JOURNAL - OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R001100200006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 25, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Journal Office of Legislative Counsel
1'riday 25 Jaly 1975 r"
0NF DENT1 L
Paget
25X1
7. Bill Raiford, Congressional Research
Service, _Libra_ry of Con. e.s:s, called and inquired as to the legal basis
for compartmented clearances. I explained that security clearances in
Government are based upon Executive Order 10450 and than cornpart-mentecl
clearances would rest upon this basic authority. However, in effect they .
are a prescribed 1imitatiou of "need- to-1,7,-now" and provide for the coy t`.ro.t
of the dissemination and access to sensitive information. I gave him a
reference to the Order and the Internal Security Act of 1930 upon which the
Order is based.
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JOURNAL
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
Friday - 25 July 1975
N
C 01t T A
3. Wilma Lehman, Civil Service
Commission, called to advise that the Daniels amendment to the Federal
Employee. Right to Counsel bill, H. R. 6227, exempting CIA, FBI, and
others was not adopted. Jn response to my query, she said she believes
the CSC is sufficiently concerned about the bill that if passed they would
recommend a veto.
CONFIDENTIAL
25X1
25X1
25X1
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 ppr . Rr~ A
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UNC:I.ASSIFIF13 CONFIDF,NTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
I
Mr. Elder
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
Attached is a representative collection
of the Director's statements concerning
permissible and non-permissible
domestic activities of the Cent al
Intelligence Agency.
Deputy egislative Counsel
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
OLC 7D49
/24/75
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
TSECRET
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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Honorable John C. Stennis; Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. . 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your request for comments on S. 244,
a bill to amend the National Secur, ity Act of 1947 to clarify certain
provisions of that Act regarding activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency. The language of the bill is identical to the amendment to the
Military Procurement Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1975 (H. R. 14592,
Section 703), approved by the Senate on 11 June 1974, which was the
subject of my letter to you of 14 June 1974. As you know, the amendment
was not approved by the conference committee.
S. 244 is very similar to the bill you introduced in the 93rd
Congress--S. 2597 (copy enclosed). In response to your letter of
25 September 1974, I assured you that the Central Intelligence Agency
will abide by the letter and the spirit of the provisions of S. 2597 in the
conduct of our activities even though the bill had not been enacted.
In my confirmation hearings in July 1973 and in the two letters
to you referred to above, I expressed my full support for those pro-
visions now proposed in S. 244 which insert the word "foreign" immediately
before the word '!intelligence" in Section 102(d) of the- 1947 Act, thus
clearly expressing the mission of CIA as relating only to foreign intelligence.
While I believe the word "intelligence" in the original Act was generally
understood to refer only to foreign intelligence, the proposed language will
make this limitation even clearer to Agency employees, other Government
officials, and to the public.
I also indicated in the correspondence noted above that I was
pleased to accept the provisions now proposed in S. 244 concerning
Section 102(d)(5) of the Act, which converts to a statutory requirement
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the .long-standing practice of complete congressional oversight of our
activities. Pursuant to current congressional procedures, the Agency
reports fully on its activities to the oversight subcommittees of the
House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, and,
under the recently enacted provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act
Amendments of .1974 (P. L. 93-559, Section 32), reports on non-intelligence
gathering activities to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the
House Foreign Affairs Committee. I am confident that any other
congressional procedures which may be established for oversight of
Agency activities will meet the necessity for effective security.
. S. 244 also adds a new Section 102(g)(1) to the Act, which reiterates
the existing prohibitions against any police, law enforcement, or internal-
security functions. At the same time, the new section makes clear that
these proscriptions do not impinge upon this Agency's appropriate
domestic activities, explicitly recognizing the necessity that the CIA
protect its installations, conduct personnel investigations, and provide
information to other agencies. It is silent, however, on the essential
need--recognized in your original bill on this subject, S. 2597--of
"carrying on within the United States activities necessary to support its
foreign intelligence responsibilities .... "
The Central Intelligence Agency must conduct activities within
the United States in support of its foreign intelligence responsibilities.
Of course, such activity could not contravene the proscriptions in the
Act against internal- security functions, but would be solely in support
of our foreign intelligence mission, such as: (a) interviewing American
citizens who are willing, voluntarily and without pay, to share foreign
intelligence information in their possession with their Government;
(b) collecting foreign intelligence from foreigners in the United States;
(c) establishing support structures necessary to foreign intelligence
operations abroad; and (d) providing technical assistance to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for its counterintelligence operations against
foreigners. I think it important that any enactment explicitly recognize
the legitimacy of these necessary support procedures so that the sphere
of this Agency's domestic activities is clearly defined.
S. 244 adds a new Section 102(g)(2) which states that the Agency
shall not "participate, directly or indirectly, in any illegal activity
within the United States". I believe this section is inappropriate and
unnecessary. It could also be used to raise difficult questions with
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respect to fully appropriate activities in the United States essential to
the support of foreign intelligence activities abroad.
Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1.947 charges the
Director of Central Intelligence with the responsibility "for protecting
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. " As
you know, Mr. Chairman, I believe that more effective deterrents are
needed to prevent unauthorized disclosures of intelligence sources and
methods. I am hopeful. that efforts to clarify this Agency's authority
will ultimately be coupled with action to protect these essential resources;
such as the proposal I submitted in January 1974 which is still under
consideration in the Executive branch.
Please allow me to express my appreciation of your continuing
interest in clear. statutory delineation of CIA responsibilities. I wish to
assure you of our understanding that the scope of this Agency's unique
authority applies only to foreign intelligence and related activities.
The Office of Management and Budget advises there is no objection
to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the Administration':
program.
Sincerely,
W. E. Colby
Director
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
Honorable John C. Stennis, Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your request for comments on S. 2597
and S. 3767. Both of these bills would amend the National Security
Act of 1947 to strengthen and clarify certain provisions of the Act
regarding activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. For the most
part their provisions are identical and these provisions are acceptable
to me. Where the two bills differ, I prefer the language of S. 2597.
The language of S. 3767 is the same as section 703 of the
Senate amendment to the Military Procurement Act of 1975 (H. R. 14592)
which was added to the bill as a Senate floor amendment and which was
the subject of my letter of 14 June 1974 to you.
I fully support the identical provisions which insert the word
"foreign" immediately before the word "intelligence" in section 102(d)
of the 1947 Act, thus clearly expressing the mission of CIA as relating
only to foreign intelligence. While I believe the word "intelligence" in
the original Act was generally understood to refer only to foreign
intelligence, the suggested language will make this limitation even
clearer to Agency employees, other Government officials, and to the
public.
I am pleased to accept the identical provisions concerning
section 102 (d)(5) of the Act, which converts to a statutory requirement
the long-standing practice of complete congressional oversight of our
activities. Pursuant to current congressional procedures, the Agency
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reports fully on its activities to the oversight committees of the House
and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. This
system has worked well in protecting the numerous highly sensitive
matters reported to these Committees over the years. I am confident
that any future congressional procedures which may be established
will be as effective as the existing ones in meeting the dual objectives
of complete security and maximum oversight.
Both S. 2597 and S. 3767 add a new section 102 (g)(1) to the Act
which reiterates the existing prohibition against any police, law-enforce--
ment, or internal-security functions, while setting forth permissable
areas of domestic activity for the Agency. While both bills explicitly
recognize the necessity that the Agency protect its installations, conduct
personnel investigations, and provide information to other agencies,
only S. 2597 recognized that the Agency must conduct activities within
the United States in support of its foreign intelligence responsibilities.
This latter proviso in S. 2597 is deemed essential so that there is no
question that the Agency Js permitted to conduct certain necessary
activities in the United States. Of course such activities could not
contravene the proscriptions in the Act against internal security
functions but would be solely in support of our foreign intelligence
mission, such as: (a) interviewing American citizens who are willing,
voluntarily and without pay, to share foreign intelligence information in
their possession with their Government; (b) collecting foreign intelligence
---
a
- -- . .-. -
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-- -- o ---rr
necessary to foreign intelligence operations abroad; and (d) providing
technical assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for its
I counterintelligence operations against foreigners.
S. 3767 adds a new section 102 (g)(2) which states that the Agency
shall not "participate, directly or indirectly, in any illegal activity
within the United States. " I believe this section is inappropriate and
unnecessary. No agency need be reminded by statute that it must obey
the law. The personnel of this Agency are well aware of the legal
requirements under which we operate as an instrumentality of the
Federal Government and are fully committed to carrying out our mission
within the confines of the law. Additionally, I believe the inclusion of this
section in the basic charter of this Agency would imply that agencies not
under such a restriction are free to engage in illegal activities.
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Section (4) of S. 2597 reenforces the charge in the 1947 Act that
the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting
Intelligence Sources and Methods from unauthorized disclosure by
requiring the Director to develop plans, policies, and regulations in
the implementation of this responsibility. Any information indicating
a violation of the Director's plans, policies, and regulations would
be reported to the Attorney General for appropriate action. Section (4)
would not create additional penalties for unauthorized disclosure.
As you know Mr. Chairman, I am of the opinion that more
effective deterrents are needed to prevent unauthorized disclosures of
Intelligence Sources and Methods. Specific legislation to this end is
under active consideration within the Executive Branch. I do, however,
support section (4)(g) of S. 2597 as clarifying the existing provision
in the 1947 Act concerning the protection of Intelligence Sources and
Methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Your interest in a clear statutory delineation of this Agency's
functions and authority is appreciated, and I wish to assure you of our
clear understanding that this Agency's responsibilities apply only to
foreign intelligence and related activities.
The Office of Management and Budget advises there is no
objection to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the
Administration' s program.
Sincerely,
W. E. Colby
Director
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CENTRAL. INTEL UGENCI AGENCY
WA: HINGToN, D.C. 20505
. 3,. .~UisM
Honorable John C. Stennis, Chairman.
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On June 3rd the Senate approved certain amendments to the
CIA section of the .National Security Act of 1947 3n voting on H. R. 14592.
With certain understandings outlined below, I am pleased to say that
these amendments are acceptable to me.
As you know, I fully accept the amendment inserting the word
"foreign" immediately before the word "intelligence" in the Act, to
clearly express the mission of CIA as relating only to foreign intelligoaQ-a.
I also am pleased to accept the amended provision of Clause (5) of
subsection (d), adding a requirement to report to the Congress any
'"... functions and duties related to foreign intelligence affecting the
national security as may be specifically directed from. time to time by
the [National Security) Council... ".
With respect to the modified version finally adopted of a new
under Clause (5) of subsection (d) noted above, if specifically directed, by
the Nation l Secur ty Council and sported to the Congre s~ s~ose would
support of foreign intelligence operations can be legitimately conducted
section restricting CIA's activities in the United State, I believe that
this language is fully appropriate on the understanding that. certain
foreign intelligence operations and certain activities necessary to the
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include such current activities, described in my confirmation hearings, as
(a) interviewing American citizens who are willing voluntarily and without
pay to share foreign intelligence information in their possession with their
Government; (b) collecting foreign intelligence from foreigners; (c) establi:
ing support structures necessary to foreign intelligence operations abroad;
and (d) providing technical assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
for its counterintelligence operations against foreigners. If this were not
the intention of the Congress, I believe the United States would, be unable` to
acquire significant foreign intelligence important to the national securit
g xve xsory 01 this Ac(..
f
f
y
PI Perhaps this understanding could be included as an element of the
e islzt h `
The new subsection 102(g)(2) seems redundant and hardly appropriate
in providing that a Federal agency should not participate in illegal activities.
Further, I believe it possible that some could argue that such language:
affects the now clearly authorized acts of the Agency such as those outlined
in Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the CIA Act of 1949, exempting CIA from various'
provisions of law where necessary to the security of foreign intelligence _
operations.
Please allow me to express my appreciation of your interest in a.
clear statutory delineation of this Agency's functions and authority and
my assurance that this Agency will respect in every way in the future
the scope"of the Agency's unique authorities as applying only to foreign.
'intelligence-and related activities.
Sincerely,
Signed
W. E. Colby.
Director ?-
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Suggested Language for Incorporation in
Conference Report on I-1. R. 1459Z
New subsection 102(g)(1) of the bill clarifies activities
in which the CIA. may not engage within the United States.
In enacting this new subsection, it is not intended to
impinge upon activities authorized by law such as those
currently undertaken within the United Mates in. support
of the CI.'s foreign intelligence mission, including; the
receipt of foreign inte1ligenca information. .
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PREPARED STATEMENT ON H. R. 15845
BY
WILLIAM E. COLBY, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
22 July 1974
Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to testify today on H. R. 15845
introduced by you and Mr. Bray. The amendments proposed in this bill would
be the first changes in the charter of the Central Intelligence Agency,found
in the National Security Act of 1947. In conformity with our American
constitutional structure, the existence of the Central Intelligence Agency stems
from an Act of Congress. This is a unique contrast to the tradition and
practice of most intelligence services, but it is a necessary reflection of
our free society. The result, I believe, makes us a stronger nation, whose
citizens live in a freedom envied by most of the world.
The amendments would add the word "foreign" before the word
"intelligence" whenever it refers to the activities authorized to be undertaken
by the Central Intelligence Agency. I fully support this change. While I
believe the word "intelligence" alone in the original Act was generally under-
stood to refer only to foreign intelligence, I concur that this limitation of the
Agency's role to foreign intelligence should be made crystal clear to its own
employees and to the public. I hope this amendment will reassure any of our
fellow citizens as to the Agency's true and only purpose.
Section (3) of the bill ree.nforces the charge in the original Act that
the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for "protecting
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intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." The
amendment states that pursuant to this responsibility, the Director shall
develop appropriate plans, policies and regulations but such responsibility
shall not be construed to authorize the Agency to engage in any police,
subpoena, law enforcement or internal security activities, and that any
information indicating a violation of the Director's plans, policies and
regulations, should be reported to the Attorney General for appropriate
action.
This amendment conforms to my own understanding of the meaning
of the original statutory language. As I said in my confirmation hearing, I
believe that the original Act gives the Director a charge but does not give
him commensurate authority. Under existing law, the Director is responsible
for developing such internal administrative controls as are possible and
appropriate to protect against unauthorized disclosure, but if such a
disclosure is identified, his only recourse beyond internal disciplinary
action, including termination of an employee, would be to report the matter
to appropriate authorities for examination of possible legal action. As you
are aware, Mr. Chairman, the Government did take legal action with respect
to one of our ex-employees who declined to abide by the agreement he made
when he joined CIA to protect the confidential information to which he would
be exposed.
Mr. Chairman, I fully agree with this clarification of the precise
nature of the charge on the Director to protect intelligence sources and
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n ethods against unauthorized disclosure. s you now, am o personal
opinion that additional legislation is required on this subject to improve our
ability to protect intelligence sources and methods against unauthorized
disclosure. The contract theory on which the previously mentioned litigation
is based is indeed a very slender reed upon which to rely in all cases. My
views on this subject became known publicly as a result of that case and the
specifics of my recommendations on this subject are still under active
consideration within the Executive .Branch, so that an appropriate Executive
Branch recommendation can be made to the Congress.
The bill would also require that the Agency report to the Congress "in
accordance with such procedures as the Congress may establish" on those
"other functions and duties related to[foreign] intelligence affecting the national
security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." The
National Security Act authorized the National Security Council to direct the
Agency to conduct a number of foreign intelligence activities which by their
nature must remain secret. The Act made clear, however, that these functions
and duties could only stem from a specific direction by the National Security
Council rather than being determined by the Agency itself. The amendments
do not change this situation but add the requirement of reporting to Congress.
Mr. Chairman, at present the Agency reports to the Congress about
its activities in a number of ways.. On certain matters the Agency reports
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publicly, such as in this hearing and in my own confirmation hearings. The
Agency further identifies for public release a number of matters affecting
it or resulting from its efforts. A recent example was the publication of
testimony on the economies of the Soviet Union and China provided to the
Joint Economic Committee and published on July 19th with only a few deletions
which related to intelligence sources and methods.
The second area in which the Agency reports to Congress is in its
assessments offoreign situations. The Agency briefs appropriate committees
of the Congress in executive session, using the most sensitive material
available, thus providing the Congress the fruits of the intelligence investment
made by the United States. I believe this type of reporting is particularly
important, as I hope to make our intelligence of maximum service to the
nation as a whole, and this can only take place if it can assist those in the
Congress who share in the American decision-making process under our
Constitution. The Appropriations Committees, the Armed Services Com.-
mittees, the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees, the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, and others have been the recipients of this
kind of material. Again, to the extent possible, information provided and
discussed in these executive sessions is later screened for publication. In
many cases the sensitivity of the sources and methods involved does not
permit such publication, but the classified transcript of the briefing can
be made available to the members of Congress.
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The third area in which the Agency reports to Congress concerns
its operations. Pursuant to long-established procedures of the Congress,
reports on these matters, including the most sensitive details, are provided
only to the Intelligence Subcommittees of the Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees of each House. Mr. Chairman, there are
literally no secrets withheld from these Subcommittees. In fact, I believe
I have more than a duty to respond to them; I must undertake the positive
obligation to volunteer to these Subcommittees all matters of possible
interest to the Congress. As you know, these reports cover our annual
budget, the details of our activities, and problems which may have arisen
in some regard or other.
The procedures established by the Congress for this reporting have
worked well. Large numbers of highly sensitive matters have been revealed
to these Subcommittees over the years, and their classification has been
respected. I am also aware of the sense of responsibility of the members
of the Congress as a whole with respect to matters which must remain
highly classified because of their sensitivity. Thus, Iam confident that
congressional procedures in the future will be as effective as those of
the past and I welcome the codification of this relationship in the proposed
amendment which requires the Agency to report to the Congress.
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Mr. Chairman, the bill also reenforces the proscription..in the_
original Act against police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal
security functions. I wish I could say that this clarification was not
necessary but as you know, Mr. Chairman, I have frankly admitted that the
Agency did make some mistakes in recent years in this area. Your own
report of the investigations of this Subcommittee dealt with those-incidents.
The Congress has, in Public Law 93-83 of August 6, 1973, made clear
that the CIA may not provide help to the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration in assisting local police and law enforcement agencies of
the states and municipalities. The language of the bill would go further
in this regard and prohibit the Agency from engaging directly or indirectly
in the above type of activities within the United States either on its own or
in cooperation or conjunction with any other department, agency, organization
or individual. This would restrict our collaboration with the FBI to the field
of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence. It may also limit the degree
of assistance the Agency could provide to the Secret Service, under the Secret
Service Act, which authorizes it to call upon the-assistance of any other agency
of the Government to assist it in its mission (Public Law 90-331). While this
amendment might restrict certain of our activities of the past which were not
in any way reprehensible, I believe that its enactment at this time would be
an appropriate way of clarifying the purpose of the Agency as related only to
foreign intelligence.
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I do note that the bill contains a proviso in this area which I believe
is both appropriate and essential to the proper functioning of the Agency.
This makes it clear that nothing in the Act shall be construed to prohibit
the Agency from conducting certain necessary and appropriate activities in
the United States directly related to its foreign intelligence responsibilities.
I welcome this proviso not only for its content but also for its clarification of
the propriety of some of the long-standing activities of the Agency which are
essential to its foreign intelligence mission. These include:
a. Recruiting, screening, training and investigating employees,
applicants and others granted access to sensitive Agency information;
b. Contracting for supplies;
c. Interviewing U. S. citizens who voluntarily share with their
Government their knowledge of foreign subjects;
d. Collecting foreign intelligence from foreigners in the
United States;
e. Establishing and maintaining support structures essential
to CIA's foreign intelligence operations; and
f. Processing, evaluating and disseminating foreign intelligence
information to appropriate recipients within the United States.
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These matters were publicly reported by me in my confirmation hearing
last summer, and I believe that there is general understanding of their
necessity and propriety. The proviso in the amendment, however, would
make this explicit.
The bill also adds a new subsection to the Act to prohibit transactions
between the Agency and former employees except for purely official matters.
I fully subscribe to the purpose of this provision, to assure that former
employees not take advantage of their prior associations to utilize the
Agency's assistance or resources or to have an undue influence on the
Agency's activities. This is particularly directed at the possible use of the
Agency's assets for "nonofficial" assistance outside the Agency's charter. I
would like to say that such a provision is not necessary, but again I must
admit that errors have been made. While I do not believe there were any
instances of major import, I accept the desirability of making the limitations
on the Agency's unique authorities quite clear.
The normal legal proscriptions against improper influence on Federal
employees apply, of course, to the Agency. In addition, a regulation has
been developed within the Agency, which is brought to the attention of each
employee each year, that any CIA employee who believes that he has received
instructions which in any way appear inconsistent with the CIA legislative
charter will inform the Director immediately. I might point out that
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in those cases which presented questions concerning the Agency overstepping
its bounds, the propriety and dedication to American traditions of our own
employees caused them to object to possible Agency activities outside its
charter. In my confirmation hearing I stated that I am quite prepared to
leave my post if I should receive an order which appeared to be illegal and
if my objections were not respected.
--Thus, we in the Agency are fully in accord with the purpose of this
.amendment. At the. same time, I confess concern over some possible
interpretations of the language of this subsection. I assume that "purely
official matters" would include our normal relationships with our retirees
or others. who left. the Agency. I would assume it would also enable us to
maintain normal official relationships with individuals who left the Agency
to go on to other Governmental activities -so long as the "official matters"
fall within the scope of CIA's legitimate charter and there is no undue
influence involved. I do wonder, however, whether certain activities might
be included under this provision as official which neither the Congress nor
the Agency would want to countenance, and on the, other hand whether the
phrase might interfere with a contact with an ex-employee volunteering
important information to the Agency.
Since the Agency has certain unique authorities under the National
Security Act and the CIA Act of 1949 and since much of its work does involve
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highly classified activity, -I would think it appropriate that the Congress add
to the Agency's legislative charter some special recognition of the high
degree of responsibility imposed on the Agency and its employees as a result
of the grant of these unique authorities. This could require the Director to
develop and promulgate a code of conduct for CIA employees at a higher
standard than that expected of Federal employees generally. Thereby,
the intelligence profession. would become one of those with special standards
such as the medical or legal professions. The Director's unique authority
to terminate employees in his discretion when necessary or advisable in
the interests of the United States, pursuant to. the National Security Act of
1947, would provide a sanction for the application of such high standards.
Regular congressional review would provide an assurance that such a
code of conduct was adequate and that it was being promulgated, applied,
and adhered to.
Mr. Chairman, it has been a pleasure to have had this opportunity to
comment on H. R. 15845. With the few reservations I have noted above,
I fully support the bill. Most of all, I fully support the purpose of the
legislation in clarifying the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency only
to conduct foreign intelligence activities. At the same time, I am pleased
that the modifications proposed to the CIA charter would not adversely affect
it.is authority or capability to carry out the challenging task of collecting,
processing and disseminating foreign intelligence in the world today. I believe
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10
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these amendments would mark an important milestone in eliminating
any' a pare nt con iot L)o veei_ out ;.deal of an open ~ n _i so .iot
and the minimum requirements of secrecy in the intelligence apparatus
necessary to protect this free nation.
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Another amendment would amplify the current restrictions
in law by specifying that within the United States the
Agency will not engage:
"in any police or police-type operation or activity,
any law enforcement operation or activity, any internal
security operation or activity, or any domestic intelli-
gence operation or activity."
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The Agency fully accepts such amendments as a statement
of prohibited activity and as a way to reassure any con-
cerned that CIA has no such function. Last July, I so
testified before the legislative oversight Committee in the
House and last September, I wrote to the Chairman of the
legislative oversight Committee in the Senate assuring him
that the Agency will abide by the letter and the spirit of
the proposed amendments..
The prohibition in these bills is supplemented by the
following additional proviso:
"Provided, however, that nothing in this Act shall be
construed to prohibit CIA from protecting its installa-
tions or conducting personnel investigations of Agency
employees and applicants or other individuals granted
access to sensitive Agency information; nor from carry-
ing on within the United States activities in support
of its foreign intelligence responsibilities; nor from
providing information resulting from foreign intelli-
gence activities to those agencies responsible for the
matters involved."
Again, we welcome this as a clear statement of what the
Agency properly does in the United States in support of its
- 38 -
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foreign intelligence mission. As I described to you earlier
and explained in my confirmation hearings, these include:
(1) Recruiting, screening, training, and investigating
employees, applicants, and others granted access to
sensitive Agency information;
(2) Contracting for supplies;
(3) Interviewing US citizens who voluntarily share
with the Government their information on foreign topics;
(4) Collecting foreign intelligence from foreigners in
the United States;
(5) Establishing and maintaining support structures
essential to CIA's foreign intelligence operations; and
(6) Processing, evaluating, and disseminating foreign
intelligence information to appropriate recipients
within the United States.
i respectfully suggest that the Committee might indicate
its support of these or similar legislative amendments in
its recommendations.
A separate matter of concern deals with the question of
appropriate oversight of the Agency. Within the Executive
Department, the Director is appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate and serves "during the
pleasure of the President of the United States and for the
time being."
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Statement
W.E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Before
Defense Subcommittee
of the
House Appropriations Committee
February 20, 1975
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This Committee is well aware of the contribution
intelligence makes to decisions about defense
levels. I would also like to remind you of its
contribution to the Strategic Arms Limitation
and similar treaties. Such agreements help
reduce the need for the heavy expense of arms.
I would like to stress another aspect of
intelligence today -- its contribution to peace-
keeping. Aside from its assistance to our ability
to make treaties to reduce tensions between us and
other nations, it has on occasion provided our
Government information with which it has been
able to convince other nations not to initiate
hostilities against their neighbors. This peace-
keeping role can grow in importance as our intelli-
gence coverage improves. Correspondingly, it can
decline if our intelligence machinery is made
ineffectual through irresponsible exposure or
ill-founded exaggeration.
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 25
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NOMINATION OF WILLIAM E. COL BY
HEARING
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
NOMINATION OF WILLIAM E. COLBY TO BE DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL ,INTELLIGENCE
Printefl,for,the use of the Committee onArmmed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
99-275 WASHINGTON : 1973
 22
di[kicult to say here that we will never give any other agency of the
I) ..S. Government help which they might use in their responsibilities
because, for instance, we provide a considerable amount of intelligence
to the FBI, and there are other ways in which we help the other
agencies of the Government.
,The fact is, however, that pink in that particular case a mistake
was made and it will not be i~' `cle again.
Senator Sv_AIINGTON. A good answer.
Would the provisions of the 191.7 act prohibit the use of a so-called
safe house to provide such materials to a White House employee?
Mr. COLBY. I think the same answer applies to that question, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator SY1rINGTON. Would these provisions of the 1947 act pro-
hibit the developing of a film for such n White House employee?
Mr. CoinY. Mr. Chairman, that depends. I mean, if one of the
White House employees has a film of some particular thing or even
needs a safe house for some Perfectly legitimate purpose I really see
no problem in the Agency helping him with that particular function.
I think it is really a matter of what he is doing and whether the
Agency participates by helping him in some improper activity, and I
assure you that the Agency is not going to participate in any improper
activity, although I can envisage a situation in which it would be
)Appropriate for the Agency to help not Mr. Howard Hunt but a White
][louse official to meet somebody without coming to public notice.
Senator Sy-_%IINOTOti. In the CIA's interest, it is proper to state that
When the Deputy Director. General Cushman, found out the nature
and degree of this operation he notified the White House staff member
who had requested it that he would no longer approve it.
Mr. C,or iv . Yes.
Senator SvMINGTON. So I would not think you would have any prob-
lem with this question.
Dlr. Coiwr. I think that is exactly it. When it began to he indicated
that the Agency would begin to participate in the activity in the United
States in that regard the Agency withdrew from that participation.
Senator SYisiNGTON . would these provisions of the 1947 act require
the Agency to insure materials loaned to a White Ilouse employee for
one function were not used for another illegal function?
MIr. Coi,BY. Let us say I think. we are going to be very careful with
some of our unique equipment, 31r. Chairman, and we are not going to
let it out without control.
Senator SYDIINGTON. Is there any practical way the CIA can moni-
tor the use of materials it provides to various employees in Govern-
nient, including those in the White House?
Mr.. Coi,BY. It. depends on the equipment. With certain equipment
we. can, and frequently do, insist on knowing precisely what is done
with that equipment, and that it is used in a legitimate purpose by the
Agency in question.
However, I think that it is possible in most cases for us to do this,
all(] we propose to do it.
Senator SY-MINGTON. Is there any agreement' between the FBI and
the CIA regarding what is to occur if one agency, in the course of
its operations, comes across the operations of the other?
Mr. Coinv. There is an agreement between the two agencies which
was drawn up some years ago. I have not had a chance to review this
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in detail but I propose to now that there is new leadership in both
agencies.
,Senator SYMINGTON. When you review it, will you submit to this
committee your conclusions?
Mr. Corny. I would be glad to.
Senator SYM{NGTON. Thank you.
Does either the CIA or the FBI have the authority to tell the other
not to continue with, or conduct, certain investigations; or, is there
merely an agreement to notify the other agency in case of a potential
conflict?
Mr. COLBY. I think the latter is correct. I do not think the CIA
has the authority to direct the FBI to suspend an investigation. We
do not,. We do have the ability to explain to them that some activity
has another explanation which they might not have known and as a
practice we always.do this.
Senator.S. MINGTON. Nor would they have a right to do so to you ?
Mr. CoLnY. They do not have the authority to give me an order to
suspend any activity, except, I suppose, in the area of domestic law
if they told me I was doing something improper, they might have au-
thority to direct me not to do it or arrest me.
[The following additional statement was provided for the record:]
We have an agreement that CIA's. foreign intelligence operations in the
United States will be coordinated with the FBI and terminated if the FBI deter-
mine,,; them prejudicial to their activities.
Senator SYMINGTON. They would appeal to the President through
the Attorney General, and you would appeal to the President direct,
correct?
Mr. Corauy. I would go to the President, right.
Senator SYMINGTON. Aside from protecting the physical security
of CIA property, such as the headquarters in Langley, Va., and con-
ducting security investigations of its own employees, does the CIA
need to have authority to provide direct or indirect support to any
domestic law enforcement agency?
Mr. Corny. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we do in terms of support to, for
example, the FBI. If we learn that a certain agent of another coun-
try is. coming here, I think it is important we be allowed to pass that
information to the FBI and not be prohibited from doing so.
Senator SY.NUNOTO:ti. Does the authority of the CIA to collect in-
telligence outside the United States extend to collecting intelligence
on U.S. citizens abroad who do not appear to be involved with the
activities of foreign governments or foreign institutions?
Mr. COLBY. No ; it does not.
Senator SYliINGTO . You answer is "No?"
Mr. COLBY.-My answer is, "No," who were not involved with foreign
institutions.
Senator SY-ni GTOV. Do you subscribe to Ambassador Ifelms state-
ment in his published address of April. 1971 that "We do not targ et
on U.S. citizens?"
Mr. COLEY. I do subscribe to that. We target on foreign intelligence,
Mr. Chairman, foreign intelligence and foreign intelligence services.
There is occasionally some incidental mention of American citizens in
this regard. That kind of information, if it indicates something iin-
prol:>er, is turned over by us to the FBI. It is riot handled by our
Agency.
 Senator SY3IINGTON. Now, the so-called Watergate Committee, the
one chaired by Senator Ervin, has recently released a set of documents
dealing with the plan during the summer of 1970, apparently approved
by the President, to establish an Inter-Agency Committee on Intelli-
gence, which would include the Director of the CIA,,and would deal
with domestic intelligence operations. Do you believe that the prohibi-
tion in the 1.947 act against the Agency having any police or law en-
forcement powers, or any internal security functions, would prohibit
the Director of 'Central Intelligence from participating'in the evalua-
tion of intelligence on domestic groups?
Mr. CoLBY. No; I do not, Mr. Chairman. I think. that in that respect
the Agency, has an obligation to provide to the Government the re-
sults of its foreign intelligence activities and collection and if this can
contribute to the Government's knowledge of some problem in the
United States that this can properly be passed by the Agency, to an
interagency group but the Agency.would not itself be engaged in those
functions or exert those. powers. It would merely pass the results of
its activities abroad; to that interagency effort and to the appropriate
authorities of the Government.
Senator SYMI\GTON. Well, it is my understanding that when the
Central Intelligence Agency was created the most difficult problems
that they had' in writing the law were the objections of the'Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation because of his apprehensions
about interference in domestic activities. You have no intention of do
ing anything of that character?
Mr. COLBY. Absolutely not, Mr. Chairman. I repeat that I read the
word "foreign" before the word "intelligence" in the authority under
this act.
Senator Sm INGTON. Based on some papers rte received we' have the
right, I think, to believe that Attorney General Mitchell did not know
of this so-called plan presented by Mr. Charles Tom Huston, a lawyer
in the WLit.e House at that time. Perhaps Mr. Hoover in reporting to
his boss, the Attorney General, requested that the plan-the request,
be put.in writing. If he. did that, Mr. Mitchell, being a lawyer, unques-
tionably would have felt that higher authority was requesting Mr.
Hoover to break the law. It may well be that is what happened and the
reason the plan, after a few days, was abandonded. In any` case, the
people that I have discussed this matter with, who are far greater au-
thorities on the Constitution than I am, feel that it was in effect a re-
quest to circumvent the Constitution, violate the Constitution. I am not
asking for your opinion on that fact or lack of accuracy but .1 would
hope that you would be very careful about this in the future because
now everybody will be considering this from the standpoint of your
operations. As I understand it, you do not intend to participate in any
way in any domestic intelligence, is that correct?
Mr. COL#.Y. I do not, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SYMTNGTON. Would this prevent you from helping to make
policy regarding the collection of intelligence on domestic grouts?
Mr. CoLBY. I believe it would, ves, Mr. Chairman. I do not see that
as within my responsibilities at all.
Senator SYMINGTON. Would the 19-17 act prohibit the CIA from col-
lecting', or providing the support necessary for collecting, intelligen"e
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 Mr. COLinY. I believe that is the same question, essentially.
Senator SYMrINc'roti . Yes.
1'Jr. -COLBY. And it would prohibit me from doing that.
Senator SYMINGTON. Would .it clarify your responsibilities, 1tlr.
Colby, and the responsibilities of the CIA under the 1947 act if it were
made clearer that your responsibilities extended only to.foreign mtel-
ligence-namely., intelligence about or.relat:ed to foreign_governmeits,
groups, or individuals?
Mr. Corny. I would certainly have no objection to that. If it would
relieve any concern that, anybody. feels about CIA, I would fully recom-
mend.that that be done. I think the easiest way for it is just :to use the
words "foreign .intelligence."
:Senator SYMIIGTON. Ambassador Helms testified before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that the requirement for the Director of
Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods has
sometimes led'to the existence of a "gray area," using 'his words, of
CI 1 responsibilities.by implication verging on -the requirement to be
i
nvolved in domestic activities.
Do you know of any way to clarify or correct this situation?
Mr. DOLBY. Mzy interpretation of that particular provision, Mr.
:Chairman, is that it gives me a charge but does not give me authority.
and methods, but in the event f identify one it gives tine the responsibil
ity ,to go to -the appropriate authorities with that information and it
does not give me any authority to act on my own. So I really see.less of
a gray area in that regard. I believe that there is really.no authority
under that act that can be used. 'If, on the other hand, there is some
concern over the matter I would have no problem because I do not view
it as giving me any authority.
Senator SYMINOTON. Do you believe that .some other 'GGovernment
official should have the overall .responsibility to protect intelligence
sources and methods.in order to make.it clear, for example, that, it is
-not the CIA's responsibility to.get involved.in domestic law enforce-
iont:functions?
Mr. ?.Cor sv..1 think, in a sense, Mr. Chairman, we all have the
responsibility of protecting national security information, and that
most intelligence. sources and methods fall into that category.
S
S
enator
YMINoTo . Well, If I understand, if there is.a a xovernment
official that should have such responsibility, it should be yourself
Mr. COL BY. For the intelligence field, I think it is myself.no question
..I_
ou
Senator'.SYMiNOToti. Right.
In,general, what do you consider to be the proper scope of
our
y
agency. activities within-the United States ?
Mr. Cor.n.Y. Mr. Chairman, we obviously have to run a headquarters
here; we have to recruit people for our staffs, and so.forth; we have
to conduct investigations on those people; we have to protect our own
intelligence sources and methods within the Agency ; we have to con-
tract with a large number of American firms for the various -kiwis
of equipment that we might .have need for abroad. We also, I. believe
quite properly,.ean collect foreign intelligence in the United States,
including requesting American citizens to share with their Govern-
inent certain information they may know about- foreign situations.
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 We have a service that does this, and I am happy to say, a very large
number of American citizens have given us some very important in-
formation. We do not pay for that information. We can protect their
proprietary interest and even protect their names if necessary, if they,
would rather not be exposed as the source of that information.
We also, I beelieve, have certain support activities that we must
conduct in the United States in order to conduct foreign intelligence
operations abroad. Certain structures are necessary in this country
to give our people abroad perhaps a reason for operating abroad in
some. respects so that they can appear not as CIA employees but as
representatives of some other entity. Lastly, I think that there are it
number of activities in the United States where foreign intelligence
can be collected from foreigners, and as long as this is foreign intelli-
gence, I think it quite proper that we do so, I can certainly go into
more detail on this in executive session any time you would like, Mr.
Chairman, but I reiterate that the focus should and must be foreign
intelligence only, and that all the other activities are only supportive
of that major function.
Senator SYIlIINGTON. If you should receive an order in the future
which appears on its face to be illegal, what would you do?
Mi?. COLBY. I would object to it and, if necessary I am quite prepared
to leave sirs responsibility it it. came to that.
Senator SY-AiINGTON. I did not.hear you.
it![r. Cor B . And I am quite prepared to leave this job if it comes
to that.
Senator SYMImGTO \ . Do you believe that CIA officials should refrain
from maIdng policy, or explicitly making recommendations about
policy, and, if so, what steps can you take to insure that the CIA
maintains its role as solely an intelligence organization?
Mr. Corry. I do indeed believe that the CIA's role is to try to call
what is. happening abroad very accurately and precisely, and inci-
dentally, to show two or three different interpretations if these legit-
imately exist. But the action that should be taken about that is a larger
question dealing with the interest and policies of the United States
and the various capabilities of the United States. These are not within
the responsibilities of the intelligence community and, therefore, I
think that the intelligence community should stick to its own business
and not get into recommending what should be done.
Senator SYMINGTON. 11"hat would be your position regarding CIA
coil aboration. with private American corporations overseas?
t'Lr. Corry. Nlrell, I think that in many respects there are perfectly
legitimate ways in which we can collaborate with American corpo-
rations overseas in terms of the exchange of information and in some
situations corporations overseas can help the intelligence activity and
mission.
However, I think your reference is rather to the situation that. cle-
veloped with ITT in Chile and I think that our position there is that
we are not going to be