ALTHOUGH FINLAND WILL PROBABLY CONCLUDE A MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PACT WITH THE USSR IN COMPLIANCE WITH STALIN'S REQUEST, THIS ACTION WILL NOT FORESHADOW AN IMMINENT COMMUNIST COUP IN FINLAND.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000100080001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 2, 1948
• Content Type: MEMO

410 Declassified and Approved ForRelease2013/01/31 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000100080001-1
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NIIIORANDUS FOR TOR PRNSIDINT
2 Unit 1948
Although Finland will probably conalmde a mutual assistenee
pact with the USSR in compliance with Stalin's reosets this action
will not foreshadow an imminent Communist ooep in Fiats& Stalin's
letter of 23 February does, however, represent the first overt step
in a long-row campaign to redoes Finland free sesifindependenee te
total subservience to the Soviet Union.
The recent Soviet demand, an Finland was planned independentlr
of the Communist coup in Oseehoslovakia. Sines November 19117, the
USSR has been Wing the gromdmork for a mutual assistance pest with
Finland as pert of its overall plan for the conclusion of soh pests
with all Swope= border states. The timing of the eogp in Combo..
Slovakia was forced upon the Kremlin when the non-Comunists took
action endangering Communist control of the police. b Ceedhosiovek
Communist victory in the Rey elm:time wild have been impossible
without such contra. In Finlands hemmer elsotiess ere not scheduled
until Mrs and the non-Ccummiste have not been actively threatening
the Communist position. The coop in Cssohoslovekla, however, has been
useful to tbe Kremlin because it hes crested in Finland a widespread
fear that failure to grant Stalin's request would precipitate similar
action in Finland. The USSR will seek to capitalise upon this reeetien
by making maximum demands upon the Finns in the negotiations an the
mutmal assistance pat. In addition, therefore to the usual previsions
of mutual defense treaty, the USA will probably also demand the
integration of the binnish defense system with its own. Even though
the Finns leal probably reject this extreme reenlist, the 002COSSiODS
Finland will eventually have to mks will undoubtedly permit the
Kremlin to gain control of the Finnish Army.
Present indications are that the Kremlin's strategy for
eastern Europe now calls for au intensification of the ?cold* var.
Not only is the USSR faced with the probebility that the Human
recovery program will soon be inplementedi but the Soviet strategists
are apparently convinced by the events preeeding the Cseehoslovak mow
that even three-quarter control over a bordering nation is ineafflabmat.
Consequently, the WAR will now intensify its efforts to obtain eventual
Soviet domination of Finland.
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Document No. 001
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
DECLASSIFIED
)DECLASSIFIED
Class. CHANGED TO: TS S C
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DD RI". 77/1763
)
Date: lei n BY: 0"
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Or 2
A Oemmermist soup la Mimed,hereof/Jiro is unlilsaly at present
became of the relative wealtuess of the Communist petetima. Communist
membership in the present Cabinet includes the Minister of Interior
(lho controls the state pollee), the Minister *fisher, mid the Deputy
Minister of Avg,. The Presiewy the Deputy Foreign Minister, and the
Minister of Justice are loft-wing socialists who have joined the Came
monist bloc but eie not, from the Soviet point of view, wholly syllabic
The remaining 12 Cabinet posts ere held by Waal Democrats seldom-
sentatives of the rightist parties. The Cammeniste exert ably
control over the labor unions and have 20 of the smote In the Diet.
Moreover, they are In the minority in oil bet a fee of the silty end
village governing bodies and do not control the rAgr or the local
polies.
Deepite this relative weakness of the Finnieh Communist Party,
the Me would be able within a matter of seethe to impose a. Communist
polies state in Finland. 4, an intensification of eeenalis and political
pressure the V= pen strengthen the Communist Pare, andweehen the
non-CoomLists. Attar the retail assistance past bee teem signed, the
Soviet Union can increase its control over the Finnish Any.
under the tune of the Finnish peace treaty, the WJAA can exercise a
direct influence over the Finnish Government in both Internal and
external matters.
The ratan and the extent of Finnish resistance to the inr.
Untitled Soviet program will determine hoe lees Finland can retain its
present status. The 235A will retaliate ifs (1) the Finns
refuse to sign *a metal aseistance poet; 2) the Commentate ore
eliminated from the Pianist Government; or (3) the Finns appear in-
creasingly dependent upon **western powers. Ceder these cdreumstseces,
the Kremlin 1111 undoubtedly either faros a Comsenlet victory in the
;lily elections or seise control of the Finnish Covermuset prior to July.
It the Finns do not resist in se* gamer, the Aremlin will prehebly
proceed more slowly in the hope of gaining eventual deminaties through
parilamentery means.
A. H. HILLABACTITER
Sear MIsairal, DGM
Director at Central Intelligence
impunim
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