THE AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE AN ANALYSIS OF COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R001000290043-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 106
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 1998
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: October 1, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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L
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Aid
COMMUNISM
25X1A2g
THE AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE
AN ANALYSIS OF COMMUNIST
STRATEGY AND TACTICS
Distributed
October 1958 copy N?
ani ize - pprov
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TAE AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE
An Analysis of Communist Strategy and Tactics
". . . 'We are devoting all our efforts so that Mongol,,.
Persians,, Indians, and Egyptians should draw closer to
us and merge with us. We consider it our duty and in
our interests to do this, otherwise Socialism in Europe
will not be stable.'* Our Party and its Leninist Central
Committee abide strictly by this advice."
E. M. Zhukov, Member,
USSR Academy of Science,
July 19573 Member of Soviet
Delegation, Afro Asian
Solidarity Conference.
(Extract from speech
published in International
Affairs, Moscow,., September
1957, page 43)
*Leninp Collected. Works,
Volume 32, paw 7-x+58.
(Also quoted by K. Bakdash,
Secretary General, CP-Syria and
Lebanon, in article in Pravda?
l4+ November 1957.)
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TAPLE OF CONTMNIS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE BASIS FOR THE CONFERENCE
III. ORGANIZING TEE CONFERENCE
.IV. THE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
V. THE NON-COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION
VI. THE COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION
IN TER; CONFERENCE
A. The Non-Bloc Delegates
B. The Bloc Delegates
3.
10
11
14
14+
15
TO ISSUES 17
A. The Peace Strategy 17
The Strategy of the Economic
Struggle
1.
The Role of National Communist
Parties
2.
The Role of Communist
Trade Unions
21
a. In the Independent Countries
b. In the Colonial Territories
21
3.
The Strategy Unified at Cairo
23
VIII. IN'i RNATIONAL CC JNIST WONT ACTIVITIES
AT THE CONFERENCE
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IX.
COMMMIST MA IP UTION OF
THE PROCDINGS
29
X. 'MME ACTIVITIES SPONSC ED U
THE SOLIDARITY COUNCIL
29
A.
Economic Study Organization
29
B.
Mass Organization Conferences
29
C.
Trade Organizations
30
D.
Cultural Bodies and Conferences
30
E.
Education., Research, and
Investigative Bodies
30
F.
Other Professional Bodies
30
XI.
COMMIST GAINS FROM THE CONFERENCE
A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
33
XII.
THE PROSPECTS
36
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CAL
A.G &'5URVEY
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A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE COI F'ERENCE
1. IPMODUCTION
The Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference which convened in
Cairo on 26 December 1957 brought together a reported 476
delegates from 43 countries of Asia and Africa,, as well as
observers from Europe and Latin America. Most of these
"observers41 represented Communist international front
organizations. Ostensibly dedicated to the idea of bring-
ing together African and Asian peoples to provide coordinated
support for colonial struggles for independence., for
peaceful economic development, and for cultural growth, the
gathering mainly served the interests of Soviet Communism,
by endorsing programs long carried out by the traditional
Communist international fronts, by accepting the USSR as
an Asian state, and by providing a basis,: in its resolutions,
for future Communist propaganda and agitational activity
throughout Africa and Asia.
The primary Communist objectives at the Conference
were to enlist Afro-Asian support for the peace campaign,
to generate pressure for adoption by the independent states
in the area of the Soviet/Communist methods of "building
socialism", to promote economic struggle between the West
and the Afro-Asian world, and to pave the way for the gradual
economic integration of the Asian and Near Eastern nations
with the Soviet bloc.
The Conference cannot be considered a complete success
from the point of view of any of the elements involved in
it.* Whatever the advantages the USSR and national Communist
parties may be able to derive from its resolutions, the
alienation of a significant number of the Free World delegates,
the disappointing of others who went to the Conference with
high hopes, and the exposure of Communist aims and methods which
*For Communist gains from the Conference, however, see
Section XI.
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took place at the Conference--aU constitute potential~if
not actual setbacks for the Communist cause. There is'
evidence of some polarization among Conference delegates--
some have moved toward closer identification with the Soviet
bloc., while others have retreated from their erstwhile
uncritical endorsement of the Communist's concept of peaceful
coexistence.
However, as in other such instances involving the
traditional international fronts, the failure of dissenting
and opposition forces to take conclusive steps to counter
Communist initiatives gives the International Communist
Movement the time and opportunity to adjust to changed'
conditions, and exploit to the full the tactical advantages
it has undoubtedly gained,
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IT. TM BASIS FOR THE CONFEf3ENCE
A prime objective of Communist strategy since the end
of 1953 has been to win over to the "Socialist bloc" the
nations and peoples of Africa and Asia. Confronted with the
accumulated distrust, resentment, and 'hatred engendered by
the destructive,, deceptive, and often violent campaigns
waged by virtually all the Communist parties of the area
from 1946 until at least 1952, the new Communist campaign
to gain acceptance and organize unity of action against the
West was begun with difficulty. Steps such as the Moscow
Economic Conference of 1952 were taken by the USSR even
prior to the death of Stalin, but it was not until the
end of 1953 that a coherent program began to emerge.
The Soviet Union then began its efforts to achieve a
rapprochement with Yugoslavia. The Cominform, under Soviet
control, conveyed, the essentials of the policy to the
Communist parties of the Free World. Communist China, dis-
engaged from its unsuccessful aggressive war in Korea, began
its conciliatory campaign to gain acceptance among the
peoples of Asia, The World Peace Council, in which the
Communist parties of the bloc combined with national front
groups sponsored by the Communist parties of the Free World,
launched its campaign for the lessening of international
tensions. The first stage of this campaign in Asia cul-
minated in April 1955 with the Conference for the Lessening
of International Tensions held in New Delhi and, one week
later, with the Bandung Conference in Indonesia. Here
Communist China was afforded an opportunity by a group of
independent Asian states to demonstrate its ability to
act as a responsible state, willing to make and honor
solemn commitments in its relations with other states. It
subscribed there to the now well-known "Bandung principles",
foremost among which was a solemn commitment not to inter-
fere in the internal affairs of other states.
But such interference was already in progress and
continued thereafter without visible interruption. National
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Communist parties remained responsive to directions from
Moscow and Peiping., and the traditional international
Communist fronts continued their attempts on the national
scene to create and organize popular pressure for acceptance
of Communist policies.
A new instrument, the Asian Solidarity Committee,', emerged
from the New Delhi Conference a At about the same time' in the
Near East a parallel effort resulted in the convening of the
second Arab People's Conference. Both of these gatherings
were designed to serve as vehicles for Communist unity campaigns
in the respective regions., but in the two years that followed
neither venture registered any politically significant'' gain.
The de-Stalinization and liberalization campaigns within the
Soviet bloc failed to dispel the distrust of these Co nist-
inspired and dominated groups., and until the end of 19.69
neither had succeeded in finding a theme with sufficient at-
traction to overcome this dirt--asto
But in December 1956 the decision apparently was made
to exploit the Middle East crisis as the basis for a rger
of both these unity campaigns. The attention which ha pre-
viously been directed--without visible success--at enl sting
the cooperation of the South Asian countries was now s feed
to the Arab coun*rieso With the endorsement by Egypt In
January 1957 of the proposal that an Afro-Asian people ; s
conference be held in Cairo, the stage appeared set for
another step forward. But again the movement lost momentun.
For six months no concrete steps were taken to organize
the projected conference. No date was set., no preparatory
body was organized,, no local campaigns to organize delegations
or generate interest in the gathering took place o
However., the small group of persons who had taken the
earlier initiatives in the campaign continued to work
diligently. Plans and preparations were made for exploiting
the Conference once it was organinado Reliable cadres ! and
easily manipulated Commnisi s; -athizers already active
in the Peace Movement and other fronts could be brough
together with comparative ease. But again it appeared that
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the indispensable attractive theme which could
invoke widespread interest and participation had
not been found.
Eventually it was in the creation of the
European Common Market in March 1957 and the announce-
ment of plans for a major European program of economic
development in Africa, that the organizers recognized
their opportunity. For more than a year authoritative
Communist publications such as theCPSU theoretical
journal, Komu unistp had been stating that the main
future efforts in the anti-imperialist struggle were
to be centered in the economic field; and Marxist
politico-economic doctrine was peculiarly suited to
sustain such a campaign. The Soviet bloc, national
Communist parties? and international fronts promptly
attacked these Eurafrican plans as part of their anti-
colonial agitation, alleging among other things that
the plans involved
a. a decision by the Western states to
reduce their economic dependence upon.* and
commitment in, the independent countries of
the Near East and Africa;
b. a Western determination to use punitive
economic measures instead of armed aggression
against those countries which persisted in
adhering to neutralist policies and in expanding
their relationships with the Socialist bloc;
c. a Western decision to strengthen their
hold over the resources and peoples of colonial
Africa, to compensate for their losses elsewhere.
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Again, as was the case with the Communist
reaction to the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Pact, :the
UN action in Korea, the European Defense Community,
etc., constructive and defensive measures taken by
Free World nations in response to aggressive Soviet
bloc initiatives were maligned, denounced--and then
promptly adapted to serve Communist ends.
It now appears that the most significant factors
exploited to generate maximum participation byre
sponsible citizens of the independent countries of
Afro-Asia in the Solidarity Conference in Cairo
were
a. the fears generated by Communist-
inspired interpretations of the significance
of the Common Market and Eurafrican plans,
and
b. the hopes and interest connected with
proposals for the creation of an Afro-Asian
common market, development fund, combined market-
ing systems, etc. In this regard it was anti-
cipated and inferred--although never authori
tatively stated--that participating countries:
of the Soviet bloc would be major contributors
of aid, profitable trading partners, and willing
participants in equitable multilateral commerce.
The arguments advanced in support of the European
programs were, by analogy, equally attractive when
transferred to an Afro-Asian context.
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the indispensable attractive theme which could
invoke widespread interest and participation had
not been found.
Eventually it was in the creation of the
European Common Market in March 1957 and the announce-
ment of plans for a major European program of economic
development in Africa, that the organizers recognized
their opportunity. For more than a year authoritative
Communist publications such as the CPSU theoretical
journal,, Koh stg had been stating that the main
future efforts in the anti-imperialist struggle were
to be centered in the economic field; and Marxist
politico-economic doctrine was peculiarly suited to
sustain such a campaign. The Soviet bloc, national
Communist parties? and international fronts promptly
attacked these Eurafrican plans as part of their anti-
colonial agitation., alleging among other things that
the plans involved
a. a decision by the Western states to
reduce their economic dependence upon* and
commitment inj, the independent countries of
the Near East and Africa;
b. a Western determination to use punitive
economic measures instead of armed aggression
against those countries which persisted in
adhering to neutralist policies and, in expanding
their relationships with the Socialist bloc;
c. a Western decision to strengthen their
hold over the resources and peoples of colonial
Africa,, to compensate for their losses elsewhere.
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Again, as was the case with the Communist
reaction to the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Pact, the
UN action in Korea, the European Defense Community,
etc., constructive and defensive measures taken by
Free World nations in response to aggressive Soviet
bloc initiatives were maligned, denounced--and then
promptly adapted to serve Communist ends.
It now appears that the most significant factors
exploited to generate maximum participation by re-
sponsible citizens of the independent countries of
Afro-Asia in the Solidarity Conference in Cairo
were
a. the fears generated by Communist-
inspired interpretations of the significance
of the Common Market and Euraftican plans,
and
b. the hopes and interest connected with
proposals for the creation of an Afro-Asian
common market, development fund., combined market-
ing systems, etc. In this regard it was anti-
cipated and inferred--although never authori-
tatively stated--that participating countries
of the Soviet bloc would be major contributors
of aid, profitable trading partners, and willing
participants in equitable multilateral commerce.
The arguments advanced in support of the European
programs were, by analogy, equally attractive when
transferred to an Afro Asian context.
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With such participation provided for, the appeal to individuals
from the colonial territories of Africa was virtually assured of
some success. These groups., together with dissident opposition
elements from a number of the Middle Eastern states, made up the
bulk of the participation at Cairo.
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III? CHGAMIM THE CONFERENCE
Once the chances for winning non-Communist participation in
the Conference looked promising,, preparatory work began. An
Egyptian Committee was set up under the leadership of Anwar Sadat.
This group, working closely with the Egyptian Government, issued
the formal invitations to a preliminary meeting to organize the
Conference. At this meeting a preparatory committee was set ups
an agenda was drafted., financial arrangements for handling the costs
of the actual Conference were made, and formal invitations were
sent out asking that national delegations be organized.
But the preparatory meeting in fact did little more than
approve the activities and proposals of the original organizers
and vest them with authority to act in the name of a multinational
body. Attempts by some participants--particularly the Turkish
delegate--to take up substantive questions at the preparatory
meeting were rapidly defeated. Once the preparatory meeting was
over., the main responsibility for preparations fell upon the
original organizers. The Asian Solidarity Committee figures took
primary responsibility for organizing in the Soviet bloc *nd in
South Asia,, while the Egyptian group took on the task of organizing
in Africa and the Arab World.
Three types of local effort were noted. First., in Iedias
Japan, Burma.. and the Bloc the national Asian Solidarity Committees
approached selected individuals and receptive groups, including
in most instances political parties in opposition to the existing
governments or at least to some policies being carried out by those
governments. Second,, in a number of instances contact was' established
with national affiliates of the World Peace MDvementpwhich were asked
to organize national preparatory groups. This type of effort was
noted in colonial territories and also to some extent in the cases
of Iraq and. Jordan. Third, where no Peace Partisan groups 'existed,
travelling representatives of the Egyptian body made personal
contacts., advised and assisted by the Egyptian Government, with
national governments or local personalities, requesting that they
undertake the organizing task.
In a number of instances Peace Partisan groups cut back their
organizing Initiatives when it became apparent that non-Communist
parties and personalities had accepted the Egyptian proposals. In
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some instances they withdrew entirely from the organizing work
when they realized that they might alienate other interested parties
who were suspicious of Communist motives. In others, they supported
or joined with the organizers in selecting delegations. In Lebanon,
Morocco, Tunisia, and the Sudan there were disagreements over the
composition of the delegations; but in every case a settlement was
achieved. In many instances participation was assured only when the
Egyptian representatives made the concession demanded by those non-
Communists whose cooperation they sought.
In the course of this effort, one of the more interesting
developments was the placing of a significant new topic on the agenda--
the question of the European Common Market. There is no evidence
that this addition--which was first revealed by one of the travelling
Egyptian representatives before the Conference--had been approved
in advance by the full preparatory committee.
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Iva THE COI ERE1 E PROCEEDINGS
When the Conference convened.. the program called for
a. An initial series of plenary sessions.. at which
leaders of national delegations were to deliver addresses,
and conference procedure was to be agreed upon.
b. The organization of commissions to deal vit1 each
major section of the agenda. It was apparently originally
intended that the commission work would involve first a
series of speeches; then a presentation of a draft report
and recommendations by a predesignated national delegation;
thereafter draft resolutions embodying the recommendations
were to be approved.
c. A final series of plenary sessions to endorse the
draft resolutions.
Problems arose in the two main commissions, the Political
and Economic Commissions. In spite of opposition, subcottees
were formed, within each of which specific draft resolutions
were worked out. The subcommittee question appears to babe
been introduced in both instances by Arab delegates. The, argument
advanced by those who favored subcommittees was, in the Political
Commission, that special attention had to be given to the problems
of Palestine and Algeria. In the Economic Commission it was
argued that the distinction between the economic problems of the
independent nations and those of the still-dependent countries
had to be recognized and provided for. Although the Soviet..
Chinese, and pro-Communist delegates all appeared to oppose the
creation of subcommittees, they adjusted effectively to the
situation. In fact the creation of the subcommittees enhanced
the influence of individual pro-Communist Arab delegates upon the
specific language of the final resolutions, prevented coordinated
action by the proponents of such proposals as those advocating
the creation of a common bank, a common market, a common develop-
ment fund, etc., and reduced the effectiveness of potentilal sources
of opposition to the general trend of the Conference. The fact
that the Conference resolutions fitted neatly with the Communist
programs for action in both the independent countries and the
dependent territories is also a reflection of the work of the
subcommittees.
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V. THE NON-COMMUNISt PARTICIPATION
Available evidence strongly suggests that other forces
besides those under Communist control did in fact make a contri-
bution to the size and apparent impressiveness of the gathering.'
But it is also clear that none of these forces were capable
of preventing Communist' control of the gathering or were able
to exploit it to serve their own purposes. Three other evident
forces were
a. Arab nationalists who support President Nasser's
policy of positive' neutrality, but at the same time appear
to oppose Communist control and manipulation of local
movements.
b. Elements, largely centering around Japanese and
Indian non-Communist nationalists, whose participation was
motivated by their interest in maintaining peace and
generating cooperative effort in economic and political
development of Africa and Asia.
c. Nationalist forces, particularly in colonial
territories of Africa, which 'ought tangible aid and support
for their efforts to win political independence.
The failures of these elements were directly related to
the effectiveness with which Communist, instrumentalities gained
control of key positions, dominated the deliberations,` coordinated
their activities at the Conference, injected reports, organizational
proposals,. and well-prepared draft resolutions, and in general
successfully applied, at a major international popular gathering, the
time-honored and effective techniques that Communist parties in
the Free World have.employed for thirty years.
But Communist tactics were by no means the only factor. Many
participants were disappointed at their failure to accomplish their
own ends, but at the same time many of them have publicly demonstrated
their satisfaction with the "moderate" nature of many of the
Conference resolutions. What criticisms they have made of Communist
actions at the Conference dealt mainly with the fact and character
of Soviet participation. Some of the more observant have also
criticized the absence of substantive discussion and the obviously
prearranged procedures by which prefabricated resolutions were
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run through the Conference. In one instance a leading delegate--
Kamal. Jamblatt of Lebanon--withdrew from his delegation and
denounced the Communist seizure of control of the national group,
but this unique event was brought on largely by the nature and
strength of the Lebanese Communist effort to win control of the
delegation.
There is convincing evidence that most of these delegates
lacked (and still lack) an appreciation of the Communist objectives
at Cairo. Equally important, they appear to lack an appreciation
of the role which the CPSU expected the Cairo Conference to play
in its general global strategy. There has been no acknowledge-
ment by this element that their mere participation aided Communist
exploitation of the Conference. The Japanese delegation alone--
the second largest group after that of Egypt--accounted for over
10 per cent of the attendance. Only fifteen of the fifty-eight
in the Japanese group subsequently extended their travel to include
a visit to the USSR and China, while the remaining forty-three, who
can be reasonably assumed to represent the bulk of the non-Bloc
oriented element, returned directly to Japan. The failure of the
Conference to endorse any substantive proposals for multilateral
economic organization has also gone unchallenged by those; delegates
whose primary motive in attending was to gain acceptance of such
proposals. Above all, so far as their immediate interests are
concerned, these elements failed to recognize or acknowledge the
relationship of the Conference to the actions of their national
Communist parties and front groups.
In fact, few of the non-Communist delegates demonstrated any
critical interest in the resolutions which did not directly involve
their own national interests. There was very little contact and
cooperation between non-Communist delegations, although a few
individual delegates did seek to establish personal contacts
with others who might later prove worthwhile. Sightseeing and
organized entertainments in general kept these people occupied
outside of the formal sessions of the Conference, while the
Communist delegates used the free periods purposefully and to good
advantage, consulting with others of their kind on matters relating
to the Conference itself and cultivating non-Communists. Scholarship
offers, invitations for trips, gift-giving, and flattering interviews
by Bloc press representatives were all extended during such periods.
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In spite of the presence of many individuals with parliamentary
or legal experience, there was no indication that the glaring
weaknesses in the constitution and charter of the secretariat
were challenged. Contradictions between the Conference's resolutions
and, the domestic and foreign policies of the respective governments
of the participants were also ignored, except in one or two instances.
In relation to the international front participation, the
"honored guests" were officially identified in Conference publicity
material only by the countries of their origin, and their identifica-
tion as.leading functionaries of the whole range of international
Communist fronts was never brought under open discussion. The
absence of observers from the waited Nations organizations dealing
with non-governmental activity of international significance, who
logically should have been extended an invitation by a body
which professed its support for the concept and organization of
the UN, was nowhere remarked--nor, for that matter, was the
absence of delegations from a significant number of Afro-Asian states.
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C L
VIe TB CC S1? PAR71CIPAMR
The Communist forces comprised the delegations (and unofficial
participants, such as translators and journalists) from the
participating countries of the Soviet bloc--the USSR, China,
North Korea, Mongolia, Viet Nam. They also included, however,
more than ninety members of the delegations from non Bloc
countries. The identified totsl group susceptible to at least
some degreee of Comm mist control amounted, therefore, to 140, or
over 30 per cent. This group was supplemented by an additional
twelve Soviet nationals, who, accredited as journalists and
translators, participated in the activities of the Conference.
The members of the non-Bloc group, whose reliability and
witting devotion to the interests of the International Communist
nt varied widely, included on the one hand a number of
fully indoctrinated, dedicated, and competent members and leaders
of national Communist parties, and on the other hand a number of
individuals who have participated in the past, at the national
or international level, in more than one identified Coamnunjist
front organization. Some of the latter cannot and should not be
classed as Com unists; but whatever their motives have been,
their witting and repeated participation in such activities,
in more than one content, and under widely varying circumstances,
suggests that in the opinion of the Communist movement at
least, they are characterized as "objectively progressive elements"
whose cooperation has proved. productive in the past, Their
participation at Cairo suggests strongly that their cooperation
has also been of appreciable current value, and there are no indi-
cations to date that any of them have significantly modified their
attitude toward such cooperation since the Conference ended.
A. The Non-Bloc Deletes
Al]. the non-Bloc Communist and pro-Communist delegates have
been active in front and unity of action programs in the past.
Bloc friendship societies, the Peace Movement, the International
Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), and bodies for the
promotion of Bloc trade were the in areas of their earlier activity.
Not all of them played leading roles at the Conference, however.
Virtually none of the lawyers' contingent were prominent.
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On the basis of available evidence, it seems likely that
Communist-inspired initiatives were taken mainly by about ten
persons, distributed more or less evenly among the Egyptian,
Syrian., Sudanese, and Japanese delegations, Most of these indi-
viduals had been involved in solidarity activity as far back as
early 1955 Another four or five, drawn mainly from the Indian
and Egyptian delegations.. appear to have concerned themselves
mainly with organizational and procedural questions--guiding the
selection of presiding heads of subcommittees, serving as
rapporteurs,, guiding discussions, etc. The balance of the group
appears simply to have made appropriate speeches and voted
properly on procedural points and resolutions.
One of the most interesting facts about the Communist and
pro-Communist delegates was that the most significant Communists
among them did not engage in any newsworthy activity--or
concealed their activity very well. N4ustafa Amin of Syria, Puad
Nasser of Jordan, Abd al-Qadr Ismail of Iraq, Romesh Chandra of
India, Tokusaburo Dan of Japan, all of whom are at least of Party
Central Committee stature, remained completely in the background.
Of this group, only A. K. Gopalan of the CP India was named in reports
of the Conference. Be participated in the Drafting Committee of
the subcommittee on Imperialism in the Political Commission.
B. The Bloc Dele&2as
The Soviet delegation included four persons with records of
extensive front activity in the past. Of these, only two--
E. M. Zhukov and A. V. Sofronoy--played significant roles. Zhukov,
who has long been a leading authority on Communist party strategy
in the Afro Asian area, worked closely with Arzumaniyan; and
Sofronov participated in the work of the Political Commission
and of the Organizational Commission which was composed of the
heads of delegations; The head of the Soviet delegation,
Sharaf Rashidov, was present at the latter gathering, but
Sofronov carried the burden of the activity. Both Rashidov and
the much better-known Soviet Moslem front personality Mirza Turzun
Zade bore no major responsibility for Conference tactics..
The Chinese delegation, which took virtually no initiatives
except in the Cultural Cotrmaission, was quite impressive. Most
of the group had participated in international front activity in
the period since 1950 (the fields of peace.. women's activities,
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youth, labor, culture, friendship, journalism, and trade
promotion). Of equal if not greater interest is the fact that
at least seven of the delegates, in spite of well-documented
records of collaboration with the International Communist Move-
ment and the Chinese Communist party going back well before
World War II, both in China and abroad, have never publicly
acknowledged their membership in the Chinese Communist party.
Most of this group in fact were active in Nationalist China up
until 5919, when at critical moments they "defected" to the
Communist regime. All of them have had long and varied experi-
ence in clandestine activity.
The Mongolian and Viet Nam delegations appeared to have
merely representational duties; and only one man, Han Sul Ya,
in the North Korean delegation was noteworthy for his activities
in the Algerian subcommittee.
A leading figure in the Chinese delegation, Burban
Shahidi, of the China-Islamic Association, stayed in Cairo for
several weeks after the Conference and participated in the creation
of a new Chinese Egyptian Priendship Society. The Soviet
delegation also remained for at least two weeks exploiting; contacts
opened up at the Conference and visiting universities, govern-
ment offices, the National Science Council, etc.
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The two primary interests of the Communist initiators and
participants in the Conference were
a. to tie the aspirations and campaigns for national
liberation of colonial territories to the Soviet peace
campaign;
b. to guide the Afro-Asian preoccupation with national
economic development into channels and courses of action
which would both complete the breaking of ties with the
West and lay the groundwork for eventual integration of
Africa and Asia into the economic system of the Soviet bloc.
The relevant issues were dealt with in the Political and Economic
Commissions of the Conference.
A. The Peace Stra. te&Z
Both the declaration issued by the twelve Communist parties of
the Soviet bloc in November 1957 and the Peace Manifesto endorsed
at the same time by sixty-four Communist parties state that
the "struggle for peace is the foremost task" of these parties--
but the Twelve-Party Declaration makes it abundantly clear that
the peace campaign is a stratagem, not an objective, when it
states that the "tasks confronting the Communist parties of the
world necessitte closer unity . . . rallying the working people
and progressive mankind,, the freedom and peace-loving peoples
of the world." The purpose of the strategy emerges promptly
in the succeeding text. After portraying Communist parties as
"loyal defenders of the national and democratic interests of the
peoples of all countries:" it is pointed out that in many countries
"still confronted with the historic tasks of struggle for national
independence the struggle against war is spearheaded against the
big monopoly groups of capital as those chiefly responsible" for
the threat of war. In independent countries, the declaration
states,, "objective conditions are being created for uniting under
the leadership of the working class and its revolutionary parties.,
broad sections of the population to fight for peace." Here, and
in the subsequent discussion of the Communist interest in seeking
power by "peaceful" means, the role of unity of action in the
peace struggle is clearly shown to be that of facilitating
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the Communist party?s gaining of power.-sand the alternative presented
is violent st e. As the declaration states: "In this case
violent stxuggl the degree of bitterness and the form or class
struggle will depend . . . on the resistance put up by reactionary
circles, on these people using force at one or another stage of the
struggle for Socialism."
The Peace Manifesto, on the other hand, is a less fundamental
document which is aimed at promoting unity of action in pursuit of
short-range objectives--the cessation of atomic and hydrogen
weapons testing and unconditional prohibition of the manufacture
and use of these weapons. It is toward these objectives that
the peace struggle activity in the Afro Asian Solidarity Conference
was directed, as the Political Commission agenda, deliberai$ions. and
resolutions show. The immediate aim was to promote participation
by Afro Asian elements in World Peace Council-sponsored projects
such as the Stockholm Congress for Disarmament and Peaceful Coex-
istence in July 1958 and the Fourth World Conference Against
Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (August 1958).
B. The Strategy of the Economic Strn le
As far back as February 1956, at the 20th Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in discussions concerning the
character of the struggle to advance the cause of Communism
outside the Soviet bloc, attention was focussed on the importance
of the economic area. But in January 1957 in a Kommunist article
entitled "The Disintegration of the Colonial System m rialism
and Questions of International Relations," the Soviet view of this
matter was further clarified, Starting from the premise that the
sunning of political independence is only the first major step
toward complete independence, it states:
?8. . . Now that the overwhelming majority of the nations
of the East have . . . ended the hateful colonial bondage,
new tasks await them.
"Imperialism, colonialism stand as a barrier on the
path to accomplishing plans for economic and culturalad-
vancement. . . .
"The disintegration of the colonial system . . is an
entire stage of acute conflicts, numerous battles over all
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questions of economies and politics. . . At the moment
the center of the struggle has moved to the economic sphere.
The disintegration of the colonial' system of imperialism
is entering a new and higher stage,:"
The article later made the point that although "the domination
by finance capital could not have been eliminated in the past
by any changes in the sphere of political democracy," the ability
of the Soviet- ta].oc to provide powerful economic support to these
countries "has fundamentally changed the objective situation of the
countries of the East fighting against colonialism. The article
makes it clear that this assistance is justified insofar as. it aids
the extension of state-owned economic enterprise., development
programs, and the elimination of foreign-capitalist controls,
and emphasizes that it supports the already existing trend in the
East toward socialism.
The article also comments on the role of Communist parties
in these countries. Calling for national unity campaigns on
economic issues, it states, "The experience of China shows that
development of` the countries of the East toward socialism -is
fully possible within the framework of a ,coalition of political
parties. Peaceful development ~doei not at all preclude,-but
on the contrary, presupposes elms truggle, the struggle of
the supporters? of social progress against the reactionary and
exploiter forces seeking to go back to agreement with imperialisml"
Soviet bloc aid is nowhere described as the main element
in this economic struggle or as a substitute for local action.
Nationalization of foreign-owned enterprise has long been a
policy advocated by such mature Communist parties of the area
as those of India and Syria; and as early as the summer of 1956
the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, a small but
highly significant Communist front organization, made the propriety
of nationalization one of its central themes. In November 1957 the
IADL Conference in Moscow claimed credit for having issued a
report endorsing nationalization of foreign-owned enterprise prior
to the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal
It is now clear that this IADL campaign played a part in
laying the groundwork for the economic deliberations at Cairo. In
May 1957 a conference was organized in Italy by the'IADL which dealt
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L
exclusively with this question, and Syrian and Egyptian representa-
tives participated in the deliberation. Again in early November 1957
the topic was a major theme of the Afro Asian Lawyers Conference in
Damascus, where its significance had been enhanced by the Indonesian
steps to nationalize Dutch-owned enterprise as a part of its, campaign
for the annexation of West Irian. It is interesting to observe that
two of the Egyptian lawyers who played key roles in these activities-
Mehmoud el-Hlnnawi and Salah Abdel fez-went to Moscow to attend
the IADL Conference in mid-November 1957 and subsequently were
members of the Egyptian delegation to the Cairo Conference. At
Moscow too the Egyptian Ali Dadawi, an ex Minister of Justice,
was "elected" a vice president of the IADL.
The role of the IADL in the Cairo Conference is further sug-
gested by the statement, made by IADL president D. N. Pritt at Moscow
in November 19557, that he had had an opportunity to "strengthen
relationships with Indonesian, Indian, and Syrian lawyers" at a
meeting held?in China in September 1957. Pritt was one of the "guests"
at Cairo, and was, therefore, in a position to exploit these
"strengthened relationships" both with long-standing colleagues in
the World Peace Movement and members of the Lawyers Association, many
of whom were key figures in the national delegations.
1. The Role of National Communist Parties
Perhaps the best description of the current Communist
program for exploiting the economic issue at the national level in
the independent countries of Afro-Asia is that written by Ajoy Ghosh,
Secretary General of the CP of India ("For A Mass Part', in New
February 1958). Under the subtitle, "Crisis of the Second ':Lau
(referring to the second Indian Five Year Plan for economic develop-
ment), he wrote-
"Conditions are getting created for the establishment
of proletarian hegemony in our national movement. . .
Our Party, while supporting the aims and objectives of
the plan, while declaring itself in favor of the
emphasis on industrialization and extension of the
public sector,, laid bare the contradictions between the
aims of the plan and the methods by which they were
sought to be implemented. . . . But the most menacing
feature of the situation is the activity that is being
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conducted by extreme reactionary circles. . . .
They seize upon the difficulties of the plan with a
view to pushing their own anti-national policies. . . .
The campaign against our foreign policy the campaign
against the progressive features of t second Five-
Year Plan,, the campaign against the kashmir Government?
all these campaigns are not unrelated.. The driving forces
behind these campaigns are in the final analysis the
same. The imperialists, the,landlords, the big anti-
national monopolists, and extreme reactionary circles
who fear the people and hate democracy. . . . It is
the patriotic duty of every Indian., irrespective of
the Party to which he belongs., to unite against these
forces,, to unmask them, to wage a determined battle
against the path along which they want to push the
country. Our Party has to play a major role in
achieving this unity.,?
A. K. Gopalan, a member of the Politburo of CP India?3 a
delegate to the Cairo Conferencep and deputy leader of the Indian
Communist Parliamentary bloc, is one of the prime figures
in this national campaigns which was intensified in August-
September 1957. The relationship between this program,which is
reflected in the activities of ti?nml Communist parties through-
out the Afro-Asian world., and t resolutions of the Afro-
Asian Solidarity Conference is ob ous., In the article quoted
above the Secretary General of the Indian Party stated that it
was t'necessary for Party units to move into action in a big and
effective way on such big developments as, the historical Cairo
2. The Role of Communist Trade Unions
a. In the Independent C,ountriea
Another major step in the elaboration of this
strategy was set forth in October 1957 in the speech delivered at
the Fourth Congress of the WFTCJ in Leipzig by S. A. Dange, another
leading Indian Communist and international front figure for many
years. Elements of this speech,, "Trade Union Tasks in the Fight
Against Colonialism'"., were subsequently accepted at the annual
session in late December 1957 as the basis for the current policy
of the All-India Trade Union Congress. The speech focussed
attention,, as did, Ghosh?s article, on defending the aims of the
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second Five Year Plan, and on criticizing the methods used to
carry it out, but added., necessarily, a further point. "The trade
union movement, while cooperating in genuine plans for development
that would benefit the people, and allowing legitimate gains to
the bourgeoisie, should refuse to give up its claims for a just
share of the national income for wage increases, for better;work-
ing conditions, and democratic rights."
Dange also called for trade unions to participate in the
struggle for peace and to agitate for support for the liberation
struggle in colonial territories.
b. In the Colonial Territories
But Dange's speech at Leipzig differentiates clearly
between the program to be followed in independent countries. and
that applicable in colonial territories. The following excerpt
reveals the plan for work in the colonies:
"The problem for the colonies as such is markedly
different. Naturally for these countries the fun,amental
task is to achieve national independence. At present
many of them are faced with brutal wars and armed!,.
repression. Under such circumstances, the economic
and social problems of the workers are extremely serious.
"In these countries the big enterprises all belong
to foreign monopolies--the greater part of the
cultivatable land has been seized by foreign colonialists.
"In many of these countries the colonial authorities
carry out so-called economic development plans which are
in fact intended to increase profits for the monopolies
and to intensify the exploitation of the peoples.
"Their (the workers) single most urgent demand is
for the improvement of their hard living conditions.
The source of their hardships is in the common scourge--
colonialism. Consequently the trade union movement is
confronted with the double task of fighting against
the direct political rule of.the colonialists and.in
defense of the workers' interests."
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Perhaps the most interesting phrase in this excerpt is
S. A. Dange?s term "direct political rule"which cannot be
construed as a simple alternative to the terms right of self-
determination" or "independence" which have long been well-
established as.Comruniet slogans. The Introduction of this term
suggests that in some circumstances a mere loosening of the ties
between a colony and its controlling power may be the proper
tactical policy for a Communist trade union to advocate, rather
than calling for immediate and complete independence, This
interpretation gains incredibility in view of the recent endorse-
ment by the Co st-infiltrated trade union organization in
French West Africa of a plan for a federal union between Prance
and the territories of French Africa.
3, The j ate Unified at Cairo
The main elements of the strategy were finally and
clearly brought together by the speech of the Soviet delegate
Arzuxuaniyan at Cairo, Although he continued to call attention to
Soviet willingness to give aid "`within the capabilities of the
Soviet economy," the main emphasis in his presentation was on
the proper methods for carrying out a national economic development
program and for financing it in large part through the Soviet
techniques used. in "building socialism" in the USSR.
The conference resolutions did not incorporate many of the
Arz yan proposals, but they reflected his basic assumptions,
endorsed the propriety of nationalization, and provided a basis for
Communist agitational and unity programs at the national and
regional levels.
The main points of the blueprint for internal, economic
development presented by the USSR were published almost verbatim
by the Co st Party of Tunisia in its newspaper., Al Taliya, on
22 December 1957, before the Conference convened, as the program
which it advocated for the nation.
Another anticipation occurred in a commentary on a book.
Development in Wee Asia, in the October-December 1957 issue of
the Asia-Africa Review. Dr. Cyan Chanel* in his article focussed
'wiJr. cyan Uaandp an erstwhile economic adviser to the Government of
India, was a delegate to the Moscow Economic Conference of 1952, deputy.
leader of a peace delegation to Peiping in 1952, and a leading figure
in the creation and activities of the India-China Friendship Association
from 1952 on..
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attention on the same problems and tasks of national economic policy
that the Soviet delegate's speech subsequently explored. This
discussion was introduced with the statement, ". . . . The Asian
countries have to face the stark fact that resources for their
economic development would have to be made available through their
own almost unaided exertions; state trading., nationalization of
foreign enterprise., development of state-financed cooperatives,
balanced development of industry., etc."
In summary., the general strategy for exploitation of economic
issues which emerged during the period of the Afro-Asian Solidarity
Conference appears to involve the following main elements:'
In the Independent Countries of Africa and Asia
A. Continuation of Soviet aid, "within limits."
B. Pressure on economic issues by the Communist
(ties and fronts, especially for the adoption of socialist
i.e., Soviet) techniques for achieving national economic
development, including the nationalization of foreign-awned
enterprise.
C. Exposure and discrediting of national elements which
oppose the socialization of the economy, the modification of
governmental economic structure along socialist lines and
ever closer identification with the Soviet bloc policies in
the foreign trade sphere.
D. Pressure for active governmental support of colonial
liberation movements.
In the Colonial Territories
A. Organization of trade union unity on purely economic
grounds (wages, etc.).
B. Extension of trade union influence in the national
liberation movement, based on opposition to colonial develop-
ment plans and to foreign ownership of major sectors of the
local economy.
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C~Rlt1~G
C. Development of a propaganda campaign addressed
to nationalist leaders and local businessmen based upon the
rosy'prospects for future aid and profitable trade--if these
territories succeed in freeing themselves from the economic
control of the "colonialists".
It was in fact observed that at Cairo the Soviet economic
delegation at one point informed a group of the delegates from
Black Africa that a billion dollars worth of aid could be made
available to them by the Soviet bloc; the precondition for getting
such aid was, of course., obvious.. The impact o 7 "offers"
is clearly propagandistic only.
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VIII. I NATIONAL CAST FRONT ACTIVITIES AT THE () ENCE
There was extensive participation in Conference delegations
of persons long identified with the numerous international Communist
fronts (see attachments A and. B. which identify such delegates).
But, in addition, most of the central organizations of these fronts
sent. representatives to Cairo as observers. This observer group
was composed of hey figures from the fronts, who had many contacts
among the. delegates.
The following list identifies these individuals:
James G. Endicott of Canada Vice President of the World
Peace Council
D. N. Pritt of England Member of the Bureau of the
World Peace Council!
President, International
Association of Democratic
Lawyers
Mrs. Jorge Zalamea of Colombia Secretary of the World Peace
Council
Carmen Zanti of Italy
Secretary. Women's Interna-
tional Democratic Federation
President of the Youths'
Federation
Renato Mieli of Italy Delegate of the Anti-Colonial
People's Conference
Cheng Chi. Ming of China Secretary of the International
Union of Students
Saadati Babak of Iran Secretary, Colonial Bureau of
the International Union
of Students
Bruno Bernina of Italy President of the World Federa-
tion of Democratic 'Youth
S. Majumdar of India Secretary of the World Federa-
tion of Democratic Youth.
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Near the end of the Conference Kemal al-Din Bindari, ex-
Egyptian Ambassador to the USSR and charme i .of the Egyptian
Peace Committee, gave a reception which was attended by active
participants in the Peace Movement. According to Tass (3 January
1958) persons attended from the delegations of Syria, .Jordan... Iraq,
Lebanon, USSR, India, Camer?oons, Zanzibar, Sudan, Kenya, Nigeria,
Uganda, and Chad. D. N. Pritt, Mrs. B shwari Nehru, M. I. Kotovp
George Hanna (Lebanon), and Dr. Felix Moumie were singled out for
special mention among the guests. This gathering is particularly
noteworthy because for some time the Egyptian Peace Partisans
have been .maintaining pressure on the Egyptian Government in order
to win official recognition,,, Prior to this reception, however.,
they had had little visible success,. The organization in fact
remains without official governmental recognition., although the
activities of its leading figures ale not significantly her red.
Little is known of the activities of these observers, but
Mr. Babak, secretary of the Colonial Bureau of the IUSB circulated
extensively among students in the various delegations. Mr. Renato
Meili, who represented the Anti-Colonial People's Conference which
convened in Athens in late Ocotber 1957, presented a message from
the president of the Greek Anti-ColonialLeaguep Mr. Nikos
Pouliopoulosp the character of which is clearly reflected in the
following extracts
"And in this sense, I am sure that the Congress will
not only condemn slavery, terror, and the tortures of
British colonialism against liberation fighters, but that
they will legitimize armed struggle for liberation.. e."
This organization., in which a number of West European Left
Socialists are active, has never endorsed Soviet actions. But the
Yugoslav Communist-controlled Socialist Alliance participated in
the October 1957 gathering, together with a number of other
proponents of unity of action between Communists and Socialists.
W. Leli himself is a member of the Communist party of Italy and
in the past has served on the editorial staff of the partyss
newspaper, LUnita.
Since the close of the Conference virtually all the interne
tional Communist fronts have given international publicity and
approval to its resolutions, declared their intention of supporting
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and aiding its programs and initiatives, and welcomed its
support of their activities. In fact, the bulk of the publicity
given to the Conference since the end of January 1958 has emanated
from the international fronts and their national affiliates,
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a'
COMMSP MANIPMAMON CP TO PROCEED
In spite of the participation of impressive delegations
from five of the countries of the Soviet VLoc, the main Communist
initiatives at the Conference were taken by Syrian, Egyptian,
Indian, and Japanese representatives with Communist and pro-
Communist recordsp whose proposals received endorsement and
support from the Soviet bloc delegates. only the Arzumaniyan
speech and the invitation to the Writerst Conference in Tashkent
in October 1958 can be construed as major initiatives by Soviet bloc
delegates. Specific condemnations of colonialism, regional pacts,
racial discrimination, and unfair economic practice proposed by
other non-Soviet delegations to the Conference were endorsed and
supplemented by general a essiona of Afro Asian support for
national liberation movements and for the territorial claims of
independent Afro-Asian countries. But the truly significant
resolutions of the Conference, from the Communist point of view,
were those which
a. endorsed activities of the international front
organizations (the World Peace Conuncilts Congress of Peoples
for Disarmament the Fourth World Conference Against Atom
and Hydrogen Bombs, August i958)
b. embodied, proposals for future organization and
action; and
c dealt with economic questions..
Xo FUi ACTI S SPORED BY THE. SOLIDgUn
The following activities were called for in the resolutions
endorsed at the Conference
A. Econcm cstd crEganizations
1. An Afro Asian Economic Committee--to pool data
and facilitate economic relations between independent
countries of Africa ens. Asia.
2. A committee within the Cairo Secretariat, to
study the economic problems of dependent countries.
B. Mass organization conferences
1. A joint cooperative and trade union conference.
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2. Youth organization conference.
3. Student organization conference.
4. Women's organizations conference.
Note, In the case of the women's group$ the
creation of an Afro Asian Feminists' Union is
envisioned. In other instances proposals for the
creation of Afro Asian bodies already are circulating.
C. Trade Organizations
1. A Chambers of Commerce Conference (announced
for Cairo.. December 1958).
D. Cultural Bodies and Conferences
1. A Committee on Cultural Exchanges (within the
Cairo Secretariat Bureau).
2. National bodies to support cultural exchanges.
3. Writers' Conference - Tashkent, October 1958 (endorsed).
4. An Afro Asian Artists' Conference.
E. Education, Reseaarchp and Investigative Bodies
1. An Afro-Asian university.
2. An Afro-Asian historians group.
3. An Afro Asian educators group.
Other Professional Bodies
(Lawyers, doctorso scientists, etc.)
The very number of bodies and gatherings called for may suggest
that these projects were merely gestures; but a glance at the
composition of the main Communist-controlled and influenced delegations
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CMTTMW" "I
suffices to demonstrate that the nucleus of a competent Communist
fraction existed. for virtually every endeavor named. Further,
the honored guests of the Conference included key representatives
of all the major international fronts except the World Federation
of Trade Unions. Only the Chinese affiliate of the WFT1 was repre-
sented9 in the person of Tung Hsina
These individuals 'ina number of instances already have
specific projects, sponsoring groups, and tentative dates toward
which to works, in which further Egyptian'or Afro-Asian initiative
is not required. For example
1. The Soviet offer to held the Second Asian Writers'
Conference in Tashkent in October 1958 was endorsed at the
Asian Writers' Conference in New Delhi, December 1956. Modi-
fied to include African participation, it is now being
sponsored by the Union of Soviet Writers, in which Aa Sofronov
of the Soviet delegation to Cairo is a key figure The
Progressive Writers a Association in India, dominated by
the CP India and parallel organizations in Japan and other
Afro-Asian countries are equipped to cooperate in the campaign,
using the Solidarity Committees as a vehicle A preparatory
committee is to be established in Tashkent in August; until
then preliminary work is being carried on by a small. group
which convened in Mosc 9. 2-4 June 1958
2. The Second Afro-Asian Student Conference was scheduled
to be held in Japan in the summer of 1958, under joint sponsor-
ship of the Communist-infiltrated Japanese National Federation
of Students Self-Government Associations and the All-China
Students Federation. However, it has now been announced that
a youth and student conference is to be held in Cairo in
February 1959. A preparatory committee is to be set up in
Cairo in late 1958.
3. The Womenoa International Democratic Federation has
convened its first congress since June 1953 and has included
support for the main themes and results of the Cairo Conference
in its program. This meeting was held in Vienna in June
1958.
4. Other Afro-Asian gatherings (such as the Afro-Asian
Wows?s Conference which was held in Ceylon in February 1958)
are tentatively scheduled. They provider like the first
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Asian Writer's Conference held in India in December 1956,
a target for Communist attempts to infiltrate and dominate
the proceedings. Even where such meetings successfully
resist Communist attempts to dominate them, the inclusion
of Soviet bloc delegations permits them to be exploited
effectively as opportunities for cultivating new acquaintances
and contacts who may subsequently be willing to abandon
opposition to Communist desires and designs.
5. Other regional gatherings, such as the African
Popular Conference scheduled for October 1958 in Accra,
a newly-projected Arab Popular Conference planned for September
1958, the Festival of African Youth scheduled to be held
in Bamako, French West Africa, in September 1958, and
many other less inclusive meetings are also exploitable in
the development of the Communist version of Afro-Asian
solidarity.
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Co 1 IAL
XI. CONKJNIST ? S MOM E Col ENCE- A P.E I1 N ASSESS1 VT
Although the extent to which the permanent organization
created at Cairo will serve Communist ends remains unclear. the
Conference itself appears to have rendered the following services
to current Communist objectives
a. It endorsed the claim of the US M to acceptance
as an Afro-Asian states, entitled to participate on a basis
of equality with other states of the area,
ba It provided in its resolutions a formal identifica-
tion of the main enemy;, a statement of aspirations, and
proposals for future action which, while ostensibly enjoy-
ing widespread popular Afro Asian supports in fact constitute
a well-tailored framework within which Communist parties
and, international front affiliates of the area (particularly
in the independent countries) can carry on the programs
and national unity strategies to which they are already
committed.
c. It provided the Communist parties of the Soviet
bloc countries with extensive propaganda ammunition which
can be and has been used in a deceptive, manner to convince
their own nations of the successes achieved through current
Bloc foreign policy., the extent of popular support and
endorsement which Communism enjoys in the Free World$ and
the weak and disorganized state of the opposition to the
further growth of Communism,
do It provided a basis upon which the C. st
parties and peace movements of the principal Western states
can mount pressure campaigns against the unity and determina-
tion of democratically constituted Western governments*
e. It further clicated.? by encouraging intransi-
gence., the orderly, equitable, and peaceful solution of
problems existing between Western states and the peoples of
the Afro-Asian area.
fo It interposed new problems which tend to inhibit and
complicate the working outs, by the independent countries
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of the area., of valid and effective forms of cooperation
and mutual support which are consistent with both
national interests and the peace and stability of the
world community.
g. It recorded Afro-Asian support for major programs
being developed by the traditional international Communist
front organizations.
h. It provided an organizational framework for future
solidarity activity., which, because of its form and
character., is particularly susceptible to subversion and
eventual domination by the International Communist
Movement.
The Soviet Union itself has openly acknowledged a number of
the points set forth above as accomplishments of the Conference.
In Izvestia of 3 January 1958 an article filed from Cairo by
S. 1o Tiov and. V. ICudryavteev stated that the important results
of the Conference were
Its "determination of the common enemy."
b. Its concrete statement of the tasks of the
peoples in relation to individual countries.
c. Its recognition that the economic problems of
the already independent countries are of even greater
importance than those of the countries struggling for
liberation.
d. Its highlighting of the importance of nationaliza-
tion and agrarian reform as stimuli for national economic
development.
e. Its treatment of issues "in the spirit of the struggle
for peace."
f. Its acceptance of Soviet participation.
Soviet bloc news treatment of the Conference addressed. to
Western Europe and the Americas particularly emphasized the'
link between anti-colonialism and the peace campaign:
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"The speeches of the delegates clearly showed that
the question of national independence of the Afro-Asian
peoples is indissolubly' linked with the fate of world
peace." (K. Zakharov commentary--in German European Service,
3 January)
"The enormous service rendered by the Cairo Conference,
Pravda emphasizes, is the fact that it rallied the people
o Africa and Asia under the banner (of peaceful coexistence).
It is precisely for this reason that the results of the
Conference have been welcomed by all peace-loving nations both
in the East and in the West." (Russian Hellschreiber to
Europe--3 January)
"Counteracting the Cairo Conference means opposing
peace. Don't Americans want peace?" (Moscow-English to
North America. 4 January)
This central thesis of the current Communist "peace" campaign
is certain to be extensively developed in the months ahead, with an
ever-increasing emphasis being put on the idea that those--
whether Afro-Asian., European, or American--who refuse to accept
the Cairo programs do not want peace.
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Coii~!!
XII. TO PROSPECTS
Over eight months have elapsed since the Cairo Conference
was held; and in spite of the burst of energy originally' expended,
the organization created there has done virtually nothing. The
majority of the secretariat members have not been designated,
and the Egyptian committee continues to carry out what activity
is being undertaken. Even at the organizing level there 'is
little evidence that Free World national affiliates are titu-
larly active or that international liaison is well-devel~d.
The USSR is clearly still interested in exploiting Afro Asian
solidarity, but what Bloc activity has been noted is centered
largely in the European states, which did not in fact participate
at Cairo. East Germany and Rumania have both organized Afro-
Asian Friendship bodies. In April, the racial discrimination
theme of the Conference was given an anti-American orientation
in East and West Europe (as well as India) through the organiza-
tion of Paul Robeson Birthday Committees. At least one Bloc
committee is known to have sought to.stimilate a parallel effort
in Black Africa.
Cautious but persistent efforts are being made to induce
Afro Asian governments to endorse the Cairo Conference; where
these efforts are resisted, an attempt is made to create the
impression that such endorsement has been given.
In mid April, in connection with the Pan-African Accra
Conference, a number of the international fronts (and the USSR.
itself) revived their laudatory treatment of Cairo and linked
it to the Accra gathering of African states. Further, significant
mentions of Cairo were contained in the speech delivered by
Nikita Khrushchev at a dinner of welcome for President Nasser of
Egypt in mid-May 1958 and in the final communique of the visit.
In describing the common views and shared aims of Egypt and the
USSR, Khrushchev stated: "The USSR has endorsed the resolutions
of the Cairo Conference." This the Government of Egypt had not
as yet officially done.
In the final joint communique, in the section describing
the identity of the views of Egypt and the USSR., it was recorded
that both governments "support the principles of Bandung which
have been reaffirmed by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference
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held in Cairo in 1957, which expressed the hopes and aspirations
of these. two continents." For a Communist propagandist, this
stateme'nt'can easily be manipulated to convey the idea that the
Cairo resolutions were endorsed, rather than the Bandung principles,
to which the Cairo resolutions,in fact pose serious challenges.
However, the chances for successful exploitation of a
regional organization have been substantially reduced during the
past months by three developments of major concern to the
International Communist Movement. ]First, the sharp Soviet bloc
criticism and the Chinese Communist denunciations of Yugoslavia
and its Communist, party have created serious strains with the Afro-.
Asian groups heretofore most willing to engage in joint activity
with, the Soviet bloc, and have disabused many who considered
Chinese Communism significantly different from--and less aggressive
than--that of the Communist party of the Soviet Union.
Second, the abrupt Chinese suspension of efforts to develop
trade with Japan and its subsequent vigorous denunciation of
the Japanese Government represent a fundamental reversal of
policy which will tend, to cripple the original Afro-Asian solidarity
concept as applied in Japan. Third, the hardening policy of?the
Communist Party of India on domestic issues and the unenthusiastic,
stubborn response of the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon
to the creation of the United Arab Republic have created new
national tensions which compromise the; "solidarity" approach and
reveal, all too 1V,,,, the crb ^ttves' of the Sa ra.}e't Union.
It may pr'', within the next few months, that the Solidarity
Council and Secretariat cannot enlist active participants from
the independent Afro-Asian states who are not subject to interna-
tional Communist discipline. They may, however, continue to exist
and operate, either as Soviet/Communist..Arat) instruments or at
a minimum as an essentially Egyptian-operated facade.. In the latter
event, the next annual meeting of the Council may prove of great
importance.
The Conference resolutions and the idea, of Afro-Asian
solidarity will probably continue to be exploited as far as
possible by the traditional international fronts as bases for
continued unity efforts Only weU,-publicized failures to gain
such support or open repudiations of these efforts by leading
figures identified with the Conference are likely to thwart this
effort.
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National Communist parties and key Communists of the' area are
certain to expend considerable effort in attempts to put into
effect on the national scene the ideas expressed by the main
Communist spokesmen at Cairo. As long as their ideas remain
unrepudiated by responsible Afro-Asian leaders and governments,
the Communists will be able to exploit the Cairo Conference in
order to conceal the true origin of the ideas, to exploit the
fiction that they represent the Afro Asian "wave of the future"
in their appeals to the uncommitted, and to press attacks upon
their most important local enemies.
only a major and spectacular shift of Soviet bloc policies
toward the Afro Asian areas a new crisis in the area, or
an abrupt change in the attitude of the independent governments
of Africa and Asia is likely to invalidate the prospects outlined
above.
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ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC EVENTS AT THE CONFIRENCE
A number of facets of the Conference activities merit
scrutiny in some detail. The following have been selected
for such treatment:
I. The deliberations ofthe Political, Economic,
and Cultural Commissions.
II. The permanent organization created by the
Conference.
III. The role and reactions of delegates from
Black Africa.
IV. Highlights of the Soviet bloc propaganda
exploitation of the Conference.
These analyses are by no means exhaustive, but they
do substantiate and shed additional light on a number of
critical points covered briefly in the preceding general
study?
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Japanese Dele-
90ion Con )
Akira S nabori
Takatomi Icbinoee
Kenichi Kooyema
Suzu Kuboyama
Giiehiro Ynaiyama
Haime Sujiki
Kunitugu Yagi
Siiichi Okubo
Takio Nisikawax
Masao Abe
Kokichi Nakaiose
Sejoi Matuise
Tadasi Mijusaw
Tasuku Asarco
Sima Kai
Toshio Akimwa
Tehiro Suitugu
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Wall
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UUMIMMIM
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. DELIBERATIONS OF THE MAIN COM4ISSIONS
A. The Political Commission.
1. The Palestine Subcommittee
2. The Algeria Subcommittee
3. The Subcommittee on Imperialism
4. The Racial Discrimination
Subcommittee
5. The Nuclear Warfare
Subcommittee
B. The Economic Commission
11
12
1. Economic Struggle Against Colonialism -
The Soviet Program is Presented 15
2. The Question of Colonial
Territories
3. The Final Resolutions
17
18
C. The Cultural Commission 19
II. STRUCT R L AND C tGANIZATIONAL CEARACTgiISTICS
OF THE AFRO ASIAN SOLIDARITY COUNCIL AND
SECRETARIAT
III. THE CONFERENCE AND BLACK AFRICA 26
IV. TREATMENT OF THE CONFERENCE WITHIN
THE SOVIET BLOC 33
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDS I. - KEY NON BLOC PERSONALITIES
ATTENDING THE AFRO ASIAN CONFERENCE, CAIRO 37
APPENDIX II. - KEY BLOC PERSONALITIES ATTENDING
THE AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE' CAIRO 44
APPENDIX III. - OFFICIAL LIST OF UELEGATES 48
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1. D&ELIBERaATIO OF MAIN Ct SSIONS
A. The Political Commission
Under the organizing guidance of Dr. Anup Singh.,
this commission selected. Ws. Rameshwari Nehru as
president (Egyptian nomination), although Dr. Singh
himself origiraQly favored an Egyptian president. A
Sudanese delegate (nominated by Ethiopia) was then
elected first vice president., although the Iraq delegate
itsaw no need for vice presidents." The squabble that
followed: sggested that the Egyptian delegate was., in the
C ni,sts8 view., the proper person to steer the commis-
sionts work. Discussion of this question ended when. the
Chinese delegate suggested that there be two vice presidents.,
nominated Egypt for the second vice presidency., and proposed
that the vice presiders head two subcommittees.* This
proposal was supported by the Japanese., the Ghanian., and
Indians. It was accepted as far as the vice presidencies
were concerned,, but the subcommittee question still
caused trouble.
ere is no firm evidence of the contemplated division
of labor between the proposed two subcommittees.
However., according to a public statement by ihalid
Mukhi al Din., the aim was to permit separate treatment
of the problems of "new" and. "old`' im eria ism. The
former was to deal with colonial territories., which
he characterized, as "survivals of the' old form of
i. ria sm'S; the latter was to deal with manifestations
affecting independent countries., such' as the Eisenhower
doctrine., eta. He gave credit for this justification
to a member of the Jordanian delegation; but it is clear
that such a division of labor would have fitted neatly
into the Communist plan of campaign.
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As in other coamn'ssions, some delegations obviously
desired to prevent the creation of many subcommittees.
But, on a Tunisian motion, supported by the Sudan, Syria,
Palestine, Jordan, and apparently.. Egypt, a decision was
made to create five subcommittees, with specific attention
directed toward dealing with the Algerian and Palestinian
questions. Just prior to the vote (which showed only
four delegations opposed), Dr. Singh again appealed for
the creation of no more than two subcommittees, endorsing
the original Chinese suggestion. When the vote went
against his proposal, Dr. Singh prevented the recording
of the identities of the four' delegations which had
supported him. It is possible that moderates from Japan,
Ethiopia, and Ghana supported India on this vote and.
were the four involved; but it is equally possible that
.the Chinese and two of the other four Communist delega.
tions present may have voted with the Indians. In the;
latter event Dr..Singh's concern over the identification
of the minority could be easily understandable, for it
would have raised questions concerning the votes of the
other two Communist bloc delegations, and perhaps
exposed a difference of opinion among Communists
over a question of operating tactics.
This breakup into subcommittees, in fact, tended
(a) to highlight the issues of Algeria and Palestine,
(b to dilute possible opposition to such prefabricated.
reports and resolutions as those presented by the
Egyptian delegate in the subcommittee on imperialism, and
(c to permit such single-minded pro-Communist delegates
as the Japanese YASUI Kaoru to make the maximum
impression.
The five subcommittees eventually approved covered
a. Imperialism
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b. Algeria
c. Racial discrimination
d. Nuclear weapons
e. Palestine
The Conference resolutions which emerged from
the Political Commission supported virtually all
national liberation and irredentist struggles in
Asia and Africa. They also
a. Gave explicit endorsement to the central
thesis which the Communist movement is currently
propagating throughout the world, that the prob-
lems of the colonial areas and newly independent
countries as well as the threat to world peace
are due solely to "imperialist ambitions."
b. Devoted most attention to the Algerian
conflict.
c. Made what appears to be the Conference's
most significant statement on the question of
Palestine.
Only one major Afro-Asian liberation problem--that
of Kashmir--was not discussed.
The most inflammatory statements made at the
Conference by self-styled representatives of national
liberation organizations were those of the persons
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who spoke in the name of the Chad and of Kenya. Both
called for Afro-Asian arming of their peoples and
promised that, with arms, the national liberation forces
would expel the colonial powers from their territory.
Neither of these "spokesmen" is known to have had
Communist contacts or to have demonstrated pro-Communist
attitudes in the past; both in fact have apparently been
resident in Cairo for some time and appear to be Egyptian
sponsored. However, the Kenya delegates were cultivated
by the Soviet. delegation to.the Conference and proceeded
to the USSR after the end of the Conference, where they
were given very flattering treatment and publicity.
l.? The Palestine Subcommittee
The endorsement by the Cairo Conference of a
special resolution incorporating a demand for the
"recognition of the rights" of Palestinian refugees
is of considerable interest. As was pointed out earlier,
the proposal that a special subcommittee be created to
deal with Palestine caused some trouble in the political
committee meeting.
The Arab-Israeli issue was in fact a subject of
discussion at the April 1955 New Delhi Conference,
where the Asian Solidarity Movement was created; and
resolutions were passed there which objected to "pressures
exerted through Israel and Turkey to force Arab states
to join military blocs" and denounced the "aggressive
policy of ruling circles in Israel." These clearcut
positions taken in April 1955 are interesting contrasts.
to the World Peace Council's inability, since the initia-
tion of the Soviet program of military aid to the Arab
World, to pass resolutions on Arab-Israeli relations, and
suggest that on this critical issue the Solidarity Movement
is more responsive to Communist desires than is the World
Peace Council.
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The full import of the Cairo resolution can only be recog-
nized, however, when it is viewed against the background of;
authoritative Communist statements on the Arab-Israeli issue .
made during the latter half of 1957. The most relevant is a
policy declaration by the Congress of the Israeli Communist
Party made in mid-1957, which called for"recognition of the
rights of the Palestinian Arabs--including the right of self-
determination, and if they so desired, their right to secession."
The Cairo resolution, proposed by the Palestinian delegation. with
Egyptian aid and encouragement and with explicit Soviet support
encompasses the first part.of this declaration, and reiterates
the April 1955 New Delhi condemnation of the Israeli Government
as an aggressive imperialist tool. The "moderate" nature of
the resolution is, therefore, in fact deceptive; it is better
characterized as a cautious. step forward by international
C ism,. in a typically deceptive long-range campaign, to
exploit an exceeding complex and explosive issue to its 'own
ends. R. Palme Dutt, who for many years has been the most
accurate. and authoritative spokesman of international. Communism
on the strategy and tactics to be employed in the colonial world,
made this clear in an exhaustive article on Israel published in
August 1957 in the British Communist magazine, Labour Monthly.
Approving the above-quoted policy statement of the Communist
Party of Israel, he pointed out that the political conditions for
such a settlement "are not yet ripe, but are gathering." The
Cairo resolution is a significant step toward the creation, of.
the "ripe political conditions" envisioned by Dutt in this plan,
from which only the Soviet bloc and international Communism
would derive major benefit.
Resolutions endorsed on 1 February 1958 by the Communist Party
of Israel reveal the extent to which the Cairo resolutions are
consistent with its domestic program and objectives:
"RESOL ONS OF M C EMRU C0MNIT1'EE OF COMMIS. PARTY OF ISRAEL
30 January - 1 February 195
"The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel
isank held its seventh plenary session at Tel Aviv from 30 January
to 1 February. Comrade Moir Wilmer, member of. the political bureau,
outlined the party pro awn for the tenth anniversary of the establish-
ment of the state, torial. Note: Neir Wilmer is also a leading
figure in Israeli. Peace Committee delegations to the World Peace Council-
"An agreement of the great powers on the disarmament question
and other international problems--among which are those of the
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Middle East--would serve the cause of peace in general and would
represent a great contribution towards a relaxation of today's
dangerous tensions. It would create more favorable conditions
for the solution of the Palestinian problem and the Israel.-Arab
conflict, which is intentionally aggravated by the imperialists
and their servants.
"V. Tom. AFRO ASIATIC COW ESS IN CAIRO
"The Cairo Congress, by manifesting the solidarity of all the
peoples of Asia and Africa, has made a great contributionto
world peace.
"The resolutions concerning economic, social, and cultural
questions, as well as the resolutions relating to the development
of the national economies of the Asian and African countries
are all part of a general program for the fight against imperialism
from abroad and against reaction at home.
"The resolution concerning Palestinian problems declares
that Israel serves as an imperialist base which threatens, the
security and development of the Middle East and represents a
danger to world peace. The main reason for this conclusion
is chiefly due to Ben Gurion's anti-national and pro-imperialist
policies. All patriotic forces of the people who have their
hearts set on assuring peace, security, and the future of
Israel must redouble their fight for a radical change in Israeli
policies in the direction of peace, independence, and neutrality.
Such a change would open the way for regularizing peace with
the, neighbor countries by taking into account the legitimate
national interests of the people of Israel as well as those of
the Palestinian Arab people.
"VI. ON M EVENT OF THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ESTABLISHNMNT
OF THE STATE OF ILL
"Our party, concerned for the fate of the people and the home-
land, will issue the following essential demands on the occasion
of the tenth anniversary of the founding of Israel:
"A change of Israel's policies towards neutrality, independence,
and peace. Solidarity with the peoples of Asia and Africa. Improve-
ment of relations with the USSR. Recognition of the national rights
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C^101101111WL
of the Palestinian Arab people. Equality of democratic rights and
liberties for the Arab population of the country. Total suppres-
sion of the military government which dishonors Israel. Solicitude
for the working people and broadening of democratic liberties."
2. The Algeria, Subcommittee
Algeria, like Palestine,, was given separate treatment
and special emphasis in the final resolutions. As has been
pointed out earlier., the demand for the creation of this
subcommittee on Algeria caused some confusion in the political
committee.. The Arab delegates were most active in the subcommittee,
but a Ceylon delegate served as chairman....
In spite of the fact that the resolution on Algeria fully
endorsed the aspirations of the Algerians,, its "moderate" proposals
for action dealt principally with diplomatic support., humanitarian
aid for the peoples and assistance to refugees., and agitational
expressions of solidarity. It did, not, as FZN propaganda had
predicted., promise or call for "immediate., massive,, and unlimited
aid" to the Army of National Liberation. s s
The emphasis of Soviet.bloc and Communist speeches in the
subcommittee was on the necessity for cessation of hostilities
and negotiation between Algeria and France., based on prior
French acknowledgement of the Algerian right to independence.
In contrast,. Arab bloc speeches,, draft resolutions, and the final
resolution as wel.1 demanded immediate recognition of Al rian
itn pend,enaa .
This distinction,,, which may appear to be little more than
hairsplitting in the light of the seriousness of the Algerian
st r is considered of considerable importance by the CPS
for it seeks primarily to promote an Algerian formula which will
enhance its global influence and be usefl in both the Afro-.
Asian and European communities. It seeks to exploit the general
threat to peace in the Mediterranean"--to promote neutralism
in Europe and at the same time to use the Algerian hope for
C- st bloc diplomatic and material, support to strengthen the
influence of Algerian Communists vis-a-vis the National Liberation
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movement. Here, as elsewhere., it is reluctant to commit itself
openly and unreservedly to one side of such a dispute.
It is noteworthy that the North Korean delegation was the
main Soviet bloc voice on Algeria. Their position on other
issues at Cairo was completely intransigent; their report on
Algeria was noteworthy for its comparison of the much publicized
atrocities attendant upon French actions in Algeria with the
accusations long levelled against Japanese and American
"imperialism" in Korea (such as the "germ warfare" charges so
energetically cultivated during the Korean conflict). it also
advanced the thesis that "the colonial war by the French imperialists
in Algeria is but part of the aggressive provocations of interna-
tional reaction led by the U.S. imperialists." But the policy
they endorsed was that generally advocated by the USSR and its
disciplined adherents throughout the world.
Insofar as the final resolution carried the demand that
"the independence of Algeria be recognized without delay,"
and called for countermeasures against countries supporting the
French military effort in Algeria, it would appear that the
Conference supported the position of the Arab states rather than
the more cautious known Communist position. But the resolution
also characterized the Algerian struggle as "a threat to the
security of the African people and international peace," and
thus contributed effectively to the Communist campaign to tie in
the peace movement (particularly in the West and Afro-Asia)
with the Arab national liberation movements and Communist
efforts to increase their influence therein. This objective is
made clear., for example, by a joint statement of the Moroccan and
Italian Communist Parties, published in LtUnita of 8 February 1958:
"The Italian Communist party should consider as its most
important task today the struggle for the relaxation'.. of
inteTational tensions and peace. It is completely
in accord with the Moroccan Communist Party in their judg-
ment that the struggle of the Moroccan people and of',all
Arab people or their independence constitutes an essential
element of world peace. . . . The two Parties declare
themselves in conformity with the recent Conference in
Cairo."
This same thesis was stated in Pravda (7 January) inan
article on unity of action by Shev n, a leading CPSU theoretician:
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"The international duty of all parties of the working
class and, the interests of peace desnd unconditional
support of the national liberation movement against
old and new forms of colonial domination"
The evidence of lack of complete agreement suggests,,
nevertheless, that the Communist movement still faces serious
problems in its attempts to exploit the Algerian issue.
3. The Subcommittee on , ri.ism
The subcommittee on imperialism attracted the partici-
pation of at least two of the key Communist figures at the
Conference- id Mukhi al-Din of Egypt served as chairman
of the subcommittee; A. Ko Gopalan of India, together with
V. K. Bha of India., served on the resolution drafting committee
of the subcommittee.
Little is known about the deliberations of this body, but
its draft resolution incorporated the .main points of the current
Soviet assessment of the aims and objectives of the West in
the Afro-Asian area and of the Soviet "struggle for peace" thesis.
Resolution on Imperialism
~PbMI~- YY ~YYMq
"The Afro-Apian Peoples Conference firmly believes that
imperialist.c ambitions lead to interference in the affairs of
other countries., to military and political pacts and alliances
directed against world peace.
"'use ambitions lead to conspiracies against national
governments,, to the creation of continued tension in interna-
tional relations; to usurping of the natural rights of smaller
nations to freedom., sovereignty and independence.
"They lead to incitement of cold war and to bolstering
up of te armament race Such factors may act as a trigger to
start a shooting war that will be disastrous to mankind.
"Because of this belief and in the spirit of Bandung,
it condemns o
"(a) imperialism in all its forms and manifestations;
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O (b) foreign interference in the affairs of other
countries;
81(c) military and political pacts and alliances that
create overriding spheres of influence., endanger world
peace and suppress the peoples' aspirations;
"(d) military aid to one country or group of countries.,
which constitutes threat to neighbouring countries and
compels them to increase their military budgets,, thus
retarding their peoples' economic development;
"(e) treaties that encroach Won national sovereignty
of nations;
"(f) exploitation of the national economy in other
countries for the benefit of imperialistic powers;
" (g) conspiring to overthrow national governments
in the interest of the imperialists;
"(h) aids on conditions detrimental to the interests
of smaller countries that ultimately jeopardise their
sovereignty and independence;
"(i) establishment of foreign military bases and
forces on the territories of other countries;
"The Conference sees in the policy embodied in Pancha
Shila and the ten principles of Bandung best means to alleviate
international tension and to end the cold war.
"Therefore it declares that it gives its full support to
the rights of the peoples:
to freedom., self-determination, sovereignty,
and complete independence;
"(b) to settle their internal p ?oblems by themselves;
"(c) to choose forms of their governments accooding
to their desires."
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4. The Racial Biscrisszination Subcommittee
In this subcommittee, discussions centered upon
coasdemnation of alleged discriminatory practices of a political
and economic tare in Black Africa. The leading role was played
by the -lmdian delegate, although the delegates of the independent
countries in or linked with Black Africa were equally vocal. The
policy of Mar-theid adopted by the Union of South Africa was sub-
jected to rticul.aar condemnation.
The resolution drafted in the subcoi.ttee"pol.iticalized.$9
the issue by attributing these practices to the desire of the
colonial powers to perpetuate and strengthen their control and
exploitation of the native populations and to repress and
harass liberation movements.
An attempt was made to introduce a condemnation of racial
discrimination in the meted States into the resolution, but
it was not successful. allegedly "moderate" action taken to
reject this addition.merits closer scrutiny,, hovevers in light
of the actual objectives of the resolution. Broadening the
condemnation of discrimination to include its manifestations in the
United, States would have diluted and to saw extent obscured the
particular political interpretation which of primary interestm--was i ee a, racial discrimination as a manifestation of colonialism.
Me- Campaign ssxbsegnez3t ls,ched n cont3ectiota with the cele-t
bration of the birthday of Paul Robeson appears more effectively
designed; to generate anti-American sentiment based on alleged
racial discrimination.
5. The Nuclear Warfs?e Subcommittee
In this body the Japanese pro-Communist YAST. r K dcai+u
encountered little opposition to his diatribe against the riest,
which further propagated the well-know denunciations of Western
preparations for launching a nuclear war, accused the Western powers
of using Afro-Asian territories by preference for weapons testing
at the risk of injuring local pop . tionsa and condemned them
for their unwillingness to accept Soviet proposals for the banning
of tests and nuclear war.
The speech by Mrs YAS and the supporting remarks by Syrian,
Indic, and other World Peace Council regulars were clearly
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intended to support the "atomic blackmail" strategy now being
applied by the CPSU in the Free World through the peace campaign.
This "struggle for peace," which is an extension of the well-known
WPC progracg has taken on new features since the publication of
the Peace Manifesto signed by sixty-four Communist parties in November
1951 at Moscow. It demands acceptance of Soviet-initiated or supported
proposals on many matters, including those on colonial terri-
tories, as the only alternative to increased international tension,
and ever-increasing possibilities of nuclear war. Subsequent
Soviet commentary has emphasized that the Conference "endorsed and
supported Soviet policy on nuclear warfare."
It is interesting to note, in connection with the drafting
of the nuclear warfare resolutions, that the Soviet delegation
flatly refused to permit the inclusion of the USSR as a
recipient of the proposed appeal for banning tests. The sensi-
tivity of the USSR on this point becomes understandable when
it is realized that the USSR refuses to permit any propagation
inside the Soviet bloc of the scare-mongering used, by men,such as
YASUI, a tactic -which they enthusiastically endorse and repeat
abroad. This posture seems dictated by their concern over the
possible impact of such arguments upon the Soviet people.: The
basis for this concern was made clear as far back as early 1955,
when then Premier Malenkov was accused by the CPS[J of succumbing
to "imperialist atomic blackmail" and contributing to "defeatism"
when he stated that nuclear warfare would lead to the destruction
of civilization. Malenkov was obliged to restate his position
for the Soviet people and to affirm that "in spite of widespread
destruction, the Soviet Communist society would emerge victorious
from a nuclear war." This remains the official domestic line in the
Bloc today.
Yugoslav attempts to criticize the USSR as well as certain
Western states for contributing to the heightening of tensions
have, since early May 1958, drawn virulent denunciations from
the Soviet bloc.
B. The Economic Commission
The organization of the work of this commission was carried
out with a speed and incisiveness not encountered elsewhere and
control appeared to remain firmly in Communist hands. The problem
of subcommittees arose, as in the political commission, but it did
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not seriously affect the course of events. At the first meeting
the Egyptian delegation nominated a Syrian Communists Nazim
Mousli, a professor from Damascus who had been a member of the
predominantly Communist delegation to New Delhi in April 1955,
to head the commission. Having assumed control of the proceedings),
Mr. Mousli proposed, as soon as he took the chair
a. the election of two vice presidents and a secretary;
b, the nomination of the Japanese delegate as secretary;
c. the nomination of an Egyptian delegate and the
Soviet delegate to the vice presidencies.
These nominations from the chair were accepted, The Egyptian
delegate was then recognized and promptly read a series of
sixteen recommendations. The Sudanese delegate then proposed that
the reports by the USSR and. Japan be presented. The chairman,
who obviously wished to give the USSR delegate the advantage of
making the final presentation and reacting to proposals made by
others, stated, "In thismeeting we only hear recommendations
from all sides," and, then called upon the Ceylon delegate to
present his recommendations. As they Ceylon delegate himself
stated, "My proposals bear very close resemblance to those advanced
by Syria and Egypt." He first highlighted as a "basic problem"
the question "how can the strangle hold of economic iperialism
be broken?" This question he proceeded to answer promptly by
proposing adoption of the concept of regional as contrasted
with national industrialization. His recommendations dealt with
the centr questions of (a) sources of capital; (b) sources of
technical knowledge; (c) relationship between consumer and capital
goods production; (d) state sponsorship of industry; (e) the need for
"political similarity" of participating governments., all of which
topics were dealt with in the subsequent Soviet presentation.
After a short comment from the Tunisian members a second Syrian
delegate, Maruf Dawalibi (who also was present at the New Delhi
meeting in April 1955) then sought to prevent the introduction of
other ideas and to steer the organization of the deliberations.
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He proposed a plan of work, suggesting that "the written* and verbal
reports so far presented were quite adequate as a basis fcr
defining the agenda of our committee." He suggested that an
agenda subcommittee of the whole be created and also introduced
a new topic, calling attention to the need to deal with the case
"of the people who are still colonized." The chairman, after
having heard and passed over comments by an Egyptian delegate
and the Burmese delegate, reiterated. the observation of his
Syrian colleague concerning the commission?s need to consider the
problems of peoples still in colonial status, and again recognized
his colleague.
Returning again to the question of organizing the committee's
work, Mr. Dawalibi repeated his proposal that the committee
operate as a unit, thus opposing the Egyptian and Sudanese
proposals for the creation of subcommittees. After further in-
conclusive discussion on whether one, three, or four subcttees
should be organized., the chair finally recognized the Rus ian delegate,
who proposed (a) a general discussion on the following day with
the whole committee in attendance; (b) a decision in principle on
the creation of subcommittees; and ((c a postponement of he
decision of need for and number of subcommittees necessaruntil
after the general discussion. His "suggestions" were promptly
supported by the Chinese delegate, Chi Tao Ming, and thereafter by
Palestine, the Sudan, and Egypt. In this manner the entire
committee was held together (as had been originally proposed by
the Syrian delegation) to hear the Soviet report, and an opportunity
was created for the real discussion on convening subcommittees to
take place outside the formal meeting. Four subcommittee' (again
a reflection of the Syrian delegate's insistence on a special
consideration of the dependent countries) were in fact formed
*Me most elaborate and lengthy reports presented at the Conference
were those presented by Egypt and Syria to the Economic Commission.
The Egyptian report had been prepared as far back as October by Adel
Amin, an Egyptian Communist. The authors of the Syrian report
are not known, but its content clearly reflects the closejlink
which the writers must have had to the Afro Asian Lawyers', Conference
in Damascus in November. Significant similarity to the Egyptian and
Syrian reports have also been noted in detailed and lengthy reports
presented by individual members of the Ceylonese and Japanese
delegations.
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on the following day- (a) the Commerce Exchange Subcommittee;
(b) the Industrial and Agricultural Subcommittee; (c) the Labor
and Cooperatives Subcommittee; and (d) the Dependent Countries
Subcommittee.
1. Economic Struggle 60inst Colonialism - The Soviet
Program is Presented
On the second day of deliberations, the Soviet delegate,
Arzumaniyan, in his speech to the Economic Commission presented
a Communist blueprint for economic development in Afro Asia,
repeating the usual Soviet offer of disinterested aid without
strings to independent countries in Africa and Asia. Other
aspects of his speech merit closer and more immediate priority
attention.
First, he spoke in a curiously ambiguous manner. When
proposing courses of action, he spoke as and Afro-Asian exploit-
ing the basic advantage offered by the admittance of t e USSR to
the Conference as a full and equal participant. At other points,
particularly when making offers of assistance,. he spoke as a repre-
sentative of the Soviet bloc addressing Afro Asian peoples. The
significance of this dualism emerged later when the economic
commission produced for all Afro Asian countries resolutions on
commerce, labor, and industrial development which were consistent
with Yr. Arzumaniyan's recommendations, and a separate group
of resolutions directed. to the dependent countries, which called for
struggle against inclusion of dependent African territories in the
European Common Market program, condemned existing colonial
development schemes, Colombo Plan, etc., and advocated acceptance
only of such aid as was offered without strings.
Second, basing his presentation on the Soviet example, he
suggested the essentials of a national economic development program
which each Afro Asian country could profitably adopt. The
principal elements of this program were
a. Financing of industrial development through
nationalization of foreign-owned enterprise.
b. State control of all foreign trade, with severe
restriction of non-essential imports, to ensure direction
of profits and benefits to productive purposes.
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c. Central economic planning., with emphasis upon the
priority development of productive industrial capacity
rather than upon consumer goods.
d. Maximum exploitation of raw materials exports in
foreign markets to help defray costs of internal development.
In view of his offer of Soviet aid and technical assistance,
`within the capabilities of the Soviet economy.," it is interesting
to note that he emphasized.in this portion of his speech that
economic development could be achieved, as he claimed it was in
the Soviet Union, without foreign aid, if the pr r techniques
were a loo ed.
Third, he suggested a cooperative economic program, to be
undertaken by all Afro-Asian countries in concert, which,would
further contribute to economic development of the whole area.
This cooperative program would involve the acceptance by the
Afro Asian group of such concepts as complementary national
economies, the use of preferential and protective tariffs, and
joint pricing of raw materials exports outside the Afro-Asian
area to maximize profits. The program,,vhich he related to the
need to protect the Afro-Asian countries against unfair pressures
of "new colonialism" of the European Common Market and, the threat
of plans for Eurafrican level optrent, contained what was in effect
an endorsement in principle of the Egyptian call for the creation of
an Afro-Asian common market, within which the USSR and its Asian
satellites presumably would be ;included. But it went far beyond those
ideas by calling for the integration of national economies in Africa
and Asia. It was clear from the proceedings that the USSR was not
disposed to commit itself in advance to such enterprises,aswere
envisioned in the detailed Syrian, Egyptian., Japanese, and even
Moroccan proposals.
Also, in this section of his speech, the Soviet delegate
said that the Afro Asian countries,, "being dedicated to the
principles of anti-colonialism naturally could not themselves indulge
in the techniques of colonial pl-ander." This interesting state-
ment, which followed his description of private investment of
capital abroad as "the main i mperialist device for plundering
colonial territories," is a clear indication that in Communist
opinion such operations by private capital are unacceptable even
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if carried out by the more advanced independent countries of Asia
and Africa, such as India and Tapan. Together with a statement
of Mr. Sadek,* it makes clear that Soviet opposition to real
Afro-Asian economic cooperation at this time will persist so long
as the exclusion of the West from Afro Asian economic affairs
is not complete., and that it does not envision the assignment
of any role in such development schemes to private capital.
Both the speech and the final resolutions on economic questions,
which the Soviet delegation accepted, laid the groundwork for
the piecemeal development of a system of economic cooperation,,
with the USSR in a position to control the pace and extent of
the development.
Against this background., the emphasis placed on regionally
integrated industrialization, with its acceptance of the inter-
dependence of the participating states, clearly suggests the
line along which Leninist "unity" is to be developed between the
Soviet bloc and the free nations of Asia and Africa, as the slogan
of "national self-determination" ceases to: be valid.
2. The question-of Colonial Territories
The denunciation by the commission of the European
Common Market and the related Eurafrica development plan had also
ote: An informative illustration of the Communist capability
to deal gracefully with problems which arise in such conferences
is provided by a statement made on 28 December by an Egyptian
delegate, Abd al Aziz Sadek (a long-time Egyptian Peace Partisan).
When it appeared that the question of an Afro Asian Common Market
was getting too much attention, this man issued a statement that
Egypt did not favor the creation of a common market because:
"1. The non-recognition of Communist China by
certain countries constituted an obstacle to the common market.
"2. There was a possibility that certain Western powers
would their control over certain territories in Asia and
Africa to 'intrude' on the common market."
He then gently directed discussion into what the USSR considered
proper terms at this time, by "proposing" that "African and Asian
countries cooperate closely in the economic field through individual
bilateral agreements."
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been foreshadowed elsewhere by Co it l st statements as far back
as September 1957, when the World. Peace Council publication.,
Horizons published, an article by Pierre Cot on `The Illusions
of the Common Market." Joint dec e?ations issued on 29 vember
and 5 December by the Veuch Co runiat Party, together with leading
representatives of the Coa st parties of Algeria, Morocco,
and Tunisia, both incorporated this same attack on the Eulrafrica
plan. Other Moscow attacks on the Eurafrica plan were also made
earlier in 1957. The Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow
in fact made a contribution to this campaign at the end of the
year by publishing a `'Symgosiu m which contained articles from
sixteen countries-all devoted to criticism of the Common Market
program.
An important point which gradually emerged during the
Cairo deliberations was that the question of the Eurafriq an
plan was viewed from two different aspects
a. The unfavorable impact of the Eurafrican plan
on the economic dew nt of the independent coun?ries
of Afro-Asia., outside the plan area., whose economies would
encounter competition from Eurafrica.
b. The equally unfavorable impact of the plan !,on the
African territories to be directly affected (e.g., North
Africa, Black Africa) whose present subjugation to colonial
domination would be enhanced by the operation of the plan.
3. The Final Resolutions
A comparison of t final proposals of the economic
commission with the recommendations submitted by the v rilous
participants reveals the following. The Syrian reccnc'ations
on the propriety of nation lizati,on,, on encouraging governments to
work for the development of joint plans and programs for economic
development, plus the recd endationa for support of colonial
peoples struggling for freedom and independence, were incorporated
in the final resolutions. r1e a reeclut?ions on economic, agricultural,
and industrial cooperation and on action affecting labor and
cooperatives reflected primarily tl., Egyptian submission. The
recommendations concerning commercial exchange as finally presented
to the Conference reflected the exgaments presented by both the
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Egyptians and Syrians and incorporated specific secondary recom-
mendationsmade by both of them, such as the need for a joint
consultative body to deal with economic planning, proposals for
exchange of commercial data, and support for a Cairo Conference
of Chambers of Commerce (an Egyptian proposal).
However, all specific recommendations for such measures as
the creation of a common economic development Rind, a common
market, a central bank (Moroccan proposal)., an Asian African
payments union, etc., simply vanished.. These very concrete
proposals which had considerable support from members of the Japanese
and Indian delegations, among others, appear to have been dropped
without any significant discussion after the unenthuslasti4 Soviet
attitude toward these recommendations was made clear in the
speech delivered on the second day of the Conference.
Although many of the delegates came to this Conference,. in
spite of misgivings, because of their hope that one or more of these
proposals might be endorsed, their failure to achieve anything
tangible appears to have gone unnoticed.
But this was not merely a failure to achieve a desired end.
It was, even. more importantly, a major victory for the International
Communist Movement which is now in a position to exploit for
agitational purposes the alluring and generalized resolutions of
the Conference,, which define aspirations that are universally ap-
pealing, and courses of action which appear desirable. The
movement can accept this wholeheartedly and yet remain free to
maneuver and agitate over methods and specific steps to the
advantage of its own cause.
C. The Cultural Commission
This commission functioned as a single body with Dr. Taha
Hussein of Egypt as presiding officer and an Indian delegate,
Professor R. V. Cturkar, as rapporteur. In this coherence it dif-
fered from the Political and Economic Commissions, which broke
into subcommittees in spite of the desires'of some delegations.
The heads of the Chinese and. Ghanian delegations participated in
its deliberations, as did Dr. Louis Awad, the rapporteur of the
Egyptian delegation. Proceedings went forward smoothly and
consisted mainly of hearing proposals from many delegates. There
was virtually no debate.
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The original Egyptian proposals were discussed and minor
amendments were offered by the Ceylon, Indian, Japanese, and
Burma delegations. These, however, were taken up with the rapporteur
rather than in open discussion. The Syrian delegate offered at
the second meeting a. modifier of the preamble to the Egyptian
resolution. This statement which "politicalized" the entire
content of the recommendations highlighted the role played by
culture in the development of political, economic, and social
solidarity."
The Soviet delegate on the commission extended the invitation
to Afro-Asian writers to participate in the second Asian Triterst
Conference to be held in Tashkent in October 1958.
The final meeting of the commission adopted the original
Egyptian recommendations with the addition of only the Syrian
amendment described above and a proposal for the creation'of
national translation bureaus.
Four additional recommendations were approved--one on teaching
of the .major languages of Africa and Asia, one on scholarships
for Algerian students, one calling for an annual Afro-Asian
cultural prize, and one calling on governments to combat illiteracy.
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II. STRUCTURAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CUARAC7 RISTICS OF TSE AFRO-ASIAN
SO T ' COUNCIL SECRETARIAT
The Organization Commission of the Conference comprised
the heads of all national delegations. However, in a number
of instances--as in the USSR delegation, for example--less
prominent delegates were present who either directed the actions
of delegation leaders or were authorized to speak for them.
Little is known about the deliberations of this commission,
but the results of its actions merit close study. The final
resolution on organization approved the creation of an Afro-
Asian People's Solidarity Council and a permanent secretariat.
This is the culmination of an organizing effort which began
three years ago. These bodies, which have not to date (ugust
1958) been completely staffed, have not yet begun to function.
In the interim the Egyptian committee is operating in their stead
and appears to be concentrating on the translation and dissemina-
tion of some of the Conference speeches. Preparation of material
for the vitriolic "Voice of Free Africa" is also being carried
out o'
On the basis of data so far received, the Afro-Asian solidarity
movement and its permanent bodies are, roughly, regional equivalents
of the World Peace Movement and its organs, the Executive Bureau
and Secretariat.
It is like the WPC in that
a. It encompasses all kinds ofpeoplep as distinguished
from the other major fronts, which specialize in appealing
to one specific group--trade unionists, youth, lawyers.
b. It has espoused as one of its primary tasks the same
basic program to which the WPC is dedicated, i.e., the
campaign for peace---on Soviet terms.
c. There is no evidence that the. Council and Secretariat
are constitutionally responsible to the Conference which
authorized their creation. (In the WPC the Secretariat is
self-perpetuating and not responsible to the World Peace
Council; the Executive Bureau of the WPC is nominated by the
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Secretariat; there is no mechanism or procedure for
direct nomination by the Council.)
It differs from the World Peace Movement--and avoids e;._,
major defect of that organization--in one essential. It has a
second positive mission, through which it can reach and influence
others who are not Communists. This mission is its support of
national liberation movements. In this it can serve as a focus
and coordinating center, bringing together all Communidt front
activity in the Afro-Asian area, whether it be in youth, labor,
professional fields, women, etc. The organization of "Algeria
Day" programs on 30 March throughout the Afro Asian area Was its
main project so far, and at the national level Communist parties
have invariably played key roles in these programs.
The organization and charter of the Council is still unclear.
All that is known is that every country in the two continents
is entitled to have one member of the Council, to be nominated
by the national committee. The Council will convene when called
by the Secretariat and will meet at least once each year. From
this limited information it seems clear, however, that the princi-
pal function of the Council will be that of a rubber stamp, to
approve in retrospect the actions of the Secretariat. The pro-
vision for individual nominations to the Council is also of interest,
because it facilitates; Communist control of the body (through
the close-knit international party mechanism) and inhibits; joint
action by the free nations of Africa and Asia, which lack any
equivalent device.
The Secretariat, composed of a Secretary General and ten
secretaries, is given virtual carte blanche so far as its mission
and internal structure is concerned. The Egyptian committee
was given the right to select the Secretary General (for one
year!); the ten other national committees authorized to designate
one secretary each were Cameroons, China, India, Indonesia, Iraq,
Japan, the Sudan, Syria, the USSR, and Ghana. There has been an
unexplained delay in the selection of secretaries. The Soviet
secretary, Abd al Ghaffar Abd al Rashidov, the first to arrive
in Cairo, did so in early March. The Chinese member, Yang Shuo,
arrived in Cairo 5 May.
Both the method of selection and the specific countries
selected are of critical importance in determining the future
of Communist control of this strategic body.
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a. A precedent has been established by which, at a
second conference, the key post of Secretary General can
be handed to a Communist, from either a Bloc country or
even a Free World country where CP domination of the
national committee is complete.
b. The precedent has been established by which any
country not considered a reliable ally by the Soviet
'floc can easily be prevented from gaining a seat on the
Secretariat.
Two seats on the Secretariat are already Communist-controlled.
For other seats Communists or crypto-Communists are likely to
be designated, although the decisions have not as yet been made.
The countries to be represented are India, Syria, and the Sudan.
In at least one of these, however, there is already evidence that
the national committee is deadlocked in making its choice. It
is impossible at present to determine whether Comocmtni.st influence
in the national committees of the Cameroons, Indonesia, Iraq,
Japan, and Ghana is sufficiently strong to lead to the designation
of an individual who is, overtly or covertly, subject to Communist
party discipline or to control by a clandestine arm of a Soviet
bloc government.
The question is not, however, being left completely to
chance, if the Secretariat follows a reported plan for the internal
division of labor and the specific assignments of the individual
country secretaries.
Four main committees have in fact been provided for
a. Political
b. Social
c. Economic
d. Liaison.
It is reported that within these main committees specific
assignments for country secretaries have been distributed
as follows:
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a. Ghana (Social Committee) - Youth and Soci2a Services
b. India (Economic Committee) - Labor and Cooperatives
c. Japan (Political Committee) - Nuclear Wens
d. Indonesia (Liaison Committee) - Asian States
e. Iraq (Liaison Committee) - Arab States
f. Sudan (Liaison Committee) - African States
On the basis of the activities of the Conference itself, and
of general knowledge concerning the activities of the national
Communist. parties of the Afro Asian are., these assignments
cannot be considered fortuitous. Rather., they reflect a particularly
apt division of labor from the Co unitt point of view, in which
a particular strength or special function of the respective
national Communist party would tend to improve its chances for
exerting influence.
a. In Ghana the youth groups are the bodies to
which local Communists and pro-Soviet extremists have
directed their main efforts.
b. In India, Communist Party mass organization is
strongest in both labor and peasant bodies., and major
unity campaigns are being conducted in both fields. It
is, further, enlightening to note that A. K. Gopalan, the
leading Communist in the Indian delegation to Cairo, i is
a member of the Politburo of the C?, president of the
Party's peasant organization, and a formulator and leading
spokesman for the current Party policy of aagg ?easivel unity
campaigns in both the labor and agricultural cooperatives
fields. The main points of the Cairo resolutions on' these
matters followed closely the min lines of a key speech he
made in August 1957 to the Conference of the Party's',
peasant movement-the All-India Kisan Sabha..
c. Again., the Japanese Conmu st Party has had major
success in developing and dominating the front ca gns
on the nuclear weapons issue0 one speech by TASM l oru.
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at Cairo on the topic was the most intemperate address
delivered by any Japanese delegate, and it faithfully
echoed the Soviet, Chinese, and World Peace Council
line on the topic.
d. The designation of Sudan to handle liaison with
the African countries is also enlightening. In this
regard, the statements made by the. Sudanese Communist Izzal
Din Amer, quoted elsewhere in this paper, reveal that this
function is precisely the one which most closely fits the
capabilities of the Sudanese party.:
e. The designation of Indonesia and Iraq to
equally critical liaison tasks is also significant. The
Iraqi delegation to the Conference was drawn from the Left-
Nationalist opposition at home and in exile, in a country in.
which official policy was, at least at that time, contrary
to that advocated by the Conference. Such elements, which
have heretofore accepted the cooperation of the Iraqi
Communist party, are admirably suited to serve as a bridge
to dissident elements in the other Arab states, and at the
same time, as a channel through which Iraqi Communists can
exert influence by providing clandestine communication
links, introductions to Party members in other countries,
advice, and other useful services.
In Indonesia the strength, international contacts, and
favorable position of the Communist bsrty, which has succeeded
in identifying itself as a leading element in the campaign for
recovery of West Irian, again would tend to give it considerable
leverage in gaining control of and exploiting this position.
It remains to be determined what functions will be assigned
to the secretaries from the USSR and, China., the Cameroons, and
Syria, all of which are of critical importance to Communist
control of the Secretariat. It also remains to be seen what
individuals actually are designated to these positions.
On the basis of the events at the Conference it appears
likely that either the USSR or the Syrian member would head the
Economic Com ittee, with the other designee taking responsibility
for a subcommittee on commercial relations or national economic policy.
China is a logical candidate bead the Social Committee, It is
impossible to envisage the function likely to be assigned to the
Cameroonian secretary.
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IIIa THE CO1 WENCE AND BLACK AFRICA
With the exception of the Ghanian and Ethiopian delegations,
which attended primarily as observers with the approval of their
respective governments., and the Cameroon delegation., which
represented an undeniably significant (although illegal) political
element, the numerous "delegations" which claimed to represent
Black Africa at Cairo were largely composed of individuals currently
residing in Cairo. These, as well as others such as the repre-
sentatives of the French Sudan, have at best very dubious bases for
their claims to be representative of politically significant groups.
Many, such as the Kenya representatives, are in fact stud#nts in
Cairo whose education is being subsidized by the Egyptian authorities.
Few such "representatives.," however, have been repudiated
by the groups or countries they claimed to represent; and there
is a hazard that they may in course of time be considered;
"representatives approved by default".
One such self-designated representative who was openly
repudiated was Joseph Garang, native of the Southern Sudan.
He nevertheless went to Cairo and was officially listed as a
member of the Sudanese delegation, as a representative of the
Southern Liberal Party. Prior to his departure from Khartoum,
however, the secretary general of the Southern Liberal Pty-had
publicly disavowed him and announced that he represented no one
except himself--and the Communist Party, of which he has been a
member for some time. It is also interesting to note that he
was not included in the list of official Sudanese delegates
released in Khartoum by the allZ arty committee which chose the
official Sudanese delegation.
The caliber and character of most of the Black African
"representatives" is clearly revealed in the following items based
on official transcripts of representative speeches and statements:
a. John Kamwidhi (allegedly a student resident in
Cairo), self-styled "leader of the T{enya delegation," delivered
a strange parody of the American Declaration of Independence,
incorporating praise for such degenerate Mau Mau terrorists
as "Marshal" China, "Field Mar s . " Kimathi and "Marshal"
Mathenye, and repeated denuncia ons of the British security
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practices. He also described Kenya political organizations,
identifying Mr. Arquings Khodek as president of the Nairobi
District African National Congress, "the only strong body,"
and listed as three other "repressed" bodies,, the North,
Central, and South Nyanza African Associations.
b. A Nigerian delegate (speaking in the subcommittee on
imperialism on the question of choosing a president for
the committee): "I propose we elect alternatively different
presidents from Africa and Asia."
Chairman ro teme "This is not very clear; if I understand
Properly, everyone would become president."
c. The spokesman for the Chad delegation aroused
considerable apprehension at the Conference when he called
for the provision of arms to a United African Army" which,
he said, would then carry out the war to eliminate colonial
oppression.
There is, however, evidence which suggests that considerable
effort was expended without success by the Egyptians in attempts
to bring more competent and impressive delegates from Black Africa
to the Conference. Invitations were conveyed to such prominent
personalities as Tom Nboya of Kenya, Julius Nyerere of Tanganyikaj,
and Diallo Seydou of French West Africa, but all of them failed to
attend. It seems Likely that their non-appearance resulted either
from their own lack of enthusiasm or, more significantly, from the
disfavor with which'their organizations viewed the gathering. Other
figures from East Africa, according to Egyptian broadcasts, allegedly
received clandestine invitations and offers of aid for clandestine
travel to Cairo via the Sudan. But in spite of such "opportunities"
to evade the travel restrictions certain to be imposed by colonial
administrations, virtually all East African invitees appeared to
find it less compromising and politically more profitable to follow
the normal procedures of applying for passports and official
permission to travel, knowing full well that permission would be
denied. These executive actions they- -and the Egyptian radio
as well--have since exploited in post-Conference propaganda. This
course was adopted by a five-man delegation from Zanzibar, three
men from Kenya, and two from Tanganyika.
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Communist participation from Black Africa was in fact very
limited; but this fact may have been the outgrowth of local
political problems with which these elements are currently
concerned..
Perhaps the most interesting and enlightening reaction to
the Conference by the Communist-oriented elements in Black
Africa was the treatment given the Conference in the 27 December
issue of the South African New Age weekly. A factual and generally
favorable half page story concerning the opening of the Conference
was published side by side with a reprint of the manifesto issued
by the Egyptian Communist Party in July 1957, which was published
at that time by Humanite and Unites the newspapers of the Communist
Parties of France and Italy. 3 ffi manifesto, which states clearly
(for a Communist audience, at least) the reservations and limits
conditioning Communist endorsement of the Nasser regime, seems
likely to have been published in this way to aid the Communist
reader to understand the true character and significance of the
Conference and the cautious enthusiasm with which the paper treated
the event. The 8 December issue of CP India=s New + used precisely
the same device., printing the manifesto on one page along with a
CP Egypt criticism of Nasser's domestic policy; a report concerning
the Cairo Conference was on the adjacent page.
in spite of the existence of significant Communist-oriented
elements among the nationalist groups in French Equatorial and
West Africa, and the issuance of invitations to local affiliates
of the World Peace Council, their participation at Cairo was
minimal. Travel difficulties alone cannot be held responsible,
for paid passages were made available by the Secretariat of the
Conference, and Communist student and trade union personalities
from the area have usually managed in the past to overcome this
obstacle when the event was considered important. But a number
of Black African Communists decided to forego attending even
such major activities as the Vlth World Youth Festival in
Moscow and the WETU Congress in Leipzig in 1957 to avoid ex-
posing themselves to local denunciation. On the basis of'informa-
tion gleaned earlier in 1957 it is also considered likely that
this most mature component of Communism in Black Africa is well-aware
of the fact that many non-Communist and anti-Communist nationalists,
as a result of their experiences with Arab residents in their
own countries, also find. Egyptian pan-Arabism and expansionism
distasteful. It is also likely that some Communists share this
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attitude and do not yet fully understand and/or enthusiastically
accept the Soviet-inspired strategy of collaboration with
Nasser-Arab nationalism in advancing the anti-colonial struggle
in Africa. This general problem is reflected in the speech
delivered by Firmin Joseph Abalo, delegate from Togo, which
reflects this attitude of Central African nationalists:
"There is finally a problem which should not escape
us, and with which Central Africa will request that the
Conference concern itself,, to try to find possible solutions.
It is the attitude of the Syro-Lebanese.
"You no doubt know (at least the Central African
delegations) that Syrian and Lebanese citizens are engaged
in commerce in our countries. Their behavior toward
the local population is like that of the European colonialists,
and they are in general allied with them to exploit our
people. On the political level as well they side with
the imperialists.
"Our masses have difficulty understanding us when we
explain to them that all the countries of Africa and Asia--
including the Syrians and Lebanese in consequence--are
united in the same struggle for their liberation from
imperialist domination. These masses, we say, cannot
understand how their Asian friends continue to fight
against us in the camp of our aggressors."
There is in fact no reason to believe that in its choice of
.means of influencing Africa the USSR and International Communism
are placing undue emphasis and reliance upon the Afro Asian
Solidarity organization and support for Nasser's aspirations. Trade
union and youth groups throughout Africa have long been cultivated
directly, and the problems attendant upon simultaneously exploit-
ing African nationalism and strengthening Communise in Black
Africa have already been recognized within the International
Movement. An article by A. Zussmanovich, published in August 1957
in the second issue of the new Soviet academic publication on
Afro-Asia.. Contemporary East sheds light on this aspect of the
Soviet attitude toward Africa. While it grants that "at the
present stage of development the liberation movement in the
African colonies is headed by the national bourgeoisie," the
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main emphasis in the article is on the developing strength of
trade unionism and the need to integrate that strength into
the anti-colonial effort.
"The African working class must clash with the colonizers
because the basic enterprises using hired labor belong
to foreign corporations. Therefore the struggle of the
working class is becoming an integral part of the all-
People, national, anti-imperialist movement."
This "assessment" is clearly not a new one; but in the past
it has been largely restricted to trade union circles. Ftirom
the abundant proof that an intensive campaign has been carried
out by the WELJ and its African offshoots since 1955 to involve
non-Communist African trade unionists in united front arrangements
at the national level two conclusions emerge.
(a) The USSR. continues to place high priority on
establishing Communist domination of African trade unions
as the main instrument for influencing and dominating the
national liberation effort in the area.
(b) Because the efforts made between 19+6 and 1955 to
pull African labor bodies directly into the Communist camp
by working through Communist trade union bodies in the
mother countries have largely failed, the current intent
is to exploit unity of action in economic struggle against
colonialism at the looal and national level as a different
route to the same end.
Communist-dominated African unions have in fact been, permitted
to disaffiliate from the WAV, as a tactical measure only in order
to make their unity proposals more palatable locally., and they have
been accepted in some national and regional bodies as a result.
But their ability to exploit these gains is limited as long as the
trade unions do not become (a) involved in violent conflict
with local government, (b) identified with the extremist elements
of the national liberation movement, and/or (c) combined in
broader regional bodies and thus open to Communist exploitation of
the opportunity to manipulate their organizational skills, common
perspective, and parallel lines of coordination and direction
which operate through the International Communist Movement.
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The Afro-Asian solidarity strategy is obviously viewed
as a means of encouraging and controlling this rapprochement,
while keeping the nature and extent of the Communist influence
in the process concealed. But the holding of the Cairo Conference
and the establishment of the Council and Secretariat are by no
means adequate organizational measures in themselves.
Other measures are being taken. These measures appear likely
to involve the assumption by the Communist arty of the Sudan
and its cadres of an important task--that of becoming a bridge,
intermediary, buffer, and source of support, between the pro-
Communist movement in the Arab World and at least some of the
national liberation forces of Black Africa. A post-Conference
speech by a leading Sudanese Communist broadcast from Cairo to
the Sudan deals with this extremely significant question:
Broadcast Interview with Dr. Izz l Din Amir, Secretary of the
Sudanese Delegation to the Afro Asian Solidarity Conference
29 December 195'
"The AASC is an extension of the Bandung Conference of
1955. . . . The present Conference represents a bigger force as
it represents the people. . . . The Conference is of greater
importance to the African countries whose case has not been
considered on an international level. There are several African
nations struggling for independence, the peoples of the Cameroons,
Tanganyika, Uganda, and others . . . . The leaders of the peoples
represented after reaching an understanding can exert pressure
upon their governments so as to present a united front in the
United Nations, thus forming an international bloc which may save
the world from the dangers of war."
Sue stion: "What is the role to be played in the Conference
by the Sudanese delegation?"
Answer: "The Sudan by its awn geographicssl,, and political
position constitutes a bridge between the Middle East and the
Arab League on the one band, and the heart of Africa which
is still under the yoke of imperialism, on the other. The
Sudan should be spokesman of the African nations which are waging
a bitter struggle against imperialism. Furtheznorej,, it has its
role which it must play in the support of the Arab cause .
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and the Arab liberation trends led by Egypt and Syria. The Sudan
as a newly independent and an uncommitted country is more
capable of acting than some other Arab or African countries which
have joined certain alliances.
"The Sudan did not achieve independence until two years ago. . .
However, in spite of the short period available,, the Sudan has
made important contacts with the African countries. The latest
example is that of the Canteroons. The Sudan was able to reach
some liberation.movements in Tanganyika and Uganda. It also
worked to facilitate the travel of some of these countries'
delegations to Cairo to attend the present Conference. .. .
There are several close links between the Sudan's cause and that
of the African countries. The Sudan had experience with
imperialism. The methods used by the imperialists in Tanganyika
or in Uganda are very similar to those used in southern Sudan
to isolate it, and to keep it in a primitive state. .
The Afro Asian countries should take action against this European
common market or the alleged free trade area."
Key figures among the Communist-influenced African nationalists,
such as Felix Moumie, are now active in Khartoum as well as Cairo.
There is evidence of cooperation between Sudanese Communists
and Egyptians in attempts to bring people to the Conference
clandestinely from Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and other central
African territories. These factors increase the likelihood that
the Sudan will in fact fill the role outlined above. FLu thee,
the ability of the Communist movement to coordinate Black African
activities of the international fronts with those of the Afro-
Asian Solidarity Council is enhanced by the introduction of
Sudanese nationals into leading positions in the executive bodies
and secretariats of.most of the major international fronts.
Some post-Conference broadcasts from Cairo to Black frica
strongly suggested that the Egyptians at least were sensitive to
the possibility that their appeal to Black Africa was being
adversely affected by charges that the Conference was Communist-
Inspired and dominated. They have tried to refute these charges
by pointing out the contradictions between the repressive measures
generally taken by Communist governments and the demands for
freedom of speech, assembly, etc., for which the Conference called
.in its resolutions.
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TREATMENT of JEE CQxyzI' G2 W W SOVIET BLOC
it was apparent as the Conference conve
d t
ne
hat the countries
of the Soviet bloc were eager to exploit it as a topic for
domestic propaganda as well as for foreign output. Such domestic
Propaganda efforts have in the past been made in connection
with the activities of the international Communist fronts, but with
the Possible exception of the VIth world youth Festival no single
such event.has in past years received as extensive and enthusiastic
treatment by both the USSR and China.
The processing for Chinese audiences was noteworthy for the
following reasons:
a?. Delegates upon their return to China inflated the
statistics concerning attendance.* Kuo Mo-jo on 9 February
said to a 1, 500-man Peiping rally that 508 delegates
representing fifty Afro-Asian countries were present
(actual participation was forty-three countries).
b. The Conference was described to Chinese audiences,
who were already fmail.iar with the 1955 Banding Conference,
as "a continuation and development of the Bandung Conference,"
reunity (reached) at a higher level," and as having produced
a common program of action." This line was echoed by the
Japanese CP and, by Soviet broadcasts in Japaneseo
c. The resolutions of the Conference were represented
as "a powerful support to the Peace Manifesto of the sixty-
four Communist and Workers' Parties at Moscow." This
line was again echoed, by the Japanese CP and replayed by
Moscow in Japanese.
d. The theme most insistently reiterated was that the
Conference represented "two-thirds of the people of the
earth ; "more than one billion, 600 million people"; the
slogan "The Wind Blows From the East" was hammered in press
and radio treatments. This thesis the USSR also propagated.,
e. To heighten the impression of the strength and
determination of the Black African participants, the Chinese
also published and broadcast dramatic (but false) stories
concerning delegates travelling to Cairo on foot from
Black Africa.
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f; China also placed considerable emphasis upon evidence
of her close rapprochemeit with Egypt. New China Egypt
and Egypt-China Friendship Societies launched simultaneously
in both countries in January 1958, were limned with the
Conference in, propaganda output.
In general, the primary Chinese emphasis was directed at
demonstrating, even through direct falsification, the strength
and vitality of the Afro Asian response to the Solidarity Conference.
Even Free World commentaries which, while generally unfavorable
to the Conference, stated that the event had to be taken
seriously were quoted extensively to Bloc audiences to prove
this thesis. The Chinese also were more ready to acknowledge the
relg!tionship of the Conference to the future of Communist parties
throughout Africa and Asia, and less interested in highlighting
the Moslem-Arab role in the Conference.
Treatment for Soviet Audiences
Moscow's treatment of the Conference differed in emphasis
from that of the Chinese. Although it too emphasized the weight
and size of the forces allegedly represented., and predicted that
"the weapon of solidarity will be used even more frequently in the
struggle of the peoples of Asia and Africa" (Leontyev, Soviet
Home Service, 2 February 1958)= it emphasized even more the
following themes:
a. The peoples of Afro Asia have become convinced
that the USSR is the true friend, mighty ally.
b. The West was stunned, confused, and alarme
the Conference.
by
c. The "slandering" by the West of the Conference
as Communist-inspired and dominated has failed to impress
the Afro-Asian countries.
d. New plots and countermeasures are being drummed
up to counter the effects of the Conference.
e. The "colonialist64" attempts to prevent delegates
from attending the Conference failed.
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The Soviet domestic treatment placed emphasis upon the value
of the Conference as an aid to the campaign for peace and in-
corporated the Conference in its ever-growing list of targets for
future "imperialist plots." It also showed the higher level of
Soviet sensitivity to the exposure of the Communist inspiration
and domination of the Conference and its concern over the reactions
of Afro-Asian overrnents which it so assiduously seeks to cultivate.
The USSR also publlicize- -the Conference resolutions on the rights
of the Palestine Arabs and concentrated, 'more than China did.,
upon the extent of Moslem participation in the gathering.
One broadcast on the Soviet Home Service, made during the
period of greatest concentration on the Conference, is of particular
interest. In this broadcast the speaker, Eugene Gusarov, placed
his emphasis upon a description of the extent to which "the young
African proletariat has entered.the path of the national libera-
tion movement." Statistics on the growth of the trade union
.movement in Nigeria and. French West Africa were presented; Nigeria,
the Cameroons, and Kenya were the main territories credited with
"significant advances" and described as the scenes of the "severest
struggles".
The broadcast strongly suggests that it is to these countries
and this proletariat that the USSR looks for the organization
and, leadership of effective national liberation movements in the
area, but it is noteworthy that there was virtually no representa-
tion of this "African proletariat" at Cairo.
Perhaps the most Interesting fact concerning the propaganda
treatment was the virtually complete omission, from both the
Soviet and Chinese early domestic output, of any extensive des-
cription of the Soviet delegate Arzumaniy nas suggestions to the
Afro Asian countries about the organization of their domestic
economic programs. Both treat his description of the extent
and disinterested nature of Soviet aid., his description of the
evils attendant upon acceptance of Western imperialist aid, and
his endorsement of nationalization of foreign enterprise as a source
of capital. His blueprint for effective economic development was
finally reported at some length in the Soviet journal Contemporary
East in loch 1958. ---?'
Another fact worthy of note was the extent to which the
Soviet outlets quoted, as the authoritative voice of the Egyptian hosts
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on key questions, statements and interviews with Khalid Makhi-
al-Din, the leading Egyptian Communist active at the Conference,
and other Egyptians closely associated with him, such as the
Foreign Editor of his newspaper, Al Masaa and Yussuf Hi].mi of
the Egyptian Peace Partisans. Mukhi' -al-din's address on imperial-
ism was reported at length in the Russian language magazine,
Contemporary East, in March 1958.
The USSR also insured the widest distribution possible of the
resolutions adopted at the Conference by issuing a special supple-
ment containing all the resolutions as an enclosure to issue No. 3
(16 January 1958) of its publication New Times.
Polish output concerning the gathering was limited, but it
did contribute two special notes:
a. It acknowledged the existence of "differences
separating Afro-Asian countries," and "serious obstacles
to the convening of a second official Conference of the
countries of Afro Asia."
b. It characterized the resolutions as "condemnation
of the opportunism of some Afro Asian countries which show
a lack of consistency in their statements in the interna-
tional area."
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APPENDIX I
KEY NON BLOC PERSONALITIES ATTENDING
TEE AFRO ASIAN CONFERENCE
Note: This list identif ies$ by country., those delegates from
non BSoc countries who are of particular interest because of their
past activities in or association with Soviet and/or Communist
activities. The numbers following their names indicate their
classification as follows:
(i) Suspect Soviet collaborators
(2) Communist Party members
(3) Crypto-Communists
(4+) Fellow-travellers and sympathizers.
DAN Tokusaburo - (l); (2); General Secretary of the Japan Asian
Solidarity Committee; Japan Peace Council; World
Peace Council.
NAGASHIMA Masao - (2); President of the Organ Papers News Agency.
HOMO Shin - (2).
LAMA Itoko - (2).
YAMADA Chokichi - (3)
OGATA Shoji - (3); member Japan Peace Council.
HATANAKA Masaharu - (3); journalist.
ABE Masao - (2); Japan Asian Solidarity Committee; interpreter.
KAI Shizuma - (4+); Middle East expert and adviser; interpreter.
YA I Kaoru - (4); Director General of Japan Council Against
Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs
M of inc tided on official Afro Asian Solidarity Conference Secretariat
lists of delegates, but otherwiit-reported attending.
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SONODA Sunao - (4); Member of Parliament; vice-chairman of Afro
Asian Solidarity Conference Preparatory Committee.
YOSHINJRA Hiroyuke - (4); Japan Teachers' Union functionary ($OHYO
affiliate); pro-Communist., liaison to Peace
Movement; advocate Afro-Asian trade union
conference.
Sudan
Izz-al-Diu 'Ali A}CR - (2); Anti Imperialist Front.
Joseph GARANN - (2); lawyer in Sulayman's employ; Southern
Liberal Party member.
Abd,-al Majid 'Muhammad ABU-HASABU - (2); may be an "ez-Communi$t";
"ousted by Communists as member of Executive
Committee of Graduates Union in 1954.
syd Hasan HAM (2); self-professed former Communist] leftist;
now member of National Liberation Party.
Ahmad SULAYMAI - (1); (2); key Party leader; lawyer; member of Inter-
national Association of Democratic Lawyers (ZADL).
*Abd-al-Majib Abd-al
- (2); lawyer; partner of S69LA.
Abdullah RAJAB - (4); editor of CP newspaper Via.
All Muhammad EMAM - (2); lawyer.
El Sayed Abd-al RAID - (4); Minister of Interior.
hammed Uthman MAB - (4); Sudanese Russian Friendship Society;
brother of Secretary General Sudan CP.
Abdullah UBAYD - (1)j (2); also reported to be Egyptian and 3ug091aV agent-
0 f inc udec on official Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference Secretariat
1i5ts of delegates; but otherwise reported attending.
msted as delegate in official Secretariat document; attended,
but not official member of delegation as originally constituted.
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apt
Khalid MMM-AL-DIN - (2)j Editor.. al-Masaa, alleged prospective
Secretary General of unified Egyptian
Communist Party.
Note: Not named in the final official list of delegates.. although
he chaired the subcommittee on imperialism.
Zakariya Lutfi G?MAA - (1); probably (2); member Egyptian National
Assembly; Conference "advance man" to Africa.
Muhammad HANAFI - (4); Peace Partisan; Conference "advance man" to
Par East.
Lutfi AL-i fl I - (2); Peace Partisan; journalist, al-Masaa.
Louis AWAD - (2); journalist, Sib.
d MI-AL-DIN - probably (2); physician.
IbrahimiRASH/D - probably (2); (4); Peace Partisan; former Under
Secretary of State.
Fathi F L - (4); labor leader; attended W'TIU Congress, Leipzig;
associate'of Chinese and Soviet labor leaders; advocate
of Afro Asia Labor Conference.
Salsh ABD-AL-HAFIZ - (4?); attended IADL meeting., Italy.. May 1957;
Afro Asian Lawyers' Conference, Damascus,
November 1957; IADL meeting, Moscow, November
1957.
Mahmoud AL-HINAWI - (4);. attended IADL meeting, Italy, May 1957;
Afro Asian Lawyers' Conference., Damascus,
November 1957; IADL meeting, Moscow, November 1957`
Note a Fifty-Five other persons were members of the Egyptian Afro-
Asian Solidarity Committee. Of twenty-nine identified on
this committee, ten are known or probable Communists.
Cot
Eva RAN Ai , - (2); secretary of delegation.
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Ceylon (Cont'd)
K. L. V. ALAGIYAWANNA - (4); teacher; leader of delegation.
Ian VAH ERDRIESEN - (2); lecturer at University of Ceylon.
Indonesia
4Bintang SURADI - probably (1), (2); leftist writer; on editorial
board of PKI publication; wife;- member PKI women's
front.
StkROSO - (4); Secretary General Indonesian Peace Committee.
Siradjudd.in ABBAS - (4); Deputy Chairman of Indonesian Peace
Committee.
Mohammad PADANG - (2); Peace Partisan.
Syria
Mustafa AM IN - (2); Secretary General Syrian Peace Committee;
member of Central Committee CP Syria.
Nasim EL MOUSLI (MUSALI) - (2); professor; Peace Partisan; attended
Conference for Relaxation International
Tensions, New Delhi, 1955.
Fakhir ALAQIL - (4); professor at university; attended Conference
for Relaxation of International Tensions.
Ihsan EL-JABRI - (4).
Miss A,ma] JAZAIRI - (4); Syria-USSR Cultural Committee. President,
Arab Women's Federation.
Fouad KA1I - (4).
Mohammed Kheir FARES - (2).
Mustafa BADAOUI - (4); Peace Partisan.
*Late arrival-not shown in official list, but actually present.
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$y is (Cont'd)
Mania' DAW'ALIBI - (4); former Minister; has participated in several
WPC-sponsored conferences., including Conference for
Relaxation of International Tensions.
Zafir AL-Win All BUZU
Peace Partisan; Kurd; Deputy and ex-Minister.
Hussein MU D Member of Parliament; has visited Moscow;
attended Conference for Relaxation of International
Tensions (1954).
Georges HAMA - (4); President of Lebanese Peace Committee.
All J'ABER - (2).
140 hammed ELI TAB - (2); Peace Partisan; lawyer.
4Hussein SEJ''ANE - (1); Peace Partisan.
Raif KI (2); writer.
Salah EL-ASIR - (4+); writer and poet.
Emile EL HAYEK - (2)..
Jibran MAJDALANI - (4); Peace Partisan.
Dr. All sAAD - (4+); Peace Partisan.
Iussayn MRUWWAH - (4); Peace Partisan.
India
Mrs. Rameshwari NENRCJ - (4); Peace Partisan; President-of Indo-
Soviet Cultural Society; president of Indian Asian Solidarity
Committee; leader of delegation.
*Not included obi official.'Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference
Secretariat: lists; :".but otherwise.: reported 'attending.
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India (Cont'd)
Dr. Anup SINGIi - (4); Vice Chairman of Indian Asian Solidarity
Committee; Peace Partisan.
A. K. GOPALAN - (2); Member of Parliament and Politburos CP India.
V. K. DHAGE - (1.); Member of Parliament; in 1953 Vice President
of Friends of Soviet Union, Hyderabad.
M. K(LIMTLLAH (4); member of secretariat of Indian Association
for Asian Solidarity.
Mrs. Perin CHAIRA - (2); member of Secretariat of Indian Association
for Asian Solidarity; wife of member of Central
Committee of CPI; Peace Partisan.
Romesh CHANDRA - (2); .member Central Committee, CPI.
U Thein Pe MYINT - (l+); Member of Parliament; confirmed Communist
liner on international issues.
U Hla GYAW - (4+); Secretary of Burmese Asian Solidarity Committee.
U Khin NYUNT - (4); leftist student leader; recently delegate to
WFDY Conference, Kiev; Joint Secretary of Burmese
Asian Solidarity Committee.
Cameroons
Felix R. MCUIIE - (4); Peace Partisan.
Mme. Marthe EKEMEYONG - (4+); Chief Editor of publication oi' Democratic
Union of Cameroon Women (WIDF affiliate).
Mme. Marthe EDIIG - (4); Joint Secretary General of Democratic Union
of Cameroon Women.
Ira
Abd-al-Wahab MAHMOUD - (4); ex-Minister.
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(Conttd)
Qasim F ASSAN - (4); lawyer.
Aziz S IF - (2); journalist; lawyer; resident in Syria; leading
Iraqi Peace Partisan; close associate of Ihalid.Bakdash.
Hussein GL - (4); ex -minister.
Abdul YASRY lawyer; Peace Partisan.
Jordan
Youssef al BA AK - (4).
Fouad (2); leader of CP Jordan.
Yehys KAI'' O A (4+); secretary of Jordan Solidarity Cor tttee.
Zeidan YCU1IS - (.); labor leader.
Abdel RWlman SIOUIEIR - (2).
remit
Ahmed al-KHATTIB - (4).
Abmad Omar al-AEiARi - (.); attended VI World Youth Festival, Moscow.
French Sudan
Diallo ALIOU (4); Vice President of (French) Sudanese Peace
Committee.
Scow ABDOAY - (I+); Vice President of (French) Sudanese Peace
Committee.
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APPENDIX II
IO;Y BLOC PERSONALITIES AMMINO
THE O-ASIAN CONFERENCE, CAIRO
Note: This list identifies delegates from the countries
of the Soviet bloc.
USSR
1. Rashidov, Sharaf Rahidovich - Chairman of Presidium of Uzbek
Supreme Soviet; Deputy Chairman, Supreme Soviet Presidium.
2. Mirzo, Tursun Zade - Chairman, Tadzhik Republic Peace Committee;
Chairman of Board of Union of Soviet Writers of Tadzhikistan.
3. Sofronov, Anatoly Vladimirovich - Chief editor of newspaper,
Ogonek.
4+. Abasov, Kurban Abas-Kuliogli - Member Central Committeeof Oil
Workers Union; Deputy to Supreme Soviet.
5. Azimov, Pigan Azimovich - Rector of University of Turkmenistan;;
Deputy to Supreme Soviet of Turkmenistan; Deputy to Supreme Soviet
of Turkmen, SSR.
6. Aldabergenov, Nurmolda
7. Arzumanyan, Apushavan Agafonovich Director of Economic Institute
of Academy of Sciences; member of staff of Problems of Economics.
8. Babakhanov, Ziyautdin - Chairman of Religious Board of Moslems
of Middle Asia and Kazakhstan.
9. Bultrikov, Balzham
10. Bazanov, Nikolai Ivanovich - possible corresponding member of
USSR Academy of Sciences.
11. Zhukov, Yevgeny Mikhailovich - Director of Pacific Institute;
Deputy Director of Institute of History; corresponding member of
USSR Academy of Sciences.
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12. Zulfeija
13. Ioen jebayev,. Salibakas
14+. Kote v, . l ivanovich - Secretary of Soviet Peace Committee;
suspect member of CPSU Foreign Section.
15. N tazayev,, Kay=
16. Novgorods yr, Turi Vladimirovich - Assistant Responsible Secretary
of Soviet-Asian Solidarity Committee.
Korea
17. Han SulTa - President, North Korean Association of Writers;
rmans, Norte Korean Peace Committee.
18. Ju Chang Zoom Vice , Chairman, Korean Society for Cultural
Relations with Foreign Countries.
19. Do Yoo Ho - Director of Institute of Archeology and Ethnography
of Academy of Sciences IflPR.
20. Whang Boung Koo
Mongolian Peo21e'
21.
Shirin rb
22.
Ochir Dwdfndakje
23.
Amga nin Ziubsandendel
24.
Pinata
n Iseren lsvodal
25.
Vandang
n.
Chinese Pe_ le's Republic
26. o Mb Jo - Vice President of World Peace Council (WPC).
27. Burhan Sh a.idi Member of WPC Bureat ; President of China-
Islamic Association.
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Chinese People's Republic (Cont'd)
28. Chu Tu-Nan - Chairman, Chinese People's Association for Cultural
Relations with Foreign Countries; member of World Peace Council.
29. Liu Ning-Yi - Member WPC Bureau; Vice President of WFIU;
Vice President, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; Vice President,
All-China Federation of Trade Unions; member of CPIT.
30. Chang Jui Fang
31. Chao Pa-Chu
32. Cheng Sheng Yu - Secretary of WPC; members Executive Committee
of International Institute for Peace; Joint General Secretaryof
Chinese Asian Solidarity Committee.
33. Chi Chao-Ting - Attended WPC .meeting, Colombo; head of
Economic and Technical delegation to West Europe.
34. Chin Chung -Rua
35. Chu Tzu-Chi - Attended WPC .meeting, Colombo.
36. Han Yu-Tung
37. Hsieh Ping Hsin
38. Liu Liang-Mo
39. Muhammad Maiden
40. Majnour
41. Sheikh Nur Mohammed
42. Tang Ming-Chao - Member Chinese People's Association fog!
Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; attended WPC meeting,
Colombo.
43- Tleng Huang
4+. Tung Hsin
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45. Wang X ng-Ving
46. Wu Han - Member. Central Committee of China Democratic League;
member of Budget Committee of WPC.
47. Yang YU
48. Yang Chung-sung
Viet Nam
49, Dr. Xuan Thus .
50. Bui Thai Cam
51. Tran Van Luau
52. Nguyen Xuan .LYE an
53. Nguyen Viem Hai
54o Do Xuan Oanh
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APPENDIX III
OFFICIAL LIST OF DELEGATES
The list given below is the final official list of
delegates issued by the Secretariat of the Cairo Conference.,
Names have not been corrected, but are reported as given
in the official list.
El Bahrain Delegation
Mr. Nasser El Said
Mr. Youssif El Rois
Algerian Delegation
Dr. Mohamed Al Amin
Mr. Ahmed Tawfic El Madani..
Mr. Yousseff Ben Kada
Mr. Ahmed Ben Katat
Mr. Saari Dahiab
Mr. Mohamed Ben Yaiia
Mr. Mostafa Ben Mohamed
Mr. Mohamed Jai Hamo
Mr. Mohamed El Habra
Mr. Nafea Ralati
Sheikh Hamed Rouehia
Mr. El Arabi Damaa El Atrous
Mr. Moustafa El Akhal
Mr. Ibrahim Rffah
Mr. Abou Raghida Ismail
Mr. Ibrahim Abou El Akram
Mr. Ayat Hassan
Shekh Omar Dardour
Burma Delegation
Mr. Uthein Fe Myint
Mr. Uhla Gyaw
Mr. Thakin Kyaw Sein
Mr. Unyars Na
Mr. Ko Khin Nyunt
Dr. Than Tun
Ceylon Delegation
Mr. K.L.F. Ala Gounana
Dr. J. H. Faden Drisen
Miss Eva Rata Wera
Mrs. Kukilan Sbiah
Mr. B. Z. Sarofoudin
Mr. A.A.N. Fernando
Chinese Delegation
Mr. Kuo Mo Jo
Mr. Burhan Shahidi
Mr. Chu Tu-Nan
Mr. Liu Ning Yi
Mme. Chang Jui-Fang
Mr? Chao Pu-Chu
Mr. Cheng ShengYu
Mr. Chi Chao-Ting
Mr. Chin Chung-Hua
Mr. Chu Tzu-Chi
Mme. Han Yu-Tung
Mme, Hsieh Ping Hsin
Mr. Liu Liang-Mo
Mr. Muhammed Malden
Mme. Majnour
Sheikh Nur Mohammed
Mr. Tang Ming-Chao
Mr. Teng Kuang
Mr. Tung Hsin
Mr. Wang Kuang-Ving
Mr. Wu Han
Mr. Yang Yu
Mr. Yang Chung-Sung
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Korean Democratic
India Dele m
Re,nblf Delegation
gat o::~ (Con dj
W. H Sul Ya
Mr?. Singh Tirlok
Mr. 7u Chang 76on
Mr. Malik Choudhury
Mr. Do !oo No
Mr. Chat er jee Kali Kama
Mr. hang Bourg Koo
Mr. E. Ottukar
W. Reddy Govenda ikangi
Cyprus Delegation
^. Goo2.aiar Ayilliath
Mr. Wowkavi Saishin Jaganinvas
Mr. Bavvas Soiiides
Mr. Tivedi Vaikunthrai
Mr. I. Pisses
Mr . DhI
Ve at as
Pk,. Cl.Pa el inos
y,
'?s. . eh ' .i, bai
Mr. S. ~-g .3 atsa].idis
Mr. V. Ca,vattis
Mrs. aupta Prehl_ata
Miss A. Nocolaidis
'sasia, Jelegatim
Et? io'La Delegation
Mr. A ww 2 jokroam-inoto
Mr. Rastid fad, oemas
Mrs. Testa Luli
W. Mohamd Padan
Mr. Marsi abe
W. H. Siradjuddin Abbas
?. Dasta Hild
Nor. Sunito
Mr. ltod A.
*r. H. Mikasha
Mai'.odjjo
Mr. A. Gimbir
l ?a~ Delegatioin
Ghana Delegation
Dr. Mohamed Hacleed
Mr. Mohamed Sadeed Shinshel
Mr. Amoa Awnah
Mr. Abdel Wahab Mohamoud
Mr. Bediako Poka
Nr. Karim Hassan
Mr. ?
bel Dove
Mr, Fit El Samirai
,~
Mr. C. A. Duncan
M?. ,no Amin El Rahmani
Mr. D. D. Duncan
Mr. a deb El Ea j Mahmoud
Mr. ? .sh ushtsik
India LDelegatibn
W. Abdel Wahab El Beani
lMr. Abdel Mhaheed, El Yasry
Mrs. Ra shw i Nehru
Mw. El Sheikh Ahmed El Gaza ^i
Mr .lira Kalim-ullah Mohammed
Mr. Aziz Sherif
Mr. Malvia Chat= Nareir
?. .:=-:.ssein Gamll
Mr. Chandra Rossh
Mr. Gamil Amin
Miss Seg. Any
y~. Singh Amp
A?s..1.ande
Miss Dike
. Moussa Sabar
Mr. Adel El Yaw i
Mr. adri hmoud Ezzat
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Cameroon Delegation
Mr. F. R. Moumie
Mr. Kamen Sakeo
Mr. Ernest Ouandie
Mme. Marthe Ekemeyong
Mme. Marthe Eding
Mr. Sengat Kuo
Mr. Dicka Akwa
Mr. Shafik Arshidat
Mr. Abdailah El Rimawi
Mr. Youssif El Bandak
Mr. Saeed El Azza
Mr. Bakr Dirwaza
Mr. Ahmed Tawalbah
Mr. Ali Abu Nawar
Mr. Fouad Nassar
Mr. Yahya Hamouda
Mr. Odah Butros Odah
Mr. Nafiz Atout
Mr.' Zidan Younis
Dr. Abdel Rahman Shukayr
Kenya Delegation
Mr. Hassan Wanis
Mr. John Shawidi
Mr. George Siwida
Lebanon Delegation
Mr. Hussein El Eweini
Mr. Emile El Khoury
Mr. Aly El Bizzi
Mr. Monah El Solh
Mr. Jubran El Majdalani
Mr. Rashid Karame
Mr. Ahmed El Assaad
Mr. Kamel Junbulat
Mr. Maarouf Saad
Mr. Shafik Mourtada
M. Takey El Din El Solh
Lebanon Dele-
gation (Cont'd)
Mr. Kamel El Assaad
Mr. Nasim Majdalani
Mr. Hashem El Husseini
Mr. Fouad El Burt
Mr. Mohamed Takey El Din
Mr. Fouad Ammoun
Mr. Aly Gaber
Mr. George Hanna
Mr. Abdel Maguid El Rafei
Mr. Mohammed Khatab
Mr. Adnan El Hakeem
Mr. Hussein Sagaan
Mr. Raaif Khoury
Mr. Salah El Aseer
Mr. Abdalla El Liyafi
Mr. Emil El Hayik
Mrs. Hissim Maddalani
Mrs. Hashim El Hossieni
Mrs. Adnan E1 Hakim
Laos Delegation
Mr. Ouvoravona
Mr. Sokamitot
Bong Souvana Fong
Shamba Foumashan
Kamoul Femfong
Libya Delegation
Mr. El Zaglaei
Mr. Mohamed Koushier Elfirgani
Mr. Bashir El Moughrabi
Mr. Mahmoud Sobhi
Mr. Moustapha Ben Amer
Madagascar Delegation
Mr. Prof. Rajaofera Maurice
Miss Gizelle Rabesahala
Mr. Rajawinson J.
Mr. Jaozandry Joseph
Mr. Razanat Seheno Henry
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Sudan Delegation
:Cont'd
Mr. Sadek Abdallah
Abdel Maguid
Mr. Abdallah Abdel
Rahman
Mr. Ahmed Soliman
Mr. El Fateh El Badr
W. Abdallah Ragab
Mr. Abdel Maged Abou Hasbo
Mr. Mahgoub Osman
Mr. Mirghani El Nasrah
Mr. Abou El Maali Abdel
Rahman
Mr. Youssef Mourafik
Mr. Aly Mohamed Ibrahim
Mr. Ahmed Zeen El Abdine
Mr. Abdallah Obied
Sudan Delegation (French)
Mr. Diallo Aliou
Ir. Sava Abdallah
Syria Delegation
Mr. Ihsan El Gabri
Mr. Fakher Akel
Mr. Maarouf El Dawalibi
Mr. Mounir Shouri
Mr. Nazim El Mosalli
Mr. Moustaph Amin
Mr.. Michel Aflak
Mr. Abdel Karim Zouhour
Mr. Hussein Marud
W. Aly Bouzo
Mr. Hassan Marud
Miss Amal Gazaeiri
Mr. Zafer El Kassemi
W. Fouad Kadri
Mr. Nehad Le Ghadri
Mr. Mahdi El Zaeim
Mr. Mohamed Kheir Fares
Mr. Gaber Omar
Mr. Moustapha Badawi
ee.
Thailand Delegation
Mr. Nay Dib Gonjogot
Mr. Sater Sofarat
Mr. Karim Maden
Mr. Bodurn Taban Sousout
Togoland Delegation
Mr. Abalo Joseph Firmay
Tunisia Delegation
Mr. & Mrs. All Balhavani
Mr. Mohamed Saleh Ben El Hag
Mr. Moaweiyah
Uganda Delegation
Mr. All Omar All
.
Mr. Abrahim Abdel Wahab
Mr. Ibrahim Lix
Mr. Mohamed Ismail Hood
Mr. Omar Youssef Saleh
Oman Delegation
Mr. Mohamed Amin
Mr. Faisal All
Mr. Mohamed El Harthi
Zanzibar Delegation
Mr. Zalikha Mahfouz
Mr. Ahmed Shad All
USSR Delegation
Rashidov Sharaf Rahidovich
Mirzo Tursun Zade
Soferonov Anatoly Vladimi-
rovich
Abasov Kurban Abas Kuliogli
Azimov Pigan Azimovich
Aldabergenov Nurmolda
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TYSSR Dele
ation (CoiartId
Arzumanyan A ushavan
Agafonovich
Babak'hanov Ziyautdin
Bultrikov Balzham.
Bazanov Nikolai Ivanovitch.
Zhukov Yevgeay Mikhailovich
Zulfeija
Kenjebayev Salibakas
Kotov Mil hail,- Ivanovich
Murtazayev Kayum
Novgorodsky Yuri
Vladi.mirovich
Viet Nam Delegation
Dr. Xuan Thu Amp
Bui Thai Cam:
Tran Van Juan
Nguyen Xuan Than
Nguyen Viem Hai
Do Xuan Oanh
Yemen Delegation
Mr. Hassan Ibrahim
lam. Ahsr d El Shamy
Mr. Mohamed El Mansour
I. Abdullah El Elawy
'. Saleh Mohsen
Mr. Abdul Tarim El Amir
?. Ahmed Saber
Mr. Ahmed. El Khazzan
E Mt Delegation
Mr. Anwar El Sacl.at'
Mr. Ihsan Abdel Kadous
M.r. Ihsan Abeid
Mr. Ahmed Alsani
. Ahmed Shawky
Dr. Ahmed Aly Hassan
Egypt Dele-
gation (Con
W. Ahmed Moukhtar Kotb
Mr. Ahmed Abdel Ghaffar
Mr. Ahmed Elaa El Dine
Mr. Ismail Azaah
?s? Amines Choukri
Ws. Cm Kalsoum
Mrs. Amina El Said
Mr. . Anwar Sal ma
Hassan Abbas Zaki
Helms Abdel Rahman
Ibrahim Rachad.
Hussein Fahmi
Hand Ammar
Dr. Dawlat Sadek
Rifaat Mahgoub
Dr. Ragab Fahmi.
W. Zakri.a ILoutfi Gomaa
W. Sallma Moussa
Soueileim El Eimari
Dr. Souheir El YjOamawi
Mrs. Siza Habarawi
Mr. Salah Abdel Hafez
Mr. Salah Abou Seif
Sabri Abou El Magd
Dr. Taha Hussein
Abdel Moeiz Nasr
Abdallah' El Arabi
Abdel Razek Hassan
All All Eilei,wa
Abdel Fattah Ismail
Abdellah' Zein El Abbidin
Aicha Abdel Ra inaan
Abdel Salam Cherif
Addl. Taher
Mrs. Aida Fahmi
Abdel ilek Allam
Abdel. Fader Hatem
Abdel Aziz Sadek
Abdel Ghhffar El Charkawi
Abdel Rahman El Rafei.
Ezzat Mohamed. Mohamed. Gheidan
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Egypt Dele-
gation (Cont'd)
Abdel Aziz Moustafa
Abdel Azim Chehata
Fouad Mohy El Dine
Ez El Dine Zou El Fokar
Mine. Faten Hamama
Fathi Kamel
Loutfi El Kholi
Loutfi Waked
Dr. Louis Awad
Dr. Moufida Abdel Rahman
Dr. Moustafa Mocharafa
Mr. Mohamed. All Kassem
Mr. Mohamed Fathi
Mohamed Chafik Ghorbal
Mohamed Hassanein Hekal
Mohamed Fathi El Sayed
Mohamed Zaghloul Hefni
Mohamed Mahmoud Nassar
Mariette Boutros Ghali
Mounir Hemaya
Mohamed Said El Eiryan
Mohamed Rouchdi
Mahmoud Younes
Mr. Mahmoud El Henewi
Mme. Nefissa El Ghamrawi
Naguib Mahfouz
Yehia Eweis
Dr. Yehia El Khachab
Mohamed Charaf
Kamal El Henewi
Dr. Abdel Razek Sedki
Mohamed Soliman El Zoheiri
Ahmed Talaat Mohamed Aziz
Dr. Ibrahim Ragab Fathi
Dr. Baligh Selim
Dr. All Eiweida
Dr. Mahmoud El Kaysouni
Mr. Youssef El Sebai
Yehia Haki
Japanese Delegation
Tokutaro Kitaatura
Choku Sonoda
Toshiwo Komoto
Osamu Inaba
Minoru Tachibana
Hiromi Nakamura
Jiro Muto
Kan Hideshima
Gtsuji Goto
Shigeyasu Sakata
Kaooru Yasui
Shoji Ogata
Tokusaburo Dan
Masaharu Hatanaka
Mrs. Yooko Nuida
Matao Nagashima
Kisuke Miyagoshi
Yoshihisa Kajotani
Tagao Koda
Tokubel Hanayagi
Toshikaju Sueda
Shoichi Shimada
Shigeru Tamura
Akira Yoshii
Takindo Makinouchi
Hirowo Miyagawa
Yuuzo Futagami
Shoichi Mano
Goro Takeshita
Jichi Higuchi
Hyosuke Kujiraoka
Matao Morimoto
Kazuo Miyata
Kohei Saito
Kenji Mimura
Lehide Kadowo
Chookichi Yamada
Tozo Ktada
Tokuwo Akiyama
Kiroyuki Yoshimura
Sanhichiro Miyakita
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Japanese Del.e
gation (Sow d)
Akira Sunabori
Takaton 1 Ichinose
Kenichi Kooyema
Sum Kuboyama
Giichiro Yr aiyama
Haim Sujiki
Kumitugu Yagi
Sinichi Okubo
Takio Nisikawax
Masao Abe
Kokichi Nakaiose
Sejoi Matuise
Tadasi Mijusaw
Tasuku Asano
Sima Kai
Toshio Akin ra
Tehiro Suitugu
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