THE PARTAI MURBA OF INDONESIA, A SPLINTER COMMUNIST PARTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000900270014-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 1998
• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE PARTAI MURBA OF INDONESIA,
A SPLINTER COMMUNIST PARTY
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The Partai Murba (Proletarian Party) in Indonesia was founded in
1948 by a former representative of the Communist International
(Comintern). The party, born during the political confusion of the
post-Japanese occupation period and nurtured by the extreme nationalist
sentiments during the anti-Dutch campaigns, never matured into a
full-fledged political body. Today, it remains one of the numerous
minor political parties in Indonesia. It has considerable influence,
however, in the top echelon of the Indonesian Government, far in excess
of its relative political size and stature.
There has been confusion as to whether or not the Partai Murba
is a Communist party. In the years since its formation the party
has been variously termed "Trotskyite party", "left-wing nationalist
party", "national Communist party", and "extreme nationalist party".
This disagreement in identifying the party's principal characteristic
exists both 'within Indonesia, among Indonesian. Government officials
and political leaders, and outside Indonesia, among non-Indonesian
observers. Apparently the confusion arose primarily at the time
the Partai Murba was founded, because of the Party's apparent syn-
thesis of Communism and nationalism, the absence of any specific
affiliation with the International Communist Movement, the existence
of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) as the identified arm of
the International Communist Movement, and the invective exchanged
between the Partai Murba and the PKI in those early days.
Within Indonesia the Partai Murba is not generally accepted or
known as a Communist party. There, it is generally accepted as
"left-wing nationalist", as another minor and poorly -organized
political party in the Indonesian political maelstrom.. This view
grants the Partai Murba a certain freedom of action and a flexibility
which are denied groups identified with the International Communist
Movement.
However, a review of the origin, policies, programs, and activi-
ties of the Partai Murba leads to the conclusion that it is a splinter
Communist party, based on the Communist philosophy, organized on
the Communist principles of organization, using Communist tactics,
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25X6F
III. Predecessor Parties of the Partai Murba
The exact date of TAN's return to Indonesia is unknown. He may
have returned as early as 1942, but certainly he was there in August.
1945 at the time the Indonesian proclamation of independence. was
issued. Specific information about TAN's exile--where he went,
what he did--is unknown. It is known that he spent at least part of
his exile in Japan, where he wrote and published two books on
Communism, including one which reviewed the development of the
Communist movement in Indonesia.
Although TAN is not known to have been directly involved with any
part of the anti-Japanese underground, Adam Malik and Sukarni, his
lieutenants during the late 1920's, were the organizers and leaders
of an important element of the underground. In the immediate post-
war period TAN and his lieutenants were deeply involved in the poli-
tical machinations that took place. During these first days of the
Republic of Indonesia, TAN, or his lieutenants, were represented
in most of the numerous cabinets of the newly proclaimed Republic.
In these critical days TAN tried several times and through various
methods to assume leadership of the government, to replace Sukarno
and Hatta by himself. In pursuit of this objective TAN formed in
early 1946 the Fighting Front (Persatuan Perdjuangan), a mass poli-
tical front, in thefashion of a "national front", headed by TAN and
Sukarni. The policies advocated by TAN and the Fighting Front
included the abolition of all political parties, a monolithic political
structure, confiscation of all foreign property without compensation,
and repudiation of the negotiations then under way with the Dutch. The
Fighting Front rapidly grew, attracting diverse groups. In March
1946 it forced the resignation of the Indonesian Cabinet, but it was
unsuccessful in forming a replacement cabinet.
Shortly thereafter the Fighting Front disintegrated; and as a re-
sult of its June 1946 attempt to overthrow and replace the Sukarno-
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Hatta Government with one headed by TAN, hewas arrested and im-
prisoned.
Although TAN remained imprisoned from 1946 to 1948, several
groups which looked to him for ideological leadership continued to be
active. In mid-1948 these groups organized the Gerakan Revolusi
Rakjat (GRR--People's Revolutionary Movement) in opposition to the
PKI- sponsored.and directed Front Demokrasi Rakjat.(FDR-People's
Democratic Front). Although in political opposition (for example,
over support of the Hatta Government, and on the question of Indo-
ne sian neutrality in the "cold" war during the nationalist independence
movement, which the GRR. favored), the general programs of the
two groups were close (for example, nationalization of foreign pro-
perties). In one observer's (Kahin) words: "Except for the plank
in its program calling for alignment with Russia, the program of the
PKI-Musso was in its essentials no different from the program which
the groups within the GRR had been advocating ever since the first
days of the revolution. "
During this period the two parties caustically criticized each
other, both attempting to assume the, leadership of the developing
movement of independence. The antagonism and animosity between
TAN Malaka and his GRR supporters and the PKI led by Musso developed
into open warfare during the Madiun Rebellion., a PKI move to capture
control of the independence movement. Goaded by the kidnapping of
the chairman and other officers of the GRR by PKI troops, TAN's armed
supporters (Bari san Banteng) aided the Indonesian Republican Army
forces in defeating the PKI military forces and proved particularly
active and effective during the initial phases of the PKI rebellion. TAN
himself was eleasedfrom prison, where he had been since,1946, before
the main battle took place at Madiun. Probably this clemency was
granted in consideration. of the support he and his followers had given
to the Indonesian Governm.ent. During the short-lived Madiun rebellion
TAN had been denounced in no uncertain terms by Musso and the PKI, -
being called a "Trotskyite traitor" (as were Sukarno and Hatta), and
"a criminal".
In October 1948, shortly after the. suppression of the Madiun Re-
bellion, several of the principal groups supporting TAN merged into
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the Partai Murba, formalizing their previously fairly loose relation-
ship in the GRR. The component elements of the new political party
were the Partai Rakjat (People's Party), Partai Rakjat Djelata (Poor
People's Party), and the Partai Indonesia Bruruh Merdeka (Independent
Indonesian Labor Party). The GRR itself continued to exist as a loose
federation of political parties in which the components of the new Partai
Murba maintained their membership.
IV. Ideological Position of the Partai Murba
Initially the new Partai Murba had approximately 80, 000 members.
TAN Malaka was the ideological leader of the new party and the master-
mind behind its organization, although nominal leadership was in the
hands of Sukarni and Marut.o Nitimihardjo, party chairman and vice
chairman respectively. The objectives of the Partai Murba, as
announced in its constitution; framed in November 1948, included
a. confiscation and expropriation of foreign properties,
b. nationalization and collectivization of vital economic
enterprises,
c. establishment of a proletarian world government, and
d. organization of the Partai Murba in accord with the
principle of "democratic centralism".
The word "murba" as defined by TAN at the time the Partai Murba
was organized manifested and stressed the ideological allegiance to
Marx and Communism. In his definition TAN stated that "n urba"
is "approximately covered by the term 'proletariat'.... However,
the historical development and the characteristics of the Indonesian
murba are different from the Western proletariat., .. Moreover,
the struggle and the enemy of the Indonesian murba are different from
the struggle and the enemy of the Western proletariat, especially in
matters concerning detail,"
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TAN went on to say, "The Indonesian murba class has suffered
most under the yoke of foreign exploitation and therefore according
to the theory of dialectical materialism the murba class must have
the truest desire for freedom and the strongest desire for freedom....
By forming an Indonesian murba organization with steel discipline and
by executing a tactic and strategy which are best fitted to the Indo-
nesian murba, the Indonesian murba will play the historic role which
is imposed upon it, namely: TO ORGANIZE AND MOBILIZE ALL
REVOLUTIONARY POWERS OF THE. INDONESIAN PEOPLE WITH
THE PURPOSE OF DESTROYING THE AGGRESSION OF THE CAPI-
TALISTS AND IMPERIALISTS AND LAYING DOWN THE FOUNDATION
OF A SOCIALIST SOCIETY IN INDONESIA. " (TAN's capitalization.)
The Partai Murba originally combined its Communist orientation
with an appeal to nationalist sentiments. Although the party never
specifically disclaimed or admitted its allegiance to the international
Communist line, its position is indicated by its early statements
and actions. In November 1948 TAN wrote: "The international con-
troversy is a struggle between two systems, capitalism and socialism....
We need time in order to take a definite attitude, although we know that
victory will be ours and the proletariat will win.... The part of the
globe in which our country lies cannot be excluded from the world con-
troversy. However, this does not necessarily mean that we must
participate in the dispute, i. e. , join one of the parties it order to
attack the other. The primary conditions for an alliance are: (1) to
increase one's own strength and weaken that of the enemy; and (2) to
take care that you are not eaten up by your ally." TAN added, "Geo-
graphically and strategically speaking it is not yet time to choose one
of the parties. Land, air and sea distances are not yet favorable for
increasing our power if we make an alliance with the Federation of the
Socialist Countries." (This statement was made prior to the Chine se
Communist takeover in China.)
In these early days of its existence the Partal Murba apparently,
attempted to establish itself as the "legitimate" Communist party of
Indonesia. In addition to issuing statements such as that quoted above,
the Partai Murba vehemently attacked the Communist Party of Indo-
nesia (PKI), which had reestablished and reorganized itself in 1945
and which had just suffered the disgrace of the abortive Madiun
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Rebellion of 1948. ,Partai Murba leaders, claiming,to be the true ex-
ponents of orthodox Soviet Communism, were convinced that Com-
munism was the wave of the future and that the Soviet Union would
ultimately triumph over the United States. The Partai. Murba dis-
credited the MadiunRebellion as a Communist-inspired attempt to
seize control, claiming that the Rebellion was Dutch-inspired and
thatthe PKI leaders Alimin and Musso were Dutch secret agents.
Behind these charges lay Partai Murba efforts to gain dominance
in Indonesia through a combination of the appeals of Communism and
nationalism.
V. Comparison of Partai Murba and PKI Constitutions
The Constitution of the Partai Murba contains most of the pro-
visions found in the constitutions of orthodox Communist parties. Al-
though it is less detailed than, for example, the Constitution of the
PKI, it outlines the organizational structure and the objectives of the
party, the responsibilities and obligations of party members, and the
strict disciplinary requirement of "democratic centralism". The
Constitution pays no explicit homage to Marx, Lenin, or to any other
Communist leader; however, it does by implication recognize its
ideological dependence upon the Communist apostles.
The: following comparison of excerpts from the Constitutions of
the Partai Murba and the PKI indicates close parallels between the
parties' structures and objectives.
Partai Murba PKI
"The organizational basis shall be "The structural organization of
democratic centralism." the party is based on the prin-
ciple of democratic centralism,
that is, centralism based on
democracy and democracy under
centralized leadership."
"The aim of the party is a socialist '- The PKI/ fights for the estab-
country." lishment of a People's Democracy
system in Indonesia, while its
@we My
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Partai Murba
"... demand the immediate
implementation of the funda-
mental rights of a People's
Democracy. "
further aim is the realization of
a Socialist society as the first step
toward a Communist society in
Indonesia.
"May Indonesian workers suc-
ceed in forming a workers'
organization with an iron disci-
pline in carrying out those tactics
and strategy best suited for the
country. "
"The Murba... will urge all the
people b establish a People's
Democracy, so that the nation of
Indonesia will be free from all
imperialist and fascist influence."
"The duties to be undertaken by
the Partai Murba as a whole shall
also be obligatory for all members
individually. "
"The PKI is organized on the basis
of democratic centralism as a united
and militant organization, steeled
with discipline that is based on con-
sciousness, which applies to all its
members. "
"A. People's Democracy government
is a government which' is able to
unite all anti -feudal and anti -im-
perialist forces. "
"Each party member must obey the
decisions of the party organization
to which he belongs... and all parts
of the Party organization must obey
the Central Committee. "
Despite these parallels in structure, organization, and objectives,
there is sharp divergence on one significant point: the relationship be-
tween the party and the International Communist Movement. Although
both base their programs on "dialectical materialism", the Constitution
of the Partai Murba, unlike the PKI's, makes no mention of the "theories"
or "contributions" of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, or Musso. In
addition, the Partai Murba discounts any connection with the "inter-
national proletariat", in obvious contrast to the PHI position. The follow-
ing quotes are illustrative:
PKI
... the historical development " .. the
duties of the PKI...
_
and the character of the Murba /include/...to be united with the
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Partai Murba
of Indonesia are different from
those of the proletariat of the
West.... Moreover, the nature
of the struggle and the character
of the enemies of the Murba of
Indonesia are different from those
facing the Western proletariat. "
PKI
international proletariat, with all
oppressed nations, subject nations,
and nations which consider us their
equals, which love freedom, demo-
cracy, and world peace. "
One article in the Partai Murba Constitution that is of particular
interest includes a provision permitting the dissolution of the party
by a vote of a special party congress or by a referendum. This pro-
vision, not found in the constitutions of orthodox Communist parties,
enables the Partai Murbalo merge with or be absorbed by other parties.
VI. Influence in the Indonesian Government
The Partai Murba has been unable to increase its size or to expand
its influence and control of mass front organizations. Its current
membership is considerably less than when first formed, and it never
established the constellation of mass front organizations envisioned by
TAN Malaka. Such influence in front organizations as it has today is
a continuation of what existed in its early days, in marked contrast
to the development and proliferation of PKI front organizations. From
its beginning, the numerical strength of the party has remained rela-
tively insignificant, particularly in comparison to the strength of the
PKI, which exploited a similar mixture of Communism and nationalism.
From its initial estimated strength of 80, 000 in 1948, the Partai
Murba has decreased in membership to approximately 35, 000, con-
centrated primarily in the Central and West Java areas.
Similarly, its representation in the Indonesian Parliament has re-
mained relatively insignificant. In 1950, in the first Parliament follow-
ing complete independence and the creation of a unitary state, the
Partai Murba held three seats. Today, in the Parliament elected in
the country's first general elections in 1955, the Partai Murba has
only two seats, out of a total of 260. In the 1955 general Parliamentary
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elections, the Partai Murba received approximately 200, 000 votes.
Membership and voting strength of the Partai Murba is concentrated
in Java, also the center of PKI membership and electoral, strength.
In the larger Constituent Assembly, charged with the, writing of a
Constitution, Partai Murbahold.s four seats.
Despite its limited size, however, the Partai Murba today has
significant influence, disproportionate to its numerical strength,
in the executive branch of the Indonesian Government. In the current
Cabinet, appointed by Sukarno in early 1957, two of the twenty-four
ministers are closely aligned with the Partai Murba. These two are
Dr. Prijono, Minister of Education and Culture, and Chairul Saleh,
Minister of Veterans Affairs. Dr. Prijono is a member of the
Partai Murba, chairman of the Communist front Indonesia-China
Friendship Association, a. member of the World Peace Council, and
winner in 1955 of the Stalin Peace Prize. Saleh, who in 1956 re-
turned from Europe after four years of "study exile", is a close
adviser to Sukarno, and in particular advised him on his concept of
"guided democracy". In the years immediately after World War II,
Saleh was one of TAN Malaka's key lieutenants and guerrilla leaders.
In 1949 he had been imprisoned by Sukarno for continuing TAN
Malaka&s policy of non-acceptance of Indonesian-Dutch negotiations
then taking place and for his continued guerrilla activities. He re-
mained in prison until 1952, when he was released to accept exile.
Since Saleh's return, both the Partai Murba and the PKI have made
overtures to him, but Saleh has, not overtly or covertly identified
himself with any political party.
Although the PKI considers both Prijono and Saleh as Partai
Murba followers, as "national Communists", and as "no friends of
the party", it has never overtly attacked or denounced either of them.
Probably this abstention is in deference to their positions and influence
in certain Communist target groups, i. e. , PrijonoIs influence among
intellectuals and Saleh's influence among veterans. Covertly, the PK1
has attempted tofrustrate Saleh's organization of veterans groups
and to block any enhancement of his influence.
In the National Council of the Indonesian Government, the forty-
seven man body formed by Sukarno as part of his "guided democracy"
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concept, the Partai Murba also shows an influence beyond its numeri-
cal strength. At least three Partai Murba leaders, including Sukarni,
the Secretary General of the party, sit on the Council. Two other
members of the National Council were in the past closely associated
with the Partai Murba and its front organizations, but their current
affiliation is uncertain. One of these two, Sidik Kertapati, is appar-
ently now more closely aligned with the PKI than with the Partai
Murba. It should be noted that Sukarni is the only leader of a poli-
tical party on the National Council%
VII. Front Organizations
Following the pattern of the established political parties of Indo-
nesia, the Partai Murba has a number of front organizations. Al-
though there is little information available on the organizational
activities of the Partai Murba's fronts, what is known indicates that
they are small in size, weak in organization, and limited in influence.
Partai Murba. front activities are conducted primarily in the labor
and peasant field, the usual areas of activity for Indonesian political
parties and their front organizations. In labor, Partai Murba controls
SOBRI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Republik Indonesia Central Labor
Organization of the Republic of Indonesia). One of the smaller labor
federations, it is comprised mainly of unions of workers on "estates'!,
in sugar mills, and in electrical plants. Its estimated size today is
30, 000, about one-half of its estimated 1954 strength.
Several years ago SOBRI made application to affiliate with WFTU,
the international Communist labor front. Although the application
was taken under consideration, no action has been indicated. There
is no 'indication that the application has been withdrawn or rejected,
and it must be presumed to be still under consideration. If so, there
is an increased probability that SOBRI's application will be accepted
by WFTU, in view of a recently adopted change in WFTU policy.
Before October 1957 WFTU accepted only one affiliate per country,
and for Indonesia SOBSI was the affiliate. However, WFTU has now
removed this limitation.
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Less significant fronts exist among peasants and youth, SAKTI
(Sarekat Tani Indonesia Indonesian Peasants Federation) and
ACOMA (Angkatan Komuni s Indone sia - Indonesian Communist Youth
Corps). Both of these Partai Murba fronts ar-e splinters of large
organizations that came under PKI domination. The original SAKTI,
organized by the Partai Murba in 1949, merged in 1955 with the PKI
peasant front, the BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia - Indonesian Peasants
Association). A splinter group under Partai Murba direction retained
the name SAKTI. ACOMA also split in two in 1952, both elements
retaining the same name, one under PKI domination, the other under
Partai Murba control.
Although there is no indication that the Partai Murba has its own
"pease", "friendship", or "cultural relations" front organizations
in competition with the PKI, the activity of Dr. Prijono, a Partai
Murba man, in organizing and directing the activities of the PKI fronts
in these spheres, is significant.
VIII. Relationships Between the Partai Murba and the PKI
Since the formation of the Partai Murba a number of reports have
suggested a rapprochement or a merger between the Partai Murba
and the PKI. Most of these reports originated during the 1955 elec-
tion campaigns. There is no evidence, however, of any formal or
direct negotiations or conversations between the two parties to carry
out such a purpose; neither party has issued any overt statements or
made any overt action directly supporting the unity of the two parties.
Nevertheless, there does exist close contact between officials and
important members of the two parties. In particular, in mass front
organizations and in the Indonesian Parliament, the members of the
parties show a unity of purpose and of action. Similarly, in the
Sukarno-appointed National Council, the known or suspected members
of the two parties show a marked degree of agreement in policies
and programs. Although there is no substantive difference between
the programs of the Partat Murba and the PKI insofar as the direction
of the future internal development of Indonesia is concerned, the mani-
fested unity and agreement between the two parties should not be taken
ipso facto as evidence of coordination between the two parties, or of
one party directing the other.
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In the Indonesian Parliament the two Partai Murba representatives
are members of the Progressive National "faction" ("faction" is the
term used in the Indonesian Parliament to denote members of a single
political party or groups of several parties acting as a single'co-
ordinated group in the Steering Committee of Parliament). Other mem-
be.rs of the Progressive National faction include representatives of
PKI front organizations, e. g. BAPERKI, PERMAI, and ACOMA, and
the faction itself is considered to be PKI-controlled.
As mentioned previously, the Partai Murba is well-represented
in both the Cabinet and the National Council. Obviously, in these bodies
Partai Murba members have close and continuous contact with the
several known or suspected members of the PKI. In the continuing
crises in Indonesia., beginning with the Cabinet crisis in 1956, the
Partai Murba as a party and as represented in the executive bodies
has supported in general the PKI positions. The party has appeared
at times to be assuming almost a median position between the PHI
and the other political parties, but in no case has the Partai Murba
been in opposition to the basic principles underlying the PK[ solutions,
e. g. , formation of the National Council, unconditional surrender of
the Sumatran "rebels", etc.
Several leading Partai Murba members hold major positions in
PKI front organizations. As mentioned above, Dr. Prijono, in par-
ticular, has been active in both the national and international levels
of orthodox Communist organizations. He was one of the founders of
the Indonesian Peace Committee and served as its chairman. In 1955
Prijono was "elected" to the World Peace Council, the international
directing organ of the Communist World Peace Movement. In the same
year he was awarded the Stalin Peace Prize for "promotion of peace
among nations". In addition, two other members of the Partai Murba
group in the National Council aided in the founding of the Indonesian
Peace Committee and are still major voices therein. One, Mohammad
Padang, is a known member of the Partai Murba; the other, Achmad
Chatib, although not known as a Partai Murba member, was closely
associated with TAN in the 1920's and in the immediate post-World
War II period.
Among the peasant and youth groups contact or cooperation, if any,
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between the large PKI groups and the small Partai Murba groups
is unknown. As noted above, the Partai Murba groups in those
fields merged with PKI fronts, leaving only remnant groups to con-
tinue under Partai Murba domination. Almost nothing is known
about these moves, how they were effected, who was instrumental,
etc. It is known that Sidik Kertapati, now a member of the National
Council, and in the past considered to be sympathetic to the Partai
Murba, was instrumental in merging SAKTI with the BTI-the PKI
peasant front--in 1955. Sidik's political affiliation is today uncertain.
At the time of the merger of the peasant groups Sidik moved from
chairmanship of SAKTI to membership on the BTI's Central Council.
When the PKI Headquarters were attacked with hand grenades in
July 1956, Sidik was meeting with Aidit, the PKI's Secretary General,
and other top PKI officials.
IX. Summary and Conclusions
As a Marxian party, the Partai Murba of today does not challenge
the dominant position of the PKI. It is a splinter Communist party,
a remnant of the organization and political ideology developed by TAN
Malaka, nurtured in opposition to the PKI during the post-World War
II independence movement. Almost completely lacking in organization,
and without any sizable following in the electorate, the Partai Murba
as a political body is relatively unimportant. It represents no poli-
tical threat to the major parties in Indonesia.
TAN's effort in the 1920's to establish a cadre Communist party
rather than a mass party has given rise to the speculation that the
Partai Murba's lack of mass member ship may be the result of choice
and design. However, the several earmarks of a successfully estab-
lished cadre party, e. g. , a well-knit organizational structure, well-
developed control of membership, and as a possible concomitant,
influence or control over significant mass organizations, are present
only to a very limited extent in the Partai Murba. There is appar-
ently little control of the loosely organized membership. The fronts
which are under party control are similarly small, relatively insig-
nificant, and in general are related to the PKI fronts as is the Partai
Murba to the PKI.
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CO
However, the influence of certain leading members of the Partai
Murba, particularly in the higher echelons of the Government and
in Communist front organizations, cannot be denied. Cumulatively,
their influence is disproportionate, far In excess of the relative poli-
tical stature of the Partai Murba itself. Examination of the activities
and positions of those persons indicates that although they have some
degree of affiliation with the Partai Murba, they have reached their
current positions of power and influence independently. Their cur-
rent status does not appear to be a result of activities in or on behalf
of the Partai Murba. Therefore, it cannot be said that the party it-
self has extensive influence as a political organization at the top level
of the Indonesian Government; the influence is rather that of its mem-
bers as individuals or of those closely affiliated with it at one time or
another.
The interesting relationship between the Partai Murba and the PKI
presents several apparent paradoxes. Although the two parties vilify
and condemn each other, members of both parties cooperate on the
National Council, in the Cabinet, and in PKI -dominated front organi-
zations. Cooperation between individual members of the Partai Murba
and the PKI should not be taken to imply that there is coordination
between the two parties. There is no direct evidence to indicate any
coordination of policies or activities of the two parties, or of their
individual members.
Nevertheless, the question. of coordinated Partai Murba-PKI
policy should be examined, in view of parallel party programs and
policies and of the cooperation in top Government echelons, as well
as in national and international Communist front organizations. There
are three hypotheses: (a) there is active covert coordination between
the two parties; (b) the policies are coordinated by a third force, e.g. ,
Moscow, with or without the knowledge of thePKI leadership; or, (c)
there is no direct coordination.
Both (a) and (b) can be supported by substantial circumstantial,
evidence, including parallel policies and programs. Similarly, the
presence of both Partai Murba and PKI personalities in leading posi-
tions within several Communist front organizations is also circum-
stantial evidence. Under these hypotheses, the existence of small
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Partai Murba fronts, and the charges and countercharges, would have
to be considered as, camouflage intended to suggest a separateness
that does not actually exist. One particular piece of evidence is im-
pressive if interpreted in the light of these hypotheses: the return
in 1956 of Semaun, founder and first president of the original PKI,
after thirty years of exile in the Soviet Union. The Partai Murba was
instrumental in urging his return, nominating Semaun for the Indo-
nesian National Assembly--prior to his return--and urging Sukarno,
prior to his 1956 trip to the USSR, to arrange the return with approp-
riate Soviet authorities. The prevalent rumor before his return was
to the effect that Semaun, under Soviet direction, would reorganize
the Communist movement in Indonesia and that he would effect a
merger of the two parties. Since his return, Semaun has not be-
come affiliated with either party, although both have made overtures
to him. Currently, he acts almost as an "elder statesman", urging
the creation of a new world bank to aid the development and indus-
trialization of backward countries. He has also become a close ad-
vi ser to Sukarno and is believed to have been influential in Sukarno's
efforts to implement the "guided democracy" concept.
If the Partai Murba serves as a Communist front organization,
as some observers suggest, it is a useful tool for the Communist
movement in Indonesia. As such, it can bring pressure upon Presi-
dent Sukarno and upon other high government echelons indirectly,
without direct participation by the PKI or PKI personalities. It can
also serve as a useful link with non-Communist parties and organi-
zations.
The third hypothesis (c), which states that there is no direct co-
ordination between the two parties, is the most probable. From the
PKI's viewpoint, there is no need for such coordination. The Partai
Murba's programs and policies parallel the PKI's. The Partai Murba
generally supports, in substance if not in detail, the PKI's "analysis"
of and decisions on specific events. In the higher echelons of Govern-
ment, and in the PKI front organizations, the Partai Murba members
also support the PKI positions. Direct coordination between the two
parties would imply PKI recognition of apolitical stature and position
that the Partai Murba does not have.
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The small size of the Partai Murba, its loose organization, and
the activities of its leading members suggest a possible willingness
to collaborate with the stronger and more influential PKI. However,
any initiative toward this end would probably have to originate with
the PM. At this time it appears that the PKI has little need and would
gain little from implementing direct coordination of policies with the
Partai Murba.
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