USE OF SOVIET OFFICIAL INSTALLATIONS ABROAD FOR SUBVERSIVE PURPOSES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 113
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 16, 1997
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: June 1, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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Appendix
The. ' list. below, name's: off icers and, other staff personnel of
Soviet. Intelligence, services: ?who. have been 'exppo s ed publicly, from
approximately 1942, to mid-1557, as, involved in:-espionage while
functioning ostensibly as diplomatic or other official represent*-
t,ives: abroad.
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Diplomatic and.
BELUSOV, Viktor. Second
Secretary Soviet Enibas'sy,
Stockholm. Involved in. the
:ZARTAR.YAN espionage case.
on.s;ula:,r P"o;s.itions
i
h
TS
N
Fili
K
SL
c
.
pp Vasyev
,
Y
I
'
Second Secretary, Soviet. Embassy,
Canberra, Oct. 195Z to April 1954,
RIS assignment: organize an
'illegal apparatus" in Australia;
r'studyrr members of Parliament.
,and Diplomatic Corps.
Left Sweden, San 1957 at request
of Swedish government.
DOLBIN, Gregoriy G. Coun -
s:.ellor, Soviet Exabassy, Wash, x KOVALENKO, Yevgeniy V,as:ilyevich.
1946. Prior to then had served Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy,
in. Japan, 1940-1944. Canberra.. State Security officer.
Departed after Petrov defected,
DRANKOV, Vasiliy D. Second April 1954.
Secretary and Press Attache,
The Hague. Target: defense and'KUDRIAVTZEV, ,Sergei. First,
industrial information. Expelled Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Ottawa.
in 1957. GRU officer in Canada, 1945.
+ FARAFONTOV, A. N. Clerk .f KULAKOV, fnu. Lieutenant Clerk,
at Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, 1945. Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, 1945.
Involved in espionage.
'. GUBANOV, Fedor Yegorovich.
Involved. in espionage.
IKUTNETZOV, P. Embassy employee,
Emba,s'sy Clerk, Canberra. London. Received secret. data from.
State Security worker. Returned British Foreign Office wireless
to_ USSR, March 1951. operator, 1952.
GUSYEV, Sergey I7. Soviet 'MAKAROV, Semen Ivanovich. Clerk,
Embassy doorman. G:RU officer, Third Secretary and First Secretary
Ottawa, 1945
in Soviet Embassy, Canberra, 1943-
1949. First State Security Resident,
Australia.
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Diplomatic'.and.'Con.su.lat Positions
MASHKANTZEV, Genadi F.
Employee, Soviet Embassy,
Washington Expelled from
US April 1957 for improper
activities in. attempt to force
former Air Force officer
Peter Pirogov to return to
USSR.
MERKULOV, Alexander I.
Second Secretary, Soviet
Embassy, Oslo, until March
1952. A contact of Asbj.orn
Suede, convicted of espionage,
July 1954.
MITROFANOV, Victor.
Chauffeur, Soviet Embassy,
Oslo. Involved in the Asbjorn
Sunde espionage case.
MOLEV, Vasili M. Clerk,
Soviet Embassy. Involved in
Soble-Albam espionage case.
Departed US, Jan 1957.
NOVIKOV, Nikolai V. Charge
d' Affaires, Soviet Ernb,as`sy,
Washington. With TOLOKON-
NIKOV, directed the Gubitchev-
Coplon case.
X NOVIKOV, Yuri V. Second
Secretary, Soviet Embassy,
Washington. Involved in. Verber:-
Ponger espionage case.. Declared
png, .Tan 1953.
OR LOV, Nikolay P. Employee,
Soviet Embassy, Stockholm. In
Sept 1951 expelled from Sweden
for .connection with H. E. Anders..
son espionage case. Target:
military data, including invasion,
routes into Swedes..
OTROSHENKO, Andrey Makarovich,
Colonel. Official of Soviet Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in. Japan, 1953.
Chief of Far East Intelligence for
State Security.
PANYUSHKIN, Aleksandr Semeno-
vich. Soviet Ambassador to.. the
United States, 1947-1951. A Major
General ,in State Security.
PAVLOV, Vitali G. Second Sec-
retary, Soviet Embassy, Ottawa,
1945. Chief, of State Security legal
network in Canada.
PETROV, Vladimir M. Third Sec-
retary and acting VOKS officer,
Soviet Embas'sy, Canberra, Au:s
tralia, 1951-1954. Defected April, 1954.
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Diplomatic',and Consular Pos'itiobs
SADOVNIKOV, Valentin M.at:-
veyevich. Second and later
First Secretary, Soviet
Embassy, Canberra. State
Security Resident, April 1949
to April 1951.
VINOGRA.DOV, Konstantin.
Secretary, Soviet, Erba.ssy,
Stockholm, 1947. Involved in
Hilding Anders.son case.
SHIBAYEV, Petr Andreyev.ich,
Colonel. Advisor cif Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In Japan, 1951, to control CP
activities and to exploit. Soviet
contacts with the US Counter-
Intelligence Corps.
SOKOLOV, Georgiy Aleksan
drovic.h. Counsellor, Soviet
Embassy, Washington, 1948.
Former Chief Resident, in
Tokyo. In the US in. similar
position.
VLADYKIN, I'=.ikolai A. Coun-
sellor .of Soviet Embassy., Wash-
ington. Replaced PANYUSHKIN
as State Security Resident in the US.
4YAKOVLEV, Anatoli Antonovich.
Vice Consul .at Soviet Consulate,
New York City until 1946. Re-
ceived reports from Harry Gold,
September 1944 until December 1946.
ZHUKOV, Ivan Vas.ili.evich.
Chauffeur, Soviet Embassy, Oslo,
until January 1954. Involved in
Asbjorn Sunde espionage case.
ZUBILIN, Vassili M. Third, then
TOLOKONNIKOV, Lev S. First Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy,
Sec,re.tary, Soviet Ernbas,sy, Washington. Directed atomic
Washington. With N. V. NOVI- espionage in the US from 1942 to
KOV, directed Gubichev-Coplon 1944.
ca s.e .
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IVii1'itary,' Naval .and Air A.ttacht:1'
AMOSOV, Igor A., Commander. Y IONCHENKO, N,ikolay V. , MA,
Asst. NA, Washington, 1952-54. Turkey. Charged with trying to
Declared png, February 1954. buy military information. Was
requested to leave Turkey, May 1956..
[, ANGELOV, ' fnu. , Lteputenant.
GRU liaison agent, Ottawa, E KOSHEL V, Vladimir F,, CCom-
1945. Officer on staff of MA. mander. Acting NA, Oslo, 1951.
Involved in. Per Danielsen case.
ASTAAFYEV, Aleksandr R.,
Commander. NA, Rome,
October 1948 to May 1955.
B UB CHIKO V, Ivan A., Colonel.
Found to be engaged, in espion-
.age. Expelled from the US,
June 1956.
EGOROV, Vikctor. Asst. MA,
Soviet Embassy, Stockholm.
Involved in Enborn espionage
case, 1948-1951.
GALKIN, fnu., Captain.
officer in Canada in 1945.
GRU
GURSHK.OV, fnu., Captain.
Driver for GRU chief, Canada,
1945.
KRYLOV, Yuri P., Major. Asst.
MA in, the U.S. Declared png,
January 1957.
KUZNE.TSOV, Anatoliy I., Major.
Asst. MA, Tehran. Expelled from.
Iran, March 1956.
MIKI-IEYEV, Vladimir P. Employee,
Soviet MA.:office, Washington, July
1954-May 195.6. Tried to procure
military information from US govern?-
ment officials;
MOROZOV, Aleksandr D. NA and.
A.s.st. MA, Argentina. Declared. png,,
June 1954.
MOTINOV, Petr Semenovi.ch, Lieu-
tenant Colonel. Asst. MA. Was in
}" GUDKOV, Andrey, Major. Asst. indirect contact with Canadian. Com--
MA, London. Expelled May 1954 nxunists involved in espionage in.1945.
for attempted espionage.
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MUitar ,' wad. Air Attaches.
`( PIVNEV, Leonid, L,ieu.tki.ant
Colonel, Asst. A-',-,R! Attache;
Wa,shi.:T.gto i., 1950-,1954. De..
dared pr g, Ma-.,r 1954.
PUP';; SHEV, Iva ., Ma, o:k?r
SOKOLOY, Afanasi., Commander.
NA, Oslo, 1951. Involved %n the
Per Dan;,e:ls'-fi case.
YEGOROV, Viktor V., Major.
Asst. Ass it. MA x... S-;o :k?o.m. Irpii.-
MA, Lo..-:dorm. Expe11~-,,d'a-?>
13 ?il-t?.s" for att rapt d c;sp.o--.age,
1954.
ROGOV, .A atoll,. MA, C L p :
. ,SFr' Da _'.s'-':
,.a, gL~-, . Exp,, :. rll~d "
hover amcnt :;a-:.uar- 195
ROMANOV, Aleksai_.dx?, Majoi:.
Asst. ;o OR:I7 Ca.--.ada,
1943-1945.
RUDITCHEV, LY eu.a-
c Comnianadex. Ass.. NA.
Exp .11 .d by Da-.s':F. gov t,
FF a.~?y 1957.
,SOKOLOV, f-.u. Wife: of Maj,,:,.
SOKOLOV. She, was ?-.sed as a
!_-awsoy-~. age-: t fol, GRU networ k,
Ca.-'7.a,da, 1945.
cat d ....LL E .s~orrka casfA Had 1zft
Swede;? before e epos .x of t'ie case
in, 1951.
YERMOLA:'*Ev, Sexgey. E:,:pioyee,
NA off c#, Ron-:, 1952u1955. Arr sted
by.Ttal'ans in Apz-i1 1955 on charges
of espionage..
ZA_ o - ~, Nikala ar, Colonel. MA,
C i. f of GRU legal ne uwo -k C -aada,
1943..1945.
ZAVAROUKEIN Peter. Asst. MA,
Soviet Ei, Aa -. Sf:-:)ckholm. 1_iv--1ved
i.n the esp=.onage case; 194':
x.940.
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VOKS,, Ptes:s,' 'Ctiltutal Attaches',and 'Uridesig'xiated'Attache's'
KHARKOVETZ, Georgiy Ivano- Y PETROV, Vladimir M. (See under
vich. Press Attache, Canberra, Diplomatic and Consular Positions)
February 1951 to April 1954.
RIS as'signi ent: to, develop PLAITKAIS, Yanis Eduardovich.
agents ,among contacts in correp- Attache, Soviet Embassy, Can'oerr,a,
pondent, government worker and January 1953 to April 1954., RIS
diplomatic circles. assignment: work among Russian
emigres.
MESHEVI'lINOV, 3oris. Cul-
tural Attache, Oslo, 1950-1.954.
Declared png February 1954.
Target: military data.
MITSKEVI T CH, V. P. State
Security Colonel. Head of the
"intelligence group" in VOKS.
T.SHER11OV, Feodor. Attache,
Soviet Ernba.ssy, Stockholm. Tar-
get: military and transportation
info rraation.
VYSSELSK ', 'fi-au. Press Attache
and lat r a Third Secretary at
En'..)assy in .Ca:::. erba. State
Secu ?it Officer. Return-,d, to USSR
in November 1950.
Un.dted' Natio':es'
GROMOV, Anatole. State
Security Colo_ael. Used United
y%Tations, cover for e.spion-.age.
Also was First Secretary at
Soviet Embassy, Was.-At. -.gto:..
GUBICHEV, Valenti.. UN
employee. Exposed, March
194.9. Target: counter -,i -itelli-
genc:e inforriiation.
KOVALYOV, Aleksandr P., Secoarr.d
,Secretary, Soviet delegation to UN.
Expelled from US for improper
activities, including espionage,
July 1954.
MART YNOV, Maks im G., Colonel.
Mere"ler of Soviet Military Staff to
UN, 19.51-1955. Declared pr?. g in
Jaaua :'y 1955.
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United. Nations'
PETRO. V, Viktor Ivanov:ich. SUMSKOY, Mikhail M. UN
UN employee. Target: military employee .in.1940Is..
aircraft. Dismissed from. UN,
July 1956. TIT'OV, Alexander. Used UN
cover for State Security activity
in 1955.
TASS Re~!reseiatatives'
ALKAYEVA, Le '.la. Worked
for Soviet Naval Intelligence,
Turkey, 1942.
KUDRYAVTSEV, Se.rgey. GRU
functionary under TASS cover,
Berlin, 1941.
ANISIMOV, Viktor. Exposed
as: RIS operative, 1951-1952,
in Stockholm.
\MEDVEDEV, fnu. Used alias,
MOROZOV. GRU Colonel under
TASS :cover, Ankara, 194.2.
ANTONOV, Viktor Nl-kolayevi.ch..`~ MIKHAYLOV, Vladimir. GRU
TASS correspondent,in Australia, officer under TASS cover, Ankara,
1952-1954. RIS. target: news- 1942.
paper men; members of Parlia.-,,
men.
NOSOV, fnu. State Security func-
tionary under TASS.cover ,in Aus-
C;EUGUNOV, Konstantin Alekseyz, tralia until August 1950.
_v i.ch. RIS agent. in the US under
TASS cover. OKOR:OKOVA, Augusta. RIS agent
under TASS.cover, Turkey, 1942..
JANOVICZ, Nikolai V. TASS Later was. translator and typist
employee at Soviet Embassy, in. Soviet Consulate.
O.s.lo. Involved. in. the Asbjorn
Sunde case, exposed in 1954.
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TASS' Rep?estntatives.'
' PAKHOMOV, Ivan Mikhay- VIS -TNYAKOV, Pavel. Chief of
lovich. TASS employee ,and TASS Bureau, Ankara, 1942.
State Security worker in State Security.officer.
Australia, arriving there
June 195 0. YEOOR ' V, fnu., Captain. TASS
correspondent, Tokyo. GRU
PISAREV, Leo_ C. TAS.S officer.
correspondent, The Nether-
lands.. RIS target: military YUDIN, fnu. Alias TARASOV.
and. civilian defense data. RIS. officer using TASS cover,
Declared png, February 1953. Berlin, 1941.
,SAMOYLOV, Sonin. A. GRU ~ ZHEVEINOV, Nicolai. TASS
Colonel. TASS correspon- functionary, Ottawa, 1945. GRU
dent in Japan, date not. deter- agent. Target: Canadian Army.
mine d.
Quasi'-legal Repre,seait'atives
DOMNITSKIY, Andrey Ivano- RASTVOROV, Yuri., Lieutenant
vich, Colonel. Chief of Soviet Colonel. State Security officer
Mission, Tokyo. Used this assigned to. Soviet Mission, Tokyo.
position as..c.ov.er for espionage.
4 TIKHVINSKIY,, Sergey Leonidovich,
KOTELNIKOV, Anatoliy Fedoro- Colonel. Chief of Soviet Mists ion .in
vich, Colonel. C1ai.kf, Consular Japan, 1956-1957. He has also used
Section, Soviet M.is,s.ion, Tokyo. TASS as, cover.
VASHKIN, Ivan., Colonel. Chief of
State Security group at Soviet.
Mission, Tokyo.
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Russian Red C:rc`s s.
BALAYAN, f:iu., Colonel. Head
of t=le "intelligence group" in
the Russia i Red Cross. ilas,
been abroad many times under
Red Cross cover.
Sov;.et Delegation's'
SMIRNOV, Al.dr? ,, Colo;-el.
Member of Skat.; s de1egatio:1
to Japa r.. RIS o ':...c r.
Trade Rc,p:L? se.-.tatives. arid C oil a i .i' ial Attaches;
CHISTYAKOV, Aleksa.ndr.
Ennpl oyee, Soviet Trade
Mis:sion., Sto.ck?olm, 1941.
Directed. Soviet agent, Anatole
Eri.c,sson, who was arrest d in
1956. Targets: Russia re-
fugees, Swedish ide.nti.ty docu-
ments,
KROTOV, Ivan I. Commercial
Counsellor, Ottawa, 1943-1945.
Used as 1 aison agent by GRU.
KOVALIEV, N.ikolay C. Com-
mercial Attache, Australia,
1952-?1954, RIS as:s.gnrnen.t:
develop contacts in political
and industrial cir?cles..
SEME~TOV, Semen M. Aintorg
-employee, U.S. Received re-
-ports re atomic e^ergy develop-
ment in 1944,
n. KRUTIKOV, fnu. Commercial
Attache, Ga::3jerra, 1948.-1950.
State Security functionary.
MIROSHNIKOV, Peter. Trade
Delegation official, Stockholm.
Expelled from Sweden, August
1956. Targets: Soviet ,and
Satellite refugees, and rada.
equipme t.
SOKOLOV, Doris P., Major. GRU
offic-_~r L Canada in 1945. Cover
positions member of Commercial
Cou's e llor's.. staff.
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La liste ci-dessous contient les noms des officiers
et du personnel des services de renseignements sovietiques
qui ont ete decouverts, depuis 1942 environ jusqu'a mi-
1959, comme ayant ete compromis dans des cas d'espionnage
tout en remplissant ostensiblement les fonctions de re -
presentants'officiels diplomatiques ou autres A 1'etranger.
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Postes Diplomatigues et Consulaires
AKSENOV, ,Nikolai Vassilievitch.
"Deuxieme Secretaire de 1'Am-
bassade sovietique, Mexico;
declare persona non grata en
avril 1959 pour avoir fomente
une agitation ouvriere commu-
niste au Mexique. (Une
autre liste dit: "accuse
d'espionnage").
DRANKOV, Vassili Dmitriievitch.
Deuxieme Secretaire et Attache
de Presse A 1'Ambassadeso-
vietique, La Haye; expulse des
Pays-Bas pour avoir fait deg
l'espionnage et avoir essaye
de corrompre un personnage
officiel hollandais, janvier
1957.
BELOOUSSOV, Victor Vassilievitch. DIAKANOV, Dmitri Alexeievitch.
Deuxieme Secretaire de 1'Ambas-
sade sovietique, Stockholm;
meld a 1'affaire d'espionnage
Zartarian; declare persona non
grata a la suite de ses acti-
vites d'espionnage contre la
Suede, janvier 1957.
BELOV, Nikolai Andreievitch.
Conseiller a i'Ambassade
sovietique, Buenos Aires; de-
clare persona non grata pour
activites politiques et inge-
rences dans les affaires na-
tionales de l'Argentine, avril
19 59
CHIBAIEIL Petr Andreievitch
(Colonel),, Conseiller au
Ministere sovietique des
Affaires Etrangeres; au Japon
en 1951 pour controler leg
activites du P.C. et pour ex-
ploiter les contacts sovieti-
ques avec le corps de contre-
espionnage americain.
DOLBINE, Gregori Gr4gorievitch.
Conseiller a 1'Ambassade sovie-
tique, Washington, 1946; avait
d'abord servi au Japon, 1940-
1944.
Premier Secretaire a 1':Am
bassade sovietique de Buenos
Aires; declare persona non
grata pour avoir foments des
emeutes industrielles, avril
1959.
FARAFONTOV, Alexandre N.~
Commis a 1'Ambassade sovie-
tique a Ottawa, 1945; meld
a l'espionnage.
GOUBANOV, Fedor Yegorovitch.
Commis a 1'Ambassade sovie-
tique a Canberra; fonction-
naire de la Securite d'Etat;
renvoye en U.R.S.S., mars
1951.
GOUSEV, Serguei D. Portier
a 1'Ambassade sovietique a
Ottawa, 1945; officier du
G.R.U.
JOUKOV, Ivan Vassilievitch.
Chauffeur A 1'Ambassade sovie-
ts ue a Oslo jusqu'en janvier
1954; me"le a l'affaire d'es-
pionnage Asbjorn SUNDE.
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"QQWMMMM
KISLITSINE, Filipp Vassilie-
vitch Deuxieme Secretaire
a i'Ambassade sovietique,
Canberra, d'oetobre 1952
a avril 1954; tithe assignee
par les S.R.S.: organiser
un"appareil illegal" en
Australie, "etudier" les
membres du Parlement et le
Corps diplomatique.
KOVALENKO, Yevgenii
Vassilievitch. Troisieme
Secretaire a l'Ambassade
sovietique, Canberra;
fonctionnaire de la Securi-
te d'Etat; quitta apres la
defection de PETROV, avril
1954.
KRILOV, Lev Vladislavovitch.
Premier Secretaire a 1'Am-
bassade sovietique, Caracas;
intervint de fawn agressive
contre la detention d'un
employe de 1'Ambassade que
1'on soupronnait d'activites
politiques illicites; de-
clare persona non grata,
join 1952.
KOUDRIAVTSEV, Serguei
Mikhailovitch. Attache de
Presse, Ankara, 1942;
Premier Secretaire a 1'Am-
bassade sovietique d'Ottawa;
officier du G.R.U. au Canada,
1945. Servit a Vienne, 1952-
1955. Arriva a Bonn, Alle-
magne de l'Ouest, comme
Ministre-Conseiiler le 20
decembre 1955; partit en
septembre 1957?
KOULAKOV, (prenom inconnu)
(Lieutenant). Commis a
1'Ambassade sovietique a
Ottawa, 1945; mete a
l'espionnage.
KOUROTCHKINE, Nikolai
Ivanovitch. Troisieme Secre-
taire a 1'Ambassade sovie-
tique a Washington; declare
persona non grata pour acti-
vates d'espionnage et pour
avoir essaye d'acheter des
publications militaires clas-
sifiees, Juin 1958.
MAKAROV, Semen Ivanovitch.
Commis, Troisieme Secretaire
et Premier Secretaire a l'Am-
bassade sovietique, Canberra,
1943-1949; etait le premier
Resident de la Securite
d'Etat en Australie.
11
doro-
MACHKANTSEV, Genadii Fe
witch. Employe a 1'Ambas-
sade sovietique, Washington;
expulse des E.U. pour action
intempestive en essayant de
forcer un ancien officier
d'aviation (Petr Pirogov) a
retourner en U.R.S.S., avril
1957.
MASLENNIKOV, Nikolai.
Deuxieme Secretaire a 1Am-
bassade sovietique, Varsovie;
la presse polonaise signalait
le 30 mai 1957 que le gouverne-
ment polonais 11avait declare
persona non grata pour actions
incompatibles avec le statut
diplomatique.
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UMMTIMMMMM~
MERKOULOV, Alexandre Ivano- PANIOUCHKINE, Alexandre Semono-
vitch. Deuxieme Secretaire witch. Ambassadeur sovietique
a l1Ambassade sovietique, aux Etats-Unis, 1947-1951;Major
Oslo, jusquren mars 1952; General dans la Securite d'Etat.
contact d'Asbjorn SUNDE, Nor-
vegien convaincu d'espionnage PAVLOV, Vitalii G. Deuxieme Se-
en juiliet 1954. cretaire a 1'Ambassade sovieti-
que, Ottawa, 1945; chef du reseau
MITROFANOV Victor Y. legal de la Securite d'Etat au
Chauffeur d 1'Ambassade sovie'- Canada.
tique, Oslo; mile a l'affaire
d'espionnage d'Asbjorn SUNDE. PETROV, Vladimir Mikhailovitch.
Troisieme Secretaire et fonc-
MOLEV, Vassili. Mikhailovitch. tionnaire de V.O.K.S. A 1'Am-
Commis a l'Ambassade soviets- bassade sovietlque, Canberra,
que; Washington; male a 1'af'ai- Australie, 1951-1954; fit
re d"espionnage SOBLE-ALBAM; defection en avril 1954.
quitta les E.U. en janvier 1957.'
SADOVNIKOV, Valentin Matveievitch.
NOVIKOV Nikolai Vassilievitch. Deuxieme et plus tard Premier
Charge d'affaires a 1'Ambassade Secretaire a 1'Ambassade sovie-
sovietique, Washington; dirigea, tique, Canberra; Resident de la
de,concert avec TOLOKON'XKOV, Securite d'Etat, avril 1949 a
l'affaire GOUBITCHEV-COPLON. avril 1951.
NOVIKOV, Youri Vassilievitch. SOKOLOV, Georgi Alexandrovitch.
Deuxieme Secretaire a 1'Ambas- Conseiller a 1'Ambassade sovie-
sade sovietique, Washington; tique de Washington, 1948;
me"le a l'affaire d'espionnage ancien Resident en chef a Tokyo;
VERBER-PONGER; declare persona occupe aux E.U. un post semblable.
non grata en janvier 19530
TOLOKONNIKOV, Lev Sergueievitch.
ORLOV, Nikolai P. Employe a Premier Secretaire a 1'Ambas-
1'Ambassade sovietique a sade sovietique a Washington;
Stockholm; expulse de Suede en dirigea de concert aver N.V.
rapport avec l'affaire d'espion- NOVIKOV l'affaire GOUBITCHEV-
nage H.E. ANDERSSON,septembre COPLON.
1951; objectif; donnees militai-
res y compris routes d'invasion VINOGRADOV, Constantin.
pour penetrer en Suede. Secretaired 1'Ambassade sovie
tii3ue de Stockholm, 1947;
OTROCHENKO, Andrei Makarovitch .mile a l'affaire d'espionnage
(Colonel). Officiel du Ministe- Hilding ANDERSSON.
re sovietique des Affaires Etran-
gares au Japon, 1953; chef du
service des renseignements en Ex-
treme Orient pour la Securite
d' Etat
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VLADIKINE, Nikolai
Alexeievitcho Conseiller
a l'Ambassade sovietique
Washington; remplaca
PANIOUSHKINE comme Resi-
dent de la Securite
d'Etat aux E.U.
YAKOVLEV, Anatoli Antonovitch.
Vice-Consul au Consulat sovie-
tique de New York jusqu'en
1946; recut les rapports de
Harry GOLD de septembre 1944
a decembre 1946.
ZOUBILINE, Vassili Mikhailovitch.
Troisieme, puis Deuxieme Secre-
taire a 1Ambassade sovietique,
Washington; dirigea 1'espionnage
atomique aux E.U. de 1942 a 19440
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Attaches Militaires, Navals et de 1'Air
ALIABIEV, Mikhail
Sergueievitch. Attache
Militaire A. 1'Ambassade so-
vietique de Caracas; in-
tervint de fagon agressive
contre la detention dun
employe de l'Ambassade qua
etait soupgonne d'activites
politiques illicites; de-
clare persona non grata,
juin 1952.
AMOSSOV, Igor Alexandrovitch
(Capitaine de Frigate).
Attache Naval adjoint a
1'Ambassade sovietique,
Washington, 1952-1954; de-
clare persona non grata en
fevrier 1954 pour activates
d'espionnage en vue de 11ac-
quisition de renseignements
sur les navires et 11equipe-
ment de la marine americaine.
ANGUELOV,Pavel N. (Lieutenant)
Membre du personnel de 1'Atta-
che Militaire a 1'Ambassade
Sovietique d'Ottawa, 1945;
agent de liaison du G.E.U.
ASTAFIEV, Alexandre Romano-
vitch (Capitaine de Frigate)
Attache Naval a l'Ambassade
sovietique, Rome, octobre
1948-mai 1955
BOUBTCHIKOV, Ivan Alexandro-
vitch (Colonel). Attache
Militaire adjoint a 1'Ambas-
sade sovietique, Washington;
expulse des E0Ufl pour avoir
ete me"le a des activates
d'espionnage, juin 1956.
EGOROV (YEGOROV), Victor V.
(Commandant) Attache mils-
taire adjoint a 1'Ambassade
sovietique, Stockholm,; mele
a l'affaire d'espionnage
ENBOM, 1948-1951.
ERMOLAEV (YERMOLAYEV) Serguei.
Adjoint a 1'Attache Naval a
1'Ambassade sovietique, Rome,
1952-1955; arrete par les
Italiens en avril 1955 sous
11inculpation d'espionnage;
declare persona non grata
pour conduite incompatible
avec le statut diplomatique,
mai 1955.
GALKINE,(prenom inconnu)
(Capitaine). Offieier du
G.R.U. au Canada en 1945.
GOUDKOV, Andrei Fedorovitch.
(Commandant).Attache Militai-
re adjoint a 1'Ambassade
sovietique, Londres; expulse
pour avoir essaye d'espionner,
mai 19544
GOUR C_HKOV (prenom inconnu)
(Capitaine). Chauffeur du
chef du G.R.U. au Canada,
1945.
ION.CHENKO, Nikolai Vassilievitch
(Lieutenant Colonel). Attache
Militaire (une source dit:
Attache Militaire adjoint) a
1'Ambassade sovietique, Ankara;
demanda a quitter la Turquie
a la suite de ses efforts pour
ach.eter des renseignements
militaires, mai 1956.
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KOCHELEV, Vladimir
Fegorovitch (Capitaine de
Fregate). Attache Naval
suppleant a 1'Ambassade
sovietique, Oslo,. 1951;
me"le a 1'affaire d'espion-
nage Per DANIELSEN.
KRILOV, Youri Pavlovitch
(Commandant). Attache
Militaire ad,oint a 1'Am-
bassade sovietique a
Washington; declare-persona
non grata, janvier 1957,
pour avoir a chete des ins-
truments electroniques et
pour avoir essaye d'acheter
des renseignements militai-
res secrets.
KOUZNETSOV, Anatolia.
Ivanovitch (Commandant).
Attache Militaire adjoint
a 1'Arnbassade sovietique
a Teheran; expulse d'Iran
pour activites d'espionnage,
mars 1956.
LiSHTCHINE,Mikhail Nikolaie-
vitch. Commis au bureau de
1'Attache Naval, Consulat
General d'Istanbul; expulse
de Turquie, septembre 1957,
pour activites d'espionnage
et pour avoir essaye d'ob-
tenir des renseignements
sur des etablissements de
defense
MALIKOV, Alexei. Chauffeur
d eol'Attache Naval au Consu-
lat General~d'Istanbul;
declare persona non grata
pour activites d'espionnage,
septembre 1957.
MARLAGUINE7Alexandre
Mikhailovitch (Capitaine).
Attache Naval adjoint au
ConsulatbGeneral sovietique
d' Istan1 1; somme de quitter
la Turquie dans les 48 heures
pour activates d'espionnage
et pour avoir essaye d'obte-
nir des renseignements sur
des etablissements de defense,
septembre 1957.
MIKHEIEV, Vladimir Petrovitch.
Employe au bureau de 1Atta-.
the Militaire a l'Ambassade
sovietique de Washington,
juillet 1954-mai 1956; essaya
de se procurer des renseigne-
ments militaires par 1'in-
termediaire d'officiels du
gouvernement americain.
MOROZOV, Alexandre nitriievitch
(Capitaine). Attache Naval
et Attache Militaire adjoint
a 1'Ambassade sovietique de
Buenos Aires; declare persona
non grata pour activites
d'espionnage, juin 1956.
MOTINOV, Petr Semenovitch
(Lieutenant Colonel). Atta-
che Militaire adjoint a 1'Am-
bassade sovietique a Ottawa;
etait en contact indirect avec
des communistes canadiens metes
a 1'espionnage en 1945.
PIVNEV, Leonid Yegorovitch
(Lieutenant Colonel). Attache
de l'Air adjoint a 1'Ambassa-
de sovietique a Washington,
1950-1954; declare persona,
non grata pour activites d'es-
pionnage visant a obtenir des
renseignements militaires clas-
sifies, mai 1954.
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"QIAL
POUPISHEV, Ivan
Vassilievitch (Commandant).
Attache Militaire adjoint
(une source dit: Attache
de 1'Air adjoint) a 1'Am-
bassade sovietique a
Londres; declare persona
non grata pour espionage,
mai 1954.
REMISSOV, Nikolai
Matveievitch (Capitaine).
Attache Naval adjoint a
1'Ambassade sovietique A
Mexico; declare persona
non grata pour avoir fo-
mente des e'meutes de tra-
vailleurs communistes au
Mexique, avril 1959.
ROGOV, Anatolia Vladimiro-
vitch (Lieutenant Colonel).
Attache Militaire a 1'Am
bassade sovietique a
Copenhague, essaya d'obte-
nir des renseignements
militaires de faCon 1114-
gale ;aexpulse (pas offs-
ciellement declare persona
non grata) par le gouve'rne-
ment danois en janvier 1957
ROMANOV, Alexandre I.
(Commandant). Assistant au
chef du G.R.U. au Canada,
1943-1945.
SMIRNOV, Serguei Sergueievitch.
Assistant a 1'Attache Militaire
a 1'Ambassade sovietique,
Copenhague; somme de quitter,
le Danemark pour avoir essaye
d' obtenir des renseignements
secrets sur les defenses da-
noises, octobre 1957.
SOKOLOVA(prenom inconnu).
Epouse du commandant Boris
SOKOLOV; servit d'agent de
liaison pour le reseau du
G.R.U., Canada, 1945.
SOKOLOV, Afanasi S. (Capitaine
de Fregate). Attache Naval
a 1'Ambassade sovietique a
Oslo, 1951; mele a 11affaire
Per DANIELSEN.
SOLOVOV, Alexandre. Attache
Militaire adjoint A 1'Ambas-
sade sovietique a Rome; de-
clare persona non grata pour
espionnage, mai 1958.
SOUKHATCHEV, Georg i' . Niconoro-
vitch. Interprete'au bureau
de 1'Attache Militaire A
1'Ambassade sovietique de La
Haye; declare persona non
grata pour avoir essaye d'ob-
tenir des renseignements mili-
taires, janvier 1958.
TCHERNOV Leonid Ivanovitch
ROUDITCHEV, Mikhail Kouzmitch (Colonel). Attache Militaire
(Capitaine de Corvette). adjoint A 1'Ambassade sovie-
Attache Naval adjoint a 1'Am- tique, La Haye (rune liste donne
bassade sovietique A Copen- son poste comme etant: At-tache~
hague; essaya d'obtenir des Militaire et de 1'Air); declare
renseignements militaires de persona non grata en janvier
fagon illegale; expulse du, 1958, pour avoir cherche a
Danemark, fevrier 195'74 obtenir des renseignements sur
les etablissements navals.
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.in
ZABOTINE, Nikolai (Colonel).
Attache Militaire.A 1'Am-
bassade sovietique A Ottawa;
chef du reseau du G.R.U. au
Canada, 1943-1945.
ZAVAROUKHINE, Petr. Attache
`Militaire adjoint A l'Ambassade
sov etique a Stockholm; mele
a 1'affaire d'espionnage ENBOM,
1946-1948.
ZENINE, Vassili 8ergueievitch
(Capitaine). Attache N:Lval
adjoint (une source dit: Attache
Naval:),;& l'Ambassade sovietique
as La Haye; declare persona non
grata:pour avoir essaye d'abtenir
des._renseignements sur des eta
blissements navals, janvier-1958.
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Re re entants'de VOKS? Attaches de Presse
Attaches u ure s, et tac es non des1gnes
CHALKHAROV", Khairoulla.
Attache a l'Ambassade sovie-
tique A Bangkok; declare
persona non grata sous'l'in-
culpation de s'etre livre
a des activates dangereuses
A la paix et a la securite
de la nation et a des acti-
vites subversives dans lps
domaines du travail, les
milieux etudiants, jour-
nalistes et politiques,
octobre 1958.
KHARKOVETS, Georgi Ivano-
vitch. Attache de Presse
A 1'Ambassade sovietique
a Canberra, fevrier 1951-
avril 1954; assignation des
S.R.S.: former des agents
parmi les contacts dans les
cercles diplomatiques, les
employes'du gouvernement,
et les correspondants.
KOUZNETSOV, Pavel Stepano-
vitch. Attache a 1'Ambas-
sade sovietique A Londres;
recut des donnees secretes
par l'intermediaire d'un
sans-filiste du Bureau des
Ai acres Etran46res,britan-
eclare persona
n que, 1953; declare'
.non grata pour espionnage,
juil.et 1952.
MECHEVITINOV, Boris S.
Attache Culturel a l'Ambas-
sade sovietique a Oslo, 1950-
1954; declare persona non
grata pour avoir essaye
d'obtenir des donnees mili-
taires, fevrier 1954.
MITSKEVITCH, V.P. Colonel de.
la Securite d'Etat; chef du
"groupe des renseignements"
dans V . O. K. S.
MONAKHOV, Constantin Petro-
witch. Secretaire Culturel
A 1'Ambassade sovietique a
Buenos-Aires; declare persona
non grata pour avoir fomente
des emeutes industrielies,
avril 1959.
PETROV, Vladimir M. (Voir
Postes diplomatiques et
consulaires).
PLAITKAIS, Yanis Edouardovitch.
Attache a 1'Ambassade sovie-
tique a Canberra, janvier 1953-
avril 1954; assignation des
S.R.S.: travailler parmi les
emigres russes.
TCHERNOV, Feodor. Attache
A 1'Ambassade sovietique a
Stockholm; objectif: renseigne-
ments militaires et de trans-
ports.
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VISSELSKI, Alexei Vladimiro-
vitch. #ttache de Presse
et plus tard Troisi6me
Secretaire ~. l'Ambassade
sovietique a Canberra;
officier de la Securite
d'Etat; renvoye en U.R.S.S.
en novembre 1950.
Organisation des Nations Unies
GROMOV,. Anatoli Borisovitch.
Colonel de la Securite
d'Etat; se servit de 1'O.N.U.
comme couverture pour espion-
nage; fut aussi Premier Secre-
taire A 1'Ambassade sovieti-
que a Washington.
GROU,CHA, Vladimir Arsentievitch.
Premier Secretaire de la Dele-
gation sovietique A 11O.N.U.
Somme par le gouvernement
americain de quitter le paysa
la suite d'efforts pour obtenr
des documents confidentiels
concernant un rapport' sur la
suppression de la revolte,
hongroise par 1'U.R.S.S.,
avril 1957.
GOUBITCHEV, Valentin
Alexeievitch. Employe a
11O.N.U. D couvert en mars
1949; objectif: renseignements
de contre-espionnage.
GOURIANOV, Alexandre
.Constantinovitch. Attache
A la delegation sovietique
A 1'O.N.U.1 declare persona
non grata a la suite du role
qu'il joua dans la "re
defection" de cinq matelots
sovietiques, avril 1956.
KOVALEV (KOVALIOV) Alexandre
Petrovitch. Deuxieme Se-
cretaire . la De1e~ation so-
vietique A 1'O.N.U:; expulse
des E.U. pour activates in-
tempestives, y compris es-
pionnage, fevrier 1954.
MARTINOV Maxime Gre gorievitch
(Colonel. Conseiller de
1'Etat-Major militaire sovie-
tique A 1'O.N.U.; declare
persona non grata pour acti-
vites d'espionnage, fevrier
1955.
PETROV, Victor Ivanovitch.
Traducteur au secretariat
de 1'O.N.U.; expulse de
1'O.N.U. pour avoir essaye
d'obtenir des renseignements
sur l'aviation militaire,
juillet 1956.
SOUMSKOI, Mikhail Mikhailovitch.
Employe A 1'O.N.U. daps les
annees 1940.
TITOV, Alexandre Semenovitch.
Se servit de 1'O.N.U. comme
couverture pour ses activites
de la Securite d'Etat en 1955-
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~~HAlPLT
TOURKINE, Nikolai Fedorovitch.
Troisieme Secretaire A la
Delegation sovietique a
1'O.N.U.; declare persona non
grata A la suite de son role
dans la "re-defection" de
cinq matelots sovietiques,
avril 1956.
YEKIMOV, Constantin Pav7Lovitch...
Deuxieme Secretaire A la
Delegation sovietique A 11O.N.U.;
declare persona non grata-&.-la
suite du role qu'il joua dans
1'enlevement par un per. russe
dune enfant nee'americaine
octobre 1956.
Representants de TASS
ALKAIEVA, Leila. Travailla
pour le service des rensei-
gnements navals sovietiques
en Turquie, 1942.
ANISIMOV Victor.. Decou
ventcomme etant agent des
S.R.S., 1951-1952, a
Stockholm.
ANTONOV, Victor Nikolaievitch.
TASS.correspondant en Austra-
lie, 1952-1954; objectif des
S.R.S.:journalistes, membres
du Parlement.
JEVEINOV, Nicolas I. Fonc-
tionnaire de TASS, Ottawa,
1945; agent du G.R.U.;
objectif: 11armee canadienne.
KOUDRIAVTSEV, Serguei
Mikhailovitch. Fonctionnai
re du G.R.U. sous couverture
de TASS, Berlin, 1941.
MEDVEDEV (prenom inconnul.
Se servit du nom d'emprunt:
MOROZOV; officier du G.R.U.
(Colonel) sous couverture de
TASS, Ankara, 1942.
MIKHAILOV,Vladimir. Officier
du G.R.U. sous couverture de
TASS, Ankara 1942.
NOSSOV, Fedor Andreievitch..
Fonctionnaire de la Securite
d'Etat sous couverture de
TASS en Australie jusqu'en
aout 1950.
OKOROKOVA, Augusta Vasilievna.
Agente des S.R.S. sous cou
venture de TASS, Turquie, 1942;
fut plus tard traductrice et
dactylo au Consulat sovietique.
PAKHOMOV, Ivan?Milchailovitch.
Employe de TASS et function-
naire de la Securite d'Etat
en Australie ou it arriva en
juin 1950.
PISSAREV, Lev.Constantinevitoh.
Correspondant de TASS a La
Haye; declare persona non
grata pour activites visant a
obtenir des renseignements sur
les defenses militaires et
civiles, fevrier 1953?
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SAMOILOV, Constantin
Petrovitch. Colonel du
G.R.U.; corresFondant de
TASS au Japon a une date
indetermineeo
TCHOUGOUNOV,,Constantin
Alexeievitcho Agent des
S.R.So' aux E.U0 sous couver-
ture :die.. TASS.
TROUCHINE, Youri Fedorovitch.
Representant de TASS A
Bangkok ; declare persona non
grata sous 11inculpation de
s?etre livre A des activites
dangereuses Ala pa.ix et a
la.:sedurite de la nation et
a des activites subversives
dari's les domaines ,du travail,
dans les milieux etudiants,
journalistes et politi.ques,:
octobre 1950.
VISHNIAKOV, Pavel. Chef du
bureau de TASS A Ankara, en
1942; officier de la Securite
d'Etat.
YANOVITCH, Nikolai V. Employe
de TASS a l'Ambassade sovie-
tique a Oslo; me"le a l'affai-
re Asbjorn SUNDE, decouvert en
1954.
YEGOROV (EGOROV),Yevguenii
Semenovitch (Capitaine).
Correspondant de TASS a
Tokyo; officier du G.R.U.
YOUDIIE.(prenom inconnu).
Nom d'emprunt TARASSOV;
officier des S.R.S. sous
couverture de TASS, Berlin
1941.
Representants Quasi-L4gaux
DOMINITSKII, Andrei
Ivanovitch (Colonel). Chef
de la Mission sovieti(4ue a
Tokyo; se servit de ce poste
come couverture pour faire
de L!espionnage.
KOTELNIKOV, Anatoli.
Fedorovitch (Colonel). Chef
de la: Section.consulaire,
Mission sovietique, Tokyo.
RASTVOROV, Youri Alexandrovitch
(Lieutenant Colonel). Officier
de la Securite d'Etat assigns
a la Mission sovietique a
Tokyo; fit defection en 1954.
TIKHVINSICI, Serguei Leonidoyitch
(Colonel). Chef de la Mission
sovietique au Japon, 1956-1957;
ii s'est aussi servi de TASS
comme couverture.
VACHKINE Ivan'Alexeievitch
(Colonel;. Chef du groupe
de la Securite d'ttat a la
Mission sovietique a Tokyo.
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Croix-Rouge Russe
BALAIANE.(prenom inconnu)'
(Colonel). Chef du "groupe des
renseignements" dans la Croix
Rouge russe; a voyage a 11e-
tranger bien des This sous
couverture de la Croix Rouge.
Delegations Sovietigues
SMIRNOV, Andrei (Colonel).
Membre de la Delegation sovie-
tique de patinage au Japon;
officier du R. I. S0
Representants de Commerce et Attaches Commerciaux
IVACHOV,Vassili Gre gorie-
witch. Employe 4 la Mission
Commerciale sovietique a
Buenos ;fires; declare
persona non rata pour avoir
fomente des emeutes indus-
trielles, avril 1959.
KHISTIAKOV, Alexandre.
Employe de la Mission de
Commerce sovietique A
Stockholm, 1941; dirigea
l'agent sovietique, Anatole
ERICSSON, qui fut arrete
en 1956; objectifs: refugies
russes, papiers d'identite
suedoiso
KOVALIEV, Nicolai Gregorie-
vitch. Attache Commercial
a l'Ambassade sovietique,
Canberra, 1952-1954; assi-
gnation des S.R.S0: former
des contacts dans les cercles
politiques et industrielso
KROTOV, Ivan Ivanovitcha
Conseiller commercial a
l'Ambassade_sovietique a
Ottawa, 1943-1945; servit
d'agent de liaison pour
le G.R.U.
KROUTIKOV, Fedor Andreievitch.
Attache Commercial a 1'Ambas-
sade sovietique, Canberra,
1948-1950; fonctionnaire de
la Securite d'Etat4
MIROCHNIKOV, Petr SergueieP
witch. Officiel de la Dele-
gation Commerciale sovieti-
que a Stockholm; expulse'
de Suede pour activites contre
les refugies sovietiques et
satellites et pour avoir
cherche a obtenir des ren-
seignements sur les instru-
ments a radar, aot1t 19560
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SEMENOV, Semen Markovitch. SOKOLOV, Boris P,(Comnandant).
Employe de Amtorg aux E.U.; Officier du G.R.U. au Canada
recut des rapports sur le ezi. 1945; poste de couverture:
developpement de 1'energie membre du personnel du bureau
atomique en 1944, du Conseiller CommerciL, I .
l'Ambassade sovietique a
Ottawa.
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Appendix
loop-ad
OLUBLI
The list below names officers and other staff personnel of Soviet
intelligence services who have been'exposed publicly, from approximately
1942 to mid-1957, as involved in espionage while functioning ostensibly
as diplomatic or other official representatives abroad.
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Diplomatic and Consular Positions
BELUSOV, Vietor. Second Se . . Soviet
Embassy, Stockholm. Involved in the
ZARTARYAN espionage case. Left Sweden,
Jan 1957 at request of Swedish government.
DOLBIN, Gregoniy G. Counsellor, ov d-
Embassy Wash 9 6. Prior to th had
served In Japan, 1940-1944.
DRANKOV, Vasiliy D. Second Seey 1!,. and
Press Attache, The Hague. Target: defense
and industrial information. Expeiled57.
i
FARAFONTOV, A.N. Clerk at Soviet Embassy,
Ottawa, 1945. Involved in espionage.
GUBANOV, Fedor Yegorovich. Embassy Clerk,
Canberra. worker. Returned to USSR,
March 1951.
GUSYEV, Sergey D. Soviet Embassy doorman.
GRU officer, Ottawa, 1945.
KISLYTSYN Filipp Vasilyevich. Second
MASHKANTZEV, Genadi F., Employee,
Soviet Embassy, Washington. Expelled
from US April 1957 for improper
activities in attempt to force former
Air Force officer Peter Pirogov. to
return to USSR.
MERKULOV, Alexander I. Second Secy.r-
Soviet Embe'ssy, Oslo, until March
1952. A contact of Asbjorn Sunde,
convicted of espionage, July 1954.
MITROFANOV, Victor . Chauffeur,
Soviet Embassy, Oslo. Involved in the
Asbjorn Sunde espionage case.
MOIEV, Vasili M. Clerk, Soviet Embassy,
Involved in Soble-Albam espionage se.
Departed US, Jan1.A1957.
NOVIKOV, Nikolai -7 Charge d'Affaires,
Soviet Embassy, Washington. With
TOLOKONNIKOV, directed the Gub3hev-
Coplon case.
Secy., Soviet Embassy, Canberra, Oct,."-
1952 to April 1954. RIS assignment:
organize an "illegal apparatus" in
Australia; "study" members of Parliament
and Diplomatic Corps.
Third
ich
il
Y
i
V
.
yev
as
y
KOVA~j K0,
evgen
Se ;# viet Embassy, Canberra.
officer. Departed after Petrov defected,
April 1954.
KUDRIAVTZEV, Sergei. First Sec , Soviet
Embassy, Ottawa. GRU officer in Canada, 1945.
j ev're n amt,
KULAKOV, fnu,., LC Clerk, Soviet Embassy,
Ottawa, 1945. Involved in espionage.
KUTNETZOV, P. Embassy employee, London.
Received secret data from British Foreign
Office wireless operator, 1952.
MAKAROV., Semen vovich, Clerk, Third Secy.
and First Sect Soviet Embassy, Canberra,
1943-1949. First -O-Resident,, Australia.
is t
NOVIKOV, Yuri V. Second Se Y.,aoviet
Embassy, Washington. Involved in
Verber-Ponger espionage case. Declared
png, Ja 1953.
ORLOV,, Niko P. EmPtoyo eep et
Embassy, Stockhollk . In Sep 51
expelled from Sweden for connection
with H.E. Andersson espionage case.
Target: military data, including
invasion routes into Sweden.
OTROSHENKO, Andrey Makarovich, Colonel.
Official of Soviet Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in Japan, 1953. Chief of
Far East Intelligence for
PANYUSHKIN, Aleksandr Semenovich.
Soviet Ambassador to the United States,
1947-1951. A Major General in
PAVLOV, Vitali G. Second Secy~>
Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, 1945. Chief cE
W legal network in Canada.
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Military. Naval and Air Attaches
AMOSOV, Igor A., Commander. Asst. NA,
Washington, 1952-54. Declared png,
Feb 1954.
ANGELOV, fnu., Lt. GRU liaison agent,
Ottawa, 1945. Officer on staff of MA.
ASTAFYEV, Aleksandr R, Commander. NA,
Rome, October 1948 to May 1955.
MOTINOV, Petr Semenovich, Lt. Col.
Asst. MA. Was in indirect contact
with Canadian Communists involved
in espionage in 1945.
i
PIVNEV, Leonid, Lt. Colt Asst Air Attache,
Washington, 1950-1954. Declared png,
May 1954.
BUBCHIKOV, Ivan A., Colonel. Found to be
engaged in espionage. Expelled from the
US, June 1956.
EGOROV, Viktor. Asst. MA, Soviet Embassy,
Stockholm. Involved in Enbom espionage
case, 1948-1951.
GALKIN, fnu., Captain. GRU officer in
Canada in 1945.
GURSHKOV, fnu., Captain. Driver for GRU
chief, Canada, 1945.
GUDKOV, Andrey, Major. Asst. MA, London.
Expelled May 1954 for attempted espionage.
IONCHENKO, Nikolay V., MA, Turkey. Charred
with trying to buy military info ~rti" a `1044
requested to leave Turkey,
KOSHELEV, Vladimir F., Commander. Acting NA,
Oslo, 1951. Involved in Per Danielsen case.
KRYLOV, Yuri P., Major. Asst. MA in the US.
Declared png January 1957.
KUZNETSOV, Anatoliy I., Major. Asst. MA,
Tehran. Expelled from Iran, March 1956.
MIKHEYEV, Vladimir P. Employee, Soviet MA
office, Washington, July 1954-May 1956.
Tried to governmentrofficialsitary . from US
MOROZOV, Aleksandr D. N and
Asst. MA, Argentina. Declared png, June
1954.
PUPYSHEV, Ivan, Major. Asst. MA, London.
Expelled by British for attempted
espionage, 1954.
ROGOV, Anatoli. MA, Copenhagen. Expelled
by Danish government in January 1957.
ROMANOV, Aleksandr, Major. Asst. to GRU
chief in Canada, 1943-1945.
RUDITCHEV, Mikhail, Lt. Comdr. Asst._jA.
Expelled by Danish government, Febk 957
SOKOLOV, fnu. Wife of Major SOKOLOV. She
was used as a liaison agent for GRU net-
work, Canada, 1945
SOKOLOV, Afanasi, Commander. NA, Oslo,
1951. Involved in the Per Danielsen
case.
YEGOROV, Viktor V., Major. Asst. MA in
Stockholm. Implicated in Enbom case.
Had left Sweden before exposure of the
case in 1951.
YERMOLAYEV, Sergey. Employee, NA office,
Rome, 1952-1955. Arrested by Italians
in April 1955 on charges of espionage.
ZABOTIN, Nikolay, Colonel. MA, Chief of
GRU legal network in Canada, 1943-1945.
ZAVAROUKHIN, Peter. Asst. MA, Soviet
Embassy, Stockholm. Involved in the
Enbom espionage case, 1946-1948.
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PETROV, Vladimir Mt Third Sete: and acting
VOKS officer, Sov bassy, Cgnbeera,
Australia, 1951-1954. Defected April,
1954.
SADOVNIKOV, Valentina-iyeyevich. Second
and later First Sec-n S viet Embassy,
Canberra. esident, Aril 1949 to
1
`'
April 195
.
SHIBAYEV, Petr Andreyeyich, Colonel.
Advisor of Soviet Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. In Japan, 1951, to control C P
activities and to exploit Soviet
contacts with the US Counter-Intelligence
Corps.
SOKpL.V,. Georgiy Aleksandrovich. Counsellr
So 4mbassy Washington, 1948. Former
Chief Resident, in Tokyo. In the US in
similar position.
4.ry
TOLOKONNIKOV, Lev S. First Sec %', Soviet
Embassy, Washington. With N. V. NOVIKOV,
directed -C8!"ase.
ry
VINOG ADOV, Konstantin. Sect, Soviet
Embassy, Stockholbj 1947. Involved in
Hilding Andersson case.
VLADYKIN,, Nikolai A. Counselor of Sov
Embassy, Washington. Replaced!PA"MHKIN
a j r jVt in the US .
YAKOVLEV, Anatoli Antonovich. Vice
Consul at Soviet Consulate, New York
City until 1946. Received reports from
Harry Gold, Sep 944. until De 946.
ZHUKOV, Ivan Vasilievich. Chaufar,
Soviet Embassy, Oslo, until Jazz 4.
Involved in Asbjornf Sunde espionage case.
ZUBILIN Vassili M. Third, then Second
Secf 'Ioviet Embassy, Washington.
Directed atomic espionage in the US
*Er
from 1942 to 1944.
KHARKOVETZ, Georgiy Ivanovich. Press
Attache, Canberra, February 1951 to
' 1
April 1954. RIS assignment: to
develop agents among contacts in
correspondent, government worker and
diplomatic circles.
MESHEVITINOV, Boris. Cultural Attache
Oslo, 1950-1954. Declared png Feb.
1954. Target: military data
JW
(C-olonel. Head
MITSKEVITCH, V.P.
of the "intelligence oup" in VOKS.
PJr1Ov, bla11suly M. P&
K
PLAITKAIS, Yanis+ Eduardovich. Attache,
Soviet Embassy, Canberra, January
1953 to April 1954. RIS assignment:
work among Russian emigres.
TSHERNOV, Feodor. Attache, Soviet
Embassy Stockholm; Target: military
and transportation informs a-'NCi .
VYSSELSKY, fnu. Pr Attache and
later a Third Sec Embassy in
Canberra. kReturned to USSR
in Nov(. 1950. S - - 2i
.?-
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TASS Representatives
ALKAYEVA, Leila. Worked for Soviet
Naval Intelligence, Turkey, 1942.
ANISIMOV, Viktor. Exposed as RIS
operative, 1951-1952, in Stockholm.
ANTONOV, Viktor Nikolayevich. TASS
correspondent in Australia, 1952-
1954. RIS target: newspaper men,
members of Parliament.
CHUGUNOV, Konstantin Alekseyevich.
RIS agent in the US under TASS cover.
JANOVICZ, Nikolai V. TASS employee at
Soviet Embassy, Oslo. Involved in the
Asbjorn Sunde case xbiatwams exposed
in 1954.
KUDRYAVTSEV, Sergey. GRU functionary
under TASS cover, Berlin, 1941.
MEDVEDEV, fnu. Used alias, MOROZOV.
GRU Colonel under TASS cover, Ankara,
1942.
MIKHAYLOV, Vladimir. GRU officer under
TASS cover, Ankara, 1942.
NOSOV, fnu. S functionary NmPk1qqg under
TASS cover in Australia until August
1950.
OKOROKOVA, Augusta. RIS agent
under TASS cover, Turkey, 1942. Later
was translator and typist in Soviet
Consulate. ~~ ~,,
PAKHOMOV, Ivan Mikhaylovich. TASS PC
and worker in Australia, arriving
PISAREV, Leo C. TASS correspondent,
The Netherlands. RIS target: military
and civilian defense data. Declared
png, February 1953.
SAMOYLOV, Sonin A. GRU Colonel. TASS
correspondent in Japan, date not
determined.
VISHNYAKOV, Pavel. Chief of TASS Bureau,
Ankara, 1942. ,~G2 officer.
S
YEGOROV, fnu., Captain. TASS correspon-
dent, Tokyo. GRU officer.
YUDIN, fnu. Alias TARASOV. RIS officer
using TASS cover, Berlin, 1941
ZHEVEINOV, Nicolai. TASS i g, Ottawa,
1945. GRU agent. Target: Canadian Army
DOMNITSKIY, Andrey Ivanovich, Colonel.
Chief of Soviet Mission, Tokyo. Used
this position as cover for espionage.
KOTELNIKOV, Anatoliy Fedorovich, Colonel.
Chief, Consular Section, Soviet Mission,
Tokyo.
RASTVOROV, Yuri., Lt. Colonel. -MR(officer
assigned to Soviet Mjssion, Tokyo.
---)TIKHVINSKIY, Sergey Leonidovich, Colonel.
t M
ssion in
apa
i
-
Chief o ,emuv e
:. /~"
He has also used TASS as cover.
VASHKIN, Ivan., Colonel. Chief of - group
at Soviet Mission, Tokyo.
R issiani Red Cross
BALAYAN, fnu., Colonel. Head of the
"intelligence group" in the Russian Red
Cross. Has been abroad many times under
Red Cross cover.
Soviet delegations
SMIRNOV, Andrey, Colonel. Member of
Skating delegation to Japan. RIS officer.
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Use of Soviet Official Installations Abroad for Subversive Purposes
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THE SHAMEFUL YEARS
THIRTY YEARS OF SOVIET
ESPIONAGE IN THE
UNITED STATES
DECEMBER 30, 1951
Prepared and released by the
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C.
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COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JOHN S. WOOD, Georgia, Chairman
FRANCIS E. WALTER, Pennsylvania HAROLD H. VELDE, Illinois
MORGAN M. MOULDER, Missouri BERNARD W. KEARNEY, New York
CLYDE DOYLE, California DONALD L. JACKSON, California
JAMES B. FRAZIER, JR., Tennessee CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan
FRANK S. TAV1NNER, Jr., Counsel
Louis J. RUSSELL, Senior Investigator
JOHN W. CARRINGTON, Clerk of Committee
RAPHAEL I. NIXON, Director of Research
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CONTENTS
Foreword ---------------------------------------------------------- I
Introduction------------------------------------------------------ 3
Soviet espionage activities in the United States between World War I and
World War II:
Ludwig Martens----------------------------------------------- 5
Aritorg Trading Corp------------------------------------------ 5
Nicholas Dozenberg-------------------------------------------- 7
Albert Foicrabend --------------------------------------------- 11
Moische Stern------------------------------------------------- 11
Corp. Robert Osman------------------------------------------- 12
Valentine Gregory Burtan -------------------------------------- 13
Gaik Badalovich Ovakimian____________________________________ 13
Mikhail Nikolaevich Gorin_____________________________________ 19
The Far Eastern Fur Trading Co ----------------------- 20
Soviet espionage in the United States During World War If ------------ 22
Soviet Government Purchasing Commission----------------------- 22
The Canadian spy case_____________________ ----------------------------------------- 24
Ignacy Witczak----------------------------------------------- 25
Vassili M. Zubilin---------------------------------------------- 28
Steve Nelson ---------------------------- 29
The Nelson-Zubilin meeting--------------------------------- 3Q
Nelson-Weinberg ------------------------------------------ 31 Arthur Alexandrovich Adams___________________________________ 32
Clarence Francis Hiskey----------------------------------- 33
John Hitchcock Chapin------------------------------------ 35
'I he Arthur Adams apparatus_______________________________ - 36
Espionage activities of Soviet officials____________________________ 38
Gregori Markovich Kheifets__...--------------------------------- 39
Martin Kavid Kamen-------------------------------------- 39
Isaac Folkof---------------------------------------------- 40
Louise Rosenberg Bra.nsten--------------------------------- 40
Haakon Maurice Chevalier_________________________________ 41
Andrei V.Selievchenko----------------------------------------- 42
Gerhart Eisler----------- ------------------------------- 42
The assassination of Leon Trotsky------------------------------- 45
J. Peters 55
Alger Hiss---------------------------------------------------- 56
The Silvermaster-Perlo groups_________ ________________________ 58
William Walter Remington ------------------------------------- 61
Philip Olin and Mary Jane Keeney______________ 63
Soviet espionage activities in the United States since the close of
World War II:
Judith Coplon------------------------------------------------- 65
Klaus Fuchs and Harry Gold___________________________________ 67
III
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THE SHAMEFUL YEARS
Thirty Years of Soviet Espionage in the United States
FOREWORD
The most shameful and sordid period in the relatively short history
of our great country is the more than 30 years during which Soviet
espionage has been allowed to spread its tentacles over the United
States.
The Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Repre-
sentatives has prepared this report in order that the American public
might have a better understanding of the true purpose of the Soviet
Government toward this country.
In November 1933, out of deference to the Russian people, the
Soviet Union was accorded diplomatic recognition by the United
States. It is questionable whether the Soviet Union could have sur-
vived without this. Surely, it would not have grown into the mon-
strosity that it is today.
This report will show that, as early as 1919, the present government
in Russia established an espionage apparatus in the United States
which has been used to secure information pertaining to all of our
industrial and defense installations.
During the past 30 years, there have been nations that have been
considered as enemies of this country. The United States fought
determinedly to stem the onslaught of nazism and fascism as exem-
plified in Germany and Italy. We stemmed the tide of Japanese im-
perialism in the I'ar East. In these causes, thousands of Americans
lost the wonderft 1 future that might have been theirs.
The United Sates had no alternative other than to successfully
stein the tide against German, Italian, and Japanese aggressors. But
this furnishes little consolation when it is considered that we did not
deter the growth of the equally insidious Communist movement.
The committee is aware that the dismal record compiled by this
country in dealing with Soviet espionage is not caused by lack of
facilities. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Govern-
ment intelligence agencies are to be commended for the manner in
which they have ferreted out Soviet espionage activities. However,
due to administrative decisions and inadequate legislation, there has
been an alarming lack of prosecution in cases of espionage that have
been discovered from 1919 to the present date.
The committee, after a review of the facts set forth herein, is con-
vinced that drastic steps must be taken to stem espionage activities
in the future.
The committee feels that it is incumbent upon Congress to initiate
steps in this direction. It is, therefore, suggested that a joint com-
mittee. composed of five Members of the Senate and five Members of
1
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-the House be authorized to study the problem of espionage and propose
legislation which will afford adequate protection for this country
against espionage before it becomes too late.
Espionage must be considered for what it is. The laws of this
country provide that a person who takes the life of another may be
given capital punishment. Espionage, which has the ultimate purpose
of taking the lives of many, should be considered no less an offense.
While this committee is deeply concerned with maintaining the
rights of the individual, it feels that the provisions for the admissi-
bility of evidence in espionage cases should be broadened. This report
will clearly show that with the admissible use of such techniques as
wiretapping, microphones, censorship, and other practices now in-
admissible, successful prosecutions could have been had in many
instances.
The committee does not feel that espionage agents should have the
protection of the laws of the very country which they work night and
day to destroy.
The committee possesses a great deal of additional information con-
cerning Soviet espionage that has not been set forth in this re-
port because it desires to avoid jeopardizing present and future
investigations.
2
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. INTRODUCTION
It must first be understood that international communism has b..t
one goal, and that is to place the free peoples of the world unner
the complete and dictatorial control of the Soviet Government. It
must be remembered that the governing body of the Soviet Union is
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. During such periods when
the Presidium is not in session, the controlling power is the Council
of People's Commissars. This Council, as well as the Presidium, is
composed of members of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolshe-
viks. Since this relationship exists between the governing body of
the Soviet Union and the All-Union Communist Party, it must natu-
rally follow that all espionage activities performed for the Russian
Government are closely related to the activities of the Communist
Party throughout the world, including the United States.
During the entire period covered by this report, Soviet espionage
activity within the United States has been dependent upon the Com-
munist Party, U. S. A., for assistance. It has been found that, with
the exception of high party officials, Communists pressed into duty for
espionage have been instructed to withdraw from open activity in the
Communist .Party while so engaged.
The espionage system for the Soviet Union has been one of the
best-planned operations devised by the Russian leaders. Communism,
as we have found, operates almost exclusively on the principle of in-
filtrating and undermining its enemies. It is therefore of prime im-
portance for international communism and the Soviet Union to be
continually aware of the strength and weakness of its enemies.
The Soviet Union has established for its espionage activities two
principal intelligence' agencies, the NKVD and the Intelligence De-
partment of the Red Army. Information developed by the agents
of these organizations is coordinated in Moscow and there disseminated
to the interested departments of the Soviet Government.
The NKVD, or People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, was
established on July 11, 1934, by a decree of the Council of People's
Commissars. It incorporated the Department of State Security,
which had been known as the GPU or OGPU (Obeyedinenoye Gossu-
darstuennoye Politicheskoye Upravlyeniye), which had been a part of
the All-Union Department of Political Administration. The OGPU
bad been formed in 1.922 to succeed the Cheka, which was also known
by the. imposing title Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter
Revolution, Speculation, and Sabotage. The Cheka, which had origi-
nally been established in 1917, had been primarily responsible for the
enforcement of Soviet decrees within the U. S. S. R.
The OGPU and NKVD, as will be shown, established foreign
branches which operated in countries outside the U. S. S. R.
The Soviet Military Intelligence organization, which operates sep-
arately from the NKVD, was established in 1921, and was originally
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referred to as the Fourth Department of the Red Army. Eventually,
however, the Fourth Department of the Red Army was reorganized
into the Intelligence Department of the General Staff and within the
past 1.0 years into the Intelligence Department of the Red Army.
There has been considerable friction existing between the NKVD
and the Soviet Military Intelligence organization. Each organization
has endeavored to minimize and even to discredit the espionage efforts.
of the other. In every important Embassy or consulate of the Russian
Government there will be found representatives of both organizations
It will usually occur that some relatively obscure military or naval
attache will represent the Soviet Military Intelligence organization,
and an equally obscure consul will be the representative of the NKVD.
In many instances these representatives have greater power than the
Ambassador or consul.
It has been discovered that in operating its espionage apparatus in
the United States, the Soviet Government has frequently interchanged
its agents between Canada, Mexico, and this country. Frequently
fraudulent Canadian passports have been utilized to gain admittance
by Russian agents into the United States. Also, it has been found
that undercover addresses or mail drops in Mexico have been used in
the course of Soviet espionage activities.
For the purposes of clarity, this report has been divided into three
sections: Soviet espionage between World War I and World War II;
Soviet espionage during World War II; and Soviet espionage in the
United States since the close of World War II. This report, except
where necessary, will not deal with aspects strictly relating to the
organizational structure of International Communism. A separate
report dealing with this aspect is in preparation by the committee.
4
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
BETWEEN WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II
LUDWIG MARTENS
Soviet activities in the United States began on January 2, 1919,
when Ludwig Christian Alexander Karlovitch Martens, a native of
Ekaterinoslav, Russia, who was then residing in New York City, an-
nounced that he was the representative of the People's Commissariat
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Socialist Federated Republic in the
United States. Martens submitted information to the Government
of this country that he was a member of the Communist Party. Mar-
tens stated that he believed in the indoctrination of the proletariat,
and believed in the establishment of the Soviet form of government
all over the world. He stated further that he, as a Communist, ap-
proved of the activities of the nefarious Third International of the
Communists and that he assisted in spreading the propaganda of the
Third International.
Working in the office of Martens during that time, as a "technical
adviser" was one Arthur Alexandrovich Adams who, like Martens,
was a native of Russia.
Asa result of Martens' avowed revolutionary designs, an investiga-
tion was instituted by the United States Departments of Labor and
Justice, with the result that Martens and those working with him
were deported on January 20, 1921. During the course of the de-
portation proceedings, Martens was represented by Charles Recht,
a New York attorney, who for many years has represented Soviet
interests in this country.
Voluntarily departing with Martens was Arthur A. Adams. The
departure, as will be seen, did not deter Adams from returning to this
country at a later date to continue his Soviet espionage activities.
While Martens was the first known Soviet espionage agent in the
United States, he was obviously not the only one operating at that
time. This fact is brought out by a report made by Felix Dzerjinsky,
head of the OGPU to the Council of People's Commissars in December
1924, in which he stated :
The OGPU not only works energetically by paralyzing the espionage of foreign
citizens in the U. S. S. R., but it has also succeeded in creating a network of infor-
mation intelligence agencies in all other large centers of Europe and North
America. Responsible workers of the OGPU are detailed to all the diplomatic
and trade missions of the U. S. S. R. abroad. The total strength of the Foreign
tepartment of the OGPU is 1,300, including the employees in the foreign section
in Moscow. The OGPU has reportedly rendered service to the Commissariat of
Foreign Affairs and the staff of the Red Army in supplying secret information
both of a political and military nature.
AMTORG TRADING CORPORATION
While it is true that this country did not establish diplomatic rela-
tions with the U. S. S. R. until November 1933, commercial barriers
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Corp. was established in the State of New York on May 24, 1924,
through the merger of Products Exchange and Acros-American. Inc.
With the founding of Amtorg, the Soviet Union had for the first time
a legitimate cover for its espionage activities in the United States.
This fact is further substantiated by statements made by G. Besse-
dovsky, the former Charge d'Affaires and First Counselor of the So-
viet Union in Paris, following his break with the Soviet Government
in 1929. Bessedovsky, in a letter to the French newspaper Matin,
explained that in 1926 the Soviet Government had sent to the United
States two Comintern agents who had been charged with directing the
activities of the Communist Party in this country as well as the Trade
Union Educational League, which was then the labor section of the
Communist Party in the United States. Bessedovsky stated that these
Comintern agents had been furnished the sum of $10,000 in order that
they might carry out their assignment.
Bessedovsky further stated that he had learned from General I.
Benzin, one of the most important figures in Soviet espionage, that
there were two illegal organizations operating within the United
States, especially in New York, and that contact with these organza-
tions was made through the offices of the Amtorg Trading Corp. Also,
according to Bessedovsky, Trillisser, chief of the Foreign Department
of the OGPU, had stated that because the Foreign Department's
budget was limited to $50,000 a year, he had not been able to develop
extensive action in the United States, and was limited to the super-
vision of Amtorg officials.
The fact that the United States was early considered to be of great
importance in the espionage plans of the Soviet Government is estab-
lished when we find that at early periods Vyzcheslav Menzhinsky and
Genrich Origorievich Yagoda headed Soviet intelligence in the United
States. Menzhinsky later became head of the OGPU in Moscow, and
Yagoda was the first head of the NKVD, with headquarters also in
Moscow.
While the Amtorg Trading Corp. had been established through the
merger of Products Exchange and Acros-American, Inc., Acros had
at an earlier time played an important role in Soviet espionage. This
organization had originally registered as a British company through
which the Soviet Government carried on trade relations with Great
Britain. It was not mere coincidence that the Acros offices were lo-
cated at 49 Moorgate, London, which was also the address of the
Russian Embassy and the headquarters of the Soviet Trade Delega-
tion.
British authorities had established in 1920, through letters found
on a Soviet courier, that one Jacob Kirchenstein was operating in
Great Britain as a Soviet espionage agent. Kirchenstein, who had
first entered Britain in 1922, posed as an American citizen and was
using Acros as a cover for his espionage activities. Having estab-
lished this fact, British authorities, on May 12, 1927, conducted a raid
on the offices of Acros. Simultaneously with this raid, another raid
was conducted at the office of Anton Miller, who was Kirchenstein's
assistant, as well as a cipher clerk at the Soviet Trade Delegation.
Documents found in the possession of Miller established that Kirchen-
stein was the leader of a secret Soviet organization which was op-
erating under the direct orders of Piatnit.sky, head of the Finance
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ments showed, was in charge of secret propaganda activities, indus-
trial sabotage, and espionage. It operated from the Baltic and other
Northern European ports, using seamen aboard Acros vessels, and
through the Red International of Labor Unions in the United States.
The documents seized by the British authorities furnished irrefutable
proof that the chiefs of the Soviet Mission to Great Britain, as well
as the Russian Embassy, were completely aware of the espionage ac-
tivities of Kirchenstein and Miller. It also developed through this
raid that there had been three other Soviet espionage agents operating
under the cover of Acros. These were Karl Bahn, one Melnichuk, and
one Jilinsky.
Miller had endeavored to destroy the papers and ciphers in his pos-
session; however, the British were able to seize certain papers before
he was completely successful. Among the seized papers were found
the names of certain undercover addresses in the United States.
Among these were Joseph Brodsky, 799 Broadway, New York; Max
Bedacht, 3101 North Nordica Avenue, Chicago, Ill. ; and International
Seamen's Club, 26 South Street, New York, N. Y.
Among the special cipher designations found in Miller's possession
were those for William Z. Foster, Charles Ruthenberg, Daily Worker,
and Joseph Brodsky. Ruthenberg and Brodsky are now deceased,
but for a number of years were active in Communist affairs in the
United States. Max Bedacht, formerly a member of the National
Committee of the Communist Party, USA, was influential in the af-
fairs of the International Workers' Order, a purported insurance or-
ganization, whose true purpose is to control foreign-language groups
in this country for the Communist Party. The IWO has been desig-
nated by the Attorney General as a subversive organization.
As a result of the discoveries made by British authorities during
the Acros raid, there was a temporary break in diplomatic relations
between Great Britain and the U. S. S. R. This action, however, was
not the conclusion of the espionage activities of Jacob Kirchenstein,
who later engaged in similar activities on the European continent and
in the United States. The facts concerning Acros established that
there was an international link in the Soviet espionage activities in
which persons in the United States were involved.
The committee's investigations have shown that there was a more
direct espionage ring operating during this same period in the United
States. One of the principal individuals involved in this ring was
Nicholas Dozenberg.
Nicholas Dozenberg was born November 15, 1882, in Riga, Latvia.
After his arrival in this country in 1904, he became active in various
Lettish organizations. Later, Dozenberg became active in the Social-
ist Party, principally in the Lettish Workers' Club of the Socialist
Party. In about 1921 or 1922, Dozenberg became the business man-
ager of the Workers' Publishing Society, and eventually business man-
ager of the Literature Department of the Workers' Party of America,
which was the predecessor of the Communist Party in the United
States.
The headquarters of the Workers' Party of America, at that time,
was located in Chicago, 111. Dozenberg continued his connections
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it until a o
NV ith out 1926, at w lic time, upon the decision of William
Z. Foster, then head of the Workers' Party, the headquarters were
moved to New York City. Dozenberg was assigned to handle the
liquidation of the party assets in Chicago and the transfer of the publi-
cation office to New York. In 1927, or early 1928, Dozenberg, accord-
ing to his own statement, was recruited into the Soviet Military Intel-
ligence organization by one Alfred Tilton, who was identified to Doz-
enberg as the head of Soviet Military Intelligence in the United States.
For his duties, Dozenberg was paid $35 per week, which money was
furnished by the Soviet Government.
The appointment of Dozenberg to the espionage apparatus was done
with the knowledge of the members of the Control Commission of the
Communist Party, USA. According to Dozenberg's testimony, he was
required to receive permission from the Executive Committee of the
Communist Party in order to accept the espionage assignment. He
was instructed to withdraw from all open connections with the Com-
munist Party, and to direct his efforts exclusively to Communist
espionage activities.
Shortly after his initial contact with Tilton, Dozenberg learned
that Tilton was living in New York City, under fraudulent Canadian
papers, in the name of Joseph Paquett. Later, Tilton secured other
fradulent papers from Canada, this time under the name of Martin.
It was Dozenberg's understanding that these Canadian papers were
obtained by Tilton, through the assistance of Tim Buck, then secretary
to the Communist Party in Canada. Dozenberg also learned that
Canadian passport papers were obtained for several prominent mem-
bers of the American Communist apparatus in a similar manner.
Dozenberg has advised the committee that on one occasion, during
his association with Tilton in New York City, Tilton had informed
him that he had spent one entire night photographing secret plans
for the British warship, Royal Oak. Dozenberg advised that Tilton
had in some manner intercepted these papers while they were in
passage to Washington, D. C., from an undisclosed place in Canada.
Dozenberg also learned that Tilton secured the money to carry on
his espionage operations through seamen couriers. The meetings
with these couriers were generally made in the offices of Dr. Philip
Rosenbleitt, a New York ity dentist.
In 1928, Dozenberg came into contact with Lydia Stahl, who was one
of Tilton's assistants and an expert photographer. One of Lydia
Stahl's duties was to obtain technical and similar books which Dozen-
berg forwarded to special mail drops, usually in Scandinavian coun-
tries. For their photographic operations, Tilton and Stahl used the
photographic studios of Joseph Turin in New York. Their work
must have been quite voluminous, because the Soviet Military Intelli-
gence operation purchased a large photostating machine which was
installed in one of Turin's back rooms. The operation of this machine
was done exclusively by Lydia Stahl.
During the latter part of 1928 or early 1929 an individual named
Dick Murzin arrived in New York City to be the assistant to Mark
Zilbert, who was soon to relieve Alfred Tilton. It has been estab-
lished that Murzin was Boris Devyatkin, and it was under this latter
name that he first established a cover or front for future espionage
activities by taking office space in the Wesson Travel Agency, where
he was ostensibly engaged in a real estate or insurance business.
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Shortly before Tilton's departure for the Soviet Union in early
1929, Mark Zilbert arrived in the United States and assumed from
Tilton all activities as head of the Soviet intelligence apparatus in
the United States.
Later in 1929, Dozenberg again heard from Tilton. Upon this
occasion,,Dozenberg was invited to visit the Soviet Union, and did so
on funds furnished by Tilton. Upon his arrival in Moscow, Dozen-
berg was introduced to General Berzin, head of the Soviet Intelli-
gence Department. General Berzin instructed that, upon Dozenberg's
return to the United States, he was to assist one Kirchenstein, a Soviet
military intelligence agent, in establishing an American background.
According to Dozenberg, Alfred Tilton had made arrangements to
enable Kirchenstein to obtain the citizenship papers of a deceased
American veteran, Frank Kleges. This deception was made possiblet
through the aid of an undertaker in Brooklyn, N. Y., who was also.
able to furnish Kleges' naturalization certificate.
Dozenberg assisted the false Frank Kleges through establishing an
office in New York and placing him in contact with various American,
firms. Arrangements were made through J. Lovestone, a since de-
fected Communist leader, for Kleges to be introduced at the Irving;
Trust Co., New York City, thus enabling Kleges to establish credit.
Kleges' next step was to proceed to Paris, France, where lie estab-
lished a business under the name of Anonymous Society for the
Importation of Dried Beans, which was then used as a cover for the
activities of the Soviet Military Intelligence.
. During this period, Mark Zilbert was the head of the Soviet military
apparatus in the United States. As previously indicated, Zilbert was
assisted in his activities by Boris Devyatkin, alias Dick Murzin. The
committee's records disclose that Devyatkin was born in St. Peters-
burg, Russia, on December 27, 1888, and that he entered the United
States from Winnipeg, Canada, on September 23, 1923. He was natu-
ralized in Chicago, Ill., on June 27, 1929. Devyatkin, as late as 1947,
was employed by the Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington,
D. C. Dozenberg has testified that he had very little personal contact
with either Zilbert or Devyatkin.
Dozenberg has advised the committee that after 1931 he traveled
extensively throughout Europe, in Russia, Germany, and Rumania.
On his return to the United States from Rumania, Dozenberg, acting
upon instructions which had been given him in Moscow, established
the American-Rumanian Film Corp. This firm was incorporated un-
der the laws of the State of New York, and its sole purpose, according
to Dozenberg, was to furnish a cover for the operation of the Soviet
Military Intelligence in Rumania. The corporation papers indicate
the officers of this corporation were Nicholas Dozenberg, president;
Valentine Gregory Burtan, vice president; Herbert J. Newmark,
secretary.
During the year 1933, while the negotiations were under way which
led to recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States, Dozenberg
was residing with his first wife in Moscow. During the latter part of
1933 or the early part of 1934, Dozenberg was instructed to go to China
and establish a business cover for Soviet military intelligence activities
in that country as well as against Japan.
Dozenberg then proceeded to Peiping where he made arrangements.
to represent an American radio corporation in China, and where he
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met a Soviet agent who gave him $10,000 in Chinese currency. Dozen-
berg then established the Amasia Sales Co. in the British concession
in Tientsin, China. Dozenberg's time was solely occupied with the
running of affairs of the business in order to make satisfactory cover
for Soviet military intelligence activities later on. .
In 1937, there came to Tientsin, China, a Joseph Freund, an Aus-
trian by birth, to relieve Dozenberg, who was to return to Moscow.
Dozenberg remained in Moscow 4 months, during which time he
submitted a report on his business-commercial activities in China,
and was instructed to endeavor to establish a similar business over
in the Philippine Islands.
Dozenberg left Moscow in the middle of 1937. Upon his arrival tit
New York City, he was given $8,000 by a Soviet agent. After making
arrangements in this country to represent a motion-picture equipment
corporation in the Philippine Islands, he left for Manila. The diffi-
culty of setting up a business cover in Manila was greater than had
been expected. Dozenberg ran out of funds and returned in July
1938 to Washington, D. C.
In March 1939 Dozenberg was met by the same man whom he had
met before who gave him instructions to go to Moscow and furnished
him with $1,000 for living and travel expenses.
Dozenberg was in Moscow for approximately 31/2 months. His
former superiors in the Intelligence Department were no longer there
and he dealt entirely with persons strange to him. He was requested
to go to China, but when he indicated that it would take not less
than $100,000 to set up or acquire a representative business concern
at that time, he was asked to return to the United States to establish
:a business cover for Soviet agents in the United States, which he
refused to do. Subsequently, he was given the sum of $600 to cover
travel costs and told to return to the United States. To this day it
remains a mystery to Dozenberg as to why he was allowed to leave
Moscow after his refusal to abide by instructions.
In 1939, after his return to the United States, Dozenberg was ar-
rested for obtaining a passport under false pretenses. He entered a
plea of guilty and was given a 1-year sentence, which he has served.
Dozenberg, since that time, has been living a quiet and respectable
life under an assumed name. He found it necessary to alter his iden-
tity, knowing that his break with the Soviets could very well result
in dire consequences to himself if he should be located by Soviet
agents.
Dozenberg was an active part of the Soviet Military Intelligence
from 1927 to 1939. Among the individuals he recalled as having
been active in the Soviet espionage activities during that period were
Albert Feierabend, a Latvian Communist who was active in Boston,
Mass.; Richard Bassow, whom Dozenberg knew to be in charge of
Soviet espionage activities in. Vienna, Austria; and Alexander
Burkan, a Soviet military agent, who Dozenberg believed was active
in the United States during 1932 and 1933. Dozenberg also knew
Burkan under the alias of Purkan, and "Patrick." He believed
Burkan was associated with the Amtorg Trading Corp., which has
already been identified as having been set up as a. cover for Soviet
espionage activities. Another person known to Dozenberg was An-
thony Wesson, owner of the afore-mentioned Wesson Travel Agency.
Further information concerning the activities of Wesson is contained
later in this report.
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Regarding Albert Feierabend, the records disclose that this person
was arrested in New York City on April 10, 1933, on a charge of illegal
use of a passport. The facts were that Feierabend had endeavored
to enter the United States through the port of New York, using a
passport in the name of Ksavier Augustus Szpokas, which he had
obtained fraudulently in Boston, Mass., in September 1930. At the
time of his arrest Feierabend was found to have in his possession
$28,700. Also found in his possession was a message contained on a
small white ribbon which carried this significant inscription : "The
bearer of this credential is thoroughly trustworthy and should be
given all possible support so that lie may effectively accomplish the
mission he is engaged in." This message was signed, "Fraternally
yours, Max Bedacht, for the Secretariat."
Due to the dismal lack of adequate legislation to cope with the obvi-
ous aims of Feierabend toward this country, he was allowed to plead
guilty to the illegal passport charge and was fined $1,000 and.placed
under a 2-year probation. Nothing has been heard of Feierabend
since 1933.
It has previously been indicated that shortly after the departure
of Alfred Tilton from the United States, his duties were assumed by
one Mark Zilbert. Investigation and descriptive detail now indicate
that Zilbert was identical with Moische Stern. In 1931, William
Disch, a loyal American who was employed as a draftsman at the
Arma Engineering Co. in New York, was approached by Moische
Stern. The Arma Engineering Co. was then engaged in the manufac-
ture of confidential mechanisms for the United States Navy.
Stern, using the alias "Mr. Herb," made the initial contact with
Disch through an intermediary in the person of Solomon Kantor, a
former employee of the Arma Engineering Co. Stern advised Disch
that he was interested in obtaining the plans for fire-control apparatus
and other confidential Navy plans. He indicated that he was willing
to pay Disch the then substantial amounts of $1,500 to $2,000 a year to
secure this information.
Disch, who has appeared before the committee, immediately made
Stern's approach known to the Government. Under the direction of
proper authorities, Disch furnished certain carefully screened infor-
mation to Stern. The meetings between Disch and Stern were always
made under the utmost secrecy. During the course of his contacts with
Disch, Stern frequently drove an automobile which was registered in
the name of the afore-mentioned Anthony Wesson. For some un-
known reason, Stern came to doubt the sincerity of Disch as a contact
and soon discontinued contacts with him.
During the same period, however, Stern was known to have been in
frequent contact with Lydia Stahl, whom Nicholas Dozenberg has
identified as an assistant of Alfred Tilton.
Although the Stahl woman's espionage activities within the United
States went undetected, the committee has learned that she, along with
Marie Martens, the wife of Alfred Tilton, was later arrested and con-
victed in Finland on charges of. Soviet espionage. Also among the
United States contacts of Lydia Stahl was Henry Felix Mins, of New
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York City, whose home was utilized as a meeting place by this espio-
nage. apparatus.
Another person contacted by Moische Stern, who on this occasion
used the alias of Kotasky, has testified before the committee. When
Stern contacted this person in 1931, he found a person much more
amenable than William Disch. This individual testified that he had
joined the Soviet espionage organization from a purely practical
standpoint, and that ultimately he wished to go to the Soviet Union
as an aviation instructor. It appears, however, that his aeronautical
ambitions were deterred because during 1931 and 1932 Stern had
him trained as an expert photographer. During this period, he was
occupied photographing numerous United States military reports
from various bases and establishments that had been secured by mem-
bers of the Soviet espionage ring. Again, in this instance, the funds
to carry on this operation were brought into this country by seamen
couriers from Europe. During this same period of 1931-32, the
individual stated that he had made at least two trips to the vital
Panama Canal Zone for the purpose of furnishing instruction's to a
United States Army corporal, Robert Osman. These instructions
concerned the obtaining and furnishing of vital military informa-
tion relating to the Canal Zone to Soviet agents in New York for
eventual transmission to the Soviet Union.
As in all previously cited instances, this individual was not to be
detected and punished for his espionage activities in the United States.
In 1933 he and his wife left the United States for France. There, upon
the instructions of their Soviet superiors, they established new con-
tracts for the Soviet espionage system and also collected, photo-
graphed, and forwarded materials furnished by already well-estab-
lished espionage contacts. However, as in the case of Lydia Stahl,
once outside the comparative security of the inadequate laws of the
United States, the individual and his wife ran afoul of the law. In
1933, they were arrested by French authorities on charges of Soviet
espionage. At the conclusion of their trial in 1935, they were re-
leased on the basis of the evidence that they had furnished against
their French espionage associates. Eventually, in 1938, the individual
and his wife returned to the security offered by this country and are
now living a model life.
As previously stated, the individual mentioned in the preceding
paragraph testified that during 1931-32, he had made at least two trips
to the Panama Canal Zone for the purpose of furnishing instructions
for Soviet espionage to Corp. Robert Osman. On June 20, 1933, at
Fort Sherman, Panama Canal Zone, Corp. Robert Osman stood court
martial on charges of having illegal possession of secret documents
relating to the national defense of the vital Cristobal, C. Z., and
attempting to transmit these documents to one Herman Meyers, Brook-
lyn, N. Y.
On October 30, 1933, Osman, as a result of the court martial, was
sentenced to be dishonorably discharged from the United States Army,
and to be confined to hard labor for a period of 2 years, or given the
alternative of a fine of $10,000. However, upon appeal, Corporal
Osman's case was reviewed by a general court martial and, on May
21, 1934, he was found "not guilty" and discharged from the Army.
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The records of the general court martial of Corporal Osman re-
vealed that he had been visited, dtiring 1932-33 by one Harry Duryea,
who gave his address as in care of a doctor in New York City. Osman,
according to his own admission, received $400 from Duryea.
Osman subsequently substantiated the facts related, and added that
the name of the doctor in New York City had been given him as a con-
fidential mail drop to be used in sending papers to Soviet agents in
New York City. The doctor involved in this case has been identified
as a New York physician who later became a lieutenant colonel in the
United States Army.
Regarding Herman Meyers of Brooklyn, N. Y., mentioned in the
court martial of Corporal Osman, it has been determined that Meyers
resided at an address used by Moische Stern while in the United States.
It was also significant that the document that Corporal Osman was
endeavoring to transmit to Herman Meyers was a copy of the highly
secret Army "white plan," which set forth the proposed plan of opera-
tion of the United States troops in the Canal Zone in the event of riot
or revolution.
VALENTINE GREGORY BURTAN
Valentine Gregory Burtan was born in Odessa, Russia, September
25, 1898. Records disclose that he came to this country with his par-
ents in 1907. He was naturalized on July 21, 1922, before the supreme
court of New York County, N. Y.
In January 1933, Burtan was arrested by the United States Secret
Service in New York City on a charge of possessing and passing coun-
terfeit $100 Federal Reserve notes. On this charge Burtan was tried
in Chicago, Ill., and was convicted on May 25, 1934. He was sentenced
to serve 15 years and to pay a fine of $5,000. Burtan steadfastly re-
fused to tell United States authorities the source of some $100,000 in
counterfeit currency which he had endeavored to. pass.
Walter G. Krivitsky, who died under very mysterious circumstances,
either by his own hand or that of an assassin, during the course of
relating his experiences as head of the Soviet Military Intelligence in
Western Europe, slated that the Burtan counterfeit money had been
printed under direct instructions of Moscow.
Burtan, as previously reported, was the vice president of the Ameri-
can-Rumanian Film Co., of which Nicholas Dozenberg was the presi-
dent. Dozenberg has stated that Burtan told him that his sole pur-
pose in passing the counterfeit money was to raise funds for the
American-Rumanian Film Co., which has already been described as a
cover for Soviet Military Intelligence activities in Rumania.
It is also known that before his arrest, Burtan was closely associated
with Jack Stachel and Max Bedacht, national figures in the Com-
munist Party in the United States.
GAIK BADALOVICII OVAKIMIAN
One of the most .extensive espionage operations conducted for the
Soviet Government against this country, prior to World War II, was
directed by an individual named Gaik Badalovich Ovakimian.
Attention to this ring originated through an investigation con-
ducted in London by the British Government. This investigation
disclosed that one Willie Brandes had been engaged in espionage
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activities as an agent of the Soviet Military Intelligence in Great
Britain. It was revealed that Brandes had entered England in Janu-
ary 1937, bearing a Canadian passport No. 22247, which had been se-
cured through the use of fraudulent Canadian naturalization papers.
After arriving in England, Brandes represented himself as a com-
mercial agent for the Phantom Red Cosmetic Co. and the Charak
Furniture Co., both Nev tYork City concerns.
Brandes recruited Percy Edward Glading and other British sub-
jects to secure secret military information for him from the important
Woolurich Arsenal. After operating for a time, Brandes realized
that the investigation being conducted by the British was pointing
perilously close to him. He escaped arrest by fleeing the country.
Glading and two confederates were subsequently arrested and sen-
tenced to prison for espionage activities.
Following this episode, Canadian authorities conducted an investi-
gation to determine how Brandes had been able to secure a fraudulent
Canadian passport. This investigation disclosed that an individual,
who must remain anonymous because of security reasons, also pos-
sessed a fraudulent Canadian birth certificate and Canadian passport
and had been primarily responsible for Brandes' securing his Cana-
dian papers. Brandes and his associates were engaged in a business
known as Round-the-World Trading Co. Associated with him in this
company were Arthur Wolf and one Herman Jacobson, who at one
time had been bookkeeper and export manager for the Amtorg Trad-
ing Corp.
At the time that the Canadian authorities made this discovery, the
person described anonymously herein was residing outside Canadian
boundaries. In August 1940, he applied for reentry permits to enable
him and his family to proceed to Montreal, Canada. Canadian au-
thorities allowed him to return and, in November 1940, after having
closely observed his activities, he was placed under arrest.
After being arrested, this individual was found to have been born
in Poland in 1903. Sometime around 1920, he went to the Soviets
Union where he worked as an engineer for the Soviet Government Oil
Trust. In 1933, while in Russia, he was approached by a representa-
tive of the OGPU with the proposition that he obtain information
concerning the oil industry throughout the world. In furtherance of
this proposition, the individual came to the United States in 1934
and was assigned to work in the apparatus headed by Gaik Ovakimian.
He continued in this capacity until 1936, when he returned to Russia
for the purpose of bringing his family to the United States. This
individual and his family returned from Russia late in the year 1936.
He was then introduced*by Ovakimian to Willie Brandes, alias Wil-
liam Hoffman. Shortly after this meeting, Brandes departed for
Great Britain with fraudulent Canadian papers, which had been se-
cured for him by the Ovakimian apparatus.
Among those operating in the Ovakimian apparatus was one Robert
Haberman, whose duties included operation in Mexico as well as in
the United States. Another person operating under the supervision of
Ovakimian was Eda Wallance, who had also used the names Leah
Kriloff, and Eda Olulsky. The committee has ascertained that Wal-
lance left the United States, ostensibly for Poland, carrying a fraudu-
lent American passport. Accounts of her whereabouts since 1936 have
been meager, but it is not believed that she has ever returned to this.
country.
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Another person associated with Ovakimian was Fred Rose, who
later was to figure in a startling disclosure involving atomic espionage.
Rose, who was a prominent Canadian Communist, later became a mem-
ber of Parliament in Canada. He subsequently was exposed as an
atomic spy through the revelations made by Igor Gouzenko, former
Russian code clerk stationed in Canada.
Other Canadians involved with Ovakimian were Aaron Marcovitch
and Adolph Stark. These individuals were apprehended by the Cana-
dian authorities in November 1940.' At the time of their apprehension,,
these individuals had in their possession the names of nearly 200 per--
sons who had made application for passports, naturalization certifi-
cates, and similar documents. Stark and Marcovitch were in the busi-
ness of securing fraudulent papers for Soviet espionage rings on a
wholesale basis.
Also operating for the NKVD under the supervision of Ovakimian
was one Mark Jonas, who, using the name of Robert Haas, entered the
United States from Vienna, Austria, in 1936. Using this name, he and
his wife remained in the United States until March 1937, when they
assumed the identity of Mr. and Mrs. Mark Jonas, after which they
remained in the United States using fraudulent Canadian passports
which had been supplied them by Aaron Marcovitch. Jonas and his
wife dropped from sight some time around July 1937 and are believed
to have returned to Europe.
During the time Jonas or Haas was residing in New York City, her
was in contact with one Charles Peter Atkin, who has been identified
as an NKVD agent. It has been learned that Atkin, who sometimes
used the aliases Peter New and Abraham C. Seatole, was furnished
fraudulent Canadian papers by Ovakimian. These papers were sup
plied by Marcovitch and Stark. Atkin left the United States during
the summer of 1937 and is not known to have returned to this country.
One of the most important contacts made by Ovakimian during his
espionage activities in this country was a Simon A. Rosenberg. This.
individual was born in Poland in 1889 and came to this country in.
1925. On May 9, 1930, Rosenberg became a naturalized citizen of the-
United States. During this same year, Rosenberg accepted employ-
ment in the Amtorg Trading Corp. which has previously been described:
as a cover agency for Soviet espionage operations.
Rosenberg remained in Amtorg employment in New York for the.
next year and in 1931 went to the Soviet Union as an engineer. Until
this time, Rosenberg's employment was entirely legitimate. However,
once in Russia he was contacted by officials of the OGPU and forced to
become an espionage agent. The OGPU resorted to a means which is
native to them whenever they can employ it-extortion. Rosenberg
was given the choice of meeting the demands of the OGPT7 or having
his sister who was living in Kiev, Russia, killed. Having no alter-.
native, Rosenberg agreed to their demands and returned to the United
States in 1932. Rosenberg's first duties for the Soviets were under the-
direction of a Soviet official named Eremin. For the next 6 years
Rosenberg obtained much information for the Soviet Government.
Most of this information consisted of industrial plans that he secured:
from various engineering companies. This information was of a gen-
eral industrial nature and did not deal with military or naval plans.
Rosenberg first became acquainted with Gaik Ovakimian in 1932,
during his return trip from the Soviet Union to this country. Upon,
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leaving Russia, Rosenberg was instructed by the OGPU that en route
he should stop at the Atlas Hotel in Berlin, which instructions Rosen-
k erg followed. At the Atlas Hotel, he was contacted by Ovakimian
who furnished Rosenberg, $1,200 in United States currency as 4
months' salary.
From 1934 through 1938, Rosenberg was associated with one Feld-
tan who was directed and controlled by Gaik Ovakimian. Feldman
has since disappeared.
One of Rosenberg's duties consisted of accompanying William Hoff-
Yuan, alias Willie Brandes, who has been mentioned herein before, for
the purpose of securing a fraudulent Canadian passport.
Other contacts of Rosenberg were the afore-mentioned Eda Wal-
lance and Mark Jonas.
During the course of the Soviet espionage activities of Gaik Ovaki-
mian, he was in contact with Jacob Golos, who was also known as
Jacob Baisin, president of World Tourists, Inc.
Golos and World Tourists, Inc., were convicted in March 1940 for
failure to register as agents for a foreign government as provided
for by the Foreign Agents' Registration Act of 1938. The court found
that Qolos was an agent for the Soviet Government. Recent informa-
tion concerning the activities of Golos developed from the testimony
-of Elizabeth T. Bentley, a self-confessed espionage courier who has
appeared before the committee upon numerous occasions.
One of the contacts used by the Ovakimian ring in the United States
'was an employee of the United States Department of Justice. This
individual furnished Ovakimian with information from reports of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation which were available to him as
ail attorney of the Department of Justice. This information was
alleged to have been channeled to Ovakimian in 1937 and 193.8.
The employee of the Department of Justice was suspended on June
17, 1941, for negligence in disclosing information contained in the
Department's files. On October 31, 1941, he was permitted to resign.
Following this action, he became employed by the Office of Price
Administration.
The committee is interested in this phase of Soviet espionage because
since 1941 it has been disclosed that two other Soviet espionage agents,
Judith Coplon and Alger Hiss, have been employed by the Department
of Justice. The security of this country would suffer a severe blow
if the confidential reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were
available to the Soviet Government. The committee at the present
time is pursuing its investigation of the third instance involving the
Department of Justice mentioned above.
To continue with the activities of Gaik Ovakimian, it appeared in
the spring of 1941 that Ovakimian was making plans to depart from
the United States. In April 1941, the household goods of Ovakimian,
as well as his automobile, were loaded on the steamship Annie Johnson,
a ship operating under charter for the Amtorg Trading Corp. This
ship was scheduled to sail for Vladivostok, Russia, via the Panama
Uanal.
On May 5, 1941, Ovakimian was arrested by agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation in New York City. He was charged with
violation of the Foreign Agents' Registration Act. At the time of his
arrest, Soviet officials insisted that Ovakimian had immunity as a
Soviet official. Ovakimian was subsequently released on $25,000 bail
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Ovakimian never canine to trial in this matter. Instead; an agree-
ment was reached between the Soviet Government and the United
States Department of State whereby Ovakimian was allowed to return
to the Soviet Union. He departed from San Francisco, Calif., aboard
the Soviet vessel Kim on July 23;1941.
Of particular interest in the case of Gaik Ovakimian were the un-
usual terms of the agreement that secured his release for return to the
Soviet Union. Ovakimian was given his release with the understand-
ing that the Soviet Government in turn would release three United
States citizens who at that time were under arrest in the Soviet Union
and permit them to return to the United States.
In addition, no doubt to show their magnanimity, the Soviet agreed
that three other individuals who, though not under arrest in the Soviet
Union, but who had not previously been permitted to leave the Soviet
Union; would be given exit visas.
The generosity of the Soviet Government became somewhat sus-
picious when the final results were examined. The records of the De-
partment of State disclose that the following six persons were the in-
dividuals the Soviets claimed they were releasing :
Mrs. IIetmann liabicht, wife of an' American citizen, supposedly under arrest ofa
unstated charges;
Dr. Michael Devenis; American citizen under arrest and internment on the non-
specific and innocuous charge of being a bourgeois capitalist,;"
Mr. Wasyl Cisiecki; American citizen, arrested in Poland in 1939, and sentenced
to 5 years at hard labor for illegal possession of firearms;
Mrs. Robert Magidoff, wife of an American citizen, not previously permitted to
leave the Soviet Union for unstated reasons;
Dr. Witold PtttkoWXski, American citizen, not previously permitted to depatt
from the Soviet Union;
The sixth was supposed to be a minor named Wagshal, an American citizen,
who, with his inbther; a Polish citizen, had not previously been permitted to
leave the U. S. S. R.
These are the persons involved in the Soviet's agreement which se-
cured the release of Gaik Ovakimian. In order to understand the
perfidy of the Soviets, it is necessary to examine the later activities Of
the six persons involved.
Wasyl Cisiecki was not "released by the Soviets. In the latter part of
1943, Cisiecki was still being held a prisoner by the U. S. S. R.
Dr. Witold Putkowski did not return to the United States. In.July
1941, he was reported to be residing in a Soviet-occupied area of Po-
land. This sector was invaded by Germany in August 1941. In Oc-
tober 1942, the American Legation at Berne, Switzerland, learned that
Dr. Putkowski was practicing as a physician in a community near
Wat saw, Poland.
Norman _"Wagshal, the minor previously referred to, was born in
Brooklyn, X. Y.; NovembeF 27, 1930. In 1931, when f of quite a year
old; he was taken to Poland by big parents. In 1938, the father, Jacob
W. Wagshal, returned to the United States leavin' his wife and son in
Poland. They were later interned by the oviet Government at Lwow
Poland. After the German occupation: of Lwow, Norfhan Wagsh d
and his mother were reported to have been interned by the Germans in
the Lwow ghetto.
Thus three of the persons used as ransom for O'vakimian nev r
reached the United States. Three of the six, ho'we/er, did ultimate r
arrive in the United State`s. One of these was Dr. Michael Devenrs
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with his wife, had been visiting his native Lithuania. During his
visit, the Soviet Government occupied Lithuania and Dr. Devenis
was imprisoned because he was a property owner and therefore a
"bourgeois capitalist." He was sent to an NKVD prison camp located
in the northern region near the Arctic Circle. Devenis was released
from prison by the Soviets on May 6, 1942, and returned to this
country. Dr. Devenis has always been highly regarded in his com-
munity and there is nothing to indicate that he has been sympathetic
to the Soviet Union.
Pelagrya D. K. Habicht, Mrs. Hermann H. Habicht, was a native
Russian who married Hermann Habicht, an American citizen, while
he was a United Press correspondent in Moscow. Mr. Habicht, when
allegedly released by the Soviet Union, joined her husband in the
United States, who had been employed by the United States Govern-
ment. At one time, he was employed by the Foreign Economic Ad-
ministration. Mrs. Habicht, since her arrival in the United States,
has been an ardent apologist for the Soviet Union and has persistently
curried favor with Soviet representatives. She has been frequently
in contact with Mrs. Robert T. Miller III, wife of Robert T. Miller,
one of the contacts of Elizabeth T. Bentley, self-confessed espionage
courier. Mrs. Habicht also has been closely associated with Shura
Lewis, a Russian national in this country through her marriage to an
American citizen.
Mrs. Lewis is known to have been in contact with Mr. and Mrs. Vas-
sili Zubilin, both of whom have been identified to the committee as
agents of the NKVD. In fact, investigation has disclosed that at
the time of the contact Vassili Zubilin was directing NKVD operations
in the United States.
Mrs. Lewis also received considerable publicity at a later date when
she addressed a high school group in Washington, D. C., and extolled
the merits of Soviet Russia as compared to the United States.
Neonila Shevko Magidoff, the third party of the Russian bargain
to actually arrive in the United States, was born in Byelorussia. Fol-
lowing her alleged release by the Soviet Union, she arrived in the
United States as a nonquota immigrant and the wife of an American
citizen, Robert Magidoff.
Robert Magidoff is a naturalized citizen of Russian birth, who
married Neonila Shevko while he was assigned to Moscow as a radio
correspondent.
During 1942, less than a year from the time she was released by
the "oppressive Soviets," Neonila Magidoff commenced lecturing for
Russian War Relief and later for the National Council of American-
Soviet Friendship.
.Mrs. Magidoff also was an acquaintance of Mr. and Mrs. Vassili
Zubilin, Pelagrya Habicht, and Mr. and Mrs. Robert T. Miller III.
The committee has also learned that, after Neonila Magidoff had
arrived in this country, Robert Magidoff made a trip to Russia and
took with him messages for some of Mrs. Miller's friends there. Mrs.
Miller, as a result, received a reply from Mrs. Arthur A. Adams, who
has previously been described.
Neonila Magidoff was naturalized on May 21, 1945, and soon there-
after she was given a United States passport. In August 1945, she
left this country for the Soviet Union as a newspaper correspondent
for the Courier-Journal of Louisville, Ky.
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and allowed to depart for the Soviet Union in exchange for six per-
sons, three of whom never arrived, and three others, only one of whom
seemed to be truly an American hostage of the Soviet Union.
MIKHAIL NIKOLAEVIOH GORIN
The activities of Mikhail Nikolaevich Gorin were originally dis-
closed in a most unusual manner. The first light shed upon his es-
pionage activities developed from the curiosity and subsequent alert-
ness of a truck driver for a cleaning establishment in Los Angeles,
Calif.
Mikhail Gorin was a Soviet citizen who arrived in the United
States in 1936 to be associated with the Amtorg Trading Corp. Later,
Gorin was transferred to Los Angeles, Calif., where he took charge of
the Los Angeles Bureau of Intourists.
Intourists was a Soviet organization which supervised the travel
of foreigners traveling in the Soviet Union. In the course of these
duties Gorin was closely associated with the Russian consulates in
Los Angeles and San Francisco.
While in Los Angeles, Gorin became acjuainted with Hafis Salich,
an employee of the Office of Naval Intelligence at San Pedro, Calif.
Salich was born in Moscow, Russia, in 1905. Ile became a natural-
ized American in 1929. From 1926 to 1936, Salich was a member of
the Berkeley, Calif., Police Department and was on leave of absence
from that employment to join the Office of Naval Intelligence.
In the initial contact Gorin brought Salich a letter of introduction
from Nikolai Allavdin, Soviet vice consul in Los Angeles and Gorin
advised Salich that the Soviets had investigated Salich's relatives in
the Soviet Union and found that they were all right. He then re-
quested Salich to assist him in obtaining information concerning
Japanese activities in the United States.
This obvious effort to intimidate Salich through the implied threat
of harm to his relatives was unsuccessful and Salich refused to com-
ply. However, Salich soon after this contact suffered financial dif-
ficulty and Gorin advanced funds to him from time to time until
Salich was unable to refuse to assist him. Salich was then paid
money by Gorin, the sums depending on the value of the information
furnished by Salich from the files of the Office of Naval Intelligence.
This arrangement continued until the afore-mentioned truck driver
picked up for cleaning a suit of clothes belonging to Mikhail Gorin
and found in the suit documents pertaining to the United States Navy
obtained by Salich.
On the basis of this information, Salich and Gorin were arrested
on December 12, 1938, and charged with violations of the espionage
statutes.
Gorin's first action following his arrest was to telephone K. Ouman-
sky at the Russian Embassy in Washington, D. C. Russian officials
obviously considered Gorin important because M. I. Ivanushkin, Rus-
sian vice consul of New York, flew to Los Angeles to consult with
Gorin and ascertain if he was receiving "proper treatment" at the
hands of the United States authorities. Traveling on the same plane
with Ivanushkin was J. Michail, general consul for the Amtorg Trad-
ing Corp., of New York. Too much has already been shown concern-
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give credence to the statement of Michail that his arrival in. Los
Angeles at that time was mere coincidence.
Gorin was ultimately released under a $25,000 cash bond supplied
by the Soviet vice consul in Los Angeles.
At the conclusion of the trial on March 10, 1939, Gorin and Salich
were found guilty. Salich was sentenced to 4 years in prison and a
fine of $10,000. Salich served his sentence. Gorin received a 6-year
sentence and $10,000 fine which he immediately appealed. On Janu=
ary 13, 1941, the conviction was affirmed by a unanimous opinion
of the United States Supreme Court.
On March 22, 1941, the United States district judge at Los Angeles,
upon the recommendation of the State Department and through the
authorization of the Attorney General suspended the original sen-
tence of Gorin and placed him on probation. The new sentence was
conditioned on the payment of the $10,000 fine and court costs and
required that Gorin leave the United States within 48 hours and never
return to the United States. On the same date that the sentence was
handed down the fine and court costs were paid and Gorin sailed from
Los Angeles for Vladivostok, Russia.
THE FAR EASTERN Fun TRADING CO.
It has already been shown that the Amtorg Trading Corp. was used
extensively by the Soviets in carrying out their espionage activities.
From time to time, however, it was necessary for the Kremlin to
establish new cover media. One such cover was the Far Eastern
Fur Trading Co. which was operating in London, England. This
company operated under the direction of two Austrians, Uscher
Zloczomer and Rubin Glucksmann.
When World War II commenced, the only officer of the firm in Lon-
don was Glucksmann and, as an enemy alien, he was ordered interned
by British authorities. Following his internment, British authorities
made an examination of the boots and records of the Far Eastern
Fur Trading Co. which showed that members of that company had
been in correspondence with the afore-mentioned Frank Kleges, who
was now operating the firm known as the Anonymous Society for the
Importation of Dried Beans in Paris, France. Other evidence found
in this examination prompted British authorities to interview Rubin
Glucksmann. They ascertained from him that the Far Eastern Fur
Trading Co. was, like Kleges firm in Paris, a cover for Soviet espion-
age activities. Both firms were associated with the firm of Wostwag
in Berlin, Germany. Wostwag was the principal business cover for
Soviet espionage in Europe. Glucksmann informed the British au-
thorities that among the individuals whom he had met during the
course of his operations for the Far Eastern Fur Trading Co. were
Max Rothstein, Ernst Czuczka, Jacob Knoebil, and Dr. Philip Rosen-
bleitt, the afore-mentioned American dentist, whom Glucksmann knew
as a director of Wastag.
It is ironical that, after furnishing this information, Glucksmann
was sent to Canada for internment on the steamship Arandora Star
and was among those lost when that ship was torpedoed in Septem-
ber 1940.
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The Dr. Philip Rosenbleitt mentioned here had previously left
the United States for Europe prior to World War II and is not
known to have returned.
Certain of the other persons are known to have come to the United
States and although there has been no indication that any of them
have engaged in espionage activities it must not be forgotten that
they at one time were associated with the Soviet Military Intelli-
gence operation in Europe and could at some time in the future be
used by the Soviets.
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE IN THE UNITED STATES DURING
WORLD WAR II
Upon the entry of the United States into World War II it might
have been assumed that the Soviet Union as an ally would discontinue
its espionage activities within the United States. However, the
opposite was the case. The Soviet Union intensified its espionage
activities in this country.
The success of the Soviet espionage during this period may be at-
tributed to a variety of circumstances.- Principal among them was the
fact that some Americans who while not actual members of the Com-
munist Party, but previously sympathetic to it, adopted the view that
because the Soviets were allies they should have access to any and
all information and that they were merely facilitating the Soviets in
making information available. Another principal circumstance which
materially aided the Russians was the sudden influx of Soviet nationals
into this country to serve as employees of the various purchasing com-
missions and missions.
It has previously been shown that the Soviets had long utilized the
Amtorg Trading Corp. as a cover for its espionage operations; how-
ever, with the opening of the immigration gates at the beginning of
World War II, literally thousands of Russians entered the United
States principally as employees of the Soviet Government Purchasing
Commission.
In addition to these the Soviets increased and strengthened their
espionage agents in the embassies and consulates.
SOVIET GOVERNMENT PURCHASING COMMISSION
Considerable information concerning the espionage operations
through the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission has been fur-
nished by Viktor Andrievich Kravchenko. Kravchenko, formerly an
inspector for the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, broke
with the Soviets in April 1944. He has advised the committee that
each employee of the Soviet Purchasing Commission was required
upon his return to Russia to furnish a comprehensive report of what
he had seen and heard in the United States. While it is true that there
were considerable limitations because of language and custom, for
many of the Russian employees, it will be seen that many of the em-
ployees fraternized fully and were unquestionably successful in gath-
ering information which has been and is now of great value to the
Soviets.
One instance cited by Kravchenko was the case of Semen Vassilenko,
an employee of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, who
flew from Washington to Moscow in February 1944 with six pouches
of material dealing with new and extremely secret developments in
war industry in the United States. Kravchenko was able to come by
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this information because he had been a close personal friend of Vas-
silenko for more than 15 years and prior to his departure Kravchenko
had assisted Vassilenko in packing the pouches. Kravchenko stated
that Vassilenko's mission had apparently been viewed as a successful
one because he learned that subsequently Vassilenko was appointed to
the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Soviet.
Kravchenko also stated that Gen. Leonid Rudenko, then chairman
of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, was in charge of
collecting secret information to be transmitted to Moscow. On March
30, 1944, Rudenko told Kravchenko that his office safe contained very
valuable information regarding tank motors, navigation instruments,
and secret airplane devices that he and his subordinates had obtained
through sources in the United States. This material; Rudenko told
Kravchenko, was to be transmitted by diplomatic pouch to Moscow
at the earliest opportunity.
The title of General as applied to Rudenko was misleading, accord-
ing to Kravchenko, since Rudenko was actually a political rather than
military officer. Rudenko had been chairman of the Executive Cog,
mittee of the Communist Party in Rostov, as well as a member of the
State Political Bureau of the Communist Party, prior to assuming his
duties with the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission.
Kravchenko claimed that the success of the Soviet espionage opera-
tion in the United States was so extensive that Moscow had complete
information on the industrial organization within the United State's.
Through this operation, stated Kravchenko, Stalin had information
concerning United States industry as complete and detailed as that in
the possession of the United States Government.
It must be understood that the above-described operations were
independent of the operations of the NKVD which at the same time
was carrying through its own operations. As previously stated, the
NKVD representatives usually outrank all other Soviet representa-
tives, including Ambassadors and consuls. One exception, according
to Kravchenko, was Mikhail V. Serov, who held the unimposing osi-
tion of assistant chairman of the Soviet Government Purchasing Com-
mission. Actually, Serov was the representative in the United States
of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bol-
sheviks holding a title equivalent to that of Party Organizer for the
Central Committee. In other words, according to Kravchenko, Sero'y
outranked all representatives of the Soviet Union except those repre-
sentatives of the NKVD, who were representing Stalin directly.
Kravchenko testified that there were NKVD agents attached Ito
every Soviet office in the United States as well as many other NKVD
agents not attached to any specific Soviet office. He also stated that
he had learned that in the early war years there was a great mass of
refugees who entered countries in the Western Hemisphere and that
among these refugees were numerous agents of.the NKVD. This
knowledge of Kravchenko is borne out in great part by subsequent
findings particularly with regard to the case of Gerhart Eisler.
A logical reaction to this information would be to question, the
propriety of allowing such a large mass of Soviet' nationals to have
freedom and access within the United States, particularly when the
ratio of representation was so completely one-sided.
While the Russians had representatives and nationals totaling thou-
sands in this country, the United States had only a relative handful
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in the Soviet Union totaling little more than a hundred. While the
Americans in Moscow, were virtually under h,quse arrest, the Soviets
in this country were given so much freedom that ever} fora period
of time this Government did r}qt male an attempt to ascertain the
"arrivals and departures of Russian personnel. Eventually, upon the
insistence of agencies charged with security, the Russians were re-
quired to furnish data concerning Russian personnel in this country.
However, this matter was left to Soviet officials with the result that
list any information could be furnished, truthful or ptherwisp.
Tiui CANApIAN SPY QASii
On the evening of September 5, 1946, in the city of Ottawa, Canada,
there commenceed a chain of events, the repercussions of which are
being felt'to the present" day. On that evening there departed from
the Russian lA~mbassy a hitherto obscure i}idiyidual named Igor
Sugeievitch Gouzenlto. Now, this of itself was not earth shaking }for
for that matter unusual, hecause Gouzenkod" been 'accustomed to
leaving the Russian Emk~assy in Ottawa fox' mgre than 2 years, in as-
much as ~e was employed"there s a code clerk.
T e difference on September ?, 1946, was the indiyidual net his
actions. Qouzejiko had made a ,decision. He was going to break with
the "'Russ srans. 6ouzenlio and hi family had' been ordered back to
Russia and being a man who could appreciate the values ' of freedom
he had given considerable thought to what he would return to. rue
there were relatives and f riencls and Gouzenko knew only too well that
there would be reprisals but also there was his imiqediate faintly.
IJow could he he sure that at a f ut}ire date sQnie mingr fault or defec-
tion would not bring about the carne result. It must also be under-
stgod? that Gouzenlto in his previous attitude and conduct must have
iir}pressed the Soviet authorities with his complete subservience to
communist principles, otherwise he would never have been given his
assigninent in Canada. 'What then caused hi s decis}on to hreak with
the Russians ? There is iothirig that can ex lain this more aptly
thall the statement Gouzenkp made to tie Ca}ialian authorities:
iavlpg arrived in Canada 2 years ago I was surprised during the first days by
the complete fr'eedoip of the individual which ggis s lp Cgiiada put does not exist
in Russia. The false representations ,out the democratic cgpntrles which are
increasingly propagated in Russia were dissipated daily, as no lying propaganda
can stand up against facts. * * * During my residence in Canada I have
seen how Canadian people and the r Government, sincerely wishing to help the
oviet people, sent supplies to the Soviet Union, collected ipopey for the welfare
of the tussiap people, sacrificing the lives of their sops in the deliygry of these
supplies across the pecan, and Instead of gratitude for the help rendered, the
Soviet Government is developing espionage activity in Canada, preparing to
deliver a stab in the back of Canada-all of this without the knowledge of the
ssian peQple.
onvi ced that such double-faced politics of the ?oyiet Goyerr}mept toward the
democratic countries do not conform with the interests of the Russian people and
endanger the security of civilization, I deckled to break away from the Soviet
regime and announce my decision openly.
I alp glad that J foi}nd the ?trength within p ysel tq take thi? step and to warn
Canada and the other delnQ r,tic eonntries o the, ai} ei which 4apgs over the p.
ouz ago.
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corhe discouraged with his new resolve. He was rebuffed in all quartei*
before any df the Canadian authorities were willing to accept his.
story.
When eventually and ft ttufiately diplofnatic formalities were put-
aside, Gouzenko unraveled facts that were of sufficient importance to
have the Prime Minister of Canada journey to Washington, D. C., to
confer with the Presidef t of the United States.
There unfolded a record of deceit and intrigue that established one
of the most ifnportant Soviet espionage rings operating until that
tithe - an espiofiage ring that encompassed the Westerin Hemisphere
and had a its goal the securing of all atoifiic data in existence:
It involved persons in high as well as low places, nuclear scientists;
a member of the Canadian Parliament, and eventually uncovered a
Soviet agent operating in this cotititry under the fiafi`ie Igtracy Witczak.
IGNACY WITCZAK
The case of Ignacy Witczak approaches the fantastic for to this day
there is no information as to the, identity of the false Ignacy Witczak
and little more information as to his means of departure from this
country or present whereabouts. The case of the false Ignacy Witczak
could probably have happened only in the United States. Gouzenko
recalled that at one period there was considerable traffic in messages
between his superiors and Moscow relative to the passport of a Mr. W.
From iformation he gathered, Mr. W. was operating on a Canadian
passport that had originally been issued to another person. It wag
obvious that there were certain manipulations within the Passport
Office that would be necessary before the false Mr. W. could operate
with impunity;
It was of sufficient importance to the Kremlin that $3,000 were au-
thorized to be expended to properly rectify the passport file. It fur-
ther developed that Moscow was certain that the real Mr. W. had died
in Spain in 1937.
Gduzenko then recalled communications referring to a. Witczak.
Examinations by Canadian authorities of the passport files disclosed
a record of Ignacy Witczak with some very unusual discrepancies.
The folder disclosed that the original copy of a 1937 file copy de-
scribed a man born October 13, 1906, a farmer by occupation, and
described as 5 feet 9 inches.
The file further contained a passport application presumably dated
also in 1937 but which showed the birth date to be October 13, 1910,
a merchant by profession, and described as 5 feet 8 inches.
While in the same year he had gained 4 years and lost an inch iii
height, Witczak acquired a wife named Bunia Witczak. Also added
at some time from 1937 was an uncertified photograph of Ignacy and
Bunia Witczak.
The reader's confusion regarding these circumstances are infinitesi-
mal compared to those of the real Ignacy Witczak; whom Canadian
authorities found living in the vicinity of the same address furnisheq
in his 1937 passport application. They found Igfiaey Witczak still
a farmer; still single; and still 5 feet 9 inches tall.
The true Ignacy Witczak had come to Canada from Poland in 103k
He had been employed principally as a farm laborer and in 1936
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break of the Spanish Civil War, he decided to join the forces of the
Republican Army in Spain and applied for and received a passport
in 1937. With this passport the real Ignacy Witczak proceeded to
Spain and joined the International Brigade.
After joining the International Brigade, Witczak and several
others were relieved of their passports by an officer who advised them
that they could not risk having their passports lost or destroyed in
front-line action.
When the time came for Witczak to return to Canada, he requested
the passport returned. Brigade authorities told him that it would
be impossible to regain his passport, because it, as well as others, had
been destroyed when the truck carrying the passports had been
bombed.
Witczak returned to Canada as best he could and soon forgot the
incident of his lost passport.
The Soviets again resorted to the same tactics they had previously
employed in the case of Frank Kleges; that was to have one of their
agents assume the identity of a dead veteran. In this instance, how-
ever, there was a mistake-the veteran was not dead and his eventual
location by Canadian authorities uncovered one of their espionage
agents working in the United States.
The United States immigration records disclosed that on September
13,1938, the steamship Veendam arrived in New York City from Bou-
logne, France. Among the passengers arriving on this boat were
a man and woman calling themselves "Ignacy and Bunia Witczak"
and carrying Canadian passports.
On September 19, 1939, in the course of the alien registration pro-
gram, there was registered in Los Angeles, Calif., one Ignacy Samuel
Witczak, who described himself as a merchant. This registration
reflected that this person had first arrived in the United States on
September 28, 1938, at Detroit, Mich. At the same time there was
registered a Bunia Witczak, who furnished substantially the same
information.
On September 11, 1951, there appeared before this committee a
witness named Dr. Arnold D. Krieger. In cooperating with the com-
mittee, Dr. Krieger readily admitted past membership and activity
in the Communist Party, particularly in the area of southern
California.
Dr. Krieger advised the committee that he had first become ac-
quainted with the individual he knew as Sam Witczak while they were
both attending the University of Southern California. Krieger stated
that from a casual acquaintance there developed a close personal
friendship between himself and Witczak. The two were soon dis-
cussing politics and also the writing that Krieger was then doing. In
the course of these discussions Witczak suggested that Krieger might
be interested in going to China to act as a correspondent. Witczak
explained that he had a friend in China who had a newspaper and
since Krieger was opposed to the Japanese aggression in China, he
believed Krieger could write articles for his friend's paper. Witczak
later informed Krieger that he had contacted his friend in China and
that the friend wanted Krieger to come to China to write for his
paper.
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ni e t it ores. e es i e t o
hste as a ca e in t r
after he had been in the Air Corps a little more than 2 months he
received a medical discharge. Shortly after this he was married.
Krieger was again contacted by Witczak, who proposed that Krieger
go to Japan rather than China and he explained that everything was
arranged and that the trip to Japan would make an excellent honey-
moon for Krieger and his new bride. Witczak eventually began to
explain to Krieger what would be expected of him in Japan and it
developed that Krieger was to act as a cover address or "mail drop"
which we have seen is frequently used by the Soviets in their espionage
activities.
Krieger testified that he accepted this proposition, but did not ex-
plain the true purpose of the trip to his wife. All arrangements
were made and passage was booked for Japan. Krieger and his wife
boarded ship, but could proceed only as far as San Francisco, where
Government authorities prohibited them from proceeding. The ex-
planation given Krieger was that the State Department would not
permit anyone to proceed to Japan at that time who had not had prior
business there.
After Krieger had returned to Los Angeles he was again approached
by Witczak, who this time proposed that Krieger undertake a similar
venture-in South America. This proposal was refused by Krieger.
Regardless of this refusal Krieger and Witczak remained on friendly
terms and Krieger testified that he was from time to time in receipt
of'other proposals by Witczak, all of which he refused.
Then in 1944 Witczak went to Dr. Krieger's office and suggested
that Krieger set up an office in which Witczak could! utilize space
and which would in effect serve as a front for Witczak. Krieger took
no action on this suggestion and at a later time was again contacted
by. Witezak. On this occasion Witczak stated that Krieger was back
in the good graces of the powers in Moscow and that he, Witczak
had received money to set up an office for Dr. Krieger. Again Dr.
Krieger declined the suggestion.
Dr. Krieger did not see Witezak again until the fall of 1945, when
the Witczaks had a party to celebrate the arrival of a new baby. At
this party Witczak informed Krieger that he was leaving for New
York and wanted Krieger to accompany him, because there were some
"higher ups" that he wanted Krieger to meet. Krieger stated that
he later learned during the course of his testimony in the Canadian
spy case that actually Witczak had been given instructions by his
superiors to get out of the country.
One of the interesting high lights of Dr. Krieger's testimony before
the committee were the instructions given him by Witczak in order
that contact be made with the apparatus in Japan.
Krieger was instructed that upon his arrival in Japan he was to
mail a post card bearing an unimportant message which he was to
sign with the initial S, to the Russian Embassy, which Witczak ex-
plained would identify him and let the Russians know that he had
arrived. Krieger was to wait for a period of 4 or 5 days, then proceed
to the flower department of a certain department store. There he was
to ask for a particular flower. Witczak advised him that there would
be a ? person there who would be interested in this same flower and
who would engage Krieger in conversation. concerning the flower.
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would follow him and that in this manner his contact would be
established.
During the period of his studies at the University of Southern
California the person using the name Ignacy Samuel Witczak excelled
as a student and attained marks and honors to the extent of being be-
stowed with a Phi Beta Kappa key.
During the entire period that the false Witczak operated in the
United States, he was cloaked in mystery. The conclusion of his case
is, sadly, just as mysterious. Following the defection of Igor Gou-
zenko, Witczak displayed a visible agitation and nervousness to his
associates in Los Angeles. Then one day, just as mysteriously as
he arrived in this country, he departed. The full circumstances have
never been disclosed but the committee has received information be-
lieved reliable that Witczak vanished on a barren stretch of beach
of the Pacific Ocean in southern California.
At first glance it might even appear that Witczak had done away
with himself, however, later reports have indicated that Witczak was
aboard a Russian vessel when it docked in Poland.
From the standpoint of power and importance, there have been but
few, if any, representatives of the NKVD in the United States su-
perior to Vassili M. Zubilin.
Vassili Mikhailovich Zubilin, who also used the aliases V. Zarubin,
Vassili Luchenko, "Peter," and "Cooper," was born January 22, 1900,
in Moscow. His first official arrival in the United States was in Janu-
ary 1942, when he assumed the position of Third Secretary of the
Soviet Embassy, in Washington, D. C. Ile later was elevated to the
rank of Second Secretary. He remained in the United States until
August 27, 1944. With him while in the United States were his 12-
year-old son and his wife, Elizabeta Yurevna Zubilin, who upon at
least one occasion used the alias "Helen."
Zubilin's positions in the Russian Embassy again exemplifies the
fact that frequently an obscure diplomatic official is an important offi-
cial of the NKVD or Soviet Military Intelligence. Zubilin was re-
portedly a general in the NKVD and had been one of the Soviet offi-
cials who directed the occupation of Poland in 1939. While in the
United States, Zubilin was the head of administration of the NKVD
Foreign Information Service and as such had complete charge of the
movement of Soviet espionage agents into and out of the United
States.
The great importance of Zubilin is stressed by testimony given the
committee by Hede Massing, self-admittedly a former Soviet espio-
nage agent and the former wife of Gerhart Eisler.
Mrs. Massing testified that in 1937, following the assassination of
Ignaz Reiss, one of the leaders of a Soviet espionage group operating
in Western Europe, the Soviet officials became suspicious of the loyalty
of Mrs. Massing and her husband Paul.
Both of the Massings had been close to Reiss, who presumably was
assassinated on orders from Moscow.
Mrs. Massing testified that in 1937, she was contacted by her Russian
superior, a woman whom she then knew only as "Helen," who requested
the Massings to return with her to Russia for a "visit."
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the Russians, the fear and strength carried over from Communist
discipline caused her to agree to go to Russia. Once there the Mass-
ings were subjected to lengthy questioning by an NKVD official, then
known to them only as "Peter." The Massings subsequently learned
that "Peter" was actually Vassili M. Zubilin and "Helen" was Eliza-
beta Zubilin.
Zubilin, after. his arrival in the United States in 1942, made many
and varied contacts with individuals in this country. Unfortunately,
little is known about what transpired in the majority of these meetings,
but it is hoped that they were not all of the importance of a meeting
that occurred in Oakland, Calif., on April 10, 1943. On that date
Zubilin visited the home of Steve Nelson and for the purpose of iden-
tity Zubilin used his cover name "Cooper."
STEVE NELSON
Steve Nelson is now a member of the National Board of the National
Committee of the Communist Party, U. S. A. He is on trial in Penn-
sylvania on State subversive charges. He also is one of the individual
leaders of the Communist Party charged with violation of the Smith
Act. Nelson has used the aliases, Stephen Mesarosh, Steve J. Mesa-
rosh, Joseph Fleischinger, Louis Evans, and "Hugo." The latter
name is the code name employed by Nelson when he would contact the
Soviet Consulate in San Francisco, Calif.
United States immigration records reflect Nelson was born in 1903
in Yugoslavia. Nelson entered the United States June 14, 1920, at
New York using an illegal and fraudulent passport under the name
Joseph Fleischinger. On November 21, 1922, the Immigration Serv-
ice legalized this entry and on November 26, 1928, at Detroit, Mich.,.
Nelson was permitted American citizenship by naturalization.
Almost immediately thereafter Nelson commenced to show his ap-
preciation of and loyalty to his American citizenship by perpetrating
frauds and engaging in espionage activity for the Kremlin. It is
obvious that the only purpose of taking American citizenship was be-
cause of the leniency and protection offered by American laws.
Nelson in the 1930's attended the Lenin. School in Moscow, which is
reserved for only the most promising and worthy Communists. The
committee has learned that the Lenin School stresses instructions in
revolutionary espionage and sabotage.
In August 1931 Nelson applied for a United States passport and
willfully made the fraudulent statement that he had been born in
Rankin, Pa. In July 1933 Nelson renewed his passport for a 2-year
period with the American Consul at Vienna, Austria. At the time of
this renewal Nelson stated that he had resided in Russia from Septem-
ber 1931 to May 1933, and from that time until July 1933, he had
resided in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria.
Nelson was in China for 3 months in 1933 working for the Shanghai
branch of the Comintern. One of Nelson's coworkers in Shanghai
was Arthur Ewert, a seasoned Comintern agent, who was imprisoned
in Brazil for the part he played in the Communist revolution there
in 1935.
Nelson, during the entire time he was outside the United States,
performed espionage work for the Soviet Government. The exact time
that Nelson returned to the United States is not known but the com-
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Party Organizer, then the official voice of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party, U. S. A.
Nelson next came to public view during the Spanish Civil War..
Here again Nelson exhibited the qualifications that make him a trusted
agent of the Soviets. Considerable publicity was given Nelson because
he rose through the ranks to become a lieutenant colonel in the Inter-
national Brigade of the Loyalist Army.
It was in Spain that an event occurred which undoubtedly had a,
great bearing on Nelson's being selected for the mission that occa-
sioned the meeting with Zubilin in 1943.
In 1937 in Spain, Nelson met and befriended a woman who had gone
to Paris, France, to meet her husband who was a member of the
International Brigade. The husband, however, had been killed in
action and Nelson assisted the wife in returning to this country. The
woman, upon her return to the United States, moved to Berkeley,
Calif., where she became acquainted with and eventually married one
of the leading physicists engaged in the development of the atomic
bomb. Nelson, through his acquaintance with the scientist's wife,
believed that he could gain access to secret atom data.
An idea of Nelson's loyalty to the United States may be gained by a
statement made by him in November 1941. It must be remembered
that this was immediately prior to the United States' entrance into the
war in which Russia and England were already engaged with Nazi
Germany. Nelson said :
Roosevelt and Churchill are fine men, but we cannot expect them to promise
socialism. We know there will be quarrels, but now we must defeat Hitlerism?
Fascism. We may have to take guns against the United States and England later.
The foregoing explanation has been given in order to explain the
nature and character of the participants in the meeting in Steve
Nelson's home in Oakland, Calif., on April 10, 1943. Here then was
a meeting of a top official of the NKVD and a prominent officer of
the Communist Party, who had a lengthy record of Soviet espionage
activity.
Following the introduction and proper identification, Nelson ex-
plained to Zubilin that he was engaged in work for the Soviet espi-
onage apparatus upon instructions delivered to him by courier from
New York. Nelson explained that Earl Browder, then head of the
Communist Party, USA, was fully aware that he, Nelson, was en-
gaged in secret work for the Soviets.
Nelson outlined completely for Zubilin the character and person-
alities of the various individuals engaged in activities for the Com-
munist apparatus on the west coast, and in most instances used their
code names in referring to them. Nelson expressed dissatisfaction
with the contacts that were being made with Japanese Communists
interned in the relocation centers and also with the handling of liter-
ature and documentary material which was being furnished points
in the South Pacific area by means of Communist seamen couriers.
Nelson also discussed with Zubilin the matter of "Russian activ-
ities" which he distinguished from purely political and propaganda
work for the Comintern apparatus. Nelson explained that with re-
gards to the "Russian activities" that there were a number of Com-
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Soviet representatives were directly approaching rank and file mem-
bers and giving them specific assignments of an espionage nature and
instructing the members not to say anything to their party superiors
regarding their assignments. It was Nelson's suggestion that the
Soviets choose, in each important city or State where espionage
activities might be necessary, a trustworthy contact and allow.that
person to handle direct contact with the Communist members to be
given special assignments.
Also at this meeting Nelson complained about the inefficiency of
two of the persons operating in the apparatus. The identity of these
individuals was established as Getzel Hochberg and Mordecai Rap-
paport. Following this meeting these two persons were relieved of
their apparatus assignments and transferred to different cities, Hoch-
berg from New York to Detroit and Rappaport from San Francisco
to Los Angeles.
The events that transpired at the April 10, 1943, meeting between
Steve Nelson and Vassili Zubilin in Nelson's home have been accounted
for. However, a short time prior to this meeting another meeting had
taken place in the Nelson house, which although not attended by
Zubilin, was directly related to Zubilin's being on the west coast.
One evening in March 1943 a man identifying himself as "Joe"
kept an appointment with Nelson which had earlier been arranged
through Nelson's wife. Upon "Joe's" arrival at the Nelson home,
Nelson was not there and did not return until well after midnight.
When Nelson finally did arrive, "Joe" greeted him by stating that
he had some information he believed Nelson could use. "Joe" then
furnished Nelson with some highly confidential data regarding the
nuclear experiments then in progress at the radiation laboratories at
the University of California at Berkeley. The experiments at the
University of California had then reached the experimental stage of
the atom bomb. The "Joe" mentioned herein has been identified in
other reports released by the committee as Joseph W. Weinberg.
Several days after this meeting with "Joe," Nelson arranged with the
Soviet Consulate in San Francisco to meet Peter Ivanov, a vice con-
sul. Nelson suggested the meeting take place at some place where they
could not be observed. Ivanov suggested the meeting would be safe
in the "usual place." Government agents subsequently observed a
meeting between Nelson and Ivanov that took place in the middle of
an open park on the grounds of St. Francis Hospital in San Francisco.
The Government agents observed Nelson passing an envelope or pack-
age to Ivanov. It was shortly after this meeting that Vassili Zubilin
arrived at the Russian Consulate in San Francisco and subsequently
met with Nelson.
The committee, during the course of its investigation into the con-
tacts between Nelson and Joseph Weinberg, learned certain facts
concerning the instructions given Weinberg by Steve Nelson. Nelson,
a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party, U. S. A.
instructed Weinberg, a research physicist engaged in development o?
the atomic bomb, that Weinberg should keep Nelson advised of prog-
ress in this development in order that Nelson could in turn furnish
this information to the proper officials of the Soviet Government.
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engaged in atomic research so that when all reports were correlated
the Soviets could assemble the atom bomb. We do not know whether
the Soviets were successful in assembling the atom bomb from this
operation; however, there is no question that the information gathered
from the Nelson group materially assisted the Soviets toward this
goal.
The committee in endeavoring to ascertain all facts concerning this
apparatus questioned Steve Nelson and Joseph W. Weinberg. Nelson
under oath refused to answer whether he had given Weinberg such
instructions and also refused to answer whether Weinberg had given
him information relating to atomic research.
Weinberg, when questioned by the committee, denied the allegations
that he had furnished any information concerning the atomic bomb
to Steve Nelson. Later, when he appeared before a Federal grand jury
in Washington, D. C., Weinberg refused to answer similar questions
on the grounds that to do so might tend to incriminate him.
The committee's investigation was intensified toward ascertaining
the facts relating to a meeting which was held in the home of Joseph
W. Weinberg in Berkeley, Calif., in August 1943. This meeting was
attended by the following persons: Weinberg; Steve Nelson; Ber-
nadette Doyle, who had been secretary to Steve Nelson while he was
a Communist Party organizer in California, and who later was a
candidate for office in California on the Communist Party ticket,
and is presently under indictment under the Smith Act; Giovanni
Rossi Lomanitz; Irving David Fox; David Bohm; and Ken Max
Manfred, formerly known as Max Bernard Friedman. With the
exception of Doyle and Nelson, these persons were all associated with
the radiation laboratory of the University of California. During
the course of the committee's investigation all of these persons were
identified as being members of the Communist Party.
The committee questioned Nelson, Lomanitz, Fox, Bohm, and Man-
fred, who declined to answer pertinent questions, basing their refusal
on the statement that to do so might incriminate them.
Joseph Weinberg, when questioned concerning this meeting, stead-
fastly denied that such a meeting had ever occurred.
The committee also introduced witnesses who had been agents of
Government intelligence agencies who testified that this meeting; had
been covered by the Government. Weinberg persisted in his denials.
ARTHUR ALEXANDROVICH ADAMS
Mention has previously been made of the fact that the committee's
records show that while Ludwig Martens, the first known Soviet agent,
operated in this country from 1919 to 1921, he was assisted by Arthur
Alexandrovich Adams. Adams, along with Martens and others, de-
parted from this country voluntarily on January 20, 1921. This
action, however, did not deter Adams from frequently returning to
this country. How often he actually returned is not known; however,
the committee has learned of several of these occasions. He returned
to the United States in 1927 representing himself as being engaged
in official Soviet business dealing with the Amo Motor Co., the. first,
automobile works constructed in Russia. Again, in 1932, he was in
this country as a member of a Russian purchasing commission sent
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by the Soviet Government to purchase airplanes from the Curtiss-
Wright Co.
In 1936, Adams, this time accompanied by his wife, visited with
-the sister of Mrs. Adams in New York City. According to the sister,
Mrs. Adams and Arthur left the United States in 1937 with the stated
purpose of returning to. Russia. From subsequent events, it is certain
that in each of these visits Adams was engaged in Soviet espionage
missions.
Although these first entries of Adams into the United States had
been accomplished with relative simplicity, his next return was gained
under entirely different circumstances. In 1938, Adams returned via
the Dominion of Canada and through the medium of a fraudulent
Canadian birth certificate.
After gaining admission to this country, Adams obtained the right
to permanent residence which was facilitated by false statements made
by Samuel Novick. Novick later became president of Electronics
Corp. of America, a firm which originated in 1942. During World
War II, Electronics Corp. of America had Government contracts
amounting to $6,000,000 and had exclusive contracts to produce cer-
tain highly secret items for use in radar installations.
The committee has also learned that Adams' fraudulent entry into
the United States was assisted by one M. S. Milestone of Toronto,
Canada, who for many years had been a member of the Communist
underground in Canada.
Very little is known concerning the personal history of Arthur
Adams, except that he was practically a charter member of the Com-
munist Party in Russia. He participated in the Russian revolution
,of 1905 and as a result was imprisoned by.the Czarist Government.
He claimed that he suffered for many years following his imprison-
-ment from the beatings that were administered to him.
Upon his arrival in the United States in 1938, Adams set up a busi-
ness with the name Technological Laboratories. In this, he was
.associated with one Jacob Broches Aronoff, a Russian-born attorney.
Later, Adams used the offices of Electronics Corp. of America, as
well as the offices of Keynote Recordings in New York City, as a cover
for his espionage activities. The committee has also learned that as
another security precaution Adams, sometime in 1941 or 1942, gave
$1,875 to one Samuel J. Wegman. Wegman, who is now deceased,
was operating a business in Hollywood, Calif., and New York City.
Adams requested Wegman to use these funds to pay Adams $75 per
week and forward this sum by check to Adams at the Peter Cooper
hotel in New York City. Through this ruse, Adams represented him-
self as being employed by Wegman as a machine designer and used
Wegman's Hollywood address as his business address. Before his
.death, Wegman explained his association with Adams and explained
that he had first met Adams through Julius Heiman.
CLARENCE FRANCIS HISKEY
During the early part of World War II, it was discovered that
Arthur Adams was actively engaged in espionage activities for the
soviet Government. His principal activities were directed toward
.securing information with respect to the steps then being taken by
American scientists to utilize nuclear fission. One of the American
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scientists active in this work was Clarence Hiskey at the University
of Chicago. On April 27, 1944, Hiskey received notice that he was
being called to active duty as an officer in the United States Army.
On April 28, 1944, the day following the receipt of this information,
Hiskey was visited by Adams at the Hiskey home in Chicago. From
the ensuing developments, it became obvious that Hiskey had for some
time been supplying Adams with secret information regarding atomic
research. Immediately after seeing Adams, Hiskey flew to Cleveland,
Ohio, where he contacted John Hitchcock Chapin. Chapin, through
the urging of Clarence Hiskey, agreed to take over Hiskey's contacts
with Adams.
There is cause at this point to pause and give consideration to the
principles involved. Arthur Alexandrovich Adams, as has been
shown, was unequivocally dedicated to serve the Soviet Government
and he had been a part of the original revolutionary activity of the
Communist Party in Russia. Hiskey and Chapin, however, are men
from an entirely different pattern. Here, as in so many similar in-
stanceq, were young men, native-born Americans, who had received
some of the greatest advantages and benefits offered by this country
and still worked to the detriment of this country. Their plan, if suc-
cessful, would have led to the oppressive rule inflicted by the Soviet
Government over all of its victims.
In Clarence Hiskey, Adams undoubtedly found a docile and willing
pupil in his espionage indoctrination. Clarence Francis Hiskey was
born July 5, 1912, in Milwaukee, Wis. From 1929 to 1933 he attended
LaCrosse State Teachers' College. In 1935 he received a B. S. degree
from the University of Wisconsin. In 1939, he received a Ph. D.
from the same university. It was during the period of his attendance
at the University of Wisconsin that Hiskey met his first wife, Marcia
Sand, who also figured in the atomic espionage activities of Arthur
Adams.
The fact that Hiskey displayed an early susceptibility is borne out
in a military intelligence report dated June 5, 1945:
Hiskey was active in Communist movements while attending graduate school
at the university. * * * Allegedly Marcia, subject's wife, was a Communist.
It was reported Hiskey had stated "that the present form of government is no
good, the Russian Government is a model and that Russia can do no wrong ;
if the lend-lease bill is passed this country will have a dictator." * * * Also
remarked that the United States Government should look to Russia for leader-
ship. Hiskey reportedly urged radical-minded young men to take ROTC train-
ing to provide for "possible penetration of the Communist Party in the Armed
Forces of the United States." In various lectures he discussed communism.
* * * Investigations conducted in 1942 revealed Hiskey read the Communist
publications Daily Worker and In Fact, and he had definite communistic lean-
ings. * * * Hiskey and his wife lived for approximately 2 years with-
whose brother was later president of the Young Communist League (cited as
subversive by the Attorney General) at the University of Wisconsin. * * *
It was reported that subject and his wife associated with other alleged Com-
munists or Communist sympathizers. Hiskey was said to be an active member
of the Communist Party.
Realizing the gravity of the charges concerning Clarence Hiskey
and Marcia Sand the committee called them to appear before it on
September 9, 1948. Both refused to answer any questions concerning
their Communist affiliations and membership while attending the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, basing their refusal to answer questions on the
fact that to do so might incriminate them. Marcia Sand, however,
testified that she was not a member of the Communist Party on the
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date of her testimony September, 9, 1948, but when as e 1 she a
ever been a member of the Communist Party, she refused to answer
"on the grounds that it may degrade or incriminate me."
Hiskey's progress following the completion of his formal education
was of the nature that would naturally place him high in the considera-
tion of those engaged in atomic research.
From September 1939 to 1941, Hiskey was employed as an instruc-
tor in chemistry at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville. For a
short period in 1941, he was an associate chemist with the Tennessee
Valley Authority aluminum nitrate plant at Shef.,eld, Ala.
Hiskey has testified that he then attended Columbia University,
New York, where he was engaged as an instructor from September
1941 until September 1942. Hiskey, in 1942, upon the recommendation
of Harold Urey, a prominent physicist, was requested to do research
work in connection with atomic energy in a laboratory at Columbia
University, known as the SAM laboratory.
The importance of the SAM project may best be understood by
realizing that this project developed the K-25 plant at Oak Ridge,
Tenn. This was one of the important steps in the development of the
atomic bomb.
In September 1943, the laboratory in which Hiskey was engaged was
moved to the University of Chicago. Hiskey remained an employee
of the Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of Chicago, until
he was ordered to active duty in the United States Army on April
27, 1944.
As previously stated, Hiskey, following receipts of orders to report
for active duty in the United States Army, flew to Cleveland, Ohio,
where he contacted John Hitchcock Chapin, and urged him to take up
the contacts with Arthur Adams.
Chapin was in Cleveland on assignment from the Metallurgical
Laboratory of the University of Chicago.
JOHN HITCHCOCK CHAPIN
John Hitchcock Chapin was one of the few individuals involved
in the Adams apparatus, who, when questioned by the committee,
cooperated by answering rather than claiming constitutional privilege.
Chapin was adamant in denying that he had ever been a member
of the Communist Party. He conceded, however, that he had possibly
received Communist or pro-Communist publications.
In his statements to the committee, Chapin substantiated the meet-
ing with Clarence Hiskey in Cleveland, Ohio, in April 1944. He
further substantiated the fact that he had acquiesced to the proposal
of Hiskey that he, Chapin, carry on contacts with Arthur Adams,
whom Hiskey identified as a Russian agent. Chapin testified that
in order that a positive identification might .be effected, he, Chapin,
had given Hiskey a key, which Hiskey was in turn to give Adams.
Upon the completion of his assignment in Cleveland, Chapin re-
turned to Chicago.. Once there he directed a letter to Marcia. Sand,
then the wife of Clarence Hiskey. Marcia then wrote a letter to
Clarence Hiskey, who was at that time stationed at White Horse,
Yukon Territory, Canada, advising him that she had received a
letter from Chapin which she had forwarded to Arthur Adams.
Chapin advised the committee that this letter to Marcia Sand was
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a preconceived signal to notify Adams of Chapin's return to Chicago.
In the fall of 1944, Arthur Adams called at Chapin's apartment.
Rather than meeting him in the apartment, Chapin testified that he
went downstairs to meet Adams. Upon meeting him, Adams fur-
nished Chapin the key that the latter had given Clarence Hi.skey.
Thus with the identification established, Adams suggested that Chapin
meet him within a few days in Adams' hotel room.
Chapin advised the committee that a day or so later he went to
Adams' hotel room and there conversed with Adams for approxi-
mately an hour and a half. Chapin denied that he gave Adams any
information during that conversation.
Chapin's testimony was extremely candid, compared to that of
Clarence Hiskey, who, when posed with similar questions, refused to
answer on the grounds that his answers might incriminate or degrade
him. This was the response of a person who had reached the depths of
degradation by soliciting fellow countrymen to become alined with
Soviet agents.
While John Hitchcock Chapin cannot be excused from an episode
of deviation in his loyalty to his country, it is recognized by the com-
mittee that he had the courage to admit his defection and his coopera-
tion with the committee and intelligence agencies must be taken into
consideration.
THE ARTHUR ADAMS APPARATUS
The reader might justifiably wonder how it is possible for a Soviet
espionage agent to operate in this country with obvious freedom.
This is made possible because he is a part of a trusted apparatus. If
an agent has set up around him a barricade of tried and trusted asso-
ciates, he may carry on his activities and seldom expose himself.
Such a group was associated with Arthur Adams. A person with
Adams' physical peculiarities and disabilities would soon become quite
obvious, and it was necessary for him, to a great extent, to use others
to help carry out his espionage activities.
The so-to-speak outer guard of the Arthur Adams apparatus was,
at best, a polygot of personalities. They consisted of Victoria Stone,
Julius Heiman, Eric Bernay, Samuel Novick, and Dr. Louis Miller.
Perhaps Dr. Miller, as a man of medicine, could, if he so chose,
furnish a psychiatric description of these individuals. However,
without his assistance, it would appear that Victoria Stone became a
part of this group as a frustrated and emotionally unstable person.
Heiman, as a person of wealth, who, like so many of similar estate,
felt that he was justifying his station in life by helping the "peasants."
Bernay, Novick, and Dr. Miller were what might be termed "feather-
bedders" or opportunists, who, feeling the strong possibility that the
Communist revolution might be successful, chose to assist its progress,
especially since they were not alarmed by the inadequate punitive
legislation this country has for such action.
Victoria Stone is the daughter of a Polish immigrant to the
Dominion of Canada. She was born Rebecca Victoria Singer, in Mon-
treal, Canada, in 1905. In the early 1930's she was married to Harry
Stone. While quite young she moved to Philadelphia, Pa., and there
received her early education.
The committee has information that at an early age Victoria Stone
exhibited a pronounced affinity for radicalism. Of the afore-nien-
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tioned group, Victoria Stone first ecame closely assac
Julius Heiman, who had been instrumental in the advance of Earl
Browder within the Communist Party, U. S. A. She stated that she
had first become acquainted with Julius Heiman in Philadelphia prior
to moving to New York in about 1928, that she had a close social and
business association with him and that Heiman had advanced the
money for the jewelry business she operates in New York.
Victoria Stone testified before the committee that through her asso-
ciation with Julius Heiman, she had met Earl Browder, who had been
a frequent guest in Heiman's home. She added, however, that though
she had maintained her association with Heiman, she had not seen
Browder in the Heiman house since the time that Browder was ex-
pelled from the Communist Party in 1945.
With regard to her association with Arthur Adams, Victoria Stone
admitted to the committee that she had been an intimate associate of
Adams during the entire period he is known to have been engaged in
atomic espionage. She was extremely vague in fixing the date that
she had first met Adams. She did recall that Adams had worked for
both Samuel Novick and Eric Bernay. It also developed that Dr.
Miller was the personal or family physician for Adams, Stone, Hei-
man, Novick, and Bernay. %
Samuel Novick, when questioned by the committee, first claimed
that he had met Arthur Adams in 1938, when Adams was a customer
of his company, Wholesale Radio Service.. He was then confronted
with a statement he had made to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service on December 19, 1937, to the effect that Arthur Adams was a
skilled radio engineer, who had been employed by him in Canada for
10 years. Novick could not recall when he first met Adams, nor
whether the statement made on December 19, 1937, was correct.
As an actual fact, Adams could not have been employed by Novick
for a period of 10 years prior to 1937, because we have seen that dur-
ing most of that period Adams had been employed by the Russian
Government and much of that time he had spent in Russia.
Novick, while admitting that he had known Adams for a number
of years, endeavored to explain that his relationship developed
solely from business dealings.
Novick has a long record of membership and association with
Communist fronts, as well as having been a substantial financial
supporter of Communist organizations and endeavors.
Eric Bernay, who is presently engaged in a business manufactur-
ing phonograph records, admitted to the committee that he had been
advertising manager of the Communist publication, New Masses,
between 1936 and 1939. He also admitted that during that same
period he had been a member of the Communist Party.
Bernay claimed that he had first become acquainted with Adams
in 1941 or 1942, at which time Adams had been a customer in Ber-
nay's record shop. He stated, that through conversations with
Adams, he learned that Adams had a knowledge of the manufacture
of records and as a result he had hired Adams as an engineer.
Bernay claimed that he had never suspected Adams was a Com-
munist, let alone a Russian agent; even though he claimed to know
nothing of Adams' background, and also that he knew for a long
period of time Adams was under constant surveillance.
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rom a t e Information available to the committee, it is unques-
tionable that these persons who were associated with Adams were not
only aware of his status as a Russian agent but also furnished him
assistance in his espionage activities when called upon.
In February 1945, Adams realized that the FBI had acquired
knowledge of his espionage activities and that his usefulness was
limited. With money advanced him by Eric Bernay, Adams pro-
ceeded to Portland, Oreg., where he endeavored to board a Soviet
vessel. He was prevented from doing so by FBI agents, even though
they were powerless to arrest him, because of limitations imposed
by the State Department.
Adams then returned to New York City but before the necessary
wheels could be put into action to effect his arrest, he vanished.
There is no certainty as to his present whereabouts, but the com-
mittee has information indicating that he successfully returned to
the Soviet Union.
No prosecution was had of those associates who assisted him, be-
cause, as in almost all other similar instances, the evidence concern-
ing their activities is considered inadmissible under present statutes.
ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET OFFICIALS
It has already been indicated in this report that Soviet officials
frequently took a direct part in espionage activities. Vassili M.
Zubilin, Mikhail V. Serov, Gen. Leonid Rudenko, and Peter Ivanov
are some of the Soviet officials who have been so engaged.
The committee has learned that there were many Soviet officials,
in addition to those named above, who took part in espionage activities.
Igor Gouzenko, the former Russian code clerk in Ottawa, Canada,
has stated that during World War II, the head of Red Army Intelli-
gence activities in the United States, was Gen. Ilya Saraev, the military
attache in Washington, D. C. Saraev's two principal assistants were
Pavel P. Mikailov, acting Soviet consul general in New York City, and
Col. A. I. Sorvin of the Tank Department of the Soviet Government
Purchasing Commission.
The committee has also learned that important Red Army Intel-
ligence, and NKVD officials frequently came to the United States
posing as diplomatic couriers.
One such ruse was used by Mikhail Milsky and Gregori Kossarev.
Igor Gouzenko has described Milsky whose true name is Milshtein,
as the Deputy Chief of Red Army intelligence in 1944. Kossarev
was described as an inspector for the NKVD.
In the spring of 1944, Milsky and Kossarev, traveling as diplomatic
couriers, made a joint inspection of Soviet intelligence facilities in the
United States, Mexico, and finally Canada.
The records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service dis-
close that Mikhail Milsky and Gregori Kossarev entered the United
States through the port of New York on April 3, 1944, as diplomatic
couriers of the U. S. S. R. The records further disclose that these
two individuals departed from the United States for Mexico City, at
Laredo, Tex., on April 15, 1944. They reentered the United States
through El Paso, Tex., on May 10, 1944.
Milsky and Kossarev then spent from May 11 to May 22, 1944,
inspecting the facilities of the Soviet consulate at Los Angeles, Calif.,
following which they went to San Francisco, Calif.
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in San Francisco, Kossarev made a similar inspection in Portland,
Oreg. They departed together from San Francisco on May 29, 1944,
and arrived back in New York City on June 2,1944.
They then went to Ottawa, Canada, Milsky returning to New York
on June 16, 1944, and Kossarev on June 21, 1944. During most of
July 1944, Milsky and Kossarev divided their time between New
York and Washington, D. C. Finally, on July 23, 1944, they departed
from the United States via plane from Great Falls, Mont.
The committee has learned that while Milsky and Kossarev were
satisfied with the facilities set up by Red Army Intelligence and
the NKVD in Canada, they were greatly dissatisfied with operations
in the United States. This inspection resulted in the recall of a
number of individuals operating in the United States, who were then
replaced by more vigorous espionage agents.
It is also interesting to note that in October 1945, Gregori Kossarev
again visited the United States, this time accompanied by one Serguei
Fomitchev. After visiting Canada, these two eventually departed
from the United States on November 3, 1945, and visited Mexico
City, Balboa, C. Z., Medellin, Colombia, and were to return to Mexico
City on November 25, 194.5.
GREGORI MARKOVICH KHEIEETS
Gregori Markovich Kheifets, who used the code name "Mr. Brown,"
was the vice consul of the Soviet consulate at San Francisco, Calif.,
from 1941 until he was recalled by the Soviet Union on July 6,
1944.
Kheifets, who was born in Moscow, May 15, 1899, like Arthur
Adams and Vassili Zubilin, was a seasoned veteran in Soviet activi-
ties. From 1934 through 1938, Kheifets was in Germany performing
special work for the Soviet Government, which resulted in the identi-
fication and punishment of persons involved in actions the Soviets:
considered subversive. This investigation finally resulted in the no-
torious "blood purge" in the Soviet Union in 1938. Kheifets made,
the claim that at one time he had been the secretary to the widow of
V. I. Lenin.
Kheifets was one of the Soviet officials who moved freely and con-
spicuously in the company of American citizens. The persons whom
Kheifets had occasion to contact form an interesting picture of Soviet
espionage in action.
The committee has learned that among the principal espionage con-
tacts of Kheifets were the following persons:
Martin David Kamen, alias Martin David Kamenetsky, a natural-
ized citizen of Russian parentage, who, at the time of his contact with
Kheifets, was employed at the vital Radiation Laboratory of the Uni-
versity of California.
Martin Kamen was born in Toronto, Canada, in 1913, and was
brought to this country when he was 3 months old. From 1936 to
1944, Kamen was a staff chemist in the Radiation laboratories at the
University of California, Berkeley, Calif. Within that period, from
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as asst
trict's atomic bomb project.
Kamen's scientific capabilities are unquestioned. He participated
in some of the most important developments toward perfection of the
atomic bomb.
On July 1, 1944, Kamen proceeded from Berkeley to San Francisco,
Calif., and there met Gregori Kheifets, who was destined to leave the
United States within a few days. Kheifets was accompanied by
Gregory Kasperov, who had been selected to succeed Kheifets as vice-
consul of the Soviet consulate in San Francisco.
The three men roceeded to a San Francisco restaurant, where, dur-
ing the course ofpa dinner, they conversed freely. In fact, the con-
versation, which was monitored by a Government intelligence agent,
was so free on the part of Kamen, that an expert has testified that
much of Kamen's conservation dealt with classified information deal-
ing with the development of the atomic energy necessary to develop
the bomb.
Kamen has not been identified as a member of the Communist Party,
however, he unquestionably knew the seriousness of carrying on such
a discussion with a person who not only was not associated with the
atomic project, but was known to him as a representative of a foreign
country. Such acts as these make the work performed by security
agencies doubly difficult.
Isaac Folkoff, who has used the aliases Cam Falconvitch, and "Pop,"
is a naturalized American citizen of Latvian birth, who has been en-
gaged in the clothing business in San Francisco. Folkoff has long
exerted a strong influence on Communist Party leaders in the San
Francisco area, and has been reported to control the strings of the
party's secret funds there.
During the course of meetings between Kheifets and Folkoff, Gov-
ernment agents frequently observed that Kheifets would depart from
the meetings with an envelope or package that had been carried to the
meeting by Folkoff.
Folkoff is also known to have been in attendance at secret meetings
with a group which included Steve Nelson, Haakon Chevalier, and
William Schneiderman, head of the Communist Party in California.
Folkoff also held clandesine meetings with Louise Bransten.
LOUISE, ROSENBERG BRANSTEN
Louise Rosenberg Bransten was born October" 10, 1908, at Berkeley,
Calif. She is independently wealthy through inheritance and receives
an income of approximately $40,000 annually. She was formerly
married to Richard Bransten, alias Bruce Minton, a former editor of
the Communist publication New Masses, who was, expelled from the
Communist Party because of differences over the expulsion of Earl
Browder as head of the party.
Louise Bransten first met Gregori Kheifets in 1942, and soon after-
ward commenced an intimate association with him. In fact, Bran-
sten was unquestionably the closest associate of Kheifets, and he fre-
quently confided in her.
While Louise Bransten's open activities appeared to have been re-
lated principally to the American-Russian Institute, a Communist-
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uals mentioned in this report : Among her contacts were : Haakon
Chevalier, professor of Romance languages at the University of Cali-
fornia; Joseph North, editor of New Masses; Earl Browder; his.
brother, William Browder: Lement Upham Harris; Gerhart Eisler;,
and Nathan Gregory Silvermaster.
During the organizing conference of the United Nations in San,
Francisco in the spring of 1945, Louise Bransten entertained Dmitri
Manuilsky, the head o7 the delegation from the Ukraine, U. S. S. R..
Manuilsky is better known as a member of the inner circle and prin--
cipal spokesman for the Comintern.
Louise Bransten has since moved from San Francisco to New York
City. Shortly after moving to New York, she established contact with+
Pavel Mikhailov, who at the time was head of Red Army Intelligence,
activity in the New York area.
Bransten., who has since married Lionel Berman, a Communist
Party official, appeared before this committee and refused to answer
questions regarding her associations on the ground that to do so,
might tend to incriminate her.
HAAKON MAURICE CHEVALIER
Haakon Maurice Chevalier is an American citizen having been born
in New Jersey of French and Norwegian parentage. In 1927, he,
commenced employment with the University of California, as an as-
sociate professor of Romance languages. During the conference of the,
International Labor Office in Philadelphia, Pa., in 1944, Chevalier
acted as translator for the French delegation, and also for the Latin-
American Communist labor leader, Vincente Lombardo Toledano;.
During the United Nations Conference on International Organization
at San Francisco, Calif., in the spring of 1945, Chevalier again,
served as a translator. In October 1945, ,Chevalier received an ap-
pointment to act as traislator at the trials of the German war
criminals.
Mention has previously been made of a meeting between Steve
Nelson and Peter Ivanov, the vice consul of the Soviet consulate in
San Francisco. The committee has learned that in the latter part of
1942, Ivanov was a principal in another meeting of interest.
On this occasion Ivanov contacted one George Charles Eltenton
and requested him to obtain information concerning some highly
secret experiments on the atomic bomb that were being carried on at,
the Radiation Laboratory of the University of California.
After this contact by Ivanov, Eltenton in turn approached Haakon:
Chevalier and requested him to assist in obtaining the desired infor-
mation. Eltenton explained that he had a direct contact with am
official of the Soviet Government and that this official had explained
that since Russia and the United States were allies, the Soviet Gov-
ernment was entitled to any technical data that might be of assistance
to that country.
Chevalier following this approach of Eltenton, contacted J. Robert
Oppenheimer, the director of the atomic bomb project, and told hint
of the conversation he had with Eltenton.
Oppenheimer told Chevalier that he considered such acts or such
attempts to obtain information on this project as constituting trea
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Andrei V. Schevchenko was born at Kharkov, Russia, on November
24,1906. He was a student at the Aviation Institute at Moscow in 1936
and 1937, and later was employed in the Peoples Commissariat of
Aviation Industry in Moscow.
On June 19, 1942, Schevchenko entered the United States as an en-
gineer in the aviation department of the Soviet Government Pur-
chasing Commission. Until September 15, 1945, he acted as liaison
between the Bell Aircraft Corp., Buffalo, N. Y., and the Soviet Pur-
chasing Commission.
During this period of time, the Bell Aircraft Corp. was conducting
experiments on the use of jet propulsion as power for aircraft. The
importance of such experiments may best be illustrated by the use of
this means of velocity in present-day aviation.
Shortly after Schevchenko's liaison with Bell Aircraft Corp. be-
gan, that company opened a new plant in Buffalo, N. Y., which had
provisions for a library. The librarian was Mrs. Leona Vivian Fra-
ney, who, along with her husband, Joseph John Franey, has furnished
the committee with valuable information concerning the operations of
Andrei Schevchenko
Mrs. Franey testified that soon after the facilities of the library
were available Schevchenko became a frequent patron of the library.
While at first there were certain classified articles in the library
Schevchenko made no attempt to secure them. However, Schev-
chenko endeavored through glowing depictions of Soviet life to indoc-
trinate the Franeys.
Soon thereafter, Schevchenko put aside the screen of his disinterest
in classified material. In fact, according to Mrs. Franey, he was ask-
ing for information on aircraft development almost before the en-
gineers had started their experiments.
At almost the same time the Franeys learned that the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation had ail interest in the activities of Andrei Schev-
chenko, and upon being contacted by FBI agents they agreed to as-
sist them in this investigation. From that point, tie Franeys supplied
Schevchenko with voluminous material, all of which had been cleared
by Government experts. For this information the Franeys were paid
sums by Schevchenko ranging from $200, which they turned over to
the Government.
Actually, Andrei Schevchenko was paying for information which
he could have secured from periodicals dealing with aeronautics. In
fact, at that time his financial contributions were probably the only
return of lend-lease that this country was receiving.. from Russia.
The policy of appeasement then in existence prohibited the arrest of
Andrei Schevchenko, and he was allowed to return to Russia. How-
ever, in his case there is a strong possibility that his Soviet superiors
have not looked too kindly upon the miserable manner in which he
carried out his assignment, and it is improbable that Schevchenko is
enjoying the glorious benefits of the. Soviet life he so glowingly de-
picted to the Franeys.
GERHART EISLER
One of the dark pages in the history of Soviet espionage in the
United States deals with the activities of Gerhart Eisler.
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must be considered along with that of V assih M. u ilin' ; for fire"
Zubilin, Eisler was an official of the International Communist move-
ment.
Gerhart Eisler ostensibly first arrived in the United States on June
6, 1941, at the port of New York, aboard the steamship Evangeline,
in transit to Mexico. Accompanying him was Brunhilda Rotstein,
whom he described as his fiancee. Eisler stated that he had been born
at Leipzig, Germany, on February 20, 1897. He informed immigra-
tion authorities that he had never before been in the United States.
The passage of Eisler and his fiancee was paid for by the Spanish
Refugee AN Society, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. Eisler
denied to immigration authorities that he was, or had ever been a
member of the Communist Party, or sympathetic to Communist
causes.
Following the immigration hearing, Eisler became the object of an
investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.. Par-
tial results of this investigation are contained in a report furnished by
J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, to the Commissioner of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, dated October 16, 1946.
This report spotlights Eisler's activities until that date and is in part
its follows :
At a hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service at Ellis Island, N. Y., on June 14, 1941, Eisler denied
that he was or had been in the past, a member of the Communist Party, denied
membership in any Communist organization, and stated that he had never been
sympathetic to the Communist cause, all of which statements were obviously
false, in view of Eisler's long-term activity as an important international Com-
munist and responsible representative of the Communist International.
Almost immediately after his release by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service in 1941, Gerhart Eisler became active in the, American Communist move-
ment and in recent years he has been a figure of cosiderable importance in con-
nection with the policies and operations of the Communist Party, USA. It is
of particular significance to note that through the investigation of Gerhart
Eisler, it has been ascertained that he is identical with an individual previously
known as "Edwards" who, from approximately 1933 until approximately 1938,
was the representative of the Communist International to the Communist Party,
USA, by virtue of which position he was responsible for and instrumental in
the determination of American Communist policy and the control and the direc-
tion of American Communist operations. During the period he served in the
capacity of Comintern representative in the United States under the name
"Edwards" he was recognized by party leaders as a figure of primary importance
and also unlimited authority. A number of individuals who knew "Edwards"
have definitely identified Gerhart Eisler as "Edwards." In addition, persons
who have been acquainted with Eisler for a number of years have reported that
he has served as a Comintern representative and a Soviet agent in other parts
of the world also.
By virtue of his position as Comintern representative in the United States,
Eisler or "Edwards," was, of course, actually the liaison between the Comintern
and the authorities in Moscow and the Communist Party, U. S. A.
Since 1941, Eisler has contributed regular articles to the official press of the
Communist Party, many of which articles have been instrumental in formu-
lating or solidifying the Communist Party line with regard to particular subjects.
He has been a regular and frequent contributor in this connection to the Daily
Worker, recognized Communist newspaper in New York City, and to Political
Affairs, formerly known as The Communist, the official theoretical organ of the
Communist Party, USA. His articles in the Daily Worker have been appearing
since 1941, and his articles in Political Affairs, formerly The Communist, since
early 1942. It should be noted that all these articles have been written by Eisler
under the pen name Hans Berger, and that Eisler has consistently denied his
identity as Hans Berger. In the role of Berger, Eisler has been an important
publicist and analyst of party policy for the past several years.
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Important Communist functionaries, many of whom are strongly suspected of
involvement in Soviet espionage operations. Although, Eisler, tinder his pert
name, is comparatively unknown to the rank and file of the Communist Party,.
the investigation of him reflects without doubt that he is and has been in recent
years a figure of paramount importance in the determination of party policy.
Whether he is still engaged ii activity as an actual operating Soviet agent, as hem
is known to have been in the past, is not completely clear. However, his known
contacts, his clandestine activities, and the care with which he has concealed
and protected his, identity, raise the very definite possibility that iii addition to.
his other activity Eisler may be involved in intelligence work as such.
The entire pattern of Eisler's activities since his arrival in the United Staten
In June 1941, as previously summarized is one of apparent evasion and duplicity
coupled with clandestine but no less important activity. Ile has been in con-
stant contact with important Communist functionaries and _has frequently beem
in touch with individuals identified as or strongly suspected as being Soviet
espionage agents. In addition, as noted in greater detail above, Eisler was for
many years an important representative of the Comintern. During a recent
interview, Gerhart Eisler unequivocally denied his activities as outlined above,.
which denials obviously were false and unfounded.
For the past several years Eisler has made regular daily. visits to the office,
of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, a well-known Communist-front
organization in New York City, and it is indicated that Eisler may have been
regularly employed by this organization although he has frequently described
himself as unemployed. Contacts with Eisler have been made by numerous indi-
viduals, including important Communist Party functionaries through officials
of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee and on many occasions at the
offices of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee. In this connection, it
appears' that Eisler has been extremely careful about any visits to Communist
Party headquarters.
Through the investigation of Eisler, the possibility was developed that Eisler
is identical with one Julius Eisman, who is known to have been receiving for-
a considerable period of time, regular monthly checks from the Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee in New York City in the amount of $150.
Subsequently investigation has identified Julius Eisman as Gerhart Eisler_
It is known that the following checks were issued to Julius Eisman by the Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee.
All of these checks which were from the funds of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refu-
gee Committee and were made payable to Julius Eisman were endorsed by Ger-
hart Eisler.
Further testimony indicating the importance of Gerhart Eisler
was given to the committee by Louis Budenz, a former editor of the
Communist newspaper, the Daily Worker.
Budenz testified that he had been informed by Eugene Dennis that
from time to time Budenz might receive instructions and communica-
Lions from a Hans Berger. Dennis continued that Berger was
"strictly underground" and that he, Dennis, knew Berger as a "respon-
sible comrade" who had been in China and Spain and many other
places "including the United States, as you, Budenz, may know."
Dennis further informed Budenz that Berger's real name was Ger-
hart Eisler and that he would use that name in contacts with German
Communists in this country. Dennis stated that Berger was "Equiv-
alent to a representative of the Communist International" and that
Budenz was to consider him as such.
In the course of his testimony; Budenz related his early experiences
in the Communist Party and how he had come to learn that the real
head of the Communist Party in the United States was the Inter-
national Representative of the Comintern. Budenz said that this be-
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name particularly apparent around the time that Budenz was ap-
pointed labor editor for the Daily Worker, when he had atten jet
:a meeting of the editorial board of the Daily Worker. At the be-
ginning of this meeting there entered a man tJiex} knQwp to Puclenz as
"Mr. Edwards." This person did not even introcli}ce himself to the
editorial board, but cg}pmenced to administer a tongue lashin to
AClarence gathaway, then Daily Worker editor., for tl}e way i wjich
Hathaway was reflecting Communist policy in the Daily Worker.
Budenz related that even though J-T thaway was then considered one
of the important leaders of the Communist Party, V. S. A., he merely
sat with a silly grin and took Edwards' tirade. Bndenz said that he
then commenced to realize that the'Cq}ninunist I rty,'Ci. S. A., was not
c94trgl1ed by the nominal heads of the party, much less by the mein-
oership, but actually was controlled by international. r@prespptative
of the Comintern.
Gerhart Eisler appeared before the committee on Febri}ary, 6, 1947,
and refused to be sworn as a w}}t~npss. 4s a result the col ip}ttee voted
tq cite Eisler for coi}tei}1pt of Congress.
Tn addition to the else passport charges, in 108, CTerhart Eisler
was indicted and convicted for cQ}lten}pt of Con recs. .Op. JblAy
13, 1949, while free on bond furnished by the Civil Rights Congress,
a Communist front, Eisler was smuggled aboard the Polish. steamship
Batory. By the time that United States authorities had discovered
this deception, Eisler was beyond the limits :qf tliq jurisdiction pf the
United States.
Not long thereafter Eisler became an official of the East German
(Russian controlled) Gove"rpwerit and there is publicly carrying on
his mission of hate against the f ree' countries gf the world.
THE ASSASSINATION OF LEON TROTSKY
Joseph Stalin hws never been known as a person who would brook
opposition. For t, is reason his unmitigated hatred was'4ireetpd tq-
Ward Leon Trotsky. Both Stalin and Trotsky had been instrumental
in the successful Communist revolution in Russia. They were con-
sidered as equals behind the leadership of V. T. Lenin. They were
peers in ruthlessness; however, Trotsky. was the inferior .tactic`ian.
Having seized a balance of power, Stalin quickly deposed Trotsky
from the Comintern. Soon Trotsky's name became a despicable epi-
thet. I1,q greater denunciation could be Inade by a Comm unist than
t o refer to an individual as a 'rptskyite.
Leon Trotsky, no matter how discredited, was still a thorn to Joseph
Stalin and nothing short of his complete removal would be satis-
factQry to the master of the Kremlin. 'The removal of Leon Trotsky
could not be accgniplished :wily. Re was living in 1Vlexicq and w s
closely guarded by individua s who had remained loyal to him. How-
ever, Leon Trotsky was considered an enemy of Joseph Stalin, and to
the NKV that was a sufficient order for his removal.
On August 20, 1940, t eon Trotsky, the political rival of Joseph
Stalin, was murdered in his home near Mexico City by a person using
a mountain ax. The killer, after his apprehension, was found to have
14 his possesgign a fraudulent Canadian passport, which' had been
altered through the substitution of a fictitious 44r4 p, Frank Jacspn:
The passport was originally issued to a Canadian, who was a member
5
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of the MacKenzie-Papineau Battalion of the International Brigade in
Spain. When arrested by Mexican authorities, the killer later gave
his name as Jacques Mornard Vandendreschd. However, his true
name and identity have never been established. Jacson's, or Van-
dendresclid's, trial continued for 3 years. On April 16, 1943, he was
sentenced to 191/2 years for assault and an additional 6 months for
carrying a pistol. He pleaded self-defense during the trial. Leon
Trotsky died the day following the attack, but before his death he
stated his killer was most likely sent by the Russian secret police.
Investigations conducted since his assassination have indicated that
Trotsky's beliefs were well-founded.
The Committee on Un-American Activities instituted its own in-
vestigation concerning the Trotsky assassination in order to establish,
if possible, what part the Russian Government and the Communist
Party played in the murder of Trotsky.
On November 11, 1950, Louis Budenz, former managing editor of the
Daily Worker, submitted to the Committee on Un-American Activities
a notarized affidavit setting forth his knowledge of the Communist
Party's participation in the Trotsky assassination. This affidavit is
reproduced in its entirety and is as follows :
STATEMENT BY Louis FRANCIS BUDENZ OF THE PREPARATIONS FOR ASSASSINATION
OF LEON TROTSKY
"Rather early in my activity in the Communist Party, while I was still. labor
editor of the Daily Worker, I was called to the ninth floor of the Communist Party
headquarters in New York City. Jack Stachel, powerful member of the political
bureau of that Soviet fifth column, had telephoned down to the eighth floor (the
offices of the Daily Worker) that he wished to see me.
"The conference to which Stachel called me was with one Jacob Golos, then
chairman of the Control Commission of the Communist Party and conducting
Soviet espionage activities under cover of World Tourists, Inc. Another man
present at the conference had been known to me only by the name of Michaels,
and I have never learned his true and correct name.
"Stachel and Golos advised me that it was important that I go with the latter
almost at once `to meet some friends of importance, from abroad.' I was
reluctant to do so, since I was busily engaged on a large editorial on the CIO
and had a speaking engagement that evening. Stachel stated that `nothing could
be more important than this assignment,' saying that 'a substitute could be found
for my speaking appointment.
"Accordingly, I went with Golos to a restaurant not far away, on East Four-
teenth Street, facing Union Square. In a far corner of the restaurant I was
introduced to a man sitting in one of the cubicles, who gave the name of Richard
or Richards. It was clear that this was a fictitious name and his Russian accent
emphasized that fact. During the course of my 10 years in the party, particu-
larly as I came to be a member of the national or central committee, and a con-
stant attendant on political bureau meetings, I met many other Soviet agents
going under such first names or adaptations of first names.
"Richards advised me that he wanted my cooperation in getting information
in regard to the Trotskyites and their movements, in order to offset any plots
against the life of Stalin and against the Soviet Union that might be planned.
This was the period of the great purge trials, and I agreed to help.
"From that time forward I met with Richards in various restaurants in New
York, on the average of several times a week. I obtained for him lists of Trotsky-
ites and also information in regard to the `left' Socialists who were following
Norman Thomas at that time. On one occasion, in his anger, Richards even
declared that he would place me on the political bureau in Stachel's post, since
he felt that the latter was not doing all that was. possible to penetrate the
Socialists. This offer I rejected, though Browder and Stachel both were cognizant
of it and even called me into a special conference to ask if there was anything
at all that they could do to assist me.
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"This gives some Idea of the high standing in the Communist conspiracy of the
representatives of the Soviet secret police (now called the MVD) with whom
I was thus dealing.
"My first meeting with Richards occurred around December 1936, or slightly
earlier. From that time on I met him several times a week at various Child's
restaurants in New York City. At his instructions we always agreed on the next
place of meeting, but the time could be changed by telephone. That is, he would
sometimes call me at the Daily Worker under his fictitious name and make
certain that I could get away.
"In the spring of 1937 Richards introduced me to another member of the Soviet
secret police, whose name was said to be Michaels or Michael. (He is not to be
confused with the first Michaels who was with Golos on the ninth floor.) Both
Richards and Michaels impressed upon me that we were engaged in trying to
halt Trotskyite plotting against Stalin. I therefore collected and took them all
the available information I could obtain in regard to the movings of secret Trot-
skyites, Trotskyite couriers, and their relations to the left-wing Socialists. At
that time, I had a number of agents for the Stalinist group planted in the Trot-
skyite camp, that being one of my first assignments with the Communist Party,
and from them I obtained this information. Prominent among these concealed
Stalinists acting as Trotskyltes was Bill Reich, who later openly announced his
Communist Party affiliations.
"The agent Michaels met with me for a short time only, when suddenly in 1037,
very shortly after I first met Michaels, both Richards and he introduced me to
another and clearly more important agent, who went by the name of Robert or
Roberts:
"This man was a very intelligent person, fatherly in his manner, and immedi-
ately"proceeded to organize new activity on my part. He instructed me to intro-
duce to him various Stalinists who were penetrating the Trotskyites or might be
useful along that line because of their work.or associations.
"I should state here thaJafter 5 years' investigation on my part, and after
examining hundreds of photographs of men connected with Soviet espionage in
one form or another, or with the conspiracy as a whole, I now know that this man
Roberts was in reality Dr. Gregory Rabinowitz, or Rabinowitch, head of the
Russian Red Cross in the United States. He was a physician and also a surgeon.
"It is significant that the Soviet dictatorship has been so unscrupulous in its
dealings with the American Nation that it would use the International Red Cross
(with which the Russian Red Cross was then connected) to advance espionage
activities of various sorts in the United States. It is ironical that the Kremlin
would use, or misuse, an organization devoted to the saving of lives for the pur-
pose of destroying the lives of its enemies by assassination.
"Among those whom I introduced to Roberts was Ruby Well, whom I had
known as a member of the Conference for Progressive Labor Action, of which I
had been national secretary prior to becoming a Communist. Miss Well had
secretly joined the Communist Party shortly after I had entered it openly, and
had been assigned to a secret training school or unit for infiltration. This assign-
ment had been given her by Comrade Chester, whose correct name is Bernard
Schuster or Zuster, the notorious underground agent who directed infiltration
of the National Guard and other organizations in the New York and New England
areas for the Soviet fifth column.
"In addition to her knowledge of infiltration methods, Miss Well had been on
very friendly terms with Hilda Ageloff, sister of Leon Trotsky's secretary, Ruth
Ageloff. Hilda was also sister to Sylvia Ageloff, a Brooklyn social worker who
devoted vacation periods and other free time to Trotskyite courier work.
"Roberts and I agreed that he should be known as `John Rich' to Miss Well,
and as such I introduced ihm to her. Before I had introduced him to her, Roberts
had given me a considerable sum of money in cash to present to Miss Well for
expenses. This was for the specific purpose of enabling her to be dressed well.
and to keep up telephone and other connections. She was reluctant to take the
money, but upon learning its purposes, agreed to do so.
"In the course of time she met not only with Roberts, but also met with me both
as long as I was in New York and then in New York after I had moved to Chicago
(November 1937) to become editor of the Midwest Daily Record.
"Miss Well was persuaded also that we were engaged in stopping Trotskyite
plottings against Stalin's life. One incident that made us both think this was the
case further was my assignment to cheek on the residents of a certain apartment
house in the Stuyvesant Square area in New York. Roberts considered it of
great importance that the exact names of these people be obtained, and it is
Interesting to note that he was aware of some Communists who lived there.
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Later on, this turned out to ,be the headquarters of a passport mill which fur-
nished the false,passport to the agent Robinson-Itubens, whose case became famous
Because the Soviet Union announced his arrest in Moscow.
"To any knowledge both from these conferences with !Roberts and Miss Weil,
I learned that she was being sent to Paris and that she had persuaded Sylvia
Ageloff to accompany her, o' rather tXiat she was accompanying Miss Ageloff.
The occasion for the trip was a Trotskyite International Congress in the French
.capital, and Ruby Well went along on ttie plea that she was interested in Trotsky-
ism and also that she could visit her sister in England.
"I .was on one occasion specifically requested by Roberts .to make a special.trip
:to New York from Chicago, ,to pers~xacle Miss Weil .to _go throu_gh with this ar-
xarigement. After having agreed enthusiastically to the .plan, she had become
disturbed. Already friends of hers wbo were Coulzit}ipists had noted her once
or twice inthe.company of the Ageloft sisters and bad reported her to the secret
-conspiratorial apparatus as being of dubious lgyalty to the communist _cau~e.
This had come to my attention, apd I had sent word to the section organizer
in her section of the party, tbat she was engaged in important secret work.
'This protected her from any official action, but' niy reipoitcould not be eyialained
to her fellow Communists in the lower ranks. This was .what ?listurljed ,her
specifically.
"Of the various conferences between Roberts and Miss Weil I can only testify
from what was told me by each one of .tbetn? After her yptuxn from Paris,
hough I did not see her then, Roberts told me ghat she had done a splendid piece
of work for the Soviet secret police .there.
"After the assassination of Leon Trotsky, in 1940, Miss Well came to me in
great distress to tell me of her part in this act. Although I was .aware 'that
assassination had been used against oviet agents who hod turned sour,-I was
not inclined to give full credence to her account until a year later when she was
able to sit down and tell me the whole story. She had in the:meantime been in' a
tuberculosis sanatorium and thus had been precluded from discussing the matter
Pith -me fully.
"However, I did report her first visit to Earl Browder who was aware all along
of my activities with the Soviet secret police. He agreed that if any attelript
was made to arrest any MVD man here, or to bring matters to public notice in the
Trotsky case, that the Communists would make 'another Tom Mooney case of it,'
alleging frame-up.
"As Miss Well filled out the story of her Paris visit to me, it ran as follows :
Before going to Europe, Roberts had sent her to see a member of the Communist
cogspiratorial apparatus residing in Greenwich Village and known by the name
of Comrade Gertrude. As Roberts had on one or two occasions mentioned this
;Gertrude to me, I knew that she existed. The plan was that Gertrude would be
in Paris at a certain address when Ruby arrived there and that she would give
Miss Weil the instructions which she should follow, and also introduce her to the
persons (Stalinist agents) whom she should introduce to Miss Ageloff.
"In this manner, Miss Well was introduced to the man Jacson, who eventually
killed Trotsky. In turn, Jacson was introduced to Sylvia Ageloff, and immedi-
ately Jacson instituted a whirlwind courtship. Representing himself to b8 a
'Jacques Mornard, a descendent of Belgian counts, he won Miss Ageloff's favor
and she smuggled him into Mexico and into the Trotsky household.
"The events which took place thereafter have been recorded in public records.
"After her return to the United States, and her release from the tuberculosis
sanatorium Miss Well approached me in regard to continuance of her membership
in the Communist Party. This had been temporarily dropped during her in-
filtration work, as is frequently the case. Upon bringing up the question with
Jacob Golos, with whom I had been in constant contact, he stated that he would
.first have to consult the Soviet consulate officials, or MVD agents located in
the consulate. After conferring with them, he reported that Miss Well could not
have a Communist Party card and she was forbidden to go near the party head-
quarters or to visit my home. I conveyed this information to her, and she was
gravely disappointed.
"(I might state that this close control of the party by the Soviet consulate
and Embassy, through their espionage agents has come to my attention on scores
,of occasions. It completely refutes the various efforts to show that any Com-
munist Party decisions of any importance are made by any native 'leader' or
that Soviet policies in any country are influenced by the native Red leadership in
that country. In the minute and rigid manner, Russian Soviet agents, or other
alien agents subject to them, direct the acts of the native 'leadership.')
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York, upon my coming in from Chicago to persuade her to go on wi h e a ?i
trip, was held in the Grand Central Terminal. It took place from 10:30 to 11: 30,
in the evening, after I had called for her at the People's Press where she was
Working. Our conference continued until I caught the late train to Chicago.
"Another person whom I introduced to Roberts was Sylvia Franklin also
known as Sylvia Caulwell and whose maiden name was something like Sylvia
Kallen.
"When I went to Chicago, under Roberts' instructions I got in touch with Jacli
Kling, head of the Young Communist League in that area. The purpose of this
consultation was, in the name of the National Committee of which I was a
member, to get hold of some Stalinist agent infiltrating the Trotskyites, who
could be moved to New York and put into the Trotskyite national office.
"Jack Kling introduced me ' to Sylvia Franklin, a Chicago social worker who
was successfully infiltrating the Trotskyites. Her husband, Irving Franklin,
had been in Spain working in secret work and had then boon sent into Canada to
aid in espionage activities there.
"After a number of consultations with Sylvia Franklin, I advised Roberts that
he could meet her in Chicago if he wished. to do so. He made a special visit to
Chicago for that purpose staying at the Hotel Stevens where he registered under
the name of Rabinowitz. He was obliged there of course to register under his
legal name in this country, and this fact I mentioned in my book, This is My
Story, written in 1946. It was a fact that he was thus compelled to use his
correct name of Rabinowitz that enabled me to check with Miss Bentley and
learn definitely that he was Dr. Gregory Rabinowitz.
"In Chicago, Roberts gave Sylvia Franklin $300 as an initial expense account
to make the trip to New York where he had arranged her employment with a
woman doctor, who was connected with the Soviet secret police.
"Ile also arranged that her husband, Irving, who had returned from his espio-
nage work in Canada, should be located in a special apartment in the Bronx, so.
that Sylvia could visit him there from time to time. She was to represent her-
self to the Trotskyites as unmarried and was set up in a separate apartment of
her own in Manhattan.
"By first volunteering to do secretarial work in the national Trotskyite offices
in New York, Sylvia Franklin under the direction of Roberts-Rabinowitz, grad-
ually made herself indispensable to James Cannon, then head of the American
Trotskyites. She became his secretary and served in that capacity for some
time. Roberts-Rabinowitz advised me that she had proved to be invaluable in
bringing copies of all of Trotsky's mail and other Trotskyite communications to
him for his information.
"It may be said here that another valuable source of information established
through the information I gave them, enabling the Soviet secret police to be
minutely acquainted with the Trotsky household and his own ideas and move-
ments, was obtained through taking advantage of the good will of Leigh White,
now the well-known anti-Communist newspaper correspondent. I had made his
acquaintance through one of the Communists working in concealment for the
Soviet secret police.
"I asked him the simple question : `Where does Trotsky's mail go, concerning.
his book?' At that time, Trotsky was preparing the book and Leigh White was
employed by the publisher who had originally agreed to publish the work on
Stalin. Mr. White advised me that all mail was going to Sara Wolf, who had
been Trotsky's. secretary and was the wife of a New Jersey professional man.
Roberts-Rabinowitz advised me that in this manner, intercepting the mail
through means of their own, they had kept in touch with all correspondence
from Trotsky to New York.
"There are many more details to the account of the preparations for the as-
sassination of Trotsky in Mexico City. For instance, one of the considerable
items which caused the Soviet Union to be able to demand that Norway move
Trotsky out of that country was the visit of A. J. Muste to Trotsky in Oslo.
Upon Muste's return, I visited him at the suggestion of Roberts-Rabinowitz, and
expressing great interest at how Trotsky reacted, learned that Trotsky said that
only a revolution by violence within Russia against the Stalinite dictatorship,
organized from without, could achieve anything against the Bonapartism in
Moscow. Roberts-Rabinowitz let me know that this information had been of
great value in private representations made by the Soviet Union to Norway, on
the contention that this proved that Trotsky was using Oslo as a base to attack
Soviet Russia.
0
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whom I introduced to Roberts-Rabinowitz.
"The above gives the substance of the methods employed to bring about the
..assassination of Leon Trotsky.
"As to Roberts-Rabinowitz, I bade farewell to him in 1939-after Miss Well's
-trip to Paris but before the actual Trotsky assassination. He got in touch with
me (as usual) through Jacob Golos and asked me to meet him at the Bronx
apartment of Irving Franklin. There he told me he was leaving for the Soviet
Union, laughed about the comic papers he had to take with him for his son
(whose name I believe was Boris) and said a fine piece of work had been done
here. We took a walk, at his suggestion, around the block in the Bronx in the
evening and then parted.
"Should other details be required on this Trotskyite case, and there are a num-
=ber which I have not covered, I hold myself always in readiness to be of such
service to Congress as I can."
'STATE OF NEw Yoax,
County of Westchester, ss:
I, Louis Francis Budenz, of Crestwood, N. Y., being duly sworn, do hereby
state and declare that the attached account of the preparations for the assassina-
tion of Leon Trotsky, former Soviet leader, constitute a true version of those
,preparations, insofar as I was cognizant of them.
I am at this time under subpena of the Committee on Un-American Activities,
United States House of Representatives, and submit this affidavit and statement
at the instruction of that committee.
Louis F. BuD.Ei7Z.
During the years 1942 and 1943, a number of letters from Mexico
'City to New York City, and from New York City to Mexico City,
were intercepted by the United States Office of Censorship. After
laboratory examination of the intercepted letters, it was determined
that these letters contained ciphered messages in invisible ink. When
the messages were deciphered, they were found to relate to the efforts
of persons in the United States and in Mexico to free Frank Jacson
from imprisonment. Further investigation disclosed that an elaborate
system of mail drops, both in Mexico and the United States, was used
in the handling of this correspondence. Subsequently, each' of these
-mail drops was investigated to determine the scope of his activity as a
part of the conspiracy to release Frank Jacson.
Jacob Epstein, 958 Madison Avenue, New York City, was identified
as the head of the group in Mexico City. This individual is of Russian
'extraction and was born Jacob Eppstein, November 10, 1903, in Brook-
lyn, N. Y. He attended public schools in New York City and grad-
uated from Cornell University in 1924. Mr. Epstein is a veteran of
the Abraham Lincoln Brigade and participated in the Spanish Civil
War in 1938. The mail drops in Mexico City through which Epstein
received correspondence from the United States were Mexicans and
refugee Spaniards, all of whom were identified as members of the
'Communist Party. Ciphered messages between New York City and
Mexico ceased in November 1943. Shortly thereafter, Pavel Klarin,
vice consul of the Soviet consulate general, New York City, was trans-
ferred to Mexico City. Pavel Klarin is a known close contact of
Y-assili Zubilin, who at that time was head of the NKVD (Russian
secret police) in the United States. Investigation disclosed that Jacob
Epstein contacted Pavel Klarin upon numerous occasions in Mexico
'City.
Mr. Epstein appeared before the Committee on Un-American Activi-
ties in executive session on October 18, 1950. In the course of the
,examination of the witness, he admitted being a former member of
the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. He also stated that he had resided in
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Party, he declined to answer the question on the groups o self-
incrimination. Epstein also declined to answer any questions pro-
pounded to him regarding his part in the Communist, conspiracy
mentioned herein on grounds of self-incrimination.
Other persons interrogated by the committee (residift in United
States) who acted as mail drops were :
Lydia Altschuler, 97 Perry Street, New York City : This individual
was born in Charlottenburg, Germany, and acquired citizenship by
virtue of her father's naturalization. She attended New Jersey Col
lege for Women, Toledo University, and Hunter College. Her present
occupation is that of a writer. She at one time was employed by the
Welfare Counsel of New York City, where she was editor of a weekly
publication called Better Times. From September 1937 to December
1944, she was education director of Consumers' Union, Ins., in New
York City. Consumers' Union, Inc., was cited as a Communist front
by the Special Committee on Un-American Activities on March 29,
1944. She was a member of the Committee of Women of the National
Counsel of American-Soviet Friendship, an organization cited as Com-
munist by this committee on March 29, 1944. Former Attorney Gen-
eral Tom Clark cited this organization as Communist on September 21,
1948.
Lydia Altschuler appeared as a witness before the Committee on Un-
American Activities on October 18, 1950, at which time she was af-
forded the opportunity to affirm or deny her part in the Communist
conspiracy to release Frank Jacson from imprisonment in Mexico. On
this occasion she refused to answer all questions relating to her partici-
pation in this underground movement, on the ground that to do so
might incriminate her. She likewise refused, on the grounds of self-
incrimination, to answer questions regarding her membership in the
Communist Party.
Barnett Sheppard, 47-14 Two Hundred and Sixty-first Street, Great
Neck, Long Island, N. Y.: Mr. Sheppard was born in Syracuse, N. Y.,
February 27, 1908. He attended Syracuse public schools, Manlius
Military Academy, Cascadella Prep School, and attended night school
at Syracuse University. He appeared before the Committee on Un-
American Activities October 19, 1950, at which time he stated he was
unemployed. Sheppard, just as other witnesses in this case, refused to
answer all questions propounded to him relating to his Communist
affiliations on the grounds of self-incrimination. He likewise refused
to answer, on 'the grounds of self-incrimination, questions regarding
his Communist Party membership.
Fanny McPeek, 846 Prospect Place, Brooklyn, N. Y.: Mrs. MePeek
was born in the city of New York, November 10, 1908. She received her
elementary education in New York City and attended Hunter College
for a short period. From 1934 to the summer of 1950, she was em-
ployed as a clerk at the Washington Irving High School in New York
City. Mrs. McPeek testified before the Committee on Un-American
Activities on October 19, 1950, and when asked questions regarding
Communist Party membership she declined to answer questions on
the grounds of self-incrimination. She also refused to answer ques-
tions concerning her participation as a mail drop in the Communist
effort to release Frank Jacson from prison in Mexico.
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N. Y.: Mrs. Baskind was born in New York City on August 16, 1914.
She was graduated from Hunter College in New York City, and re-
ceived an M. A. degree from Columbia in 1938. Mrs. Baskind was
employed by the New York Board of Education from 1936 to 1941 as
a substitute teacher, and then again from 1947 to 1949 as a full-time
teacher.
She testified before the Committee on Un-American Activities on
August 18; 1950, at which time she was asked if she had voluntarily
participated in any conspiracy involving the receipt of mail from one
source and its subsequent transmission to another source. She de-
clined to answer the question on the ground of self-incrimination.
She likewise pleaded self-incrimination when asked if she was a mem=ber of the Communist Party.
Mrs. Frances Silverman, 134 St. Johns Avenue, Yonkers, N. Y.:
The above individual was born in. New York City on July 16; 1913.
She attended New York City public schools and was graduated from
City. College School of Business, in 1935. She was last employed by
the Board of Education, New York City, from which position she
resigned on February 1, 1950.
Mrs. Silverman testified before this committee on October 18, 1950.
Just as the preceding witnesses, she declined to answer questions re=
garding Communist Party membership and her participation in the
afore-mentioned Communist conspiracy to release Frank Jacson from
imprisonment in Mexico.
Ethel Vogel, 137 West Eighty-second Street, New York City; N. Y.:
Mrs. Vogel was, born in Worcester, Mass. She attended public schools
in New York City and was graduated from. New York University in
1929.
Mrs. Vogel appeared before the Committee on Un-American
Activities on October 19, 1950. She pleaded self-incrimination when
asked questions regarding Communist Party membership and gave
the same answer when asked whether or not she acted as a'mail drop"
in the conspiracy to release Frank Jacson from prison.
Helen Levi Simon Travis, 5450 North Road, Armada, Mich.: Mrs.
Travis was born in New York City on September 3, 1916. She was:
graduated from Barnard College in 1937.
Mrs. Travis appeared before the Committee on Un-American Ac-
tivities on August 30, 1950. She testified that she had been employed
by the Ford Instrument Co., Long Island City, for a short period of
time in 1943 and 1944, and by the Chrysler Corp. in Detroit, Mich.,
in the summer of 1948. When requested to list additional employment
she refused to do so on the ground that it might tend to incriminate
her. Mrs. Travis was formerly employed by the Daily Worker, the
official Communist Party newspaper in New York City, writing under
the name of Maxine Levi.
In addition to the identification of the "mail drop" used in the
conspiracy to release Jacson, the information in the possession of the
committee reveals also that the group in Mexico requested funds for
the use of a "money drop" in Mexico. Shortly after the interception
of this request by Federal authorities, Helen Levi Simon transferred
$3,700 to one Enrique de los Rios, the "money drop" in Mexico City.
This transaction occurred on February 21, 1944, at which time Helen
Levi Simon executed in her own handwriting an application with
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the Chase National Bank in New York City to transfer the said
amount to the account of the afore-mentioned individual. The appli-
cation setting forth the foregoing transaction was entered into the
testimony of August 30, 1950, of Helen Levi Simon Travis as "Travis
Exhibit No. 5."
Mr. Philip A. Schmitz, a document analyst employed by the Identi-
fication and Detection Division, Veterans' Administration, Washing-
ton, D. C., testified in executive session before this committee on July
26, 1950. Mr. Schmitz testified that he had compared the handwriting
appearing on "Travis Exhibit No. 5" with other documents bearing
the known handwriting of Helen Levi Simon Travis which had been
supplied to him by this committee. After adequate examination, he
reached the conclusion that the handwriting appearing on said docu-
ments was written by one and the same person.
Mrs. Travis, in testifying before this committee on August 30, 1950,
declined to answer all questions relating to the above transaction on
grounds of self-incrimination.
Anna Vogel Colloms, Park Trail, Mount Airy Road, Croton-on-
Hudson: Mrs. Colloms was born in New York City on August 6, 1902.
She received her elementary training in New York City public schools,
was graduated from Cornell University in 1921, and attended Colum-
bia University, where she took graduate courses.
Mrs. Colloms appeared before this committee on October 19, 1950,
at which time she testified that she was then employed by the Board
of Education, New York City, and assigned as a teacher to Washington
Irving High School.
Investigation of Anna Vogel Colloms by a Government intelligence
agency disclosed that, in addition to acting as a "mail drop" in this
conspiracy, she was also a courier in the attempt to free Frank Jacson
to cross over into Mexico with this box of stationery. The stationery
box was retained by a Government agency which substituted other
sheets of paper for the original ones bearing the secret messages.
While in Mexico, Mrs. Colloms made a half-hearted attempt to con-
tact Jacob Epstein in Mexico City. She reentered the United States
on September 3, 1943, at which time the stationery box was returned to
her by United States customs officials. Upon her return to New York
City she gave the box of stationery to Ethel Vogel, who in turn trans-
mitted it to Ruth Wilson Epstein, wife of Jacob Epstein.
Mrs. Colloms, in her testimony before this committee, followed the
same course as all other witnesses who were subpenaed in connection
with this case and refused to answer all questions relating to this
matter on grounds of possible self-incrimination. She also refused to
:answer, on the same grounds, the question of whether or not she had
ever been a member of the Communist Party.
Sylvia Ageloff testified before the Committee on Un-American
Activities on December 4, 1950, at which time she stated that she
had been a member of the Trotskyite party or movement and, while
a member of this group, had met Frank Jacson, the assassin of Leon
Trotsky, under the name Jacques Mornard, in Paris, France, in June-
On August 12, 1943, Anna Vogel Colloms departed from New York
City for Mexico City, carrying an apparently new box of personal
stationery. This stationery box contained five sheets of paper com-
pletely covered with messages in cipher. Mrs. Colloms was not allowed
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1938, through one Ruby Weil, who had made the trip from New York
to Paris on the same boat with her. She further testified that Jacques
Mornard had, according to her recollection, illegally entered the
United States through a forged passport during the month of Septem-
ber 1939, which contained the name Frank Jacson. According to
Sylvia Ageloff, Mornard then proceeded to Mexico. Sylvia Ageloff
testified that in January 1940 she went to Mexico and while there
contacted Leon Trotsky and spent a half hour with him. During
this conversation, according to her testimony, she mentioned to
Trotsky that she knew Frank Jacson was in Mexico City and was
using a false passport. She said that she then asked Trotsky if he
considered it advisable for her to see Jacson. According to her
testimony, after she left Mexico City, she learned that Frank Jacson
had met Leon Trotsky and had, upon one occasion, conveyed Mr. and
Mrs. Trotsky to Vera Cruz, Mexico, via motorcar. Miss Sylvia Agel-
off testified that, in her opinion, Frank Jacson would never have been
permitted to enter the home of Leon Trotsky if she had not made
known to Trotsky that she had met Frank Jacson.
On December 4, 1950, Miss Hilda Ageloff, the sister of Sylvia, also
testified before the committee and stated that she had first met Ruby
Weil in 1936. She said that at this time both she and Ruby Well were
members of the American Workers' Party. She said that it was she
who had told Ruby Well about her sister Sylvia's proposed trip to
Europe. Hilda Ageloff further testified that she had met Frank Jac-
son upon his arrival in New York City and was aware of the fact that
her sister Sylvia had met Jacson in Paris through Ruby Weil. She
also stated that she knew that Jacson had entered the United States
illegally. Hilda Ageloff further testified that she had been in Mexico
several times ; that upon one occasion she was there with her sister,
Sylvia; and that upon this occasion she met Leon Trotsky. She stated
that after the assassination of Trotsky it became obvious to her that
Jacson was a member of the NKVD or OGPU.
Ruby Weil also testified before the committee on December 4, 1950.
During her testimony, she stated that she had traveled to Europe on
the same boat with Sylvia Ageloff during the summer of 1938, and
that she introduced Sylvia to Jacques Mornard in Paris. She testi-
fied that she had never known Mornard under the name Frank Jacson,
and first heard of Frank Jacson when she read of his part in the
Trotsky assassination in the newspapers. She testified that she had
joined the Communist Party in 1936 and ceased relationship with it
in 1937. She further testified that she had known Louis Budenz as
a member of the Communist Party and had considerable contact with
him during the time she was a member of the Conference for Progres-
sive Labor Action. She denied the allegations of Louis Budenz that
she had been assigned to infiltration work for the Communist Party.
With reference to the testimony of the Ageloff sisters, it is pointed
out that, as a result of their names being mentioned in connection
with this matter by other sources, they have suffered hardships. The
committee would like to state in their behalf that they cooperated
fully with the committee and furnished valuable information during
this particular investigation, despite the personal risk involved by so
doing.
Other individuals who were named as "mail drops" and as members
of this group were : Ruth Wilson Epstein, wife of Jacob Epstein, who
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served as a nurse in Spain on the Loyalist side during the Spanish
Civil War in 1937; and Louis S. Bloch, who in 1943 and 1944 was em-
ployed as a motion .picture operator in New ,York City. Mr. Bloch
was born in Lithuania and is a naturalized citizen of the United States-
He presently resides on the west coast. In addition to being named
as a "mail drop".in this case, he was named in the secret messages:
as a contact for couriers. These last two individuals were not sub-
penaed for appearance before this committee.
Because of the alertness of United States Government intelligence,
agencies, the attempt to release Frank Jacson from imprisonment in,.
Mexico never materialized. However, in analyzing the intelligence
information in the possession of the Committee on Un-American Ac-
tivities and the testimony of the witnesses, this case demonstrates that
the Soviet Government was directly interested in the assassination of
Leon Trotsky and the subsequent attempt to release his killer from
prison.
The committee feels that the American aspects of the assassination
of Leon Trotsky are important in the annals of Soviet espionage in
this country because of the number of Americans involved.
J. PETERS
A report dealing with Soviet espionage activities within the United
States would be incomplete without mentioning J. Peters, alias Alex-
ander Stevens, alias Goldberger. Peters was one of the most furtive
characters engaged in Soviet espionage in the United States.
The true name of this individual is probably Goldberger, and avail-
able information indicates he was born in Hungary. He entered
the United States in 1928 from Czechoslovakia, and he claimed to
have received a law degree from the University of Hungary. Fol-
lowing his arrival in this country, he was for many years manager
of the Communist-Hungarian language newspaper Uj Elore. Peters"
most noteworthy literary endeavor was The Communist Party-A
Manual on Organization which was published by the Workers' Li-
brary Publishers, New York City, in July 1945. This manual is re-
ferred to and quoted as the guide of Communist organizers.
Whittaker Chambers, then a senior editor of Time magazine, has
related to the committee that his initial contacts with the Communist
apparatus in the United States Government in Washington, D. C.,,
were at the behest and under the direction of J. Peters.
Chambers has stated that he was first introduced to Peters through
Max Bedacht, then a Communist functionary, in about 1931. Cham-
bers stated that from 1931 until approximately 1935, he acted as a
courier carrying messages and articles between J. Peters and another
individual known to Chambers only as "Arthur."
Sometime in 1933, Chambers was given instructions by Peters to
contact Harold Ware in Washington, D. C., and act as liaison be-
tween Ware and Peters. In addition to these liaison duties, Cham-
bers was required from time to time to give pep talks to animate the
Ware group.
This underground Communist apparatus was organized by Harold
Ware, a son of the notorious and now deceased "Mother" Ella Bloor.
This group acted as an adjunct of the NKVD of the Soviets. The
principal function of the group was to obtain information desired
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by the NKVD particularly with regard to individuals. Chambers
stated that frequently he turned over to Peters sizable sums which
he had collected from the Ware group. Chambers has identified
John Abt, formerly with the Agricultural Adjustment Administra-
tion, later with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice,
and with the LaFollette Senate Civil Liberties Committee as having
been a member of this group. Most recently Abt has been repre-
senting the Communist Party as cocounsel with Vito Marcantonio
before the Subversive Control Board. Following the death of Har-
old Ware in an automobile accident, John Abt married Ware's
widow, Jessica Smith, who at one time was a secretary in the
Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C. Later, when she became
editor, of Soviet Russia Today, she was one of the few persons ever
to register as a Soviet agent. Other members who comprised this
group were Lee Pressman, formerly with the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Administration, and later general counsel of the Congress of
Industrial Organizations; Henry Collins, at one time a member of
the Forestry Service of the Department of Agriculture; Nathan
Perlow, an economist, and when known to Chambers was connected
with tfie Brookings Institution in Washington, D. C.; Charles Kramer,
who was also employed by the La Follette committee while Cham-
bers was in contact with him ; Alger Hiss, who held employment
with the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the State Depart-
ment, the United Nations Organization, and finally was president
of the Carnegie Foundation. for International Peace.
This was the formidable group organized by J. Peters, and the
committee believes that this was the original group organized for
the Soviets in. the United States Government. The committee has
learned that for a period of time a brother of J. Peters, Emmerich
Goldberger, was employed as a chauffeur by the-Soviet Government
Purchasing Commission and Amtorg.
Upon the basis of information in committee, files, Peters was
called to appear before the committee in August 1948, and refused
to answer pertinent questions. Although the committee was power-
less to effect a prosecution of Peters, the disclosure of information
concerning him minimized his future effectiveness in this country
and he finally departed from this country of his own volition rather
than be deported.
ALGER HISS
One of the most startling revelations concerning the record of Soviet
espionage was that relating to Alger Hiss. It was particularly amaz-
ing because Hiss had dissipated an exceptional background of appar-
ently creditable Government service and a promising future as a
career Government employee. It was extremely difficult for many
of the persons who had been associated with Hiss to believe that he
could have participated in such treachery against the country that
had given him such great opportunities.
Alger Hiss came alarmingly close to escaping the retribution due
him for his guilt. Except for one factor, it is likely that Alger Hiss
could have convincingly upheld his innocence.
On August 3, 1948, the committee heard Whittaker Chambers, then
a senior editor of Time magazine. Chambers testified that from 1931
to 1938, he had been a member of the' Communist Party, and during
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the period 1934-37 was associated with a Communist apparatus
which was operating in the United States Government. The com-
mittee knew that as early as 1939 Chambers had disclosed the opera-
tion of this group to Government officials, yet, for some unaccountable
reason, no action was taken by them.
The committee, because of the lack of necessary executive clearance,
could not examine the Government files to discount or verify the infor-
mation Chambers had furnished.
Chambers, a quiet person, without any show of emotion, told the
committee that Alger Hiss had been a member of the Communist
Party, and that from 1934 to 1937, Hiss had been a part of the Commu-
nist apparatus in the Government. Also identified by Chambers as
having been a part of this apparatus were Harold Ware, Nathan Witt,
Harry Dexter White, Henry Collins, John Abt, and Lee Pressman.
Two days later on August 5, 1948, Alger Hiss, who was then presi-
dent of the Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, was given
the opportunity of answering the charges made by Whittaker Cham-
bers. Hiss categorically denied that he was or had ever been a Com-
munist, and further denied that he had ever seen Whittaker Chambers.
Had the matter ended there, it is quite likely that the great majority
of people would have believed Alger Hiss. While it is true that
Whittaker Chambers had lived a respectable and creditable life dur-
ing the preceding years, it is also true that on his own admission he
had once worked against his Government. On the other hand, Alger
Hiss' entire background was exemplary. He was considered one of
the most capable experts on foreign affairs.
Fortunately, the committee did not allow this matter to end there.
Many hours of exhausting investigation followed. The members held
executive meetings at unusual and long hours, hearing both Chambers
and Hiss. Finally, on August 17, Hiss admitted for the first time
that lie had actually known Chambers during the period in question.
However, he claimed he had known him only as George Crosley.
Following this, the committee heard Lee Pressman, John Alit, Henry
Collins, and Nathan Witt, all of whom refused to answer questions
on grounds of self-incrimination when asked if they knew Chambers
or Hiss.
Alger Hiss was probably his own worst enemy when it came to
vindicating himself. Hiss had invited Chambers to make his charges
without the cloak of congressional immunity. He threatened that if
Chambers would make these charges publicly, then Hiss would insti-
tute libel proceedings against him. On August 27, 1948, while appear-
ing on a radio program, Whittaker Chambers, in response to question-
ing, reiterated substantially the same allegations concerning Hiss.
Hiss' reaction was anything but spontaneous, and it was only after
considerable goading by newspapers that his attorneys finally took
action. On November 17, 1948, a deposition was taken from Whittaker
Chambers. In addition to this action, the Hiss attorneys requested
Chambers to furnish any documentary evidence in his possession to
support his statements concerning Alger Hiss' membership in the
Communist Party. It was unquestionably a shock to them when
Chambers produced a thick envelope containing four pages written by
the hand of Alger Hiss. There were also a great number of type-
written documents which Chambers claimed were typed on a type-
writer owned by Alger Hiss. This material was not immediately
57
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sufficient to cause the prosecution of Hiss and it was necessary for the
committee to proceed further in its investigation.
As the result of a subpena by this committee to produce all docu-
ments in his possession relating to the Hiss matter, Chambers produced
the now famous "Pumpkin papers." Actually, this consisted of five
rolls of microfilm which contained photographic reproductions of a
number of confidential and secret documents from the State Depart-
ment and the National Bureau of Standards. This was the final piece
of evidence needed to substantiate the charges of Whittaker Chambers
against Alger Hiss.
Alger Hiss brazened it out. When he was brought before a Federal
grand jury in New York City, he denied he had ever turned over the
questioned documents to Whittaker Chambers.
On the basis of these denials, Alger Hiss was indicted on December
15, 1948, on charges of perjury. The first trial of Alger Hiss ended in
a hung jury, eight jurors voting guilty and four voting for acquittal.
Finally, in January 1950, a second trial ended with the result that
Hiss was found guilty of perjury.
The great pity was that Alger Hiss could not be confronted with the
substantive offense, espionage, rather than the much simpler offense of
perjury. However, because of the outmoded provision permitting the
statute of limitations to apply to espionage violations, Alger Hiss has
never been punished for his treachery but only for his untruthful state-
ments.
The committee wishes to commend the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation for its work in bringing this case to a successful conclusion
when all the odds were against it. The location of the typewriter
and certain pieces of other evidence needed during the trial of the case
was amazing.
In order for their espionage apparatus to function as an over-all
unit it was necessary for therRussians to establish contact within the
various departments and bureaus of the United States Government.
The success with which this was accomplished was attested to in tes-
timony given the committee by. Elizabeth T. Bentley in July 1948.
Miss Bentley stated that for more than 11 years she had engaged in
Communist Party activity as well as Soviet espionage. Prior to 1938,
she had been an official in various capacities of the Communist Party
in New York City. In 1938, she became acquainted with Jacob Golos,
then head of World Tourists, Inc., an organization previously de-
scribed herein which was being used as a cover for Soviet espionage
activities. She stated that she started having regular contacts with
Golos shortly after meeting him and later when lie organized U. S.
Service & Shipping, Inc., she became an official of that company.
Miss Bentley testified that U. S. Service & Shipping, Inc., which
was organized by Golos. in 1941, was also a cover for Soviet espionage
activity. She testified that under the direction of Golos, until his
death in 1943, she acted as courier and in a liaison capacity between
individuals engaged in Soviet espionage and Golos.
Even after Golos died in November 1943, she continued to act in the
same capacity under the direction of Earl Browder, then head of the
Communist Party, U. S. A. This arrangement continued until late in
1944, when upon the insistence of Soviet officials Browder consented to
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turn over the groups which Bentley was contacting direct to Soviet
agents.
Elizabeth Bentley was able to identify only one of these Soviet
agents whom she knew under the code name "Al." She was later
able to identify this individual as Antole Gromov, First Secretary of
the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. Gromov was unquestionably
the successor to Vassili M. Zubilin as head of all NKVD activities
in North America.
Miss Bentley has stated that all the individuals working in the
Apparatus were under the direction of the NKVD. These espionage
groups with which she was working were composed primarily of in-
dividuals employed in the Government in Washington, D. C. The
head of the most important and active group with which Miss Bentley
had contact was Nathan Gregory Silvernaster. Silvermaster, who
has a record of numerous Communist-front affiliations, also has a
lengthy record of Government service. He was employed in the
Department of Agriculture, Labor, and lastly with the Treasury
Department.
Another member of this group was William Ludwig Ullmann, who
resided with Silvermaster. Ullmann, who was a major of the United
States Army Air Force stationed at the Pentagon Building in Wash-
ington, D. C., was primarily responsible for obtaining and photo-
graphing classified war plans as well as reports of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, which had been furnished to Army Intelligence in
the Pentagon. It is interesting to note that Ullmann maintained a
photorecord camera in the basement of the Silvermaster home in
Washington, D. C. This expensive photographic equipment is only
practical for the reproduction of books or documents, on a 35 mm.
film, which Bentley has stated was of the type frequently furnished
her.
Others named by Elizabeth Bentley as members of the Silvermaster
group were:
Solomon Adler, Treasury Department ;
Norman Burster, Department of Justice ;
Frank Coe, Assistant Director, Division of Monetary Research, Treasury ; special
assistant to United States Ambassador in London ; assistant to the Executive
Director, Board of Economic Warfare and successor agencies ; Assistant Ad-
ministrator, Foreign Economic Administration ;
Lauchlin Carrie, Administrative assistant to the President; Deputy Adminis-
trator of Foreign Economic Administration ;
Bela Gold (known to Miss Bentley as William Gold), assistant head of Division
of Program Surveys, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Agriculture Depart-
ment; Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization; Office of Economic Pro-
grams in Foreign Economic Administration ;
Mrs. Bela (Sonia) Gold, research assistant, House Select Committee on Inter-
state Migration ; labor-market analyst, Bureau of Employment Security ; Divi-
sion of Monetary Research, Treasury ;
Abraham George Silverman, Director, Bureau of Research and Information
Services, United States Railroad Retirement Board ; Economic Adviser and
Chief of Analysis and Plans, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Materiel and Services,
Air Forces;
William Taylor, Treasury Department.
The head of another important group contacted by Elizabeth Bent-
ley was Victor Perlo, then an employee of the War Production Board.
She first met the members of this group at the apartment of John
Abt, then general counsel for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of America-CIO. Abt was later to figure in the testimony of Whit-
taker Chambers as will be shown later in this report. 599
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Another person mentioned by Bentley, who was to figure in the
Chambers testimony, was Alger Hiss. Bentley stated that members
of the Perlo group had informed her that "Hiss" of the State De-
partment had taken Harold Glasser of the Treasury Department and
two or three others, and had turned them over to the direct control of
Soviet representatives operating in this country.
The members of the Perlo group who were named by Miss Bentley
were :
Victor Perlo, head of branch in Research Section, Office of Price Administration;
War Production Board, Monetary Research, Treasury ;
Edward J. Fitzgerald, War Production Board ;
Harold Glasser, Treasury Department ; loaned to Government of Ecuador ; loaned
to War Production Board ; adviser on North African Affairs Committee in
Algiers, North Africa ;
Charles Kramer (Krevitsky), National Labor Relations Board; Office of Price
Administration ; economist with Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization ;
Solomon Lischinsky, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration ;
Harry Magdoff, Statistical Division of War Production Board and Office of
Division, EPB ; Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce ;
Allan Rosenberg, Foreign Economic Administration ; and
Donald Niven Wheeler, Office of Strategic Services.
Miss Bentley also testified that Irving Kaplan, an employee of the
War Production Board at the time, was associated with both groups,
paying dues to the Perlo group and submitting information to the
Silvermaster group. She identified the late Harry Dexter White,
then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, as another individual who
cooperated with the Silvermaster group.
Miss Bentley further testified that there were certain individuals
employed in the Government who cooperated in obtaining information
from the files of the Government for the use of Russian agents but who
were not actually attached to either the Silvermaster or Perlo groups.
These individuals, as named by Miss, Bentley, and the governmental
agency with which they were employed during the period concerned
in the testimony are as follows :
Michael Greenberg, board of Economic Warfare ; Foreign Economic Administra-
tion ; specialist on China ;
Joseph Gregg, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Assistant in Research
Division ;
Maurice Halperin, Office of Strategic Services ; head of Latin American Division
in the Research and Analysis Branch ; head of Latin American research and
analysis, State Department ;
J. Julius Joseph, Office of Strategic Services, Japanese Division ;
Duncan Chaplin Lee, Office of Strategic Services, legal adviser to Gen. William
J. Donovan ;
Robert T. Miller, head of political research, Coordinator of Inter-American
Affairs ; member, Information Service Committee, Near Eastern Affairs, State
Department ; Assistant Chief, Division of Research and Publications, State
Department ;
William Z. Park, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs ;
Bernard Redmont, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs ;
Helen Tenney, Office of Strategic Services, Spanish Division.
William Remington of the Department of Commerce was men-
tioned by Miss Bentley before the Senate investigation committee as
having been associated with this group.
Certain of these individuals have denied the allegations concerning
themselves either through a personal appearance before the committee
or by communication with the committee. These are Lauchlin Currie,
Harry D. White (deceased), Bela Gold, Sonia Gold, Frank Coe, Alger
Hiss, Donald Hiss, and Solomon Adler.
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Communist Party as well as contacts described by Elizabeth Bentley
or Whittaker Chambers. These were Alexander Koral, Henry H.
Collins, Victor Perlo, Abraham George Silverman, Nathan Gregory
Silvermaster, William Ludwig Ullmann, John Abt, Nathan Witt,
and Charles Kramer.
Sometime later Lee Pressman appeared before the committee and
admitted his past membership in the Communist Party but denied
membership in any Communist apparatus.
Duncan Lee and Robert T. Miller admitted knowing Miss Bentley
but denied involvement in the apparatus.
Norman Bursler, Allen Rosenberg, Solomon Lischinsky, Mary
Price, Donald Niven Wheeler, Edward J. Fitzgerald, Harold Glasser,
Joseph Gregg, Rose Gregg, and Irving Kaplan, have not appeared
before the committee to affirm or ' deny .the charges made concerning
them.
The committee does not feel that this investigation is by any means
closed and is proceeding to determine all aspects of it.
WILLIAM WALTER REMINGTON
The testimony given by Elizabeth T. Bentley in 1948 regarding the
participation of William Walter Remington in the Communist ap-
paratus was not initially received by the Committee on Un-American
Activities but rather by a Senate committee which conducted the in-
vestigation because of Remington's then employment in the Depart-
ment of Commerce as an economist.
As the result of hearings before the Senate committee, Remington
was suspended froin his position in the Government in August 1948.
However, the Loyalty Review Board ordered Remington reinstated
to his position on February 10, 1949, on the basis that "the evidence
does not establish reasonable grounds for belief that William Walter
Remington is disloyal."
This committee, recognizing the near escape from punishment of
Alger Hiss, and believing in the veracity of Elizabeth T. Bentley,
instituted an independent investigation concerning Remington. Hear-
ings on the Remington case were held by the committee in April,
May, and June of 1950. Elizabeth T. Bentley was recalled at that
time and she furnished testimony as to her initial contact and sub-
sequent liaison with Remington and her Soviet principal in New
York.
Miss Bentley recalled that there were certain persons whose prin-
cipal duties were the recruitment of individuals for the Communist
apparatus in the Government. One of these individuals, Miss Bentley
described as Joseph North, "a lookout man for Russian intelligence."
Miss Bentley recalled that when Jacob Golos, her superior in the
espionage apparatus, had referred to Remington, he had stated, "he
[Remington] has been in the party some years, and I have checked
him and he is O. K. He, was referred to me by Joe North, and he
is O. K. In addition to that he is a highly respectable person."
Miss Bentley further testified that she had met with Remington
on at least 10 or 20 occasions in various places in Washington, D. C.,
such as "on park benches, in drug stores, at street corners, and in
front of the Mellon Art Gallery." She stated that she had also
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receipts for these dues.
Following Miss Bentley's testimony, William Walter Remington
appeared before the committee and categorically denied that he had
ever been a member of the Communist Party. He did admit having
a close association with certain individuals who were members of
the Young Communist League or the Communist Party. Reming-
ton admitted having been introduced to Elizabeth T. Bentley but
claimed that he had known her as Helen Johnson. In describing his
meeting with Miss Bentley, Remington stated that Joseph North,
whom he identified as a family friend, had introduced him to Jacob
Golos and had described Golos as a writer interested in the work being
performed by the War Production Board. Remington stated that
in turn Jacob Golos had introduced him to Elizabeth T. Bentley,
alias Helen Johnson, saying that "he would appreciate it if I chatted
with her about this kind of problem."
With regard to meeting Elizabeth T. Bentley, Remington admitted
that he had seen her in Washington from time to time and discussed
various matters with her, still believing that she was a writer and the
matters he was discussing with her would be of value in her literary
pursuits. He also admitted that on one occasion he had furnished
leer with a, formula for the production of synthetic rubber and gaso-
line. Remington endeavored to minimize the seriousness of such
unauthorized disclosures by stating .that the formula was of little or
no value and was not intended for use by the War Production Board.
Remington also admitted that there were times when he had fur-
nished money to Miss Bentley but claimed that he believed this money
was to be used for "refugees from Hitler" and did not consider that
he was paying Communist Party dues.
The committee heard Kenneth McConnell, who admitted under oath
that he had been a member of the Communist Party from 1935 to
1939 and that he had served as an organizer for the Communist Party.
Mr. McConnell identified Remington as a member of the Communist
Party in Kne:;ville, Tenn., during a portion of that period and fur-
nished the committee names of other individuals whom he knew to
be Communist Party members at the same time. Among these were
Merwin Scott Todd, whom the committee learned had at one time
been a roommate of William Walter Remington. Todd, when ques-
tioned by the committee, refused on grounds of self-incrimination to
answer whether he had or had not been a member of the Communist
Party and on the same grounds refused to answer whether he had
roomed with Remington.
Another individual named by McConnell was Howard Allen Bridg-
man, who admitted membership in the Communist Party from Decem-
ber 1938 to September 1939. Mr. Bridgman admitted that he was a
member of the Communist Party in Knoxville, Tenn., and among
other individuals named by him as members of the Communist Party
at the same time was William Walter Remington.
On the basis of disclosures concerning William Walter Remington
before the Committee on Un-American Activities, Remington was
called before a Federal grand jury and nersi-ted in his denial of
Communist Party membership. As a result of these denials Reming-
ton was indicted for perjury on June 8, 1950, for denying his Com-
munist Party membership. He resigned from his position with the
Commerce Department on the following day.
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guilty of perjury and was sentenced to 5 years in prison. However,
a United States court of appeals said that the jury had been improperly
charged by the trial judge and ordered that a new trial be held. The
matter is still before the courts. However, the committee feels that
the case of William Walter Remington clearly illustrates that per-
sistent investigation and hearings by congressional committees can and
does furnish valuable assistance to the executive branch of the Gov-
ernment, as well as to the courts.
For this reason the committee is resolved that other aspects of the
testimony given by Elizabeth T. Bentley and Whittaker Chambers
shall be fully explored.
PHILIP OLIN AND MARY JANE KEENLY
During the course of the trial of Judith Coplon and Valentine
Gubitchev, the defense counsel was successful in having the introduc-
tion of certain FBI reports from which Judith Coplon had made ex-
tractions that were found in her possession at the time of her arrest.
Contained in one of these reports was a reference to Mary Jane and
Philip Olin Keeney. According to this report, Mary Jane Keeney
was described by a confidential informant in August 1946 as being well
known on the east coast (of the United States) for her Communist and
espionage activities. The FBI report then proceeded to describe one
Sergei N. Kournakoff, who also used the alias Colonel Thomas. It was
stated that Kournakoff was a Russian national, who had come to the
United States as a stateless citizen on October 21, 1921. Kournakoff,
according to confidential informant of the FBI, became affiliated with
the Russky Golos Publishing Corp. and wrote articles for the Daily
Worker and New Masses magazines, both of which are Communist pub-
lications. The report indicated that prior to Kournakoff's departure
from the United States in January of 1946 he was a close associate of
Mary Jane and Philip Olin Keeney, who according to a confidential
informant of the FBI were members of the Communist Party.
Philip Olin Keeney was born February 3, 1891, at Rockville, Conn.
From 1931 until 1937, Philip Keeney was an employee of the Univer-
sity of Montana, at Missoula, Mont., where he held a position of
librarian. On September 1, 1937, Keeney was dismissed for incompe-
tence. Following his dismissal from the University of Montana,
Keeney and his wife, Mary Jane, resided at Berkeley, Calif. They
remained there until 1.940, when Mr. Keeney came to Washington,
1). C., to take. a position with the Library of Congress, where he re-
mained until September 1943. From 1943 until. 1945, he was employed
with the Foreign Economic Administration in Washington, D. C. In
December 1945 Philip Keeney was employed by the War Department
and sent to Tokyo, Japan. however, on June 9, 1947, he was relieved
of his duties with the War Department. When appearing before the
committee, Keeney stated he was tunable to ascertain the basis for his
discharge from the War Department, and efforts by the committee to
ascertain the information from the Department of the Army failed.
Mary Jane Keeney was born February 28, 1895, at Woodstock, Ill.
On October 24, 1942, she obtained employment at the Board of Eco-
nomic Warfare of the Office of War Analysis, Washington, D. C. For
a short period in 1942 she was employed as a voluntary assistant to the
executive secretary of Russian War Relief, Inc., Washington, D. C.
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n ovem er 1945 became a member of the staff of the nited
States representative to the Allied Commission on Reparations.
When, in March of 1946, the Commission was absorbed by the Depart-
ment of State, Mrs. Keeney continued in her employment. in that De-
partment until she resigned on July 15, 1946. In July 1948, Mrs.
Keeney secured employment in the Document Control. Section of the
United Nations Secretariat.
Both Philip and Mary Jane Keeney have a record of association
with known Communists and with individuals identified in this re-
port as having been en-aged in Soviet espionage activity. Among
them were Haakon M. Chevalier, Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, and
William Ludwig Ullmann, as well as Gerhart Eisler.
Also during the course of the trial of the United States v. Judith
Coplon an FBI report reflected that in March 1946 Mary Jane Keeney
was aboard the steamship Mit Victory when that vessel arrived in the
United States. The report indicated that FBI agents had observed
that the vessel was met by Jules Korchein, whom Mary Jane Keeney
was observed meeting upon her departure from the vessel. These two
individuals were placed under FBI surveillance and were observed to
enter the apartment of an individual named Wasserman. Later, on the
same date, FBI agents reported Keeney at a meeting with one Joseph
Bernstein, at which time Keeney was observed passing a manila
envelope to Bernstein. Bernstein was subsequently observed by FBI
agents meeting Alexander Trachtenberg, Communist Party official, at
which time a manila envelope, believed identical with the one origi-
nally carried by Keeney, was passed to Trachtenberg.
Mary Jane Keeney appeared before the committee and denied mem-
bership in the Communist Party or complicity in Communist espio-
nage. Philip 0. Keeney, declined to answer questions pertaining to
Communist Party membership when he appeared before the com-
mittee.
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SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
SINCE THE CLOSE OF WORLD WAR II
JUDITH COPLON
On March 4, 1949, on a side street in New York City, special agents
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation brought to. a close the espio-
nage activities of Judith Coplon and Valentin Gubitchev. This was
the culmination of many months of investigation by the FBI, much
of which was conducted in the very building which houses the FBI
headquarters in Washington, D. C. The investigation was not a
routine one for the FBI because, in a sense, the security of the FBI
as well as the country was at stake.
The FBI had learned that someone was leaking information from
FBI files to the Soviet Union. Information concerning highly confi-
dential investigations being conducted by the FBI concerning Soviet
and Russian satellite diplomats was finding its way back to these
individuals.
It did not appear that the information was coming from any Ameri-
can contacts and therefore must have been coming directly from
Moscow. This then was the pattern-someone, having access to FBI
files was channeling the information to some person who in turn was
furnishing it directly to Moscow. Once there, the Kremlin examined
the material and then, through courier or diplomatic pouch, was
notifying the Soviet Embassy and the various consulates. Because
of the disclosures of Elizabeth T. Bentley regarding her contacts
with Anatole Gromov, the Soviets realized that the FBI would be
giving the closest scrutiny to even the most minor Soviet officials. It
was necessary for the Soviet to secure some person who could be
trusted to secure the information, and another person to transmit it.
There are not many people who have access to. FBI reports. The
FBI, fully aware of this, quietly set about locating the leak. After
being completely satisfied that the leak was not inside the FBI, atten-
tion was turned to outside sources.
FBI reports were frequently forwarded to the Department of Jus-
tice. This was necessary because in many instances reports would
disclose possible violations of various statutes and the Department
could not, of course, come to a decision without examining the in-
formation developed by the FBI investigation. Reports concerning
Soviet diplomats were frequently furnished for consideration of pos-
sible prosecution under the Foreign Agents' Registration Act.
Naturally the FBI could not discontinue sending reports to the
Department without immediately tipping its hand to the guilty party
but, unless some method could be devised of locating the person leak-
in" the information, the leak would continue indefinitely.
I rom the nature of the information being furnished the Soviets, it
was ascertained that the leak must be coming from the section in which
Judith Coplon was employed.
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There followed weeks of investigation during which the FBI
watched every move of Judith Coplon. There was no indication, even
during the subsequent trial, that she suspected that she was being
investigated. When it was definitely established that Coplon was fur-
nishing information to the Soviets, it became necessary for the FBI to
find the middleman who was submitting the information to Moscow.
It was known that the home of Judith Coplon was in Brooklyn and
that she made frequent trips to New York. A short time after it was
determined that Coplon was in contact with the Soviets, she made a
tri to New York.
On this occasion, as on all others during the preceding weeks, Judith
was observed by the FBI. Instead of going to Brooklyn, Judith re-
mained in Manhattan. There she was observed in some unusual
maneuvers with a swarthy individual. It is difficult to determine
whether the swarthy individual and Coplon. had become suspicious or
whether all meetings were the same, but, after establishing that Coplon
was in contact with another Soviet agent, the FBI moved in and ar-
rested Coplon and her associate.
Judith Coplon, after her arrest, was found to be carrying type-
written cards containing extracts from FBI reports. She later
claimed that she had made these because she was writing a book and
the cards were source materials. She also claimed to have started work
on the manuscript, but unfortunately had destroyed it.
Now to examine the man that Coplon had met in New York on March
4, 1949. We must recall that the Soviets were unquestionably aware
that a close scrutiny was being made of embassy and consulate per-
sonnel. For this reason, they went outside the official diplomatic
ranks for this particular contact. What could be a better place to
locate an individual than in the organization set up to maintain peace,
the United Nations?
The individual selected by the Russians was Valentin Gubitchev.
There can be no question that he had been placed in the United Nations
Organization for the sole purpose of contacting and receiving informa-
tion from Judith Coplon.
During the course of the trial, Judith Coplon claimed that her
meetings with Gubitchev were merely lovers' trysts and that the
unusual maneuvers employed in meeting him were caused by fear of
detection by Gubitchev's wife and of the Soviet secret'police.
The Government discredited the love angle by showing that Judith
was obviously bestowing her favors in other quarters.
During the course of the trial, Gubitchev did not testify and must
have been somewhat confused to hear Judith Coplon and her attorney
accuse him of being a part of a conspiracy to frame her. If such an
arrangement were in existence, then this country for the first time put
something over on the Soviets, because arrangements were made after
Gubitchev had been found guilty to return him to the Soviet Union.
The return of Gubitchev was accomplished without an exchange of
persons from the Soviet Union as was the case with Gaik Ovakimian.
On March 9, 1950, having heard all of the testimony, a jury found
Judith Coplon guilty and she was sentenced to imprisonment for a
period of 15 years.
On December 5, 1950, the United States Court of Appeals reversed
the conviction on the basis that her arrest was made without a warrant.
This court, however, did not dismiss the indictment and stated that the
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guilt of Judith Coplon was plain. ~cgard ess o the seriousness 01.
her offense, Judith Coplon remains free, because of legal technicalities.
KLAUS FucTis AND IIARRY GOLD
The reader, in reviewing this report, might consider from the cases
cited that Soviet espionage has dissipated itself and, since the end of
World War II, declined. The committee wishes that this were true,
but unfortunately it is not. We have seen that with the beginning
of World War II the Soviets accelerated espionage activities ; also,
that during the same period the Russians cultivated and left behind
persons in the United States who, while they were not utilized, were
available for espionage activities.
During the period since the first successful experiments with nu-
clear fission, the Russians have bent every effort toward maintaining
pace with atomic development through espionage. This report has
illustrated that for the Soviets one successful espionage agent has been
worth more than. many Soviet scientists. Whereas the scientists might
have labored indefinitely without the proper information, the Russian
espionage apparatus has furnished practically everything that would
enable inferior scientists to assemble the atom bomb.
The case that we now consider, even though it had its origin prior
to the conclusion of World War II, illustrates the fact that Soviet
espionage has operated and surely shall continue to operate in the
United States unless adequate laws are enacted.
On February 3,11950, on the basis of information furnished by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, British authorities arrested Dr. Emil
Julius Klaus Fuchs, a naturalized Briton of German birth. Fuchs
was charged with having betrayed atomic research secrets on at least
two occasions, specifically in 1945, while in the United States, and
again in England in 1947.
Dr. Fuchs' position with regard to nuclear research ivv England was
comparable to that of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer in the United States.
When it first appeared that scientists could produce the atomic bomb,
the three countries then foremost in atomic research,, Canada, Eng-
land, and the United States, reached an agreement to pool the acquired
knowledge of atomic explosives. It was agreed that because of facili-
ties and "security," future experiments should be carried on in the
United States.
Dr. Klaus Fuchs, as the leading British atomic expert, was one of
the individuals selected to represent Great Britain in this research.
One of the mysteries in the selection of Fuchs was the failure of
British authorities to notify the United States of all facts in their
possession concerning the background of Dr. Fuchs. It was learned
that as early as 1941 the British Government knew that the German
Gestapo had named Klaus Fuchs as a German Communist. Even
though the British had no way at that time of verifying the accuracy
of the Gestapo charges, it is difficult to understand why there was no
notification of this at the time Fuchs was permitted to enter this
country.
Fuchs, after his arrest, stated that he had developed a sympathy for
communism while in college. Fuchs further confessed that while in
England he had associated principally with Marxians.
Notwithstanding these defects in his background, Fuchs came to the
United States and, after assimilating the knowledge he lacked, fol-
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lowed the progress being made in atomic research with unusual affinity.
Fuchs was instrumental in the development of the first atomic bomb
and was present at Los Alamos, N. Mex., on that memorable moment
on July 16, 1945, when the first atom bomb was exploded.
In all, Fuchs was in the United States from 1943 to 1946, working
on atomic research. Later, he attended top-level conferences on atomic
matters in which the United States, Canada, and Great Britain par-
ticipated. Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, in charge of, the Manhattan
Engineering District, has identified Fuchs as one of the few scientists
who had access to the United States plans for future atomic develop-
ment. Fuchs had also learned of the plan for development of the
hydrogen bomb.
It is of interest to note how Fuchs turned over his atomic informa-
tion to the Russians. Naturally, Russian impatience would not abate
until Fuchs could return to England. Therefore, an arrangement had
to be made by the Russians to have him contacted in the United States.
We have read earlier that in arranging positive identification for the
meeting between John Hitchcock Chapin and Arthur Adams, the
middleman, Clarence Hiskey, had taken a key from Chapin, which
was later produced by Adams when he met Chapin.
In the. same manner, some means had to be devised'for Fuchs to
recognize the Soviet agent he was to meet and furnish atomic secrets..
the Russian superiors, not being certain as to the. individual who
would meet Fuchs, instructed him to expect to make contact at a
certain location in New York City's lower East Side.
In the history of secret or clandestine meetings, there have been
a variety of identifying signs and countersigns but probably few
surpass the novelty of that devised by the Russians for Klaus Fuchs
and his contact.
On an afternoon in January 1944, although it was hardly season-
able for tennis, especially in the lower East Side section of New York
City, Dr. Klaus Fuchs was in that vicinity carrying a tennis ball.
The tenni.s'ball was the sign which, by prearrangement, would. iden-
tify Fuchs.
Having carried out his own instructions, Fuchs next was to watch
for a person whom he knew would be wearing gloves and carrying
a book with a green binding. His viggil was rewarded for there ap-
peared a short pudgy man bearing the necessary signs of identifi-
cation. This person identified himself to Fuchs simply as Raymond
and for 3 years this was the only name under which Fuchs knew
this Soviet agent.
The two men then proceeded to a restaurant in New York's Bowery
where Fuchs readily identified himself and proceeded to outline for
"Raymond" the information he had secured up to that time regard-
ing the developments in atomic research.
After this meeting, Fuchs resumed his duties with the Manhat-
tan Engineering District. "Raymond" took a train to Philadelphia,
Pa., where, under his true name, Harry Gold, lie was employed in the
laboratories of the Pennsylvania Sugar Co.
On May 23, 1950, Harry Gold was arrested by FBI agents in
Philadelphia on charges of espionage. Gold confessed when con-
fronted with the mass of evidence the Government had accumulated
against him. He confessed that over a period of time he had-been
used by the Soviet Intelligence Service as an intermediary in im-
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had met Fuchs at various places in the United States anal that Fuchs
had on these occasions provided him with both written and oral in-
formation.
On June 15, 1950, the Department of Justice announced the arrest
of Alfred Dean Slack on espionage charges. Slack admitted turning
over to Harry Gold samples and highly classified information re-
garding the processes employed in manufacturing certain explosives.
Gold confessed that he turned this information over to Semen M.
Semenov, an employee of the Aintorg Trading Corp. Gold, upon
Semenov's instructions, discontinued his contacts with Slack in view
of the more important contacts with Klaus Fuchs.
Upon Semenov's. departure from the United States in September
1944, Gold's espionage contacts were continued through Anatol] An-
tonovich Yakovlev, a vice consul of the Soviet consulate in New York
City. Yakovlev left the United States on December 27, 1946.
The investigation proceeded and on June 16, 1950, David Greenglass
was arrested in New York City on espionage charges. During the
summer of 1945, Greenglass had been attached to the Second Pro-
visional S. E. D. Unit at Santa Fe, N. Mex. The records at Los
Alamos reflect that Greenglass, while stationed there, worked on
highly confidential material in connection with atomic energy
research.
Harry Gold, in his confession, stated that he had gone to Albu-
querque, N. Mex., during the summer of 1945, and there received
highly classified material from David Greenglass. Gold stated that
he had turned this mnaterial over to Anatoli A. Yakovlev.
The subsequent investigation by the FBI disclosed that Greenglass
had been recruited for his espionage duties by his brother-in-law,
Julius Rosenberg, who was arrested. July 17, 1950, in New York City
on charge of conspiracy to commit espionage. The investigation dis-
elosed?that it was at the instigation of Rosenberg that Greenglass made
secret atomic data available to both Rosenberg and Harry Gold.
Further, in addition to bringing Greenglass and Gold together, Rosen-
berg had given Greenglass specific instructions as to what type of
information was desired by the U. S. S. R.
Rosenberg had been employed by the War Department from 1940
to 1945, when he was removed by the Secretary of the War Depart-
ment, upon the recommendation of Rosenberg's superior, who had
received information indicating Communist Party membership on
the part of Rosenbergg. .
On July 29, 1950, the FBI arrested Abraham Brothman and Miriam
Moskowitz on charges of obstructing justice. The investigation had
disclosed that in 1941 Semen M. Semenov had arranged a meeting
between Abraham Brothman and Harry Gold, at which time the three
discussed the type of information that Brothman and Gold were
to secure for the Soviet Government. Gold later testified that a
Russian official had told him that the work Brothman was perform-
ing for Russia was equivalent to the efforts of at least one and possibly
more Soviet Army brigades.
Gold also confessed that in testifying before a Federal grand jury
in New York in 1947, he had been induced by Brothman to testify
that the two had met through Jacob Golos, the then deceased Soviet
agent. Gold said that he falsely testified to that effect on Brothman's
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insistence in order that their stories would be consistent rather than
truthfully stating that their meeting had been arranged by Semenov.
Gold had been employed as a chemist from February 1946 to June
1948 by Abraham Brothman and Associates, consulting engineers.
Miriam Moskowitz for a number of years had been secretary to Abra-
ham Brothman and eventually had been made a full partner. From
1942 to 1944, she was employed by the War Manpower Commission
in New York City.
On August 18, 1950, FBI agents in New York City arrested Mrs.
Ethel Greenglass Rosenberg on a charge of conspiracy to commit
espionage. She was charged with having conspired with her husband,
Julius Rosenberg, and others, and of having recruited her brother,
David Greenglass, to obtain secret atomic information for transmis-
sion to the Soviet Union.
The final link in this chain of Soviet espionage was forged on
August 18, 1950, with the arrest of Morton Sobel] at Laredo, Tex.
Sobel], who had fled to Mexico after the arrest of David Greenglass,
was deported by Mexican authorities. Sobell was charged with con-
spiring with Julius Rosenberg and others in sending national defense.
information to Soviet Russia. An electrical engineer, Sobell was
employed on highly confidential work dealing with radar research for
the United States Navy at the General Electric Co. plant, Schenectady,
N. Y., during the period from 1942 to 1947. Previously from 1939 to
1941, lie had been employed at the Bureau of Ordnance, United States
Navy, Washington, D. C.
For their parts in this betrayal each of these individuals was found
guilty and received the following sentences:
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg received the death sentence.
Morton Sobell-30 years.
Harry Gold-30 years.
David Greenglass-15 years.
Abraham Brothman-7 years.
Miriam Moskowitz-2 years.
Q
70
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6
 25X1 C3b1
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6
Abbreviations used in Text of Study or
the Appendix
Asst. - Assistant
CP - Communist Party
fnu - first name unknown
GRU - Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye
(Chief Intelligence Directorate)
MA - Military Attache
NA - Naval Attache
png - persona non grata
RIS - Russian Intelligence Services
TASS
US -
VOKS
- Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union
- Vsesoyuznoye Obshchestvo Kulturnoy Svyazi Zagranitsey
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78?-0.A915R000700260037-6
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-00915R000700260037-6