are of a very limited sort. Voice of America broadcasts point-
ing up the distinction made by US poliey.makers between Red
Imperialism and Titoism, and pointed references to Soviet
encroachment in Manchuria might be of value in weakening the
solidarity of the Communist movement in Vietnam. Discreet
encouragement of the formation of a Southeast Asian confederation
would harmonize with the prevailing fears et Chinese imperialism,
now linked with the Communist advance in China and infiltration
of Chinese overseas communities. Encouragement of the
Catholic-nationalist aspirations of the Le Huu Tu group would
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reinforce the contention that the US is not opposed to genuine
nationalist movements. A program designed to help Vietnamese
students enroll in US universities would be avidly seized upon
by young Vietnamese and would strengthen US prestige.
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11.1
APPENDIX E
THAILAND
Thailand, politically and economically, is relatively
less susceptible to the ideological appeals advanced by inter-
national Communism than are other countries of Southeast
Asia. The majority of the population is satisfied with its
economic lot, which represents a relatively high Asiatic
standard of living, and is proud of the country's history of
political independence. The monarchical concept in Thailand
has a strong hold on the loyalties and imagination of the people.
Thailand's leadership has been trained in Western Europe and
American democratic traditions, and the peasantry was less
aroused politically by the events of World War II than that of
adjacent countries. For these basic reasons Communism fails
to find any sizable following in its appeal for liberation of the
masses from economic or political bondage. The only signi-
ficant number of Communists are Chinese, who are unpopular
and are discriminated against in Thailand.
That identification of the Chinese with Communism
at present prohibits open collaboration between the presumably
distinct Thai and Chinese Communist organizations. At present,
Communists are relatively vulnerable to That police controls,
do not conduct a militant program, and attempt to reach their
objectives through propaganda media rather than relying upon
military force. Chinese leadership of Asian Communism and
Chinese Communist successes in China enhance the position
of Communists within the Chinese community in Thailand,
Thai economic and racial nationalism is the major limitation
to the spread of Communism, but, in the presence of an expand-
ing Communist China, That nationalism nevertheless may play
a subordinate role to the traditional tendency of Thai leaders
to accommodate themselves toward the dominant Asiatic power.
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Political and Economic Whimbilities.
The present government and all-important Thai political
factions are pro-Western and anti-Communist. Although the
paternalistic Thai Government has not been able to eradicate
certain inequities Inherent in the That way of life, it is attempt-
ing to mitigate, within limits, the existing economic and poli-
tical problems which could be exploited to the advantage of
the Communist movement. The Thai Government is believed
to be making a more effective appeal to a majority of the Thai
population than are the Communists, whose approach is one
of continued criticism of governmental policies and practices
without offering constructive alternatives.
A distinct weakness in the Communist effort is the very
limited range of its propaganda outlets. Outside of the Thai
capital, Bangkok, there have been few known Communist
attempts to propagandize the Thai population. Intelligent use
of the US Information Service in rural areas should provide
an excellent opportunity for inculcation of democratic ideas.
In Bangkok, however, a heavy Communist propaganda campaign
in the Chinese press is believed serious enough to warrant a
strong counter-effort to present adequate factual news coverage
to the Chinese comnumity there.
The large majority of Thai and Chinese are politically in-
articulate, and, so long as the Thai Government continues to
exhibit an interest in the welfare of That people, it probably
will be able to offer a continuing alternative to Communism
adequate in appeal to the majority of the people. Not only does
the mass of the That peasantry remain immune to Communism,
but also the very nature of the Thai social structure, and its
governmental tradition and economic well being discourage the
acceptance of Communism. Vigorous Western encouragement
of the That Government's progressive measures, through eco-
nomic and technical assistance designed to enhance and enlarge
Thai capabilities, very possibly would limit further Communist
opportunity to exploit potentially dangerous situations.
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red
IrY Confe:Alerations,
The That Government at present is able to maintain a
reasoirible degree o control over Thai and Chinese Commu-
nists by means ot pelice mearsures. The extent of police
effectiveness, however, has .iot really been tested, since
the Communist groups only rarely have resorted to violence.
Should a Communist military effort develop, however, the
serious antagonisms between elements o the Thai armed
ffn.ces_ may vent effective use of a canister force. lin the
absence of direct aggression from Communist China, the Thai
Government should be able to .mainta.in internal security,
because the existence of the Thailand Communist movements
depend upon tight paaty discipline ,and covert organbation, -
rather than upoi the possession and utilization of military
force. To the extent that governmental elorts toward control
ase not diluted by cceruptien and fear of antagonizing Commu-
nist China, tie internal Communist movement does net provide
a military threat to Thailand.
3. General vulneraLilitles.
The internal problems? et the Commmist organizations in
'Mailand a.re an unknown faetor. Apparently, however, Corn-
raantst Party unity, discipline, and mora.le are good, parti-
eniariy following the rapid e.outward sweep of the Chinese
Communist regime in Chi. The absence of widespread sup-
Port, however, is indicated by the mere handful of Thai Com-
rilliniSt numbers. This groml is bolieved to be composed of
tao rilore than sonie OO intellectua.ls and. dissatisfied *Yorkers.
Suppert from the Chinese cemmunity for the Communist move-
ment is. far larger and appears to arise primarily from intense
diesatisfaction, disappointment, and bitterness at the Chinese
National Government, together with a monnting tendency toward
identification with the Chinese Communist movement for
opportunistic and paivalotic reasons.
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eliMileagamm
There is no doubt that identification of Communism in Asia
with Chinese leadership is a major deterrent among the That
to the effectiveness of the Communist effort in Thailand. Within
the Chinese community, however, this factor enhances the prestige
of the Chinese Communists and appeals to the patriotism of the
overseas Chinese minority. The That are less concerned with
USSR leadership of World Communism than they are afraid of
the extension of Chinese infoluence and domination in the form
of an expanding Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia. Exploita-
tion of this natural Thai antipathy for the Chinese should prove
to be an effective instrument for the containment of Communism.
4. ftcial Considerations.
Communist vulnerability to That police controls appears to
be lessening somewhat as the Communist regime in Chbta ex-
pands into southeast China, the area from 4htCh most Chinese
have emigrated to Thailand. The threat of deportation to
Nationalist areas in China may be losing its effect as a con-
trol measure over the activities of Chinese communities. A
more insidious factor is the increasing ability of Communists
to protect themselves against Thai security measures through
bribery of That officials.
Although nationalism will continue as a major limiting
factor, the tendency of Thai leaders to accommodate themselves
to the dominant power in Asia indicates that Thatnationalism
will diminish as a force operating to minimise the growth of
Communist Influence in Thailand. This trend probably will
progress in proportion to the extension of Chinese Communist
interests and prestige in Southeast Asia.
Opportunities for Western exploitation of Communist vul-
nerabilities in Thailand will continue to exist. Every Western
effort to assist Thailand economically or politically, however, has
been attacked in the Communist press as an "imperialist" attempt
to control Thailand's resources and people. Additional Western
assistance, whether military, financial or technical, would be sub-
jected to increasingly vitriolic condemnations. The Thai Govern-
ment would be further labeled as a vessel of the "imperialist"
powers. To a limited extent, this propaganda line is effective
among the most avid That nationalists; the majority of Thai
leaders, however; are sufficiently pro-Western in sympathy and
training not to be deceived.
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410iiaridirm.
APPENDIX F
BURMA
The Communist movement in Burma exhibits certain
vulnerabilities which the Burmese Government has not been
able to exploit fully, and it is unlikely that full advantage can be
taken of these weaknesses unless the Government is offered
and accepts external assistance. Chaotic conditions within
the countey, military ineffectiveness, and an intense national-
ism which fosters distrust of outside aid or advice have increased
the ineffectiveness of government efforts to combat the Commu-
nists. But Communist vulnerabilities?which include a split
within the movement, a program strikingly similar to the gov-
ernment's, and an ignorance of the inherent danger to their
sovereignty in international Communism?may be exploited
by competent leadership in the government and through external
assistance.
I. Political Vulnerabilities.
The government of newly independent Burma maintains a
strong anti-imperialist attitude, and its program for recon-
struction and development of the country is based on state
socialism. The armed rebellion of the two Communist parties--
the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) and the Communist Party
(Burma) (CPB)--represents a fundamental difference as to the
means of achieving the same ultimate objectives as proclaimed
by the government. In most respects basic government policies--
political freedom economic security, a socialized welfare state
through the redistribution of land, industrialization, state control
of the means of production, and equitable distribution of surplus
wealth?parallel those advocated by the Communists. The gov-
ernment theoretically also offers' but through evolution, this
utopia without bloodshed, while the Burmese Communists advocate
these changes through resort to violence.
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This similarity in aims, but with a difference in implementa-
tion, makes the government's position potentially the more
attractive. The government must intensify considerably its
efforts to establish itself in the minds of the Burmese as the
true advocate of nationalism and of improved conditions in
Burma, while identifying the Communists as the proponents
of violence, acting under foreign instructions. Its ability to
do this without the judicious application of outside assistance,
however, is doubtful.
2. Military Considerations.
The Burmese Government cannot, in the foreseeable future,
destroy the armed Communist opposition without external assist-
ance. Prolonged guerrilla warfare is likely. The government's
armed forces are superior to those of the Communists in terms
of manpower and material but are, nevertheless, severely handi-
capped in a number of respects. The most important is the wide
dispersion of government forces throughout the country to fight
a variety of other insurgents, in addition to the Communists.
Other problems are: (I) inefficient transportation and commu-
nication systems, (2) the necessity of importing most military
supplies, which are limited by depleted Treasury resources,
(3) defections, and (4) a shortage of technically trained leadership.
Thus, while the Burmese Communists possess some degree
of military vulnerability, the government, even with superior
forces, has been able at best only to protect selected centers
of population, and without external assistance will not be able to
suppress the Communists in the near future, especially if they
are aided by Chinese Communist Forces.
Another facet of Communist military vulnerability is the
mutual animosity of the two Communist groups and other rebellious
elements; clashes between them have been frequent. This is at
best a negative benefit, however, for the government has not been
able to take full military advantage of this schism.
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3. General Vulnerabilities.
There are indications that BCP unity, discipline, and morale
have declined recently but this trend does not appear to have
reached disruptive proportions. Nevertheless, most BCP
leaders seem to work with reasonable consonance, have kept the
Communist machine functioning, and have given no indication of
digressing from their present course for the foreseeable future.
The demarcation between Communists, actual and intimidated
sympathizers and bandits operating under the cloak of Commu-
nism, is not clear. It is thought that rank and file party members
are mostly opportunistic followers of local leaders, who bear a
grievance against the government, or those who have succumbed
to plausible Communist propaganda promising improvement of
their standard of living. While actual BCP members probably
number only a few thousand, 'the Party commands a considerable
popular following of perhaps several hundred thousand.
The extent to foreign control over the BCP is still an unre-
solved question. Strong foreign influence is discernible in its
propaganda and in its growing compliance with the orthodox
Communist doctrine and use of violence. The BCP had demon-
strated its amenability to foreign "advice," at least on a policy
level, and it would probably accept material assistance with
alacrity. However, it Is entirely possible that the Communist
movement in Burma would be seriously retarded in the event
of large-scale and overt foreign intervention, either Chinese or
Indian, in the implementation of policy.
Finally, the various ethnic minorities, who populate Burma's
border areas, are strongly anti-Communist. As such, they con-
stitute a possible buffer between the main centers of the Burmese
Communist movement and those of surrrounding areas.
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4. ?,pecial Considerations.
Because of the intensity of Burmese nationalism and the
Inherent distrust of any kind of foreign intervention, the utiliza-
tion of Western assistance by the Burmese Government, which
might give it the necessary strength to establish itself as the
genuine advocate of nationalism, is a complex and delicate prob-
lem. Recently the government, probably realizing finally its
extremely tenuous position, has manifested a greater degree
of amenability toward proffered external (Western) assistance,
In matter of finances and technical assistance. Only acceptance
and effective use of assistance from nations respecting Burma's
sovereignty appear to be Burma's most promising means of
undermining Communist influence.
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"VIMISENT.,
A PPE NDDE G
MALAYA
The major weakness of Malaya's militant Communist
movement at present is a military one. British forces have
demonstrated their ability to diminish the effectiveness of
Communist-led guerrilla units. In addition, the Communist
effort--predominantly Chinese--has failed, because of a
basic racial antagonism toward the Chinese among the Malays
and a "wait-and-see" attitude on the part of most Malayan
Chinese, to secure voluntary mass support for its cause. The
Communist movement in Malaya suffers from a lack of co-
ordinated, competent leadership and has not yet received any
significant external assistance. These facts have led to
another, and reportedly increasing, weakness: a lowering
of morale. Continued Communist successes in China, to-
gether with a possible UK rapprochement with the Chinese
Communists for commercial reasons, may, however, enable
the Malayan Communist movement to regain the initiative and
thereby minimize its present vulnerabilities.
1. Political Vulnerabilities.
The British Government in Malaya currently offers an
alternative to Communism adequate in appeal to a majority
of the people. This appeal is particularly strong among the
Malaya, who are one of the two major and numerically almost
equal racial groups in Malaya.
? The Malays, whose political supremacy (as the indigenous
people) over the Chinese is guaranteed under the present
British policy, are quite sensitive to any suggestion of a
change in government which might threaten their favored
position. They particularly fear political control by the more
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modiaGIBEE...
aggressive Chinese who already dominate the economic life
of the peninsula; they would also be solidly against any sug-
gestion such as the subordination of their national interests
to USSR interests. Since the Malayan Communist movement
has from its inception been almost wholly Chinese, they are
antagonistic to it on racial as well as political grounds. The
average Malay, too, is not susceptible to Communist promises
of economic improvement; his major interest is maintenance
of his status as a small landowner responsible only to himself.
His Moslem religion is a further deterrent.
On the other hand, the Malayan Chinese, with their close
political, social, and economic ties to China, their proclivity
toward opportunism, and their real or imagined grievances
under British rule, are considerably more susceptible to
Communist blandishments. 031111111111113111Ps major vulnerability
here lies with the bourgeois Chinese's involvement with
Malaya's economy; the extent to which he will align himself
with the British Government against Communism will probably
be decided by his personal business interests.
The most effective exploitation of these vulnerabilities
Is, among Malays and Chinese alike, education in the mean-
ings and implications of Communism, plus a concerted effort
to increase Chinese loyalty to Malaya and to raise the general
standard of living.
2. MIlitary ilitiesrab
British Security Forces are now engaged in suppressing
militant Communist terrorists. Their efforts have been in-
creasingly successful and, barring hostile foreign intervention
or the necessity for drastic retrenchment, they will be able to
put down this insurrection, at least temporarily, without external
assistance.
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The Malayan Peoples' Anti-British Army (MPABA), the
Communists' fighting organization, has not had the popular
support It anticipated, and has had to resort to intimidation
and extortion to supplement voluntary contributions. It has
exercised terroristic control over certain squatter areas
(land illegally occupied by displaced or immigrant Chinese)
whose population is easily susceptible to such intimidation.
In addition, there is some evidence of forced recruiting into
the MPABA.
Increased military measures against the MPABA can be
expected to show proportionately increasing success. Full
deployment of existing troops has already had a good effect,
not only militarily, but also in the important tank of increas-
ing the population's faith in the ability of the British to main-
tain control of the area. For the opportunistically inclined,
this latter consideration is most important and is one strong
reason why Malaya's Communists have so far lacked real
popular support and are now confronted with mounting
desertions.
3. General Vulnerabilities.
Communist morale in low, largely as a result of two
causes: (1) continual political and military harassment by
the British, and (2) lack of support from the populace.
Central direction of the Party seems slow and insubstantial.
It is thought that very few, perhaps only an estimated several
hundred "hard-core" Communists, have anything but a very
limited conception of international Communism. and its dangers.
Many of the 3-5000 militants are probably opportunistic
Chinese who have found an outlet for their grievances and
who are spurred on by the Communist successes in China.
The problem, then, in exploiting these weaknesses is one of
education, accompanied by attempts to eliminate inequities
under the present government which increase dissension and
explode into misguided militancy.
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APPENDIX H
PHILIPPINES
The principal vulnerability of Communism in the Philip-
pines is the weakness of the local Party itself. In addition,
Communism as a theory of government, although vaguely
understood, is widely feared and disapproved by the Filipino
people, 80 percent of whom are of the Catholic faith. The
Communist-led Huks depend upon the local peasantry of
central Luzon for supplies and recruitment and are incapable
of overthrowing the present government without external
assistance. Although social and economic inequalities suscep-
tible to Communist exploitation do exist in the Philippines,
the comparatively higher standard of living presently being
maintained will probably prevent any rsPid growth of Commu-
nism in the near future. Furthermore a 'widespread antagonism
towards any extension of Chinese influence stands as a deterrent
to the extension of Communism by means of the Chinese.
I. Political Vulnerabilities.
Although the existing non-Communist regime in the Philip-
pines is corrupt and inefficient, it is still acceptable to poli-
tically conscious Filipinos in preference to Communism. A more
efficient and honest government, however, which can command
greater respect from the ople, will probably be required in
order to check the gradual growth of Communism. within the next
few years. The Philippine Communist Party (PKP) is so small
that the political danger it represents is not that Communists
will suddenly seize control or win popular approval but that they
will infiltrate into the government through a coalition. The fact
that approximately 80 Percent of the Filipino people are Roman
Catholics may have tended to prevent the spread of Communism,
although Philippine Communists reportedly have never preached
atheism.
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Neve
461.0616111.
2. MM.. J.L.z..r Vulnerabilities.
The chief weaknesses of the Communist-led armed
peasant movement (liukbalahap) are its inability to overthrow
the government without external assistance and the generally
localized area of its operations (central Luzon). The govern-
ment could take advantage of these weaknesses by strengthen-
ing its immigration controls and security facilities. Other
weaknesses include lack of facilities for arms manufacture and
some dependence upon forced recruitment. The government
could exploit these vulnerabilities by providing stricter control
of firearms and more adequate protection of peasants who re-
fuse to join the Huks.
3. General Vulnerabilities.
Although social and economic inequalities susceptible to
Communist exploitation do exist in the Philippines, the standard
of living presently being maintained will probably prevent any
rapid growth of Communism in the near future. In order to
prevent the possible future extension of the Communist move-
ment, however, the Philippine Government must take immediate
steps to develop a viable economy and to improve the standard
of living.
The Philippine Communist Party (PICP) is young and in-
experienced. It is believed to have approximately 3,000 active
members, of whom fewer than 100 are believed to be trained
and indoctrinated Communists. The most Important Communist
front organizations are the Hukbalahap and the Congress of
Labor Organizations. Many peasants of central Luzon who join
and support the Huk army and who give moral and material aid
to the Huk cause do so largely as the result of depressed socio-
economic conditions in central Luzon. The Congress of Labor
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NIS Neod
ameneRlialr
Organizations (CLO) recruits and,holds its follvwers by
posing as the center of the progressive labor movement.
Members of most affiliated unions apparently go along purely
out of self interest and probably in ignorance of the motives
of their leaders. By encouraging anti-Communist progressive
labor unions and acquainting workers with Communist methods,
the government could help to prevent the expansion of Com-
munist influence in the labor movement.
Some liaison is reported to exist between Chinese and
Philippine Communists within the Philippines but there is
no evidence of instructions either from the mainland or
from Chinese in the Philippines.
4. Special Considerations.
The Filipino people generally will remain anti-Communist
and sympathetic toward government counter-measures. The
Communist Party, however, is expected to remain a vowing
factor in Philippine politics. Government success in relieving
economic and social distress in central Luzon does not appear
likely, although a successful extermination compaign against
the Huks might eliminate lawlessness temporarily. The Con-
gress of Labor Organizations grew in prestige and probably in
membership during 1948; although it has suffered a recent
split in leadership and consequent loss of union affiliations,
long range plans and achievements will probably remain unaffected.
Opportunities for exploitation of Communist vulnerabilities
in the Philippines do not appear to be particularly susceptible
to Communist counter-measures. Philippine Communists will
not for a long time be capable of executing a successful coup
against the national government and would probably be unable
to take other effective counter-measures against exploitation
of their weaknesses by techniques outlined above.
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APPUNDEX I
AND )NE SIA
Unless there :is a Se1:4-,tment in the near future which
enebodies the treedeeo sovere4ety from the Dutch to the indo
sians CommemisTrt as a rpuitant rallying point for nationallsw
In Indonesia may ne strengV:ened. At the momelt, the lack of
open conflict between Indoneetan Communists and the Republican
Government is due prima:141.e to reduced Communist strength as
rest:tit of Republic eounteemeasures, to the presence of Dutch
Inilitary forces fla Imeonetila, and to schisnis among Communist
elements. If natienalisrn is :.'ecognizerl and implemented in the,
settlement new being negetiveed in The liegue, the danger from
Communist consoldation may, hoeever, he minimized and the
Se?iij..SLIS within (:omenunist s rk,:Nrryr,*9
Pen.-Asian Communism and those prosecnting Marxist-Leniiii.eg
Communism, will be prosex ,ed. As long as the nationalist move-
atent is led by a more moleennte group, the Commuedst elements
will be highly vulnerable to lAo charges that they represent
Chinese Communist influence. or Soviet interests. Furthermore,
the Muslim religion a Inc:celesta represents another possible
bulwark against Communist Influence.
Political Vulnerabilities.
A non.- Communist Indonesien regime offers a prospective
Tirogeeen of limited nationalination, which, if t'le Indonesians
achieee their objeatives dur'keg the present negotiations with
the Dutch, should have more appeal than napkin which the
e.:e.oroutni.st elements can offre.US suppert of .hdonesian as-
eleatiens at The Hague Rounl Table Conference, followed by
US financial and technical ee:fi designed to raise the Indonesian
?e'fmndard e living, should aseist in consolidatiri., moderate leader-
ship
Indonesia. Commurest efforts will neecesarily be
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""Meneliiihnon
vulnerable to charges that they wish to destroy the progress
which has been made, and that they advocate an importation of
alien influences, almost certainly Chinese rather than Soviet-
led, which have few possibilities of contributing to the economic
and political stability of the area.
2. MlUtayiVuberabllit1cs.
The Indonesian Republican Government has demonstrated
a reasonable ability to suppress Communist armed uprisings in
the past without outside help. It is expected, however, that
Communist elements will continue to maintain military units
as a means to achieve their ends and that the government will
be unable to eliminate them completely. Under these circum-
stances, Communist elements will be vulnerable to charges that
they have no interest in achieving peaceful conditions in Indonesia
and that they are instruments of disruptive alien influences.
3. geam_ti. Vulnerabilities.
Countermeasures by the Indonesian Republican Govern-
ment have disrupted Communist organizations, eliminating much
of the leadership of Communist groups, and have been successful
In playing one group against the other. The schisms which now
exist, and those which could be brought about by further revela-
tions d connections, particularly with Communists in China,
remain the most important vulnerability of the Communist
movement in Indonesia. Indonesian nationalism, which prompts
these countermeasures, must, however, be given continuous and
sympathetic support from the West.
4. al Considerations.
The vulnerability of Communism to efforts by Islam is
probably increasing, but not at the rate at which anti-Chinese
sentiment will increase. Immediate exploitation of the latter
development would be more fruitful.
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While it is true that any assistance given to Indonesia by
the United States will be subject to strong propaganda attacks
from Communist sources, US aid and encouragement which
conform with the requirements at Indonesian sovereignty would
quite likely result in the development of an effective Indonesian
government favorable to the US, and increasingly possessing
the will and capability for opposing Communism in concert
with the West.
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merifteridifinftb
APPENDIX j
INDIAN SUBCONTINENT
The success of Communist movements in India, Pakistan,
and Ceylon is dependent almost entirely at this time upon
adverse economic conditions in those countries. The size
of a Communist Party membership is no indication of the
number of believers in Marxism. The population of the sub-
continent is neither sufficiently educated nor sufficiently
conscious politically to react favorably to purely ideological
arguments. The measure of Communist progress in the sub-
continent is therefore a direct function of the number of
promises of economic advancement which the Communists
can make and the speed with which these promises Can be
put into effect. In many cases the economic aims of the Com-
munists and of the existing governments are similar. The
means of achieving popular support are the same. Thus, if
the existing governments can bring about a steady improve-
ment in the standard of living within the next few years, the
Communist movement will have no hope of success. On the
other hand, if they fail to do so in the near future, Communist
supporters will increase in number until they may be able to
wrest control from the present national governments. The
latter wifi all require a measure of US financial and technical
aid within the next few years in order to establish themselves
securely. Whether or not they will receive sufficient assist-
ance to enable them to do so remains to be seen.
I. India,
The Communist movement in India is presently dependent
upon a small, trained leadership, most of whom are well known
to the police and who can be arrested whenever necessary.
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Simultaneous removal of these leaders from the field of
action has in the past practically wiped out Communist
leadership at one stroke, thereby leaving the party badly
disorganized.
Concomitantly, the Party seeks membership or -
Sympathy among masses who are economically rather than
ideologically dissatisfied. Professed party aims are not .
sufficiently divergent from those of the Government of India
to stimulate mass interests. The GOT, as well as the Com-
munists,- is interested in socialization of industry, re-distri-
bution of land, abolition of feudal land system, etc. Batts-
factory ,change in these fields under the auspices of the GOT
would leave the Communist Party little to promise and the
number of Communist sympathizers would diminish rapidly.
In the field of labor, as in the case of the peasantry, the
Communists also lack mass support. The CongreSs-sponsOred
Indian National Trade Union Congress,, In spite of its recent
origin, is now stronger' than the Communist-dominated All-
India Trade Union Congress. And, as the peasants are not
yet fully organized by either group, it is possible that the
Congress Party, which is aware of the necessity of gaining
their support, may win the race to 'obtain. it.
Limited Party membership in itself constitutes an element
of weakness in the Communist move:meet in India. Except in
cerin portions of the Deccan, its size renders it subject to
effective police control and the lack of sufficient armed force. .
to challange the. ex4:ting military might of the GOT accentuates
this deficiency. Illustrative of the prcblems contingent upon
small meniziership are certain violent actions, mainly around
Calcutti,, which were not large enough to get beyond control
and thus led only to severe r. epression. Further, faulty staff
planning has, on occasion, prematurely tipped the Communist hand
and led to the imposItion of severe suppressive measures as, for
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example, in the case of the abortive nation-wide railway
strike in March 1949.
2, Pakistan.
The Communist movement in Pakistan is presently weakened
by a lack of first-class leadership. Communist leadership in
what is now Pakistan was completely disorganized upon the parti-
tion of India and there have been no signs of real revival. While
the tenets of Islam are usually used as the excuse for the diffi-
culties attendant upon promoting Communism in Pakistan, the
Party in fact is dependent for a following upon economically
dissatisfied persons or political fortune-hunters rather than
upon persons genuinely interested in Communism. There is a
complete lack of sufficient armed forces to challenge the exist-
ing government by violent menas.
3. ayis.t.
In Ceylon the Communist movement is impeded not only by
a lack of really competent leadership but also by disunity of
thought and action among the three Communist political parties
In the country. Stalinist, Trotskyite, and Leninist parties devote
more effort to sparring among themselves than to opposition to
the political party in power. Additionally, economic conditions,
which are better in Ceylon than on the Indian mainland, do not
constitute a powerful force favoring the growth of Communism.
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