NARCOTICS COUNTRY PAPERS - NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

State Dept. review completed
Approved For,~,elease 2002/05/17 CIA-RDP78-000528900100100005-2
NARCOTICS COUNTRY PAPERS - NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Afghanistan
Egypt
Greece
India
Iran
Israel
Lebanon
Nepal
Pakistan
Turkey
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 00100100005-2
Approved For_&le se 1Q61105/1:6IrA- P
ib_
BRIEFING PAPER
NARCOTICS COUNTRY PAPER
AFGHANISTAN
1. ILLICIT DRUG PROBLEM
Reliable statistics on opium production and trade in
Afghanistan are not available. Estimates of acreage devoted
to poppy cultivation range widely, and production estimates
run from about 50 to as much as 200 metric tons of raw opium
gum per year. Much of the poppy cultivation is in relatively
remote parts of the country where administrative control is
weak, and one of:. the areas suspected of being a major producer
is st..l primarily organized along tribal lines.
Domestic use of opium is believed to be.small, and there
is no evidence of the processing of morphine base or the
?manufacture of heroin in the country. Hashish is readily
available, cheap, and locally consumed to a larger, although
still. relatively small degree. Both consumption and traf-
ficking are reported to be increasing, with itinerant foreign
visitors, especially young hippies, being the largest known
contributors to both. Most Afghan opium is believed to be
smuggled to Iran where it is consumed, but significant quant-
ities of hashish are smuggled directly to Europe and the
United States.
2. DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS
The production and trade of opium are illegal in Afghanistan,
but enforcement measures are not effective. The Government
of Afghanistan is becoming increasingly aware of the problem,
and has recently established two cabinet committees to deal
with it. Seizures of illicit drugs have increased recently
with a couple of dramatic raids made during early 1972.
Nevertheless, a comprehensive control effort has not yet
been inaugurated, and it is expected that Afghanistan will
require considerable outside assistance to mount an effective
control program.
Afghanistan is a party to the Single: Convention and is
participating in the Plenipotentiary Conference to Amend the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,, 1961. The Government
has recently indicated its interest in joining as an observer
the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs ad hoc Committee on
Illicit Traffic in Near and Middle East.
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 Approved For aplease 2002/05/17: CIA-RDP78-000523Q00 !1 %!'
Although there are a number of proposals under con-
sideration, we know of no bilateral or multilateral sup-
pression progra-ms underway in Afghanistan. There is, however,
a poE.cn advisory team from a Western country resident in
Afrghalai`_ tan, and a full complement of UN specialized agencies
With programs in Afghanistan, which might be helpful as
control programs are developed.
3. U.S. PROGRA14S
A representative of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) has been stationed in Kabul since
1970 as part of our international narcotics control program,
and a second officer is being assigned. In a more general
sense, the AID technical assistance program has as one of
.its major objectives assisting Afghanistan develop more
effective government administration which will have applica-
tion for better narcotics control. We are discussing with
the Government of Afghanistan how we might be helpful in
controlling the narcotics problem, and are hopeful that
cooperative measures will soon be undertaken.
3/72
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 Approved Foraelease 2002/05/17: CIA-RDP78-0005 ?Ri--2
QUESTION: How much opium from Afghanistan reaches the U. S.
drug market?
ANSWER: So far as we know, opium from Afghanistan has not
found its way into the heroin traffic reaching the
United States. It is of generally low quality,
making it difficult to transform into heroin.
QUESTION: Are young Americans involved in the hippy-drug
business-in Afghanistan?
ANSWER: Unfortunately, young Americans are the largest group
resident in Kabul for the apparent sole purpose of
obtaining drugs.cheaply. Many of them have been
.used as couriers for the hashish traffic. Perhaps
even more unfortunate are the young who are drawn
into the drug business more or less by accident.
These are youth trying to learn about the world
through travel, without the necessary resources.
They have also been recruited as couriers.
QUESTION: What are the penalties for illegal narcotics
activities in Afghanistan?
ANSWER: Penalties for Afghans can be very severe under.
Islamic law, but few arrests are made. Foreigners
caught smuggling narcotics out of Afghanistan receive
small fines and the loss of the contraband plus
short periods of imprisonment while awaiting prose-
cution, but so far no sentences to prison have been
handed down.
QUESTION: Why does Afghanistan permit these hippies to break
its laws and get away with such lenient treatment?
ANSWER: The Afghan tradition calls for hospitality to all
strangers, and although Afghan officials and private
citizens deeply resent the corrupting influence of
foreign hippies on Afghan youth, the Government has
hoped that sending countries could somehow control
their wandering youth.
3/72 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 Approved For&ia 1hIiEIA-IP7$'0-6652&00100100005-2
13RIEFING PAPER
], . ILLTC.IT DRUG PROBLEM
Production of illicit drugs in Egypt is negligible and
transit through Egypt is limited to small amounts of hashish
which go to Libya. Egypt has 150,000 opium addicts for whom
five to six tons of raw opium is annually imported illegally,
chiefly from Turkey but some also from Iran; about one quarter
of the illegally imported opium is seized by the Egyptian
government. Hashish, imported illegally from Lebanon, is
readily available and widely used by adult males; Egyptian
authorities seize twelve to fifteen tons annually. The use
and availability of opium derivatives, synthetic drugs,
amphetamines, etc. is negligible.
Egyptian customs and border police serve as a primary
line of defense against illegal importation of narcotics.
The Ministry of the Interior, Anti-Narcotics Administration
is headed by a Major General of the police. It has three
departments: investigation, intelligence, and'foreign affairs
with 35 branch offices in the governorates. It has the power
to investigate, arrest, and detain. The Egyptian government
is aware of the drug control problem and interested in solving
it. Our most useful consultations on amending the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs have been with the Egyptian
government.
3. U.S. DRUG CONTROL PROGRAMS
In the absence of any drugs transiting from Egypt to the
U.S., and of diplomatic relations, our assistance to Egypt
in the drug control area is limited this year to training
one Egyptian Interior Ministry officer, one Egyptian Customs
officer and an Egyptian journalist in appropriate U.S. pro-
grams. We agreed in 1930 with the Egyptian government to
exFhange intelligence relating to illegal drug traffic.
3/72 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 Approved For gei se 126bN6M 1tTA-FRfSP $'-do 5 00100100005-2
CiRIEFING PAPER
NARCOTICS COUNTRY PAPER
GREECE
1. ILLICIT DRUG PROBLEM
There is no significant production or consumption
of narcotics in Greece. The Greeks themselves are
not prone to use drugs and their use by foreigners
has been curtailed by a stiff drug prevention act.
Should the Turkish-Bulgarian route for opium traffic
to Europe. be closed, Greece could possibly become
an important transit route.
2. DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS
The Greek Customs authorities are making serious
attempts at controlling drug traffic through Greece
and are cooperating closely with the United States
Customs and BNDD to improve their capabilities. The
Greek efforts are complicated by, the enormous flow
of tourists through the country during the summer
months (nearly 3,000,000 arrivals in 1971).
3. U.S. PROGRAMS
As mentioned above, the United States is assist-
ing the Greek government to improve its ability to
control the traffic of drugs through Greece. We are
presently providing training material and appropriate
intelligence information as well as reinforcing our
working relationship with the Greek enforcement
agencies.
Appr3o l For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 D[= ('AFRTMEi?,1T OF STATE
Approved Forgelease 20d-2Ib Wf:r ti* RbA7%46052p00100100005-2
NARCOTICS COUNTRY PAPER
1. ILLICIT. DRUG PROBLEM
The illegal movement of opium in and out of India
is small in rblation to internal production and con-
sumption. About 5 to 10 metric tons enters from
Pakistan and much smaller quantities enter from Nepal.
.The amount smuggled out has been estimated at 10 to 20
metric tons, with about half going to each of the
Arabian Peninsula and the Far East. Small, but
increasing quantities of hashish are being intercepted
in possession of "hippie" travelers and in outgoing
mail.
India's consumption of illicit opium at around
200 metric tons a year amounts to less than .015 of an
ounce per capita. While heavy use is reportedly rare --
due to its social unacceptability in many areas -- it
is believed that crude forms of opium have long been
widely consumed. Also, "bhang," a mild variety of
marijuana, and "ganga," a stronger form, are most
common. Hashish has long been on the India scene and
still represents a limited problem.
2. DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS
The cultivation, processing, sale, possession and
use of opium and marijuana and their derivatives are
illegal except under Government supervision. All States
have enacted narcotics control laws similar to those of
the Central Government. Although provisions against
opium seem well designed and enforced, those against
marijuana, hashish and less refined forms are permissive
and loosely administered. Maximum penalties rarely
exceed three years and a fine.
The production and sale of raw opium are controlled
relatively effectively by two main devices. First, cul-
tivation is licensed, and a minimum output of 20 kilograms
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 Approved For elease 2002/05/17: CIA-RDP78-00052Rp00100100005-2
-2 INDIA
per hectare is required to retain a license. Second, a
price incentive scale encourages sale of extra yields to
the Gover.nm:ment. Further, the scale has been shifted up-
ward sharply in the past few years.
India has signed the 1961 Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs and complies with its provisions. Its
annual reports to the UN under this convention contain
a detailed account of India's preventive measures,
illicit traffic-and quantities of drugs intercepted.
While India's attitude toward international regulation
of narcotics has been constructive, it would likely
object to the total-suppression of licit production
and trade in view of its substantial share of the world
trade in legal opium.
3-. US PROGRAMS
There are no US drug control programs in India.
3/72
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 [DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Approved For Release 2080 ' ,i,~4,~`- 71L(Q052R 00100100005-2
NARCOTICS COUNTRY PAPER
1. ILLICIT DRUG PROBLEM
Iran is a victim nation with a large number of
domestic opium addicts and a growing number of heroin
addicts., In 1955 cultivation of the poppy in Iran
was banned. Although the ban was enforced, a lively
smuggling trade from Turkey and Afghanistan developed
which proved beyond Iran's capacity to control.
Because of this, Iran in 1969 resumed legal cultivation
of the opium poppy. Approximately one-third of Iran's
declining opium addict population is now maintained on
licitly produced domestic opium; the remaining two-
thirds receive their opium from illicit foreign sources.
There are approximately 50,000 heroin addicts, and
their number is increasing. Such evidence as there is
indicates that the heroin addicts tend to be younger,
and are concentrated in urban areas; the opium addicts
were much more numerous a generation ago, and are now
mainly older people in rural areas. There is a danger
that, with the Turks phasing out of opium production,
the demand will shift to more Eastern suppliers and
Iran may become a conduit for narcotics originating
in Afghanistan and Pakistan and destined for Europe
and the United States. There is no evidence that
Iranian-produced opium enters the illicit international
traffic at present.
2. DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS
Iran in 1969 introduced Draconian measures in-an
effort to crack down on the smugglers, concurrently
with its resumption of domestic opium production.
Since 1969 over one hundred convicted smugglers have
been executed by firing squad, and the traffic from
Turkey into Iran has been greatly curtailed owing to
increased cooperation between their governments. The
long Iranian border with Afghanistan remains a problem
because of the difficult terrain and because the
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-000528000100100005-2
2
smugglers offer well-organized armed resistance. The
Iranians have plans to up-grade their capabilities for
policing this border. In 1971 two helicopters were
purchased from the U.S. Army for use in border sur-
veillance, and the Gendarmerie plans to acquire' more
in 1972. The Iranian Government has announced its
readiness to re-impose a ban on opium poppy cultivation
as soon as its neighbors have succeeded in significantly
reducing the 'low of illicit drugs into Iran. The
Iranian Government has taken a responsible and helpful
position in international organizations dealing with
narcotics, and has recently agreed to co-sponsor the
U.S.-initiated "consensus package" amendments to the
Single Convention on Narcotics. Iran has also agreed
to participate in the Ad Hoc Middle East Committee of
the Council on Narcotic Drugs.
3. U.S. DRUG CONTROL PROGRAM
We have proposed to the Iranian Government a program
of close cooperation in drug control matters and the
initial response of the Iranians has been entirely
favorable. We envisage providing training to Iranian
Gendarmerie, Customs, and Police officials; advice in
intelligence collection; increased border surveillance
capability; and perhaps advice in treatment and re-
habilitation. There are presently in Iran: a U.S.
Narcotics Advisor to the Iranian Gendarmerie, a BNDD
Special Agent, an HEW psychiatrist working on reha-
bilitation problems, and there may be some additional
assistance to the Iranian Customs Service in the future.
We are encouraged by the cooperative attitude of the
Iranian Government and are hopeful that an effective
drug control program will be established in Iran.
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
3/72
 Approved For elease 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052 p00100100005-2
QUESTION: Is there any leakage into the illicit traffic
from legal Iranian opium production?
ANSI/ER: To the best of our knowledge there is none.
The Iranian system of controls is very strict;
licenses are required, and these are only given
to cooperative-type farms, not to individual
farmers, thus making control easier. The crop
is harvested in the presence of police and the
opium is kept under lock and key at all phases
of its processing. Since the price paid to
the cooperative farmer by the Government is
higher than"the illicit price, and since
internal demand is greater than domestic
production, leakage is highly unlikely.
QUESTION: Is the Royal Family involved in the narcotics
traffic?
ANSWER: We have no evidence that might lend credence
to this scurrilous charge. Last week the
Swiss police reportedly issued a warrant for
the arrest of a man who holds the courtesy
title of "Prince" because of his position as
a leading member of an.important tribe in Iran;
he is not, however, related in any way to the
Iranian Royal Family. Apparently the warrant
was not served owing to his diplomatic status.
The facts of this incident remain far from
clear and we have only sketchy press reports
to go on; in any event it did not occur
within U.S. jurisdiction. We understand that
the Iranian Government is conducting an in-
vestigation and may have a statement at a
later date. We have no reason to believe
that the Royal Family is in any way implicated
in this case. We believe the severity of
Iran's anti-illicit narcotics laws and their
-------vigorous-enforcement accurately reflect the
attitude of the Shah and his government`"
toward this matter.
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 LDEPARTMEENT OF STATE
Approved For4elease 2QQAQ5j7 I,+A-IRRR-Z (905? 00100100005-2
NARCOTICS COUNTRY PAPER
ISRAEL
1. II1L7,TCIT DRU PROBLEM
Israel is not a known producer of either opium poppies
or cannabis (hashi'sh), nor is it believed to be a transit
static for opium or opium derivatives. Limited quantities of
hashish do, however, enter the country from neighboring Arab
states. Sporadic attempts to re-export some of this hashish
continue to decline as a 'result of alert Israeli customs pro-
cedures and publicity given convictions for drug trafficking.
Similarly, on the domestic side, the relatively rare incidence
of hashish use by Israeli citizens and foreign tourists does
not presently constitute a significant problem.
2. DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS
Israeli frontiers are among the best policed in the world.
As suggested above, the efforts of the,.Israeli Defense Forces,
Border Police and customs officials have proven quite effec-
tive in keeping the drug situation in Israel under control.
Moreover, the Israeli authorities use established Interpol
channels to exchange promptly and efficiently information on
international narcotics matters.
3. U.S. PROGRAMS
There are no specific U.S. programs aimed at assisting
Israel in the field of narcotics control, nor would current
circumstances justify the establishment of any such programs.
As a matter of policy, the American Embassy does, however,
take advantage of appropriate occasions to demonstrate our
interest in continued Israeli vigilance with regard to illicit
drug practices. ,
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
3/72
 DEF'ARTMF NT OF STATE
Approved For$elease 20/I1 : hfA- >d052Zg00100100005-2
NARCOTICS COUNTRY PAPER
LEBANON
1. ILLICIT DRUG PROBLEM
Lebanon plays a relatively minor role in illicit
hard drug production, processing or trafficking.
Turkish opium smuggled into Lebanon has decreased
markedly over the past. few years as alternative routes
for smuggling opium from Turkey to Western Europe hava
been developed. However," Lebanon is a major producer
of hashish, the majority of which (some 200 tons annually)
is smuggled into Egypt. In spite of stringent Lebanese
narcotics laws, the Government of Lebanon has generalLy
been ineffective in controlling production and large-
scale trafficking of hashish.
2. DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS
The Lebanese police includes a small narcotics
section with which the BNDD Attache's office maintains
good relations. Arrests of traffickers are made in
cooperation with BNDD in the Beirut area. Seizures and
arrests in France and other countrids result from infor-
mation developed by the BNDD representatives. Control
efforts in Lebanon are complicated by mountainous border
areas, by a laissez faire mercantilist tradition and by
lingering vestiges of a feudalistic system which often
lends considerable protection in high places to local
producers of hashish. Our Embassy is maintaining liaison
on the drug problem with the French Embassy in Beirut.
3. U.S. PROGRAMS
There are no U.S. programs aimed specifically at
improving the training, equipment and communications
of the narcotics section of the Lebanese police. How-
ever, we have under consideration upgrading the capa-
bilities of Lebanese customs officials by offering
training in the United States. In addition, we are
urging stricter enforcement of existing narcotics laws
by the Government of Lebanon.
3,44roved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 LEI3ANON
Approved For, elease 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052 p00100100005-2
QUESTION: Is opium produced in Lebanon?
ANSWER: No. However, a small amount of Turkish opium
and morphine base are smuggled into Lebanon
directly. The opiates do not remain in
Lebanol but are shipped to processing
laboratories in-.France.
QUESTION: What are we doing to control this problem?
ANSWER: ' The -BNDD has representatives in Beirut who
are coordinating their efforts with Lebanese
police. Seizures and arrests in France have
resulted from information developed by the
BNDD representatives in Beirut.
QUESTION: Isn't Lebanon a major producer of hashish?
ANSWER: Yes. It is estimated that Lebanon produces
some 200 tons annually of-hashish, most of
which is smuggled into Egypt. The Lebanese
Government is attempting to control culti-
vation, but efforts are complicated by
mountainous border areas, by a laissez faire
mercantilist tradition and by lingering
vestiges of a feudalistic system which often
lends considerable protection in high places
to local producers of hashish.
3/72
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 DEPARTME=NT CAF STATE
Approved For- aelease 206 11 M f , ldI -F f$E0bb5Z p00100100005-2
NARCOTICS COUNTRY PAPER
NEPAL
1. ILLICIT DRUG PROBLEM
There is little information available on the produc-
tion, movements abuse and control of narcotic drugs in
Nepal. The country is not mentioned as a source of pro-
duction of opium in reports on the drug problem. However,
the opium poppy reportedly is grown illegally in valleys
and foothills of Nepal near producing areas in Northern
India, and small quantities are believed smuggled into
India. Hashish reportedly is also produced illicitly in
Nepal, and some has been intercepted entering India.
2. DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS
According to a United Nations source, the Government
of Nepal prohibited the unauthorized cultivation of
cannabis in 1960, but little is known about controls
anc tiefr enforcement. Nepal and India consult, period-
ically, on measures to limit the illicit traffic of opium
and marijuana drugs into India. Control is difficult,
however, owing to the terrain and long border.
3. US PROGRAMS
3/72
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Approved Forgelease 2 Yd'. to-li 7> Mb05?,000100100005-2
NARCOTIC:; COUNTRY PAPER
PAKISTAN
1. ILLICIT DRUG PRO33LEM
According to the Government of Pakistan, opium is pro-
duced under official control, with poppy cultivation licensed
by provincial governments and the raw opium delivered to the
government. After processing, the opium is disposed of
through licensed vendors to registered addicts. About 2,500
acres of poppies, mostly in the North-West Frontier Province
(NWr P) , are licensed under this system, with a reported yield
of 10 metric tons of raw opium gum. Pakistan does not have a
quota for the export of opium, and is committed to eliminate
the use of opium for purposes other than medical and scientific
by 1979.
There are two additional sources of opium production
which the government does not control: (1) unlicensed pro-
duction in the NWFP and (2) unauthorized production in the
tribal areas adjacent to the NWFP which are essentially un-
administered. In addition, per acre yields of licensed
fields may be higher than indicated by official procurement.
Total illicit production in Pakistan may be about 50 tons of
raw gum annually.
The disposition of the unlicensed raw opium produced in
Pakistan is unknown, but it is believed that much moves
illegally through Afghanistan to Iran or into channels of
trade and consumption in Pakistan itself. It is generally
available locally on a black-market basis and is either eaten
or, more rarely, smoked. Little if any heroin, however, is
consumed in Pakistan, and none is produced as far as we know.
Local use and addiction is not considered a major problem.
Substantial amounts of hashish are produced in West
Pakistan, and much of it is exported illegally to Europe
and the United States, often in specially prepared vehicles
which are shipped from Karachi. Again, local use is not
considered a major problem.
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 Approved Forelease 2002/05/17: CIA-RDP78-0005W0010010MTAN
Responsibility for control over production and-trade of
opium is divided. Provincial governments are responsible
for controlling cultivation, internal movement and consump-
tion. Major responsibility for suppressing exportation rests
in the Central Ex:cise and Land Customs, with support from
Sea Customs, provincial police, and para-military forces
along land borders.
We are u-zaware of any bilateral efforts at drug control
in Pakistan beyond those mentioned below. Pakistan is a
party to the Single Convention and has agreed in principle to
the U.S. proposed amendments. Pakistan is a member of the
ad hoc Committee on Illicit Traffic in the Near and Middle
East formed during the October 1971 meeting of the Commission
on Narcotic Drugs.
3. U.S. PROGRAMS
We have initiated a dialogue with' the Government of
Pakistan with the objective of gaining additional information
about the narcotics problem and discovering cdoperative
bilateral or multilateral means of controlling it. We have
informed the Pakistanis that we are prepared to be helpful
if Pakistan decides to undertake a vigorous opium suppression
effort. For several years we have had in Pakistan an AID
Public Safety Program which has provided some vehicle-E, and
communications equipment to the Excise and Land Custoris
office in Karachi. Additional cooperative measures may result
from talks currently underway.
3/72
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 PAKISTAN
Approved For;,elease 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-0005000100100005-2
QUESTION: Does opium from Pakistan enter the traffic destined
for. United States markets?
ANSWER: So far as we know, opium from Pakistan has not found
its way into the heroin traffic reaching the United
States. It is of generally low quality, making it
difficult to transform into heroin.
QUESTION: Why does the Government of Pakistan not exercise
control in the tribal areas?
ANSWER: The tribal areas.'of Pakistan's North-West Frontier
Province have in recent times been controlled only
indirectly, first by the British, and, since 1947
by the Pakistanis. This is a remote mountainous
region which is not easily accessible even with
modern means of communications. Its inhabitants
live according to a traditional tribal code which
involves little contact as possible with outside
authorities. They are armed and have their own
independent system of law and order. They do not
pay taxes, and can be expected to forcefully resist
any effort to extend government control into their
territory.
QUESTION: Is Pakistan bothered by the hippy drug groups?
ANSWER: Yes, but there has not been a large,," foreign hippy
population resident in Pakistan recently.
QUESTION: What happens to foreigners who are arrested for
violation of Pakistan narcotics regulations?
ANSWER: Pakistani courts generally decline to imprison
foreigners for such offenses. Magistrates usually
confiscate any vehicles involved in smuggling
attempts, impose the maximum fine of Rs. 1,000
(about $210 at the official rate of exchange), and
expel the offender from the country.
3/72
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Approved Forjaelease 200b1 ~M~Z - 6 z 00100100005-2
NARCOTICS COUNTRY PAPER
TURKEY
1. ILLICIT DRUG PROBLEM
Under a United Nations' convention, Turkey is one of
seven countries' permitted.Legally to grow poppies for
export. However, Tur_kevs geographic location and his-
torical connections with Europe have resulted in European
traffickers obtaining much of their illicit opium supply
from Turkey, passing it on through their smuggling teams
to consumers in Europe, Latin America, and principally
the U.S.
Removal of Turkey as a source of illicit supply
would cause considerable disruption to established
patterns of smuggling of opium and its derivative,
morphine base, through Europe. It also removes a
product particularly high in quality and forces pro-
cessors to try to develop new sources of supply. This
will force smugglers to take additional risks as they
are obliged to use new contacts and transport their
wares over longer and untested routes, thereby exposing
them to improved enforcement activities throughout the
world.
For hundreds of years, thousands of Turkish families
have raised opium poppies as a legitimate cash crop. Not
only are poppies grown for opium gum but as a source of
food and. fuel as well. About 20 to 30 percent of the
crop is used solely for the purpose of obtaining poppy
seeds which are important in baking and are processed
into edible oil. The residual oil cake makes an excellent
animal feed. The farmer thus could profit from the sale
of opium gum, from the use of seed in cooking and oil=
extraction, from the legal sale of poppy heads to European
pharmaceutical firms, and from the use of the remaining..
stalks for fael. Thus, a ban on opium poppy production
is a difficult decision for the Turkish Government,
particularly since the poppy farmer has little, if any,
knowledge of his part in the spread of the narcotic.
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 Approved For-elease 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-0005W00100100005-2 2
2. I)TW G CONTROL EFFORTS
During the past decade Turkey has reduced the area
in which the opium poppy can be grown. In 1962, production
was limited to 42 provinces; by 1970 it had been reduced
to 7 provinces. In June 1971, Turkish Prime Minister
Ni.hat Erim, in the annual decree governing opium poppy
cultivation, announced that within one year the opium
poppy would no longer be planted in Turkey. By law,
the Turkish Goveinment must announce poppy cultivation
decisions one year in advance of their implementation,
making the June 30 decree the strongest and most direct
action legally possible.for the Turkish Government to take.
The June 30. decree confirmed that poppy cultivation would
be allowed in only four provinces during the 1971/72
growing season, and states that a total ban would apply
thereafter.
The Turkish Government has acted vigorously within
its legal limits to ensure that only legitimate growers
are allowed to plant poppies, and to ensure that opium
gum is turned over to government purchasing offices. The
Government initiated a number of measures in the spring
of 1971 to improve collections. They included increasing
the price the Government purchasers paid for opium gum,
increasing the number of collection points in,,,poppy growing
provinces, making cash payment to farmers at the time the
gum is turned in (rather than using a cumbersome voucher
system), and initiating a vigorous radio and press campaign
publicizing these benefits and the penalties for non-
compliance. These measures, which substantially reduced
the amount of gum flowing into illicit channels, are being
reinforced for the final crop year.
The Government also has enacted a new licensing law
which further strengthens the Government's authority over
the growing process and requires farmers to provide much
greater detail about the location and extent of areas.-
planted. The law gives the Government an improved basis
for licensing, controlling and collecting the final crop
which includes stiff penalties for those who fail to comply.
U.S. PRO CRAMS
Following the Government of Tu`rkey's announcement on
June 30, 1971, to ban opium cultivation, the United States
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 TURKEY
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2 3
informed the Government of Turkey that we would be pre-
pared to provide financial assistance to help alleviate
the economic difficulties resulting from the ban. Subse-
quently, the U. S. agreed to provide $35 million in grant
economic z3sistance over a three to four-year period,
subject to Congressional appropriations, to support the
Government of Turkey's decision to ban opium production.
The furies will be used to cover legitimate foreign exchange
losses resulting from the ban on opium production and to
help finance development programs aimed at providing new
sources of income for those farmers who will suffer the
consequences of the June 30 decree. This assistance is
separate from and additional to conventional assistance
programs.
The U.S. also agreed to send to Turkey a high-level
team of agricultural experts. In November 1971, Secretary
Hardin headed such a team to assist the Government of
Turkey in exploring alternate means for developing substi-
tute income. This mission produced a joint Turkish/American
report on improving farm income in the poppy growing areas.
A follow-up team of AID and USDA officials returned to
Turkey in February of 1972 to help prepare an action pro-
gram and implementation plan. It was'agreed that priority
should be given to programs ready to start by the fall of
1972, and which would have an income effect by spring
harvest on a large number of farmers. The U.S. team
recommended that primary emphasis should be placed on
introducing high-yielding varieties of wheat which could
increase yields by fifty percent over conventional varieties.
In 1968, the U.S. made available a $3 million loan to
provide equipment for Turkish narcotics law enforcement
agencies and for agriculture research in identifying suitable
substitute crops for the opium poppy.
FY 1972
During this fiscal year the U.S. plans to obligate
$15,700,000 in support of Turkey's efforts to eradicate
opium poppies. Fifteen million of this amount falls
under the'$35 million pledge, and is divided into two
categories -- $5 million to cover foreign exchange losses
and $10 million for development programs in the areas
affected by the ban. The U.S. also agreed to provide
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 TURKEY
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-0005Z 000100100005-2
4
$700,000 over and above the $35 million pledge -- $300,000
for the control and collection program connected with the
last crop year; and $400,000 to finance a U.S. team to
work for the Government on the development of its programs
for realizing substitute income for farmers affected.by
the ban on opium production.
FY 1973
We plan to obligate an: additional $15 million during
FY 1973 against the $35 miLlion pledge -?- $5 million to
compensate for foreign exchange losses and $10 million
for development. purposes.
3/72
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2
 TURKEY
Approved Fo Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-000522P000100100005-2
"aw
QUESTION: Does the Prime Minioter's statement (February 24)
that Turkey has no obligation from returning to
opium poppy cultivation mean that Turkey intends
to reverse the ban?
ANSWER: In discussing his Government's decision the
Prime Minister stressed that it was a unilateral
act for which no commitment exists to prevent
a return to poppy production if farmers' income
loss is not overcome. We do not foresee this
situation arising as programs scheduled to
begin this year and those now in the planning
stages to improve farm income in the affected
region will ensure that new sources will replace
that -lost from legitimate opium sales. In this
connection, the U.S. is providing $35 million
to be made available over a three to four year
period to help in this task.
QUESTION: Can the Turkish Government make the ban stick
and thus eliminate opium smuggling from Turkey?
ANSWER: We welcome Prime Minister Erim's strong state-
ments in support of his decision and the follow-up
actions his Government has taken to stamp out
opium smuggling. These include passage of a
licensing law and improved collection and law
enforcement efforts. The successful elimination
of cultivation in other provinces where it
has been banned augers well for the implementation
of a total ban.
A
3/72
Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP78-00052R000100100005-2