THE SINO-SOVIET CONTROVERSY IN CUBA AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R001200250003-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Sino-Soviet Controversy in Cuba and
Other Latin American Countries,
Since 1952, and particularly since 1956, Chinese
Communist influence on Latin American CPs has been
apparent in the formulation of programs and policies geared
to the strategy of the "united democratic front of national
l.iberationP'. Procedures such as the systematic analysis of
economic and political, groupings and their potentials for
Communist exploitation in a struggle against the most im-
portant common enemy (US imperialism) reflect the appli-
cation of tactics recommended by Mao Tse-tung. These
tactics arp described in Mao's writings, such as "Tactical
Problems in the United Anti-Japanese Front", which since
1956 have been translated into Spanish for distribution and
study in Latin America. Mao's works., as well as those of
Lui Shao-ch'i and probably other Chinese Communist leaders,
have also been used in the training courses arranged for Latin
Americans by the Communist Party of China (CPC). These
courses have emphasized the agrarian base of the Chinese
revolution, the techniques of clandestine party organization
and action}, and the history and success of the armed conflict
in the long drawn-out struggle against the Kuomintang and
the Japanese,
It is apparent that the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) encouraged the Latin American CPs to avail
themselves of the lessons of the Chinese revolution, in view
of the similarity of political, economic, and social condi- ..
tions in China and Latin America (i. e. , existence of foreign
economic imperialism, feudalistic survivals in rural life,
and a generally low level of industrial development). For
example, the Brazilian CP program formulated in 1953-54
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under CPSU guidance reflected certain points emphasized in
Chinese tactics, and in mid-1955 Latin American CPs began
to acknowledge the importance of the Chinese revolution in
their programmatic documents. In early 1956 the Twentieth
CPSU Congress gave official recognition to the doctrine of
many roads to Socialism, and increased attention began to
be paid to the Chinese experience (in contrast to that of the
Soviets and the European satellites) as illustrative of progress
from "semi-feudal, semi-colonial forms" toward Socialism.
Thus the Costa Rican CP, after studying Manuel Mora's re-
port on the XX CPSU Congress, passed a resolution which
quoted the Soviet Manual of Political Economy on the impor-
tance of the Chinese revolution. While in Moscow, Latin
American delegates to the Twentieth CPSU Congress were
invited to China, where in the spring and summer of 1956
they participated in seminars and tours. Later in the year
many Latin American CP leaders attended the Eighth Congress
of the CPC as fraternal representatives. Since 1956, the
training of Latin American CP members in China has been
placed on an organized and permanent basis, cultural exchanges
have grown, - and Chinese theoretical and propaganda publica-
tions have been translated and increasingly disseminated in
Spanish.
This gradually increasing emphasis on the study,of
the Chinese experience has developed with the concurrence
and support of the CPSU. Yet with the development of per-
sonal contacts between the Latin Americans and the Chinese,
some indications of Sino -Soviet rivalry and disagreement also
appeared. Thus one of the first Latin American students to
return from a CPC training school was told, in 1958, by Latin
American specialists of the CPSU, that Chinese plans for
communes were "too early and too risky. " The student noted
that these specialists were more conciliatory with respect to
Tito than were the Chinese and that they regarded some Chin-
ese claims as exaggerated and, by innuendo, played them down.
The Soviets were keenly interested in the students' impressions
of the CPC course, and indicated that they also were considering
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a CPSU for Latinmericans alone. On the other hand, the
student noted that-the Chinese, who were intensely interested
in Latin America, had indicated disagreement with the Soviets
on a number of points (the denigration of Stalin and certain
Soviet industrial methods), and had shown a fundamental be-
lief in the inevitability of war with the USA.
A year later, another Latin American CP member
returning from a similar CPC training course noted that one
lecturer had stated that for the Chinese, there was no revolu-
tion in which arms were not used, thereby disagreeing with
the pacifist policy ,of the USSR. This was the only indication
of disagreement-with respect to international policy which he
noticed, however, and he found the Chinese in general to be
"very cautious" in mentioning other parties, emphasizing that
"each country has its own peculiarities. "
In general, it appears that prior to 1960, Sino-Soviet
differences-were not being emphasized to Latin Americans,
made little impression on them, and did not, in themselves,
cause friction or factionalism within the Latin American par -
ties. In some -cases, however, internal policy differences of
long standing have run parallel to the international conflict,
and have become identified with it as the Sino-Soviet dispute
has sharpened and as the Soviets and Chinese have sought to
develop support for their points of view. Now that the dispute
has been discussed and publicized at international meetings,
and is more generally understood, it is possible that there will
be a greater tendency for elements within the Latin American
parties to interpret or identify their own views with those of
the Soviets or the Chinese.
Of all the Latin American CPs, the Cuban CP
(Partido Socialista Popular, PSP) has been most deeply
concerned with the Sino-Soviet controversy, because it bears
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on the party's own conflict with Fidel Castro and the 26th of
July Movement. This conflict extends back to 1956, when
the PSP officially established its policies concerning the
armed struggle in Cuba. These were announced in a mani-
festo of September 1956 entitled "The Road of the People:
August 1933. " This stated that "we are not proponents of
violence for its own sake, nor do we believe that violence is
the only path... but when the despotic government... blocks
the electoral path and seeks to maintain itself by force, there
is not other remedy than extraparliamentary action, that is,
the direct struggle of the masses. " However, it also pointed
out that "the experience of 1930-33, when the putsch of Aguado,
the mob assault of Rio Verde, the landing of Gibara, and the
assault on the barracks of San Luis all failed, and when the
general strike and the uprising of the masses in August 1933
triumphed; the experience of all revolutions and of all strug-
gles for liberty; all such experience indicates that the correct,
the best, and the most rapid--and the most secure and most
popular--(course) is that proposed by the Party of the Cuban
Revolution, the Popular Socialist Party: the development of
the struggle of the masses and its culmination in a new August,
in a powerful general strike and a decisive general uprising.... "
In the September 1956 manifesto the PSP referred
to the unsuccessful attack on the Moncada barracks (which
resulted in Castro's imprisonment in 1953) as "desperate
and sterile". Later in the year, in the official party
It has subsequently been reported that when the 26th of
July Movement was being organized in Mexico (about
1955-56) the Communists had sought, with the support
of Raul Castro, to influence Fidel to abandon his plans
for armed invasion of Cuba. When these efforts did not
succeed, they_i instructed Raul to continue to go along
with Fidel's plans.
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theoretical organ Fundamentos, * the party paid even more
attention to the Fidelista movement:
"The 26th of July Movement raised the banner
of insurrection at a predetermined place and without
relation to the struggle of the masses... it recently
introduced the idea of the general strike into its tac-
tical concepts, but in an erroneous sense: only as an
instrument of insurrection and not--as should be the
case --as an element in the development of the mass
struggle which may be followed, in certain cases, by
an armed insurrection.
"Insurrection, moreover, is not a game. It
is a very complicated and serious tactical procedure
which should not be used... except under determined
conditions. Otherwise, in most cases, insurrection
will be no more than a putsch.
"... Lacking such conditions, it is indispensa-
ble that every true revolutionary contribute to the
patient and 'gray' task of elevating the conscience
of the vanguard.... "
A year later, at the special conference of Latin
American Communist party leaders $ld in Moscow in November
1957, the PSP still opposed Castro's tactics and his disinclina-
tion to unite with the PSP or to follow its line. The Cuban;irep-
resentative to this meeting noted that the sabotage of sugar cane
In the same issue of Fundamentos, the significance of the
Chinese experience was described in an article entitled
"Desde Pekin", by an anonymous author (possibly Cesar
Escalante Dellunde, who is known to have been a delegate
to the VIII CPC Congress and who probably participated
in seminars in China).
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(a. 26th of July tactic under the direction of Rene Ramos Latour,
known as "Daniel") was an unpopular, sectarian action which
lacked sympathy among the workers, and that although the PSP
had ."attempted to guide the Fillelistas", the latter had not
wanted to participate in coordinated mass action.
Intellectual leaders of the 26th of July Movement took
notice of the Communist criticisms and, in turn, sought to
establish their own ideological position. One of these leaders
was Armando Hart Davalos, then clandestine coordinator of
the movement and currently Minister of Education. Hart's ideas
were published (after the rebel victory) in a commemorative.1ssire
of Revolucion (26 July 1959) under the title "Justification of the
Revolution and the Strategy against the Dictatorship, November
1956. " Hart made the following points:
"On occasions, the revolution follows the course
of pacifism. We do not deny that theoretically and under
certain circumstances this may be the adequate path.,..
But possibly the most important experience that the new
generation has learned has been that the revolution, at
any moment and under any circumstance, must be pre
pared for direct action....
"The 26th of July Movement represented a real
categorical ansrer to this revolutionary need, not a
theoretical speculation....
"Opposed to it were those who spoke of peace.
The external difference, apparently, between our line
of conduct =end that of the other organizations and par-
ties, was that we publicly proclaimed the need for vio-
lence and the others advocated pacifist solutions. On
the surface this appears to be a mere strategic discrep-
ancy, but has, nevertheless, its origin in a fundamental
ideological discrepancy."
By identifying the 26th of July Movement as the only
group which advocated armed action, Hart obviously places the
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Communists with those advocating peaceful solutions. He argues
further that the purpose of violent action is not that of simple
military victory, but is that of creating discontent, dissatisfac-
tion, and opposition of such dimensions that the government will
be unable to maintain itself in pourer. Thus by provoking the
dictatorship to increased brutality and terrorism the public
reaction is created which assures the dictator's overthrow. A
quite similar point of view is held by Ernesto ("Che") Guevara,
who lists among the "fundamental contributions" of the Cuban
revolution the proof that "it is not always necessary to wait for
the fulfillment of all of the conditions for the revolution; the focus
of insurrection can create them".
The existence of what Hart refers to as a "fundamental
ideological discrepancy" between the Fidelistas and the Commun-
ists during the Sierra campaign is also indicated in a letter which
was reportedly taken from Hart when he was arrested by the Cuban
army in early 1958. The letter, unsigned and apparently meant
for "Che", * states in part:
"you have been rude as well as unjust. For you to be
lieve that we are rightists or that we come from the
petty Cuban bourgeoisie, or rather that we represent
Possibly "Che" Guevara, who may have been an advocate
of cooperation with the Communists, with whom he had
been associated. Although recently appearing to favor the
Chinese line, "Che" had been a member of the Russian-
Mexican Cultural Institute in Mexico and his wife had been
closely associated with Soviet military intelligence agents.
It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that "Che" may, at
this time, have been seeking to guide the Fidelistas in
terms of the orthodox CP line favoring unity and mass ac
tion. It is interesting that the letter refers to a copy of
another letter, written by "Che'' to "Daniel", which had
been received (apparently by Hart) and which introduced the
subject of "Che's" "legitimate doctrinal worries". "Daniel",
in the end of 1957, had been placed in charge of the sabotage
of the sugar harvest.
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it... does not surprise me. .. since it is in line with
your interpretation of the, historical proceedings of the
Russian revolution.... We have had no other course
to follow, because your leaders perpetrated the formid-
able outburst of 1917... but left the peoples located out-
side that country without the opportunity to unchain a
universal revolution.... The fatality of all this is that
Stalin was not French, or English, or German, and
was therefore unable to overcome the limited viewpoint
of a Russian leader. .. . If there can exist discrepancies
between us over the international aspect of revolutionary
politics, I consider myself among the more radical
ones....."
There are indications that the author of the above letter,
who was probably Hart himself, did not consider himself to be
a spokesman for Fidel but rather a member of a group whose
goals were in accordk.with Fidel's. This may have been a re-
established Trotskyist group, inasmuch as the author states
"do not ever identify me with persons who have dominated the
CTC (Cuban Confederation of Labor) for the past 25 years"
(i. e. , the Trotskyists of the 1930's who founded the CTC but
later became identified with Batista). In. any event, the letter
strongly suggests the existence within the 26th of July Movement
of a dissident Communist element which condemned Stalin and
Stalinism as opposed to the extension of the world revolution.
It is possible that the same distrust of the "limited viewpoint of
a Russian leader" may have later been. applied to Khrushchev's
conciliatory attitude. toward the West.
It isfinterest that a new Trotskyist party, which claimed
to have had founding members among Fidel Castro's inva-
sion force of 1956, was founded on 6 February 1960 in Guan-
tanamo, Cuba. The party has not identified its, leaders.
(See The Internationalist, vol. IV, nos. 6, 7, 8; March 15,
April 1, l5, 1960) In November 1960, an article in the Com-
munist-controlled Italian newspaper Il Paese described four
"currents" within the Cuban Revolution, one of which it called
the "Trotskyist current", which it linked with extremism and
the Chinese mode]..
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Beginning in March 1958, the PSP began to admit that
the Castro movement had become a "movement of the masses"
and that it was appropriate to support it actively in the field.
Through, the PSP organizational and material aid was given
Castro, and CP members were encouraged to apply the lessons
of the Chinese revolution with respect to work in rural areas
and within the rebel forces. Nevertheless, distrust
between the PSP and the Fidelistas continued even after the
agreements for collaboration which were worked out in 1958.
During the early months of the Castro regime there were
numerous evidences of Fidel's distrust of the PSP and his de-
termination to hold it in check. Undoubtedly, this distrust
became greatly diluted as a result of the PSP's policy of sup-
port, the aid received from the Soviet bloc, and the influence
of PSP advisers such as Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. At the same
time, within the PSP it was recognized that Fidel was "wary"
of the Communists closest to him, was "extremely individual-
istic", and felt that "his" revolution was the most advanced
type because the workers were not the leading force. One lead-
er (Carlos Rafael Rodriguez) told the Brazilian CP in 1959 that
CP leaders had little doubt that a crisis would eventually arise
between Castro and the PSP, and that when this occurred the
party planned to be in a position to seize full control of the
government.
It is against this background that the early indications
of Chinese Communist influence, as a disruptive influence,
must be placed. It is evident that the works of Mao Tse-tung,
which the PSP had recommended for study in connection with
the organization of Communist activity in the guerrilla terri-
tory, were appropriate and appealing to leaders of the 26th of
July Movement. After the victory, the organization of the
Agrarian Reform Institute provided another area for the appli-
cation of the Chinese experience, and in October 1959 a source
who was in contact with Guevara and other high officials of the
Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA) expressed the opinion that
the Soviets "do not have a chance in Cuba". He stated that
INRA officials viewed China as the "model state" while
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considering the Soviets as "degenerate Communists".
Evidence of friction within the PSP itself, possibly
related to the earlier conflict with the 26th of July leaders
and the developing Sino-Soviet conflict, came in January 1960.
At this time it was reported that a group (unidentified) existed
within the PSP which proposed that the older leaders step
down and. allow the younger members to assume nominal con-
trol of the party. This development was apparently based on
the belief that the older leaders, including Secretary General
Blas Roca, Juan. Marinello, and Carlos Ra#agl Rodriguez,
were too closely associated with the party's past collaboration
with Batista, and that others could be more effective in view
of the party's professed policy of all-out support of Fidel Cas-
tro. Significantly, these leaders (who are still in power) are
those who helped formulate the 1956 policies which criticized
the Fidelistas. It was also reported at this time that Blas Roca
was heading a group within the party which decried the uncon-
ditional support being given by the PSP to the Revolutionary
Government on the grounds that Prime Minister Castro had not
given total support to the party, pointing out that this policy of
unconditional support deprived the party of a means of retalia-
tion. should Fidel ever turn against it. Roca asserted that the
government was "riddled with Communist deviationists who
prefer the Titoist or Maoist philosophy to the Soviet brand of
Communism. " He, Marinello, and Lazaro Pena were report-
edly advocating a concentrated effort to place known Commun-
ists, i. e. , "Stalinists, " in control of sections of the Cuban
government. *
It is possible that this Stalinism refers to Stalinism as
opposed primarily to Trotskyism (not as opposed to
Khrushchevism), as the re-established Trotskyist group
was condemned by Blas Roca in the PSP organ. Carta
Semanal (4 April 1960) as a "counter revolutionax?y
provocation".
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At this time (January 1960) Blas Roca, Marinello, and
Pena were identified as heading a Stalinist faction within. the
PSG', which. (at least in this pre-Summit period) distrusted
Khrushchev. as a deviationist who might. obstruct the aggressive,
anti-USA activities of the Latin American CPs in. exchange for
concessions by Eisenhower. Lazaro Pena was quoted as say-
ing, "Can you imagine what the Cuban people will say when one
day Hoy proclaims that the Americans are not imperialists?"
On the other hand, Pena was quoted as saying that "Bias Roca
was right when he said that we. should not give unconditional
support to Fidel Castro and those damned Maoists". These
statements are indicative of the problems faced by the PSP lead-
ers in seeking to follow the CPSU line and yet also simulta.neous.-
l.y support the extremism of Fidel, Raul, and other administration
leaders.
Although critical of Khrushchev's "pacifism", thdre is
no evidence that the Stalinism of the PSP leaders represented
a pro-Chinese position. In March 1960 a very reliable source
in contact with PSP leaders reported that the PSP was "Soviet-
oriented, well disciplined, and without factional strife". Yet
it is clear that as the Sino-Soviet rift developed in. 1960, the
PSP leaders became increasingly concerned with. their own posies
tion. I.n April, May, and June, Secretary General Bias Roca
made a trip to the Soviet bloc and China, motivated in part by a
desire to discuss the nature of Sino-Soviet disunity with leaders
of .other parties. He returned with no definite opinion. on. the
matter, but impressed with its seriousness, and subsequently
the PSP held a series of meetings in an. attempt to formulate a
stand. The leaders concealed their concern from the rank and
file, however, and tried to minimize the importance of the con-
troversy. The position of the Party leadership was probably as
stated by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez in July 1960, when he. said
privately that "it would be unwise to take a position with respect
to the controversy, as the very line that one might oppose might
become the accepted line". Nevertheless, pro-Soviet bias was.
indicated in his further remarks that "the CPSU had an enormous
task in guiding the. world Communist movement along the right
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road, " and that the CPSU "must be moderate and attempt to
maintain peace in view of the possibility that the imperialists,
in their death-agonies, might strike blows which would imperil
mankind. " This statement, and the continued control of the
PSP by the old leaders after the Eighth PSP Congress in August
1960, suggest that the PSP is indeed Soviet-oriented, and that
the Chinese claims of Cuban CP support, made at the prelim-
inary meeting held in Mosoow in October to consider the. Sino-
Soviet controversy, did not refer to the party leadership. On
the other hand, the PSP leadership has publicly reversed its
earlier line to accomodate the 26th of July thesis: in his ad-
dress at the VIII PSP Congress, Blas Roca stated that the
attacks on the Moncada and Bayamo barracks were "not con-
ceived as a classic coup or putsch, despite the manner in.
which they rrere carried out. ... They were not designed to
take over the ggvernment... but... (to) form a center of revo-
lutionary struggle. . . . The great historical merit of Fidel lies
in the fact that... he saw it was possible to defeat the tyranny
by armed force. "
From the foregoing it seems apparent that the anti-
Soviet and pro-Chinese influence in Cuba is located primar-
ily outside. the PSP, in the ranks of the 26th of July Movement
and the governmental agencies and among the younger members
of the PSP. It is probably strongest among certain. elements
who fought in. the Sierra and who were aware of revolutionary
ideologies, among those exposed to Chinese revolutionary
ideologies, among those exposed to Chinese revolutionary
literature, and among the new generation of Marxists educated
i-n:. the courses established by the Rebel Army and other govern-
ment agencies which glorify the Sierra campaign. and its. leaders.
These are unorthodox Communists, who to date have neither
been clearly identified nor organized into a recognizable clique
or group. They may include Raul Castro, who denies. member-
ship in the PSP yet was once a member of the Communist Youth
and who may be a. secret member of the Party. Raul's militant,
aggressive, extremist anti-USA views give support to the Chinese
policy of promoting East-West tension rather than reducing it.
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ct'r.n a--'~
Raul was reportedly disappointed by the refusal of the Soviets
to enter into a military pact with Cuba, which was one of his
objectives in going to Moscow in the summer of 1960. He has
given strong support to the establishment of the Cuban-Chinese
Cultural Society and the New China News Agency office in
Habana, In November 1959 he reportedly received verbal mes-
sages from the Chinese Foreign Minister through Faure Chomon
(now Cuban ambassador to the USSR) including a request that
Raul "occupy the USA Naval Base at Guantanamo immediately
upon the beginning of a Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan.
Raul has also been reported (without confirmation) to have been
in contact with Chinese intelligence officials who, from Habana,
were organizing the foundation of Communist Chinese cells
throughout Latin America.
Guevara may be another vehicle for pro-Chinese influ-
ence, although he has stressed that the Cuban revolution has
followed its own Marxist path. Guevara's advocacy of armed
struggle as the means of extending the Cuban revolution to
other Latin American countries, his belief that armed struggle
can be initiated before conditions for its success are present,
and his praise of Chinese communes suggest a pro-Chinese
orientation, though earlier in his career he appears to have
been closely associated with the Soviets. Guevara also denies
that he is a Communist, and there is no proof that he is a
secret party member. Carlos Olivares Sanchez, deputy min-
ister of Foreign Affairs and the principal coordinator of Cuban
diplomatic and pars -diplomatic activities in Latin America, is
reported to be "a practicing Marxist with a preference in
Other reports suggest that the Chinese, and the Trotskyist
elements in Cuba, place greater emphasis on. action
against Guantanamo than does the PSP.
_ l)KIV
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Communist theory toward Yugoslav and Red Chinese policies. "*
Olivares is very closely associated with Raul Castro, is secre-
tary of Foreign Relations of the 26th of July Movement, and one
of the key officials involved in the extension of the Cuban liber-
ation movement to the rest of Latin America.
Armando Hart, the Minister of Education, as previously
mentioned, appears to represent an unorthodox brand of Com-
munism, possibly associated with the revived Trotskyite move
rent. (It is of interest to note, parenthetically, that a new
Latin American Popular Liberation Front containing Trotskyite
elements, was organized in Argentina in early 1960, and that one
of the organizational meetings was held in Buenos Aires in the
home of the father of Guevara. Other meetings took place in
Buenos Aires under the aegis of Cuban and ,Bolivian diplomats.)
Hart's wife, Haydee Santamaria, is head of the C sa de las
Americas in Cuba, a front which is instrumental in financing
and training revolutionary youth in other Latin American countries.
In addition to those named above, there are probably others,
among them officials who have been subjected to intense propa-
ganda during visits to Communist China, who may favor the Chin-
ese in the present dispute. At the present time, these cannot be
identified. However, it is known that the Chinese feel that they
have support in Cuba. They indicated this at the time of the pre..
liminary meetings in Moscow in October 1960, and reportedly they
were able to prevent the distribution. in Cuba of certain issues of
Problems of Peace and Socialism which favored the Soviet view-
point.
With the establishment of a Chinese Communist embassy
in Cuba and with the ideological controversy still potentially
The Chinese have been extremely antagonistic toward
Yugoslav Communism. Thus this statement, at best,
indicates only that Olivares is eclectic and not controlled
by the PSP.
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SEC FORIV
disruptive, it seems probable that the Chinese will. seek to
exploit the various dissidents, unorthodox Communists, and
extremists in the 26th of July Movement as a force in their
favor. In this effort they will be greatly aided by the actual
presence on the Cuban scene of Chinese propagandists, tech-
nicians, and officials, among whom are CP members.
The influx of Chinese visitors began in early 1959.
The New China News Agency has had a staff, headed by
Kung Mai, at its Latin American headquarters in Habana
since mid-1959. In November 1959 the Communist Chinese
Foreign Minister sent word to Raul Castro that twenty Chinese
industrial and agricultural technicians would arrive in Cuba
in January 1960. Later reports suggest that these arrived and
have been engaged by INRA, and in September 1960 it was re
ported that Chinese Communists were working on an agricul-
tural cooperative in Caney, Oriente Province. Various Chinese
delegations have also visited Cuba. For example, in October
1960 a group of Chinese trade unionists headed by Kang Yung-ho
visited Cuba to participate in the WFTUmsponsored international
labor meeting in support of Algeria, and later toured Cuban
factories and talked with Cuban labor leaders. In addressing
workers at one factory, Kang described how the Chinese had
overcome their difficulties, had defeated the USA embargo,
and had developed production on the basis of their own resources.
In November 1960 a group of eight Chinese (including trade, bank-
ing, . and NCNA officials, and interpreters) was conducted on a
tour of INRA cooperatives in Matanzas and briefed by Captain Julio
Suarez, an extreme anti-American leftist who devoted much of
his speech to a description of supposed American sabotage of the
Cuban agricultural and industrial effort. The Chinese, during
the tour, made suggestions concerning the need for the liquidation
of counter -revolutionaries and the strengthening of the militia at
various installations. Even more extensive contacts in the future
are indicated in the statements made by Guevara in China in
December 1960, when he said that "twenty-four out of the hundreds
of factories" to be built in Cuba in the next five years will be built
with direct Chinese aid. By the close of 1960 Chinese anti-aircraft
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guns, bazookas, and mortars were reported to be in the hands
of Cuban forces.
In summary, it is apparent that both the Soviets and the
Chinese have an enormous stake in Cuba. Fidel Castro's am-
bition to export the Cuban revolution to the rest of Latin America
is in accord with both Soviet and Chinese goals. The Cuban gov-
ernment has received massive Soviet aid and relies heavily on
the advice of the orthodox Communist party (the PSP), which is
controlled by pro-Soviet leaders. These leaders, although calling
for the complete support of Castro, have nevertheless viewed him
with some misgivings. Castro's impetuosity and interest in mili-
tary action (which resulted in the unsuccessful Dominican invasion
and other revolutionary ventures) may not only be counterproduc-
tive and hinder the spread of Communism, but may also result in
the extension of war and the development of a global conflict. This
would not be in accord with the Soviet policies of recent years,
and although there are indications of Soviet approval of a more
aggressive international Communist line in 1961, it is possible
that the orthodox Communists still wish to avoid responsibility for
Fidelista extremism.
It may be significant, in this connection, that the un-
officially Communist-controlled Italian daily Il Paese, of
7 November 1960, identified four currents within the Cuban
revolutionary movement: the "Nationalist" current in-
spired by Nasser and neutralism; the "National Socialist"
current, inspired by Yugoslavia, Indonesia, and active
neutralism; the "Trotskyist" current, "which is inclined
to assume extremist postures and is a partisan of the
model of the Chinese Revolution"; and the "Communist"
current, organized by the PSP and which, "after having
corrected its errors, " is today the most well-balanced and
which, unlike the others, "still wishes to collaborate with
the petty bourgeoisie. "
SECORN
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To the Chinese, the extension of the armed struggle
to other countries through the activities of the Castro govern-
ment serves the immediate end of increasing international
tensions and creating problems for the United States on a wide
variety of fronts. The justification by 26th of July Movement
leaders of sabotage, terrorism, and the initiation, of violent
action regardless of the preparation of the masses is in accord
with this Chinese goal of promoting tension. Moreover, the
rural, agrarian, anti-imperialist characteristics of the Cuban
revolution allow the Chinese opportunity for offering advice
based on their own experience, even though they are not in a
position to offer the same technical, material, and military
aid as the Soviet bloc.
In. Mexico, recognition of the Sino-Soviet controversy
within the middle ranks of the orthodox Communist Party (the
Partido Comunista Mexicano, PCM) was reported in August
1960. At that time, Prisciliano Garza Escalante, a member of
the Central Committee, told several Nuevo Leon state PCM
leaders that he had recently returned from the USSR and China
and was disturbed by the developing rift between these coun-
tries. no said the "greatest single factor causing the deteriorate
tion of relations" was the Soviet adherence to a tactical line
described by the Chinese as being "weak and non-aggressive. "
Garza said the PCM mustj-_ study the controversy and decide
whether to support the Soviet or the Chinese party. Garza was
reported as personally favoring the more aggressive action line
of the Chinese.
About this same time, a "communication addressed to
the Political Commission of the PCM, " allegedly by "a group
of Chinese Communists in Cuba" indicates that the Chinese CP
may have sought, through direct channels, to establish its
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position before the CP Mexico. * This communication,
presumably received in September 1960, outlined four
points, which epitomized the Chinese position. These, in
brief, were as follows:
a. War is inevitable and. can break out at
any moment. It will be initiated by the imperialist
bloc led by the United States, or by the United
States alone without previous knowledge by its
allies.
b. War must not be feared, even a nuclear
war. It is not certain that such a war would destroy
humanity, and, although devastating, it must be
exploited to accelerate the pace of a transition to
Socialism.
c. In some countries, a peaceful transition
from capitalism to. socialism is improbable because.
it has been proved that imperialism goes to the aid
of the capitalistic system wherever the situation is
maturing.
It is possible that the foregoing statement of Chinese
views originated with the Chinese delegation to the
congress of the Cuban CP held in Habana in August
1960. It is not known that the Chinese used this occa-
sion for stating their case to other fraternal delegates,
though this is likely. Certainly the. Sino-Soviet rift
was discussed, as the Honduran delegate reported that
the P$P "disparaged the differences" between the two
powers. In referring to the rift, he stated that the
Chinese "did nbt approve of trying to reach agreements
with the W0st, " and although they recognized the inter-
national leadership of the USSR, they believed that
"more. people will die from hunger under capitalism
than would die in a war. It
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d, The. transition from capitalism to socialism
will be violent, but it is. the obligation of the Commun-
ist parties to blame capitalist agents for it.
Another indication of direct Chinese action in :defense
of their ideological viewpoint was the distribution. in Mexico of
the book Long Live Leninism. In. late September 1960 the first
shipment of 2000 copies of the Spanish edition arrived in Mexico,
and an. additional 3.000 copies were reportedly expected. This
book has been used. by the Chinese in their attack on Soviet views,
and its distribution has been protested by various CPs in both
bloc and non-bloc countries as injurious to. Communist unity. It
is possible that, from Mexico, the book has been distributed
elsewhere in Latin Americai..
In Mexico, evidence of Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban
influences must be viewed against a background of inter-party
and intra-party rivalry, disagreement, and intrigue. To date
there appears to be no clear reflection of the Sino-Soviet rift.
However, there is. considerable evidence of a growth. of leftist
extremism which, is supported from Cuba and which, as in Cuba,
seems to involve youth and student elements, a revived Trot-
skyist party, * and. dissident members of the Communist Party
of Mexico. There are also indications that the Peoples.' Social-
ist Party (PPS), which dominates the Mexican Communist move -
me.nt, favors, the Soviet position and, in the last year and a half,
has received increased Soviet support.
The Trotskyist Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR) was
founded in mid41959. Its leaders include Jorge Meza, a
railroad worker; Hernan. Fraga, a student; Carlos Lopez,
a painter; and Jaime Estrada Lopez, a law student. Like
its Cuban counterpart, it officially identifies. itself with
the IV International.
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Within the orthodox Communist party (PCM), indirect.
Soviet. guidance and possibly interference were responsible for
the overthrow in 1959-60 of Dionisio Encina, who symbolized
Stalinism, apd the rise to power in the party of Arnoldo Mar -
tinez Verdugo and others favoring the Khrushchev line. The
victorious anti-Encina group, however, itself has become.
divided in the past year between leaders such as David Alfaro.
Siqueiros, who favors agitation, and Martinez Verdugo, who
favors more discreet action which. would limit political
repercussions..
Si.q'ueiros, currently in prison for fomenting unrest,
appears to have been a key figure in the support in Mexico of
extremist agitation over the past year. He has apparently had
Cuban support. In August or September 1959 Siqueiros' brother-
in-law, Leopoldo Arenal. Bastar, was given possession of arms
which had been. stored in the Cuban embassy in Mexico, presum-
ably for use by a group described by Arenal as being composed
of "dissatisfied petroleum workers, railroad workers, and
teachers. " In November 1959 Arenal sought additional arms
from Cuban sources for the Alfaro Siqueiros group. In January
1960 Siqueiros strongly criticized President Lopez Mateos of
Mexico and praised the Cuban revolution, receiving emphatic
support from the then Cuban ambassador, Salvador Massip. In
February, Leopoldo Arenal again appeared at the Cuban embassy
selling Siqueiros' prints in order to buy parts for portable radios
to be used in. Mexico, and in July certain members of the Mex-
ican delegation to the First Latin American Youth Congress in
Habana. took with them a painting by Siqueiros to sell in order to
buy arms for an. armed revolution.
It is of interest that the principal. controversy which,
developed at the Youth Congress in Habana concerned the
recognition of the credentials of certain "Trotskyist" delegates
from Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina. Of the Mexican
delegation, which represented some twenty-three student and
youth. organizations, representatives of five groups supported
FITMGQR
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the recognition of delegates df, the Mexican Trotskyist Partido
Obrero Revolucionario and wished the congress to denounce
officially the government of President Lopez Mateos. This:
group included representatives from the Communist Youth of
Mexico (JCM, the youth affiliate of the PCM), the !!revolu-
tionary sector" of the National Teachers. Union (SNTE), the
Worker-Farmer Party of Mexico (POCM), and the University
Student Federation (FEU). Fourteen other groups, however,
opposed the recognition of the Trotskyists and the. denunciation
of the Mexican government. This group was led by the Popu-
lar Youth (JP), which. is the affiliate of Vicente Lombardo
Toledano's Popular Socialist Party (PPS), and other groups
controlled by the PPS. This. faction gained the support of the
congress, to the discredit. of the PCM..
This controversy, although not known to be a reflec-
tion of the Sino-Soviet dispute, appears to parallel two of
the fundamental points of Sino-Soviet disagreement: the de
gree to which violence shall be used to effect the transition
to socialism; and the degree to which the national bourgeoisie
(represented by Lopez MJ teos) can be trusted and used as
allies.
Since their defeat at the Youth Congress, the extrem-
ist elements in Mexico have been further weakened by the.
repressive measures taken by the government against student
and teacher. demonstrators in August, including the arrest of
Siqueiros, * and by the removal of Leonel Padilla and Cesar
Arnoldo Martinez. Verdugo, arrested at the same time,
was released and represented the PCM at the meeting
of Communist parties in Moscow, returning on. 18 Decem-
ber. Oton. Salazar, leader of the revolutionary sector of
the Mexican Teachers' Union (SNTE), is now reported
discredited within the SNTE.
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Augusto Velasco Sandoval from their positions of leadership
in the Communist Youth. The basic reason for the removal
of Padilla and Velasco, which was effected by the Commun-
ist party leaders, was reported to be their close connection
and collaboration with the Trotskyist POR. It was Padilla,
apparently, who had. been in charge of the sale of the Siqueiros
painting in. Cuba for armed revolutionary funding. Somewhat
later, the explusion of two members of the Juventud Comun-
ista for advocating armed revolt in Mexico was reported.
The foregoing information suggests that a purge of
extremist elements from among the orthodox Communists
has, been taking place, paralleled by governmental action
which.. has resulted in. the imprisonment or persecution of
Communist and extreme leftist agitators. Although all, the
Communist organizations protest the imprisonment of Deme-
trio Vallejo, Dionisio Encina, David Al.faro Siqueiros, and
others, the practical result of the arrests has favored the
elements which seem to support the Khrushchev line and has
weakened the extremist elements among whom the. Chinese.
views might find support. The current dominance of the pro-
Soviet elements within the orthodox Communist party is il-
lustrated in an. editorial in the PCM organ La Voz de Mexico
for I January 1961. This lauds the CPSU, supports coexist-
ence as the policy for world Communism, and ignores
Communist China.
As indicated above, in. connection with the conflict
which developed at the Latin American. Youth Congress, the
policies of the Peoples' Socialist Party (PPS), led by Vicente
Lombardo Toledano, tend to support the Soviet, rather than
the Chinese, point of view. The PPS, which defines itself
as Marxist-Leninist, favors "the constant development of
the existing democratic regime and, in due course, of the
peoples' democracy, in order to arrive at the establishment
of the socialist regime. " In. practice, it defends collabora-
tion with the bourgeois administration of President Lopez
Mateos, which it seeks to infiltrate and influence, and attacks
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extremist sectarian opposition to the administration as
counterproductive.
Lombardo's policies were exemplified in his con-
demnation of the railroad strike of March 1959, which was
supported by the PCM and the POCM and which resulted
in the arrest. and imprisonment of Demetrio Vallejo and
other leaders, and subsequently Dionisio Encina. Lom -
bardo's statement concerning the strike came on 30 April
1959~after his return fom the USSR. Later, in July, he
told party members that he had been told by Soviet Commun-
ist leaders to assume the dominant role in all leftist activ-
ities in Mexico. He has also stated privately that Soviet
and satellite officials instructed him to reactivate all exist-
ing friendship societies under his control and direction.
Subsequentl)5,in 1960, Lombardo has reorganized and re-
named his party to identify it more closely with international
Communism, and reportedly has gained Soviet approval of
the PPS platform as the basis for an anti-imperialist front
in Mexico.
There can be little doubt that Lombardo has been
well informed on the Sino-Soviet rift through his high
WFTU position and his Soviet contacts. He attended the
twenty-first meeting of the Executive Committee of the
WFTU as well as the WFTU General Council Meeting in
Peiping in June 1960, at which the dispute began to grow
heated. Subsequently, Lombardo published an article in
Siempre (Mexico City, 20 July 1960) presenting an examin-
ation of the international scene "as seen from China", and
representing "the opinions of the leaders and the people of
the countries which are building socialism". The article
serves to support the Soviet point of view, however, with
respect to the castrophic nature of a new war which "for the
socialist countries, would represent the immediate paral-
yzation of their constructive programs; that is to say, the
impossibility of building socialism within the anticipated
time. "
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In summary, it. is apparent that the Soviets have made
a strenuous effort to strengthen their position in Mexico,
relying heavily on. the PPS and certain leaders of the PCM.
Chinese. views, although known to party leaders, have found
no significant support or acknowledgment. However, there
exist certain pro-Cuban extremist elements, Trotskyists,
and disgruntled Stalinists who may favorably respond to
Chinese Communist overtures, should these be made to them.
Although there is little prospect of the development of a strong
pro-Chinese Communist element. in Mexico, the existence of
a great number of separate, rival Communist parties and
cliques may provide a useful index to the nature of various
international ideological trends or schisms.
In other Latin American countries there are also
differences within the CPs and between the CPs and other
revolutionary groups which are similar to those existing
in Cuba and Mexico. These involve conflicts between activ-
ists and pacifists, between. youth and age, between the inex-
perienced and the experienced. For example, the head of
the Radical Youth. in Chile recently wrote to a friend and
former Cuban student leader, now an INRA official, that:
in Chile... a. start must be made at once.
Only one of the political leaders of Chile has the
mind and determination to pursue the revolutionary
course. That is. Clotario Blest.... This attitude
has almost brought him to disgrace in the eyes of
the leftist political leaders, especially those of
the Communist. Party, who think we must still wait
indefinitely. t!
In Brazil, a conflict exists within the CP itself, where
a leftist faction headed by Mauricio Grabois, Calil Chadde,
Carlos Danielli, and others has opposed the policies defined
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in the party's present program, which they claim defers.
socialist goals and abandons consideration of violent ac-
tion. This controversy is apparently becoming linked with
the problem of. the support of the Cuban revolution.,, and the
din satisfaction of the Fidelistas with. the pacifist policies
of the PSP is being duplicated in their attitude toward the
PCB. Thus Calil Chadde said that certain Cuban revolu-
tionary leaders had complained to him in August 1960 about
the lack of Brazilian support for the Cuban. revolution, and
a Brazilian editor, who conferred with Prensa Latina execu-
tives in Habana in November, reported that unnamed Cuban
officials had. criticized the Brazilian CP for refusing to
allow other groups, such as the Trot~kyites, to join in pro-
Cuban activities. The Cubans indicated that they would like
to find some group other than the CP to assume direction
of pro-Cuban. activities in Brazil, but that the CP was the
only one which could. be relied on.
Conflicts of this type exist also in other countries
and may easily become associated with the PSP?Fidelista.
conflict and also, eventually, with. the Sino=Soviet conflict
as the two Communist powers seek to extend or strengthen
their policies and as local Communists or revolutionaries
look for. support for their ow.n. policies or tactics as deter-
mined by their oven views of the opportunities presented by
the immediate national political situation. To date, there
has been little evidence of direct Chinese. involvement in
such. factionalism and conflict that does. exist, but this
situation may change now that a Chinese Communist base.
for operations has been established in. Habana.
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