MAO'S CURRENT THESES ON CONTRADICTION AND THE CHENG FENG (PARTY REFORM MOVEMENT)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000700200022-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2000
• Sequence Number: 22
• Content Type: REPORT

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MAQtS CURRENT THESES QN CpNTRA,DICTION AND THE.
CHENG FENG (PARTY REFQRM IvZC}VEME.NT)
SUMM~.RY~~
1. The current Cheng Feng (Party Reform .Movement), set in
motion by Maots .February and March speeches, is a reflection of
Maols apprehension over possible failure of the Second Five-Year
Plan (1.95.8-196Z): CGP popularity may be severely tested in the
course of selling and implementing the Plan.
2. Facing Chinas demography (a population of 600, 000, 000)
and the relatively small size of the CCP, Mao is concerned with
possible mass pressures on the regime, particularly in the light of
the "Hungarian tragedy" during which CP Hungary disintegrated
rapidly. (In the now available text Mao admits anti-regime
fermentation appeared in China in the wake of Hungarian events,
especially preference for Western democracy, )
3, Mao's recent theses on contradictions are consistent with
his traditional attempts to combine implementation. of Marxism-
Leninism with proper consideration for Chinese realities. His
position as "independent" interpreter of the Bolshevik Bible has
been acknowledged by Stalin and the Khrushchev regime. (The -now
available text should be fully acceptable to the Soviets. )
4. The theses that non-antagonistic contradictions exist in a
"Socialist" society are. no innovations or revisions of Marxism-
Leninism. in essence they acknowledge the fact that classes have
not been completely eradicated and that "socialism" will not be able,
for a long time, to satisfy fully the needs of the people. This
situation creates potential conflict.
~ This is the summary of an analysis prepared prior to the
publication of Mao's speech (18 June). Gertain observations based
on study of the incomplete text available have been added in brackets,
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The theses dramatize. the possibility that such conflicts may explode,
and alert the entire Party apparatus not to aggravate the situation
which may result from anticipated economic and cultural frustrations
of the peopled Fully endorsing the use of repression internally when
necessary, Mao playa up the "persuasive aspects" of the dictatorship
as apreventive-defensive measure.
5. Mao~s dramatization of the alleged "liberality" of a Communist
regime may become a showpiece of Communist propaganda. It fits
surprisingly well into. the design of the renewed Soviet line for peace-
ful coexistence and coincides with. the international line. In view of
Hungary the Soviets are in no position to dramatize the issue them-
selves and. may appreciate the general propagandistic benefits of Mao's
theses for which there are ideological precedents in their own.
theoretical writings. Nevertheless, there should be Soviet sensitivity
on the point of leadership.
6e No uniform acceptance or assimilation of Mao~s theses should
be expected in the Bloc since this would conflict with the prevailing
propaganda pattern of tactical independence of Communist Parties.
Limited assimilation in order to absorb fermentation processes is
already indicated in the attitude of CP Czechoslovakia.
7. .A.asimilation in the Bloc is facilitated by the limitations inherent
in Maot s approach:
a~ No dilution. of Marxism-Leninism.
b~ Right to criticize confined to units already controlled by
+CCP.
c) "Destructive" (i. e. , uncontrolled) criticism not permitted.
d) .Intellectuals to be 'brought under strict Party control,
e) "Weeds't permitted in order to expose "enemyts~'
propaganda and aims.
f) .Reliance on and eventual use of force internally indirectly
acknowledged in concept that "non-antagonistic contradictions"
may blow up.
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~,.:
~~
g) Evaluation of an "antagonism", i, e. , threat to regime,
remains arbitrary.
(The now available text further spells out the limitations of Maots
'liberal" or "democratic" approach, He does not eliminate the
repressive aspects of the dictatorship but combines them with the
preventive measures of Party controlled persuasion, discussion
and education,
8. The vulnerabilities of Maots theses stem from the fact that
the Party must, explain to the "people" the hard facts of Chinese
economic troubles..
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MAQ'S CURRENT THESES ON CfJNTRADICTIC)N .~.ND THE
CHENG FEND (PARTY REFORM Mt?VEMENT)
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MAC?'S CURRENT THESES ON CONTRADICTION .l~.ND THE
CHENG FENG (P.~.RTY REFORM MC!VEMENT}
1, Three times, at crucial turning points in the development
of the Communist Party of China, Mao Tse-tung has put Party and
non--Party cadre through an intensive ideological indoctrination
program in order to enforce a unified leadership approach to the
task ahead.
2, The first and most intensive of these programs (Cheng
Feng or Party Reform Movements) which lasted from 1942 to about
1;44, consolidated the Chinese Communist Party as well as Mao's
leading position and. readied the leadership corps for the post-war
showdown. with the Kuomintang. The second - -and less known- -
Cheng Feng (Three Seasons. Reform) was initiated in the summer of
1954 following the consolidation of state power in 1949 and appears
to have been geared to the ensuing class struggle period which
culminated in 1955-56 with the drastic and rapid communization.. of
Chinas s agricultural and industrial base.
3. The current Cheng Feng, which was set in motion by Maos s
report to the Supreme State Conference (2? February to 1 March 1957)
and his 12 March speech to the .National Conference of Propaganda
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?~d .,-
Work, can. readily be linked with the. emerging Second Five-Year
Plan which is to run from 1958 to 1962. Held against the background
of the dislocations. and dissatisfactions created by the rapid
communization program of 1955 and 1956, success or failure of the
Second Five-Year Plan could. well determine the future course of
events within China. A note of apprehension is discernible in the
7 June annauncernent of the "National Conference of Design" at
which the guiding principles of the Second Five-Year Plan. were
discussed. According to a New York Times dispatch from Hong
Kong, 7 June, "the announcement said that the factors that guided
the principles of the Second Five-Year Plan were the realization
that. China- was still a big agricultural country with. a meager
industrial foundation, that it had a Mtge (600, 000, 000) population
with a low living standard and. that its economy and cultural develop-
ment was uneven." Thus, a period beset with many knotty problems
is seen ahead for China. The current Party Reform Movement is an
alert to the entire Communist Party of China as well as itsgovernmental
auxiliaries and fronts, that its leadership and popularity will be
severely tested in its efforts to sell and implement the Second Five-
Year Plan.
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4. What is Mao1s fundamental approach to the leadership
problem? Although his .February and March speeches have not been
published as yet, his thoughts have clearly emerged in a variety of
CCP pronouncements and in a summary of his remarks, including
textual excerpts, acquired and published by the New York Times
Warsaw correspondent, Sidney Gruson (see New York Times, 13 June).
These are sufficiently broad in. scope to show that Maots position
today is remarkably consistent with those propounded openly in years
past, ("On Contradiction", 1937; keynote addresses in the First
Gheng Feng Movement, 1942; Report to the Third Plenum of the Central
Committee, June 1950; CCP statement "More on the Historical
Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" of 2$ December 1956;
etc. )
Mao posed the problem sharply in his February 1942 Cheng
Feng speech when he asked "How can Marxist-Leninist theory and the
reality of the Chinese Revolution- be united?" The body of thought
called "Maoism" is but the sum total of answers to this simple question,
Hence, it is no accident that the common theme of alI three Party
Reform Movements is an attack on "subjectivism", which is Party
jargon for insufficient recognition of, and inadequate tactical adjustment
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to Chinese reality. "Subjectivism" among the leadership is the root
of other harmful attitudes, ea g.: "dogmatism-+ and "doctrinairism",
i, e. , mechanical. application of Marxist-Bolshevik doctrine;
'}formalism", i~ e. , reliance on Party jargon in propaganda;
46sectarianism~', i, e. , counterproductive friction within the Party or
between the Party and the "outside"; "bureaucratism, commandism'.;
which are subjectivism in administrative and executive management,
i. eb , the attitude based on the erroneous notion that reality is changed
by issuing orders.
In the February 1942 speech cited Mao seems to express the
practical reason for his abhorrence of subjectivism: the demography
of China. Visualizing an eventual Party strength of about 4, 000, 00.0
he pointed out that fl~.e Party would, at best, represent only one per
cent out of a population of 400, 000, 000 and therefore could. not afford.
to antagonize the people unnecessarily, Today the Chinese Party
claims about 12, 000, 000 members out of a claimed population strength
of 600, 000, 000. The Party, then, represents even now only two per
cent of the total population.
Mao's concern with Chinas demography is also- evident in his
recent speeches. Introducing the concept of birth control--in itself a
staggering innovation in the social and cultural pattern of China--he
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cites the inadequacy of agricultural production in feeding a growing
population, as well as the limitations of primary educational facilities.
If, as appears indicated, the Second Five-Year Plan may not
live up to expectations, Mao's concern with possible mass pressures
on the regime is understandable--particularly in the light of the events
in Hungary,, The "Hungarian tragedyt' (as Mao terms it) emerges
clearly as the immediate cause for Mao~s current ideological and
practical deliberations, stemming from concern not only over the
popular uprising but also aver the rapid disintegration of CP Hungary,
5, Mao's is the approach of an eminently practical, self-made
revolutionary who deals with specific situations and people--and
accepts formulae only when and if they apply, Lest it be misinterpreted
as a disposition toward breaking away from the Soviet Union, it must
be emphasized that the principle of "unity of theory and practice" is a
standard tenet of Marxism-Leninism. and was one of Stalini s pet
phrases. Students of Mao's thought have repeatedly reported their
inability to find any trace of conceptual heterodoxy. In particular were
they unable to discern any deviationism in the Party indoctrination
material issued during the first Cheng Feng (1g42j which is the model
for the current Party "rectification" campaign? Neither can there be
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found any deviations from fundamental Bolshevik thought in the
available xnatexials on Mao's speeches and the current Cheng Feng,
'What is evident currently, as it was in 1942, is Mao's insistence upon
expressing and unfolding the Marxist-Bolshevik principle of the
dictatorship of the proletariat in terms of Chinese reality.
In. 1942, the first C.heng Feng was accompanied by the demotion
and loss of influence of a small group of 3vlos.cow-trained Chinese
Communist leaders who had held key positions in the Central
Committee of the CCP, on the grounds of their inability to adapt
Moscow-taught Marxism-Leninism to Chinats specific conditions,
Today too much. is made of the unorthodoxy of Moots thesis an
1?Contradictions within the hanks of the People", particularly as an
indication of a Sino-Soviet ideological rift. Mao as an interpreter of
the Bolshevik Bible has always insisted that he needs no middleman in
matters Chinese, Stalin acknowledged this position through the 1950
Sino-Soviet treaty, and the Khrushchev regime consistently enhanced
the prestige of the CCP,
6, Moots thesis that there continue to exist in a ?4Socialist?' society
a variety of non-antagonistic contradictions. is based on Marx and Lenin,
and has. even been acknowledged by Stalin and other Soviet leaders and
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theoreticians. (Mao first expounded this thesis in his essay "l'~n
Contradiction", written in 1937). In plain language Mao's position
can be summarized. as follows: In order to achieve power the
Communist Party must use farce to crush the class enemy and
establish a dictatorship of the proletariat, i, e, , solve the "antagonistic
contradictions" of the class struggle. 1~fter the Communist Party has
achieved full state and economic control, there is, theoretically
speaking, no more class conflict, since classes have been abolished.
The "class enemy" is now mainly represented by the external threat
fxorn the imperialists. Nevertheless, internally there still may
develop socio-economic-political conflicts, problems and pressures.
Since there are no more hostile classes, these conflicts, problems
and pressures are theoretically speaking "non-antagonistic contradictions",
i. e, , capable of solution by means other than force, principally by
persuasion, discussion: and education. 3f not correctly handled,
however, these contradictions may become "antagonistic", i, e. ,
threaten the. power position of the regime as they did in Hungary,
necessitating the use of farce, Through his thesis, then, Mao
addresses himself in greater detail than any other Communist theoretician,
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to a fundamental, practical proposition, i~ e. , under what circumstances
the "dictatorship of the proletariat" should bring into play its repressive
forces internally. It needs to be emphasized that Mao does not now and
.never has repudiated the use of force or terror per se, Concerning the
use of farce against the 'external enemy" Mao has never expressed any
modifying or qualifying positions, Concerning the use of force internally
his current positions do not question the principle, but merely the
usefulness and productivity of terror under certain circumstances. In
this Mao. is no innovator. He merely follows overt Marxist-Leninist-
Stalinist doctrine (although not .Stalinist practice) when he attempts to
establish a balance between the coercive and the paternalistic aspects
of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The following statement from a
report by ~,., :A.. Zhdanov to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the .Soviet Union, 21 February 193?, illustrates the
point. Zhdanov said;
"Leninism teaches; The dictatorship of the proletariat has its
periods, its special forms and diversified methods of work,
During the civil war, the coercive aspect of the dictatorship is
especially conspicuous.... Cn the other hand, during the period
of socialist construction, the peaceful organizational and cultural
work of the dictatorship, revolutionary law, etc. , are especially
conspicuous. But here again it by no me ans follows that during
the. period of construction, the coercive side of the dictatorship
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has. fallen away, or could do so. o. o The organs: of
suppression, the :army and other organizations are as
necessary now, in. the period of construction, as: they
were during the civil war period. , .."
The Stalinist. regime paid lip service. to the paternalistic aspects. of
the. dictatorship but perpetuated the terror system, Mao, although.
emphasizing the ''peaceful" and persuasive aspect of the dictatorship
for the time being, disguises. by this very emphasis the fact that the.
'organs of suppression" in Clxina continue to exist with their functions.
unchanged, Nor could Mao afford to let ".the coercive side of the
dictatorship" "fall away" since by definition his. thesis admits. that.
'non-antagonistic contradictions' may become "a.ntagonistic" if not.
properly handled. Given. the press- of the. huge. population mass of
Chinese, the- low level of economic anal educational development, the
realization-that the 5.econd Five-Year Plan may carry social-economic
progress only too small a step forward, Maots defensive use- of the
persuasive aspects. of the: dictatorship represents valid ComYnunist
tactics, and '#orthodox" at that,
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7, The defensive or preventive nature of Maots thought, under-
lying his emphasis on "persuasion", "correct handling of contradictions"
and the Cheng Feng Party training program, emerges also from a
recent Peking broadcast (26 ..April 1957) on "Why are there contradictions
within the ranks of the people?" which unmistakably reflects Maois
position. The broadcast answered the title. question thus: "First of
all we must understand that the main contradictions /emphasis
supplied / in our country now are the contradictions between the
peoples desire to build an advanced industrial nation and the reality of
a backward agricultural nation, between the people's demand for rapid
economic and cultural growth and the present economic and cultural
conditions that thwart their demand." JEmphasis supplied./' Anticipating
continued frustration of "the peopleLS demand:" Mao enjoins his Party
apparatus, especially through the Cheng Feng campaign, not to
aggravate the situation unnecessarily by i'bureaucratic't working methods
since the long-term plans of the regime and the short~erm desires
and aspirations of the ''people" may conflict. This, in essence, is the
meaning of the maoism which reads that "at present the contradictions
between the masses of our country and. the leaders result mainly from
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bureaucratic leadership in work.'t In short, if anything goes wrong
{i. e. , if non-antagonistic contradictions become antagonistic) the
Party apparatus will bear the blame but not Maoo
8, Khrushchev~ s negative reply to the question on the. 1 June CBS
television interview'fwhether these contradictions / i. e. , between the
leaders and the masses / do not exist in the. .Soviet Union today" raises
the question of the impact and applicability of Mao's theses in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe,
It is submitted that the Soviets have no reason. for rejecting
the substance, and every reason for accepting the positive propaganda
value of Mao's the se so The timing and propaganda content of the Mao.
speeches, with their conspicuous emphasis on the "liberality" of a
Communist regime, fit surprisingly well into the design of the renewed
Soviet "peaceful coexistence" drive through which they apparently hope
to compensate for their lose of prestige suffered as a result of the
crises in 1956a The. Soviets could hardly afford to dramatize the
"respectability" of the Communist system at this time, both in view of
their previous bungling (secret Khrushchey speech) and in view of their
intervention in Hungary, If not actually co-ordinated with the Soviets,
.Mao's February and March speeches are fully compatible with current
Soviet tactics and may become an important. showpiece of Communist
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propaganda, especially in underdeveloped areas? Even the minor
disagreements between Mao1s and Soviet positionsas well as Mao's
minor criticisms of the Soviet regime represent attitudes fully
compatible. with the current international Communist party line. The
latter has been. most clearly expressed by the veteran CPUSA. ,leader,
William Z. Foster (Daily Worker, 12 June) who is a "conservative"
Communist and still enjoys Soviet trust. This is his formula:
"For a less dogmatic approach to applying and developing
Marxism-Leninism,
for a more critical attitude towards other Communist Parties
and the countries of socialism,
and for an all out struggle against bureaucracy."
CPYRGHT
MaoRa speeches meet all three requirements., The built-in proviso
that the.. Chinese method of "solving problems" does "not apply to every
other countryt' also agrees with the general formula developed during
last yearts ideological crises, i. e, , provided .Soviet experience serves
as a fundamental model, local variations in implementation are
permissible although they are not binding on other Communist Parties
or regimes
Indirectly, therefore, Maots speeches offset the harsh effects
of the Soviet line against "national Comrnunism~' which was developed
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under the impact of last years ideological and disciplinary crisis.
'International solidarity~i has been largely restored and factionalism
in the world movement is aubsiding~ ~, limited ideological ragproche-
rnent with Tito is in the making.
Mao's speeches are a shot in the arm for the abortive
campaign started by the 2?th CPSU Congress to give the international
Communist movement a new look of greatex decentralization.
In this opinion, therefore, a uniform official reaction to
to
Mao~s speeches and theses. is not/be expected in the Soviet Bloc. The
extent of offical endorsement or assimilation will depend entirely on
the correlation between fermentation processes and the regimes
ability to control them. Gomulka, for example, would have to contain
Maoea views. if they were used by the radical liberals to exert pressure
on the regime The Kadar government, faced with the need for over-
coming large~scale disaffection, may yet. make controlled use of the
Chinese method.
~, xesalution of the CC of CP Czechoslovakia of 13-14 June on
ideological activity of the Party and measures aimed at raising its
standards, emphasizes the need for 'rcrticiam of shortcomings in our
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society", and states that +'a~ny form of sectarian narrowing of the
front of our literature and art. , . , is alien to our Party." 13.t the same
time. the resolution takes a firm stand against "revisionism++ and for
++proletarian internationalism+' and promises that the Party "will exert
every effort to see that all intellectuals accept the Marxist world
outlook,,.,++ This resolution appears to be a typically Czech modifica-
tion of the .Mao theses, i, e. , a minimum of ++liberalization" combined
with a rnaxirnum of controls.
The soviets, in addition to appreciating the general benefits
from Maots dramatization of the alleged respectability and liberality
of the Communist system, should. also be able. to appreciate the
''orthodoxy+' of Mao in view of sufficient parallels and precedents in
their own theoretical writings, ~ The latter, however, are distinctly
CPYRGHT
~ Precedents, .past and present, are numerous, In 1946, an obscure
Soviet student of philosophy, Tsolak ~.leksandrovich Stepanyan {in the
Young Bolshevik , No, 3-4, June-July 1946.), postulated a contradiction
in the USSR "between the growth of public demand, . ,and the relatively
unsatisfactory level of the continually growing material production,"
and predicted that this contradiction would continue to exist under
Communism. This formulation bears a striking resemblance to what
Mao now postulates as China's main contradiction.
In 1947 ~., A, Zhdanov, Stalin+s propaganda chief and Malenkov` s
competitor, launched a campaign for the solution of non-antagonistic
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~T.
inferior in quality and depth, a fact which permits Mao and the
Chinese Party to point out, with some justification, that in Maots
writings Marxism-Leninism is being "creatively developed,." fJne
could easily imagine that the Soviet leaders, while praising the Chinese
for their original ideas, could administer a severe dressing down to
their own. theoreticians and propagandists for their inability to produce
"creative" think-pieces. With all their emphasis on international
decentralization, the Soviets still are sensitive on points of leadership.
This may be the reason for Khrushchev`s almost automatic rejection of
the. idea that in the USSR conflicts exist between the leaders and the
masses,
In general, however, the Soviets should be satisfied with the
limitations which Mao built into- his concepts on how to handle potential
contradictions. through. criticism and self-criticism. 2hdanovts death
in 1948 appears to have halted this. campaign, In 1954, however, his
thesis was xevived, and Soviet theoreticians have dealt with the solution.
of non-antagonistic contradictions, admitting conflicts between social
groups, and more- recently (Kommunist, No, 5, April 195?) conflicts
within the Party. Pravda, (26 December 1956) criticized the Soviet
journal Questions of Philosophy for inadequate study of "real" or
"concrete" contradictions. although a detailed comparative study of
Soviet and Chinese treatment of this ideological problem is not available
at this writing, no Soviet reference admitting a conflict between "the leaders
and the masses" has become evident, although, of course, Soviet attacks
on bureaucracy in leadership and on attitudes isolating the Party from
the masses have been. standard themes,
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conflicts in a "socialist" society. These Tim~a.tions, less
conspicuous than the propagandistic emphasis on "persuasion" and
"democracy", are briefly discussed below,
10. The limitations imposed by Mao on the. applicability of
his theses to other areas are paralleled by the limitations inherent
in his speeches as well as in the current Cheng Feng in respect to
their domestic application,
These limitations are:
a) Ma.ols theses and the .Cheng Feng are preventive in
nature;
b) The preventive objectives require a stronger CCP both
in terms of ideological purity and organizational control.
c) The use of terror or repressive measures is governed
by the success or failure. of preventive measures.
11~ The purpose of the current Cheng Feng is to ensure that the
Communist Party be so oriented and deployed as to prevent
"non-antagox~stic contradictions" from be corning unmanageable and
explosive. Hence the far-reaching categorization and definition of all
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"problems", .large and sma11, as if by identification alone a solution
could be achieved; the fixing of responsibility for the solution of the
problems on the entire Party apparatus; the exhortations warning
against "bureaucraticism/' and "subjectivism",
tJn the other hand., the current Cheng Feng is not to dilute
"Marxism-Leninism". Hence the proposed further tightening of
ideological and organizational discipline, .and the particular emphasis
on the education of intellectuals in "Party spirit", i. e. , traditional
Marxism-Leninism as opposed to f'liberalisrn,"
12, Mao's concept of persuasion is the persuasion of the ?'rnasses"
by the Party and not persuasion of the Party by the masses, Criticism
is therefore limited.
Organizationally it appears from pertinent references that
the right of the masses to criticize pertains only to the Communist-
controlled '"units"' or .organizations (political, semi-governmental,
agricultural cooperatives, etc.) which were created during the period
of communization (1955, 1956). This form. of organizationally
controlled criticism and self-criticism keeps discussion in channels.
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Substantively criticism must be "constructive", i, e. , compatible
with general CCP programs and policies, ~i.s early as June 8--three
months after the Cheng Feng campaign was launched--the Peking
People~s_ Daily found it necessary to put the brakes on "criticism
of a destructive nature." Using language reminiscent of that previously
used at the time of intense and. coercive drives against counter-
"There are persons who are trying to use the Cheng Feng
movement of the CCP as a means to carry out severe class
struggles. o ,. .Although the large scale class struggle in our
country has largely subsided, it is by no means finished.
This is particularly true on the ideological front /i. e. , where
it really matters_/..., There are a very small number of
people who. have outwardly expressed support to socialism but
are still secretly longing for capitalism and the type of
political life in Europe and the United States, These persons
form the right-wing groups today."
CPYRGHT
The next day Peoples Daily made it crystal clear- that the
Party cannot afford indiscriminately to regard all criticism as helpful
and beneficial to the people. While the editorial says "all views and
opinions beneficial to the socialist undertakings should'bloorn~ in full,"
it characterizes as "of a destructive natureF' all criticism which "aims
at undermining the socialist undertakings, the Peoplers Democratic
Dictatorship and the unity between the Party and the people." Singled
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out for attack are "those who publicize the view that the leadership
exercised by the Communist party should be abolished."
It is significant that the news. organ. of the Polish CP,
Trybuna Ludu, published on 13 June a report. of its Peking correspondent
on these Pe ople t s Daily articles,
13, The indoctrination of intellectuals forma an effective
limitation on the appl2cation of the much-publicized slogan 'f Let all
flowers bloom, let all schools. of thought contend," .A.s the President
of the Chinese'~.cademy of .Sciences put it on 16 May 1957, it was only
thanks to "the movement of ideological re -education carried out in
recent years in China" that the "hundred schools of thought" movement
is possible now, and "the free debates now/ taking place among the
intellectuals aim at bringing the professors and scientists of China
still closer to the Party and at improving the Partyts direction,"
This is the 1957 echo of Maof s theme of the 1942-44 Gheng
Feng movement, "There is in reality no such thing as art for artes
sake,.,. The Party's artistic and literary activity occupies a definite
and assigned position in the Partyts revolutionary work and is subordinated
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to the prescribed revolutionary task of the Party in a given
revolutionary period." Mao himself, in the version of his speeches.
reported by Sidney Gruson, added an interesting interpretation to the
slogan. "There need be no fear that the policy of 100 flowers will
yield poisoned fruit. Sometimes it is necessary even to have this
poisoned fruit to know what we are fighting against For this reason,
too, it has been decided to publish. the full works of Chiang Kai-shek
and even a volume of some of the Voice of America broadcasts. It
is not enough to attack reactionaries, We must know exactly what
the reactionaries want and what they represent."
The use of provocation as a means of weeding out "poisoned
flowers" is, of course, good Bolshevik practice, In full control of
the Party apparatus and the repressive state organs, Mao can well
afford to say "Marxism-Leninism is not .afraid of criticism and does
not fear discussion." He controls the machinery to ensure that
Marxism-Leninism will win out.
14o Although Mao places conspicuous emphasis on the persuasive
aspects of the dictatorship at this stage, he endorses without
qualifications the "use of force against the enemy+'. ~ His criticism
'~ Mao admitted the liquidation of 800, 000 counterrevolutionaries
prior to 1954, The figure is open to question; it probably reaches
into several million. Maois statement that terror has. not been. used
since 54 ids also o1p~~.Ot~$$c~~~eti~~a-RDP78-009158000700200022-8
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of Malin parallels the position of the 2tJth CP5U Congress and
Khrushchev~s secret speech according to which Stalin used force
unproductively, especially against the Communist Party.
If it is accepted that Mao's concept o# the dictatorship is to
establish a correct balance between the persuasive and repressive
aspects of the dictatorship, the question arises as to when Mao would
consider the use of terror justified. On the basis of the available
materials on Mao~s February and March speeches, the answer is
obviously that Mao would use repression and terror internally when-
ever the power position of the regime was threatened This is
evident from his renewed. endorsement of Soviet intervention. in
Hungary and from his position on strikes Rejecting all strikes as
being "never beneficial to the working class'+, Mao considers small
strikes as useful symptoms of a malady to be cured but does not
consider ++big general strikes+' the same way because "they are
directed against the regime."
It is interesting to speculate on how big a strike in China
would have to be in order to be considered a threat to the regime. In
the light of past experience, it is fair to assume that the determination
of what constitutes a threat to the regime would be made arbitrarily.
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~~ _.~
For example, it may be useful to recall that in September
1952 L,o Jui-ch~ing, Minister of Public Security, announced that
"throii.gh the campaign for suppression of counterrevolutionaries with.
" fanfare" from December 1950 onwards, "we succeeded basically in.
clearing up the remnant influence of counterrevolution on the
mainland of China. "
Nevertheless, within eighteen months. {February 1954), Liu
Shao-ch'i announced, in connection with a Party purge, that the
regime and the masses were increasingly threatened by counter-
revolutionaries from within, the rationalization being that "the more
we advance in our economic construction, the more vicious will be
the sabotage of enemies at home and abroad. "~ The Minister of
Public .Security, who had in 1950 announced completion of the "basic'-'
suppression of counterrevolutionaries, in 1955 blandly explained that
those previously suppressed wexe overt counterrevolutionaries and
~ This formulation is reminiscent of Stalin's "mistaken" concept
that the intensity of the class struggle increases as socialism
progresseso
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that F'under-cover's counterrevolutionaries were the target of the
intensive 1955. drive,
These leaders statements show how arbitrarily their
characterization of the situation has changed in the past, and. raises
questions as to how many years the. present policy will last.
The new line is again that 'tthe remnants of the. counts r -
revolutionaries have been basically eliminated." These are almost
exactly the same words used by the Minister of Public Security in
1952. Within two years he modified his, statement to allow for a new,
brutal counterrevolutionary drive. Three months after the initiation
of the 1957 Cheng Feng, PeopleLs Daily ominously pointed out that
the class struggle continues Given. this. pattern of flexibility the
'persuasive" aspects of Maoism which .are currently being emphasized
cannot be projected into the future.
15e T.he1957 Cheng Feng represents Maoxs realization that the
Chinese Revolution has collided with. the hard reality and problems
of constructive. planning and building at a time when the Soviet Uniori
and the Eastern European Satellites are beset with internal political-
economic difficulties. The fundamental weaknesses in Mao~s
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ostensibly realistic and Sinified approach to the leadership problem
appear to be:
a) That no amount of "brainwashing" can change or affect
the "main" contradictions "between the peoplets demand for
rapid economic and cultural growth and the present economic
and cultural conditions that thwart this demand."
b} That no .amount of free aar ostensibly free discussion of
non-antagonistic contradictions and their reasons can change the
hard facts of China's economy. The price of consumer goods
is not determined by ideological considerations.
c) That an "unbureaucratic!' Party leadership may listen
to criticism but is not obligated to accept it. Since it still is
bound by "democratic centralism", i. e, , by policy decisions of
higher Party echelons,, it can arbitrarily reject and brand as
"unconstructive" any criticism which conflicts with Party policies
and programs,
d) That the slogan "Let many flowers bloom" is watered
down by the fact that the intellectuals have been brought under
tight Party discipline through their mass. organization or in
government agencies where they work,
e) That the slogan of long term coexistence and mutual
supervision of and by non-Communist Parties is meaningless
since the non-Communist Parties are manipulated by the
Communist Party.
f) That the policy of "building the country on industry and
thrift" wli:~ich is to be propagated is a euphemism far an austerity
programo
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16, A Pravda report of 9 June see New York Times, 10 June,
page b) illustrates clearly the contradictions inherent in the Gheng
Feng campaign The Chinese Communist Party is being brainwashed
and retrained in order to steel itself for a propaganda fob which m.
yet turn aut to be counterproductive. According to the New York
Times account, 1+Party officials in Sian J in Ngrthwest China/ told
Pravda they had appointed their best men. as propagandists to help
the people understand the contradictions that arise in the course of
socialist constructions and to make them. see more clearly the
wonderful tomorrow of our homeland and thus consolidate the farces
of our people.+' Pravda also illustrates how the CCP is forced to
deal with the problems of today. According to the New York Times
version ++party propagandists directly and candidly and in detail tell
the masses. why consumption of cotton textiles had to be eut, why
prices went up on certain goods, why there was a substantial shortage
of housing space, why propaganda to limit births had begun in China,
and why queues far street cars, buses and in butcher shops were
still inevitable ++
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In brief, when all the contradictions within Mao~s thesis
an contradictions are examined, the whale affair can be summed up
in the following .slogan:
BIG TROUBLE. -- BIG STICK
SM.~..LL TROUBLE -- SMALL, STICK..
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