PALESTINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000100540001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1948
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/04: CIA-RDP78-01617A000100540001-0
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CE11TRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 31 August 1948
Addendum to ME 8-0
CIA has been requested by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to
review and bring up to date ORE 3848
Faleati_n Truce, 27 July 1948). An analysis of recent events in Palestine
shows little reason for changing substantially the eatirmates made in
that study.
jk. Because the support given the Mediator has not been sufficient for
effective enforcement of the truce, sporadic fighting and the acquisition
of arms and fighting personnel (chiefly by Israel) have continued. Minor
violations have been neither investigated nor Checked= provocative inci-
dents have consequently become more and more frequent and serious until
the situation has deteriorated to a point, where the continuation of even
an uneasy truce appears highly problematical. The Jews have taken advantage
of the inadequacies of the truce enforcement machinery and have become
increasingly belligerent and uncooperative. Recent Arab statements emphasise
that unless the UN is prepared to deal promptly and firmly with these con-
tinued breaches of the truce, the Arabs will have no choice but to rs nee
fighting.
at. It has become even more apparent that the Mediator cannot effect an
acceptable permanent solution for the Palestine problem. Count Bernadotte
himself is apparently convinced of this. His tentative efforts toward reach-
ing a settlement have succeeded only in (Ixaosrbating the feelings of berth
Arabs and Jews, and he reportedly considers that the whole question will
inevitably come up before the General Aeriemblr once again in September.
.2. The t1SSR continues to fo'low a course productive of instability and
insecurity In the Middle East. On 19 August the Security Council, in response
to a warning that the situation was "gradually getting out of hard,' ordered
both Israeli and Arab forces to atop violations of the trues. The USSR
voted for the general resolution but abstained from voting on the paragraphs
demanding punishment for truce violations and reiterating that neither Jews
nor Arabs be permitted to gain a military or political. advantage during
the period of the truce. (Reports indicate that some materiel is moving from
the Soviet bloc to Israel and the Arab states, the greater part going to
Israeli the volume may be expected to increase if hostilities are resumed.)
ME 38-48 envisaged the possibility of the Arab states seeking Soviet assis-
taaoe if they believed their cause to be in Jeopardy. An increase in dip-
lomatic activity between Syria and the USSR has recently been reported. One
account (transmitted as "possibly true") states that the Syrian Minister in
Moscow has been instructed to obtain from the ]Gremlin a definite statement
with regard tit (1) what the USSR would do for Syria, or for all the Arab
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states, if Syria should be instrumental in barraging the Arab states into
the Soviet sphere; and (2) what guarantees the USSR could give that, ones
Syria had entered the Soviet sphere, Soviet influenoe would stop at
"reasonable" limits. Another report indicates the possibility that Syria
is considering granting military bases to the USSR in exohangs for aid in
Palestine. These and similar reports have not been confirmed; however,
the pocoibility of a rapprochcmont with the t,.,SR beuones stronger as
Arab discouragement Increases.
~,. A continuing threat to peace in Palestine is the possibi'ity of
independent action by extremist groups on both sides, particularly the
Jewish Irgun Zvai Laumi (IZL) and Stern Gang. Persistent Jewish violations
in the Jerusalem area are apparently designed to bring the city (or at
least the major portion of it) within the Jewish state by establishing it
as a Jewish-held area. Such action is almost certainly proanted in part
by the fear of the Provisional Government of Israel (PGI) that failure to
act in Jerusalem might provoke such extreree steps by the IZL and Stern
Gang as to force a definite break between these groups and the PGI, thus
splitting the Jewish community and weakening the whole Jewish position In
Palestine. The Arab gavernmonts have been reasonably successful in main-
taining order in their countries through the imposition of martial '.aw.
then, however, the local populations become wholly aware of the true serious-
ness of the Arab position and have had time to suffer the full economic and
emotional impact of the refugee problem, demonstrations may become so
violent as to defy control.
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EIELOS1tE A
RECENT MVEWPIEWS IN THE PALESTINE SITUATIAB
(Since inauguration of second truce an 18 July)
1. AraZ;. O s.
The most serious population upheaval since the termination of ''arid
War II has been the exodus of Palestinian Arabs from Israeli-held areas.
The Arab refugees, conservatively estimated at 330,000, exceed in number
the Jewish DP's in Europe. The Arab countries have neither the economic
resources nor the political stability to absorb such larp numbers of
destitute refugees. Israel's decision not to allow the refugees to re-
turn to their homes has greatly exacerbated Arab bitterness aQ;aisnst the
Jews.
2. Increased Isrtaii Intransigence,
Developments in the past few weeks have resulted in a growing feeling
of self-sufficiency and confidence on the part of the Israeli which por-
tends willingness to talcs matt-irs into their own hands without being bound
by the UN.
,4. The fact that the Israeli forces increased their holdings oon-
siderably between the first and second truces and have steadily
Improved their military potential has resulted in the feeling among
the Jews that they have the power to expel the combined Arab armies
from Palestine and that consequently the UN, far from protecting the
Israeli cause, is.aatually- deterring Israel from expanding.
b. Since the British Mandate ended on 15 May, an estimated 32,500
Jewish DP's have been admitted to Israel. By the end of 194 Israel
hopes to have admitted 125,000. This imiwigratioA policy has un-
doubtedly been responsible in large part for Israel's refusal to
readmit Arab refugees, and is encouraging Israeli demands for increased
territory over that allotted by the General Assembly partition plan.
o. During the past weeks it has been evident that while Israel. has
been successful in withstanding Arab military attacks, the continued
state of mobilization bas constituted a carious drain on its economic
resources. Israeli officials have consequently hinted that an in-
definite continuation of the truce would be an intolerable burden.
Accordingly, the confident Israelis indicate that if a peace settle-
ment is not soon forthcoming, they wou'.d prefer a renewal of the
conflict since they believe they can now force the Arabs out of
Palestine.
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3. Arab B91kCIUMA 19 .
Ahilo now trios violations on the part of the Arsbn have been re-
ported, the Arab states appear to have been fairly conscientious in
cooperating with the Mediator and the UN.
The ma: n rooent concern of these countries has burn to comnoss their
differences and to strengthen their military alliances so as to present
a common front. Israeli expansionist sentiment, which might be imple-
mented by either diplomatic or military methods, is being viewed with
increasing misgivings. Some positive countermeasures have been taken.
Iraqi and Tranajordanian leaders not at Amman on 21 August for the
purpose of placing the armies of these two countries under a unified
command in the event that hostilities were reopened. President Qvvatli
of Syria, has urged: (a) the coordination of Arab diplomatic efforts;
(b) the placing of the Arab countrieu on a wartime footing with provision
for mutual aid if neoessary; and (c) the coordination of a program for
obtaining arms and materiel from abroad.
There are definite indications that the irregular Arab Liberation
Ariy is being reorganized at its bane in Damascus. Even if a diplovatta
settlement is reached, it my be exp'cted that guerrilla warfare will con-
tinue for some time to cone.
No Arab government is yet preparod to recognise the existence of a
Jewish state or to negotiate directly with representatives of Israel.
Popular Arab disillusionment with the UN and the Western Powfrs is almost
complete. Lloanwhi'e, unconfirmed but persistent reports suggest that
Iraq and Syria are considering the possibility of seeking support from
the Ult.
4. Ob .
Although the current truce has boon more successful than its four-reek
predeasssor (11 June-9 July), it has not been strongly backed or
efficiently enforced' Cg.,, there has been no thorough investi"tion of
the destruction of the Latrun puat;,ing station and other alleged Arab
violations; and Israel has not been cited before the UN for its reported
breaches of the trues. Moreover, no effective steps have been taken to
restrain Israeli expansionist tendencies. Thus the Arabs have lost respect
for and faith In the UN, and the Jews feel strong enough to disregard it;
consequently,, both the truce and the chances for an eventual settlement
are jeopardised.
tear of Annular reaction will still prevent ai Arab government from
recognising or negotiating with a Jewish state, but determined UN action
would probably: enable this Arab Governments to "aoquissos" in the existence
of Israel and to save tape with their people by yielding only to the
dictates of an international body backed by obviously superior forms.
Such determined UN action would involve the definition of a frontier and
its delineation an the spot as an imposed boundary, with adherence to snob
a boundary by both sides djtjO& nd-guaranteed by the Security Comreil.
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OF?ICE OF THE SECREPATtf OF DEf i9!
Washington
ER 0970
26 August 1946
M 4t0RANDUM FOR ADMIRAL HILLENOErTER
SUBJEO?t Palestine
1. On 20 July 1948 you were requested to provide this
office with an intelligence estimate of the Palestine situation
which would assist our planning for military participation in
supportof the United Nations Mediator. A copy of this memorandum
is attached.
2. We have recently augmented the number of personnel and
quantity of equipment provided by the united States and we con-
tinue to attach the greatest importance to the efforts of the
Mediator to establish a peaceful settlement of the controversy.
3? In view of the high quality and usefulness of your last
estimate, I would appreciate your preparation of an intelligence
estimate which would supplement the previous estimate by review..
ing it and bringing it up to date.
IaI JOHN H. OHLT
John H. Ohiy
Special Aset. to the Secretary of Defense
I
See. t M. 41
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