SOVIET 'OPERATION BURMA'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R001200060036-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: January 18, 1960
• Content Type: NSPR

~~,
tDP0~~,5~43j~!S~?03fi-3
i i ,.
defector's ,~trst-hand account of political 'in ltration, intelligence work, press
subversion ,and espionage in a 5outhea i t Asian neutralist country
SOVIET `OPERATION BURMA'
By Aleksandr Y. Kaxr~acheyev
Aleksandr Y. I{a nacheyev is a yotmg former Soviet diplomat. who defected
front his post in ~engoon last June. His report on Soviet actirities in Burma-
and hi6 views on 'the situation ineido the USSR, which will appear here next
week-are of particular interest because, in .family background, education
and career, hie story is typical of the new Soviet generation. Born in1932 of
parents wha were- members of the Soviet intelligentsia-his father) was an
cleetronies engin~` r and his mother, a doctor-Its was graduated; from a
Moscow gymnaalulm in 1951. From 1951-54 he studied in the Chtn~ depart-
ment of. the Ministry of Higher Education's Oriental Institute. After tivo morn
years of work in the eastern division of the Foreign Ministry's International
Relatiana Instituto, he was attached to the Soviet embassy in Burma i March
1957, as an inl'ortnatian officer and $urmeee language and. area s ecialist..
N THE FALL of 1957, while on leave
in Moscow, I was informed by
high-ranking KGB (State 'Security
Bratichj officers -that I had been
's'elected to do political intelligence
work in Burma. The.-two men who
directed me to join KGB were Vladi-
mir Us and Boris Galashin, whom I
knew in Burma as high-ranking
Soviet Embassy officers. They told
me that I-had been selected for KGB
since I knew Burma, and the Burmese
language. This was a decision that I
could not accept or reject. They were
only telling me what KGB headquar-
ters had .decided.
-.They had me sign a paper which.
was an -oath to do my best in per-
formingtasks assigned by intelligence
superiors and to keep deadly silent
about my work. The last sentence of
the oath stated-that, if I willingly or
unwillingly revealed secrets, I should
be ready to accept .any punishment,
including the death sentence. Us-and
Galashin: gave me the false name of
Kazakov, 'After Chip, they.- told me
what mfr .duties would. be for Soviet...
intelligence in Burma,-
I was to translate, from B~xrmese to
Russian, secret documents ~ obtained
by the Rangoon element ~f Soviet
political intelligence, I was to develop
contacts in Burmese politic~l circles,
in order to gather information. This
would lead to my developing "cooper-
ative" ;politicians, in orde Ir to turn
them into paid Soviet agents. I was
to establish contacts with foreigners
in Burma, in order to gather informa-
tion an the work of foreign lembassies
and to penetrate them. Laskly, I was
to observe the behavior i of other
Soviet citizens in Burma a~td report
on them.
I had instructions that zkty intelli-
Bence affiliation should b~ kept se-
cret from other members of -the Soviet
Embassy in Burma, incl ding the
then-Ambassador Alexei D Shiborin
himself. The KGB is !u rvised by
the Central ~ommittee, of the Com-
munist Party; of the $ov et Union.
This organization plants it residents
abroad under cover as dipI mats, Em-
bassy ;workers, represe#ttat ves of the
-State 'Committee for ~ Cu torsi Re-`
latiotts with l'orei~tt Countries
(VOKS), Sovexpottfilm, Sovinform-
bureau, and as interpreters or tee-
nicians working with Soviet aid proj-
ects.
In Burma, the KGB unit's chief
was Ivan Vozniy, who had the rank
of Colonel of State- Security. Boris
Galashin, the man who "recruited"
me for intelligence work in Moscow,
had the cover rank of attache. He ~
was responsible for my political re-
liability.
The assistant to the chief of the ::
group was Igor Trushkovskiy. He ;
-had the cover ~ j ob of VOKS repre-
sentative in Burma and the rank of
second. secretary and cultural attache.
Two other members of the group were
Mikhail Vologzanin, who had the
cover job of Sovexportfilm repre-
sentative, and Dimitry Dityatev, who
had the rank of second secretary and `
was head of the Embassy Consular
Office. There are of course other
people, including special technical
personnel such as radio operators and :.
code makers, who work only for the
intelligence group.
The activities of the Soviet intelli-
Bence in Burma are to subvert the ~
nationalist political forces and politi-
cians, gather secret information about
the Burmese Government and to carry
out special psychological warfare. ,,
The group also had the responsibility ';
to observe and report on all Soviet
citizens in Burma, to discover the un-
reliable elements- and those that had
been influenced by "capitalist" prapa-
' Banda and surroundings. -The group ;
~
carriea out espionage work by '
also
~Qr,;~f~elrea`s~, ;:~1'~A-~2DP78-00~15Ft0012p0Q6'003r~-3
 i i
'Sanitized -Approved For'Release : C~IA~RDP78-009158001200.060036-3
CPY~HT
.t.~ts~~ t.;' ?anatrsett?, ? ~nrPian em- and liauidatina anti- and n~,n?Com? suddin to the American Ambassador
This intelligence group works with of Cambodia's sovereignty ~~anu Ja- rntrror agatittst Ina urtgtuaa n.uaetau ~, ,
3itGa[ wa[cn, ana reporw un um ae-~ - ouywae ..a ..... ..,..,,~ : , , - - - ?-~
tivities are 1?e~ularly ~ent to Moscow ~American~ bribery of th? In lien Fi.- . ' English, avid later checked the articles.
., - ._ ____ ~, _ -~,~o,,,.a MiniatPr_' frtoriuPnt v9r,1atinns published' in tho Burmese?lan~uafie
kept under: constant physical and tech- were forgeries about the A. erican fated both of these "letters" from the ,
,~tttertcan, e
onslble onl to-its head ttarters in tween the .people, of these cbuntries' Navy, to another Indonesian rebel ~,
....,,. ~_ ~. ~.. ,~ ,, t . -`' r`---_----_t_. _.___l~ TL...?., los.to,- 4t Vr.tiniv~a rtirartinn_ T tr,tnR. ,.
t3assres m nurma, especta.uy I^.o iaauu~oe Yua ,.a..~ ...+.+ ..,.-.a...-~. ~ _-?-J .. __ _ , ___ _ _ -- _ '
Th KGB' fn Burma is re? also aimed at spoiling relat~ons be- from "Admiral Frost," of the U. S. ~
. .
~~^' was .the translation of reports and ctes in the tsurmese press wQrxea as
- -a----- .. -
trated the political parties in addition guage were received in Rang on from far the rebellion from the Southeast
to?governmental departments and the Moscow on microfilm, thr~ugh in- Asian Treaty Organization. The Frost
bli
h
d
h
"
"
$tirmese 'A'rmy.
'The main bases- from which the
secret intelligence activity was car-
ried out were the offices of the Em?
basey, VOKS, Scavexportfilm and-
S~ovinformbureau, The group uses
three separate unite of special,'radio
et~pipment'fo~ its work in Burma.
'
e KGB element has a special
Th
assignment -from the CPSU Central
Committee to maintain contact with
the .legal - Communist parties above
in t
e ~, ' ;
letter,
which was pu
s
e
telligence channels, and reproduced
as ,photocopies at the Em assy. I Mirror in early June, advieed the E:,;
translated- the .articles into English "'rebels not to surrender and elated ~".'
and' Burmese. The Moscow' artfcles that the U. S. would continue to help '~
were then planted in Burm a news- them. These articles were signed by ~ ;,;
papers, through trusted urmeee the Mirror's "Special Correspondent
agents. It was then my duty to check ' in Djakarta." These Rangoon Mirror ~ .
the articles (in both the,$u ese and articles were then distributed among -,
English languages) against t e oriRi- Indonesian political circles, played up
nal Russian text. My -notes o the ac- in the world Communist -press -and- ~`
curflcv of the translation a d repro-
ductions of any variations rom the
ground and the insurgent Commu- Russian `original were sent
nists underground. These contacts are .Moscow, this time through T
ss than-
mafntained by exchanges of letters nels. The Soviet Information .S'ervice,
snd messages and by secret personal Tess, Radio Moscow, o(1'ici~l Soviet- tell,gence group rs only part of the
- - _ 1_-~_ C__.__.. -____ ~_ _.___t_ aL____-t .
carried out at very high level, such and -other newspapers w~re then out alt of ?~outheast Asia. to lndo- ~'
n n?
as that between Bobodshan Gafurov,
a member of CPSU Central Com-
mittee who visited Burma, and U Ba
obliged- to publish and; re
these materials all over she
arue stories.
world as newspapers as -the Bintang Timur, in r':,
language newspaper, the BinEang ~~
Tirnur, which was also controlled by
Soviet intelligence. ~. '
This activity of the Rangoon in t~'
~; '
India, Blitz and the Delhi Times; in
Thailand, La Petrie was used in the ~ .
same way- (l '
In Burma, there is now the cele? ~.a
orated Kovtunenko case, -which has
been going on for many months. ~
Kovtunenko is the Tass represents- ~. .
tive in Burma-who, in the spring of if '
1959, published an article in the Tass
bulletin which said -three Burmese s ;
newspapers (the .Nation, Guardian ~
and Reporter) were used- by the ~'
American :=Embassy to undermine "' ,
Burma's policy ~ of neutrality. This ` ~'s
article- was written in Moscow- origr j;;
naliy, planted in :the Delhi Times,;,,;::,
attid signed by their non-existent Ran ". ?.:
Nyein, a leader of the Communist The main Burmese newspapers
.National United Front. In Burma, I used by the group for this ork were
worked- as' an interpreter at secret the Communist?controlled Mirror and
meetings between. these two men. Botataureg; the Peoples Ju rnal, the
One of the most` important activi? New Light o/ Burma, the ~'a[h, the
ally participated was: special psycho-
logical warfare that embraced the en-
tire 5outheast'Asian region. The Ran-
goon group of the KGB regularly
:planted in the ~ $urmese press articles -
,prepared in 1Vloscow I~GB head-
~
quartere: These articles were forgeries
slsout' political 'parties and political '
leaders of other Southeast Asian ~'
abunti~ies; 'accusing ':#~tarn of being
`gt. Thep;were'attfgd at lsalatit
DESPITE UNRBST'
Monetary Reforms and Nevi;
Business Rules Heipfuf "
~' --Rice CFop Declines I
By (iRE(} Mac(iREQOR
Special to The New Yort Tlmp.
VIENTIANE, Laoa - UndP'
RQP7.8-QQ9~.5R001 ~~D006Q0
land internal dissension, the ec
This .was marnly sue to th
I88? per cent of the populatio
of Laos .people live by liarte
and are generally regarded
self-sufficient.
Crop production was also
During the last five year
Two Cigarette Plants
!d ror non-military projects
eclined to about ;8,300,000 for
he fiscal year. from $11,040,000
ear.
Economiste had little -hope
vo or three years,. nor for any.
gnlficant economic progress:
any years. - '
Altbougl- Lhos Is reported- to
capped . by a lack- of" roa4e
tti secs meiane oi. cumtriuni-
 ized approved For Release :; CIIA-RD8-009.158001200060036-3
th'1'A 1L*11 ?i~R3s channels. In thts case ;-t,;,,,,[Pa ~nrl annnnrte,l hV the S'r,vie;t ,- departUCC from the Soviet 1:mbASSy,
was made in the last link of the chain! ~. facial line for ~ovtet action m norms :.:
. j attempt was made to achieve p wer .: +-
The channel of distribution. was no ..~ by parliamentary means in the x956 =; According to this directive, efforts', --
properly selected and the editor o . +?eneral elections, when with the were to be made. (1) to increase all''
rhP Nnrinn sued Kovtunenko for def- ~:j ~ _? _i aL_ c,.