THE SINO-SOVIET CONTROVERSY IN CUBA AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R001200250011-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: DISP

The Sino-Soviet Controversy in Cuba and
1 ro\ uc1,ibn
Other Latin American Countries
Since 1952, and particularly since 1956, Chinese Communist
influence on Latin American CI .has been apparent in the formula-
tion of programs and policies geared to the strategy of the "united
democratic front of national liberation." Procedures such as the
systematic analysis of economic and political groupings and their
re-ape-ct a potentials for Communist exploitation in a struggle against
the most important common enemy (US imperialism) reflect the appli-
cation of tactics recommended by Mao Tse-tung. These tactics are
described in Mao's writings, such as "Tactical Problems in the United
Anti-Japanese Front, " which since,t 1956 have been translated
into Spanish for distribution and study in Latin America. Mao's works,
as well as those of Lui Shao-ch'i and probably other Chinese Commun-
ist leadersjhave also been used in the training courses arranged for
Latin Americans by the Communist Party of China. These courses
A
have emphasized the agrarian base of the Chinese revolution, the tech-
niques of clandestine party organization and action, and the history and
G2TV--~..,c~
success of the armed . ggle/ in t -oi the long drawn-out struggle
against the Kuomintang and the Japanese.
It is apparent that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) encouraged the Latin American CPjs to avail themselves of
the lessons of the Chinese revolution, in view of the similarity of poli-
tical, economic, and social conditions in China and Latin America
(i. e., existence of foreign economic ''imperialism'', feudalistic '`sur-
vivals, in rural life, and a generally low level of industrial developmenty).
For example, the Brazilian CP program formulated in 1953-54 under
Ap 04250011-9
 ApproMtof
CPSU guidance reflected certain points emphasized in Chinese tactics,
and in mid-1955 Latin American CP ~ s began to acknowledge the impor-
tance of the Chinese evolution in their programmatic documents. In
early 1956 the Twentieth CPSU Congress gave official recognition to the
doctrine of /many roads( to Socialism, and increased attention began to
be paid. to the Chinese experience (in contrast to that of the Soviets and
the European satellites) as illustrative of progress from "semi-feudal,
semi-colonial forms" toward Socialism. Thus1the Costa Rican CP, after
studying Manuel Morals report on the XX CPSU Congress, passed a reso-
lutioni which quoted the Soviet Manual of Political Economy on the im-
portance of the Chinese evolution. While in Moscow, Latin American
delegates to the Twentieth CPSU Congress were invited to China, where
in the spring and summer of 1956 they participated in seminars and tours.
Later in the year many Latin American CP leaders attended the Eighth
Congress of the 0f P. as fraternal representatives. Since 1956, the train-
ing of Latin American CP members in China has been placed on an organ-
ized and permanent basis,
cultural exchanges have grown, and Chinese
theoretical and propaganda publications have been translated and increas-
ingly disseminated in Spanish.
This gradually increasing emphasis on the study of the Chinese
experience has developed with the concurrence and support of the CPSU.
Yet with the development of personal contacts between the Latin Americans
and the Chinese, some indications of Sino-Soviet rivalry and disagreement
also appeared. Thus one of the first Latin American students to return
from a (CP training school was told, in 1958, by Latin American special-
ists of the CPSU, that Chinese plans for communes were "too early and
too risky. The student noted that these specialists were more conciliatory
reap$ct, to Tito than were the Chinese
t*MT they regarded some Chinese
claims as exaggerated and, by innuendo, played them down. The Soviets
Appr OPPRWPTMMTMZMM00250011-9
 Apprg,FC?YATRDP78 00
0011-9
were keenly interested in the students' impressions of the CCP course,
indicated that they also were considering 4 CPSU for Latin Americans
alorre, On the other hand, the student noted that the Chinese, who were
intensely interested in Latin America, had indicated disagreement with
the Soviets on a number of points (the denigration of Stalin certain
Soviet industrial methods), and had shown a fundamental belief in the
inevitability of war with the USA,
A year later, another Latin American CP member returning
from a siilar, CCP; training course noted ryj-
that, one lectu er =&-Mated that **for the Chinese, there was no revolu-
fP; /
tion in which arms were not used, thereby disagreeing with the pacifist
"?'et to international policy vh he noticed; however, and he found
t?` c"
policy of the USSR. This was tle:ly indication of disagreement k..
the Chinese in general to be "very cautious" in mentioning other parties,f
emphasizing that "eagh country has its own peculiarities. "
- br gerieral, appears that prior to 1960, Sino-Soviet differences
were not emphasized to Latin Americans, made little impression
on them, and did not, in themselves, cause friction or factionalism
within Latin American parties. In some cases,, however, internal
policy differences of long standing have r parallel to the international
conflict, and have become identified with it as the Sino-Soviet dispute
-AiW sharpened and as-the Soviets and Chinese fives sought to develop sup-
port for their points of view. Now that the dispute has been
discussed and publicized at international meetings, and is more generally
understood, it is possible that there will.beagxeater .te.iency for ele-
ments within the Latin American parties #& Mrerl t or identify their owU=
views with those of the Soviets or t Chinese.
Cti, -4
Of all the Latin American CP' , the Cuban CP (Partido Socialista
Popular,' PSP) has been most deeply concerned with the Sino-Soviet
Ap DP7U O -Rl' 4 0250011-9
 Appr~,tic~d, rLe_Dn 7Q nncjconn 7' 250011-9
controversy, because it bears on the party's own conflict with Fidel Castro
and the 26th of July Movement. This conflict extends back to 1956, when
the PSP official]-established its policies concerning 'b armed struggle in
-1 1
Cuba. These were announced in a manifesto of September 1956,entitled
"The Road of the People: August 1933. " stated that "we are not pro-
ponents of violence for its own sake, nor do we believe that violence is the
only path... but when the despotic government... blocks the electoral path
and seeks to maintain itself by force, there is not other remedy than extra-
parliamentary action, that is, the direct struggle of the masses. " How-
ever, it also pointed out that "ihe experience of 1930-33, when the putsch
of Aguado, the mob assault of Rio Verde, the landing of Gibara, and the
assault on the barracks of San Luis all failed, and when the general strike
and the uprising of the masses in August 1933 triumphed; the experience of
all revolutions and of all struggles for liberty; all such experience indicates
that the correct, the best, and the most rapid--and the most secure and
most popular--(course) is that proposed by the Party of the Cuban Revolu-
tion, the Popular Socialist Party: the development of the struggle of the
masses and its culmination in a new August, in a powerful general strike
and a decisive gene uprising.... "
In ti --Septet r l 56 manifesto' the PSP referred to the unsuc-
cessful attack on the Moncada barracks (which resulted in Castro's impris-
onment in 1953) as "desperate and sterile. "* Later in the year, in the
official party theoretical organ Fundamentos,,the party paid even more
' It has subsequently been reported that when the 26th of July
Movement was being organized in Mexico (about 1955-56) the
Communists had sought, with the support of Raul Castro, to
influence Fidel to abandon his plans for armed invasion of Cuba.
When these efforts did not succeed, they instructed Raul to
continue to go along with Fidel's plans.
(nw. --4 C-0
App70250011-9
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200250011-9
attention to the Fidelista movement:
"The 26th of July Movement raised the banner of
insurrection at a predetermined place and without rela-
tion to the struggle of the masses... it recently introduced
the idea of the general strike into its tactical concepts, but
in an erroneous sense: only as an instrument of insurrec-
tion and not--as should be the case--as an element in the
development of the mass struggle which may be followed,
in certain cases, by an armed insurrection.''
"Insurrection, moreover, is not a game. It is a
very complicated and serious tactical procedure which
should not be used... except under determined conditions.
Otherwise, in most cases, insurrection will be no more
than a putsch.*
"... Lacking such conditions, it is indispensable
that every true revolutionary contribute to the patient
and 'gray' task of elevating the conscience of the vanguard.. It
A year later, at the special conference of Latin American
Communist party leaders held in Moscow in November 1957, the PSP
still opposed Castro's tactics and his disinclination to unite with the
PSP or to follow its line. The Cuban representative to this meeting
noted that the sabotage of sugar cane (d 26th of July tactic under the
direction of Rene Ramos Latour, known as "Daniel") was an unpopular,
sectarian action which lacked sympathy among the workers, and that
although the PSP had "attempted to guide the Fidelistas, " the latter
had not wanted to participate in coordinated mass action.
Intellectual leaders of the 26th of July Movement took notice
of the Communist criticisms and, in turn, sought to establish their
own ideological position. One of these leaders was Armando Hart
Davalos, then clandestine coordinator of the movement and currently
Minister of Education. Hart's ideas were published (after the rebel
In the same issue of Fundamentos, the significance of the
Chinese experience was described in an article entitled
"Desde Pekin", by an anonymous author (possibly Cesar
Escalante Dellunde, who is known to have been a delegate
to the VIII CCP Congress and who probably participated in
seminars in China).
A 00250011-9
 A 200250011-9
victory) in a commemorative issue of Revolucion (26 July 1959) under
the title "Justification of the Revolution and the Strategy against the
Dictatorship, November 1956. " Hart made the following points:
"On occasions, the revolution follows the course of
pacifism. We do not deny that theoretically and under cer-
tain circumstances this may be the adequate path.... But
possibly the most important experience that the new genera-
tion has learned has been that the revolution, at any moment
and undery circumstance, must be prepared for direct
action.... -
"The 26th of July Movement represented a real
categorical answer to this revolutionary need, not a
theoretical speculation...
"Opposed to it were those who spoke of peace. The
external difference, apparently, between our line of conduct
and that of the other organizations and parties, was that we
publicly proclaimed the need for violence and the others
advocated pacifist solutions. On the surface this appears to
be a mere strategic discrepancy, ~4 has, nevertheless, its
origin in a fundamental ideological discrepancy. "
By identifying the 26th of July Movement as the only group which
advocated armed action, Hart obviously places the gommunists with
those advocating ,peaceful solutions' He argues further that the pur-
pose of violent action is not that of simple military victory, but is that
of creating discontent, dissatisfaction, and opposition of such dimensions
that the government will be unable to maintain itself in power. Thus by
provoking the dictatorship to increased brutality and terrorism the public
reaction is created which assures the dictator's overthrow. A quite
similar point of view is held by !'Che"Guevara, who lists among the
.'
"fundamental contributions" of the Cuban revolution the proof that "it is
not always necessary to wait for the fulfillment of all of the conditions
for the revolution; the focus of insurrection can create them. "
The existence of what Hart refers to as a "fundamental ideolog-
ical discrepancy'kbetween the Fidelistas and the Communists during
the Sierra campaign is also indicated in a letter which was' aken from
A
Hart when he was arrested by the Cuban army in early 1958. The letter,
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200250011-9
 Approv _d FQr Rplp^. a ? rie_Qr-Ing 990*1e~00250011-9
UUX4 111'4 Us
unsigned and apparently meant for "Che"''? states in part:
"you have been rude as well as unjust. For you to believe
that we are rightists or that we come from the petty Cuban
bourgeoisie, or rather that we represent it... does not sur-
prise me... since it is in line with your interpretation of
the historical proceedings of the Russian revolution....
We have had no other course to follow, because your leaders
perpetrated the formidable outburst of 1917... but left the
peoples located outside that country without the opportunity
to unchain a universal revolution.... The fatality of all
this is that Stalin was not French, or English, or German,
and was therefore unable to overcome the limited viewpoint
of a Russian leader. .. . If there can exist discrepancies
between us over the international aspect of revolutionary
politics, I consider myself among the more radical ones....
There are indications that the author of the above letter who
was probably Hart himselflt\did not consider himself to be a spokesman
for Fidel but, rather a member of a group whose goals were in accord
with Fidel's. This may have been a restablished Trotskyi* group, inas-
much as the author states "do not ever identify me with persons who have
dominated the CTC (Cuban Confederation of Labor) for the past 25 years"
(i.e., the Trotskyitl~ of the 1930's who founded the CTC but later became
n
identified with Batista). In any event, the letter strongly suggests the
existence within the 26th of July Movement of a dissident Communist
element which condemned Stalin and Stalinism as opposed to the exten-
sion of the world revolution. It is possible that the same distrust of the
Possibly'l Che`Guevara, who may have been an advocate of coopera-
tion with the Communists, with whom he had been associated. Al-
though recently appearing to favor the Chinese line, "Che had been
a member of the Russian-Mexican Cultural Institute in Mexico and
his wife had been closely associated with Soviet military intelligence
agents. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that 'Che`may, at
this time, Ja.ve been seeking to Vguidei the Fidelistas in terms of
the orthodox CP line favoring unity and mass action. It is interesting
that the letter refers to a copy of another letter, written by"Che'to
"Daniel", which had been received (apparently by Hart) and which
introduced the subject of "Che's "legitimate doctrinal worries. "
`Daniel; in the end of 1957, had been placed in charge of the sabotage
of the sugar harvest.
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01200250011-9
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01200250011-9
"limited viewpoint of a Russian leader" may have later been applied to
Khrus.hc ev's conciliatory attitude toward the West.
eginning in March 1958, the PSP began to admit that the Castro
movement had become a "movement of the masses" and that it was ap-
propriate to support it actively in the field. Through the PSP organiza-
tional and material aid was. given Castro, and CP members were
encouraged to apply the lessons of the Chinese revolution with respect
to work in rural areas and within the rebel forces. Nevertheless, rr al
distrust between the PSP and the Fidelistas continued even after the agree -
ments for collaboration which were worked out in 1958. During the early
months of the Castro regime there were numerous evidences of Fidel's
distrust of the PSP and his determination to hold it in check. Undoubtedly,
this' -distrust b eanie g aily__Ailuted_..a.s a -re-&ult-of, the PSP's policy of
support, the aid received from the Soviet bloc*,, anal the pf).L}?nce of PSP
advi r,p such as kCarlos Rafael Rodrigue %,, At-" same time, ithin the
S a+s
PSP it was recognized that Fidel was "wary" of the Communists closest
to him, was "extremely individualistic", and felt that "his" revolution was
the most advanced type because the workers were not the leading force.
Alcad
One
leader (Carlos Rafael Rodriguez) told the Brazilian CP in 1959
that CP leaders had little doubt that a crisis would eventually arise between
Castro and the PSP, and that when this occurred the party planned to be
in a position to seize full control of the gover.nment..
, le
1 ' /
"(.~
) 1
It is of interest that a new Trotskyite party, whic
had founding members among Fidel Castro's inv
'
f'4r N. (P F ~?Y' f~
T A 2
?r:.~y 160 in Guantanamo, Cuba
was founded
A
identified its leaders. In Novem er 0 'an article in the Commun-
ist-controlled Italian newspaper Il Passe described four "currents"
within the Cuban Revolution, one of which it called the "Trotskist
current", which it linle with extremism and the Chinese model.
'claimed to have
ion force of 1956,
The party has not
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200250011-9
 ApproMd 250011-9
It is against this background that the early indications of Chinese
Communist inf ence as a disruptive influence,.-must be placed. It * ----
.gy. clout that he works of Mao Tse-tung,~\which the PSP had recommended
for study in connection with the organization of Communist activity in the
guerrilla territoryi\were appropriate and appealing to leaders of the 26th
of July Movement. After the victory, the organization of the Agrarian
Reform Institute provided another area for the application of the Chinese
experience, and in October 1959 a source who was in contact with "Che"
Guevara and other high officials of the Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA)
expressed the opinion that the Soviets "do not have a chance in Cuba.
He stated that INRA officals viewed China as the "model state" while
Lonsidering the Soviets as "degenerate Communists. "
Evidence of friction within the PSP itself, possibly related to t'
earlier t ith the 26th of July leaders and the developing Sino-Sov-
iet conflict, came in January 1960. At this time it was reported that a
group (unidentified) existed within the PSP which proposed that t i- older
leaders step down and allow tip younger members to assume nominal
control of the party. This development was apparently based on the belief
that the older leaders iincluding Secretary General Blas Roca, Juan Marin-
ello, and Carlos Rafael Rodrigue -were too closely associated with the
party's past collaboration with Batista, and that others could be more ef-
fective in view of the party's professed policy of all-out support of Fidel
Castro. Significantly, these leaders (who are still in power) are those who
helped formulate the 1956 policies which criticized the. Fidelistas. It was
also reported at this time that Blas Rocag-heading a group within the
Revolution ry Government 6r the grounds that_ Prime Minister Castro had
not wn total support to the party, pointiag out that c-policy of uncondi-
A
tional support deprived the Party of pf means of retaliation should Fidel
Appr 250011-9
 ever turn against it. Roca a hied,\that the government was "riddled
with Communist deviationists who prefer the Titoist or Maoist philosophy
to the Soviet brand of Communism. " He, Marinello, and Lazaro Pena
(_ Mtt
were b^a ing a concentrated effort to place known Communists;
i. e. , "Stalinists'U n control of sections of the Cuban government.
v,
At this time (January 1960) Blas Roca, Marinello, and Pena were
identified as heading a ' Stalinist, faction within the PSP, which (at least
in this pre -Summit period) distrusted Khrushchev as a,'deviationist' who
might obstruct the aggressive, anti -US1'activities of the Latin American
CP,s in exchange for concessions' by Eisenhower. Lazaro Pena was
quoted as saying, "Can you imagine what the Cuban people will say when
one day Hoy proclaims that the Americans are not imperialists?" On the
other hand, Pena was quoted as saying that "Bias Roca was right when he
said that we should not give unconditional support to Fidel Castro and those
damned Maoists. " These statements
are indicative of the problems faced by the PSP leaders
in seeking to follow the CPSU line and yet also simultaneously support the
extremism of Fidel, Raul, and other administration leaders.
mere is no evidence that the ,Stalinism of the PSP leaders
represented a pro-Chinese position.' ae In March 1960
a very reliable source in contact with\PSP leaders reported that the
PSP was "Soviet-oriented, well disciplined, and without factional strife.
Yet it is clear that as the Sino-Soviet rift developed in 1960, the PSP leaders
became increasingly concerned with their own position. In April, May, and
It is possible that this (Stali.nism~.refers to Stalinism as opposed
the reestablished Trotsky is group was condemned by Blas Roca
in the PSP organ Carta Serrmanal (4 April 1960) as a "counter
revolutionary provocation. "
Approv a 00250011-9
 Apprnvarl far RaL~se~,~IlaA,,p~,~~,00~A0200250011-9
L L
June, Secretary General Blas Roca made a trip to the Soviet bloc and
China, motivated in part by a desire to discuss the nature of Sino-Soviet
disunity with leaders of other parties. He returned with no definite
opinion on the matter, but impressed with its seriousness, and subse-
quently the PSP held a series of meetings in an attempt to formulate a
stand. The leaders concealed their concern from the rank and file, how-
ever, and tried to minimize the importance of the controversy. The
position of the Party leadership was probably as stated by Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez in July 1960, when he said privately that "it would be unwise
to take a position with respect to the controversy, as the very line that
one might oppose might become the accepted line. " Nevertheless, pro-
Soviet bias was indicated in his further remarks that "the CPSU had an
enormous task in guiding the world Communist movement along the right:
v oad~',, and that the CPSU "must be moderate and attempt to maintain
peace in view of the possibility that the imperialists, in their death-agon-
ies, might strike blows which would imperil mankind. " This statement,
and the continued control of the PSP by the old leaders after the Eighth
PSP Congress in August 1960, suggest' that, the PSP is indeed Soviet-oriented,
and that the Chinese claims of Cuban CP support, made at the preliminary
meeting held to consider the Sino-Soviet controversy in Moscow in October;
did not refer to the party leadership. On the other hand, the PSP leader-
ship has publicly reversed its earlier line to accomodate the 26th of July
thesis. ~n his address at the VIII PSP Congress, Blas Roca stated that
the attacks on the Moncada and Bayamo barracks were "not conceived as
a classic coup or putsch, despite the manner in which they were carried
out. ... They were not designed to take over the government... but... (to)
form a center of revolutionary struggle. ... The great historical merit of
Fidel :Lies in the fact that... he saw it was possible to defeat the tyranny by
armed. force. "
00250011-9
 A 50011-9
From the foregoing, it seems apparent that the anti-Soviet and
pro-Chinese influence in Cuba is located primarily outside the PSP,
in the ranks of the 26th of July Movement and the governmental agencies
and among the younger members of the PSP. It is probably strongest
among certain elements who fought in the Sierra and who were aware of
revolutionary ideologies, among those exposed to Chinese revolutionary
ideologies, g those aw# Chinese revolutionary literature,
and among the new generation of Marxists] educated in 'e courses es-
tablished by the Rebel Army and other government agencies which glorify
the Sierra campaign and its leaders. These are unorthodox Communists,
who to date have neither been clearly identified nor organized into a
recognizable clique or group. They may include Raul Castro, who denies
membership in the PSP; yet was once a member of the Communist Youth
and who may be a secret") member of the Party. Raul's militant, ag-
gressive, extremist anti-U,5-,views give support to the Chinese policy of
promoting East-West tension rather than reducing it. Raul was reportedly
disappointed by the refusal of the Soviets to enter into a military pact
with Cuba,which was one of his objectives in going to Moscow in the sum-
mer of 1960. He has given strong support to the establishment of the
Cuban-Chinese Cultural Society and the New China News Agency office
in Habana. In November 1959 he reportedly received verbal messages
from the Chinese Foreign Minister through Faure Chomon (now Cuban
rnbas sador to the USSR) including a request that Raul "occupy the US P
Nava]. Base at Guantanamo immediately upon the beginning of a Chinese
Communist attack on Taiwan. "*
Other reports suggest that the Chinese, and the Trotskyi l
elements in Cuba, place greater emphasis on action against
Guantanamo than does the PSP.
Approve or e lease : A- -00915R001200250011-9
 Ar ??.a C M - 1- - - n ? r1A-RIlp7g-npA15ROnj200250011-9
Raul has also been reported (without confirmation) to have been in contact
with Chinese intelligence officials who, from Habana, were organizing the
foundation of Communist Chinese cells throughout Latin America.
"?he"I Guevara may be another vehicle for pro-Chinese influence,
although he has stressed that the Cuban evolution has followed its own
Marxist path. Guevara's advocacy of armed struggle as the means of ex-
tending the Cuban revolution to other Latin American countries, his belief
that armed struggle can be initiated before conditions for its success are
present, and his praise of Chinese communes suggest a pro-Chinese
orientation, though earlier in his career he appears to have been closely
associated with the Soviets. Gue also denies that he is a Communist,
and there is no 4Z
b h dra-a secret party member. Carlos
Olivares Sanchez, $eputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and the principal
coordinator of Cuban diplomatic and para-diplomatic activities in Latin
America, is reported to be "a practicing Marxist with a preference in
Communist theory toward Yugoslav and Red Chinese policies.- !_, Olivares
is very closely associated with Raul Castro, is ~ecretary of Foreign Re-
lations of the 26th of July Movement, and one of the key officials involved
in the extension of the Cuban liberation movement to the rest of Latin
America.
Armando Hart, the Minister of Education, as previously mentioned,
appears to represent an unorthodox brand of Communism, possibly asso-
ciated with the revived Trotskyite movement. (It is of interest to note,
parenthetically, that a new Latin American Popular Liberation Front con-
taining Trotskyite elements, was organized in Argentina in early 1960, and
The Chinese have been extremely antagonistic toward Yugoslav
Communism. Thus this statement, at best, indicates only that
Olivares is eclectic and not controlled by the PSP.
S
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01200250011-9
 Approved For Release.rJe_anoZQ_nn915R001200250011-9
that one of the organizational meetings was held in Buenos Aires in the
home of the father of 'IQ-he" Guevara. Other meetings took place in
Buenos Aires under the aegis of Cuban and Bolivian diplomats.) Hart's
wife, Haydee Santamaria, is head of the Casa de las Americas in Cuba,
a front which is instrumental in financing and training revolutionary
youth in other Latin American countries. In addition to those named
above, there are probably others, among them officials who have been
subjected to intense propaganda during visits to Communist China, who
may favor the Chinese in the present dispute. At the present time,
these cannot be identified. However, it is known that the Chinese feel
that they have support in Cuba. They indicated this at the time of the
preliminary meetings in Moscow in October 1960, and reportedly they
were able to prevent the distribution in Cuba of certain issues of
Problems of Peace and Socialism which favored the Soviet viewpoint.
With the establishment of a Chinese mbassy in Cuba,` and with the
ideological controversy still potentially disruptive, it seems probable
that the Chinese will seek to exploit the various dissidents, unorthodox
Communists, and `, extremists in the 26th of July Movement as a
force in their favor.
~=~- In this effort they will be greatly aided by the actual presence
on the Cuban scene of Chinese propagandists, technicians, and officials,
among whom are CP members. The influx of Chinese visitors began in
early 1959. The New China News Agency has had a staff, headed by
Kung Mai, at its Latin American headquarters in Habana since mid-1959.
Approved For a -00915 R001200250011-9
 Appromed,FmF 1 ?. ALA-QP7.8-00915ROO120250011-9
,_ - In November 1959; the Communist Chinese Foreign Minister sent
word to Raul Castro that twenty Chinese industrial and agricultural tech-
nicians would arrive in Cuba in January 1960. Later reports suggest
that these arrived and have been engaged by INRA,. a :in ptember 1960
it was reported that Chinese Communists were working on an agricultural
cooperative in Caney, Oriente Province. Various Chinese delegations
have also visited Cuba. For example, in October 1960 a group of Chinese
trade unionists headed by Kang Yung-ho visited Cuba to participate in the
WFTU-sponsored international labor meeting in support of Algeria, and
later toured Cuban factories and talked with Cuban labor leaders. In ad-
dressing workers at one factory, Kang described how the Chinese had
overcome their difficulties, had defeated the USrembargo, and had dgvel-
oped production on the basis of their own resources.
group of eight Chinese (including trade, banking, 'fie} NCNA officials,
C
M"'
and interpreters) wereFconducted on 'a tour of INRA cooperatives in Ma-
t ,
tanzas and briefed by Captain Julio Suarez, an extreme anti-American
leftist who devoted much of his speech to a description of supposed Amer-
ican sabotage of the Cuban agricultural and industrial effort. The Chinese,
during the tour, made suggestions concerning the need for,~liquidation of
counterrevolutionaries and the strengthening of the militia at various in-
stallations. Even more extensive contacts in the future are indicated in
the statements made by "kye" Guevara in China in December 1960, wa
he said that "twenty-four out of the hundreds of factories" to be built in
Cuba in the next five years will be built with direct Chinese aid. By the
close of 1960; Chinese anti-aircraft guns, bazookas, and mortars were
reported to be in the hands of Cuban forces.
In summary, it is apparent that botli Soviets and the Chinese have
an enormous stake in Cuba. Fidel Castro 's ambition to export the Cuban
revolution to the rest of Latin America is in accord with both Soviet and
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01200250011-9
 Approved For 915R001200250011-9
Chinese goals. Yet the Cuban government does not appear to be decisively
--orented either by the Sovietor the Chinese Communists. The orthodox
Cuban Communist Party (the PSP) is controlled by old line pro-Soviet Com-
munists who, although calling for complete support of Castro, have never-
theless regarded him with some misgivings. Castro's impetuosity and
interest in military action (which resulted in the unsuccessful Dominican
invasion and other revolutionary ventures) may not only be counterproduc-
tive and hinder the spread of Communism, but may also result in the ex-
tension of war and the development of a global conflict. This would not be
in accord with Soviet policies of recent years, and although there are
V
indications of Soviet approval of a more aggressive international Commun-
ist line in 1961, it is possible that the orthodox Communists still wish to
avoid responsibility for Fidelista extremism
To the Chinese, the extension of the armed struggle to other
countries through the activities of the Castro government serves the
immediate end of increasing international tensions and creating problems
for the United States on a wide variety of fronts. The justification by
26th of July Movement leaders of sabotage, terrorism, and the initiation
of violent action regardless of the preparation of the masses' i in accord
It may be significant, in this connection, that the unofficially Com-
munist-controlled Italian daily, Il Paese, of 7 November 1960,
identified four currents within the Cuban revolutionar movemeSc t?
f4sx O rwsus4Ynk+~ ; ie"hk-.w+nt ocict - t'c urve %
the "Nationalist" current (inspired by,,Yugoslavia, Indonesia, and 1K5p-vrd 6.f
active neutralism); the "Trotskist" current, "which is inclined to
assume extremist postures and is a partisan of the model of the
Chinese Revolution"; and the "Communist" current, organized by
the PSP and which, "after having corrected its errors, " is today
the most well-balanced and which, unlike the others, "still wishes
to collaborate with the petty bourgeoisie. "
16-17
Approved Fo I - ~DPM-00915RO01200250011-9
 Approved For Release,- QIA- 0915R001200250011-9
with this Chinese goal of promoting tension. Moreover, the rural,
agrarian, anti-imperialist characteristics of the. Cuban revolution allow
the Chinese opportunity for offering advice based on their own experience,
even though they are not in a position to offer the same technical, mater-
ial) and military aid as the Soviet bloc.
In Mexico, recognition of the Sino-Soviet controversy within the
middle ranks of the orthodox Communist Party (the Partido Comunista
Mexicano 4PCM) was reported in August 1960. At that time, Prisciliano
Garza Es'calante, a member of the Central Committee, told several
Nuevo Leon state PCM leaders that he had recently returned from the USSR
and China and was disturbed by the developing rift,)vetween these countries.
He said the "greatest single factor causing the deterioration of relations"
was the Soviet adherence to a tactical line described by the Chinese as
being "weak and non-aggressive." Garza said the PCM must study the con-
troversy and decide whether to support the Soviet or the Chinese party.
Garza was reported as personally favoring the more aggressive
line of the Chinese.
About this same time, a "communication addressed to the Political
Commission of the PCM, " allegedly by "a group of Chinese Communists
in Cuba" indicates that the Chinese CP may have sought, through direct
channels, to establish its~osition before the CP Mexico. * This
* It is possible that the foregoing statement of Chinese views originated
with the Chinese delegation to the congress of the Cuban CP held in
Habana in August 1960. It is not known that the Chinese used this
occasion for stating their case to other fraternal delegates, though
this is likely. Certainly the Sino-Soviet rift was discussed, as the
Honduran delegate reported that the PSP "disparaged the differences"
between the two powers. In referring to the rift, he stated that the
Chinese "did not approve of trying to reach agreements with the West, "
and although they recognized the international leadership of t. e USSR,
they believed that "more people will die from hunger under apital
ism than would die in a war. "
Approved For 00915R00-1200250011-9
 Approved For Release 1 EL8-00915R001200250011-9
communication, presumably received in September 1960, outlined four
points, which epitopized the Chinese position. These, in brief, were
as, follows:
a. War is inevitable and can break out at any moment.
It will be initiated by the imperialist bloc led by the United States,
or by the United States alone without previous knowledge by its
allies .
b. War must not be feared, even a nuclear war. It is not
-certain that such a war ,puld destroy humanity, and although dev-
astating, it must be exploited to accelerate the pace of a transition
to Socialism.
c. In some countries, a peaceful transition from 'apital-
.ism to ~ocialism is improbable because it has been proved that
imperialism goes to the aid of the capitalistic system wherever
the situation is maturing.
The transition from. (,capitalism to Socialism will be
violent, but it is the obligation of the Communist parties to blame
capitalist agents for it.
Another indication of direct Chinese action in defense of their
ideological viewpoint was the distribution in Mexico of the book Long Live
Leninism.
In.3ate. September 1960; the first shipment of 2000 copies of
the Spanish edition arrived in Mexico, and an additional 3000 copies were
reportedly expected. This book has been used by the Chinese in their
attack on Soviet views, and its distribution has been protested by various
CP(s in both bloc and non-bloc countries as injurious to Communist unity.
It is possible that, from Mexico, the book has been distributed elsewhere
in Latin America.
In Mexico, evidence of Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban influences must
be viewed against a background of inter -party and intra-party rivalry,
Approved For Rele 915R001200250011-9
 Approved For Release Ak pP78-00915R001200250011-9
disagreement, and intrigue. To date there appears to be no clear reflec-
tion of the Sino-Soviet rift. However, there is considerable evidence of
a growth of leftist extremism which is supported from Cuba and which, as
in Cuba, seems to involve youth and student elements, a revived Trotsky-
i party* nd dissident members of the Communist Party of Mexico.
There are also indications that the Peoples' Socialist Party (PPS), which
dominates the Mexican Communist movement, favors the Soviet position
and, in the last year and a half, mhv~ir have received increased Soviet
support.
ithin the orthodox Communist party (PCM), indirect Soviet
guidance and possibly interference was responsible for the overthrow in
1959-60 of Dionisio Encina, who symbolized Stalinism, and the rise to
power in the party of Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo and others favoring the
Khrushchev line. The victorious anti-Encina group, however, itself has
become divided in the past year between leaders such as David Alfaro
Siqueiros, who favors agitation, and Martinez Verdugo, who favors more
discreet action which would limit political repercussions.
Siqueiros, currently in prison for fomenting unrest, appears to
have been a key figure in the support in Mexico of extremist agitation
over the past year. He has apparently had Cuban support. In August or
September 1959 Siqueiros' brother-in-law, Leopoldo Arenal Bastar, was
given possession of arms which had been stored in the Cuban ~mbass y in
Mexico, presumably for use by a group described by Arenal as being
composed of "dissatisfied petroleum workers, railroad workers, and
The Trotskyi$i+ Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR) was founded in
mid-1959. Its leaders include Jorge M za, a railroad worker; Herr. an !----a
a student; Carlos Lopez; a painter; and Jaime Estrada Lopez,
a law student. Like its Cuban counterpart, it officially identifies itself
with the IV International.
-20-
Approved For R 78-00915R001200250011-9
 Approved For Re 78-00915R001200250011-9
teachers. " In November 1959' Arenal sought additional arms from Cuban
sources for the J. ,faro Siqueiros grouptR. In January 19b0 'Siqueiros
strongly criticized President Lopez Mateos of Mexico and praised the
Cuban .evolution, receiving emphatic support from the then Cubanirn-
bassador, Salvador Massip. In February, Leopoldo Arenal again appeared
at the Cuban imbassy selling Siqueiros' prints in order to buy parts for
portable radios to be used in Mexico, and in July, certain members of the
Mexican delegation to the First Latin American Youth Congress in Habana
took with them a painting by Siqueiros to sell in order to buy arms for an
armed revolution.
It is of interest that the principal controversy which developed at
the Youth Congress in Habana concerned the recognition of the credentials
of certain "Trotskyit" delegates from Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, and Ar-
gentina. Of the Mexican delegation, which represented some twenty-three
student and youth organizations, representatives of five groups supported
ke recognition of delegates of the Mexican Trotskyi Partido Obrero
Revolucionario and wished the congress to officially, denounce the govern-
ment of President Lopez Mateos. This group included representatives
from the Communist Youth of Mexico (JC( the "revolutionary sector"
of the National Teachers Union (SN TE), the Worker-Farmer Party of
Mexico (POCM), and the University Student Federation (FEU). Fourteen
other groups, however, opposed the recognition of the Trotskyis and
A
the denunciation of the Mexican government. This group was led by the
Popular Youth (JP), which is the affiliate of Vicente Lombardo Toledanos
Popular Socialist Party (PPS).. and other groups controlled by the PPS.
,
This faction gained the support of the congress, t4, the d c*red * o~ 'diie PM
This controversy, although not known to be a reflection of the Sino-
Soviet dispute, appears to parallel two of the fundamental points of Sino-
Soviet disagreement: the degree to which violence shall be used to effect
Approved For Releas -00915R001200250011-9
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200250011-9
the transition to Socialism; and the degree to which the national bour-
geoisie (represented by Lopez Mateos) can be trusted and used as allies.
Since their defeat at the Youth Congress, the extremist elements
in Mexico have been further weakened by the repressive measures taken
by the government against student and teacher demonstrators in August,
) 4k,
including the arrest of Siqueiros, and by the removal of Leonel Padilla
and Cesar Augusto Velasco Sandoval from their positions of leadership
in the Communist Youth. The basic reason for the removal of Padilla and
Velasco, which was effected by the Communist party leaders, was re-
ported to be their close connection and collaboration with the Trotskyir
POR. It was Padilla, apparently, who had b 'en in charge of the sale of
the Siqueiros painting in Cuba for a.rm d revo-lutio ,ry funding. Some -
what later, the explusion of two members of the Juventud Comunista
for advocating armed revolt in Mexico was reported.
The foregoing information suggests that a purge of extremist
elementser among the orthodox Communists has been taking place,
)_,ralleled by governmental action which has resulted in the imprison-
ment or persecution of Communist and extreme leftist agitators. Al-
though all the Communist organizations protest the imprisonment of
Demetrio Vallejo, Dionisio Encina, David Alfaro Siqueiros, and others,
the practical result of the arrests has favored the elements which seem
to support the Khrushchev line/ and has weakened the extremist elements
among whom ZEre Chinese views might find support. The current domin-
ance of the pro-Soviet elements within the orthodox Communist party is
illustrated in an editorial in the PCM organ La Voz de Mexico for
1 January 1961. This lauds the CPSU, supports coexistence as the policy
for world Communism and ignores Communist China.
Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo, arrested at the same time, was released
and represented the PCM at the meeting of Communist parties in Moscow,
returning on 18 December. Oton Salazar, leader of the revolutionary
sector of the Mexican Teachers' Union (SNTE), is now reported,-Wdis-
creditedd within the SNTE.
Approved For Release : (CIA-RDP78-00915R001200250011-9
 Approved For Relea -00915R001200250011-9
As indicated above, in connection with the conflict which developed
at the Latin American Youth Congress, the policies of the Peoples' Social-
ist Party (PPS), led by Vicente Lombardo Toledano, tend to support the
Soviet, rather than the Chinese, point of view. The PPS, which defines
itself as /''Marxist-Leninis fy favors the constant development of the ex-
isting democratic regime and, in due course, of the peoples' democracy,
in order to arrive at the establishment of the socialist regime. " In practice,
it defends collaboration with the bourgeois administration of President Lopez
Mateos, which it seeks to infiltrate and influence, and attacksixtremist
sectarian opposition to the administration as counterproductive.
Lombardo's policies were exemplified in his condemnation of the
railroad strike of March 1959, which was supported by the PCM and the
POCM? and which resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of Demetrio
Vallejo and other leaders, and subsequently Dion4sio Encina. Lombardo's
statement concerning the strike came on 3a AprilA after his return from
the USSR. Later, in July.9/, he party members that he had been
told by Soviet Communist leaders to assume the dominant roleVin all
N? 146',
leftist activities in Mexico. A Subsequently,rLombardo has reorganized and
renamed his party to identify it more closely with international Commun-
ism, aad reportedly gained Soviet approval of the PPS platform as the basis
H
for an anti-imperialist front in Mexico.
e has also stated privately that
Soviet and satellite officials instructed him to (reactivate y all existing
friendship societies under his control and direction.
There can be little doubt that Lombardo has been well informed
on the Sino-Soviet rift through his high WFTU position and his Soviet
contacts. He attended the twenty-first meeting of the WT"f-f,+ Executive
Committee of the WFTU as well as the WFTU General Council Meeting in
Peiping in June 1960, at which the dispute began to grow heated. Subse-
quently, Lombardo published an article in Siempre (Mexico City, 20 July
Approved -00915R001200250011-9
 Approved For Rele 8-00915R001200250011-9
1960) presenting an examination of the international scene "as seen from
China". and representing "the opinions of the leaders and the people of
the countries which are building 4cialism". The article serves to sup-
port the Soviet point of view, however, with respect to the castrophic
nature of a new war which "for the ocialist countries, would represent
the immediate paralyzation of their constructive programs; that is to say,
the impossibility of building ocialism within the anticipated time. "
In summary, it is apparent that the Soviets have made a strenuous
effort to strengthen their position in Mexico, relying heavily on the PPS
and certain leaders of the PCM. Chinese views, although known to party
leaders, have found no significant support or acknowledgment . However,
-6s
there exist certain pro-Cuban extremist elements, Trotsky'
.i and dis-
gruntled Stalinists who may favorably respond to Chinese Communist
overtures, should these be made to them. Although there is little pros-
pect of the development of a strong pro-Chinese Communist element in
Mexico, the existence of a great number of separate, rival Communist
parties and cliques may provide a useful index to the nature of various
international ideological trends or schisms.
,I .Other Latin American Countries
In other Latin American countries there are also differences within
the CP,Isk and between the CP's and other revolutionary groups which are
similar to those existing in Cuba and Mexico. These involve conflicts be-
tween'Yactivists' and "pacifistsY, between youth and age, between the inex-
perienced and the experienced. For example, the head of the Radical Youth
in Chile recently wrote to a friend and former Cuban student leader, now
an INRA official, that:
"In Chile... a start must be made at once. Only one of
the political leaders of Chile has the mind and determination t
to pursue the revolutionary course. That is Clotario Blest....
This attitude has almost brought him to disgrace in the eyes of
the leftist political leaders, especially those of the Communist
Party, who think we must still wait indefinitely.
Approved For Releas 8-00915R001200250011-9
 Approved For ReleangQkADP78-00915R001200250011-9
In Brazil, a conflict exists within the CP itself, where a leftist
faction headed by Mauricio Grabois, Calil Chadde, Carlos Danielli, and
others has opposed the policies defined in the party's
which they claim defer- socialist goals and abandon s
consideration of violent action. This controversy is apparently becoming
linked with the problem of the support of the Cuban revolution, and the
dissatisfaction of the Fidelistas with the 'pacifist policies of the PSP is
being duplicated in their attitude toward the PSP. Thus Calil Chadde -:;'
elliflWd that certain Cuban revolutionary leaders had complained to him
in August 1960 about the lack of Brazilian support for the Cuban4evolu-
tion, and a Brazilian editor, who conferred with Prensa Latina executives
in Habana in November, reported that unnamed Cuban officials had criti-
cized the Brazilian CP for refusing to allow other groups, such as the
Trotskyites, to join in pro-Cuban activities. The Cubans indicated that
they would like to find some o0n group other than the CP to assume direc-
tion of pro-Cuban activities in Brazil, but that the CP was the only one
which could be relied on.
Conflicts of this type exist also in other countries and may easily
become associated with the PSP-Fidelista conflict and also, eventually,
with the Sino-Soviet conflict as the two Communist powers seek to extend
or strengthen their re esti a policies and as local Communists or revolu-
tionaries look for support for their own policies or tactics/as determined
by their own views of the opportunities presented by the immediate national
political situation. To date, there has been little evidence of direct Chinese
involvement in such factionalism and conflict that does exist, but this
situation cs change now that a Chinese Communist base for operations
has been established in Habana.
Approved For Releases 8-00915R001200250011-9