U.S. HALTS SECRET TRAINING FOR ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000400100008-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: NSPR

;
- Approved For !Re lesCtialnifq1kN18?011059144M4911400008-2.
?Congress to launch
new probe of CIA
African involvement
By David Anable -
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
New York
The recruiting and training in this country of American
veterans for mercenary operations in Angolahave come to an
abrupt halt, according to sources close to the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency. .
. This is the apparent result of publication of an article in this
netsespaper late last week detailing these covert activities. The
article received wide publicity and is believed to have
prompted an urgent, high-level reassessment and clamp-
down. ,
After initial White House denials -- later modified -- this
, newspaper returned to its sources, who again confirmed last
. week's account.
i The main thrust of recruitment now has moved to the other
1 side of the Atlantic, these sources say, where certain African
embassies in West European capitals are quietly recruiting
Europeans, using American and other funds.
But the clampdown is not thought to have halted the
operations of the 300 or so American mercenaries already in
Angola. Their functions include direct combat, advice, and
training of local indigenous forces.
House committee acts
_ Other new developments:
4, Monitor Washinttton correspondent Robert P. Hey
reports it is known that one important House committee,
which has probed past CIA activities, has responded to
allegations in the Monitor article by calling the CIA in for
questioning by committee staff behind closed doors this
- week. "We'll look into" all the a!legations of increased CIA
and U.S. involvement in the Angola war, -says a key staff
source. .
The committee representatives plan to grill the CIA in
detail on the extent of its role --- direct or indirect. If this
tniestioning yields "something earthshaking," then the
1 committee can be expected to hold public hearings later this
month. Otherwise in ferination gleaned is likely to be released
in a public report.
1 The committee Wails to concentrate on two broad issues,
correspono.ent 1.*,, reports:
? In making on grt-ans of money or weaponry to eations cr
groups which cll:ocAe. the Sov-nst-ineked NIPLA (Pcpular
?
Mover -[ for the Liberation of Ang.a) in Angola, co:ed the
CIA or the U.S. rv,-.)setiahly be ex -c,e.,: tad to have known that
VJ:. ronney would i.) used ia ikri!,,-;:;N --- per:-.:aps in tk;,.e trlininz
t'T
-,t.:t---.. ir.,..? ir.,,n.Tjeti the CiA i;, :e.,:i
? ;.;n..:in ,r) iy.!dt2ve it v,..s not invoiced in the Angolan war. If this
committee fin& _1 he. CIA1,.--nevE? ofogitg6t4 kovirieffot-:
t'n;-..i its aid woul*ProircMW,1,:n9rillWri me committee and
1:;onsibly the lull C,T;tigress may fect ii.....4 deceived by the CIA.
? - the U.S. teen beloin train mercenaries in either of
facilities, or by sending American training specialists to
foreign military bases or even to private property to conduct
training there?
* The recruitment in the United States ofAmerican citizens .
for service in a foreign army is illegal under Title 18 of the
United States code. It is known that the FBI and .Justice
Department are investigating a variety of alleged cases .
involving the recruitment of Americans for service in
southern Africa.
? Sources close to Sen. John V. Tunney (D) of California.
who was associated last month with Sen. Dick Clark (D) of
I.owa in the fight against the U.S. involvement in Angola, said
? that the Senator is "very, very concerned" at the Monitor I
report. They said that the Senator believes it raises the basic
question of how the CIA can be reined in.
, Senator Tunney is described as planning two approaches to
this issue:
One, to take a very hard look at every appropriations bill
from now on in which funds might be hidden for covert use,
starting with the foreign military assistance bill which comes
onto the Senate floor soon. -
Two, to seek further support for the resolution he
introduced in the past session which would require members-
of Congress given secret briefings by the CIA to pass that
- information along to all those on their own congressional
conunittees.
The article in last Friday's Monitor said that, according to
senior mercenary officers close to the Central Intelligence
Agency, the CIA was, indirectly, recruiting American ex-
servicemen, training them, dispatching them to southern
Africa, contributing toward their pay, and providing them
and the indigenous pro-Western forces in Angola with light
and heavy weaponry.
Administration hacks off
Monitor Editor John Hughes said: "We believe our sources
to be reliable, we have total confidence in our correspondent,
and we stand by the Monitor story completely."
After an initial sharp reaction to the article, in which the
CIA branded it as "nonsense" and the White House termed it
as '"without foundation," the administration later Appeared to,
hack off somewhat and began to issue far More qualified
denials.
In answer to reporters' questions Friday, presidential
spokesman Ron Nessen said: "No agency of the United States
Government is using American trIrc?znaries in Angola nor is
any United States Government agency recruiting, hiring, or
train ag mercenaries."
But when asked whether any private company or contractor
might be doing so (a traditional covert method of CIA
opera ion), Mr. Messen said not "as far as I know."
Qu,,..vied about U.S. funds being used for such purposes; by
foreign goveraments, Mr. Nessen said: "It is no secret that
the American Government is giving modest amounts of
it is fa'r to
!;A- no U.S. (;;J;e1--:.p ?,vny L knowing
precisely how every lintpeial) is spent of that assistance."
tfidefit4F400040111410008At the possibility
gg,
agency hiring mm-American mercenaries . lie
declined to answer, saying he could not add to . his first
sbtement.
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U 8. halts s
Continued ittemallinta
Later, in an interview Saturday with NBC, President Ford
denied that the United States was training foreign merce-
naries in Angola. He said, "We do expend some federal funds
or United States funds in trying to be helpful; but we are not
training foreign mercenaries." ,
The United States, said Mr. Ford, is "working with other
countries that feel they have an interest in giving the
Angolans an opportunity to make the decision for themselves,
and I think this is a proper responsibility of the federal
ial statements, The
posed three specific
government." .
In an effort to clarify these offic
Christian Science Monitor subsequently
questions to the White House:
1. Can you state categorically that there are no American
mercenaries in Angola? Working for anyone?
2. Is any other agency or foreign government or faction or
group either recruiting or hiring or training U.S. mercenaries
for Angola?
3. The President said in his interview with NBC that the
U.S. is not training foreign mercenaries in Angola -- is the
United States training either foreign or U.S. mercenaries
that he could not go
Friday nor beyond
C.
anywhere else in the world for Angola?
Mr. Nessen, in reply, said once again
. beyond his previous answers given on
what President Ford said Saturday to NB
The whole issue of American involvement in Angola is
highly sensitive at this moment, both domestically and
internationally.
The U.S. Congress is expected to take up the whole question
st factions in Angola
of U.S. coveet assistance to the pro-We
when it returns from its current recess.
African nations to tweet
On the international front, the Organization of African
Unity is scheduled to meet late this week in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, first ;At-foreign minister level, then at summit level.
At lest 16 of the OAU's 47 members have recognized the
government set up in Luanda by the Soviet-backed MPLA.
-
The question of further recognition of the MPLA by OAU
members is expected to divide the Addis Ababa meeting with
the dispute possibly centering on whether or not to offer the
MPLA membership in the OAF.
The heavy Soviet and Cuban involvement on the MPLA side
is more than offset in some black African eyes by the much
less evident South African, and to a degree American,
involvement on the side of two liberation movements fighting
against the MPLA ? the FNLA (National Front) and UNITA
(National Union).
According to Monitor sources, the 300 or so Americans who
Inst. week had been poised to go to Angola as soon as the CIA
could obtain the necessary funds, were virtually ail former
servicemen with combat experience in Indo-China. .
These sources say that about half of this group underwent
training on the sprawling Ft. Denning, Georgia, military area,
during Christmas week.
Ft. Beaming
FL. Bernintt, is the hendouarters of tt!,! A:7th Infantry
,;t the 5Army Infantry School, _and of t:]:
Engineers. Training is 'conducted there also for Ranger and
Airborne troops, including all elements of neraclift,itTb
ping. Approved For Release 2001n
The vast training area is described by a U.S. ntiltary
source as having the right terrain for Africa. It has been used
in the past for training foreign military personnel.
The same military source, describing the many big farms
surrounding the area and the pro-military sentiments of the
local population, stated that it was entirely possible for a
group of mercenaries to train in the area with only minimal
contact with the fort itself.
A public-affairs officer for the fort insisted at the weekend
that there was no training whatsoever at the fort for
mercenaries, foreign nationals, or retired or ex-U.S. person-
nel.
Reports of recruiting
A number of reports have appeared in recent days and
weeks about several, different recruiting operations within
the United States.
For instance, two members of the U.S. Cuban community in
Florida claim to have 360 Cubans signed up and ready to go to.
Angola.
But although a number of Cubans are known to be eager to
join mercenary groups in Angola if they could, well-informed
sources within the Cuban community in Florida are highly
skeptical of this particular operation, believing it to be a
"ripoff."
Other reports have referred to the recruiting of black
American ex-servicemen being carried out by the Congress of
Racial Equality (CORE).
But CORE spokesmen insist that their aim is simply to put
together a group of medical volunteers for Angola and that
their program is purely humanitarian.
Real estate interests stop bill
By the Associated Press
Washington
A real estate interest group contributed more than $10,000
to the campaigns of 100 House members who voted recently to
kill an amendment that would have cracked down on real
estate tax shelters, Common Categ, says.
The public lobby group mid the contributions were given to
the congressmen during 1973 and 1974 by the Real Estate
Political Education Committee.
The amendment in question was killed by the House on Dec.
4 by a vote of 226 to 192. -
The amendment to the House tax bill, offered by. Rep.
AbncrJ. Mikva (D) of Illinois, would have raised the revenue-
producing ability of a proposal that limits the use of tax
shelters by real estate companies.
Mr. Mikva said his amendment would have required firms
using such tax shelters to itay $2,2 billion more in federal taxes
over six years.
Common Cause said its study shows that between Sept. 1,
1973, and Dec. 31, 1974, 100 House members who opposed the
Mikva amendment got a total of $100,050 from the real estate
political fund, while 31 who supported Mikva's proposal got
$19,550.
The group "contributed a total of over $251,00e to federal
f?oticiidatc_s during ft:tt 197 t to
f2.; for Commtn Laty:.,! said.
"Of the seven Fina i (itimmittee Fimators who ran in 1974,
fund totaling
IAI1brittivocpRos#0604004-000084tical
Common Cause S_7,J.d. Chairman Russell B. Long ( D )
of I euisiatta to $2 000. Common Canso said.
WASHINGTON POST
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CIA Said Using EximCis in An.gola
The Christian Science
Monitor reported today that ?,
300 American ex-servicetten:
have been sent to Angola in
the past three months and
similar number are trained .
and equipped to go there in a -tt
covert operation sponsored by
the Central Intelligence
Agency.
A CIA spokesman refused to
. comment on the report but
White House deputy press '
secretary John Carlson said
"the story has no foundation
audit is not true."
The Monitor report, quoting,.
what it said were sources
close to the CIA, said the U.S. '!
mercenaries were being paid
$1,000 ?to $1,500 a month and'
? received a $20,000 life in-
surance policy for helping two
pro West factions fighting a
pro-Soviet faction in Angola.
In other Angolan
- developments:
--William Eteki Mboumoua,.1.l.
secretary general of the
- Organization of African Unity,
sharply attacked South Africa
for its involvement in Angola
as his organization prepared
to meet later this month on the
? matter.
--A Guyana spokesman said
. the United States was
pressuring that nation on
South America's Caribbean
coast to refuse landing per-
mission for. Cuban planes
nupplyiug Loops and supplies
to aid Angolan pro-Communist
forces.
?Intelligence sources in
South Africa said the pro-
Soviet movement controlling
the Angolan capital at Luanda
would launch an offensive
within two weeks with fresh
Cuban troops and a new
squadron of Soviet jets.
?Guerrillas operating out
of Angola killed a. British
-
immigrant and his African
maid i n a raid on the
. Namibian border town of
Oshakati.
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p omacy on
By Murrey Marder
and Walter Pincus ,
? wassalatoa east stet writers %
The United States is en-
trapping itself in "a .no-win
-situation" in Angola, a senior
Republican said?yesterday, as
Ford administration officials
pinned their prime hopes on a
diplomatic solution to the
African conflict.
Sen. Clifford P. Case (N. J.),
ranking Republican on the
Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, said in a '
statement that, the ad-
ministration should abandon,
any involvement in the
, Angolan civil war except for ;
- diplomacy.
"Our strategic interests are
,_. best served," said Case, "by
leaving the Russians exposed
. high and dry as the major -;
force intervening in Africa."
; The United States is running
the risk of "getting bogged
, down in a war by proxies and :
mercenaries," Case said, by
"trying to superimpose the
'big picture' of American-
Russian relations upon a
fragmented tribal mosaic."
Mministration strategists
controlling U.8S. policy
refused to accept that. portion
of Case's premise yesterday,
; but they agreed with him that -
the main thrust of American
strategy right now is
diplomatic maneuver.
William E. Schaufele Jr.,
. new assistant secretary of
state for Africanaffairs, is in
Africa now in what amounts to
a diplomatic race to line up
support against Soviet
strategy in Angola.
The testing time is the next
two weeks. The foreign
ministers of the 46-member
Organization of African Unity
will meet Jan. t1-10 in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia, on the
Angolan conflict, and an OAU
summit meeting of African
leaders will be held Jan. 10-12.
Many experts in Africa are
forecasting that the OAU
meeting will produce formal
diplomatic recognition of the
Soviet-supported Popular
Movement for I he Liboration
of llama I r.al'LA) as the
legitimate government of
Angola.
norrAin4a Stressed
"If that happens, that can
make the U.S. involvement in
Angola a lost cause.' one
American official
acknowledged yesterday. The
Schaufele mission is a major
effort to head off such an ?
outcome.
Schaufele conferred in Zaire -
on Saturday. with President
Mobutu Sese Seko, it was ?
reported yesterday from
.Kinshasa, the capital of Zaire.
Covert. U.. S. Military aid is
being channeled primarily
through Zaire to the two anti-
Communist factions fighting
in Angola, the -National
Liberation Front of Angola
(FNLA) and the National
Union for the Total
Independendce of Angola
(UNITA). . .
From Zaire, Sehaufele is
scheduled to proceed to .
Gabon, Cameron, the Ivory
Coast and Senegal, and
possibly other nations
regarded as specially con-
cerned about the Soviet and
Cuban intervention in Angola
in support of the MPLA.
State Department
spokesman John Trattner said
-yesterday; "Our primary
objective is to end the fighting,
obtain the withdrawal of all
foreign forces, and encourage
the formation of a government
in Angola which represents all
of the factions in the country."
At the same time, the Ford
administration is continuing
, to. channel into Angola,
through the Central
; Intelligence Agency,
Previously authorized covert
? weapons aid for the anti- .
Communist forces.
? In addition, the ? ad-
ministration is continuing to
put diplomatic pressure on
; countries that have provided,
or may provide, air refueling
, for Cuban troops sent to
Angola to help the MPLA.
First the island nation of
Barbados, and now Guyana,
have received U. S. "ex-
pressions of concern.''
The Senate on Dec. 19 voted
against any further U. S. funds
for covert use in Angola, after
$32 million had been sent. This
reportedly left $5 million in the
aide "pipeline" with $3.2
million more for possible use
from a CIA contingency fund.
The House has yet to act on a
cutoff.
A State Department
spokesman yesterday denied
that the Ford administration
is trying to extract additional
funds from Defense Depar-
tment or other programs for
use in Angola; without going
through formal channels while
Congress is in holiday recess.
The Dec. 19 Senate vote
specifically denied use of $9
million that was contained Intl
; Defense Appropriations bill.
Senate Appropriations
Committee Chairman John L.
McClellan (D-Ark.) tried to
get a last-minute compromise
on use of the $9 million.
Secretary of State Henry A.
; Kissinger said that without it
there would be no additional
money to finance Angolan
operations. .
Sen. Diek Clark .(1)-Iowa)
said yesterday that if
Kissinger used other funds for
Angola lie would be "violating
his own statements" to the
Senate leadership.
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DEC 1275
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Foreign Policy/National Security - 8
(FOREIGN POLICY/NATIONAL SECURITY continued from p. 2819)
OPPONENTS MOVE TO BLOCK FURTHER ANGOLA AID
In less than two weeks, congressional unease over the
Ford administration's policy of supplying military
assistance to the anti-Soviet factions in the Angolan civil
war has crystallized into a major effort to block further
U.S. involvement in the conflict. The issue surfaced at
several points in Congress:
? In the Senate, attempts to amend the defense
appropriations bill to bar any further expenditures for
Angolan factions triggered a Republican filibuster delaying
final Senate action until Ford Dec. 19 relented and agreed
to a vote. But the House delayed a final vote until January.
(Story, this page)
? Both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the
House International Relations Committee approved
amendments to the 1976 military aid bill that would re-
quire congressional authorization of any further aid. The
Senate committee also approved a joint resolution to the
same effect; a simple resolution urged Ford to use economic
leverage against Soviet intervention. (Story, p. 2833)
? William E. Colby, outgoing director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, was questioned about the merits of
U.S. involvement and the extent of congressional consulta-
tion in his final appearance before the House Select
Intelligence Committee Dec. 12. Colby insisted that the ad-
ministration was in compliance with the law requiring that
the appropriate congressional committees be informed of
covert operations. (Story, box, p. 2833)
? George Bush encountered similar questions in Senate
Armed Services Committee hearings on his nomination to
succeed Colby as CIA director. Bush said he had not yet
been briefed on the Angolan situation but that he opposed
any requirement of prior congressional approval for covert
operations. (Story, p. 2816)
Developments
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger Dec. 9
acknowledged that U.S. assistance was being channeled
through neighboring states, presumably Zaire and Zambia,
to curb the success of the Soviet-backed Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (PMLA). Press reports setting
the U.S. effort between $25-million and $50-million
appeared Dec. 12. By Dec. 19, several attempts were under
way to impose legislative curbs on further U.S. in-
volvement. Administration supporters were filibustering
the Senate during debate on the defense appropriations bill
to block the most immediate threat to Ford's policy.
Secretary Kissinger personally was spearheading a
massive lobbying effort to preserve the administration's
freedom of action.
Administration Goals
The President, the secretary of state and the ubi-
quitous "high administration official" who invariably ac-
companies Kissinger have argued that the national interest
forbids passivity in the face of a major new projection of
Soviet influence beyond the traditional areas of Soviet con-
cern. While they have not spelled out the possible conse-
quences of failure to act, other administration sources have
pointed to the risk that a Soviet-oriented Angolan regime Following the three-hour secret Senate session Dec. 17,
might ex ajetisitikt646trialwiRefeht67 a2rotif) yorf teliATIRD P 7%1664144146161621bb
in southern Africa. U.N. envoy Daniel P. Moynihan has
argued, further, that a Soviet military presence in Angola
would pose a potential threat to petroleum shipping lanes
between the Middle East and nations belonging to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
President Ford announced Dec. 16 that there was no
thought of direct U.S. intervention. His spokesmen have in-
sisted that the administration seeks only to create a
military stalemate in Angola as the necessary prelude to a
negotiated settlement.
Opposition Views
The ghost of Vietnam past haunts congressional op-
ponents of U.S. involvement. They find the ad-
ministration's position unconvincing in the absence of any
tangible strategic interest, and they doubt that a victorious
PMLA would accept Soviet direction. They also fear the
effect on relations with black Africa of U.S. association with
the Union of South Africa, which has provided support to
the two factions opposing PMLA.
Claims that the U.S. involvement will be limited recall
similar statements in early stages of the Vietnam interven-
tion. But some leading opponents of covert aid have in-
dicated a willingness to consider some open assistance.
Effort to Amend Defense, Bill
Surfacing in front-page news articles Dec. 14, the
Angolan issue landed on the Senate floor the following day,
when Sen. John V. Tunney (D Calif.) and others demanded
to know what funds in the fiscal 1976 defense
appropriations bill (HR 9861) were earmarked or available
for aiding the two U.S.-backed factions in the African
nation's civil war. (Provisions, conference action on defense
bill, p. 2713)
After Appropriations Chairman John L. McClellan (D
Ark.) refused to provide this information, the Senate
agreed to meet in secret session Dec. 17 to discuss the extent
of U.S. involvement in Angola. "What we are doing in
Angola is unknown to most Americans," declared Senate
Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D Mont.).
Throughout the week, senators opposing additional U.S.
covert assistance to Angola argued that the United States
was risking "another Vietnam-quagmire"; the factions in-
volved in the civil war were too independent to allow the
Soviet Union or any other nation to gain control of the
nation, and U.S. policy leaders were poorly versed in
African tribal disputes.
"For us to become involved when knowing so little
[about Angola]...is just ridiculous," declared Hubert H.
Humphrey (D Mint?).
Supporters of roviding some assistance to the U.S.-
backed Angolan 1 actions generally expressed little
enthusiasm for the administration's policy, but they
refused to support a ,Jan on covert aid, fearing such a move
would lock the executive branch into an inflexible policy.
Tunney, Griffith Amendments
PAGE 2832?Dec. 20, 1975
COPYPIGHT 1975 CON114E5S109AL 011A11tuto, INC.
Reprocluown pron.tocl In p3rt PYClIpt hy
yd ment to cut $33-million
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from the defense bill, which he said was the amount
recommended by the CIA to continue supplying aid for
Angola. The amendment also placed a ban on the use of any
additional funds "for any activities involving Angola direct-
ly or indirectly" (it was reported that much of the aid was
being transported through neighboring Zaire), except for
intelligence gathering. There were no funds in the bill ear-
marked for Angola, but the Tunney language was directed
at still secret funding items appropriating money for CIA
operations.
A substitute amendment was then offered by Robert P.
Griffin (R Mich.) that barred expenditure of any fiscal 1976
defense funds to support U.S. combat operations "in or over
or from off the shores of Angola." It allowed additional
military grants to the U.S.-backed factions.
After a second Senate closed session Dec. 18, the
Griffin amendment was overwhelmingly rejected, 26-72.
Griffin had insisted that the nation should have some way
to provide "assistance to the majority of the people of
Africa who are resisting Soviet imperialism," but the
Tunney coalition pointed out that the amendment was un-
necessary because of the 1973 War Powers Act and that it
skirted the main issue of military assistance and covert
U.S. operations. A majority of Republicans (20) and 6
Democrats supported the Griffin language; 17 Republicans
and 55 Democrats voted against it. (Vote 596, p. 2829)
To strip the Angola issue of some controversy, Jacob K.
Javits (R N.Y.), with Tunney's support, offered an amend-
ment to retain the $33-million in the defense bill, with the
priviso that none of this amount or any other funds in HR
9861 could be used for any activities involving Angola. The
amendment was approved 93-4. (Vote 597, p. 2829)
At this point, Mansfield made six unanimous consent
requests to vote on the amended Tunney proposal, but
Griffin objected each time. A White House-engineered
filibuster against the amendment then began, continuing
until the afternoon of Dec. 19 when President Ford reversed
himself and called for a vote on the Angola issue to free the
captive defense appropriations bill.
The Senate late Dec. 19 approved the Tunney amend-
ment by a 54-22 vote. Prior to this vote, a motion to table
the amendment failed 21-58. The measure then was sent to
the House for approval in January, which would send the
entire defense appropriations package to Ford.
Resolutions on Angola
Both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
House International Relations Committee acted during the
week to show their displeasure with the U.S. role in Angola,
approving amendments to the pending fiscal 1976 military
and security-supporting aid bill. The amendments would
have no effect until they were enacted?probably February
at the earliest?but their supporters explained that they
would prevent any prolonged secret involvement.
State Department and Central Intelligence Agency of-
ficials briefed the Foreign Relations Committee Dec. 16 on
U.S. activities, but members emerged from the closed ses-
sion unhappy. "We are further down tie road than we ever
ought to have gone on Angola," said Se 1. Frank Church (D
Idaho). "We are on the road to an open-e vied commitment."
Hubert H. Humphrey (D Minn.) t aid the committee
members had agreed that any U.S. actio is should be public,
not covert, that every diplomatic effort should be made to
stop a Soviet buildup/ and that the Organ 'zation for African
Unity (OAU) should be encouraged to Income directly in-
Reports on Covert Action
Under a year-old reporting procedure, six com-
mittees of Congress were aware of the U.S. involve-
ment in the Angola civil war for some time before the
revelations of early December.
An amendment to the 1974 foreign aid authoriza-
tion bill required that the committees be informed of
such activity. The amendment was sponsored in the
Senate by Harold E. Hughes (D Iowa) and in the House
by Leo J. Ryan (D Calif.). The Hughes-Ryan amend-
ment required that no covert operations be carried out
unless the President deems them important to the
national security and that, they be reported "in a timely
fashion" to the appropriate congressional committees,
including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
House International Relations Committee. (1974
Almanac p. 533)
On Dec. 12, when CIA Director William E. Colby
was questioned by members of the house Select
Intelligence Committee about the agency's reported aid
to factions in the Angolan civil war, he insisted that the
Ford administration was in compliance with the
reporting requirements of Section 662a of the Foreige
Assistance Act (the Hughes-Ryan amendment).
Three committees in each chamber, together w
the two Select Committees on Intelligence, are i
formed under terms of the provision. The six standi:.
committees have different procedures for receiving ti .
reports:
? In the Senate Foreign Relations Cornmitte
chairman John Sparkman (D Ala.), rankle
Republican Clifford P. Case (R N.J.) and chief of th -
committee staff Pat M. Holt receive the briefing. Com
mitten members are informed that a briefing has bee,
received?though not its subject?and can request e
briefing from Holt. Members of the committee stall
responsible for the area are not briefed.
? The Senate Appropriations Committee receive'
the briefings through the five-member intelligent,
operations group of its Subcommittee on Defens,
Members are told in advance what the briefing will
about. Staff members having security clearances ar
present.
? Information could not obtained about Senai
Armed Services Committee procedures.
*The House Armed Services Committee':,
Intelligence Subcommittee is notified of the subject ie
advance and staff members usually attend.
? The House Appropriation Subcommittee 0
Defense receives prior notification of the subject an
cleared members of the staff are present.
*The House International Relations Committe
receives the briefings through its Subcommittee or:
Oversight. Additional information could not be oh
tamed.
volved in seeking an end to the fighting among the Angola
factions. "We don't intend to let the Executive Branch jne.,
make this policy by itself," said Humphrey.
Acting on that sentiment, the committee adopted In,-
voice vote Dec. 18 both an amendment to the pending
military aid bill (S 2662) and a joint resolution ( S J Her
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Foreign Policy/National Security - 10
156?S Rept 94-584) offered by Clark, Clifford P. Case (R
N.J.) and Jacob K. Javits (R N.Y.). Both would prohibit any
assistance for covert operations or training for any Angolan
movement unless specifically authorized by Congress; re-
quire unclassified reports by the President on any
assistance he might desire to provide, including normal
government-to-government assistance, and give either
chamber 30 days to stop any aid. Humphrey's foreign aid
subcommittee had approved the same language by a 7-0
vote Dec. 16.
A non-binding resolution (S Res 333) simply stating
Senate sentiment was introduced Dec. 17 by Adlai E.
Stevenson III (D Ill.), with influential co-sponsors such as
Humphrey; Edmund S. Muskie (D Maine), chairman of the
Budget Committee; Robert C. Byrd (D W.Va.), assistant
majority leader; and Barry Goldwater (R Ariz.), ranking
minority member of the Armed Services Committee. In
language aimed at the Soviet Union and its grain purchases
from this country, the resolution called upon the President
to use his authority under the Export Administration Act
to curtail exports to countries that persisted in intervening
in Angola. Besides economic sanctions against countries in-
tervening there, it urged OAU involvement, United Nations
action and a suspension of further U.S. assistance.
In the House, the International Relations Committee
adopted by voice vote Dec. 18 an amendment to its draft of
the military aid bill that would prohibit any assistance to
Angolan factions or other interests that might contribute to
hostilities there. If the President determined U.S.
assistance were necessary, he was to report publicly to
Congress, but the exact proposal for action could be
classified. Congress by concurrent resolution could block
any proposal. Humanitarian assistance would be per-
mitted. The President also was to report within 60 days on
his diplomatic efforts to end the fighting. The committee
specifically agreed that the amendment could be recon-
sidered when it continues markup of the draft legislation in
January.
A more limiting amendment had been offered by Don
Bonker (D Wash.), but the committee accepted changes
offered by Dante B. Fascell (D Fla.) and Jonathan B.
Bingham (D N.Y.).
Bonker later expressed frustration that the House
could not take more binding and immediate action because
of the lack of time before the Christmas recess.
On the Senate side, however, supporters of the Clark-
Case-Javits amendment and joint resolution said they
thought the Foreign Relations Committee's action would
send a message to the President expressing congressional
concern, and that the amendment to the military aid bill, if
enacted, would prevent a lengthy or deepening involvement
in Angola.
Pike Committee:
INTELLIGENCE PROBE
Administration witnesses admitted before the House
Select Intelligence Committee De- 17 that information in-
dicating possible Soviet violatioes of the 1972 strategic
arms limitation agreements (SALT) had been withheld
from regular intelligence channels The witnesses insisted,
however, that government official with a "need to know"
were always aware of these "hold" j terns and could find out
through informal communications if they needed to.
Retired Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, former chief of n
operations, Dec. 2 had accused Secretary of State Hem
Kissinger of keeping relevant information from intellig
analysts in order to insulate the arms agreements I
criticism. (Weekly Report p. 2645)
Ray S. Cline, former director of the S
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, in
17 testimony generally concurred with Zumwalt's chai
He said that verification of SALT violations was extrer
difficult at best and that the "hold" system exacerbatet
problem.
Edward W. Proctor, CIA deputy director for
telligence, told the committee that senior Def
Intelligence Agency and. CIA officials, including him
made the decisions on what intelligence data to place
"hold" status. He listed three reasons for doing this:
allow clarification of the information's significance; :
forestall leaks that could jeopardize ongoing negotiat
and risk compromising intelligence sources; and 3) to
form to an understanding reached with the Soviet gov
rnent restricting public statements on any subject unde
tive discussion in the SALT negotiations or in the Stan
Consultative Commission set up in 1972. to oversee
pliance with the agreement.
"Hold" procedures had been used in the past, Pr(
emphasized, citing as examples information relating te
overflights of the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and tt
emplacement of Soviet missiles in. Cuba in the fall of 1
William G. Hyland, deputy assistant to the Presi
for national security affairs, insisted that as a prac
matter the "hold" procedures could not keep any proi:
interested officials in ignorance of important inform
for any length of time. Informal communication vi
Washington's "SALT community" would prevent that
said.
But Cline said that as a result of the "hold" proced
key policymakers?including former Secretary of S
William P. Rogers?were kept in the dark about So
moves for as long as several months. Cline argued fin
orderly examination of the various charges through
regular channels at the National Security Council level.
warned that the "hold" procedure might permit alit
with a personal and political stake in the success of SA]
to obfuscate evidence of Soviet non-compliance.
In response to a question by committee member Rol
W. Kasten Jr. (R Wis.), Hyland said he was not awar
any other areas currently subject to a "hold." He specifi
ly denied that there had been any new restrictions on an
to intelligence about Angola in recent months in the S:
Department's Intelligence and Research office, wl
Hyland headed until November.
Final Passage:
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Overriding administration opposition, the House
17 cleared for the President legislation (S 2350) adding
secretary of the Treasury as a member of the Nati
Security Council. S 2350 was passed by the Senate O
and was reported (II Rept 94-730) without amendmen
the House Armed Services Committee Dec. 15.
Presidents have differed widely in their use of
council, established by the National Security Act of 194'
1969 President Nixon and his assistant for national secu
affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, reorganized the counci
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,rlurbon wholo0 Irt PAL excepl by e.drIcr?al cfronts
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H 13174 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD HOUSE December 19, 1975
general vesting options. Plans which do
not pass the existing test may be granted
caseated advance determinations and
will be subject to a new test which is now
being developed.
The concrete developments listed
above evidence the willingness of the
Commissioner to respond to the concerns
of members of the Ways and Means
Oversight Subcommittee. and of my col-
league from the Education and Labor
Subcommittee on Labor Standards, the
Honorable JOHN ERLtHBORN, expressed in
the course of the Oversight Subcommit-
tee hearing of November 20, 1975. Com-
missioner Alexander and his able em-
ployee plans, technical, and Chief Coun-
sel staffs have labored long and hard to
make pension reform work for the work-
ing people of the Nation.
The complexity and scope of the pen-
sion law have made it necessary for the
responsible Federal agencies, several
committees and many interested Mem-
bers of the Congress, and interested
members of the public, to search together
for answers. Much remains to be accom-
plished, and some things, such as the un-
fortunate practice of issuing final rules
and forms without prior public notice
and comment, need to be changed. How-
ever, the Commissioner's demonstrated
willingness to modify burdensome re-
quirements makes me confident that a
most important program is in good
hands, and that the promise of retire-
ment security- will become a reality for
many millions of Americans
RECORD STAraMENT 0
The SPEAKER pro tempo . er
previous order of the House, the gentle-
woman from New York (Ms. Anna) is-
recognized for 15 minutes. ?
ciqlir apparent that the United
l
Mr. Speaker, it is in-
States is directly involved in the military
operations in Angola. The Ford adminis-
tration has embarked upon this danger-
ous path without consultation with Con-
gress or with the American people. It is
clear, moreover, from the vote in the
Senate today on the Tunney amend-
ment, that the overwhelming majority
of the Congress is opposed to the intro-
duction of American aid in Angola, and
would not have permitted the actions
the American Government has already
taken covertly if it had been consulted.
The involvement of the United States
in the Angolan fighting is dangermis on
several grounds:
First, it creates a superpower confron-
tation between the United States arid the
Soviet Union in a region where no vital
American interests exist. Edward Mul-
cahy, Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, admitted to Members of
Congress yesterday in a briefing on An-
gola that the United States finds no spe-
cial moral or ethical or political superi-
ority in the UNITA or FNLA groups we
support; we could as easily have sup-
ported the MPLA. Yet our, response, ac-
cording to Mulcahy, was made entirely
because--we reflexively supported those
whom the Soviets opposed. This is cyni-
cal cold war politics, and is both danger-
ous and mindless.
Approved For Release
Second, it demonstrates that we have
learned nothing from. Vietnam and the
debacle that occurred there. Again we
are being asked to slowly escalate our
commitment into a war far from our
shores and in which America's vital In-
terests are peripheral at best. We have
no reason to believe that those whom we
support will further the ideals of democ-
racy and liberty for which this Nation
should stand. We are continuing to fun-
nel arms through third parties. We are
using mercenary soldiers in our behalf,
and white soldiers from openly racist
South Africa. Thereby, we incite the re-
sentment of al black Africa and of all
the world.
If the position of the United States
were openly calculated to lose us friends
in the world, it could not have beenmere
advantageous to that dismal cause. Al-
ready, we are hearing phony economic
justifications for American involvement:
Angola is rich in oil, diamonds, coffee.
She is needed to provid.e port facilities for
oil tankers. We are hearing tales of a new
"domino" effect----if Angola falls, then
Latin America is next. But these are false
justifications of an already decided pol-
icy of military intervention..
Third the U.S. administration has at-
tempted to silence those in our Gavern-
ment who disagree and has deliberately
opted against a diplomatic solution to the
problems of Angola. 'The resignation of
Assistant Secretary of State Davis this
week is merely the tip of the iceberg of
Protest within the State Department
gainst Secretary Kissinger's interven-
tionist policies. A diplomatic alternative
exists. The Organization of African Unity
will meet in mid-January to consider the
Angola fighting. The United Nations Se-
curity Council stands ready to assist. Per-
haps multilateral discussions which in-
volve all parties to the Angolan fighting
are the answer. Perhaps other interna-
tional mediation efforts will succeed. But
the U.S. Government has used none of
these techniques of helping to bring in-
ternational disputes to resolution without
bloodshed. It has instead used its consid-
erable influence in world politics toward
the option of interventionist warfare.
? While we talk, the war goes on. We are
reading reports today of South African
mobilization, of further escalation of
fighting; of the introduction of thou-
sands of troops who have crossed the bor-
der from Zaire. The American escalation
of its participation in this war goes on
unabated. In this kind of conflict, it Is
necessary for Congress to act now to
'force the Ford administration to get
American aid out of Angola, to move for
a diplomatic and not a military solution
to the Angolan question, before further
escalation makes it almost impossible to
extricate ourselves from Angola, as we
found it impossible to extricate ourselves
from Indochina without a humiliating
military defeat.
CONSUMER VETO COVERUP
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from Illinois (Mr. Aemmeerol is
recognized for 5 minutes.
2618.1P1SIT'auilli3gfiTird6
of- this year the President_ directed the
executive-branch departments and agen-
cies to develop- consumer representation
plans. . ? ?
Thesse plans had, the supposed good_
intention of providing: the consumer with
greater access to the decisionmaking
processes of those agencies.. However, re-
cently the plans have become- available
and I have a. few thoughts on what
consider to be a public relations ploy to
cover the President should he keep his
promise to veto one Of the. most hn
poet:ant pieces of consumer advocacy
legislation to come out of the 94th Con-
gress--The Consumer Protection. Agency
Act. ?
. One of the strongest indications that
these plans are not more than a window
dressing is that none of the regulatory
agencies are involved. This is an inter-
esting fact when one considers the ef-
fect out Consumers' lives- such agencies as
the Federal Trade Commission, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission, the
Securities- and Exchange Commission,
the Civil Aeronautics Board, ? and the
Consumer Product Safety Commission
have via- their. power to interpret and.
enforce the- laws passed by Congress.
The consumer Iola been clamoring for
representation on -- the policymaking
boards Of these agencies for years and
it is Particularly insulting - to him that-
those departments which perhaps_ mat-
ter most to?hia health, safety and pocket-
book were not required to submit con-
sumer repreeentation plans: -
The call t6 write the plans came, after
the release of a study by the Consumer:
Affairs Office of HEW which showed that
the agencies were doing an.: unsatisfac-
tory -job of encouraging and using con-
sumer - input, The report listed - several
shortcomings such as inadequacy in deal-.
ing with, telephone. complaints, little . or
no policy analysis, and lack of public
awareness as key reasons why consumers
are not able to. Make an impact.
A followup- phase of this study, which
was to include More specific examples of
the inadequacies encountered -in the
agencies, has conveniently been held up
for months- by a combination of late
OMB- approval and lack--of funding, s
- As I read the consumer representation.
plans, I did not see a new determination-
en the Part of these agencies to involve
the consumer in policymaking decisions,
but rather 17 dissertations on the ration-
ale of old systems long proved inadequate.
In only a few case.s- did an agency admit
shortcomings And go as far as to. Propose'
changed- programs; the others simply
described and -then. added to- existing
-
planes
- Another reservation I have with these
plans is the total absence of dollar figures
in the reports. If the agencies were seri-
ous about change and actually planned
to install the: programs outlined, surely
tee re would be some estimate of how
mech all, this would cost. If no considerae
tint to this. has. been given, then the
len ;MI of -time it will take to develop
cos -effectiveness studies will again ,put
the so/lamer off for months.
lay feeling is, that the President has
trapped himself in his own argument
0 86 ?WY dobbri3
efi Consumer Protection