WORKING PAPER THE THIRD AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLES' SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R001400380002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 15, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
25X1A2g
WORKING PAPER
THE THIRD AFRO-ASIAN'
PEOPLES' SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE
15 April 1963
25X1X4
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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The third biennial conference of the Afro-Asian Peoples?Solidarity
organization took place in Moshi, Tanganyika, from 4-11 February 1963.
Attached is a working paper which describes the events and results of
the conference emphasizing the position of the AAPSO in the international
Communist movement and particularly the effect of the Sino-Soviet conflict
on its policies and organization. It should be noted that the scope of
AAPSO interests and activities now extends to Latin America as well as
Africa, the Near East, and the Far East.
25X1X4
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The Third Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference
Delegations representing 54 anti-imperialist nationalist movements and
revolutionary parties from the countries of Asia and Africa, along with 72
observers including European and Latin American members of international
Communist fronts, met at Moshi, Tanganyika, from 4-11 February 1963.
This was the third biennial conference of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity
Organization (AAPSO). The Organization's first conference, held in Cairo
(December 1957-January 1958), legitimized the Sino-Soviet presence in the
Near East and Africa. The second conference, which met in Conakry in
April 1960, assured Communist control of the organization. This third
conference at Moshi brought a confrontation between the Chinese Communist
and the Soviets in their respective efforts to dominate the AAPSO. This
confrontation, however, was effected within the framework of a common
mutual determination to hold the organization together and to a shared
desire to maintain solidarity - at least in the short run - on the basis of
a least common denominator - the struggle against colonialism, neo-
colonialism, and Western imperialism led by the United States. But the
ultimate determination of each to control,the organization was equally
evident.
Instances of Sino-Soviet conflict were most obvious in those issues
which bore on the relative importance of peaceful coexistence and. militant
liberation, anti-colonial struggle in the war against the imperialists,
particularly regarding the World Peace Council's relation to the AAPSO.
The conflict was also apparent - if much less obvious - in proposals for
organizational changes by which both the Chinese and Soviets attempted to
add to their supporters on the two major policy-making bodies of the
organization, i.e. the Executive Committee and the Permanent Secretariat.
On these issues both the Chinese and the Soviet delegations initially took
strong positions from which they retreated to compromise stands whenever
it became apparent that an open breach and organizational split might develop.
In general the final resolutions and organizational changes reflected a
substantial net gain for the Chinese in the AAPSO leadership and program
lines.
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II. Preparations for the Conference
Signs that preparations were being made for a Sino-Soviet struggle were
apparent from the earliest preparation days for the coming conference. Not
only was it important to find a suitable locale but also to convene the-
conference at a time acceptable to both of the major Communist participants..
During the 13 months taken up in preparing for the conference both the
Chinese and the Soviets were actively working to bring about conditions
which would prove advantageous to their respective positions and add
strength to their respective support among the delegations.
Preparations for, the conference had been under way since the Gaza
meeting of the AAPSO Executive Committee in December 1961. First,
difficulties were encountered in finding a suitable locale for the meeting.
Casablanca was initially suggested because of the importance of the Algerian
situation. However, this proposal was dropped at the request of Mehdi Ben
Barka, who felt that the presence of the King, "an ally of imperialism"
would be embarrassing not only to the UNFP and the UMT but to the conference,
Ben Barka was undoubtedly aware at this time (June 1962) that a confrontation
between the UNFP and the King was inevitable. Moreover, increasing
Communist interest in the liberation movements of East Africa made it
desirable that the third AAPSO conference be held in that area. Serious
consideration was given to Addis Ababa, Mogadiscio, and Dar es-Salaam
as possible locations, and missions from the AAPSO Secretariat were
dispatched in earlyl964 to a11?:t1ueei foes, In Addis Ababa the AAPSO
emissaries were at first given encouragement by Mekasha Getachew,
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs df the Ethiopian government, who had
been a contact of the AAPSO since its establishment. Subsequently, however,
higher authorities of the Ethiopian government turned down the proposition
to hold the conference in Ethiopia, and Addis was eliminated. The governments
of Somalia and Tanganyika both approved the holding of the conference in
their countries. The final choice of Tanganyika, however, was apparently.
based primarily on the active support given to the AAPSO planners by Oscar
Kambona, Secretary General of TANU and Home Minister of the Tanganyika
government. Other factors which probably influenced the decision were the
strategic location of Tanganyika adjacent to the most important colonial
territories left in East Africa and recognition of the difficulties that might
easily arise if the conference were forced to take a stand on the controversial
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"greater Somalia issue", a virtually inescapable problem if the
conference were held in Mogadiscio.
Formal approval from the Tanganyikan Republic for the holding of
the conference was received in Cairo in July. Although the conference
was originally scheduled for the summer of 1962 in order to comply with
stipulations of the AAPSO by-laws directing a conference to be held
"every two years, " further delays occurred. Long-drawn-out negotiations
ensued between the host party, TANU, and AAPSO officials over technical
arrangements. These delays were welcomed if not encouraged by the Soviet
contingent within the AAPSO, who had been vigorously attempting to fore-
stall Chinese and Japanese demands for an early June-July conference date.
In retrospect it seems likely that the Soviet reluctance for an immediate
confrontation with the Chinese in the framework of the AAPSO was inspired
in part by their hopes of outflanking the Chinese by enhancing the influence
of the WPC in the national liberation groups of Africa and Asia through the
Moscow Disarmament Conference in July. A number of new peace
committees in Africa were in fact formed; the WPC claimed nine in October.
Furthermore, Soviet preparations for the Cuban venture were certainly
under way at this time. It is therefore likely, particularly in view of their
previous experience with the Chinese and Albanians on the Berlin issue,
that the Soviets were concerned that the Chinese might exploit the projected
Russian maneuvers over Cuba in the infighting within the Communist movement
and its fronts.
Although a mid-November date for the AAPSO conference had tentatively
been set in July, the Russian withdrawal from Cuba and the Sino-Indian
border war were accompanied by further postponements, and it was not
until 4 February 1963 that the conference actually convened.
During the summer months of 1962 the invitation list for the Tanganyika
conference was the source of repeated dissension within the AAPSO
Secretariat. The bone of contention was the question whether or not to
include observers from the World Peace Council and Eastern European
groups. The Tanganyikan government had stipulated that observers should
not be invited from European countries. This policy was in complete
agreement with the Chinese position in favor of eliminating observers from
both the Soviet-backed World Peace Council and European bloc countries.
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The issue was hotly argued in the Secretariat, where sides were taken,
with the Chinese supported by Japan and Indonesia, lined up against the
'U SSR , UAR, and India. The latter group was given some support by
the secretaries from Cameroun, Uganda, Algeria, and Iraq. The result
was an uneasy compromise whereby 12 WPC observers were invited
but all Eastern European representatives were banned. (An East German
group eventually turned up at Moshi where they had no official status but
occupied themselves busily making contacts with African leaders. )
In contrast to the dissension over the question of Eastern European
representation at the conference, proposals for Latin American observer
representation caused little trouble. Invitations were dispatched to Cheddi
Jagan's People's Progressive Party of British Guiana, and to Cuba via the
Cuban Ambassador in Cairo. Other Latin American observers from
Argentina, Chile, and Brazil were included in the WPC delegation.
There was little disagreement concerning invitations to delegates who
had attended previous AAPSO conferences. In fact, the only major problem
in this category concerned Osende Afana, Cameroun Secretary at the AAPSO
Secretariat, who had recently been denied a re-entry visa by the UAR, and
whose seat in Cairo was being flied on a temporary basis by Aloys-Marie
Ndjog. Inasmuch as Ndjog represented the Accra-based pro-Soviet wing of
the UPC and Osende Afana the Conakry-based pro-Chinese UPC faction, the
Chinese supported Osende's accreditation to the Tanganyika conference
while the Soviets sponsored Ndjog. A compromise, first suggested by the
UAR, was finally reached with the decision to invite both. Invitations to
new applicants for AAPSO membership were separated into two categories;
those who represented countries not heretofore represented at AAPSO
meetings and those who applied from countries already represented at
AAPSO meetings by other organizations. Candidates in the first group
roused little fription; decisions concerning the second group were deferred
for consideration by the credentials committee at the conference.
III. Conference Management
With the conference actually under way the Chinese and Soviet leader-
ship immediately started jockeying for position. It was apparent to each
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group that the mechanics of the conference, i.e. the make-up and
responsibilities of committees, the methods of reaching decisions, and
the accreditation of delegations and observers, would have a substantial
bearing on the relative success of their respective positions on major
issues. It is not surprising therefore that conflicts arose from the first
day.
When the conference opened at Moshi on 4 February, problems of
accreditation caused the first on-the-spot confrontation between the
Chinese and Soviet delegations. In all cases, even when Soviet supporters
outnumbered the Chinese bloc, the Chinese were apparently successful
in exercising a veto.
The first case concerned the Turkish representative Nazim Hikmet.
His application for accreditation was supported by the Soviet Union, Egypt,
and India but was strongly Opposed by Communist China, Japan, and
Indonesia. The Chinese refused even to grant observer status to Hikmet.
Later, when the issue of observer participation at committee meetings
was raised at the political committee, India again proposed that Hikmet
be allowed to participate. The Chinese, however, opposed this too, and
it was apparently on this precedent that no observers were allowed at
committee meetings.
Another problem of accreditation was caused by the arrival of Samin
Khan of Pakistan in place of Miraj Khalid, Secretary General of the Pakistan
Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. Samin Khan, a known friend of China,
was Also under suspicion by the Indians as having been sent to raise the
Kashmir issue at the conference. Strong Chinese pressure, however,
prevailed against a Soviet-Egyptian-Indian coalition, and on the third day
of the meeting Samin Khan was allowed to take the floor.
The last accreditation issue concerned the Singapore-Malaya delegation.
'Ils group, led by C. Devan Nair, on arriving at Moshi submitted an
application for AAPSO membership and delegate status at the conference.
The Chinese, apparently realizing that the Nair contingent was planning to
oppose conference condemnation of the projected Malaysian Federation,
decided to oppose their appearance at the conference. Although the Malayan
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application was sympathetically received by the Soviet, Egyptian, Indian,
and Tanganyikan representatives, the Chinese forced a rejection of the
Malayan application.
Problems of accreditation finally having been resolved, the conference
got under way with a membership completely under Communist control.
The most significant difference, however, between the situation at Moshi
and at previous conferences lay in the relatively, small impact on the
conference of all delegations save those from the Soviet Union and Com-
munist China. Although some of the African and Asian groups fovored
one or the other of the two giants, and even were used by them, all
important issues were fought out by the Soviet and the Chinese. Moreover,
it soon became clear that Chinese intransigence in most instances was
forcing the Russians to retreat in order to prevent an open breach in the
organization.
The make-up of the national delegations was generally similar to that
of the first two Afro-Asian conferences, i.e. leaders of national revolution-
ary anti-imperialist parties. There were, however, several significant
differences. In view of the great number of countries which had gained
independence since the Conakry meeting of 1960 many of the delegations,
e.g. Cameroun, Niger, Nigeria, represented parties in opposition to their
own governments. Another notable change was the weakening of some
delegations due to death or illness of strong leaders. (For example,
John Kale of Uganda died in 1960, Felix Roland Moumie of Cameroun died
in 1960, and Fouad Galal of the UAR was unable to come because of illness. )
There were also notable absentees from countries whose ruling parties
either are strongly pro-West or discourage participation in Communist-
controlled meetings, e. g. Afghanistan, Bahrein, Burma, Cambodia, Chad,
Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, ipta, Upper Volta, Laos, Libya,
Philippines, Senegal, Sudan, Thailand, and Togo.
Conference business was conducted through plenary sessions and
meetings of: a. the council, composed of heads of delegations; b. the
5 special committees, i.e. political committee, economic committee,
social committee, cultural committee, and organizational committee; and
c. the drafting committee.
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The council met twice. Its first session, on the eve of the conference,
elected Oscar Kambona, secretary general of the host political party,
TANU, chairman of the conference. It approved the agenda, elected a
drafting committee, and approved applications for AAPSO membership
of the National Liberation Front of Bahrein, Bechuanaland People's
Party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique, Mauritius People's
Progressive Party, Swaziland Progressive Party, South Vietnrn
Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, and the French Somaliland Party
of the Popular Movement.
The council met again on the last day of the conference, when it
approved without discussion the resolutions submitted to it. Finally it
elected three new members to the executive committee: South Africa,
Ceylon and Tanganyika.
The election of the drafting committee was particularly important.
This committee was originally intended to be responsible only for final
drafting of resolutions passed by other committees but in actual fact it
was here that all major issues were fought out and resolutions put into
final form. It is noteworthy in this connection that the drafting committee
at the Moscow Disarmament Conference (July 1962) was similarly used
as a device for blocking the submission to the plenum of controversial
resolutions approved by majority votes in commissions apparently to
avert a long series of clashes in the plenary meeting. The following
delegates were elected to the drafting committee:
Tanganyika
Oscar Kambona
Bhoke Munanka
Abdoulaye Diallo
Camara Mamady
South Africa Oliver Tambo
Tennyson Makiwane
Morocco
Egypt
Yussuf el-Sibai
Mur s i Saad al-Din
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Indonesia Sunito
Ibrahim Issa
Chaman Lall (on the Ssino-Indian
issue only)
R ome sh Chandra
China Yang Chi
Yang Chou
North Vietnam Ton Quang Phiet
D. Dolidze
Anatoli Sofronov
Mirzo Tur sun Zade
The significance of this committee to the council leadership is apparent
from the membership, which, in addition to representatives of the Soviet
Union and China, includes the staunchest supporters of the two major
participants. (E. g. Indonesia, Guinea, North Vietnam for China; India,
Egypt, South Africa for the USSR. Inasmuch as the tenor of the final
resolutions generally followed the Chinese desires it is probable that
Morocco and Tanganyika also supported the Chinese on occasion in this
committee.) Subsequent events suggest that the Soviets were satisfied
if the language of a resolution gave them a basis for "interpreting" the
resolution later to their advantage. This was the case with WPC's
exploitation of the general resolution in the WPC Presidium resolutions
adopted in March at Malmo, Sweden.
The 5 regular committees were also tightly controlled by the conference
leadership. Theoretically, participation in committee meetings was open
to all delegates but in practice only the major delegations took part. It is
also notable that no votes were taken at committee sessions and although
initial drafting of resolutions was supposed to be done by an executive group
selected by each committee, it was actually accomplished by the committee
chairm and the two members of the permanent secretariat assigned to
each committee.
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The plenary sessions and meetings of the five conference committees
took up the bulk of the conference time. In the course of these meetings
the areas of differences and solidarity were pinpointed. It became apparent
that while there was in fact unanimity concerning the final objective, L. e,
liquidation of neo-colonialism and western imperialism sparked and headed
by the United States, the conflicts of Sino-Soviet opinions were here as else-
where over the choice of methods and the proper allies to achieve this end..
In the confrontations on key issues where differences between the Chinese
and Soviet viewpoints were apparently not negotiable, it is significant that
while a few delegates uncritically supported either the Chinese or Soviet
position at all times, there were obvious efforts on the part of many
active delegates, e.g. those of Morocco, Tanganyika, North Vietnam,
to mediate and "paper the cracks" in order to hold the organization
together.
The plenary sessions were devoted almost entirely to speeches by heads
of delegations. For the most part these speeches combined the well--known
themes of anti-neocolonialism and Afro-Asian Solidarity with appropriate
diatribes against western imperialism. However, some exceptional ones.
treated key issues seriously and meaningfully.
IV. Significant Speeches
The opening speech of the conference was delivered by President
Nyerere of Tanganyika. It was intended to be a keynote address but
apparently it failed to provoke any visible reaction. Ii'fact it seemed
to appeal to no one. To most of the Africans, who either represented
parties in opposition to their own governments or supported such parties
in other countries and who have long looked to the AAPSO for assistance,.
such phrases as "no one of us should try to do what we so justly accuse the
Imperialists of doing, intrigue with dissident groups, " were unacceptable.
This same group, although familiar with Marxist propaganda and ideological
writings, seemed to find such anti-Marxist concepts as "we shall find a
division with capitalist and socialist countries in both sides of the conflict"
strange and incomprehensible. These thoughts clearly at odds with
Communist doctrine were also anathema to the sophisticated delegates who
are members of African and Asian Communist Parties, as well as to the
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Chinese and Soviets but no protests were offered. Certain anti-Soviet
statements, e. g. "Socialist countries themselves are now committing
the same crime as was committed by the capitalists before... They are
now beginning to use wealth.. .for the acquisition of power and prestige"
were certainly infuriating to the Russians and their allies, although the
Chinese bloc may have derived some satisfaction from them. In any
event the visible impact of the speech was minimal. Representative
Africans claimed not to have heard any attack on the Communist bloc
and suggested that such an interpretation was merely an attempt of the
imperialists to misinterpret Nyerere. Both the Chinese and the Soviets
greeted the address in silence and quietly swept it under the rug. It
contrasted sharply with the speech delivered by Mehdi Ben Barka of
Morocco, which was more in tune with the organization's mission and the
conference aims. Ben Barka's speech can therefore be considered for
practical purposes the true keynote address.
This address attempted to "draw the lines of action and to define the
precise objectives' of the AAPSO role in the struggle against neo-colonialism
and imperialism. It suggested tactics for the AAPSO necessitated by the
"new strategy of neo-colonialism" i. e. Western efforts to maintain economic
control over politically independent states. Emphasizing the urgency of
drawing a sharp line between the true revolutionaries and all others in the
national liberation movement, Ben Barka pointed out the vital importance
of giving international support to progressive forces on the national livel
and called for unity of progressive organizations in each country engaged
in the battle for "complete" independence. "The role of an organization
such as ours,0 'he saidill . . is allow a confrontation to take place." Further-
more,he pointed out that in view of current imperialist tactics in newly
independent countries "it is necessary to know if the holders of the power
are the expression of national will or the stooges of colonialist interests."
He concluded that the fundamental question of any national liberation
movement is that of who controls political power. "It deems necessary
in order to guarantee independence that power be immediately translated
by anti effective and immediate transference to the authentic representatives
of the national revolution of the said country, even if this leads to the
resumption , of armed struggle."
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"The AAPSO" he continued, "in its capacity as a movement for
solidarity among Afro-Asian peoples, must pay special attention to
the daily struggle under way to educate and teach the people, raise
their political consciousness, and build up among men such a
revolutionary potential that, at the right time, they could seize power."
Ben Barka clearly set out in Leninist terms the primary objective of
all tactical operations in the national struggles when he said that the
purpose of common struggle of popular organizations against all forms
of colonial, capitalist, and feudalist exploitations was through struggle
to "develop this common political consciousness and establish new
international relations."
The Chinese and Soviet delegates in their addresses to the plenary
session made statements that showed clearly the points upon which what
solidarity exists within the organization is based. They also defined
views, however, which were mutually unacceptable and which are inevitably
involved these days in Sino-Soviet confrontations. The consistent statements
related generally to the objectives of the organization, i. e. , bringing about
of complete independence under the leadership of the "progressive forces"
at the national level and the liquidation of neo-colonialism in all its forms.
The inconsistent areas of Sino-Soviet statements, however, concerned
primarily questions of general strategy and methods of operations.
For example, Mirzo Tursun Zade said, "peace between nations and
states - peaceful coexistence - creates especially favorable conditions
for development and successful completion of the national liberation
movement of colonial and dependent countries." LIU Ning-yi on the other
hand declared: "In order effectively to defend world peace we must carry
on resolute struggles against imperialist policies of war and aggression.
Peace cannot be obtained by begging... only by resolutely struggling against
imperialism will we be able to pave the way for the realization of
disarmament. "
Both these addresses were well received by the conference but the
wildest acclaim went to Dr. Jose Carrillo, who ended his fiery speech with
a reiteration of the much publicized Castro slogan, "Cuba Si .. Yankees no.
Fatherland or Death. We shall win. "
OM Mrprq~
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Although this emotional outpouring drew the most enthusiasm, it was
in fact the Ben Barka address which was basically the blueprint which
guided the work of the five conference committees.
These committees dealt with political, economic, cultural, social,
and organizational questions. On the whole, the successful deliberations
were confined to issues on which the entire conference was in agreement,
i. e. , the general problems caused by neo.-colonialist maneuvers. The
political committee endorsed strong resolutions in support of individual
liberation movements; the economic committee recommended the
establishment of a special committee composed of economic experts
from the Afro-Asian countries to study, plan, advise, and provide
technical assistance to countries embarking on economic planning; the
Cultural Committee issued a list of 21 suggestions for Afro-Asian co-
operation in the fields of art, literature, science, and other cultural
affairs. The most important of these was the.proposal to establish, in
Tanganyika, an Afro-Asian Solidarity University.
The Committee on Social Questions adopted a number of resolutions
on the position of women, including a recommendation that the 2nd Afro-
A sian Women's Conference be convened in early 1964. This committee
also voiced strong criticisms of the inactivity of the AAPSO in the labor
field. The All-African Trade-Union Federation was criticized for failing
to extend its influence. A suggestion that the AAPSO should set up its own
labor organization in Africa was vetoed on account of the duplication of
effort involved, but it was decided to recommend that the AAPSO should
support an._ adviser to supervise the management of the AATUF. (This
latter move was rather surprising inasmuch as the AATUF has never
acknowledged affiliation with the AAPSO. )
The Committee on Organization passed a number of resolutions con-
cerning the internal organization of the AAPSO. It authorized an increase
in the number of secretaries on the Permanent Secretariat from 12 to 14;
it nominated the first vice-president of the Solidarity Fund Committee,
Mehdi Ben Barka, as co-ordinating secretary between the Fund Committee
and the Permanent Secretariat; and it accepted the invitation of Cyprus to
play -.host to the forthcoming session of the Executive Committee.
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There were, however, two specific problems which arose, one in the
Political Committee and one in the Organizational Committee, that opened
w ide the rift between the Chinese and the Soviets.
Both the Chinese and the Soviets obviously regarded proposals for the
settlement of the Sino-Indian border issue as a matter of the greatest
significance, not only because of the issues involved in the border dispute
itself but because of its significance in the broader context of their differ-
ences concerning the global policy to be pursued by the international
C ommunist movement vis-.-vis such governments as that of India, The
Chinese and the Soviets, prior to the opening of the conference, had both
realized the disruptive potentials of this issue and at times each had hoped
to avoid bringing it into the open. Indeed,this possibility had caused at
least one of the postponements of the opening of the Moshi meeting in the
vain hope that .a settlement could be reached before the conference convened.
The Indians, however, forced the issue at the first meeting of the
rolitical committee when they submitted a draft resolution calling on the
conference to approve the Colombo recommendations "without reservation."
The Chinese immediately opposed the resolution and contended that the
matter should be dropped from the agenda, The Soviets were still loath
to have a confrontation on this issue at the conference and it was only when
the Indians threatened to walk out that the Soviets took a strong position
in favor of the Indian stand. The battle lines were then drawn. Support
for the Indians came from the Soviet Union, Egypt, Morocco, South Africa,
and Tanganyika, The Chinese were backed by Japan, Indonesia, French
Somaliland, Pakistan, Nepal, Angola, Mali, North Korea, North Vietnam,
South Vietnam, Ceylon,and Kenya. The Guinea delegation was divided -
Abdoulaye Diallo, a long-time activist in international Communist-front
circles, stood with the Soviet bloc, and Camara Mamady, Guinea member
of the AAPSO Permanent Secretariat, with the Chinese. The Chinese and
Indians exchanged strong words, the Chinese contending that if the Indians
insisted on raising the issue, they should be prepared for a full discussion
that woul.diiilelude. the question of Indian acceptance of American and British
arms. After lengthy wrangling, the Chinese became silent and this was
interpreted as tacit agreement that the resolution go through. At the next
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meeting, however, the Chinese raised the issue again and strongly stated
their view that discussion of this issue had no place at the conference.
After further violent argument, the chairman of the Committee, Bhoke
Munanka of Tanganyika, suddenly announced that he had withdrawn the
draft resoliition. In reply Chaman Lall of India challenged the ruling of
the chair. He was summarily overruled whereupon he left the room de-
claring that India was leaving the conference and the organization.
Corridor activity began immediately to bring India back and thus to
avoid an open break in the organization. The first to act was Aziz Ben
Miloud of Algeria who begged Lall to return and not expose to the world
the division in the movement. Chaman Lall and Copal Singh. rejected the
Algerian request outright. At this point the conference chiefs were
brought into play - Oscar Kambona and Yusuf al-Sibai had a series of
conferences with Chaman Lall after which Lall circulated the news that,
through the mediation of Kambona and Sibai, the Chinese had agreed to
accept the Indian resolution with deletion of the words "without reservation."
No confirmation of this agreement, however, came from any other source,
although the Egyptians repeatedly insisted that the rift was patched up.
The Chinese, on the other hand, were busy during this interval in gaining
support for their side and apparently their intransigent position convinced
at least the Soviets, Egyptians, and Tanganyikans that should the Indians'
stand win, the Chinese would break the conference wide open. It is note-
worthy that during these feverish maneuverings Romesh Chandra and
Kallimullah, the Indian Commuiist Party delegates, remained atbof from
the whole proceedings.
The compromise formula reportedly devised was a promise to the
Indians that a recommendation would be issued by the conference
chairman to be distributed separately from the conference resolutions
after the closing session.
Whether or not the compromise had been made in good faith, Lall
evidently believed it, as he returned to conference activities. When the
final resolutions were passed, however, the recommendation on India
was not among them. Apparently the Chinese tactics had forced the
Soviet bloc to retreat.
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While this struggle was going on in the political committee an even
more significant dispute was taking place in the org .nization committee.
The specific issue of this controversy concerned preparations for co-
ordinating the activities of the AAPSO with similar Latin American
organizations, and particularly the position of the World Peace Council,
in this effort. The fundamental issue, however, was a far broader one
involving, in fact, the hegemony of the Soviet Union in. the world complex
of international Communist fronts.
The confrontation on this issue, in contrast to that of the Sino-
Indian border dispute, was not forced upon the conference. It was on
the official agenda and both the Chinese and the Soviets were prepared.
There had already been two bouts in the struggle, both of which had ended
in stalemate. * It is also noteworthy that the chairman of the organization
committee at Moshi, Mehdi Ben Barka of Morocco, had led the "mediating"
forces at both Gaza and Stockholm.
Ben Barka opened the discussion by reviewing the difficulties encountered
at the previous meetings which actually centered on one problem - whether
or not the WPC and its affiliates were to sponsor Latin. American partici-
pation in a projected three-continent conference. He recalled particularly
the discussions between the AAPSO delegation and representatives of the
W PC, including Latin Americans, at Stockholm which had led to an impasse
of 13 months.
Ben Barka then offered a compromise device to break the deadlock. He
proposed that all previously suggested sponsoring organizations should
withdraw their sponsorship. He indicated that the WPC had agreed to
withdraw and asked the committee to agree formally to the withdrawal of
the AAPSO firm. sponsor ship. He then suggested as an alternative that a
preparatory committee, free from all outside patronage and influence,
should be set up consisting of representatives from six countries on each
continent.
The question of WPC sponsorship of a three-continent conference was
fought out at the AAPSO Executive Committee meeting in Gaza (1961) and
at the WPC conference in Stockholm (1961).
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This proposal was apparently accepted by the committee. The chair-
man suggested that the Afro-Asian delegates when elected should negotiate
concerning Latin American participation with General Cardenas of
Mexico. Ben Barka pointed out that inasmuch as the Latin American
Conference for National Sovereignty, Economic Emancipation, and Peace,
a meeting of Latin American National Liberation and Peace Organizations
which took place in Mexico in 1961, had not established a Permanent
Secretariat, General Cardenas as President of that conference was the
logical spokesman for the group.
At this juncture the Soviets pointed out that a group of prominent Latin
Americans who attended the Mexico Conference were present at Moshi
and should be invited by the organizational committee to take part in
discussions concerning the three-continent conference. The fact that this
group comprised the main members of the WPC delegation to Moshi was
enough to set off a violent interchange.
The Chinese objected strongly to any participation on the part of the
W PC contingent, who, they"claimed, "represented no-one. " The Soviets,
backed by India, Lebanon, Mongolia, and South Africa, repeatedly insisted
on a hearing for the WPC delegates. The Guinea delegate suggested inviting
Jose' Carrillo of Cuba to consult with the ?:committee, inasmuch as he had
already been given the right to speak at the conference and was more
representative of Latin America than the WPC group. This suggestion was
supported by Cameroun and Japan. The Chinese again attacked the WPC,
which, they said, "had refused to support the fight for National Independence,"
and said that China was "unalterably" decided against letting the WPC speak
at an AAPSO gathering. China, however, proposed that the AAPSO should
send a delegation to Cardenas and Fidel Castro as well, to discuss the
three-continent conference. They also offered to allow the "Latin Americans
at Moshi!'(who included Jos4 and Delia Venturelli, currently residing in
Peiping, as well as the WPC team) to appoint a delegate to accompany the
AAPSO delegation. Further violent arguments ensued during which the
Chinese representative insisted that the WPC was attempting to infiltrate
the AAPSO for the sole purpose of creating dissension. China was
supported throughout by delegates of Ceylon, Indonesia, Japan, Cameroun,
and Guinea.
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Finally Mehdi Ben Barka called for unity and proposed that he, as
chairman of the committee, the South Vietnamese vice-chairman of the
committee, and Yusuf al-Sibai, AAPSO Secretary General, should
consult the Latin American WPC group unofficially. This compromise
was accepted and the following additional decisions were adopted regarding
the three-continent conference:
a. The principles of Gaza were to be maintained*
b. The preparatory committee of the three-continent conference
to be free from outside sponsorship
c. 12 Afro-Asians to be named as delegates to the preparatory
committees
d. The Latin Americans Casella, Poblete, Kowder, and Varela
to be consulted privately at Moshi
e. The chairman to report these discussions to the council meeting
f. The committee "welcomed with joy" the invitation of Castro to
hold the three-continent conference in Havana
Although these decisions represented a compromise in order to
maintain unity formula, they were weighted in favor of the Chinese. The
W PC as such was eliminated from three-continent conference planning;
C uba was inserted into a key spot and Cardenas was boxed into a position
of having either to co-operate with Castro on conference preparations
or openly to oppose him.
. A final meeting of the council was the only business scheduled for the
last day of the conference. This meeting, however, was postponed from
hour to hour, owing primarily to a last-minute Soviet effort to force
reconsideration of the WPC role regarding the three-continient conference.
it was stipulated at Gaza that the sponsors and preparatory committee
to the three-continent conference should represent all the anti-imperialist
forces "within the three continents".
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In. conjunction with this effort the Soviets circulated a letter to all heads
of delegations, signed by the WPC observers who were participants at
the Latin American Conference for National Sovereignty, Economic
Emancipation, and Peace (Mexico, March 1961). The letter noted "with
deep regret the lack of proper attitude of cordiality shown towards the
representatives of the Latin American countries... by not being afforded
the opportunity of presenting their viewpoints to the 5th Committee on the
question of the proposed conference of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. "*
A meeting hurriedly called by Oscar Kambona was attended by Soviet,
Indian, and Moroccan representatives, as well as by Yusuf al-Sibai,
AAPSO Secretary General. The only concession made to the Soviets at
this session however, was an agreement that Mehdi Ben Barka would
announce to the heads of delegations (i.e. the council) meeting that the
eighteen-man preparatory committee of the three-continent conference
would consult unofficially with WPC representatives. Moreover, Ben
Barka emphasized that this was an unofficial arrangement which would
not be recorded in the minutes of the conference.
The meeting also considered the demand of the Tanganyikans that the
resolution on Sierra Leone and Cameroun be withdrawn, as the government
of Tanganyika had friendly relations with the governments of those countries
and could not permit resolutions offensive to those governments to be passed
on Tanganyikan soil, These resolutions were finally withdrawn. The
Chinese did not attend this special meeting.
VIL. Organizational Changes
The last council. meeting was uneventful. The resolutions, submitted
by the drafting committee which was solely responsible for their preparation,
were not read out. Approval was given in the form of an acclamation for
the complete text of all resolutions. Finally, the council approved the
addition of representatives of South Africa, Ceylon, and Tanganyika to the
Executive Committee.
This letter minus the key propaganda quoted here - was published in the
WPC Bulletin. The edited version conveys a throughly misleading
impression of WPC-AAPSO amity.
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The Executive Committee meeting, held also on the last day of the
conference, made the following organizational changes in the AAPSO
permanent machinery:
1. Mehdi Ben Barka drew the attention of the Committee to the
recommendation of the 5th committee that the Permanent Secretariat
should be increased by the nomination of two additional secretaries
to be chosen from dependent countries still fighting for their freedom.
The following countries were chosen to be represented on the new
secretariat: Algeria, UAR, Angola, Guinea, Kenya, Tanganyika,
South Africa, China, USSR, India, Indonesia, Japan, Iraq, and
South Vietnam. The new appointments included representatives
from the two dependent countries, i.e. Angola and Kenya, as well
as secretaries from South Africa, Tanganyika, and South Vietnam who
replaced representatives of Congo (Leopoldville), Uganda, and Cameroun
who were dropped.
2. The Executive Committee agreed that the headquarters of the
Permanent Secretariat should remain in Cairo.
3. The Committee confirmed that Yusuf al-Sibai should remain as
AAPSO Secretary General.
4. The Committee appointed delegates from Morocco, Cameroun,
North Korea, and Iran as members of the Financial Control Committee.
5. Representatives of the following countries were designated to the
AAPSO Fund Committee:
Guinea (President) UAR
Morocco (Vice President) USSR
China (Vice President) Tanganyika (Secretary General)
India
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6. The next meeting of the Executive Committee was scheduled
for Cyprus in the summer of 1963.
VIII. Conclusion
When the conference ended at Moshi on 11 February it was apparent
that the top bodies had been strengthened and that the changes tended to
enhance Chinese prestige and influence. The gain in strength can be
attributed to several factors. The inclusion of Tanganyika on the Fund
and Executive Committees and the Permanent Secretariat brings another
ruling African party - and with it Oscar Kambona?s radicalism - into
play. The entry of South Africa, Kenya, and Angola into. the Permanent
Secretariat adds militant activists and advocates of armed struggle from
East and Central Africa to the machinery of the organization. Moreover,
Ceylon's accession to the Executive Committee brings into policy-making
one of the most aggressive of the member units, a strong Chinese supporter,
And the appointment of Mehdi Ben Barka as liaison officer between the Fund
Committee and the Secretariat places in a key position a leader who is
avowedly determined to support the "true revolutionaries" in the national
liberation movements and who at the same time has been proved an
effective and cohesive force within the organization,
The organization showed that it could resist the disruptive impact of
Sino-Soviet dissension and its own well established internal inconsistencies.
It probably can continue to develop as a combat organization as long as
both of its main Communist-bloc members refrain from a final showdown
and continue to show active interest in developing joint action with the
political opposition in Asian and African countries. The USSR, inhibited
by its long standing interest in enhancing and exploiting its influence with
Asian and African anti-colonial governing parties, is more at a disadvantage
in the maneuvering within the organization. Soviet setbacks on such questions
as the sponsorship of the three-continent conference tend to enhance the
importance of both the political oppositionists like Ben Barka, and the Chinese,
whose support for aggressive national liberation struggles is appreciated
and sought by those out of power.
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On the other hand, some of the developments strengthening the -militant
character of the AAPSO can hereafter be divisive. Representatives of
single-party-controlled independent African governments are finding it
increasingly difficult to reconcile the demands laid on them by the organi-
zation for support of opposition activity elsewhere in Afro-Asia with their
need for diplomatic acceptance by anti-Communist governments in the
area. They also are finding it difficult to get the organization to pay
more than lip service to some national demands. Notable illustrations
of this were Tanganyika's insistence on the withdrawal of the resolutions
in opposition to the governments of Cameroun and Sierra Leone and
Kambona's statement to the press at the end of the conference -in which
he made it clear that the TANU government of Tanganyika would honor
only those resolutions with which it agreed, which did not include-the ones
on Israel or the United Nations.
Although Julius Nyerere's opening address was given little play at
the conference, his warnings against Communist imperialism, now on
record in the AAPSO could, if brought up and debated at a later date,
embarrass either or both of the major Communist participants in-the
A APSO.
A basic source of trouble, however, remains in the conflict between
the Chinese and the Soviets. Although the Chinese won considerable ground
at Moshi, these gains were on the tactical level. Sino-Soviet differences
on the role of the African and Asian peoples in the peace and national
liberation struggles are still unresolved. In fact, soon after the close of
the conference the polemics were resumed.
Characteristically, press comments on the results of the Moshi
conference poured out of Peiping hailing the meeting as an unqualified
success for the solidarity of militant liberation movements throughout
A sia, Africa, and Latin America. On the other hand, Soviet-sources gave
the conference very little coverage and this was limited almost entirely to
the speeches of Soviet delegates and to publicity for some excerpts from
the final documents that indicated endorsement of Soviet peace and total-
disarmament formulas.
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NEW
At the Malmo Peace Conference on 2-3 March, the Soviet-dominated
peace council, evidently ignoring the Chinese opposition at Mo.shi, approved
a resolution that hailed the "success" of the Moshi conference; but, in accord
with Soviet desires, it declared that "the unanimous approval won by the
General, Declaration and other resolutions testifies to the hopes and fervent
desire of millions of people of those two continents for national liberation,
universal disarmament, and peace."
The Chinese, who had protested at Malmo but to no avail, returned to
open conflict with renewed vigor on 7 March when Liu Ning-i addressed a
Peiping rally celebrating the Third Afro-Asian Conference. "A small
minority of delegates at the conference,'' he said, "did not face the reality
of the Afro-Asian peoples' struggle.... In their speeches:; they once again
distorted the current major tasks of the Afro-Asian peoples, departed from
the anti-imperialist struggle, made empty talk of peace, and resorted to
the terror of nuclear war to threaten the Afro-Asian peoples." Furthermore,
he added to the Chinese bill of particulars another and serious open charge
against the Soviet faction in the international fronts when he said, "Those
who are unwilling or who do not dare to oppose imperialism but who are
accustomed to manipulating and giving orders to international de=mocratic
organizations and international conferences are not very happy about this
resolution. They are now conspiring to distort the spirit of this resolution
in an attempt to manipulate or undermine the conference. " The Malmo
resolutions tend to bear this out.
The Soviets retorted forcefully to this accusation in the 30 March letter
sent by the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party. The letter stated: "the militant call "proletarians
of the world, unitd advanced by Marx and Engels, means that at -the basis of
such a union lies class anti-imperialist solidarity, not nationality, color, or
geographical principles. Cohesion of the masses for the struggle against
imperialism only on the principle of belonging to this or that continent, whether
it is Africa, Asia, Latin America, or Europe,might do harm to the struggling
people. It would not be a union but a dispersal of the strength of a single
anti-imperialist front. " Apparently the three-continent project is no longer
an appropriate tactic.
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With the increasing bitterness of both the Chinese and the Soviets
over the AAPSO and the general line to be followed in the underdeveloped
world, the best opportunity for the Chinese to win a victory over the
CPSU in the mass-organization field seems to be the projected Three-
Continent Conference. While in Latin America the old-line GP?leadership
and the pro-Soviet peace struggle cadre appear strong enough to. resist
pro-Chinese tendencies, the Chinese supporters from Asia and Africa
may be strong enough to tip the scale in China's favor. In any event, the
AAPSO as a going international front organization cannot be --ignored or
liquidated by Soviet fiat like the mass organizations that were grouped
around the old Comintern and therefore will probably continue to exist
and to provide a major battlefield in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Sino-Soviet
maneuvers affecting this organization may well provide insight into the
future of the whole array of such organizations, which the Sino-Soviet
dispute has plagued since 1960,
ft"N"EMMUM
J_O.L L.1 60 Ai. 4V.L
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