CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000500140001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 76
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1973
• Content Type: OPEN

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distinguished senior Senator from
Mis-
souri, for the able, the fair, and the im-
partial way in which he conducted the
hearings in connection with the Colby
nomination. A number of statements had
been made regarding Mr. Colby. The
Senator from Missouri saw to it that the
committee probed all these areas very
carefully. The Senator from Missouri
went out of his way to run down all state-
ments including rumors, that might bear
on the qualifications of Mr. Colby. I
commend the Senator, and I say to the
Senate that this nomination has been
thoroughly examined by the committee.
I want to observe that William Colby
is an outstanding and able? professional
in the Central Intelligence Agency. I be-
lieve that he stands in the best tradition
of the professionalism which some of us
feel is so essential to the security of the
United States of America. I have con-
fidence in Mr. Colby. There were a num-
ber of situations?one In. particular?In
which his integrity was tested. He did
not hesitate to be forthright and
straightforward in his decision as to
what he should do based on his oath and
his obligation as a part of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
I merely want to say to the Senate
that I do believe that this is a good ap-
pointment, and I hope and trust that the
Senate will give Mr. Colby the over-
whelming vote of confidence that he so
richly deserves.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
thank my good friend, the able Senator
from Washington, for his kind remarks..
For many years it has been well known
in this body that he is a true expert in
this field. I respect his opinion, as I am
sure the Senate does also, on matters of
this character. I am grateful for what he
said.
r. President, I earnestly hope that
the Senate confirms the nomination of
William E. Colby to be Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence.
The Committee on Armed Services
overwhelmingly approved his nomina-
tion. I have known him personally for
many years. He is a dedicated and com-
petent professional in a difficult and
troublesome field.
Because he is unusually able, Mr. Colby
has been asked to take on some difficult
responsibilities in recent years.
In 1968 President Johnson asked him
to head the pacification program in the
increasingly unpopular Vietnam war.
More recently, as Executive Director of
CIA, he has been assigned certain re-
sponsibilities for correlating and orga-
nizing information in the wake of the
all-infecting Watergate break-in.
I am sure the Senate realizes that
recent events?including Watergate and
the Indochina war?have caused the
Senate Armed Services Committee to
give unprecedented attention to this
nomination?not only because of the
nominee himself, but also because of the
importance of the assignment as head of
CIA, top intelligence adviser to the Presi-
dent, at this point in history
As far as I can, determine, Mr. Presi-
dent, no nominee for this important job
has ever been questioned so intensively
EXECUTIVE SESSION
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ate will now go into executive session to
consider the nomination of Mr. William
E. Colby to be Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
The legislative clerk read the nomina-
tion of William E. Colby, of Maryland,
to be Director of Central Intelligence.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, /
ask unanimous consent that during the
debate on the nomination of Mr. William
E. Colby to be Director of Central Intel-
ligence, Messrs. T. Edward Braswell, Jr.,
R. James Woolsey, and John A. Gold-
smith, members of the staff of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, be granted
the privilege of the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield.
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Mr. Charles
Stevenson, a member of my staff, be al-
lowed the privilege of the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that during the con-
sideration of this nomination, Ellen
Frost, Murray Render, and Roy Green-
way have the privilege of the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield.
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I should
just like to detain the Senate floor for
1 minute in behalf of the nomination of
Mr. William E. Colby, to be the head of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
? First, I commend the acting chairman
of the Committee on Armed Services, the
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August 1, 1973 CONGRESSIONAL RE
. by the Senate kti43 ces Co - 1 e. t is going to be a difficult one in many which show that Mr. Colby "slanted in-
telligence" and "submitted misinforma-
tion" as CIA station chief in Saigon from
1969 to 1982.
With the help of the CIA we were able
to get almost all of the classified cables
and reports suggested by Mr. Sakwa. The
committee appreciates his interest, but
it is fair to say that the committee was
not impressed with -the thesis which he
advanced as it applied to Mr. Colby.
Another witness, Mr. Samuel A. Adams,
was, until recently, a CIA analyst. He
criticized the Phoenix program--which
I shall discuss later?and he also com-
plained of the treatment given him by
CIA after he pgessed his own appraisal
of certain estimates of Communist
strength in Cambodia. Mr. Adams did
not specifically oppose Mr. Colby's nomi-
nation.
The other three witnesses were Rep-
resentative ROBERT F. DRINSN, Democrat
of Massachusetts; K. Barton Osborn, a
sergeant assigned to Military Intelli-
gence, who left Vietnam about a month
after Mr. Colby took over the pacifica-
tion program in 1968, and David S.
Harrington, a former Marine officer who
Was assigned to the pacification program,
and once, in early 1969, sat in on an I
Corps briefing for Mr. Colby.
. All these witnesses focused on the pe-
riod from November 1968 to June 1971,
when Mr. Colby headed the Vietnam
pacification program as Deputy MACV
for Civil Operations and Regional De-
velopment Support?CORDS. Each of
these witnesses were especially critical
of one CORDS program: Phoenix.
PROJECT PHOENIX
The Phoenix program has been covered
in a number of congressional hearings?
including the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and Senator KENNEDY'S Ref-
ugee Subcommittee. The program was
one of Mr. Colby's responsibilities as the
boss of CORDS, the head of the pacifica-
tion program.
It is important to realize that Phoenix
was a Vietnamese program. It had U.S.
support, however, in funds and man-
power. The program was aimed at the
VCI?the Vietcong Infrastructure?
members of the Vietcong apparatus who
were working against the Government
within the cities and hamlets of South
Vietnam.
Unquestionably, there were abuses in
the program. Mr. Colby has conceded
that. He testified, however, that the
great preponderence of Vietcong Infra-
structure killed?some 85 percent?died
in battles and skirmishes, were eventually
Identified as VCI, and were added to the
casualty lists as VCI. Others were killed
by police units.
By way of further explanation, Mr.
Colby emphasized that despite this being
a war, killing was to be minimized in
Phoenix especially, because captured VCI
were the best source of intelligence to
help our own military units.
Mr. Colby told us he worked to pro-
vide protection for accused VCI, and
bring a measure of due process into these
Paramilitary proceedings. He testified
that Phoenix eventually required three
accusers, required that province chiefs
be notified of VCI charges; and finally, in
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situations, but it is obvious that again we
have to run an American intelligence service.
tee. Three days of testimony were taken
by the full committee. In addition, the
Central Intelligence Subcommittee ques-
tioned Mr. Colby at a fourth meeting. ,
In addition to these nomination hear-
ings, the committee held 6 days of hear-
ings in May on the C/A relationship to
Watergate. Witnesses included former
CIA Directors Schlesinger and Helms, the,
former Deputy Director, General Cush-
man, and the current Deputy Director,
General Walters, and other CIA officials,
including Mr. Colby. In all, this year the
committee has taken many hours of testi-
mony on this nomination and other CIA
matters.
In addition to testifying in extensive
hearings, Mr. Colby has provided ex-
tensive responses and exhibits in reply
to later questions from Senator KENNEDY,
who was- provided the opportunity of
questioning Mr. Colby; and also Senator
PROxIalliE, as well as members of the
committee, submitted questions.
CIA, NBC, AND THE PRESIDENT
Let me say a preliminary word about
the position of CIA with respect to the
White House and other executive bodies.
The Senate should be under no Illu-
sions about the position of this Agency
in the national command authority. By
law, CIA is responsible to the National
Security Council. However, the NSC is
advisory to the President who is the NSC
Chairman. As a former NSC member in
two different positions, I know well that
the National Security Council is one of
those bodies where but one vote really
counts?that of the President.
In other words, in point of fact the CIA
is directly under the President and re-
sponsible to him.
MR. COLBY'S PUBLIC TESTIMONY
The record is available to all Senators.
Mr. Colby, in his public testimony made
some statements which are refreshing,
coming as they do from a career official
of CIA who has now been designated to
be the Director of Central Intelligence.
As example, Mr. Colby stated, in re-
sponse to a question, that he thought the
war in Laos had "undoubtedly gone well
beyond? the scope of activities envisioned
by Congress in 1947, when it authorized
CIA to perform certain covert activities,
and he questioned the feasibility of such
large scale covert activities.
Later, I personally asked Mr. Colby
If he would favor a policy of more open
disclosure with respect to activities of
the intelligence community. Here is his
reply:
Mr. COLBY. / think it Is probably essential
In America today, Mr. Chairman; and I would
favor a greater degree of exposure of what
we are doing. We have already had some
matters which we do expose. Some of the
exposure that we have quite frankly gives
us problems abroad in our relationships with
other intelligence services, and even in our
relationships with individuals who secretly
agree to work with us, who are somewhat
frightened at the prospect of their names
coming into the public, and things happen-
ing to them as a result. But I think that
there are ways in which the intelligence com-
munity and the CIA in particular can reas-
sure the appropriate committees, and also
the Senate as a whole, and also the people as
a whole, as to the activities we are engaged
in. I think we are going to have to draw that
I also asked Mr. Colby about possible
amendments to the 1947 law' which gov-
erns CIA, since our committee is" com-
mitted to a broad review of the CIA
charter. He made it clear that he is not
opposed to certain changes. In that con-
nection, he later stated. that he has been
authorized to brief the committee on the
basic directives issued to CIA by the Na-
tional Security Council--NSCID's--une
der the 1947 act. This we plan to have
him do at the earliest opportunity.
Finally, in his discussions of Possible
revision of the law, Mr. Colby said he
thought it might be appropriate to limit
CIA intelligence activities by spicific ref-
erences to "foreign" intelligence. I asked
Mr. Colby to state the proper scope of
CIA activities within the United States,'
and he responded as follows:
Mr. Court'. We obviously have to run a
headquarters here; we have to recruit people
for our staffs; and so forth; we have to con-
duct investigations on those people; we have
to protect our own intelligence sources and'
methods within the Agency; we have to con-
tract with a large number of American firms
for the various kinds of equipment that we
might have need for abroad. We also, I be-
lieve quite properly, can collect foreign in-
telligence in the United States, including the
requesting American citizens to share with
their Government certain information they
may know about foreign situations. We have
a service that does this, and I am happy to
say, a very large number of American citizens
have given us some very important informa-
tion. We do not pay for that information. We
can protect their proprietary interest and
even protect their names if necessary, if they
would rather not be exposed as the source of
that information.
We also, I believe have certain support ac-
tivities that we must conduct in the United
States in order to conduct foreign intel-
ligence operations abroad. Certain structures
are necessary in this country to give our peo-
ple abroad perhaps a reason for operating
abroad in some respects so that they can ap-
pear not as CIA employees but as representa-
tives of some other entity. Lastly, I think
that there are a number of 'activities in the
United States where foreign intelligence can
be collected from foreigners, and as long as
this is foreign intelligence, I think it quite
proper that we do so. I can certainly go into
more detail on this in executive session any
time you would like, Mr. Chairman. . . .
And may I add that he did.
But I reiterate that the focus should and
must be foreign intelligence only, -and that
all the other activities are only supportive of
that major function.
Finally, I asked Mr. Colby what I be-
lieve is the most important question of
all:
Senator Sristrserroar. If you should receive
an order in the future which appears on its
face to he illegal, what would you do?
Mr. COLBY. I would object to it and, if nec-
essary, I am quite prepared to leave this re-
sponsibility if it came to that.
SellaLOT SYMINGTON. / did not hear you.
Mr. COLBY. And / am quite prepared to
leave this job If it cornea to that.
It'HE OUTSIDE WITNESSES
Five outside witnesses testified in pub-
lic sessions, July 20, on the Colby nomi-
nation. One of them, Paul Sakwa, a CIA
officer in the 1960's, suggested that we
obtain certain documents from CIA
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guished acting chairman of the commit-
tee.
1971, that charges be presented to a sus-
pect in writing.
At our request he has supplied a series
of documents, some of them classified
Vietnamese documents, to support- his
claim that reforms were instituted by
Phoenix under his leadership.
Mr. President, my opposition to this
whole Indochina war since 1967 has been
well known to Members of the Senate.
But I do not think we should lose the
ability of an extraordinarily able man
who was only carrying out orders, Just
because he was in a paramilitary job at
the same time we were decorating thou-
sands of Americans for carrying out their
military assignments. He accepted a
tough job under orders and did his best;
and the record shows that he tried to
eliminate any abuses he discovered when
he took over the Phoenix program.
coecuuszoe
Mr. President, this has been a sum-
mary of the extensive record the com-
mittee took on this nomination. Much
in the record is classified, but we have
tried to accommodate Senators who
wanted more information.
I believe the record justifies Mr. Colby's
confirmation.
He is exceptionally well qualified. The
way the world is, surely we need an effec-
tive intelligence agency.
It is for these reasons that again let
me say I do hope the Senate will confirm
him without delay so the intelligence
community can get on with its important
ob.
I yield to the able ranking member of
the Senate Armed Services-Committee,
the distinguished senior Senator from
South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND) .
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from South Carolina.
Mr. 'THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise
In support of the nomination of Mr.
William E. Colby as Director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency.
The case for Mr. Colby has been well
documented by the distinguished acting
chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, the senior Senator from Mis-
souri (Mr. SYMINGTON) .
Simply stated this man is a profes-
sional in every sense of the word. For
the most part he has spent his entire
life in public service.
The son of an Army officer, he joined
the Army himself in 1941 initially serv-
ing in the Parachute Field Artillery.
When the Office of Strategic Services is-
sued a call for French speakers in 1943,
Mr. Colby volunteered and in 1944 para-
chuted behind enemy lines in north-cen-
tral France to 'work with a resistence
unit. Shortly before the end of the war
in 1945, he led a team dropped in north-
ern Norway to destroy a rail line used
for transporting German reinforcements.
A graduate of Princeton prior to World
War II, Mr. Colby completed his formal
education by obtaining his law degree
from Coltunbia Law School.
In 1949 he entered Government serv-
ice as an attorney for the National Labor
Relations Board in Washington. In 1951
he joined the staff of the American Em-
bassy in Stockholm and from 1953 to
1958 served in the American Embassy in
Rome, Italy.
Mr. President, the purpose of tracing
this biography la to Show the wide ex-
perience of Mr. Colby in foreign assign-
ments. He not only spent time overseas as
a youth when his father held overseas as-
signments but the vast majority of his
life has been in U.S. positions abroad.
After serving as first secretary of the
American Embassy in Saigon beginning
ill 1959, Mr. Colby returned to the United
States to become Chief of the Far East
Division of the CIA here in Washington.
In March of 1968 he joined the Agency
for International Development and was
sent to Saigon- to assume the post of as-
sistant chief of staff. In November of that
year he became deputy to the com-
mander of the Military Assistance Com-
mand in Vietnam with the rank of an
Ambassador. In this capacity he directed
the civil operation and regional develop-
ment support program. This was better
known as the pacification or Vietnami-
zation program. As director of this pro-
gram, Mr. Colby was the administrator
for all regional and popular defense
forces as well as aid programs in South
Vietnam. The success of this program
had a great deal to do with the safe
withdrawal of American military forcea
last year.
In early 1972, Mr. Colby returned to
Washington to assume the duties of Ex-
ecutive Director-Comptroller of the CIA.
In March of 1973, under the directorship
of Dr. James Schlesinger, he was named
to the No. 3 spot at CIA?that of Deputy
Director for Operations.
Mr. President, few men are as well
qualified for the post as -Director of the
CIA as Mr. Colby. He knows the. agency
well. He has worked for it many years.'
He has had experience in managing the
CIA budget
As we move into a period of negotia-
tion the intelligence gathered by the
CIA will be more important than ever.
We need a professional at the helm.
Further, Congress will be taking a
greater interest in the activities of the
CIA in future years. This is as it should
be. With a man of Mr. Colby's qualifica-
tions and- background in the Director's
office, I believe more congressional over-
sight can be accomplished in an effec-
tive and beneficial way.
Mr. President, in closing, I would like
to stress the point made by our able
chairman that Mr. Colby has had some
tough jobs over the years, because he
was the very man who could handle
them. He has worked under four Presi-
dents. He clearly recognizes the fact that
the CIA never involves itself in policy,
but merely presents the best information
available for policy decisions by the
President. He is a man who I believe will
render our Nation a distinct service in
this unique position knd I urge the Sen-
ate to act- favorably on his nomination.
I wish to thank the distinguished act-
ing chairman.
Mr. SYMNOTON. I thank the able
senior Senator from South 'Carolina,
ranking minority member of Armed
Services, for his constructive contribu-
tion.
I yield novz to the distinguished senior
Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) .
Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the distin-
?? tuna 00ZWIZMATION 1POTZ
Mr. President,- today the Senate will
cast a blind vote on the confirmation of
William E. Colby to be Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence.
It will be a blind vote in many ways.
We do not really know who Mr. Colby
Is. We are not allowed to go back into
his personal employment history and
judge his fitness. We do not know what
jobs he has accomplisited. 'We do not Ino.
know whether or not he has succeeded or
ailed.
And we will be confirming him for a
blind position. In my opinion the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence is one of
the 8 or 10 most powerful positions in
our Government.
So we will vote for or against a man
In an immensely powerful office and we
know very little about him or the job.
Why is this?
Obviously, there are serious questions
of national security involved. Intelligence
operations can be compromised and lives
put in danger. There is the ever-present
possibility of embarrassing the Nation if
caught in the middle of some particularly
sensitive operation. Sources of informa-
tion may dry up.
All these point to the necessity of se-
e Or
But I would remind the Senate that
failure to find out what is going on could
be just as serious from a security stand-
point. Do we turn a blind eye to the
covert funding of clandestine armies and
attempts to overthrow foreign govern-
ments?
No, we have lived in blindness too long
In this body.
If we do not assert our constitutional
responsibilities, the executive department
will do it for us. That has been the
pattern.
SZCZNT CHANGES
Today there are promising signs that
we are snapping out of the slumber of
acquiescence that has typified congres-
sional oversight of the intelligence com-
munity.
The Armed Services Committee has
held open hearings for the first time.
Questions have been submitted for the
RECORD and other Senators have been
allowed to pursue individual lines of
questioning in committee hearings.
The distinguished acting chairman of
the committee, Mr. SYMINGTON, deserves
our commendation for the skill and open-
ness of these meetings. He has begun
the process of reviewing the intelligence
community and he deserves the support
of every Member.
Last week I submitted a series of ques-
tions to the acting chairman for presen-
tation to Mr. Colby during his final con-
firmation hearing. The Director-desig-
nate promptly replied. Most of his an-
swers are unclassified and I wish to share
those unclassified answers today.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that my questions and Mr. Colby's
answers be placed in the RECORD.
I would like to go over several of these
questions.
First is the issue of the CIA budget. 6r-
Since Mr. Colby and his predecessor, Mr.
IPS
oirt
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? Schlesinger, Waal illaRlisiati2
lease of the aggregate intelligence budget
would not violate national security, I
asked Mr. Colby just how far down the
line this prudently could gO.
He used this question as a platform to
back off from his earlier position. Now
he says that although the "disclosure
of the total figure of the intelligence
community budget would not present a
security problem at this time, it is likely
to stimulate requests for additional de-
tails." He goes on to note that he can-
not positively recommend the publica-
tion of the total or any subdivision
thereof.
Mr. President, I do not think that a
new Director of Central Intelligence
should be confirmed without public
knowledge of the size of his budget.
In view of testimony by Mr. Colby and
his predecessor James R. Schlesinger
that release of the intelligence budget
would not violate national security, there
is no doubt that the Senate and the
American people should be told the truth
about the size of the CIA budget.
Mr. Colby has said that it is up to
Congress to release these facts. Now is
the time to do just that.
Mr. President, I would like to ask the
distinguished manager of the nomina-
tion, the Senator from Missouri (Mr.
SYMINGTON), if he could consider re-
leasing those figures in view of the fact
that the testimony from both Mr. Schles-
inger and Mr. Colby is that it would not
violate national security. Why should not
the Senate and the American people
know as much as we can disclose about
this matter as long as national security
is not endangered and why should we
not have that information?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, first
may I say to the able Senator his state-
ment this afternoon is in the interest of
the security, and the prosperity of our
country. I commend him for it. It is the
same type and character of interest he
has displayed in other matters that are
for the welfare of the United States.
When the question of the budget of
the Central Intelligency Agency came up,
inasmuch as I was a member of both
Armed Services and Foreign Relations
I found the latter committee was reach-
ing dicisions not in accordance with the
facts presented by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. I then urged that the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency Subcommittee
include members of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, which at that time
included only the top ranking members
of the Appropriations Committee and the
Armed Services Committee. For some
reason, the late, great Senator Russell de-
cided later to exclude the members of
the Foreign Relations Committee, this
after they were members by invitation
for several years.
Then it is fair to say that most CIA
interest and the budget still later came
before the Appropriations Committee
only, the five or seven senior members
of the Appropriations Committee.
I believe that it was 2 years ago that
our late beloved colleague, Senator
Ellender, was asked on the floor of the
Senate about this budget, and replied to
the effect that he did not know much
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have found that the Congress is at least as
responsible on this as our friends elsewhere
In Government, and we have, as you know,
shared with the Congress some very sensitive
material which has been successfully pro-
tected by the Congress.
On the other hand, there are situations in
which an American intelligence service will
have to be much more exposed than the in-
telligence services of other countries. We are
not going to run the kind of intelligence
service that other countries run. We are go-
ing to rim one in the American society and
the American constitutional structure, and I
can see that there may be a requirement to
expose to the American people a great deal
more than might be convenient from the
harrow intelligence point of view.
That appeared a constructive answer.
Members of the Senate Armed Services
Committee and I would hope the Appro-
priations Committee will do their best to
release more information about this
budget. I do not think his answer means,
however, an unqualified endorsement
that everyone in America ought to know
the details of the intelligence business.
That would be against the Nation's in-
terest.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I think that is cor-
rect; but I do not understand why we
cannot be told the total amount, so that
we will have some basis for judging it.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Let me say to the
able Senator, we would also give the total
amount for the DIA, for the NSA, and
the amounts for the various other intel-
ligence services, including the Office of
Naval Intelligence and the other services:
and I would be glad to discuss this with
the able Senator, or anyone else. I read
that into the RECORD, because I did not
think Mr. Colby's answer to the question
was quite as broad as I was led to believe
by what the able Senator said.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Can the Senator give
any reason for not disclosing the overall
amount?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Yes, but I would
rather not discuss this on the floor,
rather some other place at the conven-
ience of the Senator from Wisconsin.
There ought to'be more public informa-
tion. How it is given out-from the stand-
point of national security, I would pre-
fer to discuss further with the able Sen-
ator from Wisconsin at his convenience.
Then I would be glad to abide by his
decision, because knowing him, I would
either persuade him I was right, or he
would me that he was right.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Just one further
point on this. My resistance to handling
this on a classified and confidential basis
is that there is then no way in which it
can be used in debate. There is no way in
which it can be used in a report to other
Senators. There is no way in which it
can be made something on which we can
secure outside expert opinion and judg-
ments either as to the adequacy of the
responses or how much should be put in.
Frankly, some of the most thoughtful
and useful comments on spending policy
comes from outside Congress. It comes
from a variety of people; .it comes from
the interested experts in the universities,
the business community, and elsewhere;
and if we cannot discuss this publicly,
so we can secure that opinion it seems to
me we are very sharply handicapped.
a ut ?, and did not want to know. He and eon on all sides of that question. But I
was chairman of the one committee ex-
ercising any review of the status and
functioning of the CIA.
This year the Senate Armed Services
Committee took Mr. Colby and other
members of the Central Intelligence
Agency through the budget in detail.
Questions were asked and explanations
given.
As acting chairman of the Committee
on Armed Services, I would welcome the
opportunity of going over that budget
with - the distinguished senior Senator
from Wisconsin, who is a member of the
Committee on Appropriations. From
there on, I would rather not commit my-
self further at this time as to just what
Can and should be done.
I may say, of interest to other Senators
as well as to the Senator from Witicon-
sin, that the Central Intelligence Agency
receives a relatively small percentage of
the overall intelligence dollar. That was
a great surprise to me when I first found
It out.
I may say also that severea staff mem-
bers of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions sent around the world by Subcom-
mittee on U.S. Commitments Abroad of
the Committee on Foreign Relations, re-
ported when they returned that proba-
bly the most wasteful, duplicating aspect
of what they saw on their trip was in the
intelligence field. We are trying to re-
lease more intelligence figures. I am
sure the able Senator could obtain them
as a member of the Committee on Ap-
propriations.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I may say to the Sen-
ator from Missouri that I am interested
in -obtaining those intelligence figures, as
he knows, but the important step is to
declassify them. We have the word of
Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Colby that this
would not affect national security if we
knew how much it is. Mr. Colby said it
is up to Congress to release those figures.
Under the circumstances, I see no reason
why we should not be able to get this in-
formation. The Senator said it is a small
part of the total intelligence dollar. Is it a
billion dollars? A half billion? How much
Is it? think the attitude we have to-
ward CIA, to some extent, has to be in-
fluenced by what resources we put into
it. This can best be determined by know-
ing what the dollar spending is on the
CIA.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, on
July 2, in an open hearing, I made this
observation and asked Mr. Colby:
Severer Members of Congress have called
for the overall budget of the intelligence
community to be made public, so the Amer-
ican people can see at least the general
amount which is spent for intelligence func-
tions. In past years, and despite the increas-
ing desire of the American people tO know
what is going on in their Government, the
furnishing of intelligence information has
been further restricted.
Do you see any reason why overall budget
Information, or even a breakdown of the in-
telligence budget into its major categories,
would endanger national security if it were
made public?
Mr. Colby replied:
I would propose to leave that question, Mr.
Chairman, in the hands of the Congress to
decide. I think there are considerations pro
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S 15362 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 1, 1978 IR
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I think the Senator will agree that the during Phoenix program led by William knowledge, and congressional- decision -
success of the operations of the CIA, at E. Colby. That certainly had mixed re- that should be required.
least in the covert field, have been stilt at best, in the view, of Most ob- Mr. SYMINGTON. May I say the great .I.
mixed?in fact, mixed on the side of be- servers, on the basis of the hindsight we President the able Senator just men-
ing a whole series of pretty disastrous now have. tioned brought me into Government; and
failures, and I think one of the reasons So, as I say, this is not an agency that The first Director of the Central Intent-
is because so much of it has been done in has a long and distinguished record of gence Agency was from me home town,
secret. echievement in the covert operations, and a close- friend. I agree the agency re
Mr. SYMINGTON. I fully agree with They have done many useful things in began doing extraordinary things in lat-.
the Senator. , intelligence gathering; we would have to er years, actions not justified under its
Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator. acknowledge that. But the country would charter. Let us hope that can be cor-
Mr. President, I have lust alluded to the have been better served and the CIA rected. I would hope to see legislation,
fact that CIA operations have often would have done a better Job if we could plan to Bugged some myself, to correct Or
failed. Let me run through very quickly have had more congressional knowledge this development. On the other hand, of
some of the CIA operations that have of these covert operations, and if in fact all Senators who might be interested in
been made public, and how they have some of them, at least, had been made it, I would say would be the distinguished
operated: public at a time when they could have Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. Paoxsrms)
1953: Overthrow of Premier Mos- been discussed, and then influenced the because I have never seen, with one ex-
sadegh and retention of Shah on throne policies that were formulated later. ception, a CIA estimate of the Arnie,
In Iran. I think we can agree that one I am not contending that All covert Navy, or Air Force capabilities of the
was successful. operations can be made public in ad- possible enemy that was not less than
Early 1950's: Attempted airdrop of vance, of course. the estimate of our own Armed Services. pp
men into Albania to overthrow Albanian Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will Without the CIA, we would be turning
Government. Ended in disaster?all the Senator yield? over decision as to what the enemy has
caught. Mr. PROXMIRE. Yes. to the Pentagon.
1954: President Arbenz of Guatemala Mr. SYMINCrTON. The covert opera- If we do that, I am sure it would in-
and his Communist cabinet overthrown tions that have failed are the ones made crease even more our already very large lee
by CIA team. That was a success. public. Some covert operations that have military budget, because we build our
1958: CIA support for invasion forces ? cost many American lives have been out- own defenses against the best estimate of
against President Sukarno of Indonesia. standingly successful. Some such opera- what the possible enemy has.
US. pilot, Allan Pope, captured later tions have cost the lives of friends in Mr. PROXMIRE. I would agree whole-
released by intervention of Robert Ken- foreign countries, although outstanding- heartedly, from what I have heard?and 10"
nedy. That was interpreted by most ly successful. I know very little about it, as all of us
at that time as a failure. I believe it unfortunate and illegal that know very little about it, unfortunately-
1960: Reported bribe of Singapore the CIA was instructed by the National the CIA may well have done a very good
Premier of $1 million. Another failure. Security Council, just another way of job in bringing quality to the intelli-
1960 : U.S. U-2 pilot Francis Gary saying the President of the United States, gence community in the noncovert In-
Powers shot down over U.S.S.R. Collapse to carry on a war in Laos. I do not be- telligence gathering area.
of summit meeting. That was certainly a lieve that will happen again. Although Mr. SYMINGTON. And separated from
failure. the Director of the CIA does not report the military.
1961: Bay of Pigs. We all know what a to Congress, he promised me he will do Mr. PROXMIRE. Yea. 4eu
failure that was. his best to see it does not happen again. Mr. CRANSTON.. Mr. President, will
1958-62: Support for Eliambe tribes- He knows the damage that war has done the Senator from Missouri yield?
men of Tibet against Chinese invasion, to the good name of the Agency he has Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield to my able
Training camp established at Camp Hale served loyally for many years. friend from California.
In Colorado. Tibet operation terminated I agree with the Senator from Wiscon-
gm*
with some loss of life among trained sin that Many problems we are talking Mr. CRANSTON. I want to express me
Tibetans. A failure. about today came about, because of lack appreciation for the great work the
1964-68: CIA involvement with ernigree of review on the part of the committees Senator from Wisconsin has been doing
groups exposed in court case over United of Congress that should have been more in seeking to bring to public light?for
States and Canadian Estonian organize- interested in CIA operations, the information of the Senate, the Con- ge
- tions. A failure. Mr. PROXMIRE I think we also ought gress, and the country?the total budget
1984: CIA supported US. Congo oper- to recognize that it is very possible that figure for the CIA. It Is very important
ation by assisting Tshombe. Anti-Castro this whole notion of our playing God, of that that figure be made public. / think
Cubans used to fly U.S. aircraft. I think our determining that the head of a gov- that the response the Senator got to his
that was considered by most to be a ernment in a foreign country Is not the question submitted to Mx. Colby during glo
mistake. right one, that we should challenge the confirmation hearings indicates
1964-65: CIA attempts to rig Chilean whether to act by assassination or by clearly that there is no security reason
elections against Allende. Frei wins with military coup or in some other Way to put for keeping the figure secret. All that Mr.
CIA support. A temporary but certainly our own national preferences in author- Colby said, according to the Senator's
a Pyrrhic victory, which has resulted ity and power. The President for whom Meech today, was that to disclose the
since then in the view of many, as hurt- both of us have such reverence, Barre total figure of the intelligence budget
ful to American policy. Truman, who was the man during whose would not present a security problem at
1966-67: National Student Association administration the CIA was founded, said this time, but that disclosure was likely
found funded by CIA. Elaborate front in 1083 that he had no idea, at the time to stimulate requests for additional de-
organizations in the United States ex- the C/A was established, that it would tails. What he was saying there Is that
posed. That was certainly considered to get into covert operations. He was aPe there are no security reasons, but they
be a failure. palled at the so-called "dirty tricks" rec- want to keep the figure secret because
Training and support of secret army ord. they want to keep some other things
In Laos at cost of over $300 million a So here is one area that, whatever we secret. To me, that makes no sense. If A
year. I think that would be a failure, are spending?and we have no idea? there are figures that should be kept
Supply of red wig, miniature camera, considerable question could be raised, secret, those figures need not be re-
credentials, and voice alternative device first, as to whether we should continue, vealed. I agree that there are facts about
to E. Howard Hunt given by CIA. That in view of the fact that we can chal- the CIA's operation that are not properly
would certainly be considered a disaster. lenge whether it is serving our interests available for public consumption, but MIP
making public the overall figure has
Operation of dummy and front orga- under any circumstances; second, wheth-
nizations such as Air America and er covert operations represent a morel nothing to do with concealing those facts.
Southern Air Transport. Certainly attitude and posture that we should take; But the chairman of the committee
doubtful. and third, whether this kind of activity mentioned that if this figure was made
Phoenix program to neutralize Viet- should be continued without the con- public, then certain overall figures would
cong infrastructure-20,587 people killed gressional oversight, congressional have to be made public.
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?oPo
are
August 1, 1973 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE S 15363
Mr. symUtumtesdnEemealnase12001WAl tatcritiEKEZZAW131a9M9944R,Cliarri pleased to note that for
the first time the oversight committees
rather extraorz
ary position this after-
noon. Perhaps more than any other Mem-
ber of the Senate* over a period of years,
I have been pleading, arguing, working.
for further information about the CIA
to be released at least to the Congress
if not the American people.
So I do not want to be in any box
about what is or is not released.
What I said to the able Senator from
Wisconsin was based on his being a mem-
ber of the Appropriations Committee.
So far as I am concerned, it has been
most unfortunate the way intelligence
information has been so extensively
masked in the overall budget.
Mr. CRANSTON. I am delighted that
the Senator has made that statement,
because that is what the Senator from
Wisconsin and I have been looking for.
The DIA figure is already in the public
domain.
I would like to add to the point the Sen-
ator from Missouri made about the fig-
ures in the defense budget. Since we do
not know what the overall figure for the
CIA is, every other figure in the Defense
budget is open to suspicion as to its
accuracy. In order to conceal within the
Defense budget the overall CIA figure,
every other figure is susceptible to being
Padded, and certain figures are padded.
As a result, we have no idea what the
figures really are, whether for the C-5A,
the B-1 bomber, the Trident, or for mili-
tary housing. We do not know whether
those figures are accurate or inaccurate.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator from
California mentioned the DIA figure as
published. I am not sure all the DIA fig-
ures are published, or NSA, or ONI, or
Army Intelligence, or Air Force Intelli-
gence. We are getting .into something
that should be checked from the stand-
point of national security. I am sure the
Senator would agree.
Mr. CRANSTON. Absolutely. I am de-
lighted that we seem to have come to a
point of agreement among the three Sen-
ators in talking about this matter.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, apro-
pos of what the Senator from Missouri
has been quoting, indicating in his judg-
ment that the total size of the intelli-
gence budget is in the neighborhood of
something like $5 billion or $6 billion, it
has been said by some that this is high,
and by others that it is low. Does the
Senator feel, or could he discuss the total
amount of the intelligence budget, in
view of the fact that the Senator from
Missouri just said that this is one area
where there is more waste and extrava-
gance than in almost any?
Mr. Symington. May I say to the- able
Senator from Wisconsin that I came in
here to recommend the confirmation of
Mr. Colby?
Mr. PROXMIRE. All right.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I know the Sena-
tor's tremendous capacity for figures--
therefore do not want to commit myself
because I am not sure. I am quite con-
fident in my own mind, however that the
figure of $6 billion is high. As to what the
exact figure is, let me check it, and I will
tell the Senator before the end of the
week as well as the relatively low per-
centage of that figure that goes to the
CIA.
very much.
Mr. CRANSTON. If the Senator will
yield for just one brief question, I
should like to ask him if I could also
be advised of that figure. The Senator
said the Senator from Wisconsin is a
member of the Appropriations Commit-
tee. X am not contesting my right to the
figure?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I would certainly
desire to give the Senator from Cali-
fornia any information he wants. He has
me in a bit of a "crack"?
Mr. CRANSTON. That was deliberate..
Mr. SYMINGTON. Unuslial for him,
too. Let us see. In any case, one or two
members of a committee should not be
told about things other members of the
committee are not told about. When that
happens?and it has happened?I see
the Senator from Iowa (Mr. Humans) in
the Chamber, and he knows what I am
talking about?then we do not have a
majority of the committee voting money
on the basis of the facts. It was easy for
me to say to the Senator from Wiscon-
sin that I would be glad to discuss it
with him, because he is a member of the
Appropriations Committee.
Would the 'Senator be good enough to
give me 24 hours, then I will answer his
question.
Mr. CRANSTON. Certainly. The diffi-
culty I have in voting on matters like
this, not only in relation to the CIA, is
that the concealment of the CIA figure
distorts every other figure.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator from
California is right. I am sympathetic.
But we do not want to be attacked for
violating any rules on national security.
I would hope we can do what the Sen-
ator from California desires and I ap-
preciate his understanding.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator
from Missouri very much. I will be de-
lighted to wait until tomorrow.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Jerry Tinker
and Dale deHaan be given the privilege of
the floor during the course of this debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Domearci). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
The time of the Senator from Wis-
consin has expired.
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I yield 15
minutes of time under my control to the
distinguished Senator from Wisconsin
(Mr. PROXMIRE) to finish his statement.
He has obviously been in discussion here
and has been unable to finish it. So I will
be more than happy to yield him that
time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Wisconsin is recognized for 15
minutes.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I want
to thank the distinguished Senator from
Iowa for giving me this 15 minutes. I do
not think I will use it all.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I participated in
this colloquy, but did not start it. If the
Senator needs more time I will be glad
to yield him from my time.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator.
On the issue of the National Security
Council Intelligence Directives; which I
first raised here on April 10 and again
will be briefed on their contents. It is
simply unbelievable that the oversight
committees were unaware of these?the
primary operating directions to the in-
telligence community?for all these
years. How could there be any oversight
if Congress had no idea about what the
executive department had directed the
CIA to do? That is why the -oversight
committees did not know about the secret
army in Laos or the tampering with the
election in Chile. They did not even know
where to look.
I urge the oversight committees to re-
tain copies of these directives and require
frequent briefings along the lines of the
Pregrams undertaken under each direc-
tive.
I ask the distinguished Senator from
Missouri, the acting chairman of the
Committee on Armed Services, if it would
be possible to sanitize the NSCID's and
release them publicly or have the Na-
tional Security Council do so?that is,
take out the classified information in-
cluded in them, but release what can
be released.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I am not sure, but
have obtained approval to look at them
myself. We have been so busy trying to
get the procurement bill out under pres-
sure from the leadership that I just have
not yet had time. I would be glad to as-
certain whether or not that would be
possible. Those directives from the Na-
tional Security Council, at least in the
minds of some people, in effect go against
the legislation which created the agency
Itself.
Mr. PROXMIRE. It is the kind of
information we ought to have. Much of
It is historical and dated and therefore
could be disclosed.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I agree. The only
.person who could decide that would be
the President or his agent, through the
National Security Council. I will be glad
to write them a letter about it.
Mr. PROXMIRE. When I get classified
information and I ask that it be sani-
tized, 90 or 95 percent of the information
Is usually intact.
I might also add at this point that the
CIA's reply to my question about the
interpretation and extension of the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947 was com-
pletely inadequate. The NSCID's flow
from one clause in the 1947 act. The act
also provides, as Mr. Colby states, that
the National Security Council shall issue
directives pursuant to the act.
But this does not give the National
Security Council the right to change the
intent or substance of the original act.
It merely enables the National Security
Council to carry out the expressed wishes
of Congress as stated in the act. And
nowhere in the act does Congress give
the CIA authority to operate overseas
with covert techniques.
In 1963, President Truman stated em-
phatically that he did not have this in
mind when the CIA was formed during
his administration.
DOMESTIC OPZRATIONEI
Finally, I wish to talk about the issue
of domestic operations. Although Con-
gress clearly did not want the CIA to
become involved in domestic matters and
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S 15364 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 1, 1973
placed specificlU$e)vright and in the
far &lapse a owsiesuagiNgogumgpei R8:9691414pialit4waa
that effect, still the CIA maintains cer-
tain domestic operations. Some of these
may be harmless, like" the Domestic Con-
tact Service, but others pose more serious
problems.
Mr. President, the strictest kind of
restraint must be placed on domestic
activities of the intelligence community.
The CIA has no place training police
forces under the omnibus crime bill. It
should not be forming dummy domestic
corporations or active corporations, for
that matter. CIA ties with the academic
community, research institutes, aero-
space companies, and Federal bureauc-
racies should be carefully controlled.
I am particularly disturbed that the
Domestic Contact Service has been
Placed under the operational control of
the clandestine services. Mr. Colby says
that this is to improve the coordination
of its collection activities with those of
the Agency abroad. I find this disturbing
because of the possibility that the DCS,
which has a good reputation, may now
become 'tainted" by the covert side of
the Agency. If the DCS is an open and
aboveboard operation, then it $ hould
operate in an open and aboveboard
manner. It should operate under the au-
thority of the analytical side of the C/A.
I should like to ask the Senator from
Missouri one other question: Does the
chairman think the oversight committees
should be told about the foreign and
domestic operations?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I would put it this
way: The oversight committees should
be told everything that does not direct-
ly affect an operation:
During the years I spent in the Pen-
tagon at the Secretary level, there was
one subject I did not want to know about;
namely, the details of war plans.
If we' have agents in a foreign coun-
try, under cover, I do not want to know
who they are, nor do I want to know the
details of their actions.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I understand that. I
think everyone would agree with that.
What I have in mind is that when these
operations have taken place, and with-
out disclosing identities of individuals
Involved, does the Senator feel that the
oversight conunittees should be in-
formed, so that there could be a prompt
evaluation and a policy determined on
the basis of that experience?
Mr. SYMINGTON. One of the most
unfortunate developments in the history
of this country was the secret., war in
Laos run by the CIA out of the Embassy
in Vientiane under instructions from the
Embassy. It was run without knowledge
on the part of members of the Armed
Services Committee or the C/A Over-
sight Committee or the Committee On
Foreign Relations.
It was only found out about when staff
members of Foreign Relations went into
Laos and found a war being run out of
the Embassy in Vientiane.
That kind of secret operation is wrong.
It all should have been reported to the
proper committees. I believe the main
reason it was not reported was because
they knew if it was found out, it would
have been stopped.
operations ever reported to the over-
sight committees?
Mr. SYMINGTON. They have not for
some years.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Why should they not
be reported to the oversight committees?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I think they
should.
Mr. PROXMIRE. And they should ex-
ercise their authority.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Yes.
Mr. PROXMIRE. So far as the Sena-
tor is concerned, that is his position?
Mr. SYMINGTON. And to the best of
my ability, I will see that such reporting
of a war, a secret CIA war, is put into
effect.
TIIX COLBY CONFIRMATION
Mr. PROXMIRE. In considering how
to vote on the Colby confirmation I have
weighed the available facts, as inade-
quate as they may be. On the negative
aide are his associations with the Phoenix
program, his lifelong career in the co-
vert side of intelligence, and the whole
question of executive department use of
the CIA. On the positive side is his
willingness to answer all questions, his
reputation as a- good administrator, and
some awareness of the propriety of close
congressional oversight.
On balance, I have decided to support
Mr. Colby. But I am giving notice that I
will closely monitor his leadership of the
Intelligence community. And I will not
hesitate to object to any questionable use
of the intelligence community in do-
mestic affairs. Furthermore, I may offer
certain amendments to the military pro-
curement bill dealing with the CIA.
A NIA, OVICRSIONT COMMIT=
Mr. President, within the next few
days I will introduce a resolution to
create a standing committee of the Sen-'
ate on the Central Intelligence Agency.
There are many sound reasons for creat-
ing a full standing committee. Not the
least of these is the need for continuing
oversight of the multibillion-dollar in-
telligence community. This can only be
done with a full-time staff unencum-
bered by other responsibilities.
I will recommend that this new com-
mittee be composed of members of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, the
Foreign Relations Committee, and others
selected from the remaining Senators.
Mr. President, I welcome the statement
by the distinguished chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee (Mr.
&rams) that the committee will under-
take a reassessment of its oversight re-
sponsibilities. I hope that my bill 8-1935
will be considered at that time.
I thank the distinguished Senator from
Iowa and the distinguished Senator from
Missouri for yielding me time.
Mr. President, I yield back the re-
mainder of my time to the Senator from
Iowa, and I thank the Senator once
again.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, if
the distinguished Senator from Iowa will
yield. I am very glad to hear the able
Senator from Wisconsin say he has de-
cided to vote for Mr. Colby. Knowing him
as I do, I know also that he would so
Interest of the country.
His speech today on the Senate floor is
construCtive. This situation has been
wrong; it has been wrong over a period
of years; it should be corrected; and as
a member of the Armed Services Com-
mittee, the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, and a member of the Military
Subcommittee on Appropriations, I will
be glad to work with him to that end.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER,. Who
Yields time?
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I yield
myself 15 minutes.
Mr. MANSFIELD Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. HUGHES. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the distin-
guished Senator from Iowa (Mr.
Rooms) and the distinguished Senator
from Massachusetts (Mr. ICZNNZDY)
have at least 20 minutes apiece of the
remaining time and that the vote occur
on the pending nomination at the hour
of 4 p.m.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, re-
serving the right to object, I do wish
to speak on the nomination and ll am not
certain as to the time I will need. I am
waiting to hear the statements of the
two Senators.
Mr. MANSFIELD. We are trying to
accommodate several Senators who
would like to vote at 4 o'clock.
Mr. CR,ANSTON. I do not want to ob-
ject, but I would like to have 12 or 14
minutes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Very well. I with-
draw the request. fee
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I have
requested time to speak to clarify my
opposition to this nomination. As I stated
at the time of the vote by the Armed
Services Committee, I wanted to review ape
the evidence which had been presented
before making a final judgment.
That review has reinforced my original
Inclination to oppose Mr. Colby's nom-
ination.
At the outset, let me say that I do not
question Mr. Colby's ability. He has an
impressive background of Government
service in intelligence and other areas
as well as good academic and professional
credentials.
Moreover, I am pleased with many of
the statements and pledges made by Mr.
Colby in his confirmation hearings.
He has offered to accede to Congress
will in making public some information
about the CIA budget.
He has promised to continue reducing
unnecessary intelligence activities in Ilt?
order to hold down costs.
He has stated that he would respect
the prohibitions on CIA activities within
the United States and calls the Agency's
assistance to E. Howard Hunt a mistake
that will not be made again.
He has agreed to consider providing
written materials as well as oral brief-
ings to the appropriate congressional
committees.
And he has declared his intention to
resign if he is ever given an order to
Involve the Agency in an illegal act.
111,
ikee
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at*
August 1, 1973 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE S 15365
These are nAliiiinNieli6FaffeR4W aggilieltMiiPlikaTiOnolitC???Miltag2Wsure that these people
are not the entering wedge of another
clandestine cadre of American military ?
advisers?which would be contrary to ex-
isting law and against the clear desire
of the American people and the Congress
to withdraw from military operations in
Cambodia.
Mr. Colby's prior association with such
operations and his testimony make me
fear that he might acquiesce in another
secret war, at lea* so long as it can be
kept secret.
I have no objection to an intelligence
man as director of the CIA. In some
cases, it might be positively beneficial,
since he would be better able to control
the vast bureaucracy beneath him be-
cause he knows the ins and outs of the
process.
But the intelligence apparatus should
be under command and control of proper
constitutional authority; its operation
must not be permitted to become an
end in itself.
/ am fearful of a man whose experi-
ence has been so largely devoted to
clandestine operations involving the use
of force and the manipulation of fac-
tions in foreign governments. Such a
man may become so enamored with these
techniques that he loses sight of the
higher purposes and moral constraints
which should guide our country's activ-
ities abroad.
We need as Director of the CIA a man
who will unflinchingly act on those pur-
poses and subject to those constraints,
a man who will unfailingly show the
independence necessary to resist pres-
sures from his operatives below and from
his superiors above to try some dirty
trick which promises some clever suc-
cess at the expensd of our principles.
Take the example of CIA involvement
in domestic activities in the United
States. We know that the CIA provided
assistance to Howard Hunt's burglary of
Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office;
that it prepared a personality study of
Dr. Ellsberg, an American citizen; that
it provided probably illegal training to
local police forces in our country.
When questioned about taking firm
steps to prevent recurrences, Mr. Colby
answered me that?
With respect to the training of local police
personnel?any further such action will be
taken only in the most exceptional circum-
stances and with the Director's personal ap-
proval.
Instead of outright repudiation of such
practices, Mr. Colby left open the door
for his own personal decision.
Bluntly, there were too many qualifica-
tions, too many hedges in such answers
- to convince me of Mr. Colby's suitability
for this particular command post.
We cannot accept such loopholes un-
less we are willing to tolerate abuses and,
ultimately, risk loss of control.
Mr. President, in confirming a director
of the far-flung CIA, there should be no
questions whatever in our minds as to
his responsiveness to civilian control and
his respect for the basic political proc-
esses of this republic.
The discipline of the secret opera-
tive is necessary, often admirable, but it
is not necessarily conducive of the kind
' is to be commended for them.
Despite those statements, .Mr. Presi-
dent, I remain troubled about Mr. Col-
by's suitability -for this particular im-
portant and sensitive position. After all,
we are deciding who shall control what
our intelligence agency does overseas
and who should be the President's chief
analyst of political and military develop..
ments in other countries that affect our
national interest and security.
The decision as to who should have
these far-reaching powers gets to basic
consideration of a public official's loyalty
eel+ to the Constituticm of the United States
when that loyalty seems contravened by
other loyalties and disciplines. This, in
turn, gets at the fundamental qualifica-
tion for a CIA Director of an overriding
um. commitment to civilian control of the
Agency.
At a time when startling disclosures
are being made of secret warfare being
waged at the behest of a few individuals
In command positions and of large scale
falsification of official reports on such
activities to the Congress and the Ameri-
can people, it seems imperative to me
that we take a thorough, objective look
at the temperament and background of
the individual we select for this power-
ful, sensitive post.
In this context, I have serious doubts
about the way in which Mr. Colby
handled his previous assignments.
His optimistic assessments of the pop-
ularity and strength of President Diem
in South Vietnam a dozen years ago may
eser well have helped to cement American
policy in support of a dictator who had
lost touch with his own people. Better
judgments in those years may well have
avoided or mitigated the tragedy of
4?0 Vietnam.
Mr. Colby's activities as head of the
Par East Division of the Directorate of
Plans may well have undermined the
1962 Laos accords and led to the start
of the secret but deadly war In that
troubled country.
Mr. Colby's direction of the Phoenix
program, however well intentioned it
ale may have been, clearly did not prevent
abuses and excesses in that program
which are now a matter of public record.
I will leave to some of my colleagues a
more detailed analysis of Mr. Colby's rec-
ord as director of Phoenix which I believe
requires the most careful scrutiny.
I am also frankly troubled about some
of the attitudes Mr. Colby has shown
toward the proper role of the CIA in the
ea, future.
Take, for example, his statements with
regard to U.S. Activities in Laos.
Mr. Colby told the distinguished act-
ing chairman of the Armed Services
Committee (Mr. SYMINGTON) that?
The initiation of CIA's activity in Laos was
a matter which did require the use of intelli-
gence techniques because it was felt im-
portant at that time that the United States
not be officially involved in that activity.
Regardless of whatever "intelligence
techniques" were involved, the fact was
that the CIA financed one military fac-
tion which overthrew the legitimate Gov-
ernment of Laos in 1960 and later spon-
sored a secret army responsive to
vs/
As the years pasted, Americans became
so deeply involved with this army?
through advisers, pay, and air support?
that the CIA was in effect running its
own war in Laos rather than simply
gathering intelligence.
Mr. Colby never told the committee
that he would not engage in another
secret, CIA-nm war. Rather, he said:
I will try to keep it out of the kind of ex-
posure that some of these, larger activities
got us into.
His concern was with exposure rather
than with impropriety or outright il-
legality of an intelligence-gathering
agency's running a war.
In a written question for Mr. Colby, I
tried to pin down this crucial difference.
I asked him: Where should the line be
drawn between CIA and Defense Depart-
ment activities involving the use of
armed force?
His answer was:
In general, the line should be drawn be-
tween CIA and the Defense Department with
respect to armed force at the point in which
the United States acknowledges involvement
In such activities. As a practical matter, how-
ever, the scale of the activity will, in many
cases, also affect whether the United States
is revealed as engaged in the activity.
Again, the point to be made is that
Mr. Colby believes that CIA-nm military
operations are perfectly acceptable so
long as they can be concealed. This is
unacceptable to me.
When Americans are involved in. com-
bat, the Congress should be* informed
and congressional approval should be
obtained.
Yet Mr. Colby stopped short of prom-
ising the openness which our system de-
mands. When I asked him: Do you, be-
lieve that it is proper under our Consti-
tution for such military operations?as
in Laos?to be conducted without the
knowledge or approval of Congress, he
replied:
The appropriate committees of the Con-
gress and a number of individual senators
and congressmen were briefed on CIA's ac-
tivities in Lace during the period covered. In
addition, CIA's programs were described to
the Appropriations Committees in our an-
nual budget hearings.
Mr. President, in my judgment, the
lines drawn by Mn Colby in responding
to these questions are too blurry to' be
acceptable.
Given the recent evidence of the fail-
ure of more than a handful of Members
of Congress--if that many?to be in-
formed of the secret B-52 raids in Cam-
bodia, I am suspicious of such asser-
tions. And I am sure that the distin-
guished Senator from Missouri (Mr.
SYmINGT0N), though we differ on this
particular nomination, would agree that
sufficient and timely information on Laos
was not provided to the Congress.
Now we face the problem of Cambodia.
Press reports suggest that the CIA has
already placed personnel throughout the
country who are providing radio equip-
ment to Cambodian units and who then
suggest where these units skiould oper-
ate. At least some of these people worked
on paramilitary operations in Laos at
an earlier time.
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of perspective and judgment required for this particular matter, as well as other most of the developments of the Phoenix
the head of a vast governmental agency
which has the capability of either pro-
tecting or compromising our national in-
terest and our moral purpose as a people.
Mr. President, we must recognize today
more clearly than ever before that the
Congress has awesome responsibilities in
voting on this immensely important ap-
pointment. The selection of head of the
CIA is too crucial to our future to be
made with a routine etamp of approval.
This brings us to the larger context of
congressional responsibility for oversight
of the CIA. In the last 20 years more
than 200 bills designed to make the CIA
more accountable to Congress have been
Introduced and have gone absolutely
nowhere. The least we can at this time
do is to review and live up to our re-
sponsibilities under the existing im-
precise laws governing that agency.
Mr. President, my opposition to Mr.
Colby has no personal overtones. Nor do
I have cause to question either his loyalty
or ability. The question is whether or not
this man in the light of his background
and attitudes is qualified for the CIA
directorship with all of ita sensitive bear-
ing on national security, national pur-
pose, and constitutional liberties.
For me the answer is No.
I yield the floor.
Mr. KENNEDY obtained the floor.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
would like to repeat my request: Twenty
minutes to the distinguished Senator
from Massachusetts (Mr. KaNNIDT) , and
10 minutes to the distinguished Senator
from California (MT. CRANSTON), and
then a vote on the nomination.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, reserving
the right to object and I shall not ob-
ject--I simply did not hear the request.
Mr. MANSFIELD Twenty minutes.
and 10 minutes and then the vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request* of the Senator
from Montana? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I, first
of all, want to express my very sincere
appreciation to the acting chairman of
the Armed- Services Committee, and the
person that is bringing the nomination to
the floor of the U.S. Senate (Mr. SYMING-
TON) . I want to express my very deep
sense of appreciation for all the courte-
sies he has extended to a Member of the
Senate, which in this case is myself, and
for cooperating in every possible way to
assist this Member to gain information
from the nominee and also from the
committee itself on a number of differ-
ent matters which I was deeply troubled
by and very much concerned about.
After listening to the colloquy of the
Senator from Wisconsin, the Senator
from California, and the Senator from
Missouri, and hearing the Senator from
Missouri indicate that he was going to
respond in every positive way he could
to work with Members of the Senate, I
would like to say publicly that, as a per-
son who has worked with him closely on
matters,- I think My colleagues can be
very much assured of his cooperation
and willingness to extend every &area
of information that he possibly can to
the Members of the Senate.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
cannot let those very kind remarks go
without expressing my gratitude. Hav-
ing served tor many years with the able
Senator from- Massachusetts, and hav-
ing had increasing respect for his ability
and his intelligence on these and other
matters, it was a privilege to cooperate
with him in this case. It will always be
a privilege to cooperate with him.
Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, although I respect Mr.
William Colby's proven ability and the
high regard in which he is held by the
intelligence community of the United
States, I intend to cast my vote against
his confirmation as Director of Central
Intelligence. ?
In part, the reservations I have about
his nomination are matters of personal
conscience, arising out of Mr. Colby's
close relationship with the Phoenix pro-
gram in South Vietnam and my own
longstanding humanitarian concern
about the effects of the war on Vietnam-
ese civilians.
In part, my reservations also involve
larger questions about the changing role
of'the CIA in American policy and the
philosophy of the person the country
should have to guide the Agency in the
years ahead.
As chairman of the Senate Refugee
Subcommittee, as a Senator concerned
about civilians in Vietnam, as one who
has been to Vietnam and seen their
plight firsthand. I have long been trou-
bled by the continuing serious allegations
surrounding the Phoenix program.
From the fall of 1968 through the
spring of 1971, Mr. Colby was in charge
of the U.S. pacification program in South
Vietnam. As such, he was one of the
Principal architects and masterminds of
Phoenix, a program designed to "neu-
tralize"?in one of the more notorious
euphemisms of the Vietnam war?the
so-called Vietcong infrastructure, that
is, South Vietnamese civilians providing
assistance to the Vietcong.
The following statistics on Phoenix,
furnished by Mr. Colby in House hear-
ings in 1971, represent one of the few
accepted measures of the program:
PHOENIX?NEUTRAUZATION OF VIETCONG INFRASTRUC-
TURE
Total
Per- neu-
Cap- cent tral-
tuned Rallied Killed killed Ind
1968
11,281
2,229.
2,559
18
15,7611
1949
8,515
4,832
6,187
31
19,534
Sentenced:
1970
- 6, 405
7.145
8, 191
36
22, 341
1971 (May)
2.770
2,911
3,650
39
9,331
Total
28,978
17, 717
20,587
30
66,912
As Ambassador Colby stated in his
public confirmation hearing before the
Senate Armed Services Committee on
July 2, during his tenure as head of
pacification: ?
program were my own.
Yet, the record of Phoenix and related
public safety programs under Mr. Colby
is marked not only by a shocking dearth
of information on the operations and
results of tile programs?but it is also
riddled with unanswered charges and al-
legations of assassinations, of indiscrim-
inate killing of civilians, of targeting
suspects without adequate intelligence,
of false arrests and unknown persons
"neutralized," of torture and brutality *
in the interrogation centers and prisons,
of jailing non-Communist political op-
ponents of President Thieu, of reclassify-
ing political prisoners as common crimi-
nals, and of inexcusably poor training IP
and field control of a program of such
lethal scope. And we see the results of
this program continuing today in the
prisons of South Vietnam.
In addition to a private conversation
with Mr. Colby earlier this month, I had
the opportunity, at the invitation of the
Armed Services Committee to question
Mr. Colby last week in executive ses-
sion, and to submit a series of written
questions on Phoenix and related pro-
grams. Mr. Colby's replies still leave
many questions unanswered?and, in
fact, raise some troubling new ones.
In terms of the past record, Mr. Colby
has provided no additional information
on the Phoenix and related programs,
and declined to submit documentation
in support of his views. eke*
In terms of the present, it is clear
from Mr. Colby's replies that the United
States has not fully disengaged from
Phoenix and related functions, and that set
Mr. Colby supports our present posture.
One of the questions I submitted read
as follows:
What is the current status of the Phoenix
(Phung Hoang) Program? Assuming it con- w
tinues, does the United States have a sup-
portive, advisory or any, other kind of role?
Are any American or American sponsored
personnel, from the CIA or elsewhere, in-
volved in any way? Are any American com-
modities or funds, directly or indirectly, 4111P
from the CIA or elsewhere, supporting any
aspect of the Phoenix Program?
This is Mr. Colby's response:
Aside from a GVN national level coordi-
nating committee. the Phung Hoang pro-
gram has been incorporated within the na-
tional police of Vietnam and is no longer a
separate program. The United States does
not have a support, advisory or other role A,
with respect to the Phung Hoang program, ---
although CIA maintains liaison and assists
the Special Police Branch of the National Po-
lice In its intelligence functions. The United
States advisory effort with the Phung Hoang
program was terminated in December 1972, It
and U.S. assistance to the Phung Hoang pro-
gram through the Department of Defense
ended at the same time. Aside from this re-
lationship with CIA, I am not informed about
the uses made of other assistance which Oft.
might be supplied by the United States.
This comment is distressing. Clearly a
continuing American involvement along
the lines suggested by Mr. Colby is not
only unconscionable?but, I feel, it is also
in violation of the spirit, if not the letter,
of the ceasefire agreement for Vietnam.
Finally, in terms of the future and his
potential direction of the CIA, Mr. Colby igh
clearly feels that Phoenix-type functions,
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August 1, 1973 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE S 15367-
organizations an ease A
...e ? ?.? 1, the Senate Select
Calls "internal counter-subversive or minimization of its abuses, no antiseptic Committee and the special prosecutor.
counter-terrorist activities"?are a prop- label can conceal the fact that. although I do, however, want to make clear that
er function of the CIA, and serve a use- Phoenix is the mythical bird of life and my vote- against Mr. Colby's conlarnut-
ful purpose in U.S. foreign policy. resurrection, Phoenix under Mr. Colby's tion is not based on his relationship to
Again, one of the questions I submitted tenue was a bird Of death for 20,587 Watergate.
read as follows: civilians of South Vietnam. In closing, let me say again that I re-
Are there plans, anticipations, or personal This Nation should never have been Bisect the very high regard in which Mr.
convictions on your part, that Phoenix pro- involved in Phoenix. Never again should Colby is held by these who have known
grams should be supported by the United a program like that be part of America's and worked with him. In many respects,
States in the Philippines or Thailand or else- role in world affairs. he symbolizes the finest qualities of in-
,sit where? The other reservation I have about tellectual ability and personal sacrifice
This was Mr. Colby's response: Mr. Colby involves the sort of leadership demonstrated by legions of able and un-
Under the Nixon doctrine I do not envisage America wants for its CIA in the years heralded American officials who have un-
a large-scale U.S. involvement in internal ahead. selfishly dedicated their careers to the
...0 counter-subversive or counter-terrorist ac- In recent years, the activities of the Nation's public service.
tivities on the scale of experience in Vietnam. C/A, especially its secret operations, But, for the reasons stated, I am un-
have come under increasing challenge able to approve his nomination.
Frankly, this is a surprising reply? at home and overseas. The gulf between Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
for the Nixon doctrine has been in force
for the greater share of Phoenix history. the Agency's intelligence arm and its for the yeas and nays on the nomine-
es, clandestine arm Is well known. Espe- tion.
As a matter of fact, this morning, in
, daily in recent months, as highlighted The yeas and nays were ordered.
our Refugee Subcommittee, we Inquired
Into the matter with AID and Depart- by the unfolding disclosures of CIA in- Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, to me
volvement in the Watergate affair, the there is one basic problem looming be-
ment of Defense officials. I asked Mr.
Dennis Doolin about the Department of reputation of the Agency has been flue. hind the vote on the nomination of Mr.
ther diminished, because of its apparent William Colby to be the new Director of
Defense's contribution of nearly $12 mil-
lion, under fiscal year 1974, for police involvement in domestic activities in vio- the Central Intelligence Agency. That
lation of its charter. problem is the vast power wielded by the
support activities. Under Mr. Colby's
earlier response, he recognizes that the I share the serious and growing doubts Central Intelligence Agency itself.
..wip Phoenix program continues in Vietnam of many other Senators about the role When I reviewed the National Security
and recognizes that the program is now of the CIA as it is presently constituted. Act of 1947, I was reminded once again
incorporated into the national police. Already, under the leadership of Senator that the CIA's power has largely devel-
Sneers and Senator Systnerrou, the oned within the statutory authority laid
However, he was unable to give us any
information. We know that we are Armed Services Committee has begun an down by that act.
extensive review of the CIA Act. There The bulk of the CIA's duties as de-
ems con-
tributing in excess of $12 million to the are many other signs as well that both fined by the National Security Act are
police forces of South Vietnam, out of the Senate and the House intend to ex- related to advising the National Security
AID and DOD funds. But the Defense ercise a far greater degree of oversight Council and correlating and evaluating
Department personnel whom we had be- over the CEA in the future than has ex- intelligence. The authority for the "dirty
fore our committee were unable to give
ea isted in the past. tricks" is contained in one short clause
any assurance to us this morning that But Congress cannot do the job alone, stating that it shall be the duty of the
no part of these funds are being used for If the CIA is to fulfill its proper role in Agency, under the direction of the Na-
Phoenix functions, the decade of the seventies, it must have tonal Security Council?
Also, Mr. Colby indicated when I a director who is responsive and sym-
asked if such a program could start iii pathetic
. to perform such other functions and
ear pathetic to the need. As a man who has duties related to intelligence affecting the
the Philippines, Thailand, or elsewhere: risen through the ranks of the Agency national security as the ,National Security
"Under the Nixon doctrine, I do not en- on its clandestine side, Mr. Colby sym- Council may from time to time direct. (50
vision a large-scale 'U.S. Involvement in USC 403(d) (5) .)
bonzes the side of the CIA that has be-
internal countersubversive or counter- come deeply embroiled in the present This means that the law gives the
we terrorist activities on the scale of ex- controversy over the Agency's foreign CIA, subject only to the approval of the
experience in Vietnam." and domestic activities. National Security Council, a virtually
The Vietnam experience is the one Perhaps the CIA continues to need free hand in conducting clandestine op-
that gave us Phoenix. I cannot say that this covert side to its operations?un- erations overseas, overthrowing foreign
I was assured by his answers to those questionably, Mr. Colby is an outstand- governments, training mercenaries, and
esr questions. lug choice to lead such a role as the CIA's even sponsoring assassination programs
Finally, during his tenure in Phoenix, Deputy Director for Operations, the posi- such as Phoenix?all in the name of na-
Mr. Colby found it necese,ry to issue a tion he now holds. tional security.
directive to all U.S. military personnel -
But, looking to the future of the coun- Today It seems strange that Congress
participating in the program. One pas-
-se try and the future of the CIA, I believe should have signed away such power.
sage in the directive states that: the United States has had enough se- Knowing what we know now, we would
U.S. personnel .. . are specifically unau- crecy and covert ideaseand covert men. probably have placed far more restric-
thorized to engage inasaassinatiton. At the very least, the CIA needs a greater tions on the CIA's mandate. Perhaps a
Another passage states: balance between its clandestine and its brief look at the cold war setting in which
If an individual finds the police type ac- intelligence functions. the National Security Act was drafted
tivities of the Phoenix program repugnant to But William Colby is the epitome of will help to show how badly change is
him. . . he can be reassigned from the pro- the covert man. And so, although my needed.
gram without prejudice. opposition to him on this ground is in The cold war spawned an increasing
In sum, the essence of Mr. Colby's de- no sense a personal reflection on him, I tendency to see overseas political devel-
tense against the charges that Phoenix do not believe that he should be the opments in military terms and hence to
was a program of indiscriminate murder, choice to strike that balance or to shape let defense policy determine foreign Pol-
assassination, and torture is that war is the Agency in the transitions that lie
ahead. icy, rather than the other way around.
dirty business, that the program was an Prior to World War II, military officers
ee, essential part of the American war ef- One other point should be mentioned, had not been prominent decisionmak-
fort in South Vietnam, that he was aware In recent weeks, I have been troubled by era in matters of foreign policy, but the
of the abuses, that, as the military direc- a number of questions arising out of Mr. cold war saw a dramatic reversal. Diplo-
tive indicates, he made efforts to reduce Colby's role as Executive Director of the mats yielded their influence to profes-
them, that the abuses were isolated CIA in certain aspects of the Watergate sional soldiers and to civilians whose
ear - events, and that, in any eveht, he was affair in 1972 and early 1973. ? concern for military might surpassed
simply carrying out a program ordered Although this aspect is not yet entire- even that of the generals.
by the U.S. high command. ly free from doubt, the issue continues In this framework, the political sys-
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S 15368 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE August 1, 1973
tem adopted by UolacforveVilbpyr was au- 4cLogx 449.isagipaTizpiguitRophop maw-
mu, important first step
tee because?too often?this country does toward curbing the misuse of power.
one thing With the right hand and Let me emphasize again that these are
tomaticall.y part of a worldwide contest
between capitalism and communism, and
thus either a threat or a boost to our na-
tional security. As President Truman said
before a joint session of Congress on
March 12, 1947:
. . . totalitarian regimes imposed upon free
people, by direct or Indirect aggression, un-
dermine the foundations of international
peace and hence the security of the United
States.
National security had become a na-
tional mania. Accordingly, the powers
of oversight and review were given to
the two Armed Services Committees of
House and Senate and to the Appropria-
tions Committees, but not to the Foreign
Relations Committees.
Today we know that what the CIA
does has explosive foreign policy im-
plication. In many countries of the
world. American foreign policy has be-
come closely associated with the CIA.
Today we know, too, that a radical
movement somewhere in the world is not
automatically a threat to our security.
We know that economic strength and
political leadership are as important, in
their own way, as our arsenal of bombs
and missiles.
Today the mood and atmosphere have
changed, but the law has not.
And I think that is the most funda-
mental challenge facing the Congress on
the question of the CIA?to bring the law
into line with a democratic society and
to plate further restrictions on the CIA,
its Director, and its activities.
Accordingly, I am introducing today
a measure to set up a 1-year, ad hoc
Select Committee on Foreign Intelli-
gence, whose duties shall include recom-
mendations on revising the National
Security Act and taking other appro-
priate steps to bring the CIA under
firmer supervision. This committee
should address the basic questions of the
CIA's mandate and the degree of power
that is appropriate to that mandate. It
should consider that power in the context
of a democratic society. It should seek
to lay down guidelines for the CIA's
activities.
More broadly, however, the ad hoc
committee that I am proposing should
take a broad look at all our overseas in-
telligence activities, not just those of
the CIA. It would be directed to study
the implications of these activities for
U.S. foreign policy, foreign economic
Policy, and defense policy, and to report
its general findings to the full Senate.
Mr. President, I think we need a study
committee of this kind even if an au-
thorizing committee is set up relating
to the CIA. / am delighted that the dis-
tinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr.
PROXISTRE) , who has provided such crea-
tive and constructive leadership in this
field, plans to introduce a resolution to
create a standing committee of the Sen-
ate on the CIA. I am delighted, too, that
our wise and effective majority leader,
Senator MANSFIELD, is particularly in-
terested in this move, and is devoting a
considerable measure of his talents to the
effort to bring the CIA under proper con-
trol.
another with the left. There should be
some group in the Senate that can
sta,ndback and look at the whole, briefly,
without a permanent assignment, and
thus without developing a domain of its
own?in other words, without developing
a constituent interest.
I also have some modest suggestions
relating to curbing the power of the CIA
short of a fundamental review and over-
haul. I am offering these suggestions in
the form of amendments to the National
Security Act, and I will explain them in a
moment. But first I want to make clear
that I would prefer to have these sugges-
tions acted upon by some sort of over-
sight committee or authorizing commit-
tee. But if the Senate does not establish
either of these committees, I will push
ahead with these amendments on my
own.
My first proposal is to place a time
limitation on the terms of the Direetqr
and Deputy Director of the CIA. As the
law stands (50 U.S.C. 403(a) ) , the Di-
rector and Deputy Director shall be ap-
pointed by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate.
But there is no time limitation to that
appointment. I propose a term of not to
exceed 8 years. I do not feel that 8
Years is a magic number. But I do think it
important to place a time limitation on
these positions so as to prevent the per-
petuation of an "Independent kingdom."
I understand that the distinguished Sen-
ator from West Virginia (Mr. Brae) has
introduced similar legislation to place a.
time limitation on the term of the Direc-
tor of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion.
My second proposal would prevent the
posts of Director and Deputy Director
from being occupied by two "insiders" at
the same time. According to existing law,
at no time shall the two positions be oc-
cupied simultaneously by commissioned
officers of the armed services. I suggest
extending that restriction to individuals
employed by the CIA. within the last 5
Years prior to their appointment.
By requiring that the posts of Di-
rector and Deputy Director shall not both
be filled by "insiders" at the same time,
my intention is to prevent the Agency
from being run by "professionals' profes-
sionals" and subject it to some form of
supervision from?the outside. Just as a
general should not be appointed Secre-
tary of Defense, so the leadership of the
CIA should not be drawn solely from
within.
My third proposal is directed at the
broad power granted to the CIA by the
National Security Act to perform func-
tions other than those related to the col-
lection and analysis of information?the
so-called "dirty tricks". I have already
quoted that part of the National Security
Act that conveys the authority for these
operations.
My amendment would change that
power in a very modest way by requiring
not only the approval of the National
Security Council, but the specific, writ-
ten approval of the President as well.
not final solutions but only modest first
steps. And again, they should ideally be
debated by an authorizing committee or
by a committee specifically set up to
study foreign intelligence activities in
general and the CIA in particular.
I also want to make if clear that my
motive in introducing this legislation is
not punitive. I have considerable respect
for the CIA. Nor is it directed at Mr.
Colby personally. I recognize that he is
a capable man who has won the respect
of his colleagues and of many people out-
side of the Agency as well.
endeavored to find out all I
could about Mr. Colby but, like Senator
PROXMIRE, I have found that a difficult
task. I concur with him that today the
Senate will cast a blind vote on the
Colby nomination.
I came on the floortoday not knowing
how I would vote. I have listened care-
fully to the debate. Primarily for some of
the reasons. advanced by two distin-
guished Senators, Senator Hiicazs and PP
Senator KENNEDY, I shall vote against
him.
I shall vote against him also because
William Colby is a symbol of the abuse
of power.
We do not need to break the law to
have effective intelligence operations. I
believe in order, justice, and law.
My aim in the legislation I am propos-
ing is simply to place limitations on the
extraordinary power wielded by the Di-
rector of the CIA in the belief that such
power is incompatible with our demo-
cratic system.
The legislation that I am introducing
today is only a partial check on the vir-
tually unfettered power enjoyed by the
CIA. A crucial step not covered by my
proposals, for example, is making public
the budgets of the various intelligence
agencies, including the CIA. I have al-
ready pursued this suggestion through
letters to other Senators and through
discussion in the Democratic Caucus, and
I want to reiterate this concern today.
I have noted two encouraging develop-
ments in particular. First, during his con-
firmation hearing for his appointment as
Secretary of Defense, Dr. James Schles-
inger stated that publishing a gross fig-
ure for national intelligence programs
would have a "minimal" effect on secur-
ity concerns. In answer to determined
questioning on a public budget figure by'
the distinguished Senator from Vir-
ginia (Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.) ,he added:
. .. for the gross national intelligence pro-
gram figures, I think we could live with that W
on a security basis, yea.
And William Colby, the Director-
designate of the CIA, stated that while
budget totals have traditionally been
classified, he would "defer to the appro-
priate congressional authorities" for any
change. I read that as a message for us
to go ahead with changing this unneces-
sarily supersecret tradition.
Mr. President, General Marshall used
to say that political problems, if thought
about in military terms, become military
problems. Now the word "paramili-
SW,
or"
sea
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eat
August 1, 1973
tame?from AppicivedinorgReilRarte 21104in1iai2 :arsAachlitaliqMQ414414109/911140.601-4?:.. agency known as the
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
S 15369
side or or "related to"?bas come into
common use even though most standard
dictionaries do not Mt it. I am afraid
that without legislation to curb the CIA,
political problems?already woefully
militarized?will increasingly become
paramilitary ones.
I ask unanimous consent that the text
of the proposed legislation be printed at
this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the resolu-
tion and bill were ordered to be printed
in the RECORD, as follows:
S. 2321
Be it enacted by the Senate and House 0/
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That (a)
section 102(a) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403 (a) ) is amended by
striking out the proviso at the end of such
section and inserting in lieu thereof the fol-
lowing: "Provided, however, That at no time
shall the two positions of the Director and
Deputy Director be occupied simultaneously
(1) by commissioned officers of the armed
services, whether. in an active or retired
statue, or (2) by individuals who have been
In the employ of the Agency for any period
of time during the five year period immedi-
ately preceding the time they are considered
for appointment. No person may serve as Di-
rector for more than a total of eight years."
(b) The eight year limitation prescribed
for the Director of the General Intelligence
Agency by the amendment made by subsec-
tion (a) of this section shall begin to run
on the date of enactment of this Act in the
case of ,any person holding such office on
such date of enactment.
Sec. 2. Paragraph (5) of section 102(d) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.G.
403(d) (5) ) is amended by striking out the
period at the end of such paragraph and In
in lieu thereof a comma and the fol-
lowing: "but only if the President specifically
authorizes any such function or duty and
notifies the Director in writing of his ap-
proval and includes in his notice a descrip-
tion of the function or duty authorized to be
performed by the Agency."
S. Ras. 152
A resolution to create a Select Committee
of the Senate on Foreign Intelligence
Resolved, That Rule XXV, paragraph 1, of
the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended
by inserting a new subparagraph (f) and
relettering the subsequent paragraphs ac-
cordingly. The new subparagraph (f) reads:
"(f) Select Committee on Foreign Intelli-
gence, which shall be charged with
(1) conducing oversight and review of all
foreign intelligence activities carried out by
(a) the Central Intelligence Agency
(b) the Defense Intelligence Agency
(c) the National Security Agency
(d) the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S.
Marine Corps, and the U.S. Air Force
(e) the Department of State
(f) the Atomic Energy Commission
(g) the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(h) any other U.S. Government depart..
ment or agency which the Chairman of the
Select Committee determines is carrying out
foreign intelligence activities:
(2) to study the implications of such ac-
tivities for United States foreign policy,
foreign economic policy, and defense policy;
(3) to review the provisions of the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947 with a view to-
ward recommending further. restrictions on
the duties, functions, and powers of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency; and
(4) to report to the full Senate at the end
of one year following the passage of this
Resolution concerning its general findings.
SEC. 2. Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of
paragraph (4) and renumbering the sub-
sequent paragraphs accordingly. The new
paragraph reads:
"4. lEnthont regard loparagraph 7 of this
rule, the Select Committee on Foreign Intel-
ligence shall have a term of one year and
shall consist of seven members of the Senate,
four from the majority party and three from
the minority party. Two members shall be
Senators who are concurrently serving on
the Committee on Armed Services, and two
shall be Senators who are concurrently serv-
ing on the Committee on Foreign Relations.
The remaining three members shall be ap-
pointed by the President of the Senate upon
the recommendation of the policy commit-
tees of the majority and the minority. The
Select Committee shall select a Chairman
and a Vice Chairman from among its mem-
bers."
Sac. 3. The Select Committee is hereby au-
thorized, for a period of one year following
the passage of this Resolution,
(a) to adopt rules concerning its proce-
dure,
(b) to hold hearings,
(c) to procure printing and binding,
(d) to make expenditures,
(e) to employ personnel, and
(f) to receive and deposit such written In-
formation as it may request from the various
Departments and Agencies listed in Section
1, and to take all appropriate steps to safe-
guard, where necessary, the confidentiality
of such information.
Sr.c. 4. For purposes of this Resolution--
"foreign intelligence activities" means all
activities conducted in, or directed toward,
areas other than the United States and its
territories and possessions, and relating to,
(a) the gathering of information, and
(b) the planning, conduct, and execution
of political, economic, or military activities
whose existence is not generally or publicly
acknowledged by the United States Govern-
ment.
Mr, MANSFIELD Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senator
from Illinois may be yielded 3 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the Senator from Illinois is
recognized for 3 minutes.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, at an ex-
ecutive session of the Committee on For-
eign Relations on February 7, 1973, I
expressed to Mr. Richard Helms my feel-
ing that the CIA should have no direct
relationship with the briefing or training
of domestic police, law enforcement, or
internal security personnel. I said that
I believed those functions should be car-
ried out by the FBI.
I was aghast to learn that the CIA
had engaged in a training program or
In training sessions at the request of
the Chicago Police Department, among
other police departments of the United
States, with techniques that were de-
scribed to us in executive sestion. I said
that I felt this action simply had no place
in the CIA and contravened the author-
ity granted by Congress to the CIA,
which was supposed to engage in activ-
ities outside the United- States. I said
that the FBI had adequate resources to
carry on this assistance, but that if the
CIA had information that could be used,
it should be transmitted to the FBI, be-
cause the FBI had direct responsibility
for domestic activities, and that the CIA
should stay totally and completely away
from that area.
/ described also my concern because
I had just r.cently visited South Korea,
CIA, which then engaged in interne,
tional activities besides also engaging in
domestIc activities. That is a most dis-
trusted agency, and I wanted no impli-
cation that our CIA could ever become
involved in domestic affairs right here
In the United States.
Mr. Helms responded that he would
convey this information to the new Di-
rector and said he was sure that he
would abide by it.
On May 21, 1973, at an open session
with Mr. Helms, I asked him if he had
In fact conveyed this position to his suc-
cessor as Director of Central Intelligence,
Mr. James Schlesinger. He responded:
I did not talk to Dr. Schlesinger directly
about this. I conveyed the sense of the Com-
mittee's statement and the Senator's state-
ment of the General Counsel of the Agency,
which was conveyed to Dr. Schlesinger. And,
a few days before I left to go to my post
in Iran, I was informed that Senator Ful-
bright had written a letter to the Director
embodying in his letter these strictures. So
I assume that, therefore, the messages had
not only gotten through but the new Director
would abide by it.
The letter from Senator FULBRIGHT to
Mn Schlesinger was dated February 8,
1973, and said that members of the com-
mittee present at the executive session
the day before had reached a consensus
"that the FBI was the proper agency to
carry on such activities?involving as-
sistance to local police departments?.
and that they should be discontinued by
the CIA." Senator FULBRIGHT said he
wanted to underscore the point and to
request Mr. Schlesinger's comments
after he had familiarized himself with
the matter.
Mr. Schlesinger responded by letter to
Senator PULBRIMIT on March 1, 1973,
stating:
I have given this matter careful attention,
and am satisfied that the Agency's activities
in this connection have been consistent with
the letter and spirit of existing legislation.
However, in keeping with the sensitivity of
this matter I have directed that such activi-
ties be undertaken in the future only in the
most compelling circumstances and with my
personal approval. We will, of course, comply
with applicable laws and regulations regard-
ing coordination with other Federal agencies.
Before voting on Mr. Colby's nomina-
tion, I wanted to assure myself that he
was acquainted with the discussion and
correspondence between members of the
Committee on Foreign Relations and
Messrs. Helms and Schlesinger on this
matter.
I was particularly concerned to have
Mr. Colby's own views, since Mr. Schles-
inger?in his letter to Senator Fur,
Brawn?had left the door ajar on this
question by indicating that such activi-
ties would be undertaken in the future
"only in the most compelling circum-
stances and with my personal approval."
Therefore, I have raised this issue with
Mr. Colby, who has responded that he
would undertake such activities only in
the most extraordinary circumstances
and that?if the circumstances appeared
to him to be that extraordinary?he
would consult with the congressional
oversight committee before acting. This
reply is satisfactory to me, and I believe
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it indicates rather Clearly Mr. Colby's out what is for intsiligenc,e arid what is abuses which were attributed to the
Phoenix program while it was under his
direction.
Thus although I will vote for Mr. Colby,
I would hope that the Senate will give
careful attention to the manner in which.
he exercises his responsibilities and to
the questions which I have raised regard-
ing the operation of the intelligence com-
munity.
Finally, I wish to add, that the en-
dorsement of Mr. Colby by Senator
SYMINGTON, acting chairman of the
Armed Services Committee and a valued
member of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, carries great weight with me.
Senator SYMINGTON has assured I118 that
Mr. Colby will report to the committees
of the Senate and that he is confident
that Mr. Colby recognizes that Con-
gress has a responsibility and a right
to know what the Intelligence Agency
is doing.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield
back the remainder of my time.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
Yield back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Dossmacr) . All time has now been yielded
back.
The question is. Shall the Senate ad-
vise and consent to the nomination of
William E. Colby, of Maryland, to be Di-
rector of Central Intelligence?
On this question the yeas and nays
have been ordered, and the clerk will call
the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
called the roll.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce
that the Senator from Nevada (Mr.
CANNON) is necessarily absent.
I further announce that the Senator
from South Dakota (Mr. ADOITREZIC) is
absent on official business.
I also announce that the Senator from
Mississippi (Mr. Sorzsras) is absent be-
cause of illness.
I further announce that, if present and
voting, the Senator from South Dakota
(Mr. ABM:MEEK) would WAD "nay."
Mr. GRIFFIN. announce that the
Senator from Arizona (MT. GOLDWATER)
is absent because of illness in his family.
The result was announced?yeas 83,
nays 13, as follows:
[No. 361 EL]
YEAS-83
intention to be responsive to Congress.
One of the difficulties which has caused
problems for the CIA in its relations with
the Congress has been CIA's reluctance
to seek congressional guidance on sensi-
tive matters. While one can appreciate
that a concern for security may often
stifle any inclination toward candor, it is
important now that the Agency be com-
pletely forthcoming with Congress. ?
I shall vote for Mr. Colby's confirma-
tion because he is a man demonstrating
competence, integrity, and ability. I feel
that he will always consult with the Con-
gress when desirable and will keep us ad-
vised of CIA activities which have a bear-
ing on our own constitutional responsi-
bilities in the fields of national security
and foreign affairs.
Speaking personally, I have had 6 years
of extremely fine experience with one of
Mr. Colby's predecessors?Mr. Helms. I
have always found the briefings I have
had, not only concerning this country
by also countries abroad, among the most
intelligent and penetrating which has
helped me immensely in my work as a
U.S. Senator. I might say that I received
great help, indeed, in working with the
floor leader today in the matter of the
ABM. I could not have had more assist-
ance and help in reaching a conclusion
than I did from finding who would know
the policy decisions .tiest based on ob-
jective facts, enabling me to come to my
conclusion, one which I feel sure is ul-
timately shared by the administration as
well.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Sena-
tor from Illinois for his kind remarks, am
very grateful.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, first, let me
say to the Senators from Iowa. Massa-
chusetts, Wisconsin, California, and Illi-
nois that they have made a real con-
tribution in outlining some of the things
most needed to be done to supervise the
CIA and which definitely should be done.
/ should also like to commend the act-
ing chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, the distinguished Senator
from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) , for the
manner in which he held the hearings on
the confirmation of Mr. Colby.
This is a very important confirmation
to a very important post. I would also
like to agree and take the position the
Senator from Missouri took so far as the
need for creating a real supervisory com-
mittee is concerned.
I commend the Senator from Missouri
for his ideas on investigating not only
the charter of the CIA but also the pos-
sibility of letting the total budget figures
be known so far as the intelligence com-
munity is concerned.
I have had numerous conversations
with Senators and, at the present time,
the total figure, if we were given that
total figure, and if it were made known,
would not only eliminate any doubts
about the Intelligence Agency, but would
also eliminate any doubt about the over-
all Defense Department budget figures.
I can only agree with the Senator from
Wisconsin (Mr. Prioxartaz) when he said,
In effect, that it taints the entire defense
budget when it is put into different items
so that we have no way of segregating
not.
Mr. President, it is important to real-
ize that certain subdivisions and cer-
tain breakdowns will have to be looked
at carefully, even if we get the budget
figures made public. But the Senator
from Missouri. the acting chairman, who
has said that he will go into the matter,
is to be commended, because it is one
of great importance.
The Senator from Mississippi (Mr.
STENNIS) has also stated that he is going
into the matter of the charter and I
should like to commend him for that.
In closing, / should like to say that I
have attended the hearings on the Colby
confirmation. Mr. Colby has integrity.
He has experience to do the job. It is one
of the most important jobs in Govern-
ment. I believe that the CIA now needs
leadership perhaps more than any other
branch or agency in the Government. It
is awfully important.
I am therefore going to cast my vote
for his confirmation.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, al-
though I intend to vote for the confirma-
tion of Mr. Colby, I will do so with some
misgivings. My concern does not go to
Mr. Colby's integrity or to his profes-
sional competence because I have no
grounds for doubt in either of these areas.
I am, however, troubled by the practice
of placing the vast responsibilities ex-
ercised by the Director of Central In-
telligence in the hands of someone whose
experience has been devoted almost ex-
clusively to clandestine intelligence op-
erations.
In my view there is a real need to in-
sulate the analytic process from the op-
erational side of the intelligence business
arid I am not certain that a Director
who is operationally oriented will be suf-
ficiently sensitive to this problem. Per-
haps Mr. Colby is aware of this problem
but we cannot feel any assurance on this
score precisely because his background
is so little known to us. Substantial re-
organization of the Agency's structure
apparently began under the last Director
and presumably will continue under Mr.
Colby. I have serious questions whether
the overt, operations?which we have
judged the most -valuable, especially in
the estimates field?might not suffer and
might not be disrupted by undue em-
phasis on clandestine operations.
I am also concerned over the possi-
bility that the intellience community is
coming under increasing pressure from
political, policymaking officials. In re-
cent years White House and NSC of-
ficials are reported to have brought great
pressure on the intelligence evaluation-
process and to have co-opted many func-
tions previously entrusted to career pro-
fessionals. This trend has become pro-
nounced under this administration and
again we know very little about Mr.
Colby's attitude in this regard.
Finally, I am disturbed by Mr. Colby's
connection with the Phoenix program in
South Vietnam. I cannot condone a U.S.-
financed program of political intimida-
tion and assassination?even though the
Vietcong engaged in the same practices?
and I am far from confident that Mr.
Colby was sufficiently sensitive to the
Aiken Fannin
Allen Fong
Baker Fulbright
Bartlett
Bayh Gurney
Beall Hansen
Bellmon Hartke
Bennett Hatfield
Bentsen Helms
Bible Hollings
Brock Hruska
Brooke Huddleston
Buckley Humphrey
Burdick Inouye
Byrd, Jackson
Harry P.. Jr. Javits
Byrd, Robert C. Johnston
Case Long
Chiles Magnuson
Cook-Mathias
CottonMcClellan
Curtis McClure
Dole McGee
Domenici McIntyre
Dominick Metcalf
Eagleton Mondale
Eastland Montoya
Ervin MOW
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Muskie
Nunn
Packwood
Pastore
Pearson
Pell
Percy
Proxmire
Randolph
Ribicoff
Roth
Saxbe
Schweiker
Scott, Pa.
Scott, Va.
Sparkman
Stafford
Stevens
Stevenson
Symington
Taft
Talmadge
Thurmond
Tower
Tunney
Weicker
Williams
Young
August 1, 19 S 15371
7'3 p
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vso NAYS-13
Bider' Hart Mansfield
Church Haikell McGovern
Clark Hathaway Nelson
Cranston Hughes
Gravel Kennedy
-sae
void
Inne
wool'
NOT VOTING-4/
Abourezk Goldwater Stennis
Cannon
So Mr. Colby's nomination was con-
firmed.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the President be
notified.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
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E 2966
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Extensions of Remarks May 14, 1974
Approved
For ReleapeiTARlagb:AlidiERTENA44Rp059gimpgnid4
WILLIAM E. COLBY
HON. LUCIEN N. NEDZI
OP MICHIGAN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, May 14, 1974
Mr. MIMI. Mr. Speaker, few Amer-
icans would dispute that an effective cen-
tral intelligence agency is vital to the
security of the United States.
Nevertheless, we must acknowledge
that there continues to be some unease
In the land about the conduct of intelli-
gence gathering, its underlying philos-
ophy, and its possible abuses. A strong
measure of reassurance is needed.
The top men in our intelligence serv-
ices rarely "go public." When they do,
their remarks deserve our close atten-
tion.
Accordingly. I am pleased to place in
the RECORD the recent address of Wil-
liam E. Colby, Director of the CIA. Of
particular interest is Mr. Colby's descrip-
tion of how technology has revolu-
tionized the intelligence business in the
years since the U-2.
Entitled "Foreign Intelligence for
America," the address was delivered on
May 3, 1974, at the well-known forum,
the Los Angeles World Affairs Council.
The address follows:
FOREIGN Iarreamoriacz FOR AMERICA
(By William E. Colby)
Foreign intelligence has a long tradition in
America. One of our earliest national heroes,
Nathan Hale, was an intelligence agent. Our
first President, General Washington, was an
assiduous director and user of intelligence.
Intelligence hes changed in recent years,
however, and today its reality is different
from its traditional meaning. In the com-
mon understanding, intelligence is still
linked with secrecy and spying. But what I
would like to 'talk about tonight is the way
we in America have changed the scope of the
word "intelligence," so that it has come to
mean something different from that old-
fashioned perception. These changes have
stemmed from characteristics peculiar to
America and from the nature of our society.
The first and most dramatic change in
today's meaning of the word "Intelligence"
stems from the technological genius of
Americans. We have applied to intelligence
the talents of our inventors, of our engi-
neers, and of our scientists. In the short
space of eighteen years since the U-2 began
its missions, we have revolutionized intel-
ligence. In 1960 this country engaged in a
great debate as to whether there was a mis-
sile gap between the Soviet Union and our-
selves. Today the facts are so well estab-
lished that such a debate is impossible. Then
we had to try to deduce from bits of circum-
stantial evidence how many missiles the So-
viets had; today we see and count them.
We wondered then what new missiles the
Soviets might be developing; today we follow
their tests and determine from them the
range, the size and the effectiveness of such
missiles.
This technical contribution to intelligence
not only provides a better basis for decisions
about the national security of the United
States, it also enables us to negotiate agree-
ments such as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.
Over the years such limitation treaties were
always stopped by one essential feature: the
United States needed some assurance that
the other party would abide by a treaty's
restraints. Thus we came up with the "open
ried to negotiate on-
site inspection procedures. The Soviet lead-
ers rejected these because they believed such
measures would permit foreigners an undue
degree of access to their sovereign territory.
It was only after American intelligence
developed the ability to monitor such agree-
ments from afar, through technical means,
that we on our side became sufficiently con-
fident to begin the process of mutual arms
limitation. In the text of the first SALT
agreement, intelligence in fact was even
admitted to polite diplomatic society under
the name of "national technical means of
verification."
Technology has revolutionized the in-
telligence business in many other ways be-
yond those I just described. They provide
a precision to our knowledge of the world
around us, which was inconceivable fifteen
years ago. I might add that I give full
credit to the many talents here in California
which have contributed immensely to this
effort.
The second major contribution America
has made to intelligence stemmed in part
from a bad American habit. This was our
habit of disbanding our intelligence ma-
chinery at the end of every war, requiring
us to reassemble one hastily at the begin-
ning of a new war. Thus we abandoned
intelligence in the period after World War
I, when Secretary of State Stimson is al-
leged to have commented that "gentlemen
do not read each other's mail." We disbanded
the Office of Strategic Services in October
1945, only to establish a new central in-
telligence apparatus to help meet the Cold
War in 1947.
This habitual exercise provided something
new in 1942. We were faced then with the
urgent need to provide intelligence support
to our governmental and military leader-
ship about such disparate areas of the world
as the North African littoral, the "hump"
between China and India, and distant Pa-
cific islands. General William Donovan, our
first director of central intelligence, mo-
bilized the talents of academia and industry
to assemble every possible American source
of information on these subjects.
This central pool of intellectual talent
proved its worth and provided the base for
the second major American contribution to
the intelligence profession. While certainly
the collection of information is vital to in-
telligence, an equally vital contribution
comes from the analysis, assessment and
estimating process. The analytic staff within
the Central Intelligence Agency has access
to all the raw information on foreign areas
available to our Government, ranging from
that which is completely public to the most
secret products of our worldwide collection
apparatus. It subjects this information to
the intellectual talents and experience of
its membership, which in scope and scholar-
ship can rival those of our large universities.
It then produces objective and reasoned as-
sessments of developments around the world
and projections of likely future trends.
Some of the work of this corps of experts
has come to light through the revelation of
the Pentagon Papers, in which the various
national estimates on Vietnam were shown
to have been independent, objective assess-
ments of the likely future course of events
there. This is not the time or place to debate
American involvement in Vietnam and the
many factors which influenced it; I mention
these reports only to demonstrate what this
assessment process can contribute: an inde-
pendent and objective assessment of a for-
eign situation, unaffected by political com-
mitments or departmental parochialism.
As has been reported in the press, I have
made certain changes in the bureaucratic
structure through which these assessments
are produced, but the estimating process in
Its essential remains as it was. I hope I have
even reinforced it by my own Insistence that
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May 14, 1.974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?Extensions of Remarks E 2967
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honest differencee among Ina experts Must Another unique aspect of American Intel- head of the KGB in the Soviet Union. Mr.
ligence is our relationship to the Congress.
be fully reflected in our anal output rather
than concealed under useless generalizations.
America's success in this assessment
process perhaps influenced the formation by
the Soviets a few years ago of the Institute
for the Study of the USA. The Soviets ap-
parently have recognized, as we did long ago,
that it Is as important to study and try to
understand American society as it would be
to spy on it. While some other nations also
consider assessment a part of their intelli-
gence process, I know of none which can
match the investment we in America have
made in research and analysis as an integral
element of our intelligence mechanism. The
product delivered to our policy-makers has
often demonstrated the value of this invest-
ment, and opened new perspectives for the
concept of intelligence.
American intelligence presents another
unique feature. It must operate within the
tradition of an open society in America. But,
as General Washington once noted, "upon
secrecy, success depends in most enterprises"
of intelligence. These principles are not easily
reconcilable, and we are breaking new ground
in intelligence doctrine as we try to resolve
the dilemma between them.
Part of our solution to this problem ap-
pears in the National Security Act of 1947,
providing that CIA have no police, subpoena,
or law enforcement powers, or internal secu-
rity functions, i.e., that it is restricted to
foreign intelligence. This limitation is clearly
recognized among our employees, although
my predecessors and I have candidly ad-
mitted that CIA made mistakes with respect
to the wig and other equipment and the psy-
chological profile provided to the Watergate
"plumbers." I am confident and have assured
the Congress publicly that It will be re-
spected in the future.
The 1947 Act recognized the other horn
of our dilemma when it charged the Director
of Central Intelligence with responsibility
for the protection of intelligence sources
and methods. It is this charge that led my
predecessors and me to take such Constitu-
tional steps as are possible to retain the
essential secrets of intelligence. In this re-
spect we have at least one common interest
with the profession of journalism: we are
both interested in the protection of our
xnirces.
We are currently engaged in the courts in
an effort to enforce the secrecy agreement
that one of our ex-employees signed when he
came to work with us. In it he acknowledged
that he would be receiving sensitive infor-
mation and agreed to hold it secret, unless
we released it. We are not objecting to mast
of a book he proposed to write, even in-
cluding about half of the items that we ini-
tially identified as technically classified. We
are struggling, however, to prevent the pub-
lication of the names of a number of for-
eigners, publicity which could do substantial
Injury to individuals who once put their
confidence in us. Similarly, we hope to with-
hold the details of specific operations where
exposure could prevent our receipt of further
information of great value. In some cases,
the publication of the fact of our knowledge
of a situation can be of major assistance to
another nation in deducing how we must
have learned of it and shutting us off from
it. I might add that we do not censor our
ex-employees' opinions. We have cleared sev-
eral such books full of criticism, in which
the authors have been careful not to reveal
our sources or operations. The most serious
aspect of this struggle is that if we cannot
protect our sources and methods, friendly
foreign officials and individuals will be less
forthcoming with us in the future, when it
could be of critical importance to our coun-
try. No serious intelligence professional has
ever believed that General Washington's
maxim could be replaced by a variation of
the Wilsonian approach to covenants. or
"open intelligence openly arrived at."
Some of my foreign counterparts around the
world display considerable shock when they
learn that I appeared in an open hearing
before the television camerae as. a part of
my Senate confirmation. Many of them
would never be subjected to detailed scru-
tiny by their Parliament. and their identities
are frequently totally unknown. Some
months ago, for example, two journalists
were prosecuted in Sweden?hardly a closed
society?for revealing the startling fact that
their country had an intelligence service.
In our country our intelligence authority
stems from an act of Congress, it is subject
to oversight by the Congress, and it depends
upon funds appropriated annually by the
Congress.
The Congress has provided for itself a way
of resolving. the dilemma between the need
for secrecy in intelligence and the demands
of our open society. Those Senators and Con-
gressmen designated to exercise Oversight of
CIA or review its budgets are fully informed
of our activities, inspect us at will, and are
given detailed and specific answers to any
questions they raise. Other individual Sen-
ators and Congressmen and other commit-
tees frequently receive the same intelligence
assessments of the world situation as are
provided to the Executive Branch, on a clas-
sified basis, but they are not provided the
operational details of our intelligence activ-
ities. This arrangement was established by
the Congress and is of course subject to
change. My own position is that the method
by which Congress exercises its oversight of
intelligence activity is a matter for the Con-
gress to decide.
As a related aspect of American intelli-
gence in this open society, I might say some-
thing about our relations with the public
and the press. We do not conduct a public
relations program; we are not in the public
information business. But we do make as
much information as possible available to
the news media and to the public. Groups of
our citizens, including high school students,
have visited our facilities, where we try to
respond to their questions about the nature
of American intelligence.
Thus we in the intelligence profession are
aware that ours must be an intelligence ef-
fort conducted on American principles and
that it must be more open and responsive to
our public than the intelligence activities of
other nations. At the same time, we must
respect the essential professional require-
ment embodied in the National Security Act
to protect our intelligence sources and
methods. We will consequently continue to
arouse wonderment from some of our for-
eign associates as to our openness, and con-
cern among some American citizens that
we still must keep some information secret
if we are to conduct an intelligence effort
at all.
Technical intelligence, the intellectual
process of assessment, and our exposure to
our Constitutional authorities and the pub-
lic are three major contributions America
has made to the intelligence profession. /
do not want to be accused, however, of con-
cealing the fact that intelligence still re-
quires clandestine activity. Our technical
Intelligence and our study and assessment
of material openly available throughout the
world have certainly revolutionized the in-
telligence profession in the past twenty
years. But they have not removed the needs
of our national policy-makers for informa-
tion on the intentions of other powers. They
have not removed the need to identify at an
early stage research abroad into some new
weapon which might threaten the safety of
our nation, so that we do not become aware
of a new and overpowering threat, especially
from a nation not as open as ours, too late to
negotiate about it or protect ourselves.
The need for clandestine collection can
perhaps be illustrated by comparing the task
facing me with that facing Mr. Andropov, the
Andropov faces a veritable cornucopia of
*artily acquired information about America
from published and public sources. Out of
this, he must pick those facts which are sig-
nificant and assemble them into an accurate
assessment of America. My task is to search
for individual faces kept in the utmost se-
crecy In closed societies, and with these few
facts try to construct whole assessments, in
somewhat the way one extrapolates a repro-
duction of the skeleton of a Brontosaurus
from a thigh bone. Without the contribu-
tions of clandestinely acquired information,
our Brontosaurus could in some situations
be very deformed indeed.
Simple prudence, of course, causes us to
use clandestine collection only when the in-
formation is available in no other way and
is of real value to our country. My point is
that such situations do exist. Thus we will
continue to need Americans and friendly for-
eigners willing to undertake clandestine in-
telligence missions. / might add only that we
must do a better job of training future gen-
erations of American intelligence officers and
agents than Nathan sale received in a one-
day briefing and the advice to place his re-
ports in his shoes.
From this description we see that intel-
ligence in today's complicated world is a
complex affair. It must warn our Govern-
ment of new generations of Intercontinental
missiles being developed, it must be atten-
tive to foreign economic threats to America's
strength and well being, and it must identify
political problems around the world which
can adversely affect our interests. The very
complexity of the challenge has led to the
active collaboration of all the different ele-
ments of the American Government which
can contribute to the process of informa-
tion collection and national assessment.
President Nixon has charged my predeces-
sors and me with the leadership of this Intel-
ligence Community and has provided certain
interdepartmental mechanisms through
which to implement this charge. This charge
of leadership for the entire American intel-
ligence process applies to the substance of
our intelligence needs and to the resources
devoted to intelligence. It puts on me the
responsibility of preventing separate bureau-
cratic interests from impinging on the effec-
tiveness or raising the cost of our national
intelligence effort.
This then is foreign intelligence in and for
America today. It reflects the technical and
Intellectual talents of America, it reflects our
open society, it reflects the courage and in-
tegrity of our professional intelligence offi-
cers. Most important of all, it provides Amer-
ican policy-makers with critical information
and reasoned assessments about the complex
foreign political, economic and military chal-
lenges to our national security and welfare.
It is designed to help us to achieve and to
live in peace, rather than to protect us only
In time of war. It has become an important
and permanent element of our national for-
eign policy structure. We Americans who are
a part of it are proud of it, and of the im-
provements-we Americans have brought to a
profession which can be traced at least to
Moses, who sent a man from each tribe to
"spy out" the land of Canaan.
Thank you very much.
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it
wP
INF
oft
NEW YORK TIMES AUGUST 3 1975
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11111111M,
'1
Modern Intelligence:
Myth and Reality
py William E. Colby
WASHINGTON?The Aztecs thought
the Sun God had to be strengthened
each day by, the sacrifice of a young
man or woman. Without the sacrifice
the sun could not rise.
The myth of the Sun God's need
drove the nation through the daily
travail of the sacrifice.
The reality of astronomy to explain
the sunrise was unknown.
Today we have myth a about our
intelligence. They are expressed in
sensational catchwords: "dirty tricks,"
"invisible government," "terminate
with extreme prejudice," "lie to any-
one but the President," "infiltration of
the White House," "destabilization,"
"secretwar," "massive illegal."
They come from old, outmoded ideas
about intelligence: espionage, intrigue,
derring-do.
These myths achieve lives of their
own. Formal denials, evidence to the
contrary, and independent, serious,
follow-up assessments of the true pro-
portions of a catch phrase never over-
take the original allegation. The myth
becomes accepted as reality.
In, normal times, these myths are
but part of the life of an intelligence
professional, like the anonymity and
the lonely challenges, intellectual as
well as physical, of a demanding craft.
Today, however, these individual
myths are gaining momentum and
mass. They tend to portray intelligence
as unconstitutional, improper, un-
wanted by our citizens. They threaten
American intelligence's ability to con-
tribute to the political, economic and
military safety and welfare of our
nation. These myths threaten intelli-
gence's ability to help our country to
negotiate with?not confront--oppo-
nents in an unsettled world.
If we believe these myths, we can
make our own mistaken Aztec sacri-
fice?Ahrerican intelligence?in the be-
lief that only thus can the democratic
sun of our free society rise.
We must not sacrifice a virile, a
necessary, contributor to the safety of
our nation, the welfare of our citizens,
and peacekeeping in the world of the
future to a handful of myths. The
reality of intelligence today is as dif-
ferent from the myths about it as the
reality ?of astronomy from the Aztec
myth of the sunrise.
Let's note some of the realities:
Our careful centralization of foreign
Information from open, public sources
provides us with a compendium and
continuity of facts.
America's technical genius has revo-
lutionized intelligence. It has given us
new views of distant objects, new
abilities to analyze and absorb masses
of data and detail, new electronic ways,
to keep up with the fast-moving and
complex world of today.
To these must still be added that
information that we can only get from,
the resourceful, dedicated clandestine
operator. He is the only one who can
overcome the , barriers of the closed
and hostile societies that share our
planet. He can tell us of secret plans
for tomorrow or the research ideas of
today. He tells us of the human inter-
action?something no technology can
show?among groups and leaders of
closed societies.
Experts of independence, talent and
1COntin u ed
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Intellectual integrity study this wealth
of reporting. They write objective as-
sessments of world affairs free from
domestic political bias or Government
departments' budget desires.
Intelligence collection and analysis
cover not only military threats but
political problems and economic dan-
gers as well. Intelligence forecasts of
future trends abroad permit us to
make national decisions about future
foreign threats in time to react.
Intelligence permits us to negotiate
international differences before they
become disputes. And today the excel-
lence of our information now con-
tributes to a new role for intelligence:
peacemaking and peacekeeping.
With sure information ?about the
plans, capabilities and dispositions of
the political and military forces on
both sides of foreign crises, we can
- clarify their misunderstandings of each
other that might lead them to go to
war; we can reassure both sides of
getting from us early warning of
hostile moves by the other side:
Perhaps the strongest myths relate
to. the Central Intelligence Agency's
miSsion of covert political and para-
military action. Today's reality is that
Hite of this nature is done. What is
claire is fully controlled by the policy
levels of our Government and is re-
ported to committees- of the Congress.
This, then, is the reality of modern
intelligence. We underpand why the
myths arose, as we understand why
the Aztec myth was born, but serious
and scientific investigations by the
Congressional committees exaniining
Intelligence will clarify the need of
our free society for intelligence and
show the excellence of the intelligence
structure that serves it. They should
also show the true proportions of the
missteps of the past, and the national
atmosphere in which they occurred.
With this new perception of reality
should also come clear direction and
effective supervision. This will insure
that the new reality remains fully
compatible with our free society. For
this, too, is a reality of American
intelligence', that it must conform the will of the American public as
well as our constitutional procedures.
- This need not include some new
myth that "the public has a right to."
know" everything The ?citizen doei:
have a right to expect that this new'
reality of intelligence will protect his
-
country's essential secrets.
We protect other American secrets:,
proceedings of grand juries, diplomacy.
trade, income tax and census data,
although intelligence secrets are being
exposed in unprecedented, and danger--
ous, volume. '
Secrecy is not new in America. In?
telligence professionals accept, indeed
seek, a better discipline to enforce ad-
herence to the fundamental obligation.,
of intelligence, that it protect its
sources.
With public understanding of the
realities of American intelligence, we ,
can :avoid a useless Aztec sacrifice',
Nor need we believe that ultimate
myth: that America does not have the
responsibility and restraint necessary
to have the best intelligence servicet
In the world. 4
William E Colby is the Director or-
Central Intelligence.
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Approved
Hams Survey
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
1 SEPTEMBER 1915_
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As the CIA has become a better known
? institution lathe last year, the number
nee
of Americans who give it a positive rat--
lag has- risen 5 points, althci- the agen-
cy's negative marks also have risen 3
points. Its ratings tend to parallel those:
of they Federal Bureau of Investigation
".-and other federal law-enforcement agen---
. cies- - ? - - ? - .
THE VARIOUS bodies that have been'
investigating. the CIA have: not' been'',
, building enormous reservoirs of publie-
;confidence. The cross-section was askecli.
-"There- have been several. resent. hie?
,vestigations of theSIA. Do you feel the
Iread list) investigations have been fain
? and: just, toe harsh on the CIA,. or?ae
, whitewash-of .the CIA?"-.
BYA47 to 27 per ce i,Iuralltv A symbol on the eFaIlr anharsh
d Too White- Not- .?
-ust wash , sure'
Americans ?-...favor "making . die -Central
eleinteWgence Agency more -accotuitable to e
civilian authorities, but-not changing the
way:it:4s now rim," according to. the .rc-
ults of thieletest Harris SurveY:_e
80 to-6 -per cent, a large -majority -
of- those ? surveyed rejects the 'notion Of ....
"abolishing the. 'dLe and leaving the
U. S. with :no foreign. intelligence agenee
; ? ?..
? A 45 to 34 per cent plurality also
poses "abolishing the CIA,' but starting:
new 'foreign intelligence agency with::
o pe _controls. and safe-,
, ? .',
THE- RESULTS, of this survey, coma
ducted recently among a cross-section of
..1,403 adults nationwide, make it clear
that Americans are opposed to the aboli-
tion of the CIA, altho they support. steps
to make the security--agency,more ace-
.opountable to the elected officials in gov- -
eminent. By 43 to 31 per cent, aeplurali::
. ty,would? also Support a moVe-tiee'eut in.
a civilian 'head of-the CIA,- but- not 'abol- ?
shing eeeeeee,
- On-a .nuinber of specific 'areas, 'how"-
. ever, those surveYed are critical of the;
'
- ? .By '74- per cent-. a Ttnajority,`
believes "it was wrong for the CIA to be .
-involved in the,assassination-attempts of;
foreign leaders," ?- .
: ? By .54 -to .29 per ?cent,- a .rnajority-'
-also 'believes ?"it was wrong for the CIA.
to'.-have Spied an Americans :here at
home during the Viet Nam war.'
? -By- 49; to- 21 per cent, f'a liltirality ?
.5...agrees with the charge thet."the trouble
with-the' CIA is that it got out of control
of civilian authorities." - e
? And by 66 to 18 per .cent, a sizable
ewmajdrity -believes -that "in :the future.
the CIA must be monitored more closely
by Congress and the Mike House."
But by convincing majority, 52 la 24
per cent, those surveyed reject the
charge that "if it had not been exposed,
the- CIA might have taken over the
'country." To the- contrary,. Americans -
valtie maintaining the CIA despite some
Rockefeller commission 33 6 2; 33
?
errors it has committed recently. Also:e
?? By 73 to 12 per cent, a solid majori- _
ty believes. "it is very important that e
the U. S. have the best foreign .intelli-
gence agency in -the world, eyen .if it -
does make some mistakes " -
. ? By 71 to 13--per cent, a majority
i
also believes that "any successful for-
eign.
intelligence agency must be operat- ;
ed in secrecy." -
By 52 to 28. per cent, the public, is
worried that 'so many secrets of the.
CIA have been made public' that the,
future ability of the CIA to operate well
has now been threatened:"
?lb By 40 to 27 per cent, a plurality is
convinced that "most of the CIA's eddy-
- ities involve serious study of other coun-
tries and, are not involved with spying
or violence." -
' In the last year, the publie has given
the, cIA negative. marks in Harris- Sur- -
Sveys, _ but that criticism -has. not been;
:rising despite more recent disclosures
about the agency's alleged wrong-doing. -
Thee Harris Survey asked its respon-,-,
dents:-
"How-would you rate the job the Cen
tral Intelligence Ageney [CIA] has done,
as the chief source of foteign intellie,
gence for the. U. S.. government?excel--
lent, pretty good, only ;fair, or poor?" ":1
August. 1975
199t
Positive Negative Not sure
26 4-5 19--,
,-34.
? 34 39 27
31, 42
U.S. Senate Church Committee 23 8 1 53 '
U.S. Houn Intelligence
Commitiee 26 6 13 55
The result of the probes of CIA has
been-to produce public sentiment for a
change in the way the foreign intelli-
gence agency' does its job. But it is also
apparent that the public does not want a-.
change so drastic. that it would-jeopard-,
ize current CIA !operations or lead to the
agency's abolition.
Instead, the public appears to want-
the CIA to go about its business, most of
which. is secret, but with greater ace,
countability to Ccngress and the Wnitti:
House.
f,'.:
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Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500140001-4
The President and National Security Management edited by Keith C.
Clark and Laurence J. Legere New York: Praeger, 1969)
The Craft of Intelligence by Allen W. Dulles (New York: Harper and
Row, 1963)
Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy by Sherman Kent
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966)
The Real CIA by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick (New York: Macmillan, 1968)
Intelligence Activities: A Report to the Congress by the U.S. Commission
on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1955)
National Intelligence by Jack Zlotnick (Washington: Industrial College
of the Armed Forces, 1964)
To Move a Nation by Roger Hilsman (Doubleday, 1967)
Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions by Roger Hilsman (Glencoe,
Ill.: Free Press, 1956)
Central Intelligence and National Security by Harry Howe Ransom
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958)
The Intelligence Establishment by Harry Howe Ransom (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1970)
The Center by Stewart Alsop
(Three Editions)
1. Harper and Row, 1968 - New York
2. Popular Library, 1968 - New York
3. Hodder and Stoughten, 1968 - London
Cuba: The Record Set Straight by Charles J. V. Murphy
(FORTUNE Magazine, September 1961)
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t
NEW YORK TIMES
29 June 19_74
By William E. Colby
The .fo. /loWing article is adaptedirorn
rpeech that William E. Colby, Direc-
- of Celitral Intelligence, ,gove before
z- Los Angeles World Affairs; Coun-
.. In it; he alludes to the book: "The
.-. and the .Curt of Intelligence," by
::or Marchetti, .who worked for the
..A. for feurteen years. as a-- Soviet-
specialist and executive
:tent to the deputy director, and
D. Marks, an analyst and staff
--stent to the intelligence director
he State Department.
?
?.-ne? Central Intelligence Agericy is
:rently engaged in the courts in an
:net to enforce the secrecy agreement
one or our ex-employes signed
.en he came to work with us. In it
acknowledged that he would be
re.iving information and agreed to
it secret unless we released it.
We are not objecting, to most of .2.
he proposed to write,' even in-
about half of the items that
? initially identified as technically
ssified. We are struggling, 'however.
prevent the publication of. the
nes of a number of foreigners,
..city which could do substantial
.-e? to individuals who' once ?put.
?? confidence in us:.
?:rnilarly, we hope to withhold the
:ells of specific operationg where
Deere cr.lili-r , o?or receipt of
information of great value. In
cases, publication of the fact of
rlov..lecisre of a situation can be
? ?najor assistance to another nation
. 4 I 4 4
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1 1
11 'C..>
LA. and the PubJc
:
in deducing how we must have learned
of it. and shutting, us off from it. .
I might add that we do not censor
our ex-employes' opinions. We have,
cleared several such books full of
criticism ? in which the authors -have
been careful not to reveal our sources:
or operations. - - .
The. most serious aspect of this
struggle is that if we cannot protect
our sources and methods, friendly for..
eign officials and individuals will be
less forthcoming with us in the future,
when it could be of critical importance
to our country.
?Jlo serious intelligence professional
his ever believed that George Wash-.
. ington's maxim could be replaced. by
a variation of the Wilsonian approach
to covenants, or "open intelligence
openly arrived at."
Another unique aspect of American
intelligence is our relationship to Con-
gress. Some of my foreign counter-.
parts around the world display con-
siderable shock :when they learn that
I appeared in an open hearing before
the television cameras as a part of my
Senate confirmation.
Many of them would never be sub-
jected to detailed scrutiny by their
parliaments, and their identities are
frequently unknown. ? 4..
'Some months ago, for example, two
journalists were .prosecuted in Swe-
den?hardly a closed society?re; re-
vealing the startling fact that. their
country had an intelligence service.
In our country our intelligence au-
thority sterns from an act or Congress,
it is subject to oversight by the Con-
gress, and it depends upon funds ap-
peopriated annually by Congress.
Congress has provided for itself a
way of resolving the dilemma between
the need for secrecy in intelligence
and the demands of open society.
.Those Senators and Congressmen
designated to exercise 'oversight of the
Central Intelligence -Agency or review
its budgets are fully- informed of our
activities, inspect us at will, and are
given ..detaiIed and. specific answers
to any qtrestiOnsr they raiae.
. Other. individual Senators and Con-
gressmen and other committees fre-
quently receive the same intelligence
assessments of the world .situation as
are provided to the executive branch.
on a classified basis, but they are not
provided the operational details of our
intelligence activities. This arrange-
ment yeas established by Congress and
is of course subject to change.
My own position is that the method
by which Congress exercises its over-
sight of intelligence activity is a mat-
ter for Congress to decide:
As a related aspect of Arnerican in-'
telligence in this open society, I might
say something about our relations with
the public and the press. We do not
conduct a public-relations program;
we are not in the public-information
business. But we do make as much
information as possible available to
the news media and to the' public.
Groups of our citizens, including high-
school students, have visited our facili-
ties, where we try to respond to their
questions about the nature of Ameri-
can intelligence. .
Thus we in the intelligence profess.
Von are aware that Ours must be an
intelligence effort conducted on Amer-
lean principles and that it must be
. more open and responsive to our pub-
lic than the intelligence activities of
other nations.' ' . ?
At the same time, we must respect
the eisential professional requirement
embodied in the National Security Act.
to protect .our.intelligence sources and'.
? methods. We will consequently con-
tinue to arouse wondermentfrom some
of our foreign associates as . to our
openness, and concern among some
American citizens that we still must
keep some information ? secret, if we
are to conduct an intelligence effort
at all. ?
Technical intelligence, the intellec-
tual process of assessment, and our
exposure to our constitutional authori-
ties and the public are three major
contributions Americ.a has made to
the intelligence profession.
T. do not want to be accused, how-
ever, of concealing the fact that intel-
ligence still requires clandestine ac-
tivity. Our technical intelligence and
our study and assessment of material
openly available throughout the world
have certainly revolutionized the in-
telligence profession in the last twenty
years. ?. ? ?.
But they have not removed the
? needs of ournational Policymakers for
information on the intentions of other
powers. They haye not removed the
need to identify at an. early stage re-
search abroad into some new weapon
which might threaten the safety of our
nation, so that we do not become
aware of a new and overpowering
threat, especially from a nation not
as open as ours, too late to negotiate
about it or to protect ourselves.
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:???"
Statement
by
W. E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
before
House of Representatives
Select Committee on Intelligence
August: 4, 1975
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INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to have
this opportunity to present to you today the structure of the United States
Intelligence Community, and to provide what I hope will prove to be insight
into how it is organized and how it operates. I understand that you ask
that I focus today on the Community as a whole, and turn to CIA specifically
on Wednesday. I also understand that you wish especially to cover our
budget procedures and the budgets themselves, as a way of investigating
the degree of what might be called the command and control of this important
activity. I will cover as much as I believe possible in this open session; I
will then seek your agreement to cover the remainder in executive session.
I know we will debate the need for such a step, but I would hope we could
proceed first with the open part.
"Community" is a particularly apt phrase to describe the structure
that performs the important task of providing intelligence to our Govern-
ment. The Intelligence Community exists in the same sense as does any
group of people involved in a common endeavor. It is a set of bodies (in
this case, Governmental ones) operating within a fairly well understood
procedural framework which enables its members to pursue a common
objective: providing intelligence to those that need it.
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war'
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COMMUNITY MEMBERS
The Intelligence Community involves all or part of the activities of
several departments and agencies of the Executive Branch:
Central Intelligence Agency
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
National Security Agency
Army, Navy and Air Force military intelligence organizations
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Treasury Department
Energy Research and Development Administration
There are, in addition, a variety of intelligence-related activities
which, while not a part of the Community as such, nonetheless make
significant contributions to information available to the overall U. S.
intelligence effort. Among these are general reporting from our
embassies abroad and the intelligence activities integral to our
military force structure (referred to as "tactical intelligence").
This Community reflects the basic intelligence concept contained
in the National Security Act of 1947. This established the Central
Intelligence Agency under the National Security Council to advise
the NSC concerning foreign intelligence activities of the other
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governmental departments and agencies, to recommend to the National
ati Security Council the coordination of the intelligence activities of
other departments and agencies, and to perform services of common
concern centrally. It was provided, however, that other departments
ler
and agencies should continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and
disseminate what was identified as departmental intelligence, i. e.,
ws0
intelligence for departmental purposes. The Act clearly contemplates
the present structure of the agencies and departments working on their
own on matters of individual interest but coordinating and collaborating
with the Central Intelligence Agency to provide the best service to the
National Security Council.
or THE DCIS ROLE
Under provisions of a Presidential memorandum issued in November
vs.
1971, which was reaffirmed by President Ford, I have been charged to
VII
report to the President and the Congress on "all U. S. Intelligence
programs." Specifically, I am under instructions to:
-- Assume leadership of the Intelligence Community
-- Improve the intelligence product
-- Review all intelligence activities and recommend the
appropriate allocatioi, of resources
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CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
The Community keeps the Congress informed of its activities
through the mechanism the Congress has established: the designated
subcommittees of both the House and Senate Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees. We appear before these subcommittees
to discuss and report on U. S. foreign intelligence programs and to
support the detailed budgetary aspects of the programs. Through
formal executive session presentations, testimony, and question and
answer sessions, senior intelligence officers provide information to
the appropriate level of detail desired by Committee members. For
example, in considering the FY 1976 Intelligence Community program
now before Congress, I appeared before the Defense Subcommittee of
the House Appropriations Committee on six separate occasions--
four times on the Community program and twice on the CIA budget. In
addition, I provided written responses to over two hundred Committee
questions. In addition, Dr. Hall, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
?
for Intelligence, testified on the DOD portions of the Community programs
and provided written responses to about two hundred Committee questions.
Various individual program managers provided similar extensive testimony.
I also appear regularly before various Congressional Commit.-es
and Subcommittees (in addition to the oversight groups) to provide
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vitt
grit
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briefings and intelligence analyses on world affairs. I also maintain
daily liaison with the Congress through my Legislative Counsel and
provide substantive inputs to questions as they are raised in the normal
course of business.
GUIDANCE
Within the Executive Branch there are a number of sources of
guidance to the Intelligence Community. I have direct contact with the
President and the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs. In addition to this personal contact, several organizational
mechanisms exist which provide direction or guidance to me as leader
of the Intelligence Community and as the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency:
-- The National Security Council [the President, the Vice
President, the Secretaries of State and Defense and, as
advisors, the Chairman, JCS (military advisor) and the
DCI (intelligence advisor))
-- The various committees and groups of the NSC, particularly
the NSC Intelligence Committee (NSCIC).
-- The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
-- The Office of Management and Budget
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THE NSC MECHANISM
In addition to being an advisor to the National Security Council
itself, I am a member of, or am represented on, various NSC groups
and committees. In these, I provide information and judgments about
foreign developments which impact on national security policy. While
my participation is involved primarily with the substance of intelligence,
I also receive guidance and important insights concerning the management
of the U. S. intelligence effort.
The NSC Intelligence Committee is charged directly with providing
direction and guidance on national intelligence needs, and with evalua-
tion of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the user. This
Committee is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs. Members are: the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary
of the Treasury, the Chairman, JCS, and the DCI.
The 40 Committee of the NSC provides policy guidance and
approval for any CIA activity abroad other than intelligence collection
and production -- the so-called covert action mission. It is chaired
by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Its
members are: the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman, JCS, and I.
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THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD (PFIAB)
This Board is the direct descendant of the board of consultants
recommended by the second Hoover Commission in 1955. President
Eisenhower created the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign
Intelligence Activities by Executive Order in 1956. It has been continued
by all Presidents since then. The Board, now known as the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), was most recently con-
tinued by President Nixon's E. 0. 11460, dated March 20, 1969. It
consists of prominent Americans from outside the Government appointed
by the President: Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., USN (Ret.),
Chairman; Dr. William 0. Baker (Bell Labs); Mr. Leo Cherne (Research
Institute of America); Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. (TRW); Mr. Robert W.
Galvin (Motorola); Mr. Gordon Gray; Dr. Edward Land (Polaroid);
Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce; Dr. Edward Teller (University of California);
Mr. George P. Shultz (Bechtel). Vice President Rockefeller was a
member of the Board until he assumed his present office. Its purpose
is to strengthen the collection, evaluation, production and timely dissemi-
nation of reliable intelligence by both military and civilian Government
agencies and to assure the President of the quality, responsiveness
and reliability of intelligence provided to policy-making personnel. The
Board operates under a -,Tery broad charter which directs it to review all
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significant aspects of foreign intelligence and related activities in which
the Central Intelligence Agency and other elements of the Intelligence
Community are engaged. It reports periodically to the President and
makes appropriate recommendations.
THE BUDGET PROCESS
The National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) is formulated
on the basis of substantive and fiscal guidance provided by the President,
through the Office of Management and Budget. The individual intelligence
program budgets which make up the NFIP are developed in accordance
with the same guidelines applicable to other Government agency programs
-- Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11, "Preparation and
Submission of Budget Estimates. "
Program plans are developed and reviewed by each agency of the
Intelligence Community during the spring and early summer to ensure
that the gezyral scope, size, and direction of the plan are in accordance
with the objectives and priorities contained in the overall guidance.
These plans are reviewed and approved at the various levels of the
member agencies up to the head. They then form the basis against
which detailed budget estimates are developed and submitted to the
Office of Management and Budget in the fall.
These budget requests are then reviewed in detail by the Office of
Management and Budget; by my Intelligence Community Staff; by the
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Staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence); and by the
Comptrollers of Defense and CIA. Based on these reviews, the approved
budget requests for the individual intelligence programs are included
within their parent department and agency budgets and form an integral
part of the President's overall Federal budget. After consulting with
the member agencies, I then provide to the President my independent
assessment of the Intelligence Community resource requests, along
with my overall recommendations for the National Foreign Intelligence
Program.
My annual recommendations do not constitute a budget in the
traditional sense, as I have statutory authority for only the CIA. Rather,
in accordance with the President's 5 November 1971 Directive, these
recommendations represent my view as to tile appropriate substantive
focus and allocation of resources for the U. S. intelligence effort during
the coming five-year period. The DCI has presented three such sets
of consolidated Community program recommendations to the President
and the Congress -- for Fiscal Years 1974, 1975, and 1976.
Once the National Foreign Intelligence Program Recommendations
are submitted (in early December), they are considered by the President.
I then defend the Community's portion of the President's budget before
the Cong.-ess, in addition to CIA's, as outlined above.
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_ 1-0
The National Foreign Intelligence Program is contained in about
twenty Department of Defense appropriation accounts and one Department
of State appropriation account; all of which require annual appropriation
by Congressional appropriations committees. Of these, about half
require annual authorization, which falls under the purview of the Armed
Services Committees. I have also participated in these reviews, speak-
ing for the Community.
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
President Nixon's memorandum of 5 November 1971 was reaffirmed
by President Ford's memorandum. of 9 October 1974. The President's
guidance and direction, enunciated in his 5 November 1971 memorandum,
were incorporated into NSC Intelligence Directives (NSCID's) in an
extensive update and revision of NSC1D 1 (Basic Duties and Responsibilities);
all other NSCID's were also reexamined, and the entire set was reissued
on 17 February 1972. These NSCID's are supplemented by Director of
Central Intelligence Directives, or DCID's, issued after consultation
with the Community members, which specify in greater detail the policies
and procedures established by the NSCID's. Each agency then develops
its internal regulations in conformity with these policies. In addition
to creating the NSC Intelligence Committee, the 1971 memorandum
directed the creation of an Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC).
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titti
Jai
or
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This Committee, chaired by the DCI, consists of senior representatives
of the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency,
and the Office of Management and Budget. The DCI, since IRAC's incep-
tion, has invited the Director, NSA and the Director, DIA to participate
regularly in the IRAC as observers in their capacity as National- Intelli-
gence Program Managers. A representative of the NSC staff also par-
ticipates regularly as an observer. Other Com' munity Program Managers
are invited as appropriate.
The MAC meets approximately once each quarter, except at the
end of the calendar year, when more frequent meetings are needed to
formulate the annual budget.
The principal role of ipAc is to advise the DCI on (1) the allocation
and use of intelligence resources and (2) the formulation of the DCITs
National Foreign Intelligence Program Recommendations to the President.
The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) is responsible for
providing advice to the DCI on matters of substantive intelligence. .It
is designed to assist him in\the production of national intelligence,
establishing requirements and setting priorities, supervising dissemina-
tion and security of intelligence, and protecting intelligence sources and
methods,
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The Board is chaired by the DCI and meets weekly. Members
include the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Vice Chairman);
Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Director, NSA;
Director, DIA; and representatives of the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Director, FBI, and the Administrator, Energy Research and Development
Administration. The intelligence chiefs of the military services have
observer status on USIB and participate in its meetings.
USIB is supported by fourteen subordinate committees, organized
along functional lines and drawing upon all elements of the Intelligence
Community for membership. These committees also serve IRAC as
required.
To assist in assuming the more comprehensive management of
the Intelligence Community called for in the 5 November 1971 memorandum,
the President directed that the DCI strengthen his personal staff. This
has led to the formation of two groups: the National Intelligence Officer
structure and the Intelligence Community Staff.
THE MO STRUCTURE
The National Intelligence Officers were established in October 1973,
replacing the Board of National Estimates. The group is headed by a
deputy to the DCI for NIO's. Each National Intelligence Officer has a
specific area of geographic or functional responsibility for which he or she
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is .responsible. Each NIO's raison Were is to provide substantive
expertise to support me and to be responsible for insuring that the
Community is doing everything it can to meet consumer needs. The
NIO staff has been kept deliberately austere -- each NIO is limited to
an assistant and a secretary -- on the philosophy that it is the NI0's
job to stimulate the Community to produce the intelligence, not to do it
himself. There are presently eleven NIO's dealing with subjects as
diverse as strategic forces, the Mid-East, and international economics
and energy. The NIO's identify the key intelligence questions needing
action in their area, review and develop our collection and production
strategy, ensure that our intelligence is responsive to our customers'
needs, and evaluate how well we are performing against our objectives.
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
The IC Staff provides management and evaluation support to the
DCI. It is headed by an active duty military officer at the three-star
level and is a composite of individuals drawn from CIA, NSA, DIA,
active duty military (from all services), and private industry. It is
organized into three main divisions: Management, Planning and P.esourczts
Review; Product Review; and Collection and Processing Assessment. The
titles are descriptive of the functions performed.
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MANAGEMENT VEHICLES
Since I do not exercise command authority over the component
organizations of the Intelligence Community (other than the CIA), I
rely on a family of management devices to provide guidance, stimulate
the proper program direction and balance, and provide a basis for
evaluation.
Each year, I issue Perspectives for Intelligence, a document
intended to provide a broad framework to guide program development
over the next five years. Perspectives provide the Community with my
views of the environment within which the Community must prepare to
operate. It attempts to identify, in broad terms, where the heaviest
demands on the Community will come from.
I have also asked that the three major collection programs develop
plans to portray the direction each is taking over the next five years
and to serve to identify major strengths and weaknesses.
Each year, following a very extensive and detailed program develop-
ment and review cycle, I submit to the President my National Foreign
Intelligence Program Recommendations. Because of the large concen-
tration of Community resources within the Defense Department (about 80%),
the process leading up to the NFIPR is dovetailed carefully with the
Defense Planning, Programming and Budgeting Process. This doctment
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'??
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provides the President with an independent view of the national intelli-
gence aspects of the budget he submits to the Congress. The NFIPR
is prepared by the IC Staff working closely with all members of the
Community.
Each year I also issue a set of National Intelligence Objectives and
submit them for NSCIC approval. At the end of the year, I submit an
annual report to the President on Community performance against
these objectives.
These are suppleMented by Key Intelligence Questions issued by-
me after consultation with the USIB and the NIO's. These focus the
national intelligence effort on the main problems the nation faces in
the world.
This extensive management structure focuses, of course, on the
objectives and r)-ograms of the Intelligence Community. It also pro-
vides a process for evaluation of the effectiveness of the Community on
a regular basis. The detailed financial auditing and controls are con-
ducted within the member agencies of the Community, however, according
to their specific departmental regulations. On Wednesday, I will discuss
this in some detail with respect to CIA. The other members of the
Community have extensive audit and r,.view structures, which will be
addressed tomorrow by Dr. Hall,. the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence, and by other agencies s they appear before you.
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You are interested, I know, Mr. Chairman, in what this process
produces in terms of budgets. I am also interested in showing you win.'
it produces in terms of results -- the best intelligence in the world. As
an introduction to these subjects, I would like to illustrate the intelligence
problem our country faces. We live in a free society, which means that
much of the information about our society is freely available. This chart
shows rather graphically, I believe, the comparison between the kinds
of material which are freely available in our society but which are care-
fully controlled in the Soviet Union. We have some controlled information
also, and I believe we must have. But the availability of full and accurate
information available about our country should not lead us to think that
the world follows our example. For instance, it is clear that Tass pro-
duc-e-- only what the leadership wants it to produce. Radio Moscow says
and shows only what is selected, and Soviet books, magazines and
technical journals reveal only what has been approved. Our intelligence
budget is how we overcome this difference in the availability of informa-
tion. We read what is made available, but we must learn more than that
if we are to protect our country.
This chart gives a conceptual representation of our problem. It
compares the availability of open information about U. S. and Soviet
weapons systems during the different stages of their development and.
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deployment. As you can see, the U. S. process is not entirely revealed,
but a large amount is reflected in our technical journals, in our Con-
gressional hearings and debates, and in the press at large. On the Soviet
side, much of the basic research is published and included in scientific
exchanges. Applied research, however, and the subsequent stages of
test, development and deployment are conducted with only a slight degree
of visibility.
This chart, again conceptual rather than specific, shows what this
means in intelligence budgets, how much must be spent by each nation
to learn what it must know about the other. Because of the free avail-
ability of much of our information, small expenditures are needed on the
Soviet side, and their major expenditures are thus placed on the tactical
coverage of the possible use and disposition of our weapons systems.
This is reflected in their extensive use of signals intercept ships and
their other ways of closely following the tactical movements of our forces.
On our side, however, we must commit the substantial budgets I will
discuss with you, to be able to determine the subjects of their applied
research, the characteristics of the weapons systems being developed,
and their production and deployment rates. Without these funds, we
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would be unaware of many of these steps. We could face the surprise
with which the world received the news of the first Sputnik. We could
be years behind in the development of appropriate countermeasures
to a new weapons system. We would have large areas of uncertainty
about Soviet forces which could argue for excessive U., S. defense
expenditures as insurance. Most of all, we would be unable to negotiate,
agree upon and monitor limits on such systems such as SALT to bring
about a more stable world.
In this investigation, Mr. Chairman, you will discover the
revolutionary advances which have been made in our technical, analytical
and operational intelligence activities by the member agencies of the
American Intelligence Community. I believe you will find these invest-
ments necessary to our country, their products of great value, and the
budgets carefully managed and proper.
Now, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the specific figures of the
Community budget, I regret that I must ask you to go into executive
session for this aspect of my testimony.
On July 25th, at your request, you were briefed with respect to the
budget of the Intelligence Community in general and that of the CIA in
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particular. I would be pleased to give a similar briefing to all members
of the Committee and answer any questions they may have. I respect-
fully request, however, that such testimony be given in executive
session.
In making this request, I am mindful of the need for the Intelligence
Community to win the confidence of the American people, and I am aware
that a request to present a portion of my testimony "behind closed doors"
appears to run counter .to such an objective. Nonetheless, I believe
the request is in conformity with the Constitution, the laws, and the
long-established Congressional procedures. I also believe it proper
and just.
As you know, I am bound by law to protect the foreign intelligence
1
sources and methods of this nation. I am, like the members of this
Committee, bound by my oath of office and by my own conscience to
carry out the duties assigned to me -- including that one -- as fully
and effectively as possible. The issue of whether the budget should
remain secret is a fair one for debate, and I welcome this opportunity
to be heard on it.
150 U.S.C. A. ?403(d)(3), ?403(g); 18 U. S. C.A. ?798; E.O. 11652,
March 10, 1972.
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It is clear from the legislative history of CIA's enabling legis-
lation that the Congresses of the post-World War II period believed
that the financial transactions related to intelligence simply had to
remain outside of public gaze. Subsequent Congresses have consistently
reaffirmed that position over the years -- most recently in the Senate
last June, when a proposed amendment requiring release of an annual
budget figure for intelligence was rejected by a vote of 55 to 33. Both
Houses of Congress also have adopted internal rules designed to pro-
vide for a combination of detailed Congressional oversight of Agency
activities and maximum protection of sensitive information about
Agency operations.
Existing laws and procedures are a focal point of your current
investigations and hearings. When this Committee and the Senate
Select Committee complete their proceedings and submit their recom-
mendations, the Congress may decide to change the ground rules
under which we operate. If that happens, we will of course conform..
But I must testify that I believe that the Agency's budget must be kept
secret and that revealing it would inevitably weaken our intelligence.
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40i
410
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Many have contended that the secrecy of the Agency budget is in
conflict with Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7, of the Constitution, which
states that " No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by law; and a regular Statement
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall
be published from time to time."
2
In fact, that very clause of the Constitution was settled on after
debates in the Constitutional Convention that are part of another, less
widely understood American practice -- that concealment of certain
expenditures can be in the public interest.. The so-called "Statement and
Account" clause just quoted was not part of the initial draft. The
language first suggested by George Mason would have required an
annual account of public expenditures. James Madison, however, argued
for making a change to require reporting "from time to time." Madison
explained that the intent of his amendment was to "leave enough to
the discretion of the Legislature." Patrick Henry opposed the Madison
2
As noted by the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Richardson, U? S
? ,
678, (1974), "Congress has taken notice of the need of the public for more
information concerning governmental operations but at the same time it
has continued traditional restraints on disclosure of confidential informa-
tion. See: Freedom of Information At, 5USC ?552; Environmental
Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973)" at 687.
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language because it made concealment possible. But when the debate
was over, it was the Madison view that prevailed. And the ability of
the drafters of the Constitution to envisage a need for concealment is
further indicated by Article l, Section 5, Clause 3: "Each House shall
keep a Journal of its proceedings and from time to time publish the
same, except such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy. '?
The option of confidential expenditures was given to Congress;
it was first exercised at the request of President Washington, who in
his first annual message sought a special fund for intelligence activites.
Congress agreed and provided for expenditures from the fund to be
recorded in the "private journals" of the Treasury. A later Congress
passed a secret appropriation act providing necessary funds to enable
President Madison to take possession of parts of Florida. President
Polk used secret funds to send "ministers" to Central America to
gather information. Many aspects of budgets have been kept confidential
throughout our history and intelligence activities have consistently
received special treatment. In this respect, they are similar to other
well-established American secrets -- of the ballot box, of grand jury
proceedings, of diplomatic negotiations, and many more. If secrecy
is required to enable an important process to work, we Americans
accept it. Intelligence is such a process -- it is important to our
country, and it will not work if it is exposed.
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Confidentiality about information having to do with intelligence
organizations and their activities is a world-wide practice. A check
on our part has not turned up even one example of a government that
publishes its intelligence budget. There are intelligence organizations
in Western democracies that are not in any way accountable to their .
legislatures. Indeed two newspaper editors were jailed in Sweden a
couple of years ago for publishing the fact that Sweden has an intelli-
gence service and that it had relations with the United States.
I do not refer to these foreign examples to urge that we copy them.
We Americans want a responsible American intelligence service. Thus,
CIA's practice is far different from the foreign examples. Our rela-
tionships with the Hill have been close over the years and oversight is
far more extensive than may be realized. As the 94th Congress has
organized itself, four subcommittees with a total of 38 members have
oversight responsibilities for CIA. Under existing guidelines, opera-
tional activities are reported solely to them (except that, pursuant to
PL 93-559, ongoing covert actions are also reported to the two foreign
relations committees). I hold no matters secret from the oversight
committees; instead, I have and exercise a responsibility to volunteer
to them matters of pos3ible interest. On substantive intelligence ques-
tions, I appear before raany committees -- notably those dealing with
military and foreign affitirs, atomic energy, and space.
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In the first seven months of this year, I appeared personally before
Congressional Committees some 39 times. So far as the Agency budget
alone is concerned, I have made two presentations to the Defense Sub-
committee of the House Appropriations Committee and one each to the
Congressionally designated subcommittee of the House Armed Services,
Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations Committees. Additionally,
I reported to them on the Community budget. And my formal budget appear-
ances are only the most prominent part of the fiscal exchange. I frequently
answer questions on the budget during appearances on other matters. A
very large number of my subordinates brief Congressional bodies on
various aspects of their activities. In connection with appropriations
processes, we have so far provided written answers to well over a hundred
Congressional questions on the FY 1976 budget for the Agency.
My emphasis on the worldwide and American practice of treating
intelligence budgets as secret is not an argument for concealing the CIA
budget from a strong oversight mechanism. This I have welcomed on many
occasions, as I believe it an important element of the responsible intel-
ligence service we Americans must have. The better the external super-
vision of CIA, the better its internal management will be, to the benefit of
all Americans.
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Instead, the need for a secret budget reflects the widespread con-
viction on the part of intelligence professionals, grounded in their
intelligence experience, that public revelation of fiscal information would
inevitably hurt our intelligence effort. The publication of a total budget
figure for a single year, without more, might not be thought to be a
calamity. But limiting the public record in that way is not practical. The
precedent would be established under which we would at the very least
have to reveal a budget total each year. A trend line would be established,
and a not-so-hypothetical intelligence analyst in another country would
have something to work with. And there are intelligence analysis techniques
that could easily be applied to such data.
Look at this problem as we in intelligence look at foreign problems.
For example, the Chinese have not published the value of their industrial
production since 1960. But they have published percentage increases for
some years without specifying the base, both for the nation and most of
the provinces. It took one key figure to make these pieces useful: when
the Chinese reported that the value of industrial production in 1971 was
21 times that of 1949, we could derive an absolute figure for 1971. With
this benchmark, we could reconstruct time series both nationally and
province by province. If we begin releasing intelligence budget figures,
others will be able to take scraps of inf prrnation about the Agency and
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generally known financial trends such as inflation, and .use a similar kind
of analysis to draw conclusions or even identify hypotheses that would
put some of our operations in jeopardy. -
For example, let us look at the development of the U-2. Our budget
increased significantly during the development phase of that aircraft.
That fact, if public, would have attracted attention abroad to the fact that
something new and obviously major was in process. If it had been sup-
plemented by knowledge (available perhaps from technical magazines,
industry rumor, or advanced espionage techniques) that funds were being
committed to a major aircraft manufacturer and to a manufacturer of
sophisticated mapping cameras, the correct conclusion would have been
simple to draw. The U. S. manufacturers in question, their employees
and their suppliers and subcontractors would have become high priority
intelligence targets for foreign espionage. And I have no doubt that the
Soviets would have taken early steps to acquire a capability to destroy
very-high-altitude aircraft -- steps they did indeed take, with eventual
success, hut only some time after the aircraft began operating over their
territory -- that is, once they had knowledge of a U. S.- intelligence project.
Moreover, once the budget total was revealed, the demand for details
probably would grow. What does it include? What does it exclude? Why
did it go up? Why did it go down? Is it worth it? How does it work?
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There would be revelations -- even revelations of facts not in themselves
particularly sensitive but which would gradually reduce the unknown to
a smaller and smaller part of the total, permitting foreign intelligence
services to concentrate their efforts in the areas where we would least
like to attract their attention. We -- and I specifically mean in this instance
both intelligence professionals and Members of Congress -- would have
an acute problem when the matter of our budget arose on the floor of the
House or Senate. Those who knew the facts would have two unpleasant
choices ? to remain silent in the face of all questions and allegations,
however inaccurate, or to attempt to keep the debate on accurate grounds
by at least hinting at the full story.
My concern that one revelation will lead to another is based on more
than a "feeling." The atomic weapons budget was considered very sensitive,
and the Manhattan project was concealed completely during World War II.
With the establishment of the AEC, however, a decision was made to
include in the 1947 budget a one-line entry for the weapons account. That
limitation was short-lived. By 1974, a 15-page breakout and discussion
of the atomic weapons program was being published. Were the intelligence
budget to undergo a similar experience, major aspects of our intelligence
strategy, capabilities and successes would be revealed. The obvious result
would be a tightening of E ecurity practices by hostile, secretive, closed
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foreign nations to deprive us of the knowledge we would otherwise obtain
about their plans and capabilities to hurt us and our allies.
In summary, -Mr. Chairman, I have tried to view this question
dispassionately, as both an American and an intelligence official. I would
like to be able to tell the American people about our activities. There is
a great deal about the best intelligence service in the world we would be
proud to tell, to bring into perspective what we have had to say recently
about the missteps or misdeeds in our past. I am a long way from being
an advocate of secrecy for the sake of secrecy; we have deliberately
opened as much of our intelligence effort for public inspection as we can --
during this past year, for example, we have briefed and answered the
questions of some 10, 000 members of our public, from community leaders
to the press to visiting high school groups.
But I do not believe that there is any Constitutional or legal require-
ment that our budget be publicly revealed. Doing so would inevitably hurt
our intelligence product. It is reviewed privately in depth and in detail in
the Executive Branch and in the appropriate Committees of the Congress.
Knowledge of the Agency budget would not enable the public to make a
judgment on the appropriateness of the amount withoui: the knowledge of
the product and the ways it is obtained. And such exposure to our citizens
could not be kept from potential foreign foes, who, thus alerted, would
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prevent us from obtaining the intelligence we need to protect ourselves
in the world today. We have lost intelligence opportunities through
exposure already. I believe it is my job under the tatute to prevent this,
so I urge that our intelligence budgets be kept secret and be discussed
by this Committee only in executive session.
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I i
FilikkeD
ON POL/TICAL
in Lasso
?e f29Bit 111 N
EC N?MIC INTELLIGENCE
hi U.S.S.R.
newspapers
Wire Services
Radio-Television
Journals & Magazines
Books
Government Publications
Economic Info. Services
Congressional Hearings
Professional &Cultural Exchanges
international Organizations
et>.
iicgotiations
Government Exchanges
FREE
CONTROLLED
TASS
Radio (FBIS Monitored)
Books
Magazines
Uewspapers
International Commerce
X Professional & Cultural Exchanges
X International Organizations
& Negotiations
X Government Exchanges
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FREE CONTROLLED
100%
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US/USSR Weapons System Evolution
COST TO ACQUIRE INFORMATION
L
SOVIET SYSTEMS
US SYSTEMS
RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTIOR DEPLOYMENT TACTICAL
asramenes=u-sc........4-wanor=ancolara
BASIC APPLIED
TIME
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1 II 1 1 11 1
100%
i I
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US/USSR Weapons System Evolution
AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION
US SYSTEMS
?-
;-
AVAIUBIL
SOVIET
SYSTEMS
RESEARCH
BASIC APPLIED
DEVE-LOPMENT TEST PRODUCTION
TIME
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TACTICAL
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NEW LAW TO GUARD NATIONAL SECRETS?
"Leakage of Secrets
Poses a Great Danger"
Interview With
William E. Colby
Director,
Central Intelligence
Agency
O. Mr. Colby, in your view, is a new law needed to protect
official secrets in this country?
A Yes. We need a new law because the present legislation
is inadequate to protect our intelligence activities. The
present law applies essentially only to people who turn
secrets over to a foreign power with intent to injure the
United States. It does not apply to employes or former
employes of the Central Intelligence Agency who deliberate-
ly leak to the press the names of intelligence agents or
information concerning some very sensitive technical system
that we operate.
O. Is that a serious problem for you?,
A Yes. A former CIA official is publishing a book here that
names every individual, foreign and American, with whom
he worked while he was employed by the Agency. He
obviously includes in that list the names of many of our
officers, many people who worked with us in foreign intelli-
gence services, and many private foreign citizens who
worked with us at various times. As a result, some of these
people have been exposed to possible legal action in their
own countries. Others have been exposed to terrorist action.
0. And there's nothing you can do about it?
A The CIA attorneys tell me there's practically nothing I
can do about it?certainly nothing as far as criminal prosecu-
tion is concerned?even though all of us at the Agency
signed secrecy agreements as a condition of employment and
as a condition of getting access to sensitive material.
Unlike a number of other Goverrmient departments, there
is no law which the Justice Department may utilize to bring
criminal prosceedings against an employe or former employe
of the CIA who merely reveals our sensitive material.
O. Do you mean that the CIA has even less power to
protect secrets than ordinary Government departments?
A Very much so. An Internal Revenue Service employe
who reveals your income-tax return without proper authori-
zation can be prosecuted. A member of the Department of
Agriculture who releases cotton statistics to some friend is
guilty of a crime. A member of the Census Bureau who
reveals an individual census return commits a crime.
O. The CIA has been operating for 28 years. Why has this
problem suddenly become so acute as to require a new law?
A The main reason stems from the various investigations
"We Already Have More
Protection Than We Need"
Interview With
Senator
Alan Cranston
Democrat,
Of California
O. Senator Cranston, why are you opposed to a new law
that would provide additional protection for official secrets?
A I believe that we already have more protection for
official secrets than we need. My main concern is that
classification of information by the Government is out of
control. Too many different people have authority to classi-
fy?and they often do it with excessive zeal to protect
themselves and people higher up. They often seem more
interested in job security than in national security. Not long
ago someone with direct experience testified that more than
99 per cent of classified material should not be treated that
way.
We would open up a very dangerous situation if we started
to write laws that anybody who transmits or receives any
classified information without proper authority is guilty of a
crime.
O. What should be done to protect Government agencies
against wholesale leaking of secret documents?
A I'm more concerned about the need for protecting
reporters and the free flow of information to the public than
I am about the need for protecting Government agencies. I
think that we need a shield law to exempt reporters from
prosecution for refusing to reveal their sources.
A great deal of the information that the American public
gets about what its Government is up to does not come out in
formal press releases. It comes from digging by the press and
from leaks by officials who think the Government is doing
improper things. If you close that off, you would threaten the
free press and the ability of the people in this democracy to
know what is going on.
0. Do you consider the leaking of official secrets desirable?
A Yes?if the official secret is information that the Gov-
ernment is improperly hiding from the public and which the
public has a right to know. That is a very important part of
democracy.
A free press is an essential restraint on government; It is
basic to our constitutional concept of a government of
limited powers. I think the Founding Fathers had a very
acute understanding of that when they wrote the First
Amendment. They were more concerned about protecting
people against the abuses of government than enabling the
government to do things for people?or to people.
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Interview With CIA Director Colby
[continued from preceding page]
now going on. In these investigations we are taking an over-
all look at our intelligence system in order to update the old
image. In the process, the amount of leakage of sensitive
secrets poses a great danger to running an effective intelli-
gence service in the future.
Q In what way have these leaks damaged your intelligence
operations?
A A number of countermeasures have been taken by
other countries because they learned of certain activities of
ours. These countries have been able to frustrate our contin-
ued access to that particular form of information.
We're in a situation where we are losing agents. There's no
question about it. And I am sure there are situations in which
a number of foreign intelligence agencies have considered
whether to give us a particularly delicate item, and they've
said: "Well, these days, no. It might leak." We are developing
a reputation in other intelligence services of not being able
to keep secrets in this country.
a Isn't there a danger that a new law to protect intelli-
gence secrets might be used to cover wrongdoings by CIA?
A I think we are going to eliminate the potential of cover-
ups in several ways as a result of the investigations now going
on. Looking ahead, I think we are going to have clearer lines
of direction of the CIA and much better supervision within
the executive branch and by Congress. The better the
external supervision, the better the internal supervision. This
will tighten up everything and would prevent the use of new
legislation for anything other than a good reason.
Moreover, I think we've had a rather rich lesson in the last
couple of years of the dangers of trying to cover things up. In
a big Government bureaucracy you really can't cover up,
because somebody always writes a memorandum or leaves
the service and tells about it, and an enterprising reporter
finds out about it.
Q Who would determine what are real intelligence secrets
that require legal protection?the CIA itself?
A No. I would have no problem in demonstrating to a
judge in chambers, if necessary, that any case brought under
a new law involved a sensitive intelligence matter and was
not an arbitrary or capricious prosecution. Only after a judge
had established that fact would the case go to trial?in
public. That would detertnine whether the defendant was
guilty of communicating the secrets illegally. The secrets
themselves would not be exposed in open court.
EXEMPTING PRESS FROM PROSECUTION-
11 In your view, should the press be held liable for publish-
ing intelligence secrets?
A I don't believe that I should be able to prosecute a
newsman who picks up something and then publishes it, and
the new law I proposed would prohibit suck a prosecution. I
do think the individual within the system who gave it to him
should be punished, however. I am not in favor of the sort of
Official Secrets Act that Great Britain has, which makes it a
crime for anyone to release. secrets?whether officials or
newsmen.
Q What are your chances of getting the kind of legislation
that you advocate to protect secrets?
A Well, if I were asking for this legislation on my own and
in isolation, I admit the chances would not be good in the
present climate. But in the process of taking a fresh look at
our intelligence structure as a whole, we Americans cannot
responsibly consider how to run an intelligence organization
without resolving this problem of how to keep a few Ameri-
can secrets.
Interview With Senator Cranston
(continued from preceding page)
Of course, there are areas where I am very strong':
opposed to the revelation of classified information. But
want to be certain that the information is properly classified.
a How would you do that? OW
A Well, it's necessary to define very precisely the categor
ies of information that are really vital defense secrets. In rn)
opinion, these would be limited to cryptographic informa-
tion, plans for military-combat operations, information re-
garding the actual method of operation of certain weapons
systems, and restricted atomic data. The disclosure of infor-
mation in these categories obviously would be very damag-
ing to the United States and should be against the law.
There are other areas of information involving national
defense where disclosure would not necessarily be damag-
ing?for example, cost overruns on weapons development. I
think it would be proper for somebody to blow the whistle only
that if he were aware of abuses. In this category of informa-
tion, we need the tightest possible definition of what can be
classified as secret. Also, we must take into account the
intent of anyone who reveals this sort of information.
I am absolutely opposed to any catchall phrase?like
national security?to cover information that should be classi-
fied as secret. We've learned in the Watergate and other
scandals that the term "national security" is subject to the it
broadest possible stretching to cover up wrongdoings.
"CIA HAS HAD TOO MUCH POWEV?
Q What about the CIA? Is additional legislation needed to
prevent officials or former officials of that Agency from
revealing names of agents and similar secrets?
A The CIA should have adequate protection, but we have
to think out very thoroughly precisely what that protection
should be. I think the naming of agents is-improper. But if an
agent acts in violation of the law, that's something else again.
In a case of that sort, it's a matter of individual judgment flt
whether or not it should be made public.
Basically, it's my view that' the CIA has had too much
power?and this has led to a lot of abuse. You can't really
draw a distinction between the use of power by the CIA to II
protect sensitive information and the use of that same power
to do almost anything they choose and then cover it up. We
certainly need more control over the intelligence agencies?
and that control must include a greater ability by Congress to
decide what should and should not be classified as secret.
O. The news media have revealed a number of intelligence
operations?such as the salvaging of a sunken Russian sub-
marine and interception of telephone conversations between
Soviet leaders and the Kremlin. Should the press be liable for
compromising such espionage operations?
A No. I would leave the decision whether or not to
publish to the professional judgment of the press. I don't 1111
think that you can start writing definitions of information
that it is illegal for the press to publish, without making
governmental restrictions on the availability of information
subject to vast abuses. -
_
Q Is it possible to Operate an effective intelligence organi-
zation in this country in those circumstances?
A Yes. We obviously need an intelligence community, but
we don't want to subvert what we are supposed to be
protecting?which is our fundamental democracy?by giv-
ing Government agents power that is too sweeping.
Basically, I believe that because Government is getting
bigger and bigger and ever more powerful, we have to be
very much on guard against giving it authority and secret
power without proper, constitutional restraints.
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NEWSDAY
13 JTJNE 1975
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Behind the Cloak;
A Placid Wooded Headquarters
On the surface are charges of assassinatio- n plots- and illegal
deeds. But underneath, there is an everyday human side.;
Sr Jane -11forse
Newsday Staff Correspondent
ntil quite recently, one. of the few prov-
able facts known about the cloaked and
secretive Central Intelligence. Agency is
that its headquarters are in Langley,
Va., just outside WaShington. Current
probes of the organization suggest, however, - that
;t may be a way out, and that anything.at all could
going on there.
Indeed it is.
Although the knitting and. crocheting club has
..djourned for the summer, the 60-voiee chorus con-
%mimes to hold once-a-week practice sessions, the
grand slam bridge club hasregular duplicate games
very Tuesday at 6:15 and the Bible study class
.els together twice a week at midday.-
mr
The fact is that behind the shadowy, faceless
goy facade and in the midst of recent revelations
grd investigations, .there exists a not-so-faceless
illinnch of individuals linked by federal-style bu-
reaudracy that's complete with a hyperactive em-
lloyee activities association, a private washroom
.1.0 the director, a credit union and. a car pool. It
has, as Well, carved-in-marble a testimonial to honor.
'11 of its people killed in the line of duty, a clini
et up with the specialized equipment needed for
he prompt treatment of heart attack victims (some-
thing that's required with startling regularity it is
Id), and a "helping hand" fund that takes up
tooluntary, 'anonymous collections to help staff mean-
hers in need.
' Nonetheless, these days, anyone who veers off
...he highway after the sign that says "CIA Next
-Right" is apt to cause. other drivers and passengers
to risk dislocating their vertabrae twisting for a
ook. it's hardly a wonder, of course. The place has
MICever been on the Gray Line tour and there are
relatively few people, outside the staff and its'pro-
esional associates, :whstilklaniM.4.11FORK Reigiti*se
A CIA employee consults the agency's large collection
of foreign newspapers. This and the pictures that follow
2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP77M00144R0005001400014re all released by the CIA.
Gontinued
' :-The ear- e visiting outsider would find that whae-s- The CIA Eas Won- tIii ilesign:-OliiEFri thel
: first floor, though, and in ? ' teinpore
inside is a magnificently vvooded, 213.1asore o. ,i,..a. "AY-14.7X1 ";*nart col-1
?and cainkillItotaliSt ffiaraSttePlitagq:CM e: o ' "441111)if?74A64146}a?RW ,
..,. . , .
; lector Vincent Melzac are positioned- effectivelyi
puses it's a little short on parking, but that's partly on various Walla, and an Exhibit. Hall in _ the
because Allen Dulles, who was the agency director , southeast area. is Currently displaying near eastern]
. when the new headquarters were built, had strong alid,Indo-Pakistani art objects from the private cola,
,
feelings ab trees lections of CIA employees. The agency's own line
.
out .
? arts commission is at the moment being chewed out
He say, Gee, that's a beautiful tree, and
by in-house itics for putting phony grass beneath
tie something around it to mark it for saving, even the magnolia trees in &small patio off the-eafeteria,
if .it had to be moved. I figure he cost us something_ area, but it has been lauded for other moves.' It:
like 250 parking spaces," an associate recalls. , gave its approval, for instance, to _"wrapping" the,
. Dulles hired the arehitectural firms .of Harrison four main banks of elevators in floor-to-ceiling blowa
and Abramowitz and Frederic R. King, reportedly ams of antique maps, one ofRome, one of Paris, one .
outmaneuvering the General Services_ Administra- of London and .one of St. Petersburg in Czarist
tion, which had some other ideas. The seven-story? Russia. ? ? - - - .
.off-white, reinforced-concrete building that resulted'; The elevator 'interiors fell into waggish hands,
was completed_in 1961?and promptly infiltratedH and, although standard ena smoking,' signs are
Field mice moved in almost at once. - . carefully posted, they're in such not-so-standard
Present-day two-legged infiltrators might get - languages as Japanese, Persian, FEndi and Hausa,
by the guards at the toll-booth-like main entrance as well as French and German. If a Chinese-speak-
gate (they seem to be accustomed to unannounced ing spy ever penetratee the place, he probably would -
visitors arriving- to pick up and haul avieTy passen- feel most- at home using, the stairs, since floors are
gem) but- to park or to get more than 20 yards1 numbered in various Asian and foreign numerals...
inside the front door, you need papers. If you're. ' He should not, however, bet any money on
expected, guards?behind signs warning that such' getting that far. .
things as cameras, firearms and :incendiary devices, Anywhere on "campus," you can tell the regu- ;
are prohibited?will point- you toward a reception . Jars from the drop-in-trade at a glance. The regua
room stocked' with magazines and pay phones. ' lars have their pictures on thier ID cards and
.There, one of three receptionists will smilingly; seem to favor hanging them on chains around_ their
offer a- visitor's form to be filled out in duplicate. necks. They're also the-odes who don't sane' fo,
Once you receive the seal of approval (a clip-on , gawk at the portraits of former _CIA directors
card- saying "Visitor"), it's entirely possible that that are spaced out along one of the firsteffner,
you might even get inside someplace as exotic as: corridors. Or at the framed display of CIA Medals, -
the self-service- postal- center. It will- happen, some of which have to be stashed on the premises
though, only if the person whom you're meeting until they'ee.not too hot to be handled by reeffiia
or- the escort who's assigned to You is agreeable.: eats whose cover _or operation might .b Whew-if?.
From the reception room on, you must- have corn-. they took delivery. Or at the copy Of George!
pany . _ , . . ..
Washington's letter articulating his own, .strongj
The building is roughly a quadrangle. In the feelings of the necessity of intelligence gathering
center is an enclosed patio that you'd pass if headed; and the need to keep it secret
',., f .?
for the "open" cafeteria or the Muzak-free but; - It's hard, of course, for a newcomer not to stePit
cocktail-lounge-like Rendezvous 'Room. Alcohol, Land stare. What the CIA -may really be- running!:
though,. does not crass the border of any govern-, is a mini-museum with research facilities. ,. .
anent food service instal ation.The Rendezvous. Even, inside the library are more artifacts and
Room-is, instead, noted for its $:2.20 daily ail-yon- memorabilia. For one thing, there's the big -wooden
can-eat buffet . - -
o o , seal that identified the agency's old headquarters
When the- Weather permits, numbers of rem-. in midtown Washington. It was saved in an in-
ployeep opt for outside eating at rustic tables on formal Sunday morning talvage operation per-
the grounds beind the building. Still others patron- formed by a thoughtful history-minded staff mem-
ize a second cafeteria that duplicates the first with her. . .
the same vaulted ceiling and expanse of glass that, There's also the historical intelligence collection
,
as interior decorators have established, brings the of some .2%000 "tradeoraft" books- frequently con-
outdoors in. The latter cafeteria, though, lets in suited by intelliienceotTiceri in search of a piece-
only the outdoors and certain well-cleared CIA dent. The library's main Collection is now primer-,
employees. ' ? lily a body of about 75,000 reference books plus a
_
Some of the same employees were. no doubt in-1 worldwide selection of telephone directories and
volved-in a. Successful 1962 coup that resulted enough newspapers to provide the English with
in the elimination ef the building's thoreuelo a few centuries worth of fish-andachlo wrappings.
ry depressing alt-gray _earn ors. V:mgmers were. To keep further abreast of current events and.
. rushed in and finally agreed on white walls Pune- thinking, the CIA training office; from time to
tweed by colored doors and panels, each shaded time, invites guests such as missile man Wernher
to follow the other like spokes in a color wheel., . von Braun, author-editor-educator Irving Kristol,
" The new look---was -e Mt -with most employees, Marquette University Journalism School Dean
although one senior- official is supposed to have, George Reedy and former Strategic Arms Lireitaa
commented that it brought to his mind the story lion Talks negotiator Paulateitzeoto speak before:
of a visitor showp around the home of.? a newly employees in a bubble-domed 500-seat auditorium
rich WW? "Madam," the 'visitor said, 'urn PaY attached to the main building. Keeping up also
'for-the drinks but I won't go upstairs." ---- . - means that the Northern Virginie:Community CO1-
Upetairs, one hears, there are still some prob-
continued
lems with personal clutter. Personal clutter is "the
enemy of good design," according to a 7-page book-i
and emPl% rilfIR9171iFiL4a114 2004/43in9 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500140001-4
be aiding the oKosition when they tape cartoons -
to their office safes or pile junk on. tepoefothem,
??? ?
Sends over in.struotori- to hold affeizi
:rk-hour classes in a varietfkl4P or Re,le
'la That last move, though, seems like a 6601i-to-I
Newcastle waste of effort. As one of -the resident]
I 011ectuals puts-it, if the CIA dosed down- tomor-1
It Its/ as a spy operation, it cOuld reopen_ the follow-
Pt day as one of the country's leading universities,
Enough academic expertise could be rounded upl
r--, the premises to set up shop immediately in
rything from `.`A." for anthropology to "Z"- for;
grAlogY. For a language-studies department alone,:
the new university could call :on people with
:.--npetence in 97 different tongues and dialeots,
r t including the desk officer, who ha S achieved
iernational recognition for -his hoikA
retittinr Lat*i
wit the headquarters
ni the Central
'intelligence Agency,
4-1-te stairs, at left,
ttre decorated' with
poor numbers in
roreign characters.
uch touches are signs
that despite its
attered -image, the
CIA is in many ways
very hum- an
organization.
triO
_
continued
Approved For Relea
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The outd000r eating area where employees oft*
have lunch in good zveatht
_
Director William CoThj arrives for
ork at the main entrance TheIra/
- the CIA building is abo;e, w PP/Wwwnfor Release-2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500140001-4
!trance beneath the overhang at left.
z
The well-equipe d employees
gym in the basement.
- The letters C stand for Historical Intelligence Collection,
where the `tradec-aft' collection is housed.
continued
_
roved For Release 2004/11/29 ;icIA-RDp77M00144R000500140001-4
. A blow-up of an antique map
of Sr. Petersburg in Czarist'
Russia decorates an elevatior
installation.,
_
Part of information board
maihtained for employees.
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Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500140001-4
SPOTLIGHT ON CIA
What It Is ? . What It Does
Is spying on enemies and friends, or subver-
sion of governments, immoral? Mr. Colby was
invited to visit the magazine to give editors
his first comprehensive interview dealing
with CIA's worldwide operations.
Q Mr. Colby, many people around the world question the
moral right of the Central Intelligence Agency to spy on
friendly countries, as opposed to countries that are potential
enemies of the United States. How do you answer that?
A First, it's hard to distinguish so clearly between friends
and potential enemies, as over our history a number of
countries have been both. But basically the question comes
down to the concept of state sovereignty and the right of a
country to protect itself, which have long been recognized as
part of international relations. That includes the right to
carry out such operations in the world as are believed
necessary for self-protection.
I think that moralists over the years have accepted some
degree of clandestine work as part of the normal relationship
between states. In any case, is spying any less moral than
developing great weapons systems, or many of the other
things that nations do in their self-interest?
Q How do you decide whether to operate in a friendly or
neutral country?
- A The decision concerning any intelligence operation is
determined by the answer to four questions: What is the
importance to our nation of the intelligence result being
sought? What is the risk of exposure? What would be the
impact of exposure? And how much does it cost?
In most open societies, you don't have to conduct clandes-
tine operations to get information. So you would be foolish to
run the risks and absorb the costs of a clandestine mission.
Obviously, in a friendly country the adverse impact of
exposure would be very great. So that is a very negative
Approved For Release 2004/11/29
-
Interview With
William E. Colby,
Director of
Central Intelligence
Mr. Colby's first involvement in intelligence
work was in the Office of Strategic Services
in World War II. He then earned a law
degree from Columbia Law School, and in
1950 joined the CIA. He served in Rome,
Stockholm and Saigon, and as head of the
Agency's clandestine services. He became
Director of the CIA on Sept 4, 1973. He
appears, at right in photo, in the conference
room of "U. S. News & World Report."
ZE-ZSZ.V....10,413LRE..
factor. But there will be situations in some parts of the world
where a well-conceived, low-risk operation is necessary to
get some information which could be terribly important to
us.
Q What about covert operations such as the one the CIA
conducted in Chile before the overthrow of Allende?
A Again, it's a matter of the United States taking a
decision that a certain course of action is important in the
best interests of our country, and friendly elements in
another one. There have been exposures before. The U-2
[spy plane] operation, of course, is a notable example.
0. Do you, as the Director of the CIA, decide that a covert
operation, such as against Chile, should be conducted?
A These decisions are very carefully structured. The
authority for them stems from the National Security Act.
This authorizes the CIA to carry out such other functions and
duties related to foreign intelligence as the National Security
Council may direct.
Furthermore, we explain to our congressional oversight
subconunittees in general how we propose to use the funds
that are appropriated annually for the CIA. We provide the
most-sensitive information and have no secrets as far as these
subcommittees are conceined. I don't necessarily describe
each operation in each country in detail, but if a member of
these subcommittees asks what we are doing in any particu-
lar country, I'll give him a full and fair picture.
O. Who actually makes the decision that a covert operation
should be undertaken?
A The actual operation is approved by a committee of the
National Security Council?the Forty Committee. If there is
high-level policy concern about the situation in some
country, we in CIA look at it and see what we might do that
would help implement national policy. Then we go up to the
National Security Council and say, "Here is what we think
we can do to carry out the general policy with regard to that
country." If the proposal is approved, we go ahead and carry
it out.
(continued on next page)
: CIA-RDP77M00144R000500140001-4
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SPOTLIGHT ON CIA
[interview continued from preceding page]
I'm not suggesting that CIA has been pushed or shoved
into undertaking actions of this sort; it's part of our job.
Q Is clandestine activity the major element in CIA activ-
ity?even in these days of d?nte?
A To answer that question, we have to stand back and
examine what the United States intelligence "community"
includes. It embraces the CIA, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, the intelligence
services of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the intelligence
units in State, Treasury and the Atomic Energy Commission,
and the FBI. All of these agencies collaborate on the
intelligence job.
After all, intelligence consists essentially of the collection
of information?by overt, technical and clandestine means?
the assessment of all this information, and deriving conclu-
sions and judgments about what is going on or is likely to go
on in the world.
In 1971, President Nixon said that the Director of Central
Intelligence should take a leadership role in this whole effort.
And I've tried to do this.
Essentially I have four jobs:
One of my jobs is to be head of the intelligence communi-
ty. Apart from the CIA, I don't have full authority over these
other agencies, but I do have certain influence on them
because of my responsibility to report on what they are
doing.
A second job is running the CIA. .
Third, I have to be substantively informed about situation's
around the world so that I can provide briefings, information
and assessments to the National Security Council.
Fourth is the job of acting as a kind of public spokesmar
and handling problems like our recent troubles.
Now, to get back to your question: By reason of the way
the community is structured, clandestine activity, most oil
which is clandestine collection rather than covert political or
similar action, does represent a considerable percentage or
CIA's activity. But if you measure it against the whole of the
intelligence community, it's a rather small percentage of th*
total community effort.
0. Has d?nte changed the character of your work or
reduced the need for clandestine intelligence?
A I wish it would. If you get to the logical end of d?nte"
then we would have established a relationship with tlu'
Soviet Union of mutual respect for each other's strengths, so
that our differences can be negotiated about rather than
fought over. This, in turn, should encourage the Soviets hilt
believe that they ought to be more open with their
information. But that's not the situation now.
Today the Soviet attaches can go to almost any newsstand
in this country, pick up a copy of a technical aviation or spacal
magazine, and from it learn a vast amount of detail about ow
AMERICA'S TOP INTELLIGENCE CHILF
The massive flow of information pouring into Washing-
ton requires William Colby, as Director of Central Intelli-
gence, to make? constant evaluations of fresh global
developments bearing on U. S. interests.
Following, in his own words, is the appraisal Mr. Colby
gave editors of "U. S. News & World Report" of tensions
around the world, what they mean, what they could lead
to, and the possible impact on the superpowers.
Strategic balance: U. S. vs. Russia. "The Soviets are
developing new missile systems that will increase their
strategic power considerably.
"But we do not see that in the foreseeable future they can
dominate us. We have both reached the point where we can
destroy each other, and the rest of the world?and they
know it.
"You ask if the transfer of American technology to the
Soviets is a matter of concern.
"We know that the military have a very high priority in
Soviet decision-making. We have procedures that put limita-
tions on giving them things of direct military value. And they
have a problem of adapting our technology, which works
because of our competitive system. That is a problem they've
got to do some adjusting to.
"The Soviets are, of course, well behind us technologically.
But they are able to challenge us in arms competition by
taking a much-more-disciplined approach, particularly in
assigning their best talent to arms work. One very interest-
ing thing is to compare the Soviet military work in space
with the Soviet civilian work in space. There is an obvious
qualitative difference between the two. The military work is
much, much better."
D?nte: Why Soviets want it. "There are three main
reasons for Soviet interest in promoting d?nte with the
United States.
Approved For Release 2004/11/29:
OP
"First, they obviously wan
to prevent the kind of horren-
dous confrontation that is pos-
sible in this age of superwea
ons. The result of a nuclea -
exchange between us would
be just so incredible now that
they realize that somethinS
has to be done to avoid it.
"Secondly, they insist that
they be recognized as one of
the world's two superpowerS
and get the status that thei.
strength implies. They might
also benefit from a relaxation of the Western solidarity that
characterized the 1950s and 1960s.
"Thirdly, they would like to accelerate their developnien
in economic and technical terms, because as they look at the
enormous power of the West?America particularly, but also
the other countries?they see it moving at a tremendous
rate. They hope to benefit by a greater degree of exchangr
and borrowing from that movement.
"Generally, the Soviet concern over their internal disci-
pline is very high. This is partly a result of d?nte. They ar
nervous about what d?nte can do in terms of getting nev?
thoughts and new political drives going within the Soviet
Union. And they just don't want that to happen."
Soviet empire: Starting to crumble? The Soviets face t, -
problem as the states in Eastern Europe show signs of
dissatisfaction over iron-fisted control from Moscow. The
Russians have made it clear that they are not going to broor
any substantial break in their Eastern European buffer zone,,,,"
"But, at the same time, they obviously have the problem of
CIA-liefi ilVirdbEdthtd614 that are circulating in
fi$
avo Approved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500140001-4
weapons systems. Unfortunately, we have to spend hundreds
of millions of dollars to get comparable information about the
Soviet Union. We couldn't fulfill our responsibilities to
Congress and the nation unless we did spend those millions
of dollars gathering that information.
Q There is pressure for CIA to restrict itself to the
collection of foreign intelligence such as you've described,
and abandon covert operations?that is, aiming at the
overthrow of governments. How do you react to that idea?
A Given the state of the world today, the Capitol would
not collapse tonight if the CIA were not permitted to
conduct such covert operations any longer. In fact, we do
considerably less of these than we did during the worldwide
confrontation with the Soviets and the expansionist drive of
the Communists in the 1950s, And we do considerably less
than during the period in the '60s, when we were dealing
with Communist insurgency and subversion in a number of
countries. Changes in the world situation and our national
policies have decreased such activities. We still do some; but
covert actions of this type are a very small percentage of our
total effort at the moment.
O. Why is it needed at all?
A There are a few situations where a little discreet help to
a few friends of the United States or a little help to a few
people espousing a certain policy or program in a foreign
country can enable us to influence a local situation in a way
that may avert a greater crisis in the future.
?????MIONIMI.111,
And times change. We might be faced with a real need for
early, quiet influence against a rising threat, which otherwise
we might have no alternative than to meet by force later. We
no longer want to send the Marines to such situations. I think
this flexible tool is important to preserve so that we can use
it if we have to.
O. Do you assume that undercover agents from friendly
countries are operating in the United States?
A Certainly I do. The FBI has identified a number in the
past.
You have to recognize that, in dealing with a lot of
countries around the world, it's accepted that we all engage
in the clandestine gathering of intelligence. Nobody gets
emotional about it. It's been going on since Moses sent a man
from each tribe to spy out the Land of Canaan.
O. There has been some comment that budget cutbacks
have hurt intelligence gathering to the point where Secretary
of State Kissinger goes into talks with the Russians with
inadequate information. Is there any truth in that?
A We obviously are suffering budgetary pressures from
Inflation. I think we are still giving a very good intelligence
product to our Government. I have great confidence in it.
There have been some projects that we have turned down
because they were totally out of reach financially. These
have been in the category of things that would have made
our intelligence more complete, but I don't think that we
(continued on next page)
SIZES UP WORLD'S TROUBLE SPOTS
mei
some of those countries?including demands for greater
freedom of action.
"The old idea of total Soviet dominance and control is
under challenge even from some of the Communist Party
leaders in Eastern Europe."
Western Europe: Communist penetration. "One thing
the Soviets want is Communist participation in the govern-
ments of Western Europe.
"This is in line with Communist ideology, which says that
collapse of the European democratic system is inevitable, so
that the movement of Communist forces from minority
voices to participation will enable the Communists eventual-
ly to take over governments there and run them.
"Obviously, the Communists are playing a role in some
countries by reason of the 25 per cent or 28 per cent of the
votes they represent, and the difficulties of organizing
governments among the fragmented non-Communist par-
ties.
"There's been some increase in Communist Party in-
fluence. But several trends are running: One is the increase
in European Communist Party influence in these countries;
another is the apparent increase in the independence of
European Communist parties from Moscow's control, and
another is the non-Communist parties' reaction to this, WI
d?nte, and to each other. It's premature to tell where these
trend lines are going to cross.
"We are certainly not saying, 'It doesn't matter whether
the Communists participate in power.' What I'm saying is
that this is a complicated, multifactored matter."
Cuba: Castro's policy now. "Fidel Castro's attempts to
export his brand of Communist insurgency to other countries
of Latin America didn't work.
ment of state-to-state relationships. And they've been quite
successful with that new policy.
"As for Russia, the Soviets still rate Cuba as a geographic
asset?no question about it. It's a very substantial geographic
asset, but it's a very costly one to them in terms of the
support the Cubans have required over the years.
"Cuba's present activities in Latin America?stressing
state links?are, in general, of long-term use to Soviet
interests."
War in Mideast: Quite possible. "Another round of war
between Israel and the Arabs is possible?quite possible.
"It depends in great part on peacemaking diplomacy.
Obviously, the Arab summit meeting at Rabat, which named
the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate
representative of Palestinians living on Arab land held by
Israel, raises new difficulties.
"As for the Soviet role: They desire to play the role of a
major power in the Middle Eastern area. They are endeavor-
ing to express that through their naval presence, through
their military-aid programs, through their economic aid, and
so forth. Their policy right now is to keep that presence
active, keep the capability of influencing the situation. But at
the same time they have a considerable interest in continu-
ing d?nte with the United States. They've got to try to go
along a rather narrow track without abandoning their
influence, but, on the other hand, not seeing the whole thing
derail.
"The Soviets do get a certain amount of benefit from the
economic troubles that afflict the West as a result of the oil
problems, but they don't have to do much about that. It's
taking place pretty much on its own. On the other hand,
they have to realize that an aggressive move by them to cut
off oil could cause a reaction on our side. It would be a very
"The Cubans have stressed in recent years the develop- direct affront to any d?nte hopes that they have."
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USNSRVVR
National Security Council in session. Mr. Colby, far left, may suggest covert operations by CIA in a country causing "high-level
concern" as a way to "implement national policy." He adds: "If the proposal is approved, we carry it out. It's part of our job.i
SPOTLIGHT ON CIA
[interview continued from preceding page]
have yet dropped below a danger line. I don't think it has
imperiled our ability to negotiate.
However, as we look ahead a few years, we do have a
problem coming up because of the inflationary squeeze.
We've tried to respond to this by focusing our effort on the
more-important things and dropping off the things that we
may have needed in a different world.
O. Where have you been able to cut back?
A Luckily, today we are not required to maintain the
scale of effort that we did in Southeast Asia, for example. Our
problems in some of the other parts of the world are more
manageable than they were when we were deeply con-
cerned about a large number of countries that were under
pressure of Communist subversion or insurgency. The im-
pact on the world balance then could have been quite
substantial if any one country had made a change in political
direction.
Today, I think the world balance is a little more stable, at
least with respect to major military threats to our country.
The real challenge for intelligence is to provide the kind of
information that enables us to negotiate and enables us to
anticipate future developments in countries that would be of
great importance to us. Obviously, the subject of economics
has become more important in the past few years. Terrorism
has become a threat to the safety of our citizens. Also, the
narcotics problem has grown in the past few years. But other
situations correspondingly have declined, and we've been
able to compensate.
O. Mr. Colby, the CIA has been widely criticized for its
involvement in Watergate--
A The CIA did two wrong things in the Watergate affair:
The first was providing Howard Hunt paraphernalia for use
in his work for the White House. The second was providing
White House employes the psychological profile of Daniel
Fllsberg. They weren't earthshaking, but they were wrong.
We shouldn't have done them, and we have told our
employes that we won't do them again.
O. If someone called today from the White House and
asked the CIA to do something improper, what could you det
about it?
A Well, that's very clear. In my confirmation hearing Oh
July 2 last year, I said that if I was ordered to do something
improper, I would object and quit if necessary. That's easy,.
Also our employes have been instructed that if they have an3
question about anything that they are asked to do, they are
to come to me.
If anybody really tried to misuse the CIA in the future, Op
think the organization would explode from inside. It reall3
would. And that's good, because it's the best protection we
have against this kind of problem.
O. Do you operate at all inside the United States?
A We have no internal-security functions or police or law
enforcement powers. It is clear that our function is only
foreign intelligence.
What do we do inside the United States? gLis
We have a large building up on the Potomac River with
lot of employes. In order to know something about them
before we hire them, we conduct security investigations. We
also make contracts with people around the country tot
supply us with things that we can use in our activities abroad
And we have contracts for research projects so that we can
expand the base of our knowledge.
We have a service in our agency that talks to AmericanAlk
who may have knowledge of some foreign situation that they _
are willing to share with their Government. We identify -
ourselves as representatives of the CIA, and we assure these
Americans that they will be protected as a sourc --and war
will do so. But we don't pay them and we don't conduci
clandestine operations to obtain such intelligence from
Americans.
We have some support structures in this country for ouM
work abroad. We also collect foreign intelligence from
foreigners in America. This is intelligence about foreign
countries and has nothing to do with protecting the internal
security of this country against those foreigners. That is their
job of the FBI, with which we have a clear understanding
and good co-operation as to our respective functions.
(continued on next news page)
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eat
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SPOTLIGHT ON CIA
[interview continued from page 32]
Q A number of Congressmen complain that there is no
effective control over the CIA. Is there any reason why your
agency shouldn't be subjected to tighter supervision?
A I think we have responded to Congress's right and
desire to know about the details of our activities over the
years in the form that Congress itself has arranged. Now, the
arrangements we have with our oversight committees in
Congress are a lot more intense today than in past years.
Twenty years ago, all of this was considered a very secret
affair. Today, Congress is much more demanding. We
answer any questions our oversight committees ask, and I
must volunteer to them matters they might not know to ask
abaut. That's the way Congress wants it, and
we are responding. If we didn't, we'd be in
real trouble.
0. Mr. Colby, do you feel that the effective-
ness of the CIA is impaired by all the publicity
that you've been getting lately about secret
operations?
A Obviously this has raised questions
among some of our foreign friends about the
degree to which we can keep secrets. Leading
officials of foreign governments have brought
it up in discussions with me. Individuals who
have worked with us in various parts of the
world have indicated a disinclination to work
with us any longer because of the very real
dangers to them of exposure.
In that respect, we have been hurt. But I
like the way our society runs. I think it is
perhaps unique that the chief of intelligence
has to be exposed, as he is in America. But we
have a responsibility to the American people.
We are as responsive as we can be and still run
an intelligence service. We regularly brief
newsmen on world situations, we talk publicly
? about our activities in general terms, and we
release our information and assessments
whenever we can. I think America gains a
great deal of strength from this, even though
it's a big change from traditional intelligence
secrecy.
0. How do leaks affect morale at the CIA?
A You have to draw a distinction between leaks that lead
to criticism of our programs and policies and leaks that
expose our people. I think that we can and should stand up to
the criticism. But exposing our people can be very difficult
and also very dangerous.
Yois will recall Mr. Mitrione, who was killed in Uruguay.
[Dan Mitrione, a U. S. employe of the Agency for Interna-
tional Development assigned to train police in Uruguay, was
kidnaped on July 31, 1970, and later killed by Tupamaro
guerrillas.] He was murdered?that's the only word for it. He
was alleged to have been a CIA officer, which he was not.
I think it is reckless to go around naming people as being
identified with the CIA.
0. Why can't you prevent former CIA officials from
publishing books that reveal secrets of your agency and the
names of secret agents?
A There are criminal penalties for people who reveal
income-tax returns or census returns or even cotton statistics.
But there are no similar criminal penalties for people who
reveal the name of an intelligence officer or agent or an
intelligence secret, unless they give it to a foreigner or
intend to injure the United States. I think it's just plain
wrong for us not to protect our secrets better.
I am charged in the National Security Act with the
protection of intelligence sources and methods from unau-
thorized disclosure. But the only tool I have is the secrecy
agreement we require our people to sign as a condition of
employment.
We invoked this agreement against one of our ex-employes
who wrote a book. We didn't censor his opinions or
criticisms; we just tried-to prevent him from revealing names
of people and sensitive operations, some still going on. We
are currently engaged in a civil action in the courts to
determine whether we can enforce the agreement he made.
I recommended legislation that would make it possible for
us to protect intelligence secrets more effectively. My
recommendations would apply only to those of us who
voluntarily sign an agreement that gives us access to these
WIDE WORLD
Anti-Marxists in Chile protesting policies of the late President Allende. CIA
acted "in the best interests of our country, and friendly elements in another."
secrets; it would not impinge on First Amendment guaran-
tees.
0. Mr. Colby, can we get back to the question of the
necessity for the United States to maintain a big, secret
intelligence operation in an era of d?nte?
A Yes?I didn't fully reply to that.
I feel it is essential to the protection of our country, not
only our military security but also in the sense of security
against the other problems we face overseas?economic
pressures, terrorism, local problems that can start in various
parts of the world and eventually involve us. Through our
intelligence work we must anticipate these problems and
take protective steps. If we don't know that another country
is developing a particular threat, we can be caught very
badly off base.
Beyond that, our intelligence work makes it possible to
engage in negotiations. The SALT [Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks] agreement between U. S. and Russia is the most
obvious example. Without the knowledge we had of Soviet
weapons through our intelligence activities, it would not
have been possible for us to negotiate.
We also have what I would call a peacekeeping role, which
(continued on next page)
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You remember the atom spies in America and all that sort of
thing. In the past few years the Soviets have apparently
become aware of the significance of assessment?the anal"
function of intelligence. They've set up institutes to study t
United States, realizing that the facts are easy to obtain in
America. Their real problem is assessing what we might do,
which is a terribly complicated and difficult intelligens"
problem.
Q Are you suggesting that the KGB no longer maintains
spies in this country?
A Oh, they do?sure, they do. What I am saying is tl"
they have moved from heavy dependence on espionage s
greater reliance on more-normal ways of collecting and
assessing intelligence. You can only say that's a change for
the good; it should give them a more accurate picture of
and it could hopefully reduce their espionage someday.
But the Soviets still run very extensive covert operations
around the world. In any kind of foreign mission they send
abroad?for example, delegations to international organi"
tions?there always will be KGB people or people fro
GRU, their military intelligence. They also conduct a long-
term program of training people and putting them in place
under false identities to stay for many years. Colonel AL"
[Rudolf Abel, a convicted Soviet spy, was returned to RUSE
in exchange for U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers in 1962] was
an example of that. They have the benefit, of course, of
indirect support from a variety of Communist parties aroutill*
the world.
Q The Director of the FBI has said that there now are so
many Soviet spies in America that he is having trouble
trailing them. Why do we let so many in?
A We let them in as diplomats, commercial travelers,
in some other capacity. You have to realize that there has
been a very large increase in the number of Soviet citizens in
the United States, as compared with 10 years ago?partly ek
a result of d?nte. Now, if you get an increase in Sovi,
citizens in this country, you are inevitably going to get an
increase in Soviet agents.
You see, in the Soviet Union the intelligence service isI
very, very powerful institution because of its responsibiliti-
for internal security as well as foreign intelligence. They
have, in effect, merged the CIA, the FBI and our State police
forces. And their intelligence service carries a very hi
degree of responsibility for preserving the power of ti
Soviet state, for party discipline and for public discipline.
Consequently, the KGB has an institutional power that is
totally different from the FBI and CIA combined in all
country.
I think our system makes us a better and a stronger nation.
Missile sites in Cuba photographed from U-2.
"Technology has revolutionized intelligence. . . . We can moni-
tor the 1972 SALT agreement without on-site inspection."
SPOTLIGHT ON CIA
[interview continued from preceding page]
I see of increasing importance in the years ahead. On a
number of occasions, we have seen situations developing in a
dangerous manner. By alerting our Government in good
time, it has been possible for it to defuse these situations.
a What part do spy satellites and other forms of modern
technology play in your work of collecting intelligence?
A Quite frankly, technology has revolutionized the intelli-
gence business. You have seen the photographs that came
out of the U-2 operation over Cuba. You can realize the great
importance of this development if you think back to the
great debate in 1960 about a missile gap. People took strong
positions on both sides, and we at the CIA were trying to
determine what really was happening?whether a missile
gap actually was opening up in favor of the Soviet Union.
Today it would be impossible to have that debate because
the facts are known.
This kind of technical intelligence made the SALT agree-
ment possible. For years we insisted that any arms agree-
ment would require inspection teams to monitor on the
ground what the Russians were doing. Given their closed
society, they wouldn't permit it. That stalled negotiations for
years. Finally our "national technical means," as we politely
call them, were improved to the extent we could tell the
President and Congress that we can monitor the 1972 SALT
agreement without on-site inspection teams, and we could
make the agreement.
Q Some argue that satellites and other forms of technical
intelligence can do the job and that there is no real need for
clandestine agents ferreting out information. Do you agree?
A Not at all. Technical systems and open observation can
tell us a great deal of what is physically there in closed
societies. But they can't tell us what is going to be there in
three or four years' time because of decisions that are being
made in board rooms today. They can't tell us the internal
political dynamics to allow us to assess how such a society is
changing. And they can't tell us the intentions of people who
may be bent on deceiving us. Intelligence of this sort can be
obtained only by what we call "clandestine collection."
a. Looking at Russia's intelligence operation?the KGB?
how does it compare with ours in scale and effectiveness?
A I think Soviet intelligence is going through a change?a
good change. For years the big thrust was on stealing secrets.
Dan Mitrione, an American
murdered by guerrillas in Ur
guay, "was alleged to hay.
been a CIA officer, which !-
was not. It's reckless to name
people as being identified
with the CIA," says Mr. Colbrfr
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ft*
Approved For Release 2004/11/29:
A CHECK LIST OF RECENT IMPORTANT
CIA-RDP77M00144R000500140001-4
BOOKS ON INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
'BARRON, John
KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Acients
(New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974)
(Paperback ed.: New York: Bantam Books; 19V4)
An excellent, well written account of many major cases in which the KGB
has been involved around the world. Also included are some details of the
.organization of the KGB. This is the best current book on the subject.
BOURKE, Sean
The Springing of George Blake
(New York: The Viking Press, 1970)
(Paperback ed.: New York: Pinnacle Books, 1971)
George Blake, a British intelligence officer, was a Soviet penetration
agent: Eventually caught and imprisoned, this book is a well written and
valuable account of the escape of Blake from a British prison, written by
the Irishman who engineered the operation. This book not only provides the
fascinating story of the escape plot, but also gives an insight into the per-
sonality of Blake and the operations of the KGB in the Soviet Union after
Blake and Bourke were reunited in Moscow.
DE VOSJOLI, P. L..Thyraud
Lamia 1
(ECTiTon: Little, Brown and Co., 1970)
The memoirs of the French career intelligence officer who served in the
French Resistance during World War II, and who was also the liaison officer
of the French Intelligence Service in Washington at the time of the Cuban
Missile Crisis. The book gives some important insights into the French In-
telligence Service. A fictionalized version of Lamia, under the title of
Topaz, written by Leon Uris, preceded it and was made into a movie.
FROLIK, JOSEF
The Frolik Defection
(London: Leo Cooper, 1975)
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bULLES, Allen W.
The Craft of Intelligence
(New York: Harper es Row, 1963)
(Paperback ed.: New York: Signet Book, 1965)
The former Director of Central Intelligence (1953-1961), after touching
on some of the early history of intelligence, examines many aspects of in-
telligence requirements,.collection and production, describes the Communist
intelligence services, and explores the uses of intelligence. With the
authority of his own experience, he expounds the role of Central Intelligence
and the Intelligence Community in the U. S. Government, up until the.time he
left office. (It should be noted that the paperback edition of this work has
a little added material, particularly as to specific cases.)
HYDE, H. Montgomery
Room 3603:
during
(New York:
(Paperback
The Story of the British Intelligence Center in New York
World War Li
Farrar, Straus and Co., 1963)
ed.: New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1964)
An anecdotal account of British secret intelligence operations in the
United States and the Western Hemisphere during World War II, by a member of -
the staff of Sir William Stephenson, then Director of British Security Coordi-
nation in the United States. The book describes this organization's relation-
ships with the FBI, the support it gave to General Donovan in establishing the
OSS, and many BSC operations in intelligence collection, counterintelligence:
and covert action throughout the Western Hemisphere.
KAHN, David
)
The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing
(New York: Macmillan, 1967)
(Paperback ed., abridged,: New York: Signet Book, 1973)
?
A comprehensive history of secret communication from ancient times to the
present. The book provides both an historical survey of cryptology and consi-
derable information on the science and methodology. It is by far the most
comprehensive work of its kind.
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'KENT, Shoftproved For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500140001-4
Strategic Intelliqence for American World Policy
(Princeton, New jersey: 'Princeton University Press, 1949) -
(Paperback ed.: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966)
A foresighted early work on the theory and ideal operation of national
intelligence production. The hook lays down many of the principles which
have subsequently been established in practice. The paperback edition con-
tains a new 5000 word preface by Ur. Kent, ralesting his many years of ex-
perience as Chairman of the Board of National Estimates at CIA.
.KIRKPATRICK, Lyman B.,
The Real CIA
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1963)
Describes the author's experiences in OSS and his long career in CIA,
where he served in many positions, including those of Inspector General and
Executive Director-Comptroller. It provides an insider's view of the devel-
opment of CIA up until 1965.
KIRKPATRICK, Lyman B., jr.
The U. S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities
(New York: Hill aria. Wang, 1973)
(Paperback ed.: New York: Hill and Wang, 1975)
A description of the roles, functions, and organization of the U. S. In-
telligence Community, prior to Prof. Kirkpatrick's retirement from CIA in
1965. The book is the best available for that period, but does not reflect
the many changes in the Community since that date. Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant reading.
.;
KOCH, Brigadier General Oscar W. with Robert G. Hays
G-2: Intelligence for Patton
(Philadelphia: Whitmore Publishing Co., 1971)
General Patton's successes on the battlefield in World War II could not
have been accomplished without an effective intelligence effort and the com-
mander's appreciation and use of the intelligence product. General Koch, Pat-
ton's G-2 in the North African, Sicily and European campaigns, relates his ex-
periences with this controversial leader in a highly readable fashica. The
insider's view of the intelligence support for Patton's operations, rarticu/arly
during the Ardennes campaign, is of great interest and value to the student of
military intelligence.'
3
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. ?
ItIA.STERNIAN, SiAlatIliNeel.For Release 2004/11/29 : CIA-R0P77M00144R000500140001-4
The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to-1945
(New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1972)
(Paperback ed.: New York: Avon Books, 1972)
Masterman was Chairman of the British XX Committee during World War- II.
At the end of the War, he wrote this text as an official classified history.
Release was authorized for publication by the British authorities in 1971.
The book describes the highly complex and successful efforts of British In-
telligence to neutralize, and in many cases to utilize, the Services of
every German agent in Britain during the War. A major text on counterintel-
ligence and deception, the book is a veritable treatise on this type.of work
and the meticulous coordination which it requires.
[MORAVEC, General Frantisek]
Mater of Spies: The Memoirs of general Frantisek !k>ravec
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday Co., 1975)
General Moravec was the head of Czechoslovak Military Intelligence from
1937-1945. The book describes his efforts to develop this excellent service
in the light of the General's certainty of on-coming hostilities with Germany..
On the day that the Germans arrived in Prague, British Intelligence evacuated
Moravec and eleven of his best officers to London, where they served for the
duration. Following the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1943, the
General and his family again fled to the West, and the book includes nothing
of his subsequent work. It is one of the finest memoirs of its kind by a
first-class intelligence officer.
PENKOVSKIY, Oleg.
The Penkovskiy Paners
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday F, Co., 1965)
(Paperback ed.: New York: Avon Books, 1966)
The story of a Soviet intelligence officer who provided information of
tremendous importance to British and American intelligence while continuing
his service in the Soviet Union. The case constitutes one of the more sig-
nificant Western intelligence coups in recent times and offers great benefit
for those career intelligence officers who study it.
4 "
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?
.1
'OW
z' A
ITOPOV, DuskApprovedForRelease2004/11/29:CIA-RDP77M00144R000500140001-4
Spy/Countersny: The Autobiography of Dusko Ponov
(New York: Grosset V( Dunlap, 1974)
(Paperback ed.: Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1975)
Popov, while ostensibly working for the German Abwehr during World War
II, was actually one of the best agents for the British in the Double Cross
system (see Masterman, supra). He is agent.uTricycle in the Masterman book,
and his autobiography makes pleasant and informative reading about the life
of an unusual double agent in that dangerous work.
SMITH, R. Harris
OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency
? (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1972)
This book is the most complete story of OSS to date, but must be read
with some caution. With access to virtually no classified files, the author
has had to rely on the fading memories of many of the participants, as well
as the rather inadequate published literature on the subject. This results
in some errors of fact, which, taken with some biased views of the author,
make for uneven reading.
STRONG, Major General Sir Kenneth W. D.
Intelligence at the Ton: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday Co., 1969)
General Strong was a career British military intelligence officer who
served as G-2 for General Eisenhower during World War II. After the War,
he founded, and became the first Director of, the British Joint Intelligence
Bureau. Subsequently, he became the fi:rst Director-General of Intelligence
in the Ministry of Defence. This book relates General Strong's experiences
during his intelligence career, his views of the role of intelligence in
government, and important insights into the profession.
5
?
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- ? n"?? '''?
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UNITED STATES. COMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Report to the President
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, June 1975)
This is the report, findings and recommendations of President Ford's
Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, chaired by Vice
President Rockefeller. The Commission was established, following allega-
tions in the press and elsewhere, to determine whether any domestic CIA
activities exceeded the Agency's statutory authority. This is a clear
and detailed account of CIA's activities in the domestic field, particu-
larly in the light of the times and the circumstances under which they oc-
curred. It is important reading for the professional intelligence officer.
DVORNIK, Francis
Origins of Intelligence Services: The Ancient Near East, Persia,
Greece, Rome, Byantium, The Arab Muslim Empires, The Mongol
Empire, China, Muscovy
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1974)
Dr. Dvornik, born in Czechoslovakia, is a distinguished professor of
history and political philosophies of ancient and medieval cultures, now
associated with the Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine History (Harvard)
at Washington. This scholarly work, begun in part for a post-war project
initiated by General William J. Donovan as a private citizen, deals with
the secret services of countries in the centuries before and after the
birth of Christ. A unique work because of its total range over scholarly
writings on these periods, it descrnes the rudimentary intelligence ser-
vices of the empires described in the title. An essential work for those
interested in the origins of intelligence services in ancient tines.
August 1975
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