COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF LABOR UNIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000400030007-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: REPORT

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COMMUNIST PZ=TMLATIO" Or LABOR
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I'T?kOD UC TION
GUATEMALA
A. Development of Communist Influence in Labor
S. Use of Labor Organizations to Further Communist Objectives
C. Communist Party Control of Labor
II. JAPAN
A. Development of Communist Influence in Japanese
1945-48
B. Decline of Communist influence in Japanese Labor, I.949-52
C. Re -Emergence of Communist Influence
- Development of.G'6mmunist Influence in Labor
B. Co st"Lxploitation of Labor
C. Curi nt Tacti
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INTRODUCTION
In taught that Communists must be able "to agree to any
and even - if needs be - to resort to all sorts of stratagems,
.noeuvers, illegal methods', to evasions and subterfuges, only so
as to get into the trade unions, to remain in them and to carry on
Communist work within them'
king advantage of conditions as they existed In
The purpose of this pr:per is to illustrate how the Communists,
to a high degree of proficiency.
There is ample evidence that Communists have long considered
Lenin's statement as a guiding principle in trade union work, and they
have developed the technique of penetrating and exploiting trade unions
ries,. were able to penetrate and exploit the trade union movement
own purposes.
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. GUATZMAT A
A Development of Communist 3 uen Labor. Prior to 1944, no
. labor unions other than controlled workingmen's mutual aid societies
existed in Guatemala, nor was there a real Communist Party as such.
The pre-1932 Communist Party had been crushed by former President
Ubico, who feared an uprising similar to that which had occurred in
El Salvador.
The June and October 1944 revolutions ended the 70 year tra of
dictatorship in Guatemala. The political, economic, and. social upheavals
following the revolutions gave the Communists opportunities which
heretofore had not existed, particularly in the labor movement, for
employing infiltration and organizing tactics.
Following the June uprising of 1944, a schoolteeacherk' union
ended, and in January 1945 it emerged as the Union of Educational
1945, and with other new unions it joined the Educational Worke rs'
Union to form Guatemala's first labor federation, the Confederation of
Guatemalan Workers.
The new labor federation recognized the need fore rie need
labor advisors to aid its development and progress, but such advisors
were not available in Guatemala. This deficiency was quickly " remedied"
by a group of Central Americans with Communist backgrounds who had
had experience in labor organizations in other countries. They were
joined by Antonio Ovando Sanchez, 4 Guatemalan labor organizer who
had been trained in Moscow.
These persons came to Guatemala and became advisors to the
new federation. One of their first acts was to create an indocta-ination
school, 'known as the "Escuela Clariidad", for the ostensible purpose of
lab
.
n
o - "_ "
g
-- _
,. _ar.y.r.
became apparent and alarmed the Railway Workers Union and certain
other unions, who withdrew and formed another federation, the Trade
Union Federation of Guatemala.
In January 1946, the government closed down the school on the
rounds that the Guatemalan Constitution forbids "political organizations
Tonal character".
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C
sthiLy
gr 11- ,saw to da a Eto x w
member of Congress in 194
b* t 040, rose ra Al in
..- of the Union Of
1, Tu in 144,
rged in
Workers
ecr ncralahfip
t time. publicly
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Otiorre*, a
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1953, the General Confederation of Cruaternatlan Workers
ated with the WFTU.
Use of Labor Organizations to Further Communist C ectivees.
on of organized labor in Guatemala for the
litical objectives is well established.
i4, a Cora tt st-controlled political action committee was
express puxpos* of directing labor participation in the
ctions. it played a prominent part in the presidential and con-
gressional elections of that year.
53, the General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers and its
y, the National Confederation of Farm Workers of Guatemala.
Willy incorporated into the "National Democratic Front"
composed of the four Administration political parties.
The strength of these two organizations in 1953 has been esitimated
at 100, 000 members. When one considers that a total of only 225, 000
des were cast in the 1953 congressional elections in Guatemala, this
figure becomes significant and is indicative of the disproportionate
inflsnt which the GuAtemalan Workers Party, (Communist Party, of
mala) which'numbered only about Z, 000 official members, at the
time, was able to exercise on the national political scene.
rnul eta, recognizing agrarian reform as one of the most
liable to a minority seeking state power,
ongly supported the Agrarian Reform Bill submitted by the
,ministration to Congress in 195Z. They were also instrumental in
the -subseequ t adoption of amendments to the law which specifically
provided for a predominance of representatives from the General
Confederation of t;aatemalan Workers and the National Confederation
of Farm Workers in the local and departmental committees adxmin-
tstering the law. Communist control of the agrar in reform movement
eby guaranteed by the terms of the law.
!solutions of the General Confederation
01
t ame s espre cased b
ts."peac
the Party.
led and supported the
In the international field, it supported
"American mperial.ism"'
Communist propaganda line.
the USSR and its policies, opposed
se followed the international
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4.
C. ComrMUPIIt
P
ar y control ref Labe r. BY 1953, the mineral
Confederation of Guatemalan Workers eveloped to the point
the country. At the same timee, the Guatemalan Workers Party
(Communist) was in undisputed control of the Confederation, and
therefore of organized labor in Guatemala.
Party control of the Confederation was assured by the means of
placing Party members, many of whom were also members of the
Party's Political Committee, in all key positions within the Confed-
eration. Thus, Gutierrez, Secretary General of the General
Confederation of Guatemalan Workers, was a member of the Political
Committee of the Party, and at the same time head of the Labor
Union Commission of the Central Committee. Party control of the
Confederation was thefore immediate and direct.
ous challenge to the Party''s leadershof
or
ani
d
p
g
ze
labor was permitted. A short-lived revolt in 1952 against Communist
l
contro
of a union was readily put down, and its leader was forced
_ A -
Me political party to which he belonged, In
October 19 3
, s
small labor federation was formed which challenged Gutierrez to
justify his international Communist connections. Gutierrez did not
. er,toreap respond, and J,n4a*uary.l9 4'the leaders of the new
federation were arrested by the police: and reportedly expelled from
Guatemala without any charges being placed against them.
The General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers remained
firmly wider Communist control until the revolution of 1954, at
'nlt time its leaders fled into asylum. and the Confederation
collapsed.
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U. JA2AN
A. Development of Communist Influence in Japanese Labor,
045-48. Prior to 1949. although weak u erground or
ganizationa tea, Communism was not a strong Revolutionary
threat in Japan, ' for any Communist manifestation vva promptly
suppressed by the government. The government wae~ only slightly
more tolerant of Socialism and of tra. a unionism.
defeat of Japan U. S. occupation policy encouraged
democratic ideas and organizations and trade unionism was established
as an essential principle of democracy.
y-3rhe Coxmxnunis
ire advantage of the new opportunities. As students of Marxiism
Leninism, they recognized the importance of capturing the trade unions
Communist objectives, and their theoretical training had
d them to organize and lead trade unions.
The deteriorating economic situation in Japan between 1945-41,
mpanying unemployment, inflation and food shortages.
ed "ideal" conditions for the Communists to exploit. While other
not neglected, their principal target was the trade union
rhich they concentrated their efforts. Their superior
ipline and organizing ability enab'le4hem to forge ahead of others
the control of the trade union movement, and by early 1946 they
.shed in many of the new trade unions and were rapidly
expanding their influence.
Apparently confident of their ability to dominate the entire
trade union movement, the Communists issued an appeal to the Socialists
for the formation of a single trade union federation in the latter part
of 1945. The Socialists, fearful and suspicious, rejected these advances,
and in August 1946 formed their own movement, the Japan Federation
(SODOMEI). No to be outdone, the Communists, working
openly and through secret members in various unions, and through
fellow-travelers and dupes, established a second federation, the
grass of Indus-trial ?`nionrMa(SANEETSU), which it pruclaimed as a
ition of the most progressive trade union forces." It repeatedly
d that it was Communist -controlled.
During the latter half of 1946, a number of strikes and
demonstrations occurred, due to the worsening of economic conditions.
The Communists were quick to exploit these strikes and to expand them
aller strikes and giant demonstrations. At the same time, they
appealed for trade union unity and for a united political front to over -
throw the government and establish a s r "people I s gove rnmeent".
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~Fs
The effective and vigorous Communist leadship had its effect on
members of SODOM i; pressure for unity with SANBETSU increased,
aided by Communists working both openly and secretly inside SOODCMEI
unions. Faced with the danger of secessions, the anti-Communist
leaders who controlled SODOMEI engaged in a tactical maneuver. They
rejected a full merger with SANBETSU, but agreed to the formation
of a joint council. ZENROREN, for consultation an common problems.
It was not what the Communists had in mind, but it represented a
step forward in their efforts to establish control over the entire
trade union movement.
ZENROREN subsequently became the Japanese affiliate of t
WavW Federation of Trade Unions after the visit to Japan of a WFTU
delegation headed by Louis $AT in March 1947.
During 1947, the Communists intensified their unity campaign and
e helped by a number of domestic factors, among these being the
,.ctionalism in the Socialist Party, the disillusionment in
to, and the still deteriorating economic situation.
Communist advances became more and rnoree of a problem to
SODOM=, which found itself faced with a growing inability to hold
ranks against the expanding influence of SANBETSU. Zn what was
E defensive mote, SODOMEI withdrew from ZENROREN
n August 1947.
By mid-1948 there were approximately a million and a half members
ANBET IJ. By infiltration and subversion the Communists were
.eerting an ever increasing influence over SODOMEI unions, and were
well on their way towards controlling the entire Japanese labor
meat.
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produced a dramatic and swift reversal of the Communist tide.
mobilize slowly and hesitantly in 1948` they gathered force, and during 194
trade union movement. However, anti-Communist forces began to
of 1948, there seemed to be no limit to Communist ability to e
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7.
B. Decline of Communist Influence in Japanese Labor, 1949-52 By the end
A number of factors were responsible for the Communist reverses. The
unists no longer enjoyed the benevoler4 te,lerance of Occupation
,ties, who became more outspoken in i exposure and denunciation
untsm, particularly in the trade union field. The Japanese govern-
under control, and Japanese production started on the road to recovery.
At the same time, the purge of Japan's pre -war leaders came to an and in
1948, and gradually some of the most able and vigorous political leaders,
government officials, etc. , returned to their former professions and added
their weight to the fight.
rnent also began to take counter measures. Another factor was the unproved
economic situation brought abbut by American aid. Inflation was brought
nioner themselves, a growing revolt against Communist control
vas ak g place, and efforts were made to replace Communist policies with
d rnucratie socialist conceptions. The movement was organized in
+s~e who had consistently fought the Communists, partly by-
and . workers o began to rebel at the incessank strikes now that the
ec is situation had improved and partly by former Comrnunistse and
follow-travelers who had become disillusioned.
leaders in SODOMM and In the Socialist party
port to the rebellion inside SANBLTSU, and began to issue
rmation of a new trade union federation free from Communist
0, the Japan General Council of Labor Unions (SOMYO) was formed.
in philosophy, its constitutional convention declared that it would
ntrate on economic goals, would not be an instrument of any political
ould be anti-Communist in principle and in policy.
in a few months, most of the unions in SA BBTSU and SODOMEI had
ted with SORTO, leaving SANB TSU an empty shell, which it has
remained ever since. In 1954, SANBETSU numbered less than 30, 000 members.
years were to elapse after the formation of SCHYC before the
!d regain their influence in the labor movement.
aftlacan
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Communist Party
Iscr t infutratim of S -? TO,
to an effort to regain
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