(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000200210002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: ALL STATIONS CONCERNED
1. The attached interpretation of the 19th Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow, October 1952) has been prepared for
transmission to friendly liaison services for their comment and criticism
and, particularly, to establish a better understanding between our service
and liaison on the following important points,
2, It is possible that in the course of the new Soviet-Communist
softening-up tactics, government: or other pressure will be brought on
liaison services to de-emphasize their coverage and investigation of local
Communist Parties, The attached report may serve as a warning against
this emergency, and as a springboard for discussions as to how to pre-
pare against it,
3. One need not be alarmist in order to recognize that the new, soft
Communist "United Front" tactic which is going to be stepped up from
now on, is more dangerous than the hard revolutionary line, The Communist
order of the day is to split the Western Alliance, Friendly liaison services
should be brought into the front line to stave off the attack.
4. The report consists of an analysis of the 19th CPSU Congress and
several supporting appendices. Attached to the report is a watch list of
indications concerning the new Soviet-Communist tactics.
5. This watch list should also be transmitted to liaison with a
request to report pertinent data regularly. Stations are requested to submit
monthly follow-up reports on the information requested in the watch list,
6. An internal watch committee has been organized withi 25X1A2d1
in order to review Soviet-Communist tactics on a permanent basis. Thus
it will be possible to service liaison with headquarters information and
evaluations.
7, All Divisions and Stations are responsible for speedy and
effective handling of this transaction. The responsible headquarters staff
will continuously review the progress achieved in this matter.
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THE 19TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
5 - 14 October 1952
1. On 20 August, the Soviet press announced that the CPSU had convoked
an All-Union Party Congress for 5 Octobers It was the first full Congress since
March, 1939--a lapse of over 13 years. The Agenda called for three main
reports to be delivered- a report for the Central Committee by G. M. Malenkov,
a report on the Five year Plan by M. Z, Saburov, Chief of the GOSPLAN, and
a report by N. S. Khrushchev on proposed changes in the Statutes of the Party,
2. The Congress was attended by over a thousand voting delegates, 167
non-voting delegates, and more than 120 foreign Communist leaders.
3. Just before the Congress began, the Party periodical, Bolshevik,
published an article by Stalin entitled "Economic Problems of Socialism in the
USSR," which set forth some new refinements in Soviet economic -social
theory and which has as an important effect the further postponement of the
achievement of Communist society, On the last day of the Congress, Stalin
addressed a short message to the foreign Communists. It was not very precise,
but it left room for speculation as to its effect on the tactics of the non-
satellite Communist Parties and their relation to the Soviet Union. The atten-
tion of the Congress, so far as non-Satellite CPQs were concerned, was
focused on the tactics of the CP's of Western Europe. Relatively little
serious consideration was given to non-Satellite Parties in other parts of the
world,
4. The Congress, and the Stalin article in Bolshevik, which set the line
of the Congress--
(1) Endorsed continuation of East-West tension, and of attempts to
aggravate friction among the Western Allies, particularly, between
the U. S. and Western European countries, through a ste.P-ed-up united
front tactic and "peace" campaign;
(2). Once again demonstrated complete subordination of the international
Communist movement to Soviet State interests, and reaffirmed Stalin
in power;
(3) Pointed to tighter Soviet organizational controls over the Communist
Parties abroad and to closer supervision of their activities,
(4) Endorsed the continuation of the military and industrial buildup of the
Soviet-Satellite block;
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(5) Again postponed the achievement of Communism in the USSR;
(6) indicated a substantial increase in powers of the State-
(7) Revised the Party Statutes in terms that suggest an alteration in
the nature and role of the Party;
(8) Elected the members of the Central Committee, which then
elected the menzLe
.i i b G '_s L 'he art~y a
(9) Elected an 11-man committee to revise the Party program, The
first revision of the program since 1919, the recommendations of the
Committee should cast additional light on the character and role of
the Party. The committee is headed by Stalin, and includes four
Politburo members, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Kaganovich- also
P. N. Pospelov, Director of the Marx -Engels -Leniin Institute; P. F.
Yudin, a Party theoretician and chief editor of the Cominform
Journal; Otto V. Kuusinen; A. M. Rumyantsev, M. Z. Saburov, and
Doge Chesnikov,
5. The following paper discusses the most significant results of the
Congress. Considerable leeway has been allowed for ideas that are, at
the moment, purely speculative. Their validity will be tested by actual
events in the next year or so. For the moment, it is hoped that interested
readers of this tentative analysis will take the opportunity to criticize it at
length and in any respect, or to add to it any interpretation which may have
been overlooked.
Attached to the paper are several more detailed analyses of various
aspects of the Congress.
A.
B-
C.
D-
E.
Foreign CPas
Comparison of New and Old Statutes
Composition of the Central Committee
Composition of the Presidium
Soviet Domestic Affairs
These were prepared to establish bases for the discussion, but it was felt
that they might be usefully attached to the paper for readers who care to
examine the problems in detail.
6. Soviet World View and Policy. There has been no change in the
Soviet World View, The "two-camp" concept still holds.. It has been
broadened by the enunciation of its economic counterpart, the division
of the world market between the two "camps. 10 Recognition of this
division was implicit in the calling of the Moscow Economic Conference
of April 1952.
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Soviet political and propagandistic pressure on the West is to be
continued. It will be intensified in an effort to split the Western Block and
to isolate the U, So
This attempt will operate on two levels. (1) internationally, the Soviets
will maintain general tension, particularly vis-a-vis the U. S. ; will intensify
economic warfare, and may try to defect individual countries from the
Western Block by offering to settle secondary issues; ~Z) within each of the
Western Countries, the Communist Party will try to soften up support of
the Western security program by means of the "united front" tactic,
operating on the "peace" movement, playing up the high costs of military
defenses, United States aggressive intentions, interference of the U. S.
in national affairs, and the abandonment of democratic freedoms by the
national governments,
The Soviets anticipate an East-West war, not in the immediate future,
but eventually. Meanwhile, they are doing what they can to weaken the
effectiveness of the Western security system and the strength of individual
Western countries, and are continuing to build up their own military power
and basic industries.
Stalin emphasized the complete identification of interest between the
USSR and the foreign CP's. Their role in the softening-up program is
vital to the Soviets. However, maximum effectiveness in the "softening-
up" effort cannot be achieved unless the CP9s in most of the countries of
Western Europe set aside, for the time being, their hopes for Socialist
revolution,
Stalin's article in Bolshevik implies that the united front peace
tactic is temporary. "Victory" is "certain," he says. The Communists
in Western Europe have it easier than did the Bolsheviks in 1917, Governmental
repression is less severe; the Communists have the benefits of the practical
lessons of the CP's of Russia and Eastern Europe and of their example and
guidance; the ruling bourgeoisie of Western European countries have
"exposed" themselves and can no longer claim popular support, The
"struggle for peace" and "democracy" can lead to coalition governments
which may withdraw from the Western security system or slow down their
defensive efforts. Eventually, the united -front -peace tactic may lead to
situations where it could be abandoned in favor of an outright revolution on
orthodox "socialist" terms,. Meanwhile, the united front-peace tactic would
probably arouse opposition on the part of "firebrand" elements within the
Western European CP's, Stalin recognized this possibility and indicated that
by "helping" these Parties, the CPSU would have to exercise firm control
over them to keep the opposition in line.
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7, Southeast Asia, The absence of delegates from some of the
countries of the Far East (Japan, Malaya, Philippines, Thailand, Indo-
China) can only be noted as curious. It cannot be explained by any firm
reasoning. As has been remarked, the Congress did not produce any-
thing. new or significant regarding Communist tactics in Southeast Asia
or Japan. No change of tactics in the Far East was indicated.
8. Economic Policy, The economic programs of the Satellites
will probably be revised to speed up their integration into the Soviet
economy, Soviet economy itself will remain geared to the military
build -up.
The division of the world market between the two "camps" is
interpreted by the Soviets as leading to increasing friction among the
capitalist countries. It is possible that they will dangle attractive (and
insincere) trade proposals before individual western countries in an
effort to aggravate these frictions. Dumping of goods from the Soviet-
Satellite economy onto the world market was also hinted at.
References by Stalin, Malenkov and others to the possibility of wars
between capitalist countries were timed to increase the climate of
tension which the Soviets need in order to make their economic warfare
moves more palatable. As long as capitalism exists, some kind of war
is inevitable. A war among the capitalist countries is just one more
possibility,
? 9. The Foreign CP's. Stalin made it clear in his speech to the
Congress that the foreign CPIs must be "helped." In his article in
Bolshevik, he expressed dissatisfaction with the ideological level of
most of the fraternal Parties. In other words, he expressly recognized
that many western Communists would not be able to understand the why
or the how of the united front tactic, particularly when it means the
temporary shelving of their-immediate revolutionary aims.
It is clear that he intends that the foreign CP's will be more closely
supervised then heretofore; material assistance in the form of money or
propaganda was probably also contemplated.
As has been noted, the role of the Western CP's is to carry out the
softening-up process by means of the united front.
The united front tactic should not be misinterpreted as indicating
a lessening of over-all East-West tension, It is not aimed at lulling the
West as a whole into a false sense of security, but at undermining the
conviction on the part of the people_ in individual Western countries
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that it is necessary to continue to support the Western allaince with the
U. S. and to carry the taxation and other economic burdens of rearmament,
and that it is the USSR which represents the real threat to peace, No
concessions by the Soviets on major issues were indicated. No lessening
of hostility to the governments of Western Europe was implied. And, of
course, the virulence of Soviet attacks upon the United States was only
increased, .
The united front tactic can be effective only in a climate of general
tension. The Soviets provide the tension; the foreign CPIs exploit the
consequences of the tension.
The objectives and demands of the united-front as it is currently
being applied are these:
(1) the U. S. is singled out as the main enemy, not only of peace,
but also, of its allies, The latter are not equal partners of the
U. S. , but are merely its tools, This is aimed, obviously, at
arousing general hatred for the U. S. and suspicions of U. S,
intentions towards its allies.
(2) The ruling bourgeoisie in the countries of Western Europe have
sold out to the U. S. to maintain their share of the dwindling
capitalist market. This is aimed at exposing the ruling .
bourgeoisie as traitors and at isolating governments that continue
to cooperate with the U. So
(3) The bourgeois regimes have become fascist; have abandoned the
formula of democratic freedoms by which they have disguised their
control of society and with which they were previously able to
corr#ete against the Communists for the support of the people.
(4) The Communists must "take up the banner of bourgeois democracy."
By posing as the champions of traditional liberties, they will
confuse many democrats who are uneasy about any suppression of
freedom, even those of the Communists, who provoked the repressions
in the first place. (The "democratization" of the CPSU is probably
part and parcel of this pose, and the Western CPIs may very well
adapt their own organizations along similar lines. )
(5) The Parties must not indulge in "premature" revolutionary
attempts. They must concentrate on legal political activities. They
must play down doctrinaire Communist demands and promises;
emphasizing, on the contrary, demands for "peace" and "democratic
liberties." This does not mean an end to Communist-inspired
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violence. It does mean, however, that violence will be identified
with disguised slogans and not with Communism. To keep the
government on the defensive and to provoke it into police counter-
action, a certain amount of violence is probably necessary; but it
must not be allowed to get out of hand, and it must always be
identified with ,'peace," "democracy," lower taxes, real workers'
demands, and the like.
A number of ways by which the Parties may organize and carry out the united
front tactic are outlined in the "Watch List" attached to this paper.
10. Character of the CPSU. The changes in the Party Statutes suggest
a radical change in the character of the CPSU and in its relations to the
Soviet State, That some alteration in the character of the Party has been
performed is clear. What is more difficult is to assess what the alteration
means,
It can be interpreted to mean that the Party is simply registering by
means of its Statutes a recognition of post-World War II realities: the
achievement of Socialism-in-one -country; the end of class warfare in the
USSR; complete identification of Party interests with those of the State.
Accordingly, there is no basic change in the role of the Party vis-a-vis the
Government as we have known it: the exercise of total control over the
Government by the Party through the parallel authority of the Party apparatus
at all levels of the State machinery, and through the system of interlocking
membership of Party leaders in directing organs of both sides of these
parallel systems.
This interpretation is based upon the following evidence:
(1) there is no formal recognition of a lessening of the power of leading
Party organs in the Statutes, nor was such a lessening implied in any
of the proceedings of the Congress;
(2) Most of the new members of the Central Committee and the new
Presidium were promoted up the Party ladder;
(3) Many of the new members at the top of the Party hierarchy were
appointed to important administrative posts in the St ate bureaucracy;
(4) A separate and totally disciplined, totally controlled apparatus is
necessary to control the various power arms of the State; to keep them
from competing with each other for absolute mastery, and to ensure
their harmonious functioning in different fields, but according to a
single basic plan and policy.
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Finally, it should be noted that the lead editorial in the 24 October issue of
the Cominform J onrnal stated that the leading role of the Party had not
merely been preserved, but had actually been increased:
'? The carrying out of the grand programme for building Communist
society raises to a still higher level the leading and directing role of
the Communist Party, the significance of its organization and
ideological-educational work."
Against this view is one which sees in the Statutes and in the proceedings
of the Congress the preparation for an eventual subordination of the power of
the Party to that of the State machine. The evidence supporting this thesis is
the following:
(1) The nature and role of the Party as they are defined in the new statutes.
It is no longer defined as the "organized vanguard of the working class, .. .
the highest form of its class organization," an organization of militant,
select, and disciplined revolutionaries who lead all institutions of the
State. It is now defined simply as "a voluntary militant union of
Communists holding the same views." The latter new definition does
not appear to be a definition of the main instrumentality of a dictator i,?,,.7.
apparatus.
( 2) The name of the Party has been changed, On its face, it is ser ".e
enough to drop the word "Bolshevik" from the title, leaving only the r, r 1
"Communist" since there is no longer any real distinction between txem:nn.
This is the explanation the Khrushchev gave. It will not hold water,
however, for there has been for so long a symbolic meaning to the word
"Bolshevik. " It has stood, not merely as an historical symbol of Lenin
and the Revolution, but also for perfectly definite principles of
organization and of the relation of the Party to the State. The explanut _
fails to say why it was thought necessary to retain this symbol for so 1, Z-1
(3) Manner of depicting relation of the Party to the State. The third '-..c
of evidence supporting the theory that the Party may eventually be
subordinated to the State is that, in the old Statutes, the Party was
pictured as being outside au;td above the State and other non-Party
institutions and organizations. This connotation is absent from the new
Statutes, and its absence is meaningful. The rules and duties of Communists
as defined in the new Statutes are much more closely related to Society
(1, e, , State) than heretofore.
(4) The tasks of Soviet economy in the transition from Socialism to
Communism are defined by Stalin in terms implying an even greater
extension of the powers of the State: (a) continued expansion of basic
industry; (b) reorganization of the system of commodity exchange,
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beginning with the confiscation by the State of the products of the
collective f: -nn; (c) an enormous expansion of educational (particularly,
of technical training) facilities,
(5) The objectives of Socialist economy are expressed by Stalin in
terms tha, -~ea?, e their execution in the hands of the State machine, and
that leave little for the Party to do: "The essential forms and require-
ments of the basic law of socialism might be formulated approximately
as follows: Assurance of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly
growing material and cr'.> .ral requirements of all society by means of
uninterrupted growth, she perfection of socialist production on
the basis of the highest techniques,"
(6) The administration of Communist economy, in the indefinite time
when the main tasks (prerequisites outlined in (4) above) and the
objectives (in (5) above) have been achieved, appears to be, in Stalin's
Bolshevik article, essentially a continuation of the same methods of
administration as are to be in force from now on--state planning,
state control of distribution, state management at all points of production.
The necessity or a Communist Party is not automatic.
(7) The powers of the State have enormously increased since 1939 (the
MGB-MVD; the administrative powers of the bureaucracy; the propa-
ganda apparatus; the Armed Forces),
(8) The Statutes and other pronouncements at the Congress laid much
more stress upon State (and industrial) discipline than previously,
(9) Encouragement of "criticism from below" tends to weaken the
position of lower Party organizations and to subject the Party to the
vicious system of self -protective spying and informing which has
infected the State, but which may have been less practiced in the Party
itself.
(10) Expulsions from Party membership are now effectable for "offenses
punishable by the courts" unon "receipt of the reports on, , a the misdeeds
from the administrative or judicial authorities, 10
(11) Great stress is laid, not on the Party organization as such, but upon
the personal initiative of individual Communists, to see that the State
functions smoothly and efficiently.
(12) The Presidium is a much larger and therfore, a more unwieldy
body than was the Politburo, Unless a smaller, inner, ruling body
mss
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emerges (the Secretariat, or part of the Presidium), authority : jthin the
Party leadership will be greatly diffused. (It is recalled that t.-Le Central
Committee--in Lenin's time, a genuinely effective leading body--was
several times enlarged for the deliberate purpose of diluting its
authority. )
11. The interpretation outlined above is a radical approach to explaining
what may have been intended by the rewriting of the Party statutes. It is put
forward primarily to provoke thought, comment, and watchfulness over
forthcoming events which may tend to support it or to disprove it entirely,
It is a tentative hypothesis, and nothing more. Should it prove out in fact,
the implications. are as yet only dimly discernable, but are probably enormous,
They are, however, consistent with what we believe Stalin represents.
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