BEHIND THE MASK OF UNITY AND INTERNAL PEACE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000700070001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 2, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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BEHIND THE MASK OF "UNITY AND INTERNAL PEACE"
41.1011?MIONNEPON.WOINOWN.P.*M11?11.8%
Do Communist Parties Mean It When They Talk of Abandoning
Violence and Engaging in Peaceful Political Action?
1. Since early 1948 Communist parties in many countries of South-
east Asia have carried on bloody insurrections aimed at the overthrow
of democratically-elected, non-Communist governments and their
replacement by Communist regimes. These governments' programs
for reconstruction and national development have been hampered and
disrupted by the need to concentrate all energies upon the suppression
of rebel violence. The growth of stable and orderly democratic poli-
tical institutions has been checked and the lives and property of the
people placed in constant jeopardy by the Communist determination to win
by armed force the power which they were denied by the votes of the
people.
2. It speaks e11 for the strength and vitality of the young, newly
independent governments in these countries that everywhere the Communist
appeal to force has been defeated. Under the leadership of the late
President Mags:aysay, the Philippine Republic has reduced the Commun-
ist 7:-Iuks to a handful of terrorists hiding out in the jungle. The Govern-
ment of Burma under such leaders as U Nu, U Ba Swe, U Kyaw Nyein
and General Ne Win, has withstood the assaults of Than Tun's Burma
Communist Party insurgents whose once powerful forces are now capable
only of senseless destruction and wanton banditry. In Malaya, while
preparations for independence go forward, cooperation between the
majority of the people and the British authorities has frustrated the
Communist attempt to seize power by violent revolution. In Indochina,
while Communist armed forces have been able to control parts of Viet-
nam. and Laos, they have failed in their major purpose--the overthrow
of the non-Communist governments of South Vietnam and Laos.
3. Now, faced with defeat and failure in their policy of seizing power
through armed struggle, these insurgent Communist parties have
changed their tactics. In Burma, the Philippines, Malaya and Laos
the rebels who not so long ago boasted of military victory and the
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establishment of people's democracies and the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat are now talking about unity and cooperation. They are desper-
ately seeking negotiations which will let them come out of the jungles
and take up the role of legal opposition or loyal coalition partner which
they once rejected and abandoned. All this is, of course, in perfect
harmony with the tactical change of the international Communist line, -
which has had to fade the fact that the policy of Communist expansion
by military action was no longer yielding profits.
4. How much reliance, we may well ask, can be placed in this
alleged change of heart which has been forced upon the Communists
by their military reverses? Do they really mean it? Has the leopard
really changed his spots or has he simply given them a coat of white-
wash? It is a well-known part of Communist doctrine that tactics may
be changed widely in accordance with the situation, but the basic goals
of world revolution and destruction of all rival political systems must
not be and are not lost sight of for one moment. Are we not justified
In suspecting that the new appeal of the Communist parties for unity,
peace and cooperation is nothing more than such a tactical change,
adopted becau e-ewith the temporary failure of violent revolt?it
offers a more promising road to the unchanging Communist goal?
In the Communists own words:
"Lenin taught the Party how to retreat in good order
when the forces of the enemy are ,obviously superior
to ou.r CrMil., in -order tb prepare with the utmost energy
for a new offensive." (fflstor of Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik), p. 219.)
Or, as Pravda put it, as long ago as 1914:
"Marxist tactics consist in connecting different methods
of struggle,, in skilfully shifting from one to another."
(Pravda, April 17, 1914.)
That the long-established Communist principle that Socialism
can come only by violent revolution has not changed, despite current
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talk of united fronts, ceasefires, and purely political action, and that
It is accepted by Asian Communists as well as by Europeans, is
attested by a statement by the Politbureau of the Chinese Communist
Party reported by the Peking Peoplels..]:_22....../..0 on December 29, 1956.
It is part of a restatement of the fundamental principles to which all
Communist parties are expected to adhere:
"The proletariat, under the leadership of the Communist
Party... takes power from the bourgeoisie by means of
revolutionarx struggle."
5. It is clear that the Communist movement has always recog-
nized the desirability of shifting its tactics from armed revolution
to united front and back again in accordance with the situation, but
that it preaches that the final victory must come through armed
struggle. The history of the world in the last few decades is replete
with Illustrations of Communist practice of this theory.
However, we do not havedto rely exclusively upon such basic
Communist theory to support our suspicions of the sincerity of the new
Communist attitude. There is direct evidence that even while insur-
gent Communists are seeking negotiations or actually negotiating with
the governments which they failed to overthrow, they are reiterating
their determination to establish a Communist regime and are planning
for the renewal of the armed revolt whenever the situation becomes
more favorable.
Burma
6, The Burma Communist Party, in insurrection since 1948, has
suffered serious military defeats and has no present hope of military
victory over the Government. Since early 1956 it has been making
proposals and approaches to the Government for negotiations which
would legalize the Party and permit it to engage in legal political action.
In the latter part of 1956 and in 1957, the Burma Communist Party,
besides covert approaches to the government, has made public approaches
through letters to political leaders and manifestoes to the public,
expressing the Communist desire for peace and legality. A public
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manifesto, dated November 29, 1956, included the following state-
ment:
"The Burma Communist Party has always followed a
policy of peace and has placed the People's interest
first. The Burma Communist Party has no interest
other than that of the People. During the year it has
placed the desire of the Sanghas / Buddhist clergy,/
and the People first and has always tried to bring
about negotiations for the ending of the civil war and
the restoration of internal peace. "
Thl.s, from a party which has for nine years been carrying on
a bloody rebellion and is still raiding towns and villages, blowing up
trains, shooting up busses and dynamiting aqueducts, is a little absurd
on its face, but there is further evidence.
7. During a military Operation against the Burma Communist
Party, the Burmese Government captured a Party document. This
document was a transcript of a Party conference at which Th,akth. Than
TIM, Burma Communist Party leader, answered questions on Party
strategy and tactics. The transcript was prepared for the members
of the Party Central Committee. Dated October 25, 1955, this state-
ment of Party principles was intended to make clear to the inner
circle thk real pnen30Set behind the campaign for a: ceasefire, peace,
unity And negotiation. upon which the Party was about to. embark.
Than Tun said:
"The moment we get a ceasefire, we will use our demo-
cretin rights to continue the fight, to add to our strength,
and prepare 'once more for armed struggle. Until the
Civil War eada we will use the method of armed insur-
rection non-atop. There is no question of a coalition
with the Na Government. The final goal of seizing power
must be won through violent methods. There is thus
change in strategy. It is not to form a coalition with the
Nu .Government but to eradicate it. While we are fighting
within the democratic fold, the armed method will have
to be held in abeyance, but the final struggle will be with
weaponst.1?
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The necessity, from the Burma Communist Party point of view,
for this temporary change in strategy, was also explained by Than Tun:
"The decision as to what is the right method will be
reached when we are in a strong position. With mass
support the initiative will then be in our hands. We must
note that at the present time we do not have that advan-
tage. Therefore we must strive after mass support."
This clear statement, in advance, of the real motives and pur-
poses of the Burma Communist Party in seeking legal status and
renouncing civil war, gives the lie to the high-sounding statements
In its public propaganda.
..1\ZALL._a a
8. The Malayan Communist Party, like the Burmese, began a civil
war against the government in 1948--a war which is still going on. Un-
able to face government forces in the field, the Malayan Communist
military activities have consisted principally of acts of terror and
otage from which the villagers and other nOncomba.tants have been
the chief sufferers. Government forces have reduced tb.e strength of
the Malayan. Communist jungle guerrillas to less than 3, 000, a force
completely without hope of overthrowing the government. In this
militarily hopeless situation, the Communists in Malaya, like those
In Burma, have since the beginning of 1956 been making proposals
to the government which include negotiated peace, a ceasefire and
legalization of the Party.
But the Malayan Communist Party, again like the Burmese,
took ains to warn its 'Members in advance co..ticeri:-
flea ' the united front tactic upon which it was about to embark.
The Party paper, Freedone NOW's, in June 1955 reminded the Party
membership:
"As we are all aware, our armed struggle and united
front are two weapons which the Party employs in
scoring victory over the enemy. These two weapo
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inseparable. They react on each other; they impel
each other; And they coordinate with each other. "
Could we ask for a. clearer statement from the Communists
themselves that they regard their new appeal for peaces cooperatim
and the united front simply as a variant in tactics with the goal of
Communist revolution remaining unchanged?
Laos
9. In :LADS, where the Communist Pathet Lao-, with the support
a the Communistia of North Vietnam, has been in insurrection since
1953 and still denies two provinces of the country to the government,
negotiations have been going -on between the Pathet Lao and the govern!.
met for more than two years. Agreem,ents in, principle were signed
by the leaders in August and December of 1956 which would provide
for the integration of the Pathet Lao into the government and army of
Laos and the participation of Pathet Lao leaders im 4 coalition gavern-
rnent Throughput these negotiations the Path:et Lao has professed,
pexceful intentions:, its devotion to n.ational interests and its
innocence of revolutionary a,mbitions. What it is, really planning,
however, wa revealed by the statements of a captured Phet Lao,
officer with high Connections, in the organitation under interrOgatim
by the Laotian authOrities. The Pathet Lao., he said, had no: ttitknIL:ion
of a real unification with the government. It planned tO renew the
fighting and expected 'additional support from the Vietminh. If
unificatiOn (of the Pathet Lao; and the government) waS adopted, the
Pathet Lao would then have cadres In all echel. AS of administration
and military bureaus- of the government. These- cadres would_pre-
tend to.be nment but Woad actually' do all that thei
cqu.ld to stiby_ettlea, ? replace old functionaries- with
Pathkit LA.0 members and, finally, eliminate all remnants of the -pld
regime and establish a "People's Democratic State."
10. It Is clear that neither the Burmese, the Malay-an nor tate
Laotian. Communists. have any intention a renoulacing the policy of
violence or their ultimate aim of the overthrow of non-Communist
governments. If they advance such ideas, temporarily, it is only
with the intention f weakening the vigilance a Antii.- Communists,
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winning a much-needed breathing space for themselves, and gathering
their strength in preparation for a new attempt to destroy the demois
cratic regimes and institutions of their countries and to install
Communist governments in their places.
Non-Communist governments which entertain such proposals
of unity, peace, legalization and cooperation from rebel Communist
parties should be clearly aware that while tactics may shift, the
basic aims and strategy of Communism remain unchanged?wbrid
revolution and ths destruction of all rival political systems.
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