A Successful Communist Infiltration of Government

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000400090004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 1999
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

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A SUMMerM1 Cor, Inf tra i = g, r2= ant
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In 1955 the scattered rernnante of the Guatemalan Communist
Party regrouped, after the collapse of the Cormunistominated
nationalist goverrmrent of Guatemala, led by President J'acobo
Arbenzn One of the first items of business taken up by, the
Guatemalan Coxm;*unist Party was a very exhaustive investigation
and analysis of the events which culminated in the collapse.
In this process of *self-criticism and criticie,'" the ex
Secretary General of the Guatemalan Party, Jose Manuel Fortunyp
was severely criticised and censured for weaknesses and mistakes
It is a'parent that this effort was intended to saddle him
personally with much of the renronsibility for the catastrophe
which befell the Party*
A formal inquiry was carried out by the Party, and Fortuny
was given the opportunity of presenting his neelf-criticism"
to support the Party's chargee0 However, the staterents he
produced were considered generally unsatisfactory by the Party,
since they contained not only his admissions of guilt on certain
charges, but also his defense of his own actions and attitudes
on what he considered to be the most serious charges of political
failure and deviations
Copies of the documents of the Party concerning this inquiry
have been found in the possession of a representative of the
Party residing illegally in Guaterala0 The attached excerpt
from Fortuny'e main defense is presented as a particularly en-
lightening expose of the position held and activities carried
out by a key figure in the Guateralan Communist Party during the
period of emergency. It is a very revealing statement that
shows clearly the results that can be attained when a Communist
Party, .,in a campaign of unity-of-action and collaboration with
a nationalist movement, concentrates much of its cadre member-
ship on the infiltration of the governing group. In particular,
it shows how much political influence on both domestic and foreign
affairs actually can be gained by an individual Communist, who
in fact occupies no official position and beams no official
responsibilities, when he concentrates with the Party's agree-
ment and aid upon developing personal influence over a senior
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government official. While it highlights this topic of influences
it should also be recognized that such a relationship gives
excellent opportunities for political espionage as wells
This technique appears to be of particular importance for
study at present in those areas where national liberation move-
ments and nationalist governments are targets of the current
Communist campaign to capitalize on the dynamic forces of
nationalism,
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~Introduetorv Notet In the first section of this
document, Jose Manuel Fortuny acknowledges his improper
behavior (excessive drinking and improper conduct
with women), his lack of qualification for the position
of Secretary General of the Party, and the effects of
his ill health on his work, He then tries to defend
himself against charges that he had been irreeponsi-
bleq defeatist, vacillating, and lax in his actions
during the no-riod of the crisis of.the Arbenz
Gaverntrent2
He refutes these charges as follows:
"When the Army summoned Colonel Arbenz on 8 Jane and the
first plane of the mercenary invaders dropped the first leaflets
on the capital, I renewed my activity, with the Party designating
me as its main link with President Arbenz and recommending that
I aid him in every way possibleo
"In accordance with these decisions, I remained at the
President's side as much as possible,, counteracting the intrigues,,
the charges, and the proposals continually made against and to
him by some of the political leaders of the national bourgeoisie
and certain officials of the Cabinet; I gave detailed and up-to-
the-minute information to. the Party on the developments in the
struggle, the decisions made, and the steps to be taken on behalf
of the government; I passed on the Party's suggestions to the
President and gave him my own opinion when there was not enough
time to consult the Party, I thus remained with President Arbens
until the end, when he relinquished the Presidency, and later
on,, when he took refuge at the ?%xican Embassy and when he left
the country to go into exiles
"I thus engaged In a series of tasks for President Arbenz
which took up all my time, from 1000 to 1100 hours of one day
until 0400 or 0500 hours of the next. These tasks included the
following; The elaboration of.the replies which wee were sug-
gesting that the President should make to the Army elements which
had given him the 8 June ultimatum; the elaboration of the de-
tails of the tactics to be followed to maintain the Guatemalan
delegation to the UN in the Security Council sessions; the
elaboration'of the diplomatic communiques to be transmitted
from the Chancellery to the Security Council and the U.S.,(and Latin
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American) emtassiea; replying to hundreds of telegrams of
solidarity from abroad; giving attention to the more important
telephone calls; attending various informal meetings of certain
officials as well as the last general meeting, at which the Chief
of the Armed Forces himself explained the military situation;
assisting in the drafting of the last addresses made by President
Arbena, including the one in which he made his 'renunciation';
constant petitioning to have the people furnished with arms;
the adoption of security measures for the President; the elabo .-
tion of the plans to arm the people, when the arming was approved
finally and too late; and various other activities, including that
of obtaining cash funds for the Party.
"It would seem that my making this report is useless, be-
cause certain comrades, to my way of thinking, have gone a little
too far in their criticism of my behavior, My work alongside
President Arbenz in the most critical days of the struggle against
the foreign intervention made me forget altogether what took place
at the meetings with Comrade Alejandro and the comrades.of the
Secretariat involving a criticism of my personal behavior and an
explanation of my actions, which resulted in my being temporarily
relieved of my duties
"Comrade Pellecer, for example, bas written letters left
and right, including some to comrades in other Parties, in which
he gave all sorts of opinions about me, most of them incorrect.
I only had the opportunity to read one of these letters and rather
rapidly, but among the various impassioned comments he made in it
was the statement that I and one of my brothers had become panicky
and that this feeling had spread to President Arbens. This is
entirely false. My female covpanion (sic) could testify, in
the first place, as to my attitude toward my brother who is
referred to here, and to the fact that I reprimanded him for
showing fear. My brother's conduct is his responsibility and not
mine. If I had grown panicky, I would not have remained with
President Arbens until the end and would have given more attention
to more of my personal documents than I was able to--I would
have salvaged at least my property deeds; I would also have made
my companion panicky, but she can testify, now that she is in
a better condition to be a competent witness, what my. actions were
like during those dramatic days. I even submit the testimonial
of Colonel Arbenz himself, of Major Hartinea or of all those
who were aware of my calmness or of my behavior at President
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Arbenz's side? Is therefore, contradict Comrade Pellecer's
accusation as well as others he has made which are not pertinent
here because they do not concern my personal conduct, On the
contrary, certain comrades in the Party leadership can testify
that in those days I was guilty more of overconfidence and optimism
than was Varranted under such circumstances.
"Other comrades, in referring to the circumstances anrri*ind-
ing r7 temporary release from my duties in the Party, surmise
that my behavior was due to defeatist vacillation on my part, I
cannot accept this accusation either, because it is not compatible
with the truth. I expressed on several occasions my feeling that
I was not the person to be given the duties of party Secretary
General and did so long before the situation in Guatemala gave
any warning of the imminent imperialist intervention. I said
on various occasions that the Secretary General should be a
militant with qualities like those of Comrade Silva Jonama, for
example, Moreover, I confess in all frankness that when the
American imperialists' propaganda shouted to the high heavens
that a shipload of arms from 'behind the Iron Curtain' had reached
Guatemala, I did not correctly Judge the extreme gravity of the
situation, thinking that 'the worst' had taken place in Caracas
and that if the American imperialists had not
openly neither would they do so when the arms reached Guats lap
and I. even told this to President Arbenz0 It was long before that
time that my personal conduct started to Dive way to a eesses
because of my drinking; similarly, it was long before then that
I told myself that certain comrades were not being objective in
their appraisal of the situation in our country. It cannot be
said that when I was faced at that time with the imminence of
the foreign Intervention, the renewal of the struggle in our
country, and the violence of the anti-Communist campaign, r
decided to capitulate by leaving the Party leadership. On the
conttaiy9 because of the way in which I lent my services to the
active struggle in June, I could prove# in accordance with my
actions at that time, that I fully intended to fight to the
end and that I did not forei a defeat--which was also one of
our mistakes--but felt certain that victory was oars,
"Finally, I cannot accept the responsibility for one other
things because it is not true and because accepting it would mks
as guilty of a gross irresponsibility. I am speaking of the
criticism of certain comrades who wish to believe that,my opinionser
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had a major influence in the decisions taken by President Arbengo
It has been said that looking at events subjectively as they
affected me personally, I Influenced the President to adopt the
course of action which he thouglhtwas the most correct, This
too is false'
"It is true that President Arbens and I are on vet intimate
terms, that ve had a wry close friendship, that I becwte known
as one of his 'best f riende, t and that we even went so far as to
converse about intimate private matters, but this should not
imply that I went so far as to confide to him the confidential
deliberations of the Party nor that I told him about the internal
questions of our organization? At the time my case was taken up
by the Setariat, as I indicated above, it is true that I
confided to him the fact that I felt very tired, that I was il1,,
and that it was for these reasons that we had dec ded on releas-
ing me from duty to take care of my health, but !,did not go any
further; indeed, it was not in my province to inform him about
! rything that had been said during-the meeting with the Se -
tariat.0 I did not in any way discourage him; on the contrary,
I told him that I felt that in this way? the Party leadership
.would be better off, since it would not have to put up with
a person who, becAause of illsshss,, was not producing much work*
At the time, the President expressed his concern over my health
and even placed his own doctor at my disposal.,
"There are many facts,, too numerous to mention here, which
prove that the circur,stancets of my temporary release from duty
as Secretary General could not have influenced the decisions made
at that time by the President. The factors which determined his
.decisions,, his extreme confidence at the start,, his hopes, and
his later discouragement when the Arm7 vilely betrayed him were
far different ones. I will, however, cite two facts, or rather
appraisals. The President became eve" of the Army's betrayal
as soon as the members of the Chief of Staff and National Defense
Ministry handed him the shoot of questions which the international
press described as an ''ultimatum, v that is, on 8 Junes If it
were true that he had been influenced by my erroneous personal
conduct or my appraisals of the situation, what better opporianity
could I have bad than then to give up my post? And how else
could one interpret the next.-tomthe-last address he made to the
nation, in the elaboration of which I played a major role? Did
_that address have any indication of the decision or decisions he
`adopted? We shall not consider here whether or not there as
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wisdom in the decision to ban the popular demonstration of 18 June,,
the decision not to make any changes in the command of the Army,
the decision to rely too much on the Chief of the Armed Forces,
the decision not to arm the people,, the decision not to take
adequate steps to control the chiefs of the operations in the
battlefield? or the decision to resign, Mat is important here,
however, is the fact that neither my personal conduct nor the
circumstances which led to my temporary separation from the CC
Secretariat had anything to do with the above -mentioned amissionse,
errors, or inadequate measures, as far as influence is concerned,
"Furthermore, did not the decision to take the matter before
the UN Security Council indicate a major decision made by
President Arbens himself? Where then was my defeatist Influence?
And what about the steps taken to arm the people, to ocnsrr the
press, and the arrest and liquidation of many conspirators? Did
they not show a determination to fJght to the end? Again, where
was my defeatist influence? And do you think that President
Arbonn was unaware of the Party's determination and of the fact
that I shared in the decisions made by the Party's leaders?
" Nos By evaluating the factors in the defeat of the demo-
cratic regime from the point of viwv, of my personal influence
on the President, we would be abandoning our way of approaching
the facts, we would not be considering the actual conditions of
the struggle in Guatemala or comprehending the action of the
forces defending our country or the magnitude and extent of
that struggle. It would also mean overlooking the class rela-
tionships of the main personalities who directed the final acts
of the Guatemalan democratic government. Neither would this .
mean taking into account (on the contrary,, it would be flagrantly
contradicting) the evaluations which we made in the recently
elaborated document in which are emamined the causes of the de-
feat of the Guatemalan democratic regime,, the on-arses, defects,
and weaknesses of the Party,, the democratic forces, the political
leaders of the national bourgeec&eie and of all of us who, by our
equivocations and omissions, were partly responsible for not
creating the ability to offer a much greater armed resistance
to American Imperialism,
"Comrades* I acknowledge my mistakes and assume my responsi-
bilities, but it is not my duty to acknowledge those mistakes
I did not commnit nor those responsibilities for which X am not
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liable. I accept just criticism of my conduct and mistakes,
but I would be serving our Party and the democratic cause of
Guatemala feebly if I accepted the responsibility for things
I did not doos
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