A STRATEGY CHART FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIA RESPONSES TO THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000300130051-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: October 11, 1975
• Content Type: FORM

25X1A
E7 uNcLAsSIf oved F pr lelp R004/09/23: CIA-R
" USE ONLY
11 051-2 0 SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
5UB3ECT: (Optional)
A Strategy Chart for the Development of CIA Responses to
the Issues Raised by the Senate and House Select Committees.
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
Chief,.Review Staff
DATE
1.1 October 1975
STR
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
DATE
building)
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
As requested at the
2 - -- ---
- -
-
5:30 meeting yesterday,
attached is an updated list-
ing of the issues arising
3.
from the investigations con-
ducted by Senate and House
Select Committees. This
4.
list was originally prepared.
at. the Director's request to
serve as the "issues" column
- ~
-
-
T
%.
-
in
in a strategy chart for de-
veloping CIA responses to the
issues raised by the Senate
"~ ------ _
Te -
-
and House Select 'Committees .
Also attached is a
`
i
7 -
-
listing of problem areas the
Director may wish to raise
-_.
at the White House meeting
a.
on Monday,
9. 25X1 A
10.
12.
13.
.
14.
15.
Approved For Rele
se 2004
09/23:
IA-RDP7
M00144R000300130051-2
..,.. r.....m~... r--~ )Tr~R A
.T
 Approved For Release 200 Wk I l'4 0144R000300130051-2
"ISSUES" Column of the Strategy Chart
I. Intelligence Community
A. Role and Functions of the DCI.
1. Should the DCI continue to manage the CIA
while presiding over the intelligence community?
2. If not, should the future DCI be placed in
the NSC or be an autonomous officer reporting directly
to the President?
3. A revision of the National Security Act of
1947 is likely. It will include provisions designed
to ensure protection of the constitutional rights of
American citizens against possible violations. What
other new provisions are needed to modernize the
National Security Act to fit the future role of U.S.
intelligence?
B. Intelligence Community Budgetary Process.
1. What changes need to be made in the community
budgetary process to strengthen executive control over
American intelligence agencies? Should this include
a strengthened ro:Le for 0MB and NSCIC?
2. Should the DCI authority over the intelli-
gence community budgetary process and resources be
augmented to strengthen his command and control? What
other measures are necessary to make it possible for
the DCI to be held accountable for the performance of
the intelligence community?
3. Is intelligence production (estimates, current
intelligence,, technical intelligence, etc.) worth the
enormous amounts of money being poured into this ac-
tivity?
4. What measures are needed to prevent dupli-
cation and financial waste, especially in regard to
the management of large technical collection projects?
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300130051-2
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP77 V100144R000300130051-2
C. National Estinw1cive Process..
1. Shou4 the Board of National Estimates be
reconstituted improve the quality, integrity and
independence of national estimate production? How
do current national estimates compare to these pro-
duced under the BNE?
2. Can other measures be taken to shield
national estimates from undue influence of policy-
makers and policy executors?
3. Degree of DCI versus intelligence community
authority over national intelligence production.
4. The record of the intelligence community for
predicting major international events is being studied
as a means of determining the real value of the intelli-
gence product to the U.S. Government and public. Is
it possible that there is insufficient analysis of
available intelligence and inadequate coordination
of the intelligence product? How do we assess the
value of the intelligence product? Recent HSC hear-
ings on intelligence postmortems of major events have
highlighted the predictability issue as a dominant
theme of HSC hearings.
D. Improvements Needed in Intelligence Community
Security Procedures.
1. Strengthen legal basis for secrecy agreement;
need for sources and methods legislation.
2. Improvements in concept and definition of
secrecy (FOIA, Privacy Act, etc.).
3. Legislation to regulate the handling of
classified information.
4. Procedures for congressional declassification
and/or publication of classified information to avoid
repetition of confrontation with HSC.
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300130051-2
{ T
~' ~ i ' J 3
 Approved For Release 40`'9/73": 64-k M00144R000300130051-2
E. Domestic Activities of the Intelligence Community.
1. Warrantless electronic surveillance within
the U.S.. Open hearings postponed for the time being.
but the issue of domestic electronic surveillance.
2.. Need to clarify legal authority for NSA
interception of transnational foreign communications.
3. Huston Plan. Open hearings underway designed
to demonstrate that the Nixon administration misused
the intelligence community for domestic political ob-
jectives.
II. Central Intelligence Agency
A. Command and Control over CIA Administration,
Budget, Personnel and Operations.
1. Are management procedures and practices
adequate to ensure accountability and strict compli-
ance with policy directives?
2. Do internal, budget controls and procedures
ensure proper oversight of expenditure of funds for
authorized activities only? Should the GAO be re-
quired to audit CIA expenditures?
3. The quality and responsiveness of CIA in-
telligence production to U.S. Government and con-
gressional requirements.
4. The quality and timeliness of foreign
clandestine intelligence collection and counter-
intelligence. How is management by objective applied
to human source collection requirements and with what.
results?
5. Role, utility and future of covert action.
Various covert action operations are being studied in
depth by the SSC
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300130051-2
25X1A
 Approved For Release 20 - Q L0144R000300130051-2
Congo, and the impact of the Katzenbach report of
1967 on covert. action) and the HSC (list of projects
not yet firm) as case studies to ascertain one or
more of the following:
(a) As examples of command and control
within the CIA and between the CIA and the
White House (NSC). Did CIA act as a "rogue
elephant rampaging out of control of both the
Congress and the 'President"?
(b) As examples of the misuse of the CIA
by various presidents for unauthorized or mis-
guided foreign policy adventures.
(c) As examples of lack of adequate Con-
gressional oversight and as a means of bypassing
the will of Congress on foreign policy and foreign
aid issues.
(d) As a means of stimulating debate and
resolving the issue as to whether covert. action
is a morally acceptable instrument of foreign
policy.
(e) As a means of making a major contri-
bution to U.S. interests at relatively small
cost in funds and manpower.
B. Domestic Activities of CIA in Support of Foreign
Intelligence Operations.
What legislation is needed to prevent recurrences
of abuses revealed in the press, Rockefeller Commission
Report and the SSC and HSC investigations? Do these
alleged abuses indicate weaknesses in the command and
control chain of command? Illustrative of such issues
are:
1. The mail intercept program. The SSC has been
investigating this issue in depth and has interviewed
numerous present and former Agency employees who were
direct or indirect ;participants in the program. HSC
and the Abzug subcommittee have thus far dealt with
this issue on only a hit-and-run basis.
- 4 -
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 CIA-RDP77M00144R000300130051-2
oql
 Approved For Releas g('1U &1 3~ ~IAJR 77M00144R000300130051-2
25X1A
2. Proprietaries. CIA proprietaries have be-
come big issues for the SSC and especially the HSC.
m_I.n s
believe they smell corruption in connection with gifts
to.foreign sources and contacts.
4. Cooperating U.S. companies. This is of in-
terest to the SSC, especially the multi-national cor-
porations, a subject of special concern to the Chair-
man. IIT is first on their list, not only because of
its Chile involvement but because the SSC staff be-
lieves that CIA extended favors, such as interven-
tion with U.S. regulatory agencies, on behalf of these
companies in return for services. rendered by these
companies to CIA abroad.
5. Cooperating U.S. citizens. This is related
to (3) and (4) above. We are having great difficulty
in protecting the identities of persons in this cate-
gory, especially as the SSC and HSC staffers zero in
on specific activities or believe they have identified
an abuse situation.
arrangements-and-much work have gone into providing
the committee staffs with the information they have
requested butwithout revealing the true identities
of the proprietaries and their personnel. The HSC
appears determined to prove that the proprietaries.
are poorly run, financially mismanaged, and may even
be conduits for certain improper practices. HSC
hearings on this subject are likely.
3. Covert Procurement practices and procedures
in the U.S. and accountability for procurement by
CIA stations abroad. This is a hot HSC item and in the
A of HSC staffers is related to (2) above. They
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300130051-2
-
 Approved For Release 20 l
fft1 - ` " A-F'Zb 00144R000300130051-2
Q - ~'
25X1A
7. Il and related activities. The SSC
is into this activity and is collecting documents
and conducting interviews.
8. Breaking and entering and surveillance con-
ducted in connection. with press leaks and CIA personnel
security cases. Main interest in this area seems to
be. in the Department. of Justice, but SSC is also looking
into this subject.
9. Drug -testing. The SSC Ytas been into this
subject in great depth and has interviewed a number of
employees and ex-employees. What makes this a hairy
public relations problem, of course, is the Olson case.
HSC has thus far shown little interest in this.
10. Toxins. Not much left to the imagination
after the SSC executive session. The hearings were
designed to show lax practices in CIA internal command
and control.
C. Miscellaneous Allegations of CIA Transgressions.
1. Assassination plotting. This subject has ac-
counted for a major portion of the SSC time and at-
tention over the past few months. A report of some
-250-300 pages has been drafted but it appears to have
become enmeshed.in.back-room partisan politics. It
is to be reviewed by representatives of the intelligence
community before publication.
2. Destruction of files related to drug testing.
The SSC has taken an active interest in the subject of
drug testing and is, of course, aware of the destruction
of certain files. Only the Department of Justice is at
this time pursuing the destruction of files ("destruction.
of U.S. property") as an issue. The FBI has been in-
vestigating.
3. Possible perjury charges related to testi-
mony on Chile by senior Agency officials during con-
gressional hearings. The SSC is aware of this issue
but only the Department of Justice is actively pur-
suing.
6 -
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 CIA-RDP77M00144R000300130051-2
1'1'9
a
99
L; U LL
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 CIA-RDP77M00144R000300130051-2
4. Possible CIA "penetration" of the White
House and other executive agencies by detailees and
former Agency employees now employed by these agencies.
The suspected purpose is to spy on these agencies and
manipulate government officials to the advantage of
CIA. Although. it defies comprehension, this subject
is being vigorously investigated by HSC staff pre-
sumably in the hope of vindicating themselves when
the Prouty/Butterworth incident blew up in their faces.
can iden
h
ey
Every CIA detailee and former detai.lee t
tify and locate.will be interviewed, including secre
taries.
III. Congress
Congressional Oversight of CIA
A. How should Congressioaoversight of CIA be re-
structured to ensure a equate detailed knowledge of
CIA activities at.hce and abroad? Select committees
of each house or e joint committee for Congress are
being considere' by both the SSC and HSC. Unresolved
is whether the existing oversight committees should be
abolished and their functions transferred to a newly
established joint committee or select committees.
B. What should be the Congressional role in intelli-
gence acquisitions, intelligence production and de-
cision making on covert action? If covert action is a
morally acceptable tool for the conduct of foreign
policy, should. legislation be passed to require prior
consultation with Congress before covert action is
undertaken?
C. Should Congress receive the same service from
the CIA and other members of the intelligence community
as that accorded to the President. and the National
Security Council? Specifically, should Congress be a
customer for intelligence production on an equal basis
with the President and NSC members?
D. What specific legislative rcamdendationrshould dbe
made to correct the inadequacies
as a result of the SSC and the HSC investigations?
Can Congress establish effective controls over the in-
telligence community through the budgetary and appro-
priations process? Should the GAO have a role in ~~
Congressional oversight? "-'Should there be. an "open"
intelligence budget?
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : C9-RDP77M00144R000300130051-2
ILL .
 ISSUES
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300130051-2
Other
SSC HSC Congressional Department Rockefeller
Committees of Justice Commission
CIA Position
I. Intelligence
Community
A
B
C
I
I
D
etc.
II. CIA
A
B
C
D
etc.
:I. Congress
A
B
C
D
etc.
Appro
ed For Relea
a 204/09/23.,:' CIA-RpF
7M00144R000300
30051-2