THE PATTERN OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA CONCERNING LAOS 1955-1956

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000600080005-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 1, 1956
• Content Type: STUDY

A Study of the Motivation of Specific Propaganda Lines in
Relation to Concurrent Communist Policies and t1actics.
The Communist Problem in Laos.
- -meat-which -would i - -
- between the,-Pathet-Lao-and--the_-Government-attempting-to reach_a settle-
Since the Geneva Conference in 1954, negotiations haveTbeen in progress
been in insurrection against the Royal Government of Laos since 1953.
Approi Fo"F ease : CIA-RDP78-009 R000600PMM
THE PATTERN OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA CONCERNING LAOS 9~ F E %.
1. The Pathet Lao, a Communist--pseudo nationalist group under the
direction and control of the Vietminh of North Vietnam, ,b=1111 have
b) reunify the country,
c) restore the authority of the Royal Government in the
two northern provinces held by the Pathet Lao, and
d) reintegrate the Pathet Lao into the military and polit-
_ical structure of the-country.
-2. The Geneva Agreements envisaged general elections throughout Laos
for the f etablishment of a government for a reunified country in _ 1955.
it Such elections had been scheduled for Aiust, 1955. Negotiations stalled,
largely over the insistence of the Pathet'Lao on retaining control of
11. --- _.___ _ __ _._-_ end the civil war
the two provinces and the determination of the Government that a rest-
eligible to_participete although,_tn _fact,__they- ab_8tained and- the elections
;;-and--in-December held elections in which the-Pathet Lao were theoretically
a "m r1in-La Ler nai ay, tiowaras the end of the - year, -suspended -the talks- -
} were not held in areas under their military control.
Themes at the BElg nni na 1256,
Propaganda from Hanoi and Peking radios and from the Communist
press in China, North Vietnam and Laos has'reflected in its pronounce-
Dente-the-current status of-the problem and4i~itt of tmnuni8t policy st
Pr v E Release :_CIA-RDP78-00915R000600080005-2
 'Approved Qqr Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R600600080005-2
a given moment. This propaganda in the first months of 1956 followed
well defined lines. One thread which has run through the Communist
broadcasts consistently has been the charge that ?' American imperialist
influence is to blame for all the troubles in Laos.
The Hanoi radio in its Voice of Vietnam (VOV) program on January
5, 1956, charged that "Th6ee responsible for the disturbances in Laos
are the American imperialists.* The Poking radio, on January 14,
repeated the charge in the words, "Laos will be used as a lase for the
Americans to open agression", and "The Americans are plotting to develop
war in Laos."
Pathet Lao propaganda along these lines was even more direct and
personal. Numerous tracts and leaflets were distributed during the last
months of 1955 denouncing the elections and appealing to the National
Army to cease fighting the Pathet Lao. One such tact distributed in
Khammouane Province in early December said, "Because of America the
elections will be held without Pathet Lao participation. The Ai RWAn
tactics are to destroy the Pathrht Lao and to make Laos an American
base where they will station their armies in preparation for war. The
Laos people will become slaves of the Americans."
The Paehbt Lao also made personal attacks against " leaders.
One lgW leaflet chargetithat "the whole government has been bought by
the Americans." Lao I ?gala, the PativOt Lao paper, stated on July 9,
1955, that "Katayzs aim is to turn over the country to America, in
return for money."
4. Of particular concern to the Communist propagandists at this time
was the question of restoration of Royal Government autIority in the
northern provinces as authorized by the Geneva Conference, but which
the Pathet Lao were determined to resist. The Hanoi radio reported
on January 10, 1956, a speech by Paeh6h Lao leader Prince Souphanouvong
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600080005-2
 'low %W
pproved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600080005-2
-3-
d1nouncing Royal Government military operations in the two provinces
inspired by the U.S. imperialists who wanted to m k use the provinces
aq a military base.
-FM , the publication of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party of North
Vietnam, had struck the same note two days earlier when it tttaeked the
R4ya1 Government plans for the two provinces as inspired by the American
earning of making an attack against the Peoples Republic of China."
perialists who desired to establish a military base there and were even
5~ Before long the propaganda attack on the American imperialists was
oadened to include"their lackeys in Laos" as the Voice of Vietnam put
it on January 14. The broadcast charged that the Royal Government had
hild "unilateral"elections"under the American imperialist orders", was
recalled "so many acts of double dealing by the Royal Laotian Goverment."
abotaging the agreement between Prince Souphanouvong and Premier Katay ""
The.Vietnam News Agency (VNA) broadcast of the same date accused the
of having "pretended to accept the recommendation of the International
Cchtrol Commission" or a ceasefir27 but instead continuing its attacks
the Pathet Lao. On 29 January the Voice of Vietnam declared that "The
pie of Laos clearly understand that the Royal Laotian aut}n rities have
hfd unilateral elections against the Geneva agreements and have carried
ggle_to defend their country against these bloody hands."
Phthet Lao propaganda followed the same lines. A series of tracts directed
attacks against the Pathet Lao." It urged the people to "resolutely
t1the National Army early in January 1956 referred repeatedly to "the
rialist Americans and Katay" as the cause of the war.
Laos an stern Milit
lkt Besides broadening the attack to include not only the American intr
i
ialists but their Laotian "lackeys", the Comsunist propaganda towards
end Of January began to shift its emphasis awW from the question of
elections, the status of the two provinces and the Royal Government
tacks" on the Pathet Lao. These issues were still i
g -
eke g~ n occasional
-AWpA !r-r Two had 7w ~H I s,w tr IH- ~~3~ ~ "Ft d~~~1' s~ru`'!
A" 4 ,
 ?r
I Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600080005-2
-4-
I
mention but the chief emphasis was increasingly on Laos' foreign policy
and her relations with foreign countries. The sinister role of the
U.S. was still played up but with reference to the alleged American
`attempts.to tie Laos into the western bloc, to drag her into the
"aggressive bloc of SEATO", to make her a battlefield in the next war,
and to prevent her establishing "good" or "friendly" relations with other
countries, "especially neighboring ones."
Attacks upon the Royal Government,and particularly on Premier Katay,
continued,now based more specifically upon their acquiescenee`vr
cooperation in these sinister American designs.
7. On January 13, the Voice of Vietham charged that "the Premier KataZZ
did not conceal his preference for SEATO" and that the "Royal Government
has handed over Laos to SEATO." This line was continued on January
29 in a broadcast based on an editorial in the Pathet Lao publication
74g Ite 1a. "Royal Laotian Premier Katay", said the Communist radio,
"has said that the "Kingdom of Laos would request the intervention of
this aggressive blgci~EAT_07. . and 'though some great powers Mould
doubt&ess declare th t participation in the 2kkddm Southeast Asian
Bloc is a violation of the Geneva Agreements, the Kingdom of Laos would
join the Bloc anyway.: "
The RLG and Katay were even accused of intriguing with the Chinese
Nationalists for military support although it was not made clear whether
it was with the Off irregulars from Burma or the Chinese Nationalist
Government on Taiwan. The' NA on January 20 stated that the U.S. had
promised the RLG "full support from the Chiang Kai-shek bandits" and
that "Katay Sasorith, Premier of the Royal Laotian Government, estab-
lished personal contact with Chiang Kai-shek emissaries during his visit
to the northwest regions of Laos."
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600080005-2
 V
pproved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600080005-2
_5-
question
The in cotion of the !ff Wit, however, was a side issue,
probably designed for purely local effect. Comauniat propaganda in
ibruary and early March paid more and more attention to spelling out
the terms of a Laotian foreign policy whichwau be acceptable to the
Pethet Lao as a basis for agreement with the Royal fovernment.
O ]arch 5, the Voice of Vietnam described the provisions
acceptable policy for the Laotian Government. Along with the
?gration of the Pathet Lao "without vindictiveness" this included;
no f`moign military bases in Laos, no military pacts: with foreign
acentries, and "complete understanding" with neighboring, friendly
with neighbors, no forgn military bases, no military alliances and a
tea. The Vietnam News Agency on march 13 again listed the *rms
a satisfactory agreement? including democratic rights, good relations
prooes
The le
off
ing
:lay -and
had also
endea
do ben bete
coal ohan
see in dra
R by them.
ASO i red to have
ltatsye oabinet and
dividual Ide nunaiatte n -of
pproved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600080005-2
:a had al
f the RLC
eted chie:
a new *a
a candid
crmer Pr
lain its
the new
Prince
,, "lackey
rs of os were
M
ovornment were ire
na Ph . Co
L 1 a . Den
f roper slime",
t they--may,
"
46 -to ivanna Phcrt
user politic
not been
khile Kat
party.
;king as
and Sou
gando made lit}tls distin
 N..Y v.r
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600080005-2
14
to find ways and means to reach a settlement on the Pathet Lao side
on the basis of the Geneva agreement. The Indian Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence with neighboring countries have been advertised
as the feature of the foreign policy. But the people have already ex-
perienced the Katay government's way of declaring one policy and ex-
ecuting another." . . .*Mr. Katay as well as Mr. Souvanna Phouma pretend
to look for a basis of understanding with the Pathet Lao. They publicly
proclaim their adherence to the Five Principles of Coexistence of Nehru.
But everybody is aware of their intentions.
A Pathet Lao newspaper, Sil Thaw in May 1956, accused Souvanna
Phouma of corruption; "H.H. Tiao Souvanna Phouma used 130,000,000 of
government funds to build himself a house at Nong Thwada". . ."The day
of the investitu of Prince Souvanna Phouma's government, his wife
transferred 1,250,000 francs to France."
Preparing the Way for New PL-RLG Negotiations.
Katay's attempt to form a new government and remain in power
failed. How much his tougher attitude toward the Pathet Lao had to do
with his failure and how much the attacks upon him as a tool of American
imperialists hurt him are questions difficult to answer. No doubt these
factors played some part. In early March, Prince Souvanna Phouma took
ot'fice as Premier with Katay as a member of the cabinet add a deputy
Premier. Souvanna's program for Laos included a pledge to solve the
Pathet Lao problem on the basis of the Geneva agreements, an endorse-
ment of the Five Principles, a neutral foreign policy with a rejection
of any foreign alliances and a denial that the acceptance of American aid
mean that his Government was in any way under American control.
,U. While Communist propaganda continued to chrge tree RLG with
violating the Geneva agreements by attacks on the Pathet Lao and of
being under American control, it gradually shifted its emphasis away
from these charges about past events and concerned itself with the future
policy of Laos.
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600080005-2
 'kMW
pproved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600080005-2
A VNA broadcast on April 10 proposed a_reopening of the Pl-RLG
talks which had been suspended in November, basing the proposal on the
domestic and international policies which Souvanna Phouma had announced.
(This broadcast antedated by less than 3 weeks the formal request for
reopening negotiations by Prince Souphanouvong on April 28) It expressed
the hope"that the new government will act in accord with these statements."
On May 13 the VNA reported a despatch from WilfrAd Burchett, Communist
journalist then in Vientiane. Burohett had found the new Laos government
less pro-West than Katay's *overnment had been. Souvanna had a more
"*pathetic attitudd toward the Pathet Lao and hadX approved of the
Cambodian policy of neutrality. The campaign had=begarft to interpret
Souvanna1s generalities about peace and neutrality in Communist temps and
to commit hi bliely to such interpsetationsA had 69j/c4%.
. On May 2$ Prince Souphanouvong made a statement which set forth
the Communist view of Laotian affairs at this juncture and which was
reported on the 31st by the Hanoi radio. He pointed out that while both
the Pathet Lao and the Government had desired to negotiate the issuesbe-
tween them, "foreign reactionary forces have been intervening ever more
deeply in the internal affairs of our country. . turning our country
into a military base and colony of theirs."
The Pathet Lao leader then noted that "When forming the new govern-
ment, Premier Souvanna Phouma also declared that he would negotiate witty
the Pathet Lao on the basis of the 4eneva Agreements, carry out the
Five Principles of Coexistence and establish good relations with other
countries, particularly with neighboring ones."
"The Pathet Lao forces" he added, "heartily welcome these statements
and hope that they will be carried out."
This statement by Souphanouvong was-replayed and re-'erred to again and
again by the Hanoi radio station. The Peking radio, which had had little
to say about Laos for a month or two, took up the same theme. In
broadcasts on March 26 and 27 and July 13 and 28, the New China News
jpproved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600080005-2
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP7~r-00'15R000600080005-2
I
Agency (NCNA) noted with approval the foreign policy of the Souvanna
Phouma government with its commitments to the Five Principles, neutrality
and good relations with neighboring countries, meaning, of course, Comm-
uni' China and North Vietnam. In the last mentioned broadcast, NCNA
warned that the U.S. would almost certa- try to interfere with the
new Laos policy of peace add neutrality.
$4. This last point-that the "good intentions" of Souvanna Phouma
might be nullified and sabotaged by the intervention of the American
imperialists was not being overlooked 1 the Hanoi radio either. The
Voice of Vietnam pointed out on June 11 that the new policy of peace
and neutrality "contravenes the policy of interference and aggression
of the American imperialists" and on July 27, sopm-kinsidcke asked
the pointed question, "But will the Government of the Laotian kingdom
let the foreigners openly intervene, in the internal affairs of the
country at the risk of seeing the dountry transformed into a military
base and a battlefield?"
*. The line and purpose of the Communist propaganda from March through
July, as new Pathet Lao-Royal Government negotiations became more
imminent may be summarized as follows.
policy
Souvanna Phouma's/Otatements concerning neutrality, the Five
Principles, peace, the Geneva Agreements, etc., are seized upon,
interpreted in Communist terms and placed on the record to commit Souvanna
Phouma as widely as possible to these items of the Communist program.
Doubts are a xpresse as to whether Souvanna will actually implement
these principleq*o'prepare the way for charges of bad Sith and broken
promises in the event that the Royal Government attempts to modify the
Communist interpretation.' a',
'The suggestion that the U.S. will try to
interfere with such implementation is intended to imply that any re-
luctance on the part of the Government to accept Pathet.Lao terms is
the result of such intervention and evidence of the subservience of the
Royal Government to the imperialists.
pproved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600080005-2
 Approved4or Release : CIA-RDP78-00915FtT00600080005-2
Communist Propagandp ands the August Agreements.
0 H
is..
The new negotiations held in Vientiane-in early August resulted in
agreements in principle which included reintegration of the Pathet Lao
into the military and political structure of the couityy with guarantees
of their rights, including legalization of the Party and its front org-
anizations, commitment as to new elections and coalition government in-
cluding Pathet Lao representation and a neutral foreign policy. Specific
details implementing these agreements remain to be worked out, but the
settlement seems likely to conform to Communist desires.
Communist propaganda on the agreements has first of all endeavoured
to get the Communist interpretation of the terms on the record. The
VNA, for instance, in announcing the agreements on August 11, stated
that they provided for supplementary elections and a coalition govern-
ment although the Royal Government, at that time, had not abandoned its
position that elections depended upon constitutional revision and coalition
upon the results of the elections, The Peking radio in an NCNA broad-
cast the previous day had made a similar assumption.
Both Peking and Hanoi praised the "conciliatory spirit and good
faith" of the Royal Government delegates and welcomed the agreements
as a great contribution to peace. Prince Souphanouvong, in a speech
over the Viettiane radio which was also reported by VNA, called on
the people "to support with all their might the policy of peace and
neutrality of the Royal Laotianovernment headed by Premier Souvanna
Phouma." He declared that the agreements had "smashed the foreign
9)
countries plot to intervene. The Peking radio on August 8 had also,
after praising the agreements, sounded the warning of the "need for
vigilance against obstruction and sabotage by the forces of foreign
intervention."
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600080005-2
 0
,, III
Approved For Release.: IA?-RDP78-00915R000600080005-2
bj 'k . The pattern is the same---praise of the Souvanna. Phouma government for
accepting the agreements in order to commit them publicly to the Communist
+ It is fairly apparent from the above &hatysisthat the determining fI4d!s
in the Communist propagandaline toward Laos and the Royal Government and
The R es and Determining FActora of the Communist Propaganda Line.
pretation by the Government can only be the result of intervention by the
% I.ie%leb
American imperialists aas~ to discredit such modifications and their_
he suggestion thaaany modification or qualification of this inter-
interpretation and make I later Government objections diffieult*
advocates in advance.
changes in the Government leadership or policy, but are the requirements
!I the changes in that line are not the fasts of the situation nor any
01 vommunlaT, policy 1Leeli
-At the end of k(ft 1955, the Communist Pathet Lao movement/ was still
v I l ~1 rL ra ~~-r
operating under the old programsof Abe attainment of power through armed
revolt with the holding of a sedure territorial base and_themaintenance
of an independent army as its immediate and essential interests: Its (.t !1
propaganda therefore aimed at the denigrationletthe Royal Laotdinjovern
ment as lackeys and slaves of imperialism, warmongers with bloody hands,
'.~ ' ruptsalfseekers, etc., in order to destroy its mass suppcr$ and to
present the Pathet Lao as the true Laotian patriots. Government military
activities,designed to restore its authority in the northern provinces
threatened the secure base.of the Pathet Lao and were denounced as violations
of the Geneva agreements and attempts of the Americans and their Laotian
(;7
tools to establish military bases there. Laotian independence was regarded
as a sham and the statements of Government leaders on neutrality, peace,
By early 1956 two changes had taken place in the situation neceas-
itating a reassessment on the part of the Communists of their position
in respect to Laos:
The failure of the Pathet Lao insurrection to arouse significant
The identity between the propaganda issuing from the CPR, the DRY and
the Pathet Lao themselves seems to show clearly that this well-orchestrated
campaign to influence the Laotian government and the course of the Pathet
pP Ad & ? eapiet`fti 4-BPE 7?;PPt9sib Pe7&6db9x, gr%-Ag
__ and "-coordii-ation-by some central agency; -
 ApproJ" For ReleasSPA-RDP78-00915R000600080005-2
popular support and the withdrawal of major Vietminh military support
after the Geneva Conference made Pathet Lao prospects of seizing power by
armed revolt seem rather remote. The new line of international communism
for--backward, former colonial countries was also changing. Political
neutrality had become respectable rather than an imperialist device;.
independence was real even when incomplete in the economic field. A
principal Communist aim for these countries was now to detach them from
Western ties and align them with Communist foreign policy even while they
remained non-Communist domestically. For nationalt p m rdbm Communist
parties the new line ordained a shift from armed revolt to political
action including the achievement of legal status, leftist and national
unity programs, popular fronts and coalition governments as a road to
power.
'i. In conformity to these new factors, Communist propaganda to Laos changed.
The primary issue for a political settlement between the Pathet Lao and
the Royal Laotian Government becameirst, the adoption by the Government
r
of a neutral foreign policy, rejection of foreign military bases and
alliances and good relations,with neighboring countries (the CPR and the
DRV), and second, the legalization of the Pathet Lao asAp&Litical party
without penalization of former insurgents, and its admission to the gov-
ernment.
Since agreement with the Government on these issues would not be
furthered by denigration?of RLG leaders, the propaganda emphasis shifted
to a recognition of their good intentions and deploring the fact that
foreign intervention was forcing them to policies contrayy to their real
views. This was made easier by the change in the RLG when Souvanna Phouma
replaced Katay. The Communists could then ignore the fact that they had
previously lumped Souvanna together with other Government leaders and with
Katay in their attacks and pretend that they saw a real difference between
the new government and the old. The endorsements of the Five Principles,
of neutrality, the desire f6r peace, etc., which had previously been
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600080005-2
 Approved For Release : c i c-RDP78-009 5R000600080005-2
dismissed as sham and pretence are now regarded as exressing the true views
of the Royal Government leaders. The American imperialists continue to
receive a major share of the Communist propaganda attack, but the Royal
Government leaders, once accused as corrupt partners in their sinister
designs are now viewed as in danger of having their good intentions frus-
trated by the interventionists. Not only the Communist aims for Laos are
served by the attack upon the Americans, but also their broader aim of
eliminating U.S. influence from Asia.
40. The changes in the Communist propaganda do not reflect a changed -Omwmms
Communist analysis of the Political situation in Laos, k nor a
re-evaluation of Royal Government leaders--they originate from a new
tactical plan. Royal Government endorsement of theive Principles, des-
cribed previously as a pretence, becomes evidence of a peaceful and neutral
.policy; independence changes from sham to reality overnight. Ministers
who yesterday were bloody-handed lackeys of imperialism and instigators of war wh
who must to overthrown are today patriots with whom the Pathet Iao can work
to rid the country of foreign intervention.
Throughout this episode Communist propaganda has been formulated
in response to the needs of Communist policy and the program of the inter-
national Communist movement. The fadts of the situation in Laos, the char-
acter and policy of the Government and its leaders and the actifities
of the U.S. have all teen twisted and distorted to fit the changing tactics
of th&emovement.
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600080005-2