THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE INTER-PARTY DEVELOPMENTS AT AND AFTER THE RUMANIAN WORKERS PARTY CONGRESS - - BUCHAREST, 20-25 JUNE 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240023-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 23
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE SINO.SOVIET DISPUTE
INTER-PARTY DEVELOPMENTS AT AND AFTER THE
RUMANIAN WORKERS PARTY CONGRESS?BUCHAREST, 20-25 JUNE 1960
The background of the dispute (1957-1960)
1. The present dispute between the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) has
its origins in differences which date back at least three years--
that is, to the summer of 1957. On the Chinese side, antecedent
resentments may date as far back as the formative period of the
CPC in the twenties, when Stalin's policy of alliance with the
Kuomintang drove the CPC to disaster, as well as to the war and
early post-war perion, when Soviet support for the Chinese Com-
munist cause was minimal and did not inhibit the stripping of
Manchuria. There is clearly no single cause for the current
dispute. Rather, it would appear, an accumulation of Chinese
policies and actions increasingly displeased and challenged
Khrushchev and, presumably, a majority of the Soviet leadership.
In the field of domestic policy, it is now known that Mao's "Let
a hundred flowers bloom" program aroused Soviet doubts about
its usefulness. The program for the "great leap forward"
beginning in early 195$ and the communes program, adopted by
the CPC in May 1958 were readily recognisable as s. considerable
irritant in Sino-Soviet relations by the silent treatment which
they received in the Soviet Union.
2. Disagreement over foreign policy manifested itself in
August 1958 when Khrushchev, after four days of discussion with
Mao Tse-tung, publicly rejected, on 5 August, Vestern proposals
for a summit meeting within the U. N. Security Council on the
crisis in the Middle East?proposals which he had accepted in
July. Nevertheless, on 23 August the Chinese began shelling of
the off-shore islands. On 23 May 1958 the Coplimder of the
Chinese Air Force predicted that China would make atomic bombs
"in the not too distant future" and the Chinese press ceased to
amismaimea.
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li?i plan for an
4 his concept of
for "the Far East and the entire Pacific Basin' e 21st
CPS, Cngrse a in February 1959. Chinese reactions were
not enthusiastic, and, from April 1939. an, refurtnc. to the
plan disappeared altogether. In the light of these and other
indicetions, it Can be fairly assumed that Soviet unwillingness
to deliver atomic weapons to Chinese control had become a
serious issue. It is now known that the Soviets cited as the
reason for their reluctance their apprehension over Chinese
policies and pronouncements in the external field which were
in conflict with Khrushchevis "peaceful coexistence" tactics,
which affirmed that global or limited war need not be avoided,
and Which objected to Khrushchev's aid programs for "bourgeois"
regimes in underdeveloped countries on the grounds that they
would delay revolution. Chinese objections to peaceful coexistence
tactics manifested themselves after 1957 in the deliberations of
the International Communist Front organisations, especially
within the World Peace Council and the International Union of
Students...two organisations which were most directly and in-
tensely engaged in building their appeal on the unity campaign
so typical of the peaceful coexistence perioe. They desired to
Involve bourgeois and nationalist groups in mass action and
therefore advocated informal conversations, negotiations,
and concessions to such groups. The Chinese refused to "sit
around the table" with them except in formal meetings of
designated representatives, and resisted Soviet efforts to
broaden the scope of concessions on program and organisation
questions. Chinese resistance was particularly manifest after
the Soviet decision of June 1959 concerning Ithrushcbev's visit
to the United States.
. In August 1959, the Chinese overran Indian border
Longju and reopened the border dispute wialt India, after
years of quiet. The Soviet position on this dispute signifi.
failed to give full endorsement to the Chillt61V claims,
earlier Chinese repressive actions in Tibet had been
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promptly supported as just and as an "internal affair."
Khrushchev, as was known later, did not interpret the reopening
of the dispute as a mere attempt to register opposition to his
trip to the United States, but as an un-Marxist blunder which
needlessly undermined Indian neutralist attitudes and potential
value in the peace and disarmament campaign and impaired the
appeal of CP India. When Khrushchev visited Peiping, after
his trip to the United States, for the October anniversary cele-
brations in 1959. the Si1110?117Lgon dispute was dne topic of discussion
sad it is virtually certain that Khrushchev presented his views on
improving USSR-U.S. relations. Sine-Soviet discussions were
? unsatisfactory, however, and no communique was published.
According to three widely separated and reliable sources, in
QEARAgimaSamirailligig5t-.44tter tra at 1_,Lat the b1o!Ues,
In bol IEWS-QA-UPWrUgici, re24#944.
November 1959, V. Uyitchev, Chief of the Agitprop Department
of the CPSU, published an article in Problems of Peace and
Socialism that justified the policy of peaceful coexistence as Vtlase
struggle on the international plane" and significantly noted Lenin's
criticism of "Left Communists." It is known that the Chinese
have since been accused of criticising the November 1959 joint
program of the European parties, which is clearly based upon
the same premises as the article. In December 1959, Khrushchev
warned the Chinese in stating at the Hungarian Party Congress
that "we must all synchronise our watches."
4. In January 1960, the Chinese positions hardened. At
the Rome meeting of the Presidential Committee of the World
Peace Council in January 1960 it transpired that the Chinese
had charged the USSR with seeking to isolate China in the
interest of achieving a =Lofts vivendi with the U.S. A reliable
source states that the USSR in January 1960 informally broached
to the Chinese the idea that the Sino-Soviet differences required
discussion, only to be told by the Chinese that the differences
were between the parties and should not be mentioned. The
CPC appears to have reached during January important decisions
which had a major effect on the dispute. On 21 January the
3
Seeliernelerfrr
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People's Congress adopted
t which specified that
treaties it takes part in framing;
meeting of the foreign ministers
the Chinese observer, Kiang
ant in his speech, broadening
greements." The contrast
descriptions of theworld, situation in Xiang Shang
those given by the European bloc speakers was
the 1957 Mo*cew declarat
port the conflicting position
February 1960 asserted that "the
opulent of tit* onal situation has borne out the
as of the ration." It appears likely, therefore,
se decided in late .7extuary to take the initiative
the debate. 13ut also on 6 February a verbal
the Central Committee of the CPSU asking the
CPC to &ttend a meeting to discuss outstanding problem* was
trend in Peiping.
mid.April 1960 the Chinese took advantage
sexy of Lenin's birth to make their most
on the theoretical innovations developed by the
CPSU at and after the 10th Party Congress in January 1956.
Using oblique but unmistakable arguttemts. the Chinese
challenged the premises underlying Soviet foreign policy and
by implication disparaged Ithrushchev's stature as a Communist
theorist. The Chinese attack comprised three major statements:
two articles in the party's theoretical monthly Red mks (issues
alls. 7 and 14 1 sad 16 APT11), the first entitled "On Imperialism
as the Source of War in Modern Times" end the second entitled
"Lettig Live Leninism i " as well as an editorial on 22 April in
the authoritative newspaper. the People's
4
as, .r.dis 4Z4s
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7. The Soviet. replied in the speech delivered in MOSCOW
April by Otto the CPSU Central Committee and
start**. A very defense of current Soviet foreign
and of the general lines endorsed at the 20th and 21st
Cengresses, his speech confined its critical comments
Amoral statements condemning "dogmatic positions as back
positions." On the same day * Chinese Politburo alternate,
Lu Tingd, gave a speech in Peiping which incorporated many
of the arguments of the "Long Live Leninism" article. The
divergences between the two speeches were so great that when
one Commie:dot party seriously affected by the dispute. the
Indian party, published both speeches side by side in the $ May
lima of its newspaper New Age, without comments, its action
aroused considerable comment and created confusion among
party members.
I. The Chine then began to carry their ea
ether parties. "Long Live Leninism, " the Lu T
104 the People's Daily editorial of 22 Aprils ated
sad published in the widely circulated English language poking
of 16 April. At the same time, the first edition of
containing the three articles was produced by the
Languages Press in Peiping in many languages for
on abroad. Two further editions of this book were
pduced, one in May and the other, after the Suchnrest
tions, in August. The book is known to exist in
vanish. French, the Eastern European languages
Russian), and Vietnamese. It has been distributed
4 in certain countries at least of Latin America
and Western Europe. It spears that the Chinese later at-
tempted to circulate the arUcles in the USSR in ono of their
two Russian language publications. Drushba? an action which
the Soviets protested. The magasine was in fact suspended
from circulation in the USSR after the publication of the June
issue. earlier inetances of Soviet refusals to circulate
Chinese doctrinal writings in the USSR have recently been
reported by reliable sources, who heard the details during
party discussions of the Sino-Soviet differences.
5
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al o Chinese
anniversary of
? the
ligation
PIns al.P.114,#1 der
lic ideological debate v4th the
the use of the charge of
published on 10 Juba. one
r Soviet Russia, end one by
per Pravda, expressed this
rary tattooing deviationisrn"
positions held by the Chinese
d the significance of the 11
Party Dec1*rstion of November 1937. Matkovsky characterised
it as of the international Communist
of the general line expressed
other hand, referred parti-
authorizing and requiriag a struggle
m" as well as against "rightist
the Yugoslays. In discussing
pportunism he mad. the significant
oups of Communists but the leadership
ve veered into leftist deviationisna."
explicitly identified the Chinese as
but their relevance to the dispute
g of this intensification of the Soviet *Oa k
s coincides with a CPS11 letter on the
h was circulated, shortly after
Et following the collapse of the con.
parties of the bloc and those of
the text of this letter is not
have been unacceptable to the
Om rstid?May on that the course
proved the validity of the
Imperialism and the illusory
gotiation. Perhaps the worst
Chinese, in Soviet eyes, Nmes their argument
6
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mmunist participation
urely tactical advan
? Of the true eharec
nation was precisely the kind o
U Wes most *WIT to avert.
11. it is lihely too that the CPSU decided at this time
d a sharp letter or criticism to the CPC. One
eat Free World Communist who visited Moscow in
y stated that he learned from a member of the CPSU
tat that a "sharp" letter was being sent to the CPC.
re calling for a conference was reportedly sent to
on 2 June and on 7 June, sad it appears likely that
2 June was the "sharp" one. it is also worth
e CPC le/Were went into closed conference in
* move which may well have been prompted
two CPSU letters. They were in fact still
see delegation left for the Illuslutrest
Chinese too made a major move in the now
*ping dispute. They did this in early June at the
Connell meeting of the 'World Federation of
in Peiping. On 2 June they presented an ultimatum
WFTU report to the chief Soviet representative.
d it. The Chinese claimed that the report contained
features1 including attacks on the communes.
tin& which opened on S June after a five-day delay.
? of both WFTU affiliate* and representatives
five unaffiliated national trade union federations,
as figures Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-ch'i, 1.4u
ping, and Liu Chang-sheng publicised
the peace struggle, the threat of imperialism.
*used by the campaigns for peaceful co.
programs for giving substantial economic aid
d underdeveloped countries. Using a tactic they
d earlier in April, the Chinese leaders accompanied
7
milinewIPPOPPERINIm
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All.. Ili.. al.? A
expressions of approva
U.S. at the time
nce. This approval of
by expressions of soli
stt.S. sets of aggression.
U was particularly stung by the
Chang.sheng.
nod a private meeting of
of CPSU doctrines, representatives
pposed the continuation of the talks
ge that the Chia**, action was a
of the 11 Party Declaration of November
the authority of the Moscow decla.
apple' in the Shevlynia article
charge has since figured
esentation of its case. According
a virTU session Teas liaise
e CPC, accused the CPSU in
*w declaration overboard."
pro
to.
pting, gsn.ral seers
turn of2 "Aro:ging
ox x
14
et
er CP's against the Chinese. Tb.. representative
rld CP was told, by a representative of the
Central Council of Trade Unions, that the
in Peiping was interested in knowing if he
In Moscow after the end of the conference.
5. When a group of European and African delegates to
U meeting arrived in Moacow on 13 dune, a number
U officials conferred with members of this group. One
legates in the group is limey/a to have talked privately
official, V. Tereshkin, of the CPSU Foreign
oncoming the Slap-Soviet dispute. The delegate was
4mtaarmarmliitmtimir
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"Weireope.
rotation the CPSU placed on recent
Tereshkin asked that lie have a plenum
connnittee convened after his return
Chinese at Peiping and to condemn them
scow declaration. A second parson,
s L. I. lireabsev, chairman of the
Soviet, was also reported present
to a statement brroadcast
s in session, representatives el
t parties held * meeting
y rsaftlmed their adherence
. because the leadership of both
seated in the group of WFTU delegates
pears possible that the meeting
and that the reaffirm/piton was
s.
e cryptic endorsements of the
19 June 1960 a ststement by Agostino
Communist and president of the
the Italian Party newspaper Unita.
was also broadeast in Italian from
Novella described the Chinese
proposed at the WFTU Council
the 10 June Soviet
ewe as "devistione." So far as
the first iustance in which a
publicised this charge against
of the statement coincided
d Congress of the Rumaniaa
Bucharest, where the newt phase of the
17. The
for Soviet adoption
Ion to press at Bucharesi
We is suggested by an
9
arimioreedkarillf"'
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the 14 June issue ofit.ed, Flag, which, in an obvious
reference to the CPSU's earlier justification of its views on
peace and peaceful colaxistence, observed that "one cannot
separate oneself from the revisionists merely by stating that
the forces of socieliem predominate over the forces of
imperialism." The Chitteseitslletieulo the .ctristreos
the Rumanian Workers PariLatoppstria-hioacow for an
of views iT7 iune. It presented a. litter from the
CPC which limited its powers to agreeing on * dote for a
party conference to discuss Stop-Soviet differences and ex.
changing views, without, however, adopting any formal
resolution. The CPSU representative, were not successful
In obtaining an admiseion from the Chinese delegation of
e errors of the CPC. The Chinese, however, reportedly
expressed. willingness to correct their positions if in an
exchange of views with the delegates *buctieres* a majority
should prove them wrong. The CPSUclust_i_fring i scton
by luiokIn the November 1957 Peace Mangesto Shall
Pa tilt MN tiMek intitted that
stpaxtries ialuallid mutually be
trk.X,Cokeit a final
e Bucharest session should
but an exchange of views.
at Bucharest that in Moscow the CPSU
reposal that other parties be brought
d wished to confine the group to
blocparties only. The Chinese said that
d this proposal. It would appear. then, that
ence to their instruction forced the Soviets'
hand.
18...Ithough there are reports that the CPSU intended
by the end of May to attck the Chinese at Bucharest, tile
Soviet decision to make a major effort there to enlist the
support of other parties appears to have been reached as a
result of the Chinese stand on 17 June. Virtually none of
the major Free World parties sent top.lsvel delegates to the
10
iltreseparensinom
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congresses, The 1&ct thst hrushchev wa to ad the Soviet
delegation was announced only on June le, the dity of his
departure. All the European satellite delegations except
Albania were led by per eons of national stature equal to that
01.101ruehchev, but the late arrival of Comullra of Feland
and the early departure of Novotny of Csechosievehis, suggest
that this top4evel representation was organized on abort
notice. The leader of She Chinese delegation, Film; Chen,
was clearly outranked by this group. Fifty parties were
represented at the congress. Twenty.ftve of the thirty.five
bon-bloc fraternal delegations identified as present were
composed of second and third echelon party leaders and
none of the more significant Fre* World parties, except
Chile and Syria, were represented by their leaders.
19. The Soviet delegation to Bucharest included
B. Ponontarev and Y. A. Andropov, the heads of the two
Central Committee sections for relations with the non*bloc
parties and bloc parties, respectively. During the first days
of the congress they and their colleagues concentrated on
briefing fraternal delegates. It is knovm that a group of
En lishospeaking delegates and a second group comprising
those who spoke Spanish were called together separately and
briefed from a long letter which the CPSU intended to issue
to all parties, The letter had apparently been either corn.
plated or revised at this last moment, for it contained the
Soviet account of the Moscow oxchaages of 17 June and
explained the Soviet view of how the inter?party discussion
should be handled. The inclusion of Wu lisiu-ch'uan, the
deputy director of the CPC's International Liaison Depart
merit. as one of the four Chinese delegates suggests that the
Chine.. too planned to exploit their supporters and acquaintances
among the delegates.
20. The reporting on the sequence of events at ucharest
concerning the Sino?Soviet dispute is in some respects contra-
dictory. The following probable chronology, however, emerges
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from
a. a.
its open sessions.
to the congress, p
criticised "mechanical
"children",
onions
ble Information.
Rumanian party coti
? Ithrushchev. in his fi
ed the essentials of the
(mestere of what Lenin
" imperialism.called such p
ess began
at public speech
Soviet line and
said on
and attacked
nthoee wtto do not understand that war is, laider present
circumstances, not inevitable." Other public speeches by
Rumanians and fraternal delegates. including the Chinese.
Pseng Chen, occupied most of the 21st. 22nd, and 23rd.
b. On 22 lune P'ests Chen spoke publicly the
ming. He included in his remarks a characterisation of
recent U. S. actions as a "peace fraud," and he 'warned that
"imperialism can never be trusted." Referrbig on a number
of points to the 12 Party Declaration, he emphasised the
doctrinal statements previously highlighted in the Chinese
criticisms of the Soviet line. He praised the Cuban and Alger an
struggles and said that war could be averted and peace pre-
served by aiding liberation movements and revolutionary
struggles. He also sailed for Communist unity and the
"broadest possible anti.imperialist united front with this unity
at its core." He further charged, as his party had done
earlier, that the imperialists were using modern revisionists
(Tito) to disrupt Comnamist unity, and he called ler a struggle
to the end against modern revisionism. He made no mention
of "peaceful coexistence." an omission for which he was later
upbraided by Khrushchev. It was on this day that the CPSU
reportedly begun caucusing with the fraternal delegates.
21. Three Inter-party meeting. dealing with the Sino'
? et dispute smear to have been held. The first occurred OA
24 June, when the Soviet bloc representatives met all day to
draft a communique. No information is *visitable on this meeting
beyond a statement that the first draft of the communique was
presented by the Soviet representative and that the Chinese felt
12
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obliged to refer the
Peiping for possible
communique appears,
Its. delegation. to have
CPSU. The Chinese dole
a dilemma, but succumbing
COMITItUliqUO on the 24th
the Central Committe in
. The move to produce
light of the CPC instructions to
iurpriss pressure move by the
were obviously faced with
pressure, they did sign the
ZZ. On ZS June, altar the conclusion of the Congress
at rnidsday, a closed meeting of approximately 140 ate*
from 50 parties was convened. This ameond meeting, a full*
scale debate, was opened by the first secretary of the
Rumanian party. Cateerglska..Dej, who read the draft corn
mutaique. A number of other delegate' then spoke, including,
at least, representatives of East Germany, the UK, France,
and Italy. In fact, according to one source, more than
twenty delegates spoke before the Chinese representatives
took the floor. The Soviet caucusing and briefings had had
me effect, for most of the speakers are reported to have
erred in general to the Soviet line of argtuttent. It is also
lb noting that PasPolovi the Soviet representative at this
reportedly did not speak. This tactic...in which
? the lead in a Soviet-inspired attack- -is well known
and is usually employed to permit the CPSU to have the last
word and to appear all aa objective mediator rather than
merely as one more partisan participant in a debate. When
the Chinese representative finally spoke, he attacked the
line taken by most of the preceding speakers, chartists that
It Was unrealistic, slanderous, and groundless, and based
upon incomplete evidence. He also criticised negative
attitudes toward certain Chinese domestic policies and
asserted that the reports prepared for the WFTU Peiping
meeting had contained attacks against the communes and great..
step forward programs. (Se. note.) He refuted charges
that the Chinese had not played their full part in the peace
struggle, referring to their support of /Chruslichev's visit to
the U.S. and to Mau En.lai's negotiations with many countrie
13
11 T
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Be els* insisted that the Chine.. had supported peaceful
coexistence, noting in particular their role in the 1935 Bandung
conference. According to another source, the Chinese rep.
resentative also stated that China would stand on the Moscow
declaration of 1957, supported the idea that a reappraisal of
the international situation was necessary, and endorsed a
proposal that the reappraisal should be carried out on a
multiparty basis. Pospelov too endorsed this proposal. This
Chinese reaction appears to have been mainly defensive; what
new facts the Chinese delegate brought forward were apparently
selected to prove that the Soviet case was t biased and and
incomplete presentation.
(Note. This Chinese charge is particularly interesting
because the two main WFTU reports presented at Peiping, by
Marcel Bras and Ibrahim Zakaria, did not criticize these
Chinese policies. In fact, the Bras report contained two
laudatory references to the communes. It is known, however,
that on 2 June (i.s.. three days before the delayed opening of
the Peiping meeting) the Chinese informed V. Grishin, the
head of the Soviet delegation, that the treatment of the peace
and disarmament themes in the draft V rTu reports was
inacceptable and would be openly attacked if the drafts were
not amended before presentation.. It is also known that these
sections were not amended to meet Chinese demands?in fact,
a number of amendments actually made in the final report
strengthened the WTI'U's support for the Soviet peace line.
At least one amendment, dealing with the question of Free
World economic trade and aid with under-developed countries,
was, in fact, of such a nature as to be particularly unpalatable
to the Chinese. It has *leo been reported that the French
representatives at Bucharest were particularly incensed with
the Chinese for having brought this question into the debate,
but no one is reported to have refuted the Chinese charge as
untrue. One report provides a clue to a plausible explanation
of this matter by noting that the Chinese said that "such a
WFTU report would have been rejected by the Chinese people."
si?iimewitmneglin
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It seems likely then that the Chines* charges referred to
original draft of the WTTU report prepared by Louis SsUlant.
The offending language probably was edited out. at Soviet
insistence, before Bras actually delivered the report to the
council. The involvement of the two Frenchmen. Saillant and
Bras, in this matter would explain the vigorous reaction of the
French delegates at Bucharest.)
Z3. Delegates at this second meeting received a numb?r
of papers, including en 80-plue page Chinese translation of a
CPSU document. This document appears to be a critical factor
In the further development of the dispute. Its existence has
been reported by a number of independent and widely separated
sources, and at least time reports indicate that it was a sharp.
wide ranging, and bitterly critical summary of Soviet criticisms
of the CPC. One source has reported that, prior to the Bucharest
congress, the CPSU addressed a "sharp" letter to the CPC
embodying its criticisms of Chinese doctrines and actions in.-
luding charges against the Chinese foreign policy toward India
and Algeria, as well as charges that Chinese actions were
straying "bourgeois" confidence in Communist desires for
peace end arousing Afro 'Asian suspicions of international
Communism. The fact that the CPSU sent a letter "raising
various issues" to the CPC was also stated by Vans Chen at
Bucharest. A third source, describing the contents of the
document, also notes its sharp.tone and its charges of Chinese
tors in the foreign policy toward India. In addition, this
source says that it criticised Chinese nationalism and Chinese
non-cooperation with the USSR in military matters. On the
basis of this series of reports it seems probable that the
Chinese?translated Soviet document distributed at this second
meeting on ZS June was in fact the full text of the "sharp"
CPR! letter to the CPC (see above pars U). If this was the
case its presentation by the Chinese was clearly a part of
their effort to set the record straight, and undoubtedly
disrupted the Soviet tactical plans for the meeting. Such a
significant decision must necessarily have been mode by the
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CPC Central Committee, probably during its rly June
meeting, and suggests the CPC's attitude ?toward the
Bucharest meeting was predicated, at least to some extent,
on the Use of this tactic. There is some question whether
librushchev was present at this first day of debate. At least
one source indicates that he was present, but there is no
evidence that he participated in the discussion.
24. On 26 June came the final meeting, another closed
*ion that was attended by those present on the preceding
it was at this second installment of the debate the
chev personally presented his general indictment of
Chinese and provoked a heated exchange with Vent Chen.
A number of reports state that the Khrushchev sppech opened
the proceedings. The speech was a long one and reportedly
Involved direct attacks on Liao Tse-tung, comparing him to
Stalin as "always thinking in his own terms" and "formulating
theories without coming into contact with the events of the
modern world." One source states that Khrushchev's speech
was arranged at short notice. The reporting on the speech
suggest* that it was at least partly extemporaneous, with
Khroshchev injecting facts, anecdotes, and direct charge*.
that effectively demolished the attitude of restraint, tact,
and adherence to principle wlich the CPSV had previously
tried to maintain in the debate. Speaking angrily, with
violent gestures, he described the CPC doctrine* as ultra-
leftist, as dogmatic, and, finally, as left revisionist. He
said the Chinese did not understand the nature of modern
war, and rejected Chinese protests over the fact that the
USSR had failed to support China in her border dispute with
India characterizing the dispute as a conflict of purely
national interests in which the interests of world Communism
re not involved. There is reason to suspect that his attack
o included charges directed against some elements of
r Communist parties of complicity with the Chinese. He
attacked Pleng Chen himself, chiding him for his failure to
refer to peaceful coexistence in his public address to the
16
4.111199111011.1P141$41Mom
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congress on the 22nd. In generalapparently reiterated in
ronger and less ambiguous terms virtually all the charges
embodied in the original CPSU letter to the CPC. Since
s speech is described by sem* sources as a systematic and
detailed presentation of the Soviet charges, it seems likely
that it was in fact built around the argumentation of the draft
ciruclar letter of 21 June earlier shown to Free World
delegate.,
25. Pleas Chen is reported to have replied very
heated tonna. He said he had asked for on to he
held on equal terms, and that the CPC respected the CPSU
as an "elder brother" but not as a "father" party. Counter.
attacking strongly, he accused Khrushanv of orgsaieing the
meeting to make an attack on the CPC and Mao Tse.tung and
to cover up a Soviet effort to undermine the prestige of the
CPC. He defended Mao'es "more in contact with the modern
world than Xhruslachev, and more active than ever since
leaving the government chairmanship." Referring to
Khrushchev himself in terms reminiscent of the 16 June Red
Fin article, he charged that HIChrushchev's policy is a policy
of revisionism, creating illusions about imperialism and under
estimating its true nature." Speaking of the abrupt shifts in
Khrushchev's policy toward the imperialist powers, he repor
tei
asked the delegates whether "any conclusione can be drawn re
gerding 1Chrushchevis policy toward the imperialist powers."
Hs stated finally that the CPC had no trust in Xhrushchev's
analysis of the world situation and especially his policy toward
the imperialists. Refuting Ithrushchev's charges that the
Chinese did not understand modern 'oar, Pleas said the Chinese
had proved in Korea as well as against the Japanese that they
have more experience than other peoples of the world. He
further registered a proteet, saying that he had asked for delay
in the iseuance of the communique but had been told on 24 June
that It had to be aimed ia the interest of unity. He stand for
the benefit of other delegates the instructions under which he
was working, and said that if the communique were published
17
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mammal* -11,11nli!riT'
0
? Central Committee car
squired.
26. A SUM.ber of state ts by others wer. then made
In a general discussion. Todor Zhivkov first spoke d gave
full support to Khrushchev's position.; others, 4611 less
warm than Zhivkov, were, it is reported. generally pro-
Khrusitcherv in their views. No one spoke against the Soviet
position. Khrushchev reportedly ended the session by saying
that further bilateral discussions between the CPSU and the
CPC were necessary.
21. A commission (or comm et up
sessions to prepare for a. conference to be held dur
next November anniversary celebrations In Moscow1 etere
arties were to present their views. Divergent reports
on e composition of the committee have been received. In
Emeriti they agree that the committee was to involve about
parties and that all the bloc parties were to be rop-
ed. At least two separate reports state that the polities
gentina, Cuba, Brazil, Japan, and West Gerrnaity were
to be represented on the commission. One of these re
supported by a third separate one, also states that Italy
since were to participate. Other perties to participate,
listed only in single reports, are those of the U.S., the U.K.,
India. Syria. and Australia. At least one source states that
the commission was to be composed only of representative*
of the bloc parties. The terms of reference of this COIXOW I Sian
are not known. The commission has since been called to meet
in Moscow at the end of September. ALseparate CPSU committee
has allegedly been set up as well, to prepare a new CPSU
? document on the dispute. It seems probable that the CPSU is
plownong to use it in November as the draft letter of 21 June
was used at Bucharest, to predetermine the outcome of the
conference. According to one source. Khrushchev gave in.
structione to the delegates at the end of the session that they
were to report back to their Central Committees that a plenum
18
aieszeitios
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shou d be convened to discuss the doctrinal dispute, with the
results of these plenums to be disseminated at all 1eels of
the party. On the basis of other information however, it
appears probable that most parties did not construe his *tate-
ment as a command, /or there were few such programs
initiated before the CPSU4s plenum of mid?July.
28. The final co unique approved by the fraternal
delegates was relessed by TAMS in Moscow on 27 Sun..
According to one source, it was adopted primarily to conceal
the fact that the meeting had fated to accomplish anything,
but the CPSU, particularly lihrushchev, clearly wanted it
as a device to exert pressure for prompt resolution of the
dispute. A short and virtually mechanical reaffirmation of
the validity of the 12 Party Declaration of November 1957,
its text did not in fact clarify any of the issues in the dispute.
This became apparent in a few days with the appearance of
the Soviet and Chinese press statements on the communique.
The signatures of the 12 Bloc parties (including the CPC)
registered on 24 June, and the unanimous approval given by
the fifty parties represented were to prove the only significant
feature of the communique.
29. The principal result. of the Bucharest tinge appear
to be the following. The Chinese succeeded in making known
to a large audience of bloc and non-bloc Communist party
gates their strong exceptions to Khrushchevos policies and
orne of the less "principled" actions taken against them by
the CPSU. They may have hoped that their adamant tactics
would create fear of an open split and thus force the Soviets
to break down or compromise. Their actions left the Soviet
and their supporters in other parties little CAOL4411 but to
defend the Soviet position as the supreme suthority and policy
maker in the international Communist movement and to apply
against the Chinese all their influence within the bloc and Free
World Communist parties. It would appear that the final
Chinese position was one from Which they will have to retreat
U they desire a settlement. it is premised that this will be
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the situation with
them in November 1940,
meets in Moscow on the
October Revolution.
The CPSU
213
ets will Mt*
the world Communis
sion of the celebration of the
30. The CPU circular of 21 June cossiated of some s
ages. In an introductory section it outlined the history of
dispute in "recent:ft* years. In succeeding sections it analysed
and refuted the Chinese arguments and it presented a bill of
particulars on instances of Chinese violative of discipline.
31. Soviet views or the beckground of the di9ute. The
=wet stated that, deapits a long history of friendly re.
as and cooperation between the USSR *ma the CPR, the
.it* noted that the Chinese had "recently" begun to take
gent positions on very important questions and that this
tend threatened to disrupt good relations and the solidarity
of the international movement. This divergence was mari.
fasted in the Chinese articles on the senivarsery of Lenin's
birth in April, statements within the WFTU and other inter.
national organizations, and Chinese statements at variance
with the 1957 Moscow Decleration and Peace Ma:life:go. The
CPSU had made no move against these Chime. statements,
considering it necessary to bold a meeting to discuss them.
32. According to the Soviet*, Chou En lei told the
Soviet Ambassador to China in January that the problem was
essentially a Party matter and that he preferred not to discuss
it.
ExeCrpts set rigs in this *CCouflt are
basefd on a number of summaries of the document, and
do not necessarily reflect ct text of the original.
ZO
eleelleeMteeseeliimmo
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? 33. On 6 February 1940, this Catrai Canunittee of the
CPSU proposed a discussion to resolve the dlffersnc?a. The
Chinese retailed to attend such a meeting and began publicising
their views.
34. At the time of the meeting of the General Council of
the WFTU in Peking in early June, the Chinese revealed to
the Soviets their great dissatisfaction with CPSU positions
and they also told other Communists of their attitude. On
Z JUJU Liu Ning-yi told Grishin that the Chinese were very
dissatisfied with the position of the WITU one question of
peace and disarmament. Liu Ning-yi said that "to sit down at
the same table with imperialists" meant the "betrayal of ell
mankind". He warned ?dab that U the report of the WETU
were not changed, the Chinese would criticize the WFTU and
expo** its "right opportunism."
3. At a session of the General Council, Liu Ning?yi
presented views that differed from the Soviet positions, the
CPSU document charged. Than. at a suppor and meeting to
which the Chinese Politburo invited some delegates, LAu
Shao-,chi said that there wore important differences of opinion
among the Communist Parties. Tang Hein0441ini then spoke
on "War and Peace", accusing the Soviets of errors in the
ZOth Congress thesis on 'peaceful coexistence" end "throwing
overboard" the Moscow Declaration--at the some time,
according to the CPSU document, as he himself contradicted
the Moscow Declaration. He attacked Soviet efforts to negotiate
with the West as 11 "betraysl" a world Communism. Chou
En.lai was going to *peak, but the delegates aeserted that they
wod4 not condone criticism or discussions "behind the backs"
of the Communist Porties.
36. The CPSU document criticized the Chinese methods
correct, unacceptable and opposed to proletarian inter
alum. The Soviets had been informs!d by comrades of
Parties that the Chinese had many ttmee asked for meeting
? -otwenismoTomma
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and bad bSen in
going 'back to as early a
'cisme and di
37. The Chinese said that because of the opposition
expressed against their ottitude, they would not speak in the
WFTU sessions; but they did so nevertheless. even in
discussion with non?Corrirnunist delegates. Then, the
Chinese speekers at the WFTU meeting tried to impose the
Chinese line on the WFTU and openly to line the WFTU up
against the CPSU.
? 34. In addition, the Soviet document
were distributing "Long Live Leninism" and o
articles within the Blot, without the permission
CPs.
39. It is necessary to discuss the problems of the
"character of the present epoch", "war and peace", "cod.
existence", and "road to socialism". the CPSU document
totes, because the "Communist movement does not see these
problems clearly."
40. "Chars pilntwsr: The document
cised as one. sided the Chinese characterisation of the epoch
is of "imperialism, wars, and revolutions." The Chinese
claim that any other attitude is a departure from L011/21/111 views.
The CPSU believes that the Chinese fail to take into account
the changes in the correlation of class forcer and that they
misunderstand and misinterpret Lenin's thesis. The Chinese
analysis is "incomplete" and it conflicts with the Soviet
cheracteriastion of the "epoch" as oat also of "disintegration
of imperialism, transition to socialism, and of formation and
consolidation of the world system of socialism." Developing
further the well-established Soviet concepts in this regard, the
document stated that the definition of the character of the epoch
has "great fundamental importence", for from this definition
are derived different conclusions regarding "strategy and
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ceful transition,
nt."
CO ?
41. The Chinese clatrntb.st the CPU
Leninism appraising e nature of "Lave
re wrong. The document cited statements at
21st Congress and by KhrusItchev on his return
and later, from France, to support the Soviet r
Chinese charges.
42. 'War and POSC ? At one time, the CPSU dOcument
said, the Chinese labored to the Iihrusheltev thesis on peace.
ful coexistence. Lately, in the April articles and at the V FTU
meeting, the Chine** have departed from this thesis. In B.ed
Flag the Chinese said that only the "imperialist general staff"
and not the Communists. could decide whether there would be
was or pewee, whether to launch local or general war, or
whether to intervene eltroad. This attitude is based on a wrong
analysis of forces. The document reiterated the Soviet
argument that "war is net merely an economic phenomenon",
but depends upon the correlation of forces, and that the forces
of peace may be able to prevent the "imperialists" from req.
sorting to war. The most "decisive" fatter is the Cornmuniet
camp.
43. To take the position vi 4 to
"fatalism", "paralyses the struggle".and disarms the people."
Events after the ZOth Congress confirm the Soiviet thesis. By
1963 "wtku the most rash imperialists will see that war is
impossible."
44. At the Moscow conference in 1957 Mso himself
'Everything reduces itself to gaining eri years. Lasting
peace will be assured throughout the world.'Today, the
Chinese are inconsistent. On the one hand, they call imperialism
a "paper tiger". On the other hand, they say that the imperialists
cannot be restrained. The GPSU, however, says that the
imperialist* should neither be over or underestimated.
rem
t they
U.S.
of the
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45,According to Gbi*esearticles, whoever defends the
is / 'opposed to wars of liberation' ".
is false. Coext5tenc5"does not mean renuatistion of
national liberation, including
sty is true: class struggle Will
e throat of r has been eliminated.
46. The Chinese have persisted in their view that as
long as imperialism cadets... the succession of period' of
war and peace will be permanent and inevitable." (The
document cited Red Flag end people's Daily.) At the WFTU
meeting, Liu Ching.slieng said that it was an "illusion" to
think that there could be a world without wars and without
ms so long as imperialism exists. At a public session
of the WFTU, members of the Chinese Central Committee
launched a polemic against the Pease manifesto which had
been signed by "all" Parties, including the Chinese.
47. The CPSU document declared that peaceikil co-
tence means "gaining time" for the "consolidellon of
Socialist system and the acceleration of the building of
socialism and Communism." The "Communist Parties
cannot permit society to be thrown back hundred of years'
and the destruction of "hundreds of millions" of people.
46. It is Impossible to accept the arguments of
"'WS toed not fear war. Atom bombs are pap
ger* rased by the iroperialistil to subjugate people. The
losses Fron2 war will be compensated by the victory of
socialism. "
49. The Soviet position, the CPSU document said, is
that ten or fifteen years of peace will assure the supremacy
of Socialism and it will then be possible to exclude war, "even
if capitalism remains in part of the world." (The document
cited Lenin in support of this policy.)
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'sharp.
*between them.
oexistence, the Soviets asserted, will encourage
forces within the "imperialist bloc" and will
ontradictions" within "imperialist countries" and
51. The Chinese say that coexistence me lass peace".
This is wrong. The Soviets never included within the concept
of coexistence relations between colonies and colonialist
countries, between dependent and imperialist countries,
between the proletariat and the exploiters. Coexistence, on
the contrary, is a "form of class war" on the international
level. It opens up possibilities for solidarity with the masses
for the eventual defeat of capitalism. (The document cited
the November 1959 Rome "Appeal" of the 17 West European
CPO.
52. The Chinese say that, in connecti
for national liberation, "the CPSU is flirting with the nati
bourgeoisie" and "abandoning class positions." This is
wrong. The Soviet position on participation of the national
bourgeoisie in the national liberation struggle is "Leninist".
53. Soviet economic aid to the "liberated countries"
Is justified by the fact that "objectively" such aidpromotU
the causeic4Aeakens imperialism. The Chinese
say that the policy, should be "revised" on the ground that
when the national bouueoisie gains power it loses its ability
to fight imperialism /India.. Egypt. and Indonesia were
cited/ and "are themselves becoming imperialists".
54. The Soviet?nswered. this by saying that it is
necessary not to "skip stages in the revolution". To do
so can cause "serious danger." It is essential to "look at
the correlation of class forces." The "imperialists" try to
exploit "splits in the national liberation movements". The
Communists must try to increase their "friends" among
the neutralists. This used to be the policy of the Chinese,
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slogan f "
55. The CPSU document said that it was necessary to
exploit "contradictions in the enemy camp" and cited Lenin's
statements on this subject. The Chinese argument that one
sh0144. IllaktimitAtoto_vdtli th imporialiste " is a
denial of this Leninist policy.
56. latti.StovtalL.M444er itASIOntia,
tia-WIAILMAT40$401-Of1ltt 1.sittoPoOsillete" aowilo to
wou4d...m*1 itimpoesible to, "mobilize the SPoinit
the tkmt of war."
57. ThiApsIseittdivoltd that coexis_
mMA,..4ia.,gikkl-ktY?RC,A11?:AiKMktkft_c4PA.R!!,
insinuations at,the !FIR melt4i,affiitt disarmai
encouraged Tho",,cw'' _Pak 40Y!,44,114)._
t is "new". lt is based on the belief that the
Set 11?44 P#1 it ye s$6,41. to cYltaPP-17rOld-Plaukfir
la !naTarninffillf._111.11040.i/IngEttit4ifOralt
traiikt_taq 4143311 Jr_age,21
soviet effort
.bowthffaim of the rfaament caltotipp .a.n4 fyintp in.
tiventittpf s-Sraft 2.047",_ ?Tb t CAilltse ST*
tymagirse.ggatu,, the theA,1,44.11741at 01010in and thi. aPPP0.4i0n
is in conflict with ff,pyift pmpaze. The Qiinese concept of
a "third way" which was put forward at the WTTU meeting
means nothing less than continuation of the cold war and Of
the arms race and causes political difficulties for the peace
policies of the USSR by substantiating imperialist charges that
Communists want war.
58. Different tossnajttutaktioxpoitaslisina., T
cpsy document soNte4 Chtnefe cheAtitt Oat the. GPSIL had_
tReallefekliTieloitte. the .!!eltlY
way of trau.Otict%T..,_ 4t4t4 tkti_414S4mtareictaknots.on,this
poi* and .:he *.te,,teln!ont 41,44-1 11,57, MOVVr*W X.41411trat494L, the
26
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40i
59. Chin
?raw:sleet s".
charged, the Chines
made it difficult to ar
60.
use
s in the "inter
*se internation
been taking a s
e at decisions.
c atic
CPSU
which
.P.AtKALcomef
1141,9As?
61. At the IUS meeting at Tunis In Iebruary 1960, the
Chinese had opposed "broader contacts with student organi-
zations in capitalist countries" and had instead emphasized
the need for "u:ncompromising struggle". At a WFDY meeting
in March, and at the Afro-Asian conference in April, the
Chinese had opposed discussion of disarmament on the ground
that the "call for disarmament lulls the popular masses and
demobilizes them in the struggle against imperialism."
62, As early as 1949, at the conference of Asian trade
unions in Peking. the Chinese had r ropoeed "unfolding bitter
struggle in colonial and semi-colonial countries' "and formation
of "liberation armies" under Party direction. This bad been
done without consulting the Parties and had helped the "imperiali
in their fight against the VETT.% The Chinese had later revised
this attitude, the document said.
63. In May 1954, the Chinese Central Committee had sent
e CPSU a report cf the Communist fraction of the Chine..
unions which agreed with the WFTU position'. However
Mese were opposing WFTU decisions Which applied to
all countries. This caused trouble between the WITTY and
some CPs. "Now", the CPSU document said, "the Chinese
talk of NkFTU opportunism, and this threatens the unity of its
ranks.
27
61391DPIPiamermam,
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64. Chinese divergence from the 1957 Declaration and
ice Manifesto. The CPSU charged the Qtinese with departing
the Moscow documents of 1957 on sin main count..
1. They had "revised" the characterisation of the
pre epoch's so as to make it read that this is "az epoch
of wars and revolutions".
2. They say that the "Leninist pr pie of peaceful
coiucistencess1 as it is spelled out in the Moscow Declarations
creates "illusions" and that "peaceful coexistence is impossib e
it only gratifies the imperialists ane enables them to murder
the people* of Asia and Africa with impunity."
3. 3. The Chinese say that the thesis in the Moscow
Declaration that "the struggle for peace /1s7 the foremost
task" of the Communist Parties is "erroneous and anti-Leninist'
and that it encourages the "delusion that there can be peace
with capitalism."
4. The Chines, reject the Moscow De n'
thesis on" 'different form. of transition' "as corning from
an" 'incomrect understanding of "
5. The Chinese question the thesis of the Moscow
Declaration that the Zeth CPR; Congress had opened "a new
stage" in the international movement, and they want to re.
open the question of the "cult of personality." The Chinese
had endorsed the CPSU's action regarding the "cult of Stalin".
and Mao-Tse.tung himself had done so at the 1957 mo?covir
meetings. The new proposal to reopen the discussion "de.
tracts from important Party tasks, end weakens the struggle
against the consequences of the cult of personality" in some
other ituttes? the document declared.
6. In violation of the principle of correct "fraternal
" of Communist Parties. the Chinese have criticized
28
morlimrinaiff410101YIPPw'
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Parties "behind their This criticismof the policis
of the CPSU "does not contribute to the prestige or unity' o
the intermit:lonet movement. In particular. the Chinese
had disagreed with the November 1959 "Appeal" of .e' teen
West European CPs and had called *Li mlocuznent "opportunist".
In this way. the Soviets say. the Chinese have set themselves
up as the "judges over the group of moat experienced parties'.
and they did it in the absence of these parties, at a meeting
at Peking. _l_n_aiticisiniz itsalfx AitcCA4ese?Cg
has not been direct. but Its' made use of "indirect me ode
and function_axtsc. "
65. The need for closer unity between the eocisU?t camp
national, Cornrmmist moven:tent. The CPSU docu-
that the Chinese position threatens serious damage
of the socialist camp and that "many" Chinese
s have been "disloyal and uncornradely".
66. Although the Chinese say that tho (USSR should lead
the camp", behind the back of the CPSU they have attacked
the cPsui th. 2-2.9a0.-!,3049-410-2-4-ttartlealtinti-MtnitatiOttr9o.
be national tion movement and othstisp_r_esentattys,
" This shows a lack of "sincerity"
violation of"principles of proletarian internationaii
67. The document cited cases when the CPSU had disagreed
'4th the Chinese Party, but had not intervened: the "hundred
flower s"...program; the Chinese abandonment Fin the commune
program/ of the "Leninist principle of material incentive under
socialism. In Soviet eyes. lualti,to Leniptem iLlteltakw4
n1words but deeds", the document said, and it cited
ovtet aid to the s (15 billion rubies in deliveries and
6.6 billion rublescredit.)
68. The document said that it was necessary and po ible
for the differences between the Chinese and the Soviets to be
overcome 'without compromising principles." The Chinese
29
trifoorommorteismim
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46...Z.s..t.o.P.Itt....r.a4 J.
must take into account the "interests of
At"; ditunAticanstm, btxmat
counnon enemy."
d Communist
pm the
69. On 17 June. CPSU representatives met with CPC
delegates en route to the Rumanian Party Congress. The
Soviets told the Chinese that they considered the letters'
"views and methods erroneous." The Chinese refused to
change their stand, but said that they would be willing to
"admit their errore if a majority at the Bucharest conference
"proved" them to be wrong.
CPSU co s tiered it necessary,ts,,FhArtnje_
?es_ stttarsts of a.l..21 a _et
71. Th ent concluded with asimussion of
S9?W4PASSAVAILSMWd$,,,I,,:.:Alligh4.09,E.S.01M4SAL
criticLezt,. isKa hiapciet wa_Ltrid dralvthe uses sear conclusions,
liembigt Jthi'n,Ld the interests orthe eniire
the r tio I C.14,M2X.Ittee inittalgAt
from 4:1.4 of Cornrg In the Chinese
Developments after Bucharest
72. in the three months following Bucharest. the dispute
continued unresolved, and indeed, there was no serious at-
tempt to resolve it. Each side continued to argue the rneritil
of its respective position; each continued b effort to get
support within the world movement. The Soviets sent a series
of letters to the Chinese criticising Chinese propaganda
activities and putting the Chinese on notice that Soviet technicians
would be withdrawn during August. The Chinese replied to these
lettere and. on 10 September, produced a comprehensive rebuttal
30
Sanitized - Approv=a4- sfy_CIA-RDP78-0091