THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE INTER-PARTY DEVELOPMENTS AT AND AFTER THE RUMANIAN WORKERS PARTY CONGRESS-BUCHAREST, 20-25 JUNE 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 1998
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: December 1, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-009158001200240011-0
THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
INTER-PARTY DEVELOPMENTS AT AND AFTER THE
RUMANIAN WORKERS PARTY CONGRESS--BUCHAREST,
20-25 JUNE 1960
-` f FILE
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01 200240011 -0
THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
INTER-PARTY DEVELOPMENTS AT AND AFTER THE
RUMANIAN WORKERS PARTY CONGRESS--BUCHAREST,
20-25 JUNE 1960
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01 200240011 -0
 Sanitized - Approved For Release.: CIA RDP78-00915RO01200240011-0
THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
INTER-PARTY DEVELOPMENTS AT AND AFTER THE
_&UMANIAN WORKERS PARTY CONGRESS---BUCHAREST, 20-25 JUNE 1960
The ybackground of the dispute (1957-1960)
1. The present dispute between the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) has
its origins in differences which date back at least three years--
that is, to the summer of 1957. On the Chinese side, antecendent
resentments may date as far back as the formative period of the
CPC in the twenties, when Stalin's policy of alliance with the
Kuomintang drove the CPC to disaster, as well as to the war .and
early post-=war peri :)d, when Soviet support for the Chinese Corn-
munist cause was minimal and did not inhibit the stripping of
Manchuria. There is clearly no single cause for the current
.dispute. Rather, it would appear, an accumulation of Chinese
policies and actions increasingly displeased and challenged
Khrushchev and, presumably, a majo.ii.ty of the Soviet leadership,
In the field of domestic policy, it is now known that Mao's "Let
a hundred flowers bloom" program aroused Soviet doubts about
its usefulness. The program for the "great leap forward"
beginning in early 1958 and the communes program, adopted by
the CPC in May 1958, were readily recognizable as a considerable
irritant in Sino- Soviet relations by the silent treatment which
they received in the Soviet Union,
2, Disagreement over foreign policy manifested itself in
August 1958 when Khrushchev, after four days of discussion with
Mao Tse-tung, publicly rejected, on 5 August, Western proposals
for a summit meeting within the U. N. Security Council on the
crisis in the Middle East--proposals which he had accepted in
July. Nevertheless, on 23 August the Chinese began shelling of
the off-shore islands.. On 23 May 1958 the Commander of the
Chinese-'..&ir. Force puedicted that China would make atomic bombs
"in the not too distant future" and the Chinese press ceased to
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01 200240011 -0
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01 200240011 -0 +
refer to Khrushchev's earlier plan for an atom-free zone in
Asia. Khrushchev revived his concept of an atom-free one
for "the Far East and the entire Pacific Basin" at the 21st
CPSU Congress in February 1959. Chinese reactions were
not enthusiastic, and, from April 1959, on, reference to the
plane disappeared altogether. In the light of these and other
indications, it can be fairly assumed that Soviet unwillingness
to deliver atomic weapons to Chinese control had become a
serious issue. It is now known that the Soviets cited as the
reason for their reluctance their apprehension over Chinese
policies and pronouncements in the external field which were
in conflict with Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" tactics,
which affirmed that global or limited war need not be avoided,
and which objected to Khrushchev's aid programs for "bourgeois"
regimes in underdeveloped countries on the grounds that they
would delay revolution. Chinese objections to peaceful coexistence
tactics manifested themselves after 1957 in the deliberations of
the International Communist Front organizations, especially
within the World Peace Council and the International Union of
Students--two organizations which were Most directly and in-
tensely engaged in building their appeal on the unity campaign
so typical of the peaceful coexistence period. They desired to
involve bourgeois and nationalist groups in mass action and
therefore advocated informal conversations, negotiations,
and concessions to such groups. The Chinese refused to "sit
around the table" with them except in formal meetings of
designated representatives, and resisted Soviet efforts to
broaden the scope of concessions on program and organization
questions. Chinese resistance was particularly manifest after
the Soviet decision of June 1959 concerning Ehrushchev's visit
to the United States.
3. In August 1959, the Chinese overran the Indian border
post at Longju and reopened the border dispute wMaIndia, after
eight years of quiet. The Soviet position on this dispute signifi-
cantly failed to give full endorsement to the Chinese claims,
although earlier Chinese repressive actions in Tibet had been
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01 200240011 -0
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01 200240011 -0
promptly supported as just and as an "internal affair. "
Khrushchev, as was known later, did not interpret the reopening
of the dispute as a mere attempt to register opposition to his
trip to the United States, but as an un-Marxist blunder which
needlessly undermined Indian neutralist attitudes and potential
value in the peace and disarmament campaign and impaired the
appeal of CP India. When Khrushchev visited Peiping, after
his trip to the United States, for the October anniversary cele-
brations in 1959, the Sino-Inti.an dispute was one topic of discussion
and it is virtually certain that Khrushchev presented his views on
improving USSR-U. S. relations. Sino-Soviet discussions were
unsatisfactory, however, and no communique was published.
According to three widely separated and reliable sources, in
October 1959 the CPSU sent a letter to at least the bloc parties,
holding fast to Khrushchev's views on USSR-U. S. relations.
In November 1959, V. Ilyitchev, Chief of the Agitprop Department
of the CPSU, published an article in Problems of Peace and
Socialism that justified the policy of peaceful coexistence as eblass
struggle on the international plane" and significantly noted Lenin's
criticism of "Left Communists. " It is known that the Chinese
have since been accused of criticizing the November 1959 joint
program of the European parties, which is clearly based upon
the same premises as the article. In December 1959, Khrushchev
warned the Chinese in stating at the Hungarian Party Congress
that "we must all synchronize our watches. "
4. In January 1960, the Chinese positions hardened. At
the Rome meeting of the Presidential Committee of the World
Peace Council in January 1960 it transpired that the Chinese
had charged the USSR with seeking to isolate China in the
interest of achieving a modus vivendi with the U. S. A reliable
source states that the USSR in January 1960 informally broached
to the Chinese the idea that the Sino-Soviet differences required
discussion, only to be told by the Chinese that the differences
were between the parties and should not be mentioned. The
CPC appears to have reached during January important decisions
which had a major effect on the dispute. On 21 January the
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01 200240011 -0
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240011-0
ten'.-& " -
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted
a resolution concerning disarmament which specified that
China would be bound only by treaties it takes part in framing;
and in February 1960, at the meeting of the foreign ministers
of the Warsaw Pact countries, the Chinese observer, Wang
Sheng, incorporated the statement in his p.peech, broadening
it to include "all international agreements. " The contrast
between the descriptions of the world situation in Wang Sheng's
speech and those given by the European bloc speakers was
striking.
5. It is at this point that the 1957 Moscow declaration
first began to be quoted to support the conflicting positions,
when the People's Daily of 6 February 1960 asserted that "the
development of the international situation has borne out the
correctness of the declaration." It appears likely, therefore,
that the Chinese decided in late January to take the initiative
in broadening the debate. But also on 6 February a verbal
message from the Central Committee of the CPSU asking the
CPC.to attend a meeting to discuss outstanding problems was
reportedly delivered in Peiping.
6. In mid-April 1960 the Chinese took advantage of the
90th anniversary of Lenin's birth to make their most serious
public attack on the theoretical innovations developed by the
CPSU at and after the 20th Party Congress in January 1956.
Using oblique but unmistakable arguments, the Chinese
challenged the premises underlying Soviet foreign policy and
by implication disparaged Khrushchev's stature as a Communist
theorist. The Chinese attack comprised three major statements:
two articles in the party's theoretical monthly Red Flag (issues
no. 7 and 8, 1 and 16 April), the first entitled "On Imperialism
as the Source of War in Modern Times" and the second entitled
"Long Live Leninism, " as well as an editorial on 22 April in
the authoritative newspaper, the People's Daily.
4
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01 200240011 -0
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01 200240011 -0
7. The Soviets replied in the speech delivered in Moscow
on 22 April by Otto Kuusinen of the CPSU Central Committee and
Secretariat. A very strong defense of current Soviet foreign
policy and of the general lines endorsed at the 20th and 21st
CPSU Congresses, his speech confined its critical comments
to general statements condemning "dogmatic positions as back-
ward positions." On the same day a Chinese Politburo alternate,
Lu Ting-i, gave a speech in Peiping which incorporated many
of the arguments of the "Long Live Leninism" article. The
divergences between the two speeches were so great that when
one Communist party seriously affected by the dispute, the
Indian party, published both speeches side by side in the 8 May
issue of its newspaper New_Ae, without comments, its action
aroused considerable comment and created confusion among
party members.
8. The Chinese then began to carry their case to the
other parties. "Long Live Leninism, " the Lu Ting-i speech,
and the People's Daily editorial of 22 April were translated
and published in the widely circulated English language Peking
Review of 26 April. At the same time, the first edition of
a book containing the three articles was produced by the
Foreign Languages Press in Peiping in many languages for
distribution abroad. Two further editions of this book were
produced, one in May and the other, after the Bucharest
confrontations, in August. The book is known to exist in
English, Spanish, French, the Eastern European languages
(including Russian), and Vietnamese. It has been distributed
in India and in certain countries at least of Latin America
and Western Europe. It appears that the Chinese later at-
tempted to circulate the articles in the USSR in one of their
two Russian language publications, Druzhba, an action which
the Soviets protested. The magazine was in fact suspended
from circulation in the USSR after the publication of the June
issue. Earlier instances of Soviet refusals to circulate
Chinese doctrinal writings in the USSR have recently been
reported by reliable sources, who heard the details during
party discussions of the Sino-Soviet differences.
5
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01 200240011 -0
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01 200240011 -0
9. After the Kuusinen rebuttal of Chinese charges, the
CPSU took advantage of the 40th anniversary of the publication
of Lenin's book Leftwing Communism, an Infantile Disorder
(10 June 1960) to carry the public ideological debate with the
Chinese to new heights, including the use of the charge of
"deviation." Two Soviet articles published on 10 June, one
by D. Shevlyagin in the newspaper Soviet Russia and one by
N. Matkovsky in the party newspaper Pravda, expressed this
criticism by attacking "contemporary left-wing deviationism"
in terms which referred to the positions held by the Chinese
party. Both articles highlighted the significance of the 12
Party Declaration of November 1957. Matkovsky characterized
it as a "programmatic document of the international Communist
movement," and as a validation of the general line expressed
by the CPSU. Shevlyagin, on~the other hand, referred parti-
cularly to the declaration as authorizing and requiring a struggle
against "leftist opportunism" as well as against "rightist
opportunism" such as that of the Yugoslavs. In discussing
manifestations of left opportunism he made the significant
point that " Oyonly groups of Communists but the leadership
of individual parties have veered into leftist deviationism."
Neither of the articles explicitly identified the Chinese as
the target of criticism, but their relevance to the dispute
was unmistakable.
10. The timing of this intensification of the Soviet attack
on the Chinese views coincides with a CPSU letter on the
Summit Conference which was circulated, shortly after
KQirushchev's return home following the collapse of the con-
ference, to the Communist parties of the bloc and those of
France and Italy. Although the text of this letter is not
available, it seems likely to have been unacceptable to the
Chinese, Who emphasized from mid-May on that the course
of events before and at Paris proved the validity of the
Chinese arguments concerning imperialism and the illusory
and fruitless character of negotiation. Perhaps the worst
offense of the Chinese, in Soviet eyes, was their argument
6
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01 200240011 -0
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240011-0
that the only value of Communist participation in such peace
negotiations was the purely tactical advantage that came out
of their eventual exposure of the true character and intentions
of the enemy. This observation was precisely the kind of
statement which the CPSU was most eager to avert.
11. It is likely too that the CPSU decided at this time
to send a sharp letter of criticism to the CPC. One
prominent Free World Communist who visited Moscow in
late May stated that he learned from a member of the CPSU
Secretariat that a "sharp" letter was being sent to the CPC.
CPSU letters calling for a conference v= e reportedly sent to
the Chinese on 2 Jufle and on 7 June, and it appears likely that
the letter of 2 June was the "sharp" one. It is also worth
noting that the CPC leaders went into closed conference in
Shanghai on 8 June, a move which may well have been prompted
by the receipt of the two CPSU letters. They were in fact still
meeting when the Chinese delegation left for the Bucharest
party congress.
12. The Chinese too made a major move in the now
rapidly developing dispute. They did this in early June at the
Xlth General Council meeting of the World Federation of
Trade Unions in Peiping. On 2 June they presented an ultimatum
on the official WFTU report to the chief Soviet representative,
who rejected it. The Chinese claimed that the report contained
objectionable features, including attacks on the communes.
At this meeting, which opened on 5 June after a five-day delay,
in the presence of both WFTU affiliates and representatives
of some twenty-five unaffiliated national trade union federations,
the leading Chinese figures Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-ch'i, Liu
Ningri, Teng Hsiao-ping, and Liu Chang-sheng publicized
the Chinese views on the peace struggle, t1 .e threat of imperialism,
and the "illusions" aroused by the campaigns for peaceful co-
existence and by programs for giving substantial economic aid
to bourgeois-led underdeveloped countries. Using a tactic they
had employed earlier in April, the Chinese leaders accompanied
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240011-0
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240011-0
those criticisms with fulsome expressions of approval of
the Soviet posture towards the U. S. at the time of the
collapse of the Summit Conference. This approval of the
Soviet actions was accompanied by expressions of solidarity
with the USSR in its stand against U. S. acts of aggression.
It was learned that the CPSU was particularly stung by the
speeches of Liu Ning-yi and Liu Chang-sheng.
13. When the Chinese convened a private meeting of
Communist party members among the delegates to hear a
statement of the Chinese criticisms of CPSU doctrines, rep-
resentatives of the CPSU promptly opposed the continuation
of the talks and made the ominous charge that the Chinese
action was violation of the terms of the 12 Party Declaration
of November 1957. This Soviet appeal to the authority of
the Moscow declaration paralleled the similar appeal in the
Shevlyagin article published in Moscow, and the charge has
since figured prominently in the CPSU's presentation of its
case. According to credible reports, during the WFTU session
Teng Hsiao'p'ing, general secretary of the CPC, accused
the CPSU in turn of "throwing the Moscow declaration over-
board."
14.
Soviet representatives in Peiping not only criticized the Chinese
actions in ,r`eiearndldiscussions with foreign Communist rep-
resentatives but by 9 June took concrete steps to enlist the
support of other CP's against the Chinese. The representative
of one Free World CP was told, by a representative of the
Soviet All Union Central Council of Trade Unions, that the
Soviet embassy in Peiping was interested in knowing if he
could stop over in Moscow after the end of the conference.
15. When a group of European and African delegates to
the WFTU meeting arrived in Moscow on 13 June, a number
of CPSU officials conferred with members of this group. One
of the delegates in the group is known to have talked privately
with a top official, V. Tereshkin, of the CPSU Foreign
Section, concerning the Sino-Soviet dispute. The delegate was
25X1X6
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240011-0
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01 200240011 -0
informed of the interpretation the CPSU placed on recent
Chinese actions, and Tereshkin asked that he have a plenum
of his party's central committee convened after his return
home to discuss the Chinese at Peiping and to condemn them
as violations of the Moscow declaration. A second person,
tentatively identified as L. I. Brezhnev, chairman of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, was also reported present
at this meeting. According to a statement broadcast while
the Bucharest congress was in session, representatives of
the French and Spanish Communist parties held a meeting
on 14 and 15 June, at which they reaffirmed their adherence
to the 12 Party Declaration. Because the leadership of both
these parties was represented in the group of WFTU delegates
in Moscow at this time, it appears possible that the meeting
in question took place there and that the reaffirmation was
a reaction to the Peiping events.
16. In contrast to these cryptic endorsements of the
Moscow declaration, on 19 June 1960 a statement by Agostino
Novella, a leading Italian Communist and president of the
WFTU, was published in the Italian Party newspaper Unita.
In this statement, which was also broadcast in Italian from
Czechoslovakia on 20 June, Novella described the Chinese
criticism of the resolutions proposed at the WFTU Council
meeting in Peiping and, like the 10 June Soviet articles,
characterized the Chinese views as "deviations." So far as
can be determined, this was the first instance in which a
Free World Communist party publicized this charge against
the Chinese. The appearance of the statement coincided
with the opening of the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian
Workers Party in Bucharest, where the next phase of the
dispute developed.
The B'ucharest debates (20-27 June 1960)
17. The Chinese determination to press at Bucharest
for Soviet adoption of a militant line is suggested by an
C T / T T' rn
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01 200240011 -0
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01 200240011 -0
article in the 16 June issue of Red Flag, which, in an obvious
reference to the CPSU?s earlier justification of its views on
peace and peaceful coexistence, observed that "one cannot
separate oneself from the revisionists merely by stating that
the forces of socialism predominate over the forces of
imperialism." The Chinese delegation to the congress of
the Rumanian Workers Party stopped in Moscow for an
exchange of views on 17 June. It presented a letter from the
CPC which limited its powers to agreeing on a date for a
party conference to discuss Sino-Soviet differences and ex-
changing views, without, however, adopting any formal
resolution. The CPSU representatives were not successful
in obtaining an admission from the Chinese delegation of
the errors of the CPC. The Chinese, however., reportedly
expressed a willingness to correct their positions if in an
exchange of views with the delegates at Bucharest a majority
should prove them wrong. The CPSU, justifying its action
by invoking the November 1957 Peace Manifesto (not the 12
Party Declaration adopted at the same time), insisted that
the views of all the Communist parties should eventually be
ascertained before attempting a meeting to reach a final
solution. In this context, the Bucharest session should
presumably have involved nothing but *n exchange of views.
The Chinese stated at Bucharest that in Moscow the CPSU
had first made the proposal that other parties be brought
into the debate, but had wished to confine the group to
delegates from the bloc parties only. The Chinese said that
they had rejected this proposal. It would appear, then, that
the Chinese adherence to their instruction forced the Soviets'
hand.
18. Athough there are reports that the CPSU intended
by the end of May to attack the Chinese at Bucharest, the
Soviet decision to make a major effort there to enlist the
support of other parties appears to have been reached as a
result of the Chinese stand on 17 June, Virtually none of
the major Free World parties sent top-level delegates to the
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01 200240011 -0
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01 200240011 -0
congress,. The fact that Khrushchev was to lead the Soviet
delegation was announced only on June 18, the day of his
departure. All the European satellite delegations except
Albania were led by persons of national stature equal to that
of Khrushchev, but the late arrival of Gomulka of Poland
and the early departure of Novotny of Czechoslovakia suggest
that this top-level representation was organized on short
notice. The leader of the Chinese delegation, Pteng Chen,
was clearly outranked by this group. Fifty parties were
represented at the congress. Twenty-five of the thirty-five
ilon--bloc fraternal delegations identified as present were
composed of second and third echelon party leaders and
none of the more significant Free World parties, except
Chile and Syria, were represented by their leaders.
19. The Soviet delegation to Bucharest included
B. Ponomarev and Y. A, Andropov, the heads of the two
Central Committee sections for relations with the non-bloc
pa-tties and bloc parties, respectively. During the first days
of the congress they and their colleagues concentrated on
briefing fraternal delegates, It is known that a group of
English-speaking delegates and a second group comprising
those who spoke Spanish were called together separately and
briefed from a long letter which the CPSU intended to issue
to all parties. The letter had apparently been either com-
pleted or revised at the last moment, for it contained the
Soviet account of the Moscow exchanges of 17 June and
explained the Soviet view of how the inter-party discussion
should be handled. The inclusion of Wu Hsiu_chtuan, the
deputy director of the CPC's International Liaison Depart-
ment, as one of the four Chinese delegates suggests that the
Chinese too planned to exploit their supporters and acquaintances
among the delegates.
20. The reporting on the sequence of events at Bucharest
concerning the Sino-So:riet dispute is in some respects contra-
dictory. The following probable chronology, however, emerges
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO01 200240011 -0
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R001200240011-0
from an analysis of the available information.