SELECTED TRANSLATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST DEVELOPMENTS NO. 14

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 1998
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: September 15, 1960
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915RO012001200 -7
4 I +
1 pterbe;s' 1960
Photoc opios of this report may be purchased from:
PHOTODUPLICATION SERVICE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
205 EAST 42nd STI- T, SUITE 300
NEW YORK 17, IT. Y.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R0I01200120008-7
This publication was prepared under contract
by the UNITED STATES JOINT PUBLICATIONS RE-
SEARCH SERVICE, a federal government organi-
zation established to service the translation
and research needs of the various government
departments.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
co 380---D/3-4
S] LECT TfMNSIt.TIONS ON INT LN.k.TIONAL COMMUNIST DE LOP:IS TS
No. 14
Prof ace
This! is a monthly publication containing trwislations of materials
on the International Communist movemenv selected mainly from Communist,.
and Pro-Communist organs pubblished in the Free IForld.
All articles in this report (No. 14) were taken from "SF." weekly
journal of the Danish Socialistisk Polkeparti. (Socialist People's Party,
i.e., ,;14evisionni.st Party), Copenhagen. Complete source information is
given under i:uliviclual article headings.
1
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
Page
I. Socialism in Denmark and Its Development
3
A. Can a Perspective be Set Up?
3
B. The "Welfare State" No Solution
3
C. Activities Directed by the Workers
4
D. A Multi-Party System
6
E. A "Loading Party"
7
P. Freedom for S'Thom and Repression for Ifliom?
10
G. Freedom and 13quality for All
12
H. Rights to Freedom Today and. Under the Transition to
Socialism, the Role and Function of the State and the Law
15
I, Conclusion
18
II. The Transition to Socialism: Growing In or Jumping In
20
III.
Whither the Soviet Union
22
IV'.
The History of the CPSU
24
V.
A Soviet Poet's Showdoim i itli the Idols of the Stalin Era
29
VI.
The Personality Changes in the USSR
32
VII.
Ihirushchev's Campaign Against Bureaucracy and Inequal3ty.
Signals of Internal Politics
33
VIII
. The Co-E.Existence of Distrust and the Absent Great Power
37
I
After Paris
41
X.
After the Summit Fiasco ATi::.ita I hrushchev's Great Chance
Which 'Jas ;Tasted
4-3
:"I.
Hamlet Boris Pasternal:
46
- 2 -
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
I. SOCIALISM TN DENMARIC AND ITS D 'LOPMENT
/his uiisigned article was serialized on page 2 of the follow-
ing 1960 is sues: No. 20, 20 1.Iay; No. 21, 27 May; No. 22, 3
June; No. 23, 10 June; No. 24, 17 June; loo. 25, 2-1. Juno; No.
26, 1 July; and No. 27, 8 Juiy_7
A. Can a Perspective be Set Up?
Can one say anything at all about this? ..Often one will simply dodge
this question entirely, and of course nothing can be predicted zritli cer-
tainty. On the other hand there arc trends, past and present, from which
something about the future may be inferred. It is our simple duty to try
to do so.
In the years after the war one has met with two hinds of answer, to
the question about the development of Danish socialism. One is given by
the communists and is characterized by vague remarks that "one will find
out in duo time:"
That is not entirely honest, as the communists joined the Moscow
declaration of 1957, in which is given a quite detailed scheme for the
development of socialism, all the way to collectivization and regulation of
intellectual life. ITithin the framework there is supposed to be room for.
"national variationu", but the framework is very narrow.
The second answer is given by the social democratic ideologists and
is, if possible, oven more slippery. In 1947 "Promtidens Danmark" / onmark
of the Future set up something that suggested a socialist pers?~ccUve.
But in the years since then, this perspective has been replaced by what
might be called the "welfare ideolo; ": the goal is an econot.iic framework
comprising a small state sector and a large private sector, ;Tit', consider-
able newer for the L;overnmont and a certain limited amount of planning that
would be realized by means of financial policy. This method is already
used. today by "the welfare .state", and there the methods of the moment are
equated with the long-range good.
Such an attitude is, of course, untenable at a time when we arc
experiencing a tochnicc:.1 revolution and everything is going through
gigantic changes. To be satisfied. with purely practical politics in such
a situation, without lood.ng more titan 5 or 10 years ahead at a time, is. to
invite catastrophe.
Nevertheless, all one can find out about the future perspectives cf
the social democrats are vague remarks about the "economic life" ("capital-
ism" is an "obsolete" word in those circles) and social improvei:cents within
the present framework.
B. The "l'Teifare State" no Solution
But the ."welfare state" has not abolished the fundamental evils
associated with a class society and capitalism. within large sections of
the working population there is a decided need for a socialistic perspoc--
tive. But this is not mot by the social democratic leadership and only in
a hazy and vague manner by the loft tying of the party and the conuntinists'.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-3RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915RO!01200120008-7
The Socialist People's Party has no patent on posess .on of the latest
truths: but it arose from the conviction that the Harxist analysis of
reality is full of rich possibilities, if they are freely acid unrestrainedly
used, without sidolon glancos to foreign party slogans.
By examining the developmeni tcnloncios in. the class, struggle in and
outside Denmark and clrauing out conclusions from this frith a view to the
_Cuture, we can present a clear socialistic perspective. at course, now
dominant trends may suddenly arise, and just because of this tho socialists
must always have their attention directed towards the many-sided reality.
In gosieral it may be said that socialism in Do mark :off' a long time
in the future must tc1ko its characte^ from tho manner in trhich it came into
being, from the specific traditions for the conduct of the class strugglo
in Denmark, and from the political formulas of this class struggle. It
will also moan that if the bourgeoisie breaks with those traditions, for
orw-,iplo by e::tablishing a decidedly 'ascicst govern}nent, Danish socialism
will come into being in a different; way from that which we can fore-,oo
today, and its development - at Toast to begin with - will bo di2forcnt.
But from the development in Denmark during recent decades one -must
conclude that the tray to socialism in Denmark, taking everything into
con,::idoration_, trill be cleared by c; struggle to give our do ocracy a
socialistic content. Next it must be pointed out -,,hat, this analysis being
correct, that (party) or those partios which carry it out, and their
program, will play the decisive part in the development of socialist:i in
Denmark.
From this it :olloTrs that airoady today one can say something about
at least some of tho characteristics of socialism in Denmark.
C. Activities Directed the ?Workers
If Danish socialism is to o a result of the democratic struggle,
various forms of socialized property trill unavoidably be discu sod. But in
this field it is actually impossible to say anything concrete today. The
detailed shaping up of socialized property forms is unquestionably a matter
which will be dcter:ninccl along with the development of socialism.
On the other hand, one can very Srell say something about certain
common features of this socialized property, especially about its manage-
mont and adulsioin against tho 0::-?loiters, can be stumped up as follows; the
t_`Ieo_7 ias shown it elf useful in very acute situations, when used in the
spir'.t of its originators and not in a distorted (revised) form; but beyond
`IPA it ~;as in many - though not in all - cases also turned out that the
workers were the victims of severe compulsion and were left without power;
also thoir freedom of o-)inion, press and freedom of organisation were
violates' .
For the originators, Tram.. and Lenin, it was a natural matter that
freedom for the workers would be consciously built up. Lenin firmwo l that
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-1 DP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :CIA-RDP78-00915R0!01200120008-7
the extension of democracy that had taken. place with the revolution would
continue at a rapid rate. Ile snohe in 1918 of "after the first step (after
control by the irorhers) carrying out the second step towards socialism,
that is, the workers would tnhe over the maragerent of .production". ("On
the iiext Tasks of Soviet Power". )
But then the civil war bro?ire out in full flame, and a situation
arose which answered to, and had to answer to, the doctrine', of "the dic-
tatorship of the proletariat unbouric,.eC. by law". Only a couple of years
after the end of the civil war Lenin was .put out of the control by illness,
and the second stop was never taken as long as the successor, Stalin, held
the power. Only cluringg a theoretical debate in 1959 was the question
raised as to whether it was not abov!.t time to "tame the net step".
;'hen such a serious sidetracking has once been sltotm to be possible,
it is clear that the socialistic revolutionary theory of government must
be improved with ~;tt4 rantees that it will not lead to enslavement ' of democ-
racy and freedom as a whole: this is the lesson gathered from experience.
Because of the form it received in 1917/20, it carried dangerous.possibi-
lities v`. ch assumed a catastrophic character when the theory also was
distorted by Stalin in the and of the thirties.
ZI y did Lenin's formulation cf the theory carry such dangerous
possibilities? Here it is only to be pointed out that there is a glaring;
contrast between socialism "where the free development of each individual
is the condition for the free dovelopwent of all" (Marx), and the govern-
ment comrsulsion which - as will be shotm in the next chapter - is necessary
even in the gentlest transition period. This contrast is, in other words,
unavoidable, and is of course sharpened. Brion complications 'occur, such as
foreign intervention and civil war. But it can be overcomes - not auto-
matically, but if the loading social forces (the or ;anv.zations of the labor
movenont) go about it in a determined fashion.
It is clear that if these forces had followed Lonin'!;s suggestions in
the Soviet Union - among; others the one hero quoted - the i;overnment
coercion would. have dwindled. to a mi.nimun and lost. its importance. But
that Old not happen - and the result was the opposite.
In the field of ideas this development resulted in barren sectar...
ianism - t!~.at moans a fixation on certain. (often specially selected)
formulas, which must not be confronted with reality, by which is understood
the experience of 43 years.
G. freedom and Equality for ll
For Denmark in 1960 an entirely different situation:pevails, than
in those countries where the socialist revolution was carried out under
civil war conditions. Our country d=oos not have an auttocra-tic militaristic
government, and international capi-u'calism has been considerably weakened as
compared. with 1917, 1945 and 1949. ,to do not figure on arriving at social-
ism through civil war, but on the contrary, we anticipate 4 development
which is characterized by a striving to ive the existing democracy a
socialistic content.
For those reasons alone it is extremely improbable that tls,ere would
be any application hero at home o the revolutionary, socialistic theory
12 a.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R0;01200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
of government in t'io form it received in 1917-20. To this are added the
foreign experiences. The real reason or t'he isolation o_' the secta-ianisr>i
hove at home is that it has iing class; above Cho regard for the
inie e~'t of the entire iroriin;; class, his-'oand as a matter of
principle. As a trend opportunism is closely related to reformism and its
assertion that by ears of small roforms one can "little by Tittle" arri.vo
at socialism. The basic idea of both is the theory of the "c radual V, oz;-in;;
into socialism", a theory which - as has been shown - at least never loads
to socialism.
The modern political carriers of those viovpoiita are the social
democracy and the socialist international. Under the "gradual ;rowirng in"
the state is, according to this theory, to have the duty of assuring formal
freedom and "equal riGhts" for all citizens. This duty is accorded sucl:
importance that under all circumstances its fulfillment must have prac^_donco
over the social transformation.
This theory of government does not cause any particular di_scom?.ort
alien the politically formal democracy and its economic basis, cal italiom,
are relatively stable. During the transition from the system of :'euc'alisra
with diff oron?t law for difforen:'U citizens it even meant a strengthcnin ; of
1rogross. But a glance at historical oxporioncos s_2ous that it has not
helped to transform society in a socialistic direction, much less to defend
the gains in democratic form.
Here at home opportunism has predominated in the labor raovemont
since the first ZTorld ITar. 'Jo have had trar and crises, capitalism has at
times been e::cooainlly woaRoned, but the hmvo not got socialism. All cha:icos
have boon passed tip - or more correctly, not recognized - because tllc
opportunistic loaders have stared. thorisolvos blind at U'lo principle of
" freadorn and equal riCil?us for all".
Internationally things have gone still worse. On one hand the
gonufloc Lion to this principle led to. the :?act -;hat c vnitai isrn in .Testern
urope, which was rlortall T weal_enec' a_"ter the -first ?Tor? e. Jar, survivec': all
the sauo - because also accorc_iiig to this principle the nighty capi?;alis-tic
propal anc a apparatus a&.--the or;;ani ation W2-2i liatoa. with 'aid; capital had
to have full :ir?eeclom (Germany in 1913 is a classical anC irrefutable
example). On the other hand is the circilmstarLec fiat the opT?ortunisti c
labor leaders tool; the catcht-rorc? "yroedom for all" more seriously than did
the c1a>ss enemies - so that capitalism aftor both Vor'_'d `;Tars could carry
out a successful co-Lurter of'onsivo, in a number of countries in Cho form er
fascist counterrevolution.
In practice the theory of "freoc?om ancL equal ri,_ h1 for all" 'pas
boon s1io'Crtl to be 1mn0Sui iJ1o bo ;-,h as an in i trurlont in the service of tho
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CtAl tDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
socialistic transformation and disastrously useless as a moans of protecting
what has already been achieved. 1Iby`? Because it neglects the realities
which both Marx and Lenin correctly pointed out; no state unctions and no
revolution is achieved without a ceri:,ain amount of coercion: These two
statements of fact constitute the real basis for the government theory of
Mar ism. A criticism of the opportunistic theory of g;ovenument therefore
throws light also on Denmark's spocictil path towards socialism.
It is now clear that the opportunistic theory about "freedom and
equal rights for all" is of no use, but rather of groat harm to the working
class in its struggle for democracy and socialism. In contfast the
revolutionary socialistic government theory is of great importance in
shaping Denmark's path towards socia.isrn.
As has been shown, the socialistic government t1ieory is subject to
certain shortcomings; it is necessary to find guarantees that the freedom
of the wok leers - the great majority of the people - does not get lost, that
the necessary goveriunent coercion be limited to a minimum and be reduced in
stop with the possibility of doing so, that the traditional rules (e.g.
decision by majority vote) for legislation be respected in all quarters,
and that the formal democracy be really extended and not merely replaced by
another formal system. The last moationed moans, among other things, that
as long; as tho capitalist opponents follow the spirit and the letter of the
law (as the socialist parties always have done hero at home), the principle
of "equal rights" will be maintained - but of course in such way that its
content is changed; while the right today is "more equal" for the capital-
ists, it will in the socialistic transition state necessarily be "more
equal" for the working man.
Can these guarantees be f ounce?
The necessity has already been indicated for a purposeful striving
to preserve and develop the broad democracy, which is the immediate fruit
of the opening, phases of the transition process. But thereby dangerously
much is actually left to those forces which place themselves or are placed
at the hoed of the transformation process. Have we any guarantee that they
trill consciously go about the task, the solution of which 1.411 make thorn
sunorfluous?
To, that we do not have. In some cases they have done so, in others
not. But we can get a sure guarantee, if only one certain Condition is
fulfilled.
No party must get a monopoly on socialism. We have already rejected
the justifications for "the one-party system and the leading, party" and now
we repeat; none of the political or trade organizations of labor must - like
a papal church council - be recognized as possessing the highest and only
true wisdom. surely one of the solutions proposed in a debate may be the
right one, but the proponents must 'b~ on an equal footing vlion they appeal
to the people, and the decision must be exclusively with the people. Wo
also repeat: the right to be right and to mare mistakes in questions which
concerns the life of the people belongs only to the pooplo,who must bear:
all possible bad consequences, and not to an assembly or group of wiseacres
who often can personally ovado the unpleasant consequences.
- 14-
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R0I,01200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
But will it o thus here .t booze, that during; the transition to
socialism the state will give room for sevoral .parties with equal rights
(crith free press, otc) which mutually can control one arlothor? Will not
socialism in Donmarh too, lead to a ono-party system, open or camouflagod.,
with all the unfortunate rosults which this system has has in several of tl`ze
countries which today havo a socialistic system?
No, it will not. On the contrary it is almost impossiblo to ima(;ino
that the demand for a real multi-party system Should no-:: bo met irhilo
soci.alisrr is lapin shc,po in Denmark.
Whore are two reasons that spo is a or this.
1. Socialism in Denmark will - providod the bourgeoisie does not
violate our popular government by fascist measures - become a reality as a
result of an e: tension of our present democracy. ~.'he fi.nt to V. our
der.uocracy a socialistic content presupposes, of course, forms o:,' contest-
which fit ,the historical character of our democracy, as it has boon shaped
during almost a century and a h1a' i of class trug,;lo, under which ffroodorl
of expression has become an ingrown custom, and the colla'aoration of sevoral
parties is necessary. The socialistic transition st-ato in Denmark will be
the fruit of the contributions of several parties, and consoquontly it :rill.
also have room for several parties.
2. The Danish tror?ting class, whose contribution is docisivo for the
achiove lent of socialism, will novor accept supprossion o_' free debate in
the labor r;.iovomont, of rroodori of expression and. of the other democratic
ri?h-cs. That would bo contrary to the vary fighting traditions of the
working class and would moan giving; up somo of its most dearly bought
victol~io s .
The result is that unless the parties and or, anizations wdiicii will
constitute the broad socialistic moToment, by their programs anc' ontire
policy? prove to the gonoral public that they will guard the dot ocratic
,~ ains, the irorlting class trill deny thorn its confic'once, and it will not put
the power of govornrrront in their hands. Those who right Irish to throttle
democracy in the name of the die tctorship o.:' 'ono proletariat trill be - and
axe - ?tojectod by the working class in Donmar':k.
It fo1lov:s from this that the creation oy a monopolistic party
system in connection tri'i-h -the developcient of socialism in Denmark is not
only a ;;hoorctically vrronc and polii;ica-lly objoctionablo ic'ea, but it is
also an unroalistic and impossible iCoa. It also fo'_lozrs from this thaw
personal frooclom - and not antidorlocratic aberrations - will bo a porma o-A,
part of socialism in Donrmark.
O- y ono condition must be fulfilled, for VIA ' s to occur with cor-
tai.nty: that socialise in momma=, must be the achievement on the Danish
wort:in,; people. And Ire neither can nor will imagine the achievoment of
socialism) hors at home in n !V other tray.
K. Ri phts to Pie edoriod an c;. Under the Transition. ti on to Socialism, 'Clio Ito? e
and Function of the Stato and the Law.
1. E ory state is based to a certain extent on coercion - police
power, economic and other moans of pressure, which are used more or loss
equally a-,ainst various sectors of the population.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-# DP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R0101200120008-7
The advantage of our present doriocracy, as comparod to earlier forms
of. government, lies in the coercion hitting all citizens equally. The
trouble is that this is only nominally true.
Let us take a look, at the mannish state today. There are innumerable
coercive rules, in the, form of orders and ;prohibitions, as for example; one
must serve one's military duty in one way or another, one must let one's
children be educated, a woman must feed her children, one must submit to
the decisions of the permanent arbitration tribunal, one must obey the
doe-roes of the labor court.
One could continue without end. All the rules - the laws and the
private agreements that are in turn g=uaranteed by the laws - together
constitute "justice" in our society. Many of them are general - e.g. that
one must have one's children vaccinated against smallpox - and can be found
in all civilized countries regardless of social structure.
But others are special for our society and take notice of equality
only as a matter of form; here are only two examples among innumerable ones:
the freedom of expression is by law secured "for all" but the wealthy can
make the most effective use of it. And if a rejected mediation proposal is
enforced by law, the order applies "equally" to employers' and workers, but
since a. mediation proposal practically never has favored the workers, the
"equality" has always favored the em.eloyers.
Finally, some parts of the law are directly designed to strengthen
the state and its apparatus, e.g. a regulation which says that one must not
"insult a functionary in his official capacity". As the state is capital--
istic, it means that those regulation:; are to protect the capitalist state
and reinforce its authority.
For the sake of -fairness it must be said in passing that the formal
democracy has created such good fighting conditions for thwworkii.ng class,
that from time to time it has been possible to introduce coercive regulations
and laws which have put a damper on the worst exploitation. They have been
of such a nature, however, that they do not alter the picture significan-`Ay.
The long and the short of it is that the capitalists, by virtue of
their property right to the means of production (the factories, machinery,
land, etc.) can make the state guarantee them the inviolability of this
property, that they can utilize the formal rights to freedom far more
effectively than the workers can, and that the asserted "freedom and
equality for all" is only a form and cover-up for unequal rights, in other
words; class rule. The bourgeois "riht" is in its nature a means to secure
the proservation:tancl functioning o" capitalist society.
This the opportunists have +never been willing to adjit, and there-
fore no socialism has over come from their call for "freedom and equality
fo - all". Their theory of govornmen., Fits capitalism as th glove Nits the
hand, and does not have even as much regard for reality as many bourgeois
political theorists have today. It would have ;eon a miracle of biblical
dimensions if with the hhlp of this political theory one could have brought
about socialism or have been able to avert fascism.
2. When oven the formally democratic (capitalistic) form of govern-
ment is based on coercion, and its alleged "freedom and equality for all" is
- 16 -
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R0'i01200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
mainly a hollor,? p rase, then it is obviously impossible to imp ine a
socialistic transformation. of society without a certain amount of coercion.
dust as many of the coercive measures we encounter in the :Danish
state today are intnndod to -protect the private capitalistic property
right to the means of production, so the laers and regulations o-? the oocial-
istic transition state trill unavoidably be aimecc at bringing about e-ne,
protecting the workers' property right to the means of production. Thereby
a large part of the government coercion trill be turned "the other way".
T'Te can take as a;i example the socialization of -the roans of. pro..
duction. As we assume that socialism here at home will come into Mein? as
a result of an en.tdrsion o"f the esa.sting democracy, it is I ' )ossible that one
will. nogotiato a compensation arran, emont, ithicli trill not, however, be
economically aclvantagoou s to the formo?,- oeaners - in contrast to that
nationalization which in reality strengthens capi-.',alism. A loss of .income
will be ciuickly noticeable to thorj, and the material possibilities for
using the "equal rights" more efwectivoly than the vorkors can, will 0-is-
appear. Iri addition the loss of the accustomed poor and influonce will be
noticed imuediatcly - and thereby also the loss of all that -this power rroanc
for batter utilization of the "equal rights."
In reality there has tius occurred a vary serious cutting down of
the freedom of the capitalists. The "equal right" has turned its edge the
other gray.
In this respect no state, regardless of how peacefully "ahe parlia-
montaxy revolution to os place, can ;et around tiro use of coercion towards
the o; ploiters - if it is the intention at all to carry through tho
socialistic transformation.
Finally, it is utter naivete to cling to "equal rig?Irts" in situa-
tions wloro the reaction actll^11y is preparing or is carrying out forcible
attacks on the democracy. Tho reaction has often boon shameless onourh
to o.cploit the principle of "freec'_om for all" for tie purpose o:_? abolishing;
freedom. Both in German in 1933 anc? in France in 1958 the social democ-
racy ;,-as paralyzed and irlpressed thereby that democracy was abolishou
ro2ercna.co to this and thct paragraph in the coustitlution, certainly
accompanied tritli open threats of violence.
The genuflection to the 2on-wl "frocclom for all" cos-,' Gern ny very
dearly, and it is not the fault o" -the Froneh opportunists i the price
is not as high in France.
12 the roaction in similes mc.:no:. attacks the sccicclistic gains,
must the socialists Lion also hoop ?l"Ira poaco out of rogard.for tho "price--
loss freedom and equality for al.'.?" No, TO say, in both cases the reaction
is placwn itself outside the lar: it has forfoi tad all "equc'! ;:iglus" and
scluancTh od its 2r oCdom.
All things considoreci, the socialists must thoroforo unconditionally
reject the 3ovo nmont thoory Of the o-onortunists as uni oalis"tic, jho~t-
sightoil, without foundation, inacl.ogiato and dangerous.
The important thing is to use instead the socin listic theory o
govornment, of fioodora and coercion, in accordance -;rich tile cxtaGricents
already made ancl in the form corresponding to the deveiopiaont in Denmark.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CTAt PDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
T. Conclusions
In those articles an attempt has been made to bring! up to date
various aspects of the larrist theory about the transition r'rou capitalism
to socialism and to a)ply the thooay to the historically de ermined Danish
situation. In do ng this we have also examined the opportunistic and
sectarian revision attoupts to which the theory h1s boon cxposod, and we
have established the validity of its basic doctrines also today and under
our conditions. La s-tly we have made an a'Lltempt to develop ,he theory,
partly to overcome certain shortcon..in;s, which may be recogiizcd by
examination of the historical experience, and partly to render it fully
suited for use under our domestic conditions.
It will finally be practical. to bring together those conclusions
that hereby have boon reached, into a few simple points:
1. The way to socialism in Denmark - first to the creation of
transition state - is by an extension of the existing formal democracy.
The ztrugglo to give a socialistic content to democracy is the special
characteristic of the Danish way to socialism, from the outline of which
we are able to discern two phases, first the broad unification on the basis
of the trade and political unity o" action. for the attainanont of democratic
and social improvements and for to'Jal disarmament of our country, and next -
as a fruit o:' the democratic unification - unification for the attainment of
socialistic goals. Under the latter phase it will be possible to establish
a state which consciously has socialism as its goal - the socialistic
transition state.
2. Socialism in Denmark will be characterized by the workers'
direct management of the socialistic industries and of most of the "public
business". Democracy will be direct. Government by the people will be
o tenclo to its real scope, a l ovcrnment of the people, for the people, by
t;ie )cople.
3. Socialism in Denmark will not have room for any one-party
system, either overt or camoui'la ;c~? . As long, as government compulsion is
necessary, socialism in Denmark will be given such form that both prin-
ciples and policies of the movement can be discussed freely and without
hindrance among individuals, groups and parties that represent various
points of view. In the same ;ray, final decisions will be put in the hands
of the people and be settled. in accordance with the majority principle.
Also the anti-socialist parties - as long; as they hoop within the lair - as
the socialist parties have always done here at home - will~lbe in a position
to criticise, appeal to the people and participate in elections and
referendums.
4. Freedom of . expression and personal freedom, attained after
almost a century a_.c~. a half' of class struggle, will be proservecl and as-
sured. But in accordance with the demand of socialism for', real democracy
and the creation of? "equal right" on. a real, not formal basis, the socialist
transition state trill undoubtedly broa? up the monopoly on., the forming of
public opinion which today is almost without limitation in the hands of
capital and/or groups that think in the grooves of the capitalistic world of
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
ideas .(throe h coir_troI o'``a i:u:l wncc on radio end- V, daily and 1reohh1;;,
pross', movies u,ncl all other entertainment, i:ies"t of all cducation aricl
litc_ai~ure, etc. The opinion-forming apnare tus nus~ ac in. the hands off:
the pcoplo i tsel b r' irhich is understood tho vorl.in peoples mai:i:?old
local and stational o anizations of cultural, popular; trctirle andiolitical
nature, as t? roil as tY o antisociali;stic oppoaition'.
But the formation o-? public opinion must under no circumstances be and will not, be - co troller: by a s::n le party or a rational organization or
controlled b r a single group. l tat iioz.1rl make impossible the freedom of
press and opinion - regardlesz of hoer fierce the proclamations that one
might send, out-4bout it - to great detriment of the free development o:?,
humanity and the builclin;; o2 socialism.
5. Because freedom of press and opinion is exactly the fundamental
guarantee that the traditional rules of democracy and the personal freedom
and c'.iE'ri-by are protected,' and that misuse; of. authority :o." any kind, which
might occur while Iovernment means of coercion are still neceasarr, would be
immediately o::pbuec_ and prevented. Freedom of the press will havo il;s.
Greatest effect in that 'ho, ?opinion-forming apparatus. is put in .tile haul's of
the people, and it is, secured tlioreby so. that no- Single group achieves
control. over public. opinion. Loth precautions arc of the greatest ippor-
taned for the development of socialism, the more.,active and unixi.:ndoroc' tho
participation of tho w1hole. population in the management of,. all the affairs
of society, the faster, more effective and loss_,p4iufuI; will be the building
of socialism. Bu?t active and unhindered pccirticipation in the nanagemont is
only possible trlien people are secure, that is 4ien tl-ioy are both, riatcriwlly
and intellec'ually froe. Therefore the frcedorti o pre.^s and opinion p?:jys
such large and positive part in the develoopmen-b o< socialism in Deiliar'.
The working class' here at home Imows por: ectly well that, a society
irithout capitalists, autocratic employers, and coupon ciippers,,,is preferable
to the present society. Dov;?ito much ta-M about tho welfaro state, the
Danish wo: kors feel every day the insecurity, injustice and lack of sal
detei'minai;iori. They fool that ro a,rc ipso of what lies been achieved toelay,
it is insuffioi.ont. They ,.now tl=at the solution is a ociety where, the
values ro unclivid,od to -:,hoso irho ercwio them, anc:;:.there the.riirection of
socioty is laid in t io hands' of those trio i ic'ce the soeio'.,y thrive ,ant grow -
the -Sroxking people, that is the tror? ors -,A- h Mind and. mind, in city and
country.. all who produce values by their otm effort without OxploiUlig
others. This is the socialistic society.
''?'or many years opportunistic le)or. loaders Lave concealed glair lack
of ability and wish -to bring about socialism in .owe country by poi .tin to
the antidormiocratic aberrwtions.n. other countries, rrixere they IZavc tri ec?. to
haui1e socialism on other histo'rllca'_ founea?tioiis, hinclere'. by all Idinc's . of
human frailties, for. a:loz uimo trithout possibili'vy of 'ielp. from the out-
side - and least o. all $ olil to s aid 1 a tor. leaders. - and "ron: tie be laving
based. on a much smaller fund of cxperionco than what we. Dave on.. rang. today.
It is not reasonable to u;~e this a i an o. ruse ; `"ho t 1 r is cr ors
and dimes that have folio?Tod the ;?roboss of creating socialism cl.>etrhoro
.n the world does not justify Danish lab. loaders in discontinuing tiro work
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: Ch4IRDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
to make Denmark socialistic, There is no danger that socialism in Denmark
will ,'ae, marred by a .y hin~ of that kind provided that. it is the irork of,
the Danish working class and labor movement themselves - and we will not
and cannot imagine it in. any other way..
Tor this reason, we are calling for unification to fight for
de;.locratic and social progress, for uni- icati.on of -the worizinl class and
all working people to the necessary,'ight, ,t'rhose clear goal is socialism,
all the workers' oirn society.
II, ' THE .Tt NSITION TO SOCIALISM:. GR0VDG IN OR
JUMPING I:N
10 Juno ' 1960
Pages 2 and 10
Ejvind I tiisgaard
In an editorial article in t3P" no. 11 tho question is asked. should
the ' adherents of socialism in Denmark "work for a gradual and harmonious
grmrrtl? into socialism or for -a clean transition from capitalism to social-
ism, i.e. a fundamental changing of society".
In simplified form the answer was, that as the idea of growing into
socialism had not led to socialism aLwahere, while on the contrary Marx's
and Lenin's teaching about the funnental changing of society, revolution,
actually has brought socialism to large sections of the world, the idea of
uro-,ring into socialism must be rejected as useless for a movement which
really =has socialism as a goal. Such a movement must take the road towards
ftinddinental changing of society.
An Inaccurate Presentation of the Problem
But such a conclusion is tooeheaply'arrived' at and, the proof is
simply not valid` for - ro reasons, which I shall soon e;:-slain. First,
hotever,' just a little remark about the ra7anner in which die question is
presented: It is, intentionally or unirr entionally, presented so that the
reader must get the impression that only the "clean" transition to socialism
is a real revolution, a real fundamental changing of society, while the
gradual' anc'.harmonious gro;rth means to remain at the status quo.
I:r these two meanings are implied in the words, the question
answers itself, of course. Instead the gaostion should have', been worded,
"Can the trazsi cio,i or fundamental cha.nginr, of society into socialism take
place by a 'gradual, harmonious ' groia'in ,' in' as well as by a sudden ' Jump'?"
If the answer is yes, which of the Awo methods is charged with more ad-
vantages and fewer disadvantages?
The Conce-)t of revolution
This juggling of concepts comes back in the answer to the question
and that is exactly the first reason why I hold the proof to be cheaply
arrived at and invalid. In the ?lar 'i st -theory the word "revolution" means
any transition from one economic system of society to another (for example,
the transition from feudalism to capitalism). Consequently, any such
transition or fundamental change is a revolution, regardles's of whether it
-20 -
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R0'01200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
is peaceful or violent, parliamentary or unpalllaii]entary, gradual or Svdcim,
harmonious or disharmonious
IP.ion the article says that a movement which wants to introduce
socialism bust take the:rcvolutiona:.^,,r and fundamentally society-changing
road or the "clean" transition road (the favorite child has many names),
nothing; more is stated than that those ciao Irish to introduce socialism .:1us'v
introduce socialism. And one des not got wiser from that.
According to the Marxist definition of the word "revolution", a
;rad zal and harmonious growing into socialism is a revolution, a clear and
und,amontally changing transition from capitalism to socialism. That is, of
course, provided that the said growth is completed, but vith this sole and
only reservation it is as good a revolution as the qt icl= revolution in one
"jump". The question is, *whether both are possible, and this the "rovoiu-
tionary" Marxists have flatly denied.
Jum anc' Causative Pelationshi
Now I am not iCnorant of the fact that the Mar::ist theory said that
all transition from one qualitative state to another happens "in the form
of a jump" rapidly and suddenly, as, for example, when water becomes steam
by Beating to 1000C. But if we look at it more closely we find that also
here it is a matter of tautology, as there is no other definition of "jumr)"
than the transition from one qualitative state to another. The mistake is
that one is fastening on to the speed with which such changes may take place
in chemistry and physics.
One makes it look almost as if there were the question of a miracle
a clear break with the causative relationship. But this is exactly not the
case. The causative relationship is entirely unbroken and continuous,
Unfortunately, I cannot master the theory of thermodynamics well enough to
give the explanation of the chin,-o of water into steam, I must limit myself
to referring to the authorized textbooks about this.
The Process Takes Time
Precisely when ire - o from the physical processes to the socia-J-
economi.c ones, we discover that the "revolutionary" Marxists regard the
sudden "jump-life" transition from one qualitative :Mate to another as
broach in the causative relationship. .entirely aside from the fact that one
must be wary of the analogy between physical and soc~.o-economical processes
- (no one can prove that the transition from capitalism to socialism must
occur suddenly as with a "jwip" just because this is the case with the
transit? on of water from the liquid to the gaseous state) - as I said,
entirely aside from this, it is absolutely incontestable that transitions
from one form of society to another have always taken time.
One can at the most tal'_: a'-)wt suddenness, if one is measuring the
duration o the transition by the millions of years that life has been on
earth. I do not _UIOIT if any Mar::ist believes he can tell the date and time
of day when I)onma rl.'s transition from feudalism to cap talism took )lace.
:e can mention important events which ho can take as indications of the
transition, but the transition itself took place over a longer period.
The same is true of the transition of the Soviet Union from capital-
ism to socialism.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R0'01200120008-7
The Soviet Experience
On November 7, 1917, the Bolshevik seized power, but the problem
was not solved by that feat. Officially the constitution of! 1936 is
regarded as the crucial event, and that means the transition took about
twenty years. If one demands that certain juridical forms also belong to a
real socialistic society, the transition in the USSR took not twenty but
closer to forty years.
It will be objected here that the blame for this lies not with the
olsheviks but with the counterrevolutionary forces, famine and the
in'~orvention.wars. It may be reasonable to take the two last--mentioned
into consideration, but not the first, because that was not a one-sided
product of counterrevolutionary forces alone, but also a product of Lenin's
demand for.absolute dictatorship of the Bolsheviks, not limited by law.
The Conditions in Denmark
One may think that the Bolsheviks would have lost the battle if they
had not followed Lenin, that is admitted; but when we are to', find out which
way is the best in Denmark today - and ire are apparently agreed that our
parliamentary tradition males it impossible for a party to usurp power un-
limitecl by law - then we must not reckon on being able to emulate the
Bolsheviks in the trick of fast conversion to socialism.
If one renounces power unlimited by law, one needs take into
consideration the wishes and opinions of others, one must proceed cautiously,
coavinco instead of making short work of opponents.
'That, of course, is what we understand by domocracy,',and the
democratic way is not only a good way, it is the only one that is passable.
Iloltirover, it is also slower to travel, and there is no use holding onto the
belief that the transition to socialism must and shall take place suddenly
and abruptly.
I started by saying that there were two reasons why the answer to
our question was incorrect and the proof invalid. The other' reason is that
the more statement that the idea of ,raring into socialism so far has not
resulted in socialism anywhere is not by any means tantamount to saying that:
it cannot be done. That it has not so far been done is not necessarily the
fault of the idea itself, but may also be due to the fact that the politi-
cians who have tried to introduce socialism "by growing in" have lost sight
of the goal, have become tired on the way, and have adjusted themselves to
the existing conditions.
Examples of this are directly mentioned in the article. But one
cannot of course expect the validity of an idea tested and proven by people
who no longer believe in it. -- In other words, it is still an open question
whether the theory is valid.
(Some remarks on the starting point for an evaluation of the
development within the CPSU)
No. 22, 3 Juno.1960 Iuai Noltke
Page 2
- 22 -
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
Some SF readers have addressed some questions to me concerning the
evaluation of the internal development in tlxe CPSU and the convulsions over
t'io co3.1apse of the summit meeting. There is a search for an evaluation
of iriierc the development now ;rill go, esl)oci ally after the meeting of the
Central. Committee May 4. The question is: will one risk a return to the
cold war and the mothods of the Stalin period, or is it _,2robablo that "the
more progressive and democratic tendencies" will. Gain the upper hwnd:'
Generally spoakin[;, I believe it is necessary to state that in the
Soviet Union one is continuously in the middle of a long ;ransition period
frith gradual renewal, under inner conflict in the ruling party and in uovic?
socioty. This opinion is not recent ,Aea me, nor was it formed after my
exclusion from the Danish communist party in 1953. 111reaay in a meeting of
the directorate of the said par-by in 195 i , after the report of the Danish
party delegation t rhich had visited the USSR and talked with Soviet leaders,
I presented some remarks which, accordin,; to riy notes from the said meeting
had the following content:
Indeponclent Marxist ] yaivA, on
"...I believe that frith rogard to dovelopm.en - s in tie Soviet Union
anc', the CPSU one must be prepared for the fact that after the errors of the
Stalin era and, the 'cult of the individual', one will continuously and :tor
a long time bo in a transition period in the economic, social and political
development process, characterized by constants struL;gle between the old and
the new. Thus extensive and fundamental errors anc' slips such as those
characterizing the "period of person worship" aro not corrected and con-
giiorod vrith one stroke or in a short time. Strong elements from the old-
time regime (bureaucratic grot?ps)'will stubbornly resist the necessary
changes unclor the further development of the socialistic society and t_io
stato power. Obsolete viewpoints and methods will only radually be overcome,
and one will probably from time to time be faced with temporary rolapses.
But in the lon run I have no doubt about the general direction of the
development totrards continued economic progress and towards socialistic
democracy.
";hutch standpoint should we as 'iIar.:ists false as to the said inter
conflicts in the CPSU? I believe our task must be to follow closely the
individual stops in this transition period, anc. accivcly to support the most
progressive trends in our Soviet brother party. that :scans suc_. forces as
most consistently seer to carry out the epoch--ran dng decisions of the 20th
con ross of the CPSU ... To must incloponcs.ontly use the 'Har?,i.st analysis
also iii th roY,ard -to clevolopmonts in the socialist trorld, and not be satis-
fied only by approving all decisions and changes in Vic order in zrl.iclx they
arc made ... rr
The Process Con'cinues
I still believe that, generally speaking, this evaluation covers
the main. parts of the current developments among tlic Soviet communists. I
rogard outright return to the methods of the Stalin period to be quite out
of the question, both in internal and foreign poli-,'Acs.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 : CIX-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R0'01200120008-7
As far as bureaucratic 1-overs,mont forms - and the privileged.
-position of the "bureaucracy" - are concerned, I think one can say that
those dubious factors gradually will be put out of action. /This isT simply
because, under the present dovolopment, they have become a hindrance both
to the continued rational,groor'~h of the productive :Corcos and to normal
growth of the political and cultural life under rising and more all-sided
enlightenment.) Therefore, likewise 17zruslichov's many and quite fundamental
reforms, which maaoW other things also have expanded the direct influence,
role and authority of the trade union committees and the collective enter-
prises. This process in the direction of more democracy can'hardly be
stopped - as the main trend.
Of significant importance hero is Idarushchev's ricthoc? for breaking
down resistance from. "the hard ones" in the Iiolotov-Ysagar_oviPh group and
frorz the buroauc: acy. Again and again IOurushchov has appealed directly to,
and mobilized, both workers and collective farmers to got after the old
bureaucratic methods in administration and leadership. Hereby broad popular
forces are activated.
IV. THE HISTORY 0:p THE CPSU
No. 20, 20 Nay 1960
Pages 6-7
The history of the communist tarty in the USSP is an incredible
stony of will rower and merciless fights, of liuraan devotion and humiliation,
unity and strife, vengefulness and goodness, greatness and pettiness - of
fanatically fighting men of good wil:" and less good will and about their
wise, co;r:rdly, courageous and -Atupid actions. But first acid last it is the
story of the greatest human achievement in the history of centuries. Hero
is a group of people - first a small flock, then more and finally millions -
who find the fulcrum from which all things are moved, and in the course of
half a century they alter their world totally and irrevocably.
However one, ray stand on the subject of their -paoans and goals, one
must recognize the greatness of t eir undertaking and achievement.
The History of Two Giants
tlhat history could be written about these people.' All other history
books will scan poor, if the real history of the communist party of the
Soviet Union were written. And what would it not mean to all those who
strive to change their world in the same direction as the M ssian corumnists
- in socialistic direction?
come day that history will probably also be written. As far as the
time up to the begin inL of the 30's is concerned, there are several im-
portant historical accounts, but for the time after 1936 we are in the
desert.
"The History of the CPSU, a grief Survey", writ-bon !,by Stalin, is not
the history of the Soviet communist... It is the history o a mystical
- 24
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
concept, 11the party" which never is in error, incessantly purges itself of
rottenness and goes from victory to victory. Aside- from tyro figures - Lenin
and Stalin - the people in it are accos' ed only a secondary role: "tho party
decided", it says, what does it matter which people it is who make the
decisions, when one knows that they ma. ahem with Lenin and Stalin at
thoir head?
Mainly the party is described only in the persons of these two
"giants"s at intervals there occurs, however, a list of the Leninist core
i-iieli regardless of the historical situation tu:?ns out to be persons long
dead and persons who, at the.tir..e of publication, here close to the author
(in the 1933 edition Yozhov belongs to the "Leninist core" of the civil war:
in the 1946 edition his role does not appear to be worth mentioning).
Stalin's boob about the CPSU is the plainest modern example of
"applied history u-riting". Its purl oso is not to describe the course of
history and to learn from it, but (1) to praise the communist party as
infallible (2) to make Stalin one frith it and (3) to smear all his oppo-
nents. On the other hand, the boot: is silent about all the "errors" which
all those, who at the time of writing closed ranks around Stalin, hcd
committed during the years.
On the 20th congress of the party this presentation was strongly
criticized - for what can present-day youth learn from a "historical
analysis" which explains all defeats by referring to enemy agents disguised
as leading communists, and all victories as results of the omniscience of
a few geniuses?
After four years a now edition of the CPSU history has been
published, written byaa conuttoo with Ponomarov, who is ideologically
close to. Stalin, at the head, but not - li'_ce Stalin's book - officially
authorized by the Central Committee.
One clings to the hope that is contained in the last mentioned
circumstance.
From Stalin to hrushchev
it may appear strange to squander so much space on Stalin':; old boo
about party history, when it is the new that is to be treated. There are
two reasons for this: (1) only by comparison with the old presentation can
one evaluate the ideological progress: "Prom Stalin to i.Ui.rus ichov" (2) the
objections in p inciplo against the old presontation are also valid for the
new: its purpose - to strengthen the authority of the current party leader-
ship -- is just as dominant.
In the now presentation the party is not the work of two men, but
of one --- Lenin. Various random recitations o? Lenin's adherents e'o not
c.iange this sign icantly. After Lenin's deat`i more emphasis is given to
the Stalin group as a ui_t. A novelty is the uN s'l
novelty I~Cwon of the naaes of
those who belonged to the group - in other words, those Stalin adherents
who went "soft" and therefore wore liquidated byr Stalin: Kossior, 1).uc?zutak
'rand others".
Those two little words, "and others," play the same -part as in the
old edition. By their use, direct lies are avoided when situations are to
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIASRDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
be described where opposition men, who were later executed, supported Lenin
or Stalin - a state of affairs often occurring, which is to be hushed up-
-1 preaches Towrards the Truth
Most of the direct lies and the crudest cover-ups hasre disappeared.
It is reported clearly that Leidn was in the minority durin the peace
negotiations with Germany. But often the truth slips out in a peculiar
form; the attentive reader actually learns that Trotsky was lithe chief of the
fed Army but it is mentioned only in connection with a criticism of it.
It is the same with the once fat.ious "troika" - Stalin, Zinoviov, Kamenev -
who fought Trotslr in the period 1920-25: they are mentioned in a sub-
ordinate clause, when Zinoviev and Kamenov broke with Stalin. The Stalin-
Bu:hari.n coalition which arose thereby is mentioned for the first time when
Stalin broke with Bul:harin. All of it in subordinate clauses. This is also
a way of writing history - one can imagine Denmark's modern, political history
written in the same way.
Nevertheless, this cautious tribute to truth is a great stop forward
from Stalin's book. But one will look in vain for a clear view of the
membership of the Central Committee and thePolitburoau at various times.
It was the party, personified by Lenin and the Central . Committee - specif-
ically disregarding Zinoviev, Kamonev and Trotsky that carried out the
October Revolution - and not a group consisting of (in addition to those
already mentioned): Stalin, Sverdlov, Nogin, Uritsky, ILollontai, Artiom,
DzorzhinslW, Siaumian, Derzin, I rkov, Bukharin, Joffe, Sokolnikov, Smilga,
Bubnov, 2iuralov. This presentation is also more practical,', as the "party"
later than?..od the seven last-mentioned, p:Lus the three opponents referred
to, in a very special way.
No More Trots1 ito Vermin!
In one respect the new presentation constitute important progress.
The use of lanZ~ua o has been completely changed: The "Trotskyito vermin",
"dregs of hummAty" and many other tidbits have disappeared. In a few placds
there are some "surrendorers" loft, and in one place Trots1rism is referred
to as a "counterrevolutionary monshevik" movement. Deviations are referred
to by the words "against the party" and "erroneous" (the former is worse
than hie latter). In the entire book there is only one "oneonrr of the
people" namely Beria, who is not even elevated. to "foreignjagent", only
"political adventurer".
The changed form of expross_ton is, not accidental. The reader is at
the same time given a reasonably objective report of the arguments of the
opposition, each time followed by critical remarks. But in by far the
greater number of cases it is lack of political judgment for which the
authors berate the opposition, and not directly evil intentions. The
manifold opposition movements are not looked upon as paid foreign agencies,
but as 1lonshovik movements - i.e. adherents of that wi.n of the Russian
social democracy which regarded it as impossible to build socialism in a
backward country like Russia.
That means that they are looked upon as what they Spore, namely
politicians, not criminals. This is the most genuine imprpvemont from
Stalin's textbook. But how about the trials? About this in a later article.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R0I01200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
No. 21, 27 May 1960
Pages 65-d
Ono i?rill natu-=ally soareli with special ilzterost t1irourh the now
edition of the party history of CPSU for new f~cta al information and a now
evaluation with regard to the tragic chapter of the bi trials of the 30's
agni:lst Stalin's political opponents in the conunuids-b party. ,That new
mate:;ia1 does tze book bring here?
As a rule, one should expect that trials whore prominent leaders
admit having boon despicable spies even since the founding o. the state would
bo regarded as very important source material, anc'_"be inclu~'od even in the
briefest presentation. Can one ta:o the liberty of hushing up such im-
portant material?
Stalin, at least, did not think so. In his book (tile 1933 edition
has 472 pages, large typo) about toil pages are used to report the dis-
closures from these trials. The Ponomarov comraitteo must have boon of a
different opinion - for in its presentation, the section of which up to
1930 covers 500 closely printer. pages, thoro aro zero lines about the big
trials.
Paradoxically one fools encouraged by this reach of tic most
elementary rules of history writing. Suroly it impairs the clarity -
innwnerablo persons, frequently mentioned, disappear suddenly without trace
from the story, those who do not know bettor may believe that they hcve
settled down in social security pensions. But a hoalthy sense of sh-mo is
ovidont through the silence.
The False Theory of the Trials
Indirectly -Cho -trials are mentioned in one singlo place: it is said.
that Stalin put forth an "orroneous" theory of sharpening the class
struggle. "In practice it servos. as the justixicction of punitivo measures
on a largo scale against the politically beaten idoological oplononts of the
party. Also many honest comrn n i is andi. people outside trio party rho we re
enti_oiy innocent were ex?osei_ to punitive measures". Then the rosponui-
bility is laid on Yozhov and Boria, who "o..ploited the personal shortcomings
of J. V. Stalin".
The two sentences quoted (and teat is actually all that is said
about the macs purges) are written in a somewhat befuddled way. ?Tore the
"ideological oy7ponen-bs" not "on irely innocent"? The author apparently does
not consic'.or them to be "honest comruanists", but on the other hand it is
said txla'b they wore sacri:'ices to an erroneous theory ?- and therefore not
to justice!
This presentation does not contribute any evidence of clarification
in tho article of Stalin-followers: it rather increases tho process of
confusion.
As far as 'fro are concerned, Fro do not mare groat demands. To regard
it as a significant stop fwnrard that it is admitted that a number of the
founders of the Soviet state were not German and Japanese spies (as it is
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CTk-kDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R0!01200120008-7
said in Stalin's presentation). If one thought so, one would surely have
used. at !cast one line in the 744 pages to mention it ...
A Tame Evaluation of Stalin
The treatment of Stalin is lenient in form and sharp in content,
where it follows the criticism already '_;nm:m. The formic; most interesting.
It is quickly surveyed: seven pages plus a few subordinate clauses here and
there in connection with corrections of the "errors".
Three Lines About the "Lenin rerad Affc?ir".
Is it right to gather all that 'is negative in a historical period in
two small paragraphs, the last of which, furthermore, one does not come
across until long, after one has finished the period in question? hundreds
of pages are used to describe how well everything is Coin g, and then
suddenly some brief, concentrated remexlzs that it was not at all as Well as
one just thought.
An o;ample: In 1948-51 the Soviet was shaken by a -iolcnt inside
party light which was fought in the deepest secrecy. It took thq form o.2
incrimination of 14alenkov's political opponents, was named tho "Leningrad
affair", and cost the lives of, among others, the party leader in Leningrad,
the premier of the P FSi, two Central Committee soerotaries and a member of
the Politburcau. Does not mention of the "Leningrad affair" belong in the
description of the period 19':?5-53 (chapter 16)? Could it have failed to
put its stamp on this period?
One reads through the chapter in vain. All was goiirg very well.
More than 30 pages further, in the chapter concerning the period 1953-5C
we find in the section "Errors and do_"ects produced by the person worship
/cult of the individual are corrected" three lines about the "Leningrad
affair". It must not be permitted to disturb the general positive picture
given of the period 1945-53.
In this way it becomes difficult, if not impossible to derive a
proper lesson from history. It is probably also for that reason that one
can read througli the conclusions at the end without finding any resume
concerning the "person worship". Is the "person worship" not a danger,
like "revisionism" and other deviations?
Z?Thon one studios the concrete decisions of the Central Committee
during the last si.^ years, one receives a clear impression that it is. But
here in this presentation, theory nx.cl practice must always be kept apart.
In practice one can make corrections (and one does), but tle theory must be
kept "pure". It must not be infected - by reality.
More Factual About 02pononts
Finally, a very great improvement must be pointed out. i'Thile the
"anti-party" group liquidated in 1936-39 are still treated in historically
incorrect mariner, and Beria (certainly correctly) alone is called "ends r
of the people", those politicians ;rho after the 20th con;ross have been
given the label "anti-Harty" are at least treated in a way that is histori-
cally correct.
This is quite interesting, because the words one his heard about
them curing the laut three years have not all been friendly. Nevertheless,
20
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
Uolotov is mentioned in all cases z.fiiere he has played an important - and
from the authors-' vie n oint - positive role. The same is true of Bulgainin;
and under the list of the _rea-V military leaders of -she Ilar9 Ziiukov is
included.
If only the whole boo'. had 'bee-,i ir.~it'en in that gray, much could have
been forgiven. It irould not ilav3 meant that the authors - and. he party
leau.ersiiip - would have had to relinquish a criticism o he principles of
the various op5osition standpoints, from Trots?W to Ho_(otov, but it would
undoubtedly have meant that the myleh of the "unified party" and the
"Leninist core" would have gone by the board. There2oro, if the book shout!...
still be effective as y3ropa"cnda for tlae tarty leader s'xi , much greater
demanth would have been made to the au;;hors' reasoning ability. Alrecdy the
deliborately limited criticism of Stalin shakes the dog.ia of irr allibility
and of unanimity; imagine a similarly tuned-do;m evaluation e:-tended. to
include all the arominent 'xirsonalities in the histo.'y of the party!
The result would, in return, be such that LT.ae socialist movement,
both inside and outticle the Soviet Union, could draw practical usefulness
from the book, re ;ardloss o_? whether or not one agrood with the evaluations
and critical remarks oi' the au'-hors.
- As the matter now stands, tie boots is historically considered an
expression of an important step fonrard compared to Stalin's book, so
important that one can be sure that the great decisive stop also will be
made, even in a foreseeable future.
Ix"eavy_,_Colorless Pea dingy
As a historical presentation the book is important by its compre-
hensiveness, but in many respects it is useless because it falsifies or
distorts the historical sequence - which may be evident from the a:amples
brought out here.
As historical roadin,-, it is deadly depressing - the chaptor on tho
last war, the horrors and heroism of which are great enou,;h to surmount
even the most pedestrian narrctivo, is a worthy once-ration. In contrast to
Stalin's book, which had the sole advantage o_ being; readable, it is
ponderously tr itton (and obviously translated front a German draft: what
for oxannlo is "-forsonoriss"?) It will therefore not be much read and not
spread. ,aucli confusion. 3ut on the othor hand, it is not authorized by the
Central Co!nmlittee. Jo are waitin^ for another edition.
Because the book about the histo:iy of the conmunist party of the
Soviet Union is still to core.
V. A SOVIET POET'S S1IOi'TDOi21-T WITH T1iC IDOLS OI,' T1[ STALIN J.
(Pr .vda prepared for May Day a Tull Ipa?e poor "From a Distant
Past" by the rebel poet Aloxandor Tvardovs1sy. )
ITo. 22, 3 Juno 1960 Criticus
Page 7
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: C1A2RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
In what direction does the development go in the Soviet Union since
the recent personnel changes and the meeting of the Central Committee May 4
this year? It is difficult to predict because this is againla period oy
strife. Personnel changes, however, have also put their mark on the
cultural front: By a decree of May 7 the until-now ministers of culture
liikolai A. Ilichailov was removed. 1Ie was regarded as belonging to the "hard
core" aria has caused much trouble, for less orthodox authors and artists.
Instead , mterina A. Purtseva took office as Bead of the ministry of
culture. She had just been reir,-oved from the party secretariat, and has a
reputation for belonging- to the more "liberal" inner circle around
ldirushchev.
A Poem in Pravda
On the literary front a remar hhable thing had happened, just before
the recent changes and Mw r Day: In Pravda for April 29 there appeared on
page 4 a full page poem: 'Trom a Distant Past". The privileged author was
one of the "rebels" of Soviet literature, Alexander Tvardovsir.
The selection of Tvardovsliy for the poem of the day in Pravda was,
in consideration of the previous quarrels in Soviet literary circles,
already a sensation, but that was only the smallest part. More sensational
was the subject of the poem and the author's treatment of it. Because this
is a very unusual poem about Josi" V. Stalin, soon through the eyes of a
well known Soviet writer. Let us lool> at some samples :
Separated from Life /Paragraph head - not integral part of Poem
"']pile he lived separated from life by the walls of +he Kremlin
he was over us as a threatening spirit,
and we did not know other nc.mes.
Fie demanded to be glorified, always more,
in the capital as in the village.
There was nothing; to add and nothing to cut out.
It was so in the world.
It was so for a quarter of a century.
This man's name echoed tog,et:her with the word fatherlanc!
as an appeal for fight and wore."
Alea:ander Tvard.ovs zr makes a running charge to topple the idols of
the past in the people's minds, and '~.ero in, Pravda itself /s, an attempt to7
break down respect for the false worship of the man and leador, who craved-
to be the new god of the people. '_q-,to Soviet poet continues!:
The God of the True Believers jare.graph head - not part of poem
"Ile Oid not mow the least moderation
when he first h0k usurped tire rights,
which the name of the God demands from the believers
- those Sri th the deep faith.
And he had already so accustomed himself to this
that he saw the whole world through the smoko of his pipe
- so that he could command owTor all as a god.
For his hands reached out over all. the world's imps*tant concerns:
over all production, over all kinds of science,
over the depths of the oceans and the heavenly bodies.
-30-?
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R0
101200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
And he listed ahead the number of the riany exploits.
It was also. to him the heroes owed their_ honor after' death
Our songs were sunk about this only in the hour of i r.cath,
3roakinC all lairs he as ablo to lot the entire people
fool his subrimo anger ...
Tvarclovs? r brines out in his poem, tuldisgh:isod, Stalin's brutal
sottlement'?uitll all the old 2ightors of the revolution in the infamous
trials and purges:
"Those irho in the boginhing had trzvol.led the same road,
who had worked in the underground, knozm the prisons,
those rho hart seized the power. ancl hart fought
they wore thrown doi-m into tho darkness,
one after the other.
The one in the shaci.ows and the sleep -
the long list of them
,rho became old men before their time ...
Thus he lived on earth.
Thus ho led, while he hold the rains with an iron hand.
One will seek in vain for the one who not in his presence,
. glori:?i_od him and exalted him.
It tress probably not in vain
that this son of the orient
shaved to the utmost the character
of his implacable injustice, his cruelty
and his execution of the l&w."
Lenin Did Not Teach Us to Create Gods ...
Tvardovll3r turns in_aiis poem to the crinCinr hypocrisy which in tho
period of person worship /cult of tiho individual became the polsoisous
atmosphere around Stalin's figure
'".Tess it not the whole wor]. which in tho ceremonial hall
hardly Cave him time to open his mouth
be oro Choy shouted hurrah:
Would he cc~lso this time have his tray? And trhy!
lxporionco has turned to the wrong side.
Whom shall one blame, that i c was the way it was?
The great Lenin t.r, s no - od,
and he did not teach us to create gods :
And at the and of his great poem o' sett1oiacnt with the past,
Alexander Tvardovs1r turns toirar.ls ti'.e net,-, about Ito grow in tLio rich
Russian soil
"Toci.ay the times aro c:ifforonto
The living earth, whIcil is bocorini.n ~,roon,
pushes everything out that is to grow.
The people will direct its great cause on the chosen path ?-
without trusting its land, its "ace and its children's fcto
to any deity, from one pinnacle to another.
But it trusts only the real wisdom of.tho guide.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CTA3ItDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915RO101200120008-7
That is why I now have seen more smiles
and less grief on people's faces ..."
This was the opening note for May Day - the poet's greeting to the
people in the party organ Pravda. - Not a bad greeting, which started with
a look back at the black winter night which characterized a quarter of a
century. "The great Lenin was no god.. And he did not teach us to create
gods!2 An appeal to the people's confidence in itself, while the hollow
idols are thrown down. This greeting deserves to be known as a Soviet
settlement with the past - with a "distant past" as Tvardovs1W calls his
poem.
No. 20, 20 May 1960 Unsigned
Page 5
The justified sensation over the American spy plane that was shot
down near Sverdlovsk has caused several other news, items from Moscow to be,
although not entirely forgotten, at least pushed into the background. This,
despite the fact that they may really be just as important.
Prior to the meetings of the Supreme Soviet where IMrushchev pre-
sented his sensational speeches - backed up by Foreign Minister Gromyko and
Marshal Gretshko - there was a meeting in the Central Committee of the CPSU.
The only thing we know so far from this meeting is that it made a series of
changes in the leading posts in the party. In this connection partly as a
result of this, the Supreme Soviet undertook some further changes. The
revamping is of such magnitude that it must be noticed and have serious
reasons.
Frol I{oslov, who until now was deputy premier, is relieved of this
post and transferred to become party secretary - presumablylsecond secretary
(Khrus'hchev is first secretary and Suslov downgraded to second secretary).
Tirtseva and Ignatov have resigned as secretaries in the party and are
appointed minister of culture and de-ratty minister president respectively.
Two others - previously very prominent - party secretaries Pospolov
and Aristov, have disappeared from the secretariat and have boon given
other, not specified, positions in the Russian Soviet Ropub]fic. Pospelov,
who was the leader of the CPSU delegation to the Danish party congfess in
the -fall of 1958, has also been fired as member of the Party Presidium
(executive committee).
The leader up to now of the Seven Year Plan, Kosygin, has been
relieved of this post but has been appointed first deputy premier, Novikov
was appointed the now plan loader, and at the same time he became deputy
premier (but as far as we know not a member of the party Presidium).
K'irishonko and Beljajov, who have had very influential positions, were
actually fired from these months ago and transferred to southern provinces.
They are now also formally outside the party Presidium. And finally
Voroshilov has resigned as president of the Supreme Soviet and is replaced
by Brezhnev.
-32-?
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R0!01200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
In a water -'he whole thing ZTent over very quietly. The Central Com-
mittee made the decisions in a close:. meeting and itself cc rried out the
part lxertairdng to the party, irhi1o the Supreme Soviet (parliament) put
the rest into c_foct. Tim reason is given only in tae case of Troros.lilo?r
-- his ago. A quite different kind of political reasons wore given in 1957,
when Molotov, ICaganovich, Malonkov and Shopi:.ov were ousted, and also whon
Dulganin was fired as premier and transferred to North Caucasus.
But such an extensive rovanping of the party and stato leadership
has, of course, its reasons and its importance. It is evidence that these
must bo Zrithin the Sovie-b loadorshin_ si, aificant and incompatible c'dver-
Loucos with regard to tiia policies of tho Soviet Union, internal c s 1-re11
as e_cteanal. But about the nature the divergencies, no info5mation is
available. :Nihat one ccui see however, is that Idirushchev's influence is
conso!.jdatod by the changes.
It is not believed that this t;dll be tho last. I:either should 0110
say that the personalities in party and state loadorship should never
change: on tlio contrary. But it cannot be saticfactorj or entirely ncalthy
t'_iat such comprehensive changes are uncertaken after deci:,ion in closed
mootin;s a?d without justification to tho people, who ce..n only talc not'co
of the -acts - without kioirin whether they are ozprossicns for c_iangos in
direction to acdovo a more stable and consistent pro ress on the course
alp eady taken.
A preliminary evaluation of the revamping eauz only give the result
that Iairushchov obviously rias strengthened his position to such an extent
that he found himself capable of replacing a number df 'people who ali;ays
here open or clandestine dogmatics of the type from the Stalir period.
']hethor this means real progress cannot be said with certainty. It -would
unquestionably be progress if not only the party Leads but the Soviet people
took part in doeidin and maIting changes, but these appear, as ire said, to
have taken place by a rather extensive palace revolution in reverse.
VII. I}IRUSHCHFV' S CAMPAIGN AGAINST BUIU AUCRACY AND
INEQUALITY: SIGNALS OF INTERNAL POLITICS
No. 23, 10 June 1960 Gort Petersen
Page 5
The dramatic collapse of the summit meeting has had. the o$: oct that
the -foreign policy of tho USSR. ovorshaclo??rs other topics. S-Rion iihrushchov
came to last erlin, howovor, he laid aside the hard line from Paris, but
the corrbont of the Soviet oreig n policy at the moment appears actually to
fit the doscription, sharp in words, conciliator] in action. The coexisb-
oice line has not boon abandoned.
A gonuino chard in Soviet foreign policy would also be impossible
without corresponding cnc;,ngos in internal policy. ITith an effective "hard"
foreign policy Loos militarization, c.isc.plino and retrenchments at home:,
accompanied. by privileges for the "cadres" without whose active loyalty
such a tightening up is not capable ol' being carried out.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CtARR'DP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
But the Khrushchev group has hitherto associated its uame with the
diametrically opposite policy and has just started,a new push forkwrard. In
the higher Soviet meetings in the beginning of May some light was thrown on
this, and indications also came out as to why this was regarded as necessary.
In other words, we must -cake a closer look at Soviet internal policy.
Proposals in the :Highest Soviet Meeti
In the meeting of the Central Commi-L-1tee May 4, just before the
meeting of the Supreme Soviet, there had taken place a shifting of leading
personalities which disclosed deep disagreements. Both the shifted ones
and those remaining were strong opponents of the old Molotov foreign policy;
the disagreement is about internal questions.
But which? That came out in the Supreme Soviet, when Khrushchev
presented proposals, among other thii.gs: to legalize the transition to a
42-'lour week, which already had started; to discontinue the personal taxes,
which will deprive the state of about:, 10j of its income; to ;give the tax
reform character of a wage assessment; and to increase the production of
consumer goods beyond what the Seven Year Plan had anticipated.
All this is explosive. One need only recall that Malenkov fell on a
desire to strengthen the light indus'bry. But there is much more ...
Ilal Overtime
Much came out in the speech of the trade union chief GrisChkin.
Perhaps the shortening of working; hors is ospccially popular in certain
director circles, considering that "many enterprises under the Tatar, the
Yaroslav and the Lithuanian economic councils are guilty of illegal overtime
work and abolishment of rest days". Or when "in many enterprises" "10 to
20 , in some enterprises over 30`%, of the total work hours" is wasted in
inactivity because deliveries and wort, organization are badly arranged.
No, t?ie shortening; of worlda1 hours imposes very great demands on
the loaders. And it is not improving, when Grisclkiin encourages the trade
unions to "fight constantly" for the enforcement of the labor laws, and as
the topping on the birthday cake he gives out the word that the shortening
of working hours will be followed up by increase in wages, '' a watchword that
is supported by the chairman of the labor and wage cominissiaon and by'
11rusiichov himself.
Prising Standard of Livid
In this connection, Grishkin refers to tho necessity for planning
production in broad workers' assemblies. All workers must in a certain
sense be brought into the leadership, otherwise the grandiose plans cannot
be carried out.
- Also the material and social improvements are naturally of groat
importance to the work: output. The strongly increased offering of consumer
goods moans that now there is "some purpose in mawdng money". One can
got something for one's wages, and drish1idn throws light on the changes in
the purchases of workers' families on the basis of a statistical study of
the budgets of 15,000 families during the years 1953/59. In addition he
presents the information that during the last 'Lour years 10 million sewing
machines, 18 million radio and TV receivers and 99 million watches have
been sold.
- 34 -
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
A further increase in the capacity of the light ir._dustry will of
course strengthen this tendency and increase the work output.
Social IIneclua.litV
`.Thilo one surely has beer. able to obtain agreement about 'Ph-.s
im-orovomer~t in the )roduc Lion o2 the light i:idustry, Sher.: tLo present
production basis is considered, there is ano-Uhor question connected with
"social atrnosphore" that is combustible.
From the speeches in the meeting of the Supreme aoviet it appears
that 7 or V p of the wage earners today receive the minimum trage, 360 rubles
a month, that the groat majority earn towards 1,000 rubles, and that 0.6 -
about 400,000 functionaries, earn over 2,000 rubles a month.
These figures are an expression of social inequality, a horitago fro; i
the Stalin period. Stalin was of the opinion that only by a very strong
material encouragement could one creato the necessary teclmical and admin-
is-trativo cadres in the then primitive Russia. To some extent this was
correct, but the result wrs a sl.arr, social stratification: and it eras in
to hold onto the principle after 19415.
any case wrong
The Un.even Z-leifIrt os Prico;teduction
Parallel with the very wide wage differentiation, Stalin used. a
system of consistent price redaction. 'I'Ihat did that mean: The prices for
the absolute necessities of li2o were hold on a low stable level and wore
not chrn(od. Those on the lowest economic level used'their entire income
for these necessities of life, and to them it meant nothing if the prices
for clothes, watches, radios etc. wore reduced by 10, 20, or 5C a. Bu,, it
moan something for those who earned enough so that they could afford some-
thing more than the daily necessities: if the price of clothes was reduced
by 25I,, then a new set of clothes might come within their reach. The purs.co
reduction policy served the same purpose as the wage differentiation, and
it likewise produced social inequality.
The New Situation
Today the Soviet Union has a surfeit of capable cadres, and the
organization of education guarantees that this is a stable condition. An
entirely now generation of workers has groin up, both urban and rural. The
new situation has some very decisive effects:
1) The problem, which brought into being the flaring social in-
equalities, has been solved in principle.
2) Socialism as a systom an only come to full flowering if it is
characterized by each individual citizen's conscious an(I active contri'u'~iorl
in 'the common work.
3) From. originally boing a spur to progress for a technically
bacluard country, the social inequality became the most serious brake on tho
full development of socialism.
4) Those circles which have had tie benefit of the inequality are
interostodin preserving it, because its abolition will mean loss of their
privileges,' and because it can talc place only at their direct cost.
-There can therefore not o any cause to wonder that there is an
sharp conflict in the leading Soviet circles about the abolition of: the
glaring; social inequality. As one will see, this question is perhaps the key
question i.n the zt ser: Jovelopment chase of -bho USSR.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-PMP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R0'01200120008-7
i rushchov did not conceal the conflict or the problem when he spoke
to the Supreme Soviet. He said, for example; "Some comrades seek to make
us go only by the tray of price reductions ... but one must keep the fact in
view, that one only creates unequal conditions for the population (thereby)
... After the Second jTorld 'Tar there arose ... a much too great gap between
the wages for the workers in different categories of work, and this gap
must be reduced."
O ponent of Inequality
Iirushchev is not against price reduction in principle, but he would
have it accompanied by wage increases for those with low wages and cuts for
those with high wages. The abolitth n of :personal tax is part of this
policy: for incomes under 1,000 rubles the wages are to be increased with
an amount equal to the previous tax: incomes over 2,000 rubles, on the
other hand, are not to rise, as the nominal (rages are reduc'ced to the extent
of the amount of tax.
During the meeting Grischkin also explained how the !trade unions had
caused the wages in a number of trades to be increased 20 to 30% during
recent years, and he state(, that this policy would be continued.
The IUhrushchev wing; has thereby answered the question of the further
social development with a clear dc:it.nd for equalization of 'the groat
difference between the social strata - oven if it must be done at the cost
of the privileged. Others in the loading circles have wis1'od that the
Stalin policy of one-sided price reduction should continue, and the glaring
social inequality be retained. And the adahoronts of equalization have won
- this round.
During the conflict between the interests of the "bureaucrat cadres"
and the common people IUwushchov chose to spea:z fqr the people. In 1957
he won over the chief representatives of bureaucracy - Molotov, Malenl:ov,
Bulg;anin, Purvukhin and others - who resisted a policy which would increase
the capacity of the national oconon1r but would woaken the Bower positions
of the bureaucracy. Bureaucracy as such, however, could noither be de-
stroyed nor removed from one day to the next, and it still exercises its
influence.
The forthcoming; step - to break the material privileges of the
bureaucracy, is still more far reacaing, and it is not surbrising that
some of I3hrushchev's hitherto firm supporters are droppingawaSy - the top
party cadres are of course socially infiltrated in the bureaucracy of
officialdom. Therefore ICirichonko and Bioliaev wore replaood by two of the
most radical Idhriishchov adherents, :"'odgorny and Poljansiy.
Pre arations for the 22nd Cont?ress
But the conflict is of course not finished. A Central Committee is
still in o fice which was elected in 1956 and is, in all that matters, the
result of a compromise between Iuirushchov's and Molotov's rings at tshe
time. Only next year will a now leadership be elected on the 22nd congress.
It is surely with this congress in mind that the party has'' again boon given
the character of a workers' party, by the admission of 2 million workers
"from production" since 1956. They will luzotwr how. to send the right dole-
gates.
36
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R0',01200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
international socialism is interested in the victory of the progres-
sive trend, and international capitalism in that of the conservative trend..
Perhaps one should bring in this factor when one is evaluating the NATO
policy at the moment.
VIII. THE CO-EXISTENCE OF DISTRUST AND TIM
ABSENT Gi'T PU,IEP
IJo. 20, 20 May 1960 Kai Uoltke
Pages 4-5
The summit meeting in Paris started Monday under such tense conditions
that the leading statesmen of the great powers literally stumbled into an
international crisis - whon they as "men of good frill" were to seek V-10 way
to peace and relaxation of tensions. It was under the pressure of a new
alignment of power: the Soviet space ship sent up with precision and under
the fresh impression of the storm around the disclosure of American spy
?Mane excursions, that the preparatory steps towards he summit meeting
were talt:en. The danger of a collapse was at once written on the wall, and
underscores by ',3irushchev's surprizing suggestion that the meeting possibly
should be postponed for 6 or 8 months. That was the overture!
One is at once tempted to ask: why, under these circumstances, did
Ihrushch.ev Co to Paris at all? Only to call off demonstratively Eisenhoirer's
impending visi?b to Moscow ne:dt month and to present his ultimate demands
.or opening any personal negotiations i-rith the USA's head of state? After
:.irushch.ev's previous declarations, irhich were much milder, this can hardly
ue presumed. It rather looks as if the leaders of both the two suporpo.rers
have been subject for pressure - both on the home front and from certain
allies - and are faced with internal conflicts among influential circles
which tie their hands and drive them forwards on dangerous paths.
irctsxachey's Ultimate Demands
Let us look at Ihrushchev's throe conditions for sitting down at the
conforenco table with Eisenhot-ror. the first demand has the appearance o2
;practical politics. It was that the flights, which Zero contrary to inter-
national lair, must be discontinued. That there also eras demanded a formal
and contrite apology brings a danr;erous element of prosti e into the
Toro round in a dubious way. Because thereby Lisenhowor trould aavo to
cisavow himself and his cabinet. Because they have -publicly taken the
responsibility for the piratical !American "aerial inspection".
With Iuarusheiiev's third demand, for "punishment" of those guilty,
i-re are getting close to the ridiculous. Moir would ho expect to sit down
at the conforonco table with a man t-rho was to -punish himself and his closest
co- rorlcers? Jas that not to put a bomb under the summit mee tins; itself?
The demand appears quite provoking, politically very unwise and not
very hol_ni'u1 to a poaceful understanding. As a mole one must choose between
a negotiated peace and "war criminal trials". The latter follow upon an
i. unconditional surrender.
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 :t??A-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R0!01200120008-7
Eisenhower's Unavoidable Genufloc Lion
Under itirushchev's massive offensive President Bisonliower was forced
into an important aunission - urosr,u.rod by his allies: He land secretary of
state 41:ortor had, after the Ovordiovsk episode, jumped up like lions, had
spoken of several years of aerial os-,)ionage and had indicated that it would
continue. In Paris the president fell doi-m like a lamb and'! promised to stop
the overflights.
The president lied again when he explained that in the Hay 9 ?'eclara-
tion continued aerial espionage had never boon indicated, an interpretation
of previous declarations w ich muse be called. rechioss, as John Danstrtw.p
correctly reported. Eisenhower after his unsuccessful space flight had to
land on the firmer "round of the vioiatod international lain.
But the weapons' technical development and the tremendous progress
of space exploration opens noirfields which the classical international law
never could have tltc imagination to map or codify: How higl1 in the air does
t'.io sovereignty of a state go? Soviet sputniks and American satellites will
soon be able to map "enemy country" with the same minute certainty as the
best espionage plane. Space agreements force themselves into the discussion
oar' security and disarmament. In a near Future the satellites will perhaps
not only be able to photogra-7h military targets, but also vr,in down from
silaco both rockets and H-bombs. ?1hcat use is it then to have control over
tl:L.e patient earth? One must start working on the problems of disarmament
and security before the explosion comes: But solutions ta1o time.
Disarmament the host Irnjor-cant Task
The technical revolution of our age, the possibility for -total
destruction and the dangers of the atomic race carry also as a sign of the
time a need for keeping the ideologgi.es, including the Marxist, un to date.
It is admitted that many things have changed. On the 90th anniversary of
Lenin's birth the old Finnish veteran Otto V. Iruusinon put :forth an imlpor--
tant declaration in the name of the Soviet party leaders-. "Peace will win in the end . Even in the imperialist countries
there are more and more sensible leaders who maize it clear that a war
becomes more and more improbable because of the destructive power of the
weapons now existing. It is evident therefore that the Soviet government -
at the same time as it remains true to Lenin ?- follows a policy character-
ized by Firmness with regard to its principles but, at the Same time open to
compromise. The most important tasl. of our tines is to arrive at a general
di s armament ... "
And Otto V. Xuusi on continue(l: such is the military,-technical
dalect .e e The nor wea,)on, which was created with an eye to war, is begin-
ning to o:_ercise a presaure in favor of peace. For Har..ist!rs there is nothing
strange in t_iis. The classics of Marxism have never. denied that new weapons
typos not only cause revolutions in warfare, but also can have an influence
on politics. 'angels wrote about th s in "Anti-Dui.rin ". And 1T. K. ".rupskaja
(Lenin's wife) tells that Lenin foresaw "that there will come a time When
war will be so destructive that it becomes entirely impossible" ...
--33-
Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
 Approved For Release 2000/09/14: CIA-RDP78-00915R001200120008-7
"Revisionism" or not: It is -bhe healthy ?.angua^e c-L" common sense.
The adhi:fission oT one o.4 l I ar. ism's riiost n?2icant netr` problems in our
times, ane' the theoretical foundation for the lratchwordi about peaceful
coe.;is-once.
The m:cc l.uded Great Power
But a relaxation of tensions and progress tolra:ecls arucui1ont limita-
tions and gri.dual disarmament implies global understanding and nogotiation,
and in the Paris mooting Asia's load4.ng groat pourer -ras so far 1ac? .n
China with its 6 or 7 million inhabi-'ants - an international factor of
rapidly grot-rin,; luportanco. Tae Chinese 'remier Chou Bn--lai, in his