POTENTIAL DISSOLUTION OF THE COMINFORM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000400350002-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 16, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915RO 4OO39 Od2 1955
POl`SN`- DISSOLUTIOU OF THE CONINFOIUI
lo Cure indications. Several press reports have recently indicated
that the 1-'II"? cGong thing the dissolution of the CO." a'oRiI, These
reports include a statement in the Indian newspaper Eiindustani. Time on
7 June according to which Nehru intended to suggest o No ow M-at-Die disc
solution of the COflhi WORII would be in the interest of relaxation of inter-
national tensions and that accession of the Soviet leaders to this proposal
was prole, Another report is contained in a Berlin INS story of 13 June
reporting that an East German Coammanist official who would not give his nags
stated that the dissolution of the COflINFCMl prior to the Summit meeting is
"most likely,"
20 Although there is no substantial direct evidence to support these
indications, a dissolution of the COI~II}IFOE I, or acy drastic change In its
external . sta. appears a marked possibility in the light of (a) the general
Soviet line] (b) the present setti xsg, particularly the approaching for-power
negotiations, and certain parallels with the situation at the time of the
dissolution of the COMMON; (a) the ease of handling the COME ORPIOs job in
other v W9.9 conceivably through the politics], machinery of the recent Warsav
Pacto* If this CONINFORI3 should be" dissolved, the technique would almost
certainly in solve every effort to make it appear as a collective action, and
the move probably would be publicised as a move to peace and relaxation of
tensions.
3o Print Status of the COMINFCR fo The COIENFOR11I operates as one of
several war R~ ore ons,p under the Foreign Section of the CPSU
Central. Coamitteeo The Foreign Section is the actual, covert control apparatus
of the CPSUQ It uses the C oven as well, as other international, fronts (such
as WFC, WFTUQ WI1 F9 WFD ') to coordinate and control the world Commudst move.,
mento N 'erahip in the COMINFORij is limited to the Ccmmanist Parties of the
USSR, the Eastern European Satellites (except East Germany and AM=") ,v France,
and Itslyo Its activities have been confined, almost entirely to the field of
information, Its principal functions have been to spread the current "lire"
* The Possibilities of the Warsaw organization for Communist purposes are
clearly indicated in Article 6 of the Eastern European agreement which reads
as folio rsz
"For the purpose of the consultations among the Parties
envisaged in the present Treaty, and also for the puny
pose of e=dsdng questions which may arise in the
operation of the Treaty,, a Political Consultative
Co.t shall be set up,9 in which each of the 'Parties
to the Treaty shall be represented by a member of its
Goner nt or by another speeific appointed representative,
The Cc ttes MY--et u such awdli bodies as
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000400350002-7
 Approved F r Release : CIA-RDP78-00915ROI040034'00 e,195
POTENTIAL DISSOLUTION OF THE COMINFORtI
1, Current indications. Several press reports have recently indicated
that the X'i ,r ccrjrje the dissolution of the Co:inn ern, These
reports include a statement in the Indian newspaper Hindustani Times on
7 June accorl3mg to which Nehru intended to suggest to foscur Wa-Me dis-
solution of the `CO 1I1IE+'OMI would be in the interest of relaxation of inter-
national tensions and that accession of the Soviet leaders to this proposal
was probable, Another report is contained in a Berlin INS story of 13 June
reporting that an East German Coomaniat official who would not give his name
stated that the dissolution of the COim]F iu'I prior to the Swmait meeting is
"most likely,"
20 'Although there is no substantial direct evidence to support these
indications, a dissolution of the COIMF'OR I, or any drastic change in its
external. - status appears a marked possibility in the light of (a) the general
Soviet line; (b) the present setting, particularly the approaching foautipoirer
nago td.ations, and certain parallels with the situation at the time of the
dissolution of the COUIMTERN; (e) the ease of handling the COT 1rNFORt1 a s job in
other ways, conceivably through the political machinery of the recent Warsaw
Pact?* If the COMIIFOM! should be dissolved, the technique would almost
certainly involves every effort to make it appear as a collective action, and
the move probably would be publicized as a move to peace and relaxation of
tensions.
3. Present Status of the COMINFORM, The CO 1fNFOR14 operates as one of
several wo"c erg a ons, under the Foreign Section of the CPSU
Central. Cc ttee,0 The Foreign, Section is the actual, covert control apparatus
of the CPSUQ It uses the Ccminforaa as well as other international fronts (such
as WPC, WFTUO WIC9 WFDY) to coordinate and control the world Connunist moves
monto Membership in the COMII+'O I is limited to the Communist Parties of the
USSR, the Eastern European Satellites (except East Gen=W and Albania), France,
and Italy0 Its activities have been confined almost entirely to the field of
infornation0 Its principal functions have been to spread the cu rent "line"
The Possibilities of the Warsmt organization for Communist purposes are
clearly indicated in Article 6 of the Eastern European agreement which reads
as follows a
"t'or the purpose of the consultations among the Parties
envisaged in the present Treaty, and also for the pug
pose of exinng questions which may arise in the
operation of the Treaty, a Political Consultative
Cr rittoe shall be sat up, in which each of the 'Parties
to the Treaty shall, be represented by a member of its
Goverment or by another specifically appointed representative a
The CaI.ttee May set up such awt.liar boes as ma
rave, neceas 0
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000400350002-7
 ? ~`
Approved For Release :C - i r1 -00915RO110400350002-7
no Al ;he h the Ct}I 21TER d at its height was of course a much
more Mena and active organization than the CONII 'OflM, the circa
se i of the fir"ss dissolution may give some indication of they
possible tt rg of a comparable move nca, By the spring of 19I43,0 wart es
ca sunications difficalties and other factors had made the COIL NTER T practi.
cr ,y ineffeotlvep At about that time, the appointment of Joseph Eo Davies
as special US emissary an Ir,.n&Leaasoo was announce-d, Almost i diate1y
the after about May 15, 19143.9 Moscow took the ini.ti.ativa of proposing
di.assolutions qnd various teleg amo were sat to foreign Com=nist parties to
round up sup rto The dissolution was announced on 22 May 1913. This was
several days Wore Davies arrived in what was to prove a forerunner miseic n
to Sec tart' F u1V's trip in Octobarr, Tbus$ there is a good circm stantial
cam that the dissolution was timed for its r imun effect on the US - then
the prime So iet target - and was probably designed in part to set the stags
for the la.t : gotiations, Me decigs nevertheless, was met with a measure
of sound skes tics Q
b. This parallel would cortainly suggest the likelihood that action
on the CO SM Ot I will precede the Summit meeting. Moreo ,rq it could well be
timed to ccriacido crith or just precede or follow a visit to Moscow by some
stator such as Nehru, Ali of Indoneaian U Nu,, or a similar neutralist
repreentati e
Co It MY L argued that dissolution would be left as a card to be
pl d at the Suwsit. This seems most unlikely. however,, because it would
give US`,3 U1 O *Ad Prance the strcnge,it poes .;ble chant to arrgua that the
COiII CP11 was in fact a fog of in carfercncoQ Apia 411a it would be an
admias'sion than t- the USSR c roped the CCININFOP,NN unilaterally, and dest
the it scion almost certainly highly desired., of collective action (as in
the CCJ EN M RN case) . Dissolution of the COHMORN would also be unc Cortsb]
cuts to the issue of Satellite cont of which the Soviets have so far sshh
ztrG inc is tiore of s g toe lude,, Nore finally,, would the Soviets
expect to got any useful. deabern. d fro no, as they must anticipate that the
West is fu1 a i of the fat t t thee `"d solution of the COMi.Ng'OI 2 would be
an smp v . ~ and organization.afly eign .aant0
7a Arad bil~ of Subsjtut s The acstivdtios of the 001,MFC t could
via ea i ~,ken over by o` er parts of the Cm=udst et ructuree in a
Variety of uaj a To the extent that WWor a Lasting Peace" is u ct as a
charnel for :ose m; gs views, this could a illy be done by Soviet ptzb3,i cations
themselves or by covert cnelo. The line c .d be p pagated in the saw
or conceivably a substitute sriodical could be de-bleed,, In this
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000400350002-7
 Approved Fbr Release CI - 8-00915R060400350002-7
coxuiection9 the politic , machinery of the new Warsers Pact mar offer posal-
bilit eo The Political Consultative Co rtttee - or another body under the
Wars= Pact - would have certain advantages over the COI1It MN in that
Umnia and Mast Germany are ors, while Communist China has participated
as an observer in the founding conference - although so far as is known it
has no member p statuso Msrreovers the Warem Pact is part of the facade of
a looser confederation -like stricture that Mosccm is apparently seeking to
pro tp perh to argue its case better at the Sundt, On the other bench
use of the Warsaw machinery, designed for the Satellites and associated with
a military structures mfr be a poor to get the nonnSate]lite foreign
Cost parties into the plaj on an osteneib1 r equal footingo In any- event1
dissolution of the COMINFORM need not constitute any substantial sacrifice
whatever in the effectiveness of the international Communist apparatus4
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000400350002-7