Soviet-Communist Capabilities for Sabotage in 52 Listed Countries.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000400090001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 12, 1949
• Content Type: IM

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.1749
"Nr',` ':L I Gf GE a ~r i' !il)U ~ NO. 144
, Ul . ECTs S via', Con Waist Capal:,i.1iti?la for S&abotige in ?:,2 Listed
1,~ f kj&g-. e have asked to estimate the `broad Sc'A .et;-Cexr rla..' st
r:abi.;iliti es for sign t'icent sabotage in 52 listed coixntrlos.
2. Thaesti .tes era given in the requested form of a cc?t;cgorrcal
statemant brie-fly- stilt scan 4:iatol- ,
3. Capabilities h+ v e been taken to be those t x3 Sti ng at 11-j grew it
ti !:?, but in rr k, inr~ estiirts.tess a context of ap-proa .l * .e; he 3t 1'.t,ieb hr :
been a asizt Q
1+,, No account has been taken of the Incidence of iradiniAlu i r c f s of
aat otage -.. either by fanatics or tr? do d agants. It 1!3 o orisi ,de:r
that such atterripts must be regarded as ,ossi ie whe-raver desirable
fi rget:: exist. tiSpeeiai concentration of in ustx7 in of yr . ise P-re.,
dommina: tl, ? fagrio.,A.tur tai Gauntries,, and ttonokaic praess=es which, m< ke
to buy saboteurs,kri) e -r, Iasi::ed ,
It possible reap'
It is to be noted ? ghat the capabilities deacribed will increase
Notes except as noted thac wstizgates given have been irafo m?a]1y co -
d...nated and arrreat with ? hie Int,I l.i.ge ;oe t rg, nizt; ion of the
Department of State25 Abe ca,-s s o ? :so i4ai . Coj.z'w,ibiew G rai>,.:,s,
Ecuador., Guitema].av T? inidad} it has 1, n im aossiblo
to re?aeh ommpie "a agreement within the deadline,
RETURN TO ARCHIVES & RECORDS CENTER
l -MEU`ATEEY AFTER USE
'108-N-16 In ux-q
,. i -. Document No. . 4 b 1
ANGE in Class.
DECLASSIFIED
Class. CHANCED TO: TS S
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or deer eas x ao ct rta:sn. sources of social tens on de e1op. or are reso:?vu ,
A
(e') In 1 ndustb-ia]. and ser i-i c ustr~a 3~.: d coy n if::1a these
(h)
tenai.ois -.,and to occur in connection w ate gc.: living
cos e, co , i.tion of works, and the distributir:> i. of
social benel"its.
In colonial-,, sorb.--colonial, and formerly coic1,1:: i regions,,
the.-;se teas-ions tend to occur in connection wi-,:a wnndi.gonoas
nationalist movements and latent r-.. ;iai anteg dsms o
Ccnisequentl . the estimates given will need periodic x a-exami tiz n
if they are to reUain their validity,
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NORTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA
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CWTA 111 CM Sahotsge pc~ ,;ib: to 1 i. exp:. cited
The, Coaas;.unist Party,, outlaww+sd in 1943, has h e a t i U f cacti' B
strength out das jn to a.houut 2,000 and i ;s discipline impaired. It
rera.ins, howeve , potent, in the 11orker' s Confeder?y ti_on cot ad
interfere with pov^;e ? 1:xlent; , rai?.roads, teiea commuuicatloy s, and
port facilities,, Se mrity t cvt though oo side:r~,,d ad olt,1E.te under
existing coedit:.oasis, 'would meec r-orgarrivation to deal vik-,h a con-
certed determined e';ort a
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CUBA: Sabotage definitely to be expected,,
The Communist Party is one of the large,>t, be,,~t-orF;Vdnized, f4nd
best-disciplined in Latin America v It has a nuclei s of bout 55,0O0
militants arid counts on a popular vote of about 15O2O00R Its leaders
are experienced and able. It has a party press and numerous "front"
organizations 6 Its major weapon is its influence I ti organized labor.
Sabotage would include two types of operations (1) indirect sabotage
by slow-dm.rn and strikes; (2) direct action against facilities con-'
sidered vital to the US? Sectaritly forces a ?e considered able ulti-
mately to control an organized sabotage attempt, though not before
considerable damage will have been donea
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*GU TE 3ALA: Sabotage proLebly to, be expected.,
There are relatively few Communist Party m e m b ~ rs L Guatemala.
Severely repressed between 19:32 -. 1944, the Party la k: ex . rienved and
disciplined nemb6rship. lowae er, t'-he present a dmin.istrati,,~. n is suscepti"b"., ,
to Go nunist influence e::erted through "front ^gan1zztion s,cg particularly
those of labor. The government has definitely ti-,tided to side with labor
in disputes between management and labor. Though the Co un .sts could do
little in the way of direct significant sabotage, their capacity for in--
direct sabotage by way o~' pralorcging labor difficulties ant's strik:.es,
against which the government would not take vigorous actio ,, is a positi-+t g
capability. Its use is accordingly probable.
* Department of State estimates "Sporadic sabotage oaalyG"
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HfAiTI Sporadic sabotage only.
The Coma .irht ?aarr-ty as c? itlawed In 194:8, and all i : ec:
Co:muniete Y Ave ainw.e paean ,Cept under suxvoi1i.anc e Th~,rr are,
u
so ie Comwuni.aty amo i the a Sal worke~?a and they rt.ron g: y :1r) ?1. e
or dominate certain workers union: G rernae t control -!*. s fix end.
no ai ifte-aa.t organized , botages or oven indirect sabQUg,? through
strikes are Uke3y to develop.
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HONDURAS; No sabotage indicated,
There are few known Coaaunists in the country, and. almost all
who have come into the country in the past have 'been efftoctively
elivd.nated from the local scene,
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?J N, e. (excluding Canal Zone) Sporadic sabo t Ea oza
(NB: This estimate assures that planned u'P roiaiter-
ea ores become operative as
excludes expected direct sabota ;e as:,te p :,,:a by
trained saboteurs.)
The capacity of Panamanian Communists for si nif=.caant Sabo-.
taae is afar is tly limited. They lack experienced The
basic orientation of the present g;c;r ernment is aaaati.-USSKl acid pram
#xi.sting seci.arity plans are cons_idere- adequote to check local
attempts phyaicnliy tc damage Panamanian instal ationsu Indirect
sabotage in the form of strikes, aloe- do s, etc, ftre tut expoet
to be more thaar sporadic.
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8CU'I AMERICA
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A its :} TINAt, Sabotage possibly to be expected.
The Communist P'artyv though not large numeri?:ally, Is rein-
forced by about, 90,0CC Slavs who are members of a
Soviet--sponsored "front" organization. In addition it has exper-
ienced leaders and a fairly large number of sympathizers,, It is
well provided with press organs. Its strength is e;enterr.d in the
Federal Capital and Province of Luenos Aires ? It has to 3t ground
in the labor movement genes ally, but still has particular infiu-
ence among-railway., part, and meatpacking workers and alao through
"front" organizations,, It would be extremely- difficult tee ensure
full protection to industrial plarsts and. other strategic installa-
tions against a determined Communist organization. Nevertheless,,
the security forces of the Peron gove: rament are considered well
able to deal with a moderate sabotage effort,
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BR Z1Lt Sabotage probably to be r pecterL
The Comcnwaist Party-., although outlawed in 1947y s t.-11-12 has an
estimated rnemlership of about 175,000. Its leadership is still
organized and in control of the P xty` s activi.ties. Its strength
is concentrated in Sao Paulo, R.,o do Janeiro, and P urnamhucoo Its
influence is particularly strong among manganese miners, port
transportation, and electrical power workers. Socicl and, economic
problems offer opportur _t es for combining sabotage with local
strikes and disorders,, The Army and the poll:'.ce have been actively
suppressing Communism and are considered able to check organized
sabotage. Its incidence., however, remains probqible.
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*BOLIVIA Sabotage I a sib to be acted.
Exi8ting Cont., t ca bi:ii tieto for sabotage are ?i'1:3 W. The
number of Communists is small. There is no militant Cazruntist
organization. Coanun t inf ueme in pollti? o-sc ial s l.tuations is
relatively ineffecti ; in combination with anti--govt r nt par?t1er,
however, Communists vid ht be ab1 to bring about the gt r ntw s
fall and thus =,-o duce an nnstable condition favorable to sabotag
The presoA Bolivian administration has hitherto co ant r-ad treats fro w
extreme Right and left opposition by declaring a state al' siege ana?I
employing special as c;urity measures. The Bolivian tfr 1.rdustry and
its relation to US r equxirements provides, however, a desirable and
vu3nerab13 target. Consequently, even occasional acts of sabotage
in Bolivia would have as crippling an effect as 1i- 1azsned &ttempt.~
in other countries.
*The estimate is agreed, but the Department of State si.fcz-tantiating
statement differs.
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BI.ITISH GUIi.a No sabotage indiceteda .
No Commt niat organi ration is known to exist in Lr1t_ .sh Guiana.
The, 'oaf to industry, linked with Ca.r,ac ian production' rrmides a
significant and? desirable target, Local security force; are entir v
capable of dealing with any attempt to organize an internal effort
against this :.n.dustry
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CHILE: Sabotage probably to be expscte&
The Communist Party, outlawed in 194, is estimated to number
4O,.OOO/50,OOO member;3Q It has retained effective control of the
Federation of Miners and is infiltrated among railroad, port, elec-
tric,al, and telephone workers. The internal security farces are
considered able to prevent extensive and coordinated dam ;e, but
initial and planned attempts are probable in view of ty e difficulty
of guarding widely dispersed facilities and an extended transporta-
tion system.
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*CaLONB1JU Sabotage pt'obabiy to be e cp cted.
Commtxai.s suet th is small and divided between to ! roups, both
i:~. ,
of which sup .o t the SSE in spite of 'heir wur ual ant
tY.03e88, Communist; influx- e is t.m-, ort.ant in the oil urn:.kInu o and the
National Federation of Wor. kers
production would be he main target of sabotage effort &,, Nov xtboIesR,
too Comncunista have not sho paest capability to promrttc succoas'ul
strikes and damAp Prom &abatagay or strikes mid not b treat.
*The estate is geed, but the Department of State atiostantisting
statement differs.
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*CURACAO AM NRUBA. Sporadic sabotage, only.
There is no sigr1fictat Comunbat influtz=?s eo ,o g tja:ai labor,
local security, measures , both govern ntal .nd on the art of oil
companies, ara efficient in checking the influx of ants and
considered adequate. The a:,tuation is generally trfav rahls for
sabotage attempts by local people. However, the o"11 r +=. : sier3es c on-
titute a srigsn;ficatnt and doairabie target and df pct sabotage attemptf
by specially trained sabot curs can be expected.
pakrtn Ynt of State est1mtes "No sabotage indicated. "
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it ui r i!y nmcrt4t " } ; v -:13. f ?"
'tad port WC;] k
m ~:'a: C;,E~ m" gh ' .t Ylc.' '.,
.E -i:a :li 'art .3?9 ff Ic ~i 'a.'. erP C c ta,`_? t3.Pl: e, "h Y's:t"flf : i 7 "r
tment of Std. O'st: s"`' E `oz, probably to s, ';
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LY i-nol.A.'. c:-)
for . m.J.ti'3Xt'ta1 t`3 ~3s'as 7 3 E: d? a'xp~ % ~ ~ ; it i t ;T
s 3 ~t hat the abs~:nc cad ^ix'i =sz
app th ityr :.r ;, ret?1v ]
4
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P Rus $pWE:dic s-bota e c
The nvw..rmutlawer Ccrm uni,-~t Party never Iad C zat a ,11UeIIACS
and Was divide irate ' rc factions. The present : tr ng .i of tre
arth.od, ? party o Eists of its i tfxuence among
teE_? cs1et
w v, orl -m's
and a mang Miners,, stevedcnes, and railroad wackers a The dis .i.
dents are strongest a -orig r o :,raction, and movor r xnsport worker3
Thare ha,s been a vacuum iin labor leadership since the goveii1rent
st*ppreszed the largo!a t ? e ''?t.-v g, party. , Ad a. wh ch cc ta r o1,led they .
gas., e labor eratxett bait the Co ?zmn: sts ha, ,re been aLle to take
little t dvant ge of this open"I n a Security forces,, in q to of
the poiiti_c&].: nsta :i1ity of Peru, are cons-..tiered effective to
control Communist a : sxs . ~ and to prevent a >oordirate d s tbotage
effort
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SURINAM: No sabotage iiudicat ?
There is no evidence of any Co rsun1at ou in C rinan c r
of ate Cc rnunt. Est; influence in the labor movement. The h,~,mtite
industry provides., however, a s .fmi icant and ae,31rab1,- t;argetq
L 1. security forces are entirely c:apsble c~:r dealing ~,,ith. any
attempt to 2?r inize ar internal. effort against this Industry.
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% t . STD .Ds Sporadic sabotage a ye
No org :n.iz . Gcarne gist tarty < xs.sts' t ooh i id" --i,t),u 1 Co..
munists are known to be present a Their capab i.tie & re we kth noting
only in coii junctj m wit l the special consideration :: t cd beic ` .
Secur ty
"os?ces a adee aie amt, cagahl e of pr ipt and effeetjv , c.:u t r rn 5 =,,
However,, the Trira.wdad oil ref?ina1.es oorAstitute a ssi~` .;ur~t and desix?ca'1_i }
target, and dix?ect sabotage attempts by trained sabote c,:s must be kept
under considerat;fons
*Depr tr nt of State estimate - "No sabotage i 3.iea w . n
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VE ZL> Sabotage pro bly to be expected.
The Car +.mizt Party has an est: ted strer h of i J . it
has ro :sympathizers and two .l-dis k ri1 Imcd pr nK organs.
The Party is pa.r icular strong in the labor us one =e: oqe ing lake-
tanker Fleet, Caracaa transport, the telegraph system:,, pots, and
certain oil fields of Eastern and Western Verse la,. rho present
political confusion. affards the Com mist Party am. opportninity to
penetrate stiff..]. Wither the labor a a rent. d edurit3v farces have
shown to date an a el1ent capacity to stop strik z .,id prevent
sabotagee. Inprove. nt in these respects should result from the coop a--
tion that is being plant by the government.. the oi]..:Iam a ilas, a
the W.
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 some' mu-NNO
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AFRICA
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AFRICA
(a.) x:ILI J CONGO: ro sa bott e indie,tea . `
Although desi.ra::ti s,
(f) xi C .7 ati"s sabotage. 1ndicatecl m
That: Li nationalist ferniing 3.aj strong .r:d k 11. cu--ganizedb . ~'
is no esvidencc that is boar, i raced by act i~?~ "='~:k rnmni or
Tia,ire is no evidence cf Ccsm. .u.~t remtration sir .a 63 Csr c5: 'v ; ecgxxi
forces are co ,. ider d adenaats in present
(g) SIEF1 IJONNk No sah*,s;a ,,s i.rd catecl,
No : ' ,ctwrs exist which suggest any a ahot ;e sv m:-iY i?,3es
(h) NORTil ,N HOIJSSIA~ Na eahot&ge indicated,,
No fpnrtant Co 4? ?t grroxa or activities have yet leer.
(i) SC7if" N } ?HOD SIA: No sabotage i icated ,
No Co un:Lt groups or activities have yet bee :=3 rex :meted a
signffica t app rt i.t:Ies f ,-.,r Cox tt nist penetration exi.r. a Security, are more Vian adequate m TI rail link with Mozembiq offers a des.1ra&I
gat.
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EN H NORTH AFRICA: Sabotage possibly to be e-rp:e
The native Moslem par lat ion t their IettO:; ra 61 not .or;
respond to Conawai_st aioc-trine, bif, thaIrr3ev la been a}
be exploited by the Co aenniast Party tx>roug strikes $ p: jblit disorcl ras
ppeals to
. t I~"
(a) A iLp Sabo-tta :sib to b e t c..
T h e Coax uaii. t Party is as 11 a n d , it>s j s e l l - , u? leadership :L
incompet,aat round . reor i.zation. Its 1_raravai b1;;
InSt"MMUt of action is the
t d ~~ i u a ~ e .~
(CCT) v which includes the majority of organized Tabor and frequ 3
follomn the Paris leadership in calling strike Cogrw~aa: ai..sts and
sympathizers, usually pacial.i.zod orp ers of European origin, ar t Ort
centrrated in , . ,row, the naval installation of %6r- _..yl-?cebir, ra as
and Arzew, a1 the air 1 stalIntiono at Ira. Sonia and T-t.--larace-L. Era)
recent Uw nch verbal agreement res cti ig the we of adiit y Lcot, 5l d -
tions is known to th:: Comist pasty and ovides a ail,,imilus and -targets
for sabotage. Civil insta11 tior r in Algeria are not particularly vul-
nerable to significant sabotage. 3 stin military as a.? security forces
are coris1, red adequate for present circa s tannceas .
(b) WrGCC, Sabotg possih17 to be exp cted.
Co riitnt Party a ria berashi,p is smaller thaan. f. ; Algeria, but
leadership more, of ' Oct?1 re. There are ha rd-corn groups and sy a7tthcetic
tech .ci at Port r r utoy arad G ahlanct,. St:inalhs to sabotage is
provided by the presence of the Naval Air Activity, at Port' Lyaa:
.s 24-
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(}B Planned s a W . s a g s this Installation was d5- n c e c a i d pre-
vented in December i9/8.) C t c I i i rt :llaticns srt fl xt-- , .arty
vulnerable. Exi;g?t. , a g military and security f o ,:gin are s-c' ] sr ed.
adequate,
(c)UJAn f3abcotage Fasil to exp~n
The Tunisian Ccr; : st Party has the ;a ;: 1 ?tf r
any in North Africa., but, the w at cc-,mpetent Ie,~ie ship. Itz
vehicle has 'been the nas ..des :tea Signif:.cc .y..i . aE.~: I7tl t
present since Eurc,dx) C c rani ; skilled workers c.r a,c,., ~, s t d
naval Installations in Bizerte and Ferry ille Ord the ::w? i albs ; .vr
of Sidi Ahmed and El Aou a. Civil irsta? .atia? o are_'? tit .dta ujn.r-'
vulnerable. E). tl m