THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST APPARATUS IN ACTION

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP78-00915R000900220002-6
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
November 11, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 23, 1998
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 14, 1958
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP78-00915R000900220002-6.pdf261.91 KB
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c' bite n 57 THE INTERNATIONAL Cp?I4UNIST APPARATUS IN ACTI-q 1. The complex international Communist app~_ratus is buried in every Communist party and Front organization, It performs basics;ly three functions a, international co-ordination and control; b* espionage, and covert (non-attributable) political action and propaganda; c. support of Co.munist organization thrnugh Provision of secret funds, training facilities in the Bloc, supplies ranging from printing equipment to military material when needed. 2. During the Stalin period, particularly in his last years, emphasis was on the requirements of Soviet espionage ae vices, and the international apparatus was largely controlled by the Soviet intelligence services. Co-ordination and control of the international Cork.unist movement was conducted andcznntrolled by Stalin and his confidants. 3. Khruushchev is now atte,pting to organize the international apparatus to better serve the political requirements of the USSR and the Bloc, in addition to the requirements of Soviet espionage services. From available evidence it appears that Khrushchev is revitalizing that function of the international apparat which is concerned with the control, co- ordination and support of the Communist movement in the Free World. This does not mean a decrease of Soviet espionage activities aboad. It means, however, that the Co-wuw=Mist Party of the Soviet Union is incr=-asing its direct contacts with the Connurrist parties abroad, in order to strencthen than an viable instruments of subversion. Khrushchav has an internationalist outlook and believes, more than Stalin did, that Comrtuni; and Communist parties as well as fronts abroad can eventually take over. k. At the EEoscow meetings of Corsnunist leaders from all parts of the world, in November 1957, the groundwork is laid for the revitalization of the international control and co-ordination apparatus. Emerging principal features are- a. The Soviet Contuaist Party and its'"oscow apparatus remain the organizational center. evidence shows that the CPSU hay been expanding the Foreign Section of its Central Committee which performs the routine work of international co-ordination. Subsequent to the November meetings--in January 1958-the major front organizations announced a we'll co-cremated, Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000900220002-6 aabitious program for 1958. A large delegation of top Soviet CPSU experts on propaganda was scheduled to leave for Rora, probably to assist CP Italy with its election campaign. A top Soviet trade union organizer was des- patched to Cairo probably to spark-plug C mmist pene- tration of labor unions in the Middle East mnd Africa. The trend shows definitely that CPSU is attacking the problem of co-ordinating the movement with new vigor, will conv'.okeloeal meetings of the international Communist leadership once a year. Similarly, regional meet: rigs will be called in the Bloc when need arises. c. Corniist parties in the Free World will increase regional consultation and co-ordination with each other, d. Communist parties in Europe and Internati.:nal Front organi- have been ins.tructdd_to_ cations in generals support more effectively liberation nove- . t i xa, le d striae This eesana for e r u v e c d d l ? p , , , n un o e r e op o s more support for the Algerian rebels. It also means support for non-Cosannnist rebels (such as Castro in Cuba), if they can be persuaded to accept it, CP China will probably increase its co-ordinating and support function vis-a-vis CP's in Louth Asia, on behalf of, and in concert with, the CPSU. Reliable evidence shows that the Chinese CP has training facilities for foreign Corzanists, f. Other Last European GP's will share some aspects of Inter- national control, particularly the CP's of East Germany and Czechoslovakia. At Xoscow in November it was agreed that an international publication would be issued to clarify problems of doctrine and ideology. This publication, which will serve to spread the propaganda campaigns and theories of Noscow and Peking throughout the world, began distribution in late August. It is published at Prague in l4 different languages. The Snglish-language edition is entitled World Marxist i (i i thiiti with the subttlewhchse man t o Xoa o other editions), *Problems of Peace and Socialism,* h. TraUlne. of foreign Caunists in the Bloc will increase net the next two to three years. One Communist party leader expects to have all leading functionaries trained Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000900220002-6 in Moscow by 1960. International front organizations will probably also expand training facilities. The i"P' # e.g. in atisidiaing a program cf regionalized training schools abroad, I. Funds for CPts abroad will probably be furnished by CPSU and 91oc parties on an increasing scale. indications are that a greater percentage of the funds will go to Covmnanist parties and organizations in underdeveloped countries. J With specific reference to Latin America# it is reliably reported that a conference of all Latin American delegates was held in t`escow# November 19$7~t under the chairtansh p of the Soviet spec- ialist for Latin American affairs of the CPSU# and attended by Chinese delegates. The conference permitted the representatives of significant Cornnlst parties to discuss their area problems. The Soviet chairman laid out specific action program for the Latin Arerican Ceanu nist parties which was s cc :pted. The program included recuests for: a) increased efforts to fan and exploit anti-U.S. sentiment; b) revival of the Communist controlled peace movement throu& a Latin American peace conference. (This was held in Argentina in hey 19$$x; to c) /support the Communist noveiant in Cuba by, organizing a week of solidarity with the people of Cuba; t) renewed efforts to attack the Organization of American States through a Communist controlled cultural conference to coincide with the next OAS conference; e) to promote the Soviet economic offensive,:; by organising a Coeenmaist controlled eeonoSc conference. (A conference now scheduled to be held in Buenos Aires in December 1958 may combine both the cultural and economic objectives.) The chairman also requested that the Latin American Ccmmimiat partite improve and intensify the co-ordination of their activities. At the conference the Confederation of Workers of Latin America (CTAL) came in for some criticism, and ways and means of streng- thening or reorganizing the CTAL were discussed. Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000900220002-6 8. The care of the Latin Asaerican conference illustrates the thorrughncss with which Communist area problems were discussed in Psscow. It also illustrates the fact that the preparatory work was under the control of the CPSU and the Bloc parties, which in this fashion assur.td policy king powers. According to the account of Friedrick Ebert, politburo rember of the East German Communist Party (&:D), the "sister parties from the capitalist countries" i.e., from the Free World, were only "consulted" at this stake, eaen though these discussions centered around the drafting of the Twelve-Party Declaration, which contains a general directive for Communist parties in the From world. s 9. In 195P the international Co ?r4rcist apparatus has concentrated a. deteloping and increasing the activities of the international Communist front organizations in Latin America, Asia, the Piddle.:ast, and in Africa, through exploitation of the idea of Afro-Asian and anti-colonial erlidarity.. b. increasing the subversive potential of Co;nii,atist pasties largely through legal, parliamentary means and united front tactics. 10. Concerning the subversive potential of the international Com- munist freest organizations, it is noted that evidence on the activities of Soviet agents within them is increasing. For example, a -Japanese front figure, identified as a Soviet agent, was reported to be active in organizing a wasz reception for Sukarno upon the latter's arrival in Japan. A fora-or Soviet agent who was involved in the assassination attempt on the life of Trotsky in Y4y 19110, has been involved in organizing an anti-US front which extends throughout Latin America. At the Atro- Asian Solidarity conference in Cairo in Decester 1957 several delegates with records of Soviet agent activity were noted. International Corruni.st front organizations also r-aintain their capability for subsidizing Cossiunist- controlled publishing firrse in the Free World although the headquarters of most of thece fronts have been pushed back behind the Iron Curtain. 11, Concerning the erphasis on legal, parliamentary cethods, this tactic will probably prevail most strongly in the underdeveloped countries which are the wain targets of the Soviet diplomatic and ecenonic offensive. Corsunist pa=ties in these areses will increasingly attempt to legalize themselves in cases where they are underground, and atte^pt generally to merge with the political streams of nationalism in order to exacerbate nationalist tensions and frictions with the West. CP Brazil, for example, has initiated a legall--ation drive. Local election tauccessee of the Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000900220002-6 Corm mint political front in Singapore further illustrates the tr .d. But this legal method is only effective when it is successfully com- bined with the infiltration of other parties or government organizations by the concealed Goi :vnjst. This too Is being worked on by the parties in Afbv-A, is and Latin America, in some countries? where the CP's are illegal, subversive action, to overthrow or help to overthrow an existing anti-Conrnnis't rover nt may be a prerequisite to legalization and the adoption of parliamentary tactics.