BRIEFS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 1957

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000700200019-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2000
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: July 16, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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BRIEFS Q1V IN TERNATIQNAL COMMUNISM
1957
MAQ TSE-TUNG QN C?NTRADICTIONS
and the
PARTY RECTIFICATI?N MOVEMENT
16 July 1957
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Ma.o Tse-tong on Contradictions
and the
Party Rectification 1Vtovement
I:.IV.~'R tQI?UC TION
Y, 4n: 2.?:.L'.ebruary a:nd 12 Marc'a 1857 Mao T.se-tong delivered
speeches de:alin,g with; rr'I'he Correct dandling of Co.ntradictir~ns within:
th:e' Ranks of the..~'eople, r' -which .set off ,a Cemrn-unist Party wide
"rectification of wt~rking style'! and anation--wide movemex~.t of criti-
cism and countex-criticism, chiefly by officers: of mass. or front
oxg;anizations and by leaders of non-Communist political. parties.
2. From then. urzt,il 1$ .Tune 1957 Maass speeches remained un~
published, .but Maces. views.. became available in the form of discussions.
of the issues; in Peoples .LAa;il~, in speeches by various high Party
functi?naries, anal. in ;ace~ounts" of Mao~s. speech: and of his.- thoughts. a~
publishe+ct by Polish G.omxa~unis"ts. rho visited China in March.
3< C,3n l8 J'ux.~e 1957 the New China News .Eigency printeS the
official version of the speech, which it said had been edited by Ivlaoo
4. attached is an analysis of Mao~s thinking, ~~ its. Chinese
hi.s.torical context, and of its.. rel~:tion t.o pr.eviaus a.nd current Marxist-~
L,enini.st theory, with. pa.rt.icu~ar? reference to t1 :e much-mooted sug"ges-.
bons: that Ms..a?.s ,sp:eech is. an ideological innovation or shows adevelop-
ing fissure between:. the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties. 1~Teither
~a.ppea.rs to be truep ~'1'hat M,ao criticized the. use mf Soviet troops- for
suppression of th.e Hnn,gaxian revolt i s also untrue. Mai. has- cons.is-
ter~t~.y,~ supported this. a.ctican.) T'he paper .doses: w~.th comxnent.s on the
in~h:exent limitations: on applic..aton of Mao~s May 1956 slogan. 'Let tine
.Hundred Flowers. Bloom, Let All Schools of Tla:ought Contend, 's and
of other s;log;ans now being widely disseminated in China.
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5. The attached analysis ~s completed just gri~r to publication
of the speech and is based on the sources mentioned above. E~camina-
ti.on of the officia.]. June 1$th Yers.ion does. not. change any of the. major
points, of the ps,per, though it;~9.s clear that Maoks revisions, in;s.ertions:,
and. omissions changed the tome conB.iderably~
~:. Tha emphasis of the first version is believed. to have
been that. counterrevolutionaries were for all intents: and
purposes eliminated, and peaceful. methods. properly u.a,ed
to~ suppress them ,are therefore no longer apprapriate.
The ~~ine 18th ver+aion puts much emphasis on tkie continued
presence of counterrevolutionaries supported by further
diacoverie~ by the controlled press. of plots from early
June on) and on th.e suppreas:ive duty of Mao's "Peopl,ets.
Ilernocratic I3ictatorship,1P
b. The tone- of the. original was. appaxentl.Y designed. to
stifle critics. of tt~e "Hundred glowers.?~Hundred Schools"
slogan and en~co~u,:ramie open criticism of communist Party
cadres, In the June version criteria were laid dovvxi to
limit the extent o.E allowable criticism.
c. The eventual triumph of Marxisin~Leninism was an
element cif the. first speech, but it was. emphasized much.
more in the ,~'aar~:e version that intell.eetuals must acquire
a T'Ivlarxist.Leni:riist world outl.oakt` ox find themselves
in a bl ~.d alley.
d, Exs.rnples of student ,strikes" snd unrest were omitted
from the official revised verai.on.
e. Mao in the ;J`L~ne T8th version doses not streets, as he
apparently did in the original speech. the existence of
contradicts?ns. bertween the masses. and. the leaders.
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f. Blunt criticisms of the failures. of CP ~Iungary to
control the populs.tion of Hungary (bef.ore t3ctober I95b)
were soft-pedaled in the June. version.
g. The s.arne applies to critici ms of Soviet restrictions
on freedom of expression in the arts ,and to St ,aliri's re~-
liance on secret polie:e. This is in line with the Chinese
preference for ,avoiding public discussion of differences
in the C?xnmunist world.
6. In general, the ,Tune 18th version .of Mao's speech sounded
more like :a warning against :excessive criticism than had the original
which encouraged it. The change of tone was :appar.ently a r.eacti.on
to the articulate public criticism of the dominant role of the CCP by
non-Communist political. leaders., which. caused the People's Uaily
on 8-12 June to lash .out ,a.gain t "deetruetive criticism" whlich. went
beyond the bounds of the criteria. Mao gave far allowable criticism...
Mao may also have wished to avoid embarrassing .satellite govern~-
ment.s, such .as. the Czechs. ,and.. East G:ermans., who are vulnerable
to attack for more repress:_ive policies.
7. The "destructive criticism's to which the Party objected was;
made at M.ay and June meetings of non-Communist political leaders
convened by the CG.P as. a direct result of M.a:o:'s call for such criti~-
cism of Party cadres, 1`Ton-communists criticized not only bureau-
eratic habite on the part .of Communist Party officeholders (criti-
clam which Mao considers: desirable and necessary) but also .such
sacred tenets as the right of the Party to rule China, fJne speake.x
.said the people want to kill. the. Communists. Another said bureau-
cratism in China today is ,a worse evil than the capitalist system.
As the result of the expression of these serious doubts. as to the
1:'arty}s; leading role in the Mate, the Party laundled. a barrage of
''counter-criticisms' against its- critics,
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8. Whether the original criticism of the Party had gotten out
of hand or was the part of an elaborate Communist Party plan to smoke
out dissent is not known. Cn the one hand, the People's Daily in June
and July and the Chief of the Party Fropaganda Department on 11 .July
said that "rightists" had "taken advantage" of Mao's campaign of
criticism and. self-criticism to stir up trouble for their own benefit.
tan the other hand, PeoPle's Dai.~on 1 July claimed that the Party
had. foreseen these developments and set a trap for the unsuspecting
non-Communist intellectuals:
"The Communist Party foresaw that a class battle be-
tween the bourgeoisie and the proletariat was inevitable.
For atime in order to let the bourgeoisie and the boor-
geois intellectuals. `,wage this battle the press published
few or no affirmative views ... the reason was to enable
the masses to distinguish clearly those whose criticism
was well-intentioned from those with ill intentions behind
their so-called criticism. In this way the forces for an
opportune counterbaow amassed strength. Some people
call this scheming. But we say it was quite open. We
told the enemy in advance that 'before monsters and
serpents' can be wiped out they must first be brought
into the open, -and only by letting the poisonous weeds
show themselves above ground can they be uprooted. "
9. ` In the course of the "counter-criticism, " by the Party, those
who had criticized the Party bE;yond the permitted bounds were com-
pelled to publicly disavow theia- errors and recant. What punishment
is to be meted out, however,- h.as not been specified, and none of the
critics, some- of whom are Cabinet Ministers, have as yet l.vst their
jobs. Nevertheless, the Party has not proved easy to satisfy in these
public self-criticisms. After they had continued almost a month, the
Party's Propaganda Chief, in a major address to the National Peoples
Congress on 11 July., added the serious charge that the "rightists" had
aimed to "seize leadership in 1-,he whole country" and instigate "a
4
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counter-revolutionary dictatorship. " At the same time the .Party
indicated it was not satisfied with recantations. to date. A Peo}ale's
Daily editorial on 10 3uly accused the "rightists" of organizing a new
tra.tegy in the face of disc-Query of their "~s.ubversive activities against
the people. and plotting to dethrone the peoples regime, " in ,an attempt
to "rid thexnaelves of future difficulties. ~' The alleged "new strate-
gies-" are said to include "cunning and ambiguous confessions, alliance
with one another_f for both. defense and offense, putting the blame
on others' shoulders, pretending to be sick, hiding and desperate
resistance." The editorial ominously warns that such strategies will
be detected and cannot prevent the. necessity for "rightists" to "shed
their mistakes.,'' while at the same time warning the "rightists." if
they stubbornly do not "shed their difficulties, " the '~people!'::will be
ani;~r and "discard them.''
10. No matter what their ultimate punishment, it is clear that
the. critics of the Communist Party in China today cannot expect .an
easy time, in spite of slogans to "Let all flowers bloom and .all schools.
of thought contend.
c z- ~, ,-,
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MAC}-rS GUFtRENT T'HF.~ES f)N CC'~SdTR,A.J?~CTI4~N .A,~i.I~ THE
CHEIV~r F~N~ .dP'A,R TY I~ EE`t)RM Mt~'VFME~'I?}
SUMM,ARY'~
1. The- curent Cheng F`eng (:Party Reform Movement), set in
motion by Maa~.s February and Mareh speeches:, is a reflection of
IvI,a.Q~s app~ehens icon. over possible failure cf the ~ecand Five-Year
I''lan Q1958~-.1962)? CC.P` popularity may b.e seve.r.eTy tested in the
caxxrse of selling and implemenxing the Plan.
2. Pacing China.~& demography (a population. of bOCI, QOM, QOaj
and tlge relatively sma11 size of the. CCP, Ma+~ ie c?neerned. with
passikil~a mass:. pressure.a on the. regime, pa:rticulaxly in the light of
the "Hungarian: tragedy' during which ~P Hungary disintegrated
rapidly. (ln the now av~.ilable text Iviao admits: anti-regime-
ferrnent~a.tan, especially preference for Western democracy,
appeared in. China in the Wake of Hungarian. events. )
3. Mao~s recent theses on contradictcns are consistent with.
his. traditional attempts. to combine implementation of Ms:rxisrn-
Leninism with proper consideration o#:.~ ~'hinese re,a:lities. His
p+c~s.ition as "independenx'' interpreter of the Bol~shevilt Bible hoe.
beer.;acknowl:edg.ed by Stalin and the I~hrushchev regirrre. (The no'W
available text should be fully acceptable to the .Soviets...)
~. The theses. that non~anta.gonis;tic contradictions exi.at in a
'rSo.cialist~a scsciety are na innovations or revisions of lviaxxism-
Leninism. In essence they acknowledge the fa.c;t that classes have
This is the sumxnary of s.n analysis prepared prior to the- publicaw
tion of IVtao~s speech. X18 Junej. Certain. observations: b,as:ed on
study of the incomplete text available ha:.ve been added in parenthe..s;es.
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not been completely eradicated and that ~'socialism't will not be able,
for a long time, to satisfy fully the needs. of the people. This
situation creates. potential conflict.? The theses dramatize the
possibility that ,such conflicts ma.y explode, and alert the entire
Party apparatus. not to aggravate the situation which may result
from anticipated economic and cultural frustrations of the people.
Fully endorsing the use of repre~asion internally when. necessary,
Mao plays. up the "persuasive aspects" of the dictatorship as a
preventive-defensive measure.
5. Mao's. dramatization of the alleged "liberality" of a Gom-
munist regime may become a shcawpiece of Communist propaganda.
It fits surprisingly well. into the design. of the renewed Soviet line
for peaceful coexistence and coincides with the- international line.
In view of Hungary the Soviets are in no position to dramatize the
issue themselves and may appre.riate the general propagandistic
be~.efits of Mao's: theses- for which there are ideological. precedents
in their own theoretical writings.. Nevertheless, there should be
Soviet sensitivity on the point of :Leadership,
6. No uniform acceptance- or assimilation of Maots theses
should be expected in the Bloc since this v~?uld conflict with. the
prevailing propaganda pattern of tactical independence of Communist
Parties. Limited assimilation iri order to absorb fermentation pro-
c.esses is already indicated. in the; attitude of CP Czechoslovakia.
7. Assimilation in the' Bloc is facilitated by the limitations.
inherent in Maoas approach:
a. No dilution of Marxism-Leninism..
b. Right to criticize confined. to units: already controlled
by CCP.
~'~estructiveT' ~i, e. uncontrolled} criticism not permitted.
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d. lntehectuala to be brought under strict Party control.
e. !Weeds'' permitted in order to expose "enemy's:"
propaganda axicl aims.
f, Reliance on .and eventual use of.force internally in-
dixectly acknowledged in concept that "nom,antagonistic con-
tradictions" may blow up.
g, Evaluation of an `=antagonism'', i. e. threat to the
regime, remains arbitrary,
(,The now available text further spells. out the limitations of Mao's
"liberal" or ''democratic" :approach. He. does not eliminate the
repxess.ive aspects of the dictatorship but combines them with the
preventive measures of Party controlled persuasion, discussion,
and education,
8, The vulnerabilities of Mao:'s. theses stem: from the fact that
the Party must explain to the "peoples'.th.e hard facts of Chinese
economic troubles..
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NLAO~S CUR13E1VT 'T`HESES OZ~]" ~ONx'I~AT)rCT~+fJN AN.D 'SHE
CHEIVG FENS ~FARTY REFAIt~i IvI~JVEMEN7')
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MAC)~S~ CURRAN'T` 'THESHS. C9N CCNTRA~ICTI4N ANT) THE
CHENG FEN~Z (PARTY 12EE`~+RM MpVEMENT}
1. Three times., at c.rucis.l turning- points: in the development
of the Communist Party of China, Mao; T.se=tong has. put Party and
non-Party cadre through. an. intensive ids?logical indoctrination
pra-gram in order to enforce a unified l.eader,s:hip approach to the
ta;ek ah.ea.d.
2. The first and most intensive of these programs (Cheng
Feng .o.r Party Reform Movement} which 1a:sted from 1942 to about
1944 consolidated the Chinese :Communist Party as well as: IVlaors
leading position ,and readied the leadersh ip corps. for the poet--war
showdown with the Kuomintang. The second--;and less known:--
Cheng Feng (Three Seasons: Reform) w~a:s initiated in the summer of
195Q following the consolidation of state power in 1949 and ,appears..
to have been geared to the ensuing class struggle period which
culminated. in 1955-56 with. the drastic and rapid eommuniz.ation of
Chinas. agricultural and industrial base.
3. The. cuxrent Cheng Feng, which wad s.et in motion by Maots.
r-sport to the Supreme State Conference {27 February to 1 March. 1957)
and his 12 M,arela speech to the National Conference of Propaganda
V~ork, can readily be linked with the emerging Second Five-Yeas
Plan. which is to run.. from 1958 to 1962. I-Teld against the background
of the disle-catians .and di.sss:tisfaGtion.s; erea.ted by the rapid.
communization. program of 1.955 and 1956, success or failure of the
Second Five.-Year- Flan could well determine the future. course of
:events. within China. A note- of apprehension is: discernible in the
7 June announcement of the ?lNational Canferexiee of 1]e sign" at
which the guiding principles. of the Second. Five--Year Plan-:were
discussed. According to, a New York Tixia:es: dispatch from Hong
Kong, 7 June, 'the announcement said. that the factors that guided
the principles of the Second .~`ive-Year Plan were the. realiza:tivxl
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that China was sttll a big agricultural country with a meager
industrial. foundation; that it had a huge (600, 000, 000) population
with a low living standard and. that its economy and cultural develop-
ment was uneven." Thus, a period beset with many knotty pxoblems
is seen ahead for China. The cL~rrent Party Reform: Movement is an
.alert to the entire Communist Party of China. as well .as its govern-
mental .auxiliaries: and fronts., that its leadership and popularity will
be severely tested in its: efforts to sell and. implement the Second
Five-Year Plan.
4. What is. Mao's. fundam?:ntal .approach to the leadership
problem? Mao's thoughts have r_learly .emerged in a variety of
CCP' pronouncements and in a su~.mmary of his remarks, including
textual excerpts., acquired and published by the Nevcw York Times.
Warsaw correspondent, Sidney Ciruson (see New York Times; 13 June).*
These are sufficiently broad in scope to show that Mao~s. position
today is remarkably consistent vrith those propounded openly in years.
past. ("On Contradiction", 1937; keynote addresses. in the First
Chang Feng Movement, 1942;. Report to the Third Plenum of the Central
Committee, June 1950; CCP statement "More. on the Historical
Experience of the Dictatorship o:E the Proletariat" of 28 December 1956;
etc.}
Mao posed the problem. sharply in his February 1942. Chang
Feng speech when he asked "How can Marxist-Leninist theory .and the
reality of the Chinese Revolution be united,?" The body of thought
called j'Maoism'{ is but the sum ?total of answers to this. simple ques ion.
Hence, it is no .accident that the common theme of all three Party
Reform Movements: is an attack +an "subjectivism", which is Party
jargon for insufficient recognition of, and inadequate tactical adjus -
ment to Chinese reality.. "S.ubjectivism't among the leadership i,s
the root of other harmful attitudes,, e. g.: "dogmatism' and ~~doctri-
nairism'+, i, e. mechanical application of Marxist-Bolshevik doctrine;
And in the official version. of his speech, published 18 June 1957..
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'rf~srmalism", i. e, reliance on Party jargon in propaganda;
t's:ectarianism", i, e. counterproductive friction within the Party o_r
between. the Party ,and the ~'outsidex'; r'bureaucxatfsm, commandism",
witch are subjectivisrntn administrative and executive management,
i, e. the attitude based on the: erroneous. notion that reality is, changed
by ~.s,suing orders,
In the February 192 speech cited, Mao seems to :express the
practical reason for h.is abhorrence of ,subjectivism: the demography
of. China.. ~isuali~ing an eventual Party strength of about 4, 000,.000,
he pointed. oust .that the Party would, at best, rrrpresent only one per
cent -out of. a population. of. 400, 000, 000, and therefore could_.not afford.
to:.a;ntagoni~:e. the people unnecessarily, Today the Chinese Pa.xty
claims about 1~, 000, 000 members out of a. claimed population strength.
of 60po 000, 000. Th.e Party, then, represents even now only two per
cent of the total.. population.
Anao's, conc:e~n with China.'s demography is also evident in his
recent speeches. Introducing the concept of birth control-~-.in it.aelf a
staggering inriovs.tpon in the. social .and cult~xr~,l pattern of Chinas--he
cites the. inadec~~a.acy of agricultural production. in feeding a ,growing
population, as wel as the lirr~:itations: of primary .educational fa.clities..
If, ab appears. indicated, the Second F'ive~Year Plan may not.
live up to expectations, Maa~'.s concern with. possible mass pressures
on the regime is understandable-particularly in the. light of the events
in Hungary; 'I'he "Hr~.ngarian tragedy" (as: Mao terms.. it} :emerges.
clearly as the imxnedat.e cause for Mao~& current ideological .and.
practical deliberations, stemming from c.ancern not only over the.
popular uprising but ,also over the: rapid disintegration o.f CP Hungary.
5, Nlao~s i.s. the approach of ,an eminently pra_ctic.al, self-made
revolutionary who deals. with specific situations. and. people-rand
accepts formulae only when and if t3zey apply. Lest it be: misinterpr,et.ed
;as .a. dispositin~n: toward bres:king away from the. Soviet Union, it must
'..3
S . _- ~ _
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be emphasized that the principle of "unity of theory and practice" is a
standard tenet of Marxism-Leninism and was one of Malin's pet
phrases. Students of Mao1s thau.ght have repeatedly reported their
inability to find any trace of conc:eptu;al heterodoxya Tn particular were
they unable to discern any deviationism in the Party indoctrination
material issued during the first ~Gheng Feng X1942) which i the model
for the current Farty 'rectification" campaign Neither can there be
found any deviations. from. fundamental Bolshevik thought in the
available xn.aterials on Maors speeches and the current Cheng Feng,
What is evident currently, as it was in 1942, is Mao~s insistence upon
expressing and unfolding the Marxist-Bolshevik principle of the
dictatorship of the proletariat in terms of Chinese reality,
In 1942.. the first Cheng 1~ eng was accompanied by the demotion
and loss of influence of a small group of Moscow-trained Chinese
Communist leaders who had held key positions in the Central
Committee of the CGP, on the grounds. of their inability to adapt
Moscow-taught Marxism-Leninism to Chinas specific conditionso
Today too much is. made of the w?orthodoxy of Maof s thesis on
"Contradictions. within the Ranks of the People", particularly as an
indication of a Sino-Soviet ideological rift. Mao as an interpreter of
the Bolshevik Bible has always. insisted. that he needs no middle man in
matters Chinese, Stalin acknowledged this: position through the 1950
Sino-Soviet treaty and the ~hru,shchev regime consistently enhanced
the prestige .of the CCF.
6~' Mao#s thesis that there continue to exist in a "Socialist"
society a variety of non-antagonistic. contradictions is based on Marx
.and. Lenin, and has even been acknowledged by Stalin and other Soviet
leaders and theoreticians,. Mao first expounded this thesis in his essay
"Qn Contradictions', written in 1937). In plain. language Mao's position
can be summarized as follows l:n order to achieve power the
Communist Party must use force to crush the class. enemy and
establish a dictatorship. of the proletariat, io ee solve the ":antagonistic
contradictions" of the class. stru?;gle, After the Communist Farty ha.s
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achieved. full state and ecenomic control, there is; theor.etic~lly
speaking, no more cTa~'s ce~nfliet, .since classes have. been abolished.
The "class enemy" i.s navr mainly represented by the external threat
from the imperialists. Never$helesa:, internally there- still may
develap. socio-economic-political conflicts, problems and pressures.
Since there are no_ m;ore: hQ:sttle classes, these. conflicts:, pxoblems.
and pressures s:re theoretically speaking "non~antagoni,stic .eontradic-
bons'', i. e. capable of solution by means :other 'than force, principally
by persuasion, discuss ion, and education, If not correctly handled,
however, these cc~ntradic$ions may become ".antagonistic.", i, e.
threaten the power p.o,stic~n of. the regime as they did- in Hungary,
necessitating the- use of force. Through h.is thesis, then, Mao
addresses himself in greater detail. than any other Coxn.munist theore~
titian to a. fundamental, p:ractic.a:l propo:sftio~, i. e. under what circum,-
stances.. the 'dictatorship of ~:e proletariat".should bring into. play $t;s
repres..sve forces inte.rnallyy It needs. to be emphasized that Mao does.
not nov~rand nevex has repudiated the use of force or terror per se.
Concerning the us:e of force against the ''ge~terna.l. enemy" Mao ha_s. never
expressed ,any modifying or qualifying pos bons. Concerning the use
of f~a:rce anternally his current positions. do, not question. the- principle,
but merely the usefulness and. productivity of terror under certain
circumstances. In this: Mao: is no innavatora He merely follows
ovsrt Iola.rxi.s.t-L:eniniat-~talirz.ist doctrine ~,a.Ithough not utalni,st
practice) -when he attempts to establish a balance- between the coercive:
and. the. paternalistic aspects of the dictatorship .of the grol:eta:riat.
'The- following statement from ,~. report by A.. AA. Z.hdanov to the Plenum
of the Central committee of the Communist F.arty of the Soviet Union,
21 February 1937, i].Iustrates the- point. Zhdanov said;
"Leninism:: teacheSe ~'he dictatorship of the proletariat has.
its: periods, its. special forms: and diversified. methods. of
work. ~i.ring the. civil. war, the. c'Q.ercive aspect of the
dictatorship is, especially co:nsp,icuous. , .. 4n th.e other
hand, during the period of :socalist construction, the- peace-~
fut. oxganizational and cultur:~a woxk of the- dietato:rship,
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revolutionary law,- etc, , are especially conspicuouso
But here again it by no means follows. that during the
period of construction, the coercive side of the dietator-
s.hip has. fallen away, or could do so... , The organs of
suppression, the army and other organizations are as
necessary now, in th,e period of construction, as they
were during the civil. war period, , o .'~
The Stalinist regime paid Iip service to the paternalistic aspects of
the dictatorship but perpetuated the terror systemo Ma.o, ,although
emphasizing the "peacefultc and persuasive aspect of the dictatorship
fox the time being, disguises. by this very emphasis the fact that the
j'organs of suppression'' in China eantinue to exis with their functions
unchanged. Nox could. Mao afford. to let "the coercive side of the
dictatorship" "fall away" since by definition his- thesis. admits that
"non-antagonistic contradictions"' may become ~`antagonistic1? if not
properly handled, Given the press. of the huge population mass of
Chinese, the low level of econorriic and educational development, the
realization that the Second Five~Year Plan may carry social-economic
progress Only too small a step fe~rward, 1Vlaots defensive use of ,the
persuasive aspects of the dictatorship represents valid Communist
tactics, and "orthodox" at that.
7o The defensive or preventive nature of Mao~s. thought, under-
lying his ernpha is. on ztpersuasion", "correct handling of contradtc-
tions", anal. the Cheng Feng Party training program, emerges also from.
a recent Peking broadcast (zb April 1957) on 1f~hy .axe there contradic-
tions. within the ranks. of the people?r' which unmistakably reflects. Ma.o~s
positiono The broadcast answered the title question thuso "First of
all we must understand that the main contradictions /emphasis
supplied/ in our country now are: the contradictions between the
p:eople's desire to build an advancedindustrial nation, and the reality of
,a backward agricultural nation, between the ~eoPle~s demand for rapid
economic and cultural~rowth and the present economic and cultural
conditions. that thwart. their dema.ndo" f Emphasis s,upplied~/
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,Anticipating continued frustration of 'jthe pe.ople:~,s. demandF~ M,ao
en,~oins his. Fartyapparatu.s, especially through the Gheng F`.eng
campaign,. not to aggravate the situation unnecessarily by "bur,eau-~
cratic'~ working methods' since the long-term plans of the regime and,
the sport-term desires .and ~:.spirations of the: r~people~{ may conflict.
This, in .essence:, is: th:e. mea~,ing of the maoi;sm which reads. that
arat present the contradictions between the ma,sse:s of our country and
the leaders result mainly from. bureaucratic leadership in work. zs
Iix short, if. anything goes; wrong (i. e, if non-~a..ntagonistic contradic-
bons. become antagonistic) the Party apparatus will bear the blame
but not 1VIac~.
8, Khxushchev~s. negative reply to the question an the 1 June GB;S
television interview ~~wliether these. contradi::ctons f i. e. between the
leaders and the masses/ do not exist in the Soviet Union today" raises
the question o'f the: impact and applicability of Mao!~s theses in the Soviet
Union and. Eastern Europe,
It is submitted tl~.at the soviets have no reason fox rejecting
the substance, and every reason for accepting the positive propaganda
value of Mao's these .. The timing and propaganda content of the Mao
speeches, with their conspicuous emphasis on the r'liberality" of a
Communist regime, fit surprisingly well into the- design, of the renewed
Soviet'Ppeaceful caexistencet' drive through which they apparently hope
to. compensate for their loss: of prestige :suffered as a .result of the
crisis: ?x~ 1956, The Soviets. could hardly afford to dramatize the
'respectability?'' of the Communist system at this: time, both in view of
their previous bungling {secret E~hrushchev speech) and. in view of their
intervention in Hungary. If n.ot actually co-ordinated with the Soviets,
Mao~s February and March speeches: are fully compatible with. current
Soviet tactics .and may be.corne an important showpiece of Communist
propaganda, especially in underdeveloped areas... Even the minor
disagreements between Moors and Soviet positions as well as Mao~s
minor criticisms of the Soviet regime represent attitudes fully com-
patible with. the. current international Gomxnunis.t party line. The
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latter has. been most clearly expressed by the veteran. GPUSA leader,
William Z. Foster (Daily Worker;, 12 .June) who is a "conservative"
Communist and still enjoys. Soviet trust, This is his. formula
"For a less dogmatic approach to applying and developing
Marxism-Len.inisrn,
for a more critical attitude towards. other Communist Parties
and the countries of socialism,
and for- an all out struggle- against bureaucracy."
Mao~s speeches meet all three requirements.. The built-in proviso
that the Chinese method of "solving problems" does. "not apply to
every other country" also agrees with the general formula developed
during last years ideological crises, i, e, provided Soviet experience
serves as a fundamental model, local variations in implementation
are permissible although they are not binding on other Communist
parties ox regimes..
Indirectly, therefore, Mao~s speeches offset the harsh effects:
of the Soviet line. against T'national~_ Communism" which was developed
under the impact of last year's ideological and disciplinary crisis,
"Internationai solidarityt' has been largely restored and factionalism.
in the world movement is subsiding. A limited ideological. rapprochee
went with Tito is j.n the making,
Mao's speeches are a shot in the arm for the abortive
campaign started by the 20th GP~~U Congress to give the Internatiorxal
Communist Movement a new 1?ok of greater decentralization.
Ixi this opinion, therefore;, a uniform. official reaction to
Maors speeches and theses is not to be expected in the Sovlst Bloc.
The extent of official endorsemenl; or assimilation will depend entirely
on the correlation between fermentation processes and the regime ~a
ability to control them, Gomulka, for example, would have to contain
Mao's views if they were used by the- radical liberals to exert pressure
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on the regime. The Kadar government, faced -with the need for over-
coming large scale disaffection, may yet make- controlled use' . of the
Chinese method.
A resolution of the CC of CP Czechoslovakia of 13-14 June on
Ideological. activity of the Party and measures aimed at raising its
standards, emphasizes. the-need for "criticism of shortcomings in our
society', and .sts.tes: that x!any form of sectarian narrowing of the
front of our literature anal art... is alien to our Party. ~' At the same,
time- the resolution takes a firm stand against t"revisionismr' and for
"prolets;rian inter.~r.tionali.sm''r and promises: that the Party "will exert
every effort to s.ee that all. iri~e.ll~ectuals :accept the 1Viarxi:st wa_r1d
outl?ok, .. , x' This. res.olutian. appears to be a typically Czech modifies,-
tion of the- Lao theses i< e. ,a minim~xrn of "liberaliz.atont' combined
-with. a maximum of controls...
The Soviets, in addition. t:o appreciating the general benefits
from Mao:rs dramati,~ation of the alleged respectability and liberality
of the Cosnrnunist system, should. also be able to .appreci.at.e the
''ortl~a.adoxy~' of. Sao in view of sufficient parallels and precedents in
them sawn: theoretical writings.' The batter, ho~rever, are distinctly
'~ Precedents, past ,and present, are numerous. In 1946, an obscure
Soviet .student of philosophy, Tsolak Aleks.androvich Stepanyan (in th.e
Young: BoyshevikA fiTo. 3--4, June-July 1946), postulated a contradietian
in the USSE~ "between th growth of public demand.. , ,and the relatively
unsa.tisf,actoxy level of the continually growing .material production,"
and predicted that this contradictian would continue to exist under
Coxnx~.unism. This formulatlor~ be,a.rs a striking resemblance to what
M;ao now postulates a.s China's main contradiction.
In 1947 A. A. ~h;da:no~r, Stalin's propaganda chief and Malenkav~,s.
competitor, launched a campaign. for the solution. of non-.antagonistic
contradictions through criticism and self-criticism. Z.hdano:v~s death
in 1948 appears t? have halted this. campaign.. In 1954, however, his
thesis was revived, and ,Soviet theoreticians: have dealt with. the ,solution
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inferior in quality and depth, a fact which permits M,ao and the
Chinese Party to point out, with some justification, that in M.ao:?s
writings. Marxism-Leninism is being "creatively developed." Cane
could easily imagine that the Soviet leaders, while praising the Chinese
for their original ideas, could administer a severs' dressing down to
their own theoreticians and propagandists for their inability to produce
"creative" think-pieces.. With all their emphasia on international
decentralization, the Soviets. still are sensitive on points:,of leadership.
This may be the reason for Khrushchev's almos automatic rejection of
the idea that in the USSR. conflict;s exist between the leaders. and the
masses.
In general, however, the. Soviets should be satisfied with the
limitations. which Mao built into his concepts on how to handle potential.
conflicts in a "socialist" society. These limitations, less conspicuous
than the propagandisaic emphasis. on "persuasion?i .and'~democracy",
are brief 7:y discussed below.
1?. The limitations imposed by Mao. on the ,applicability of
his theses to other areas. are paralleled by the limitations inherent
in hie speeches as well as in the current Cheng Feng in respect to
their domestic application,
of non-antagonistic contradictions, admitting conflicts. between social
groups, .and more recently ~Kommunist, No. 5, April 1957) conflicts
within the Party. Pravda.. (26 December 1956) criticized the Soviet
journal ~2uestions of Philosophy for inadequate study of "real" or
?'concrete" contradictions. Although a detailed comparative study of
Soviet and Chinese treatment of this. ideological problem is not avail-
able at this writing, no Soviet reference admitting a conflict between
"the leaders and the masses'" has become evident, although, of course,
Soviet attacks.. on bureaucracy in leadera.hip .and on attitudes. isolating
the Party from the masses have been standard themes.
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These limitations are;
a. Ma:o~s: thes:e.s. a.nd the Chong Feng are preventive in
nature;
b. The preventive objectives re quire a stronger CGP
both in teams. of ideological purity and oxganizatianal control,
c, The use of terror o:r r.epressive measures i.s govexned
by the success: or failure of preventive measures,
11. Th.e purpose of the current Chong Feng is to ensure that the
Communist ~'axty be so oriented and deployed as t.o prevent "non-
ants,gonistc contradictions'! from ksecoming unmanageahl:e and
explosive, Hence the far-reaching categorization and definition of ,all
"problems", Large .anal .ama11., as if by identification alone a solution
could be achieved; the fixing of responsibility fo:r the solution of the
problems on the entire- Party apparatus; the exhortations. warning
;against "bureaucratieis.m?' ,a.nd'~subjectivtsm~'.
fJn the other hand, the current. Chong Feng is not to dilute
Marxism-i.eninism. Hence the proposed fu.rth.e.r tightening of
ideological and org:antzational discipline:, and th.e-particular emphasis
an.the education of in$ellectual.s in'~Party spirit'#, i. e. traditional
Marxism-Leninism ;as oppos.e.d to. txliberalis_m,. ~'
12. Mao's concept of pexsuasion is the persuasion of the "masses"
by the Fa.rty .anal. not persuasion of the Party by the masses. Criticism
is therefore limited.
Urganiz.;ationally i.t appears from. pertinent references that
the. right of the masses to criticize pertains only t.o the CommunistL
controlled "units't or organizations (polit.ica.l, semi-governmental,
agricultural. cooperatives, etc, }which vrere created during the pBriod
of cornmuniza:tion_ (1.955,1956}. This form of o:rganiz,a.tionally cont.ralled
ll
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criticisrr~and self-criticism keeps discussion in channels.
Substantively criticisrr~ must be !'constructive", i. e. com-~
patible with general CCF programs. and policies. As early as June8-=
tXiree months. after the Cheng F'eng campaign was. launc hid ~=the: Peking
People's Daily found it neces.sa~ry to put the brs.kes on "crit~.cism
of a destructive nature." Using language reminiscent of that previously
used at the time of intense and coercive drives against counter-
revolutionaries, the party organ Saida
"There are persons. who ;are trying to u,se the Cheng Feng
movement of the- CC:P as a means to carry out severe class
struggles... o . Although the large scale class struggle in our
country has largely subsided, it is by no means finished,
This is particularly true on the- ideological front / i. e. where
it really matters/ .... There are a very small numbex of
people who have oui:wardly expressed support to socialism
but .are still secret]Ly longing fox capitalism anal the type of
political life in Europe and the United States. These persons
form the right-wing groups. today."
The next day Peo lime's. I)~aily made it crystal clear that the
Forty cannot afford indiscrimir~a.tely toiegard all criticism as. helpful.
and beneficial to the people. W'lhile the editorial says. ":all views. and
opinions beneficial to the socialist undertaking should'bloom~ in full, ri
it characterizes. as. 1iof a destructive nature" all criticism which'{aims
at undermining the socialist undertakings, the Feoplees Democratic
#lictatorshig and the unity between the Party and the people, " Singled
out for attack are "those who. publicize the view that the leadership
exercised by the Communist Party should be abolished.''
It is significant that the news organ. of the. Polish CP, Trybuna
Ludu, published .on 13 June a report of -its Peking correspondent on
these People's Daily articles.
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13. Z'he indoctrination of intellectuals fon~ri;s an effective
limitation on this. applic:atic~n of the rnuehapublicized slogan "Let all
flow.erB bloom, let all s~ch.ools of thought contend,'' As the P"re,sident
of the Chinese .Academy of Sciences. put it on 16 May 1857, it was only
thanks- to: T''the movement of ideological. reeducation carried out in
recent ye:ar:s. in Ch:ix~a." sat the "hundred_sehool.s. of thought" move-went
~s possible now, anal 't the free debates. f :~t~wl taking place among the
intellectuals: aim at bringing the professors anal. scientists of China
.still. elos.er to the Party a:nd ;at .improving the. Partyks direction,
~'hi~ is the 1957 ech? of Mao's theme of the. 194-44 Cheng
F'eng m;ov?rxients ''There is in reality no .such thing as art fox arts
Bake.. , . 'T`he Partyrs. ,artls.tic and literary activity occupies a definite
and aas.igned position.. in the Partyrs revolutionary work -anal ins. s;ubor-~
dina.ted to tlge pr.es.cribed revolutionary task of the Party in. a given
revolutionary peridd," Mao himself, in the. version of his: s.peeche,s
reported by Sidney Grus.on, added an rote-resting interpretation t4 th.e
slogan, '?~?Faere heed. be n.o: fear that the policy of 100 flowers. wi11
yieJ.d poisoned fruit. 5~a~ra~etimes. it is necessary .even to have- this:
poisoned fruit tea knovFrrvl~s..t we .axe- fighting against, For this reason,
too, It h~:s been. decided. to publish: the full works' of Chiang tai-shek
,and even .a volume of some of the Voice of .America broadca.sta. It
is no.t .enough to attack reactionariea. We must know exs.ctly what
the reactionaries: want and what they represent. "
?l`he use of provocation as a means. of weeding out '"pois.oned
fruit'' is, of cs~urse, good Bolshevik practice. In full control of
the Party s.pparatns. and. the repre.s s ive state organs., , Mao can well
;afford to say 'rMarx.isrn~Le:ninism is not afraid of criticism .and does
not fes,r di:scuss;iora'? He controls: the machinery to ensure that
Marxism-Leninism will -win. out.
T4. Althougls lvia:.o places conspicuous emphasis on the persuasive
a:sp:ects of the d,t.ctatorsl~.ip at this stage, he endorses without
13
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qualifications the "use of force against the enemy".'x His.. criticism
of Stalin parallels the position. of the 20th CPSU Congress. anal
Khrushchev's secret speech according to which Stalin need force
unproductively, .especially against the- Communist Party.
J_f it~, is accepted that oxxe of the most important of Mao%rs
concepts. of the dictatoxship is t.o establish a corxect balance between
its. persuasive anal repressive aspects, the question arises as to when
Mao would consider the use- of terror justified, fJn the basis of the
avs:ilable materials. on Mao's February and Mareh speeches, the
answer is obviously that Mao would use repression and terror inter
na11y whenever the power position of the regime w:as threatened. This
is evident from. his renewed endorsement of SovXet intervention in
Hungary and from his. position on strikes. Rejecting .all strikes as
being ('never beneficial to the working class.'#, Mao considers small
strikes as useful symptoms of ~~, malady to be cured but does not
c.ansider 'xbig general strikeszr the same way because 'they are
directed against the regimen"
It is interesting to speculate on how big a strike in China
would have to be in order to be considered a threat to the regimen. In
the light of past experience, it is fair t:o assume that the determination
of what constitutes a threat to the regime would be made arbitrarily,
As an example. of how arbitrarily the degree of threat to the
regime can be characterized, it may be useful t.o recall that in
September 192 Lo Jui-Ch'ing, Minister of Public Security, announced
that "through the campaign for suppression of counterrevolutionaries
with fanfare" from 13ecember 1.950 onwards, T'we succeeded basically
in clearing up the remxiant influence of counterrevo~,ution on the
mainland of China, tr
~ Mao admitted the liquidation of 800, 000 counterrevolutionaries
prior to 1954. The figure is open to ques ion; it probably reaches
into: several million, Mao's statement that terror has not been used
since 1954 is also open to question.
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N.everthele~;s, within. etght.een months (February 1954), ]:~iu
,5ha.o-~_chti announced, l.n coxin.ecoon. with a Tarty purge, that the
regime- :and. the rna,sse';s were incxea~ingly threatened by counter-
revolutionarie.s from within, the xationali:z,ation being that '"the more
we advance in our ees~nomic construction, the more vicious. will be .
the s;abc~ts:g.e of enemies at kac~m.e: and. abroad. f''~ The Minister of
Public Security, wha ha:d in. 7.950:_;.announced completion. of the'"ba;sic"'"
suppression a# counterrevolutionaries, in 19'55 blandly explained that
those previc~us.ly ~uppres>e.ed were overt counterr.evoiutionaries. a.nd
that '"un.der~cover"~ counte.rxev?lu.tionaxies were the: target of the
tnten.s iv.e. 19 5 5 drive ,
These $,ee:der;s~ &ta.tern.ents. shove ho~v arbitrarily their
characterization of the. s.itu.ation has. changed. in. th:e past, .and raises.
questions. a.a tca how m,a:ny years; the pr,e.sent policy will last.
The new line. is again that rrth.e remnants of the counter-
revolutirsnarieshave been basically eliminated, "' These are alrno,st
exactly the carne v~ards used by the Minister of Public Security in
1952.. Within two years' he modified his: st~:texnent to a11mw for a new;
bxut~:l counterxevolutioa3ary drive; Thxee months ~.fter the initiation
of the 1957 ~~eng Feng, Pea~1;~~s. Daily ~$-1Z .June. 1957) ominously
painted out that the class..stxuggle continues,' Ca:.ive.n this. pattern of
flexibility e ccantinued us;e of '"per ua~ive~~ a.ap.ec_ts of Ma~ois.rr:,
which. ,are currently being :emphasized, cannot bs projected into- the.
future.
l5. The 1957 Cheng Feng represents Mao':s realization that the
~.hine:se Revolution lass; collided. vrith the ha.r,d re~.lity .and problems:.
~ ~'hi~ formula,tian is .reminiscent of ~ta.lin~.s ~'mi,stakent" concept
that the intensity e~f the el.~:ss:. struggle incre,ase,s, as socialism
presgre~sse:s.
~~ v In tlae 18 ~`une 1957 revised version of his speech, Mao
emph~.:sized that ""the clads: struggle is not entirely over. ""
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of constructive- planning and building at a time when the Soviet Union
.and the Eastern European Satellites are beset with internal political
:economic difficulties. The fundamental weaknes.:ses in Moors
ostensibly realistic and Sinified approach to the leadership problem
appear to be;
a. That no :amount of "bra inwashingr' can change or s.ffect
the '.!xnain~' contradictions "between the people's demand
for rapid economic and cultural growth and the present
economic and cult~xr~l car~d.ti4ns that thwart this. demand."
b. That no amount of free os ostensiby free diseussi.on of
non-~antagonis-tic contradictions and. their reasons can
change the hard facts of China's economy. The price- of
consumer goods is nat. Betermi.ned by ideological con-
s iderati.ons,
c. That an 'runbuzreaucratic" Party leadership may listen
to criticism but i.s not obligated to accept it, Since it still
i.s. bound by ~"democratic centralism", i. e. by policy
decisi.ans of highex Party echelons, it can arbitrarily rem
j.ect and-brand af~ "unconstructive'' any criticism which
conflicts with Party policies ,and programs.
d. -That the. slo?;an "Let many flowers bloom" is watered
down by the. fact that the intellectuals. have been brought
under tight Party discipline through their mass organiza-
tion:~or in government agencies where they work.
e. That th.e slogan of long term coexistence and mutual.
supervision of and by non-Gommuni:st Parties i.s meaning-~
less. since. the non-Gornmunist Parties .ar:e ms:nipulated
by the Communist Party.
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f, ?I`hat the policy of "building the country on industry and
thrift~~ which i;s to be pxopagat,ed is a euphemism for an
austerity program:.
16. A Pravda. repoxt of 9 June {see New Ybrk Tirnes., 1(3 June:,
page 6) illustrates cl:eaxly the. contr.adictian~ inherent. in the Cheng
F"eng campaign. The t;hine,s:e .communist Party is being brainwashed
and retr,aineel in order to ~te~I itself fo-r .a propaganda. job v`rhich. ma.y
yet turn. aut to. be counterproductive. Ac.coxding t~ the New York
Tunes .account, tpP,arty officials: in Sian ~ in Northwest China,j told.
Pravda they h,ad app:o;inted: their best men. a~. prop,agandists to help
the people understand the cantr:adictions that ,aris.e in the. course of
sty:c:ialis.t construet.i.on:s and. to make them .see. more clearly the
wonderful tomorrow of :our homeland h:nd thus c.onsolidat.e the. forc.e.s
of .our people. ~~ Px~:yd;~ also illustrates how the CGP is forced to
deal. with the problems. cif today. According to the: New Yorl? Tixnea
vex,sican ttparty propsg.andi:sts. directly and candidly .an,d in detail. tell
the mas,se~ why consumption of cotton textiles had to be cut, why
p;riee.s went. izp on certain goods, why there' was. a :su.bstan;ti,al ,shortage
of hoursing space, why propaganda to: limit births' had begun. in China,.
,and why queues.. fo;r street cax.s, buses and. in butcher shops. were
still inevitable,
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