Soviet Reactions to Scandinavian Adherence to the Atlantic Pact

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000400140001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 29, 1949
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY .' b-39 Z~
29 March 1949
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 149
SUBJECT: Soviet Reactions to Scandinavian Adherence to the Atlantic
Pact
1. Assumptions.
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a? Norway and Denmark, having Joined the Atlantic Pact, receive
re
substantial military aid up to their absorptive canacity, but no often 51-1
air or naval bases are constructed in their home territories.
b. Sweden adheres to her policy of neutrality.
2? Summer'
a? General Soviet Policy.
The USSR will view with particular concern the adherence of
Norway and Denmark to the Atlantic Pact, because of their strategic
location and their proximity to the Soviet Union. Soviet propaganda
will continue to emphasize the danger of foreign military bases. The
Soviet leaders will intensify their "war of nerves" In an effort to
hamper implementation of the Atlantic Pact in Norway and Denmark.
This "war of nerves" will coaist of intensified propaganda, diplo-
matic representations, troop movements, and some economic pressu.:'e.
However, it is believed that the Kremlin will not risk a general. war
by resorting to military aggression in Scandinavia or Finland;-'even
though the Scandinavian countries received substantial military aid
under the Pact.
Note: This report has been coordinated at the working-level with
the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
Army, Navy, and the Air Force. The report is based on
Information available to CIA on 24 March 1949?
Document No.
MC~"Ir_ .~ Y ?
Date:
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b. Soviet Policy Toward Syecific Countries.
(1) Norway.
The accelerated "war of nerves" against Norway will prob:-
ably include intensified Communist propaganda and pressure, exploit-
ing the subject of foreign military bases, and playing up fears of Soviet
military action.
(2) Denmark.
Communist tactics in Denmark will be similar to those em-
ployed against Norway. Danish fears of Soviet military action will
probably be kept alive through reports of troop movements in the So-
viet Zone of Germany.
en
(3) Swe-d
The primary Soviet aim regarding Sweden will be to keep that
nation neutral. Although pressure toward this end will be maintained, it
is believed that the Kremlin will avoid any mow -- such as military
occupation of Finland -- which might frighten Sweden into the arms of
the West.
3. Discussion.
g General.
The USSR is acutely aware of the key geographic importance of
Scandinavia in the strategic considerations of both East and West. The
Kremlin's recent notes to Norway revealed its concern lest bases which
could be used by the West be constructed in a country contiguous to the
Soviet Union. The primary Soviet goal in connection with Norwegian
and Danish adherence to the Atlantic Pact, therefore, is to prevent the
establishment of military or naval bases which could interfere with So-
viet access to the Atlantic, and from which the USSR could be bombed.
in case of war. Soviet propaganda, at least, has shown no inclination
to accept Scandinavian assurances concerning such bases, and it will
probably continue to emphasize this theme.
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However, the Kremlin is believed unwilling to risk war at this
time through military action in Scandinavia or Finland. Moreover,
it may realize that even if such moves as occupation of islands in the
Spitsbergen Archipelago or a coup in Finland did not bring about war,
they would hasten implementation of the Atlantic Pact, and might frighten
Sweden into an alignment with the West. Therefore, the Soviet cam-
paign will probably be limited to an accelerated "war of nerves," con-
sisting of intensified propaganda, diplomatic representations, the use of
troop movements, and some economic pressure.
Indications that the local Communist parties are girding them-
selves for an intensified campaign can be seen in the reported reorgani-
zation of the Scandinavian parties, in their resolutions declaring loyalty
to Moscow, and in recent "peace demonstratiors 9 $ staged in opposition to
the Atlantic Pact. However, the small size of the Scandinavian parties,
their previous lack of success in organizing strikes, and their failure
in mobilizing opposition to the Atlantic Pact in Norway and Denmark, pre-
clude any over-all capability of carrying out an effective campaign of
economic disruption.
Continued Kremlin pressure on the Finns will constitute part of
the "war of nerves" in Scandinavia. This pressure may include (a)
actual or purported troop movements along the Finnish frontier; (b)
continued Communist agitation to enter the present Social Democratic
Government; (c) a request for defense talks under the Soviet-Finnish
Mutual Assistance Treaty; and (d) alleged violations of the Finnish peace
treaty, in order to provide a legal basis for eventual Soviet military
action. However, indications are that the Finns will resist attempts of
the Communists to enter the Government. Moreover, while the Finns
might agree to defense discussions, it is unlikely that they would give
the consent necessary under the terms of the non-aggression treaty
for Soviet troopsto mOveirto Finland Despite all this pressure, So-
viet military intervention in Finland is believed unlikely.
There are indications that the Kremlin is trying to build up fear
of Soviet economic reprisals in Norway and Denmark. However, Soviet
economic pressure will probably be limited both in scope and in its
effects. In the first place, Kremlin policy has been to encourage East-
West trade, qualitatively, from the Soviet point of view, in order to
strengthen the economy of the East and to emphasize the importance
of that economy to Western. Europe. In the second place, Norway and
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Denmark could turn to the West for commodities which might be cut
off by the East, such as Polish coal and Soviet gain. At the same
time, the East would be faced with the problem of finding new markets
for its coal and grain, as well as substitutes for desired Norwegian
and Danish products. Therefore, although fears of economic reprisals
will probably be exploited to the maximum, it is unlikely that the So-
viets will embark on a concerted campaign of economic retaliation.
In the case of Sweden, real economic pressure by the Soviets
is improbable. Such moves would be expected to boomerang, since
Swedish iron ore, ball bearings, and industrial equipment are parti-
cularly important to the East.
._ ~ icy rd ec, ific ot~ tries.
(1) Norway.
Northern Nom is vulnerable to attack from the USSR across
their 122-mile frontier, and across the border from Finland. Norweg-
ian apprehensions concerning such an invasion will probably be kept
alive by reports of Soviet troop move meets along the Norwegian and
Finnish frontiers, and by local Communist propaganda In that area.
Spitsbergen seems a likely subject for renewed Soviet pres-
sure on Norway. Here the Kremlin may employ the familiar theme
of foreign military bases once again, pointing out that the construction
of such bases would be a violation of the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920.
For propaganda purposes, the USSR might reassert its claim
to Bear Island in the Spitsbergen 'Archipelago, which it claimed prior
to the Treaty of 1920. However, the Soviets will probably decide against
the seizure of the island. In addition to avoiding the risk of war, the
USSR will wish to avoid any move which would hasten Western plans
for military aid to Norway.
One possible form of Soviet economic pressure would be a
demand that Norway make good any temporary deficit under their trade
treaty, through payments in dollars or gold equivalent. This temporary
deficit is caused by the fact that the bul s of Norway's exports to the
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USSR -- derived primarily from her fishing industry -- are delivered
during the latter months of the year, while Norway's imports of So-
viet grain are received early in the year. A Soviet demand for pay-
ment would prove embarrassing, financially, to Norway, and might
result in a Norwegian request for increased ECA aid.
(2) Denmark.
Soviet strategy in Denmark is expected to follow the general
pattern of that employed in Norway. The Danes would be especially,
sensitive to reports of Soviet troop movements in the Soviet Zone of
Germany, and such reports may be used as part of the `'war of nerves. "
The Kremlin may also arouse Danish fears of Soviet seizure of Born-
holm Island in the Baltic, although such a move is regarded as un-
likely. In exploiting the subject of Western military bases, the Soviets
are expected to intensify their propaganda concerning alleged American
plans for taking over Greenland completely and for building bases in
Denmark itself. Knowing Danish sensitivity regarding their sovereignty
over Greenland, the USSR will capitalize on any indication of Danish-
American differences concerning military bases there.
(3) 2NMOM
It Is Soviet policy to assure continued Swedish neutrality.
As part of the Soviet campaign to prevent Swedish adherence to the
Atlantic Pact, the Kremlin will continue, to play on Swedish fears of
a Soviet invasion of Finland. However, the Kremlin probably rea-
lizes that such a move -- even if it did not result in a general war --
might frighten Sweden into the arms of the West. It is believed, there-
fore, that the Kremlin will avoid any move which might defeat its pur-
post of keeping Sweden neutral.
In the economic sphere, the USSR might call upon Sweden for
increased deliveries of goods under the Soviet-Swedish trade and credit
agreements. However, it seems improbable that the Soviets would
push the matter very far. The Kremlin will wish to avoid any move
which might invite Swedish economic retaliation, or which would re-
sult in closer Swedish economic ties with the Wes;. Strong economic
pressure, therefore, is not expected to be one of the weapons employed
against Sweden.
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