RESEARCH STUDY POLITICIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2001
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: August 1, 1975
• Content Type: RS

STATINTI: Approved For Rel
00144R000300050052-0
mommilmmilmm1011.111.1.1.11......111.1111. For Official use Only
Research Study
Politicization of International
Technical Organizations
For Official Use Only
OPR 405
August 1975
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
25X1A
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
August 1975
POLITICIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL
ORGANIZATIONS
by
NOTE: This study was reviewed by representatives
of other offices in the CIA and of other govern-
? mental agencies, but no attempt at formal coordina-
tion was made. For further information about this
study, please call
code
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION AND KEY JUDGMENTS
1
A NOTE OF METHODOLOGY
4
DISCUSSION
6
POLITICIZATION: THE PERCEPTION AND THE REALITY .
6
RHETORICAL POLITICIZATION
7
SUBSTANTIVE POLITICIZATION
11
THE POLITICS OF TECHNICAL ORGANIZATIONS
18
APPENDIX
GLOSSARY
A-1
CHARTS
PERCEPTION OF POLITICIZATION IN TECHNICAL ORGANIZATIONS
DERIVED FROM INTERVIEWS follows page 3
UN-ASSOCIATED INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, follows page A-1
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
INTRODUCTION AND KEY JUDGMENTS
The United States has experienced varying degrees of
success and difficulty in achieving its goals within the
United Nations system over the years. There is a growing
perception, however, that during the past two years the
actions of a coalition of the world's small states has
made the maintenance of US interests in that body more
difficult than ever. Politicization has become the stan-
dard term used by bureaucrats, journalists, congressmen,
and academics to describe the wide spectrum of difficulties
which the US now faces in international institutions.
There has been particular concern that politicization has
now spread from the General Assembly to the international
technical and specialized organizations which the US has
long valued as assemblies where the technical bases for
broader international cooperation could be somewhat
dispassionately established.
This study attempts to measure whether, and in what
forms, politicization is increasing in these technical
organizations, and what the consequences could be for US
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
interests. Particular attention is given to establishing
whether political issues have altered or interfered with
the chartered mission and work of these agencies, and to
sorting out any rising trends of political debate from
the standard "noise level" of politics which is found in
all international gatherings. This study also examines
the meaning of politicization as seen by many of the US
officials who must deal most directly with its manifesta-
tions and consequences.
This study finds that despite a high level of political
rhetoric, external political issues appear to have caused
only minor damage to the substantive effectiveness of
these organizations. The dichotomy between rhetorical and
substantive politicization is rooted in the character and
operating environment of the technical organizations as
well as in the contradictory interests of the. member-
states. Thus, while the LDCs may find political speeches
essential to a particular occasion, they are often either
unwilling or unable to disrupt the functioning of these
groups. This reflects in some cases their anticipation of
benefits from the organizations, And in other cases their
-2-
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
lack of specific interest or technical competence in the
matters at hand.
The low level of actual damage from politicization
thus far also reflects the strong US position in these
organizations -- especially the high caliber of its
expertise and its good standing with the professional
secretariats. Prospects are good that, by pursuing these
advantages, the US can act to maintain the dichotomy and
prevent any progression beyond rhetorical political activity
in the technical organizations.
-3-
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICIZATION
IN TECHNICAL ORGANIZATIONS
DERIVED FROM INTERVIEWS
TYPE OF POLITICIZATION
Rhetorical
Substantive
WHO
ICAO
WII0
WMO
UNDP
Low or None
WMO
IAEA
UNIDO
IAEA
ITU
FAO
IMCO
ITU
C 0 0
Moderate
IMCO
ILO
W
H
ICAO
UNDP
ILO
High
UNIDO
FAO
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
A Note on Methodology
Because of the difficulty in obtaining current data on the UN
system -- and the international technical agencies in particular --
the authors of this paper employed a variety of approaches to measure
the existence and effects of politicization. Ten organizations
believed to be representative of the highly diverse "UN family of
organizations" were selected as the sample for this study:*
-- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
International Labour Organisation (l10)
-- Food & Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO)
World Health Organization (vao
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Universal Postal Union (UPU)
International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
- World Meteorological Organization (WMO)
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO)
United Nations Industrial Development
Organization oca0
* The major exclusion from the study sample has been the financial
organizations. Their processes and functions were judged too
different from the other bodies to permit a valid comparison of
evidence concerning politicization.
See the appendix for a descriptive chart of:I? technical
organizations.
-4-
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Both factual and impressionistic information about these
organizations were gathered in a lengthy series of interviews with
those officials in the various US government agencies who deal most
directly with the major technical bodies. Generous contributions
of time and expertise -- both in interviews and in commenting on a
draft version of this paper -- were made by officials in the Bureau
of International Organization Affairs of the Department of State;
the departments of Agriculture, Labor, and Health, Education and
Welfare; the Coast Guard; the Federal Aviation Administration; and
the Energy Research and Development Administration.
The distinction made in this paper between rhetorical and
substantive politicization was, in fact, a product of apparent
contradictions which arose in the course of many of these interviews.
Although many officials offered an initial impression that politici-
zation was a serious problem in the organization with which they
dealt, they were often unable, in follow-up questioning, to provide
examples of changes in programming or budgeting which would indicate
major disruption of the organization. This dichotomy -- relatively
effective levels of substantive performance despite bitter rhetoric --
was confirmed in searches of the New York Times Data Bank and other
reportorial archives for the public record of the meetings and
programs of these bodies.
The authors wish to express appreciation to Edward Mickolus,
an OPR summer intern, for his contribution to the design and execution
of the methodological approach to this study.
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : Crk-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
DISCUSSION
POLITICIZATION: THE PERCEPTION AND THE REALITY
All definitions tend to be self-serving, and the
purposes of a study such as this make it inevitable that
the use of the term politicization will be somewhat
interpretive. The term derives from an assumption of the
functionalist school among international relations special-
ists that the handling of "technical" matters among the
world's disparate states can (and should) be carried out
in isolation from discussion of contentious political
issues which may exist among them. This appears, in fact,
to have been part of the shared mind set of many of the
representatives of the western powers who established the
UN system. In this view -- allowing for some acceptable
standard "noise level" of corridor politics -- any intro-
duction or imposition of items extraneous to the purely
technical matters on the agenda or program of an organiza-
tion is politicization. In its most significant form, this
phenomenon would involve the hindrance of an organization's
normal functioning (and by extension the damaging of what
the US perceives to be its interests and policies in a
particular body). Thus the current interests of the US or
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 A-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
any other country will shape its view of what is "political"
and what is properly technical.
RHETORICAL POLITICIZATION
By any measure, it is clear that both the political
noise level and US awareness of it have risen markedly in
international forums since the late 1960s. This is so
because the number of participants has increased and because
the US has become a principal target of the verbiage. In
addition, the content of political debate in the UN system
has changed: the somewhat familiar ideological differences
of the old East-West confrontation have been replaced (or
perhaps outshouted) by persistent and often shrill economic
and social demands from an aggregation of small states.
Many journalists have, somewhat hastily, described the
verbal exchange between LDCs and the developed nations as
the "new cold war."
In contrast, the pattern of expert opinion and other data
gathered in this study points clearly to the conclusion that --
except for a few issue areas* -- the increasing imposition
* For example, in the ITU the developing countries are demanding
that radio frequencies be allocated to all nations as a shared
natural resource, regardless of any single nation's ability to
utilize them. In many of the organizations the demand for an
expanded executive group is resulting in greater LDC participation
and influence in the inner councils of these groups.
- 7-
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
of political demands has had little or no effect on the
continued substantive functioning of the international
technical bodies. Thus the politicization process in these
bodies has so far been largely a rhetorical one. Nevertheless,
the distinction between this and those fewer instances of
substantive disruption of the organizations is worth making
because of the widely-held belief that rhetoric is a precursor
of concrete political action. In international (and especially
UN) politics, the unchallenged repetition of certain demands
or behavior can lead to their legitimization. But there are
factors which indicate that the dynamics of the current
political rhetoric do not fit past patterns. This and the
nature of the organizations themselves would indicate a
need to refrain from categorizing all instances of political
rhetoric in the UN system as part of a uniformly threatening
situation.
It is quite easy to impose a political or otherwise
unconventional question upon the established routine of an
international organization, since any member usually is
granted the right of submitting an item for discussion.
And given the sometimes dry and technical nature of routine
discussion in these bodies, a political dispute is guaranteed
to be a highly visible and audible affair for the participants.
-8-
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Such action can take many forms: extraneous declarations
of condemnations are urged for passage; questionable groups
are sponsored for member or observer status; attempts might
be made to expel or suspend a member. In large part because
of the ease with which it can be undertaken, the rising
frequency of political rhetoric gives no real measure of
its impact.
It should also be recognized that the new states of
the international system generally do not share the attitude
of the UN's founding members toward technical bodies. They
tend to view all multinational forums as potential platforms
which can place them and their interests before a worldwide
audience. Also, the segregation of technical from political
matters is not yet part of the pattern of conducting domestic
affairs in many LDCs; their political and economic systems
often have not achieved a sufficiently high degree of adminis-
trative specificity to require such distinctions. In this
respect, their behavior in international bodies should be
seen as more natural than calculated.
Bloc politics -- the most visible tactical aspect of
the current politicization -- is not the same phenomenon in
this case that the US has faced in the past with the USSR
and other Communist countries. In general, the LDCs are a bloc
-9-
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
by default of other power sources, and should not neces-
sarily be viewed as "ganging up" by design on the developed
nations. It is often simply their way of pursuing indivi-
dual interests and certainly makes the rhetoric more
visible that it would be if practiced piecemeal. Further-
more, most of the new LDCs entered the international system
with no tradition of the sovereign conduct of foreign
relations, and quickly found group participation to be the
most natural way of articulating the obviously small share
of power they held. This has often been disconcerting to
those states which have ordered their diplomatic relations
primarily on a bilateral basis.
Finally, it must be emphasized that carrying out
protracted political debate in a technical organization
is generally a different and far less fruitful undertaking
than is the case in other international gatherings. Each
of these bodies has a charter which sets its functional
limits, and thus a full constitutional change would be
required to alter its mission to respond to any substantially
different needs and wants on the part of LDCs. Represen-
tatives from developed nations to the meetings of many
organizations are frequently technical experts -- often
uninstructed in diplomacy or their government's official
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 :-CIIR:RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
policy -- who are simply not inclined to discuss what they
consider extraneous issues. In contrast, most LDCs cannot
afford to staff a delegation to each agency, so their rep-
resentative is often a diplomatic official who though
politically sophisticated is over his head in substantive
discussion. Furthermore, procedural controls over debate
and the agenda itself, by both the professional secretariat
staff and the older member-states, can channel discussion
and preclude uncontrolled debate. In addition, most agencies
have a tradition of consensual decisionmaking, which is
inimical to the confrontation of up-or-down voting usually
demanded on political issues.
SUBSTANTIVE POLITICIZATION
Much of the concern over rising levels of rhetorical
politicization has been based on an assumption that where
words are hostile, so are actions. It is often assumed that
under such conditions, these organizations would be either
less able or less willing to serve US needs. This has been
the case in the UN General Assembly where increasing verbal
abuse has, in fact, been associated with mounting defeats
when matters come to a vote. Information collected in these
interviews and from the organizations' records suggest this
association has not been carried over into the specialized
agencies.
Approved For Release 2002/01/0-21.1e1A-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
With only one exception (the ILO), substantive
politicization appears to have remained low regardless of
the level of rhetorical politicization.* While ineffec-
tiveness and conflicts with US policies certainly do exist,
they are not directly attributable in any significant degree
to politicization. In response to questions concerning
agendas, budgets, programs, technical coordination, and
information collection, US representatives' answers
indicated no significant reduction of those services
valuable to US interests.** Most of those interviewed
recalled only occasional incidents where rhetorical
politicization had seriously impeded technical work and
noted that verbal hostilities generally did not affect
substance. These observations were confirmed by the
records of the organizations. Little change has been
noted in programs important to the US during the past
* See chart following p.3.
** The rhetorical and substantive politicization distinction was
developed from this apparent discrepancy -- interviewees' initial
assessment of advanced politicization in their organization compared
with later assertions that substantive output had not changed. The
discrepancy seemed best explained by dividing politicization into
two sub-categories. As discussed above, this distinction not only
seemed necessary to understand the results of the interviews but was
also supported by objective data drawn from records and press reports.
Approved For Release 2002/01/024 pA.-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
several years of increasing rhetorical attacks. Some
organizations, such as IMCO, have slightly enlarged their
services, which are valuable primarily to industrialized
states. Where technical assistance programs for LDCs have
been added or increased, they have been financed through
additional funds and have not displaced basic services.
Both sets of evidence indicate that these organizations are
performing their technical functions and serving US
interests at normal levels -- which vary widely among
organizations -- regardless of levels of rhetorical
politicization.
Levels of substantive politicization have also
remained low despite the varying lengths of time that these
organizations have been subject to rhetorical politiciza-
tion. Although this does not mean that the distinction
between rhetorical and substantive politicization will
necessarily continue, it does suggest that substantive
politicization is not a simple product of rhetorical
politicization. The linkage seems equally tenuous in
reverse: in the few cases where rhetorical excesses were
perceived to have diminished in recent years (the ITU and
WHO), there was no noted regression in whatever low levels
of substantive politicization existed. It is also
-13-
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
interesting to note that the one case of substantive
politicization, the International Labour Organisation --
where both State Department and Labor Department officials
perceived a moderate degree of substantive politicization
was not attributed to developed countries/less developed
countries animosities, but to tensions between democratic
and socialist ideologies.*
Most of those interviewed noted that increasing levels
of rhetorical friction did consume valuable conference time
allotted to substantive business. Even for those organiza-
tions where rhetorical politicization was characterized as
moderate (ITU, IMCO, ICAO, and UNDP) or high (UNIDO, FAO),
however, the officers did not see this displacement as a
serious impediment to the work of the organization. Agenda
planning and adherence have clearly become more difficult;
but those interviewed felt that they -- with the assistance
of sympathetic secretariat officials and chairmen -- could
still exert sufficient influence to insure that business
in which the US has interests is completed.
*
Since US substantive interests and goals in this organization are
quite diffuse, assessment of impediments to those interests and goals
is, at best, tenuous. The ILO is interesting, however, as an organiza-
tion in which LDCs have taken few strong stands and US proposals (both
formal and informal) have met opposition largely from Soviet members
and from West European socialists.
-14-
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
In many cases, rhetorical assaults have become
institutionalized: the same speech i$ 1114de by the
same delegate year after year and time is duly alloted
for the expected interruptions. In WHO, conference speeches
on Israeli intransigence by Arab members and on the status
of Puerto Rico by Cuban representatives are an expected
annual event. In one conference, where debates on political
issues such as Israeli/Arab affairs were predictable, the
last two conference days -- after substantive business had
been completed -- were reserved for this discussion. This
insured that uninterrupted time would be available for
technical business and helped to insulate technical decision-
making from political tensions. The effectiveness of such
maneuvers led most of the interviewees to conclude that the
time factor of politicization is at present far more an
inconvenience than a threat to substantive work.
Other explanations for continued US influence in the
substantive work of these agencies are strong US relations
with secretariat officers, the technical expertise of
delegations, and the comparative lack of LDC involvement in
technical substance of most of these organizations.
Perhaps the most important aid to insuring the
uninterrupted conduct of these organizations' substantive
-15-
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
business is the quality of US relations with key members
of the secretariat. In most organizations the secretariat
is the originating point for agenda planning; if the US is
to exercise influence towards minimizing time lost to
rhetorical assaults and insulating substantive considera-
tions from such disruptions, close ties with the secretariat
are vital. As with the weight of US expertise in conference
delegations, able and long-term US appointees in agency
secretariats greatly increase US substantive influence.
In those organizations which are primarily conduits of
aid and assistance, self-interests are a major restraint
upon LDCs' moving from rhetorical battles into substantive
battles. UNDP, FAO, UNIDO have all been protected from
extended substantive disruption because LDC majorities
clearly prefer that business be completed and their programs
executed.*
4 UNIDO may become the first exception to this generality if its
structural changes and conversion to independent organization and
Specialized Agency status -- which is a result of LDC pressures for
institutional reforms that they believe will give them greater control --
diminishes its capacity to execute assistance programs through loss of
financial support from developed countries. The results of its re-
organization will not be apparent, however, for two or three years.
This principle of LDC restraint by direct self-interest also
applies to various bodies within organizations. Several interviewees
noted, for example, that LDCs intercede with political speeches far
less frequently in committees concerned directly with assistance
programs than those concerned with matters such as statistics collection.
-16-
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02: CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Other technical organizations, however, serve
primarily the major developed powers which have global
communications and transport industries. Although ICAO,
ImCO, ITU, and WMO have acquired technical assistance
programs, the main burden of their activities is still
regulation, coordination, and collection of information
which chiefly is of value to states with large commercial
interests in these fields. In these cases the complexity
of these technical subjects and the weight of US expertise
insulates the substantive from the rhetorical. LDCs lack
the staffing and information to oppose positions on topics
such as the fine points of new shipping and air transport
regulations. Federal regulations devised in the US to
coordinate interstate commerce and communication have
served worldwide as models for international regulations
in these fields. Compared to industrialized states, LDCs
have relatively small interests in the details of these
regulatory agreements and little motivation for opposing
US policies on these issues. Most of the opposition the
US meets in such organizations is, in fact, from other
developed countries and derived from substantive rather
than political differences.
Within the narrow confines of the substantive
deliberations of these technical organizations, then, the
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 qA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
US enjoys not only technical advantages, but also a
surprising capacity to insulate them from its mounting
ideological liabilities. This insulation is, however,
the product of these organizations' particular atmosphere
and subject matter. It does not appear to be the case in
other international bodies. Just as the assumption that
the General Assembly's pattern of substantive losses
following close upon rhetorical losses has been found not to
apply to these specialized organizations, so their separation
of rhetorical and substantive matters is not feasible to the
same degree in other UN entities.
THE POLITICS OF TECHNICAL ORGANIZATIONS
The reality of politicization in the technical
organizations has remained uniquely low, but its perception
has not. The apparent impact of politicization has been
greatly magnified beyond its real dimensions by two primary
factors: the suddenness and consistency with which the US
lately has found itself in a minority position; and the
contrast with a brief preceding period of unusually low
politicization in the mid and late 1960s.
During the immediate post-World War II period, the
rhetorical politicization accompanying the Cold War was far
more pronounced than at present. Substantive politicization
-18-
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
also seems to have reached a higher level, with much greater
paralysis of international technical work, during those
East-West confrontations. Yet few western representatives,
scholars, and journalists expressed concern then over the
political nature of these battles which the US, with its
majority backing, often won. Current concern is at least
as much a result of the US minority position as of the
intrusion of politics upon technical bodies.
The current period was preceded by a phase of unusually
low political controversy in these organizations. Between
the de-emphasis of Cold War competition in multilateral
forums and the rise in numbers and consciousness of non-
aligned states (which came slightly later here than in the
General Assembly), there was a short period during the
1960s when these agencies came closer than ever before to
approximating the functionalist ideal of apolitical delibera-
tions. This period was an aberration, not a norm. The
current acceleration of political controversies in these
forums, thus, is perhaps best seen as a return to normal
conditions. It seems more natural that the tensions of
"high politics" seep down to these technical bodies than
that cooperation born of technical coordination will carry
over into those bodies dealing primarily with foreign policy
matters.
-19-
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
There appears, however, to be sufficient room in
these bodies for both political controversy and technical
functions -- as long as sufficient distinction is made
between the rhetorical and substantive manifestations of
politics. It seems clear that these organizations
do not have to be essentially apolitical -- and they
are not likely to be -- in order to achieve their prescribed
work and to serve US technical needs and interests.
Under present conditions, the only foreseeable threat
to US technical needs and interests would be a conscious
and concerted effort by LDCs to break down this rhetorical/
substantive distinction and to hold substantive decision-
making hostage to political goals. Such a strategy --
especially in those organizations which primarily serve
industrial powers -- could be quite effective given LDCs'
conference majorities and their increasing representation
on governing bodies. It would also be consistent with non-
aligned ideology which has recently turned from demanding
a greater share of the world's wealth to demanding a new
system of allocating that wealth. A campaign to gain
approval in these organizations for a point of non-aligned
dogma, such as the New International Economic Order, could
challenge the US substantive advantages.
-20-
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Thus far, however, the LDCs have not tended to use
votes on technical subjects as leverage for unrelated
political concessions. Until such developments emerge,
the strength of US positions on substantive issues --
compared to its liabilites in rhetorical battles -- warrants
encouragement of continued separation of rhetorical and
substantive contests.
-21-
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
APPENDIX
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
GLOSSARY OF
ORGANIZATION ABBREVIATIONS
FAO- Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GATT- General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade
IAEA- International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD- International Bank for Reconstruction & Development
(generally called the World Bank)
ICAO- International Civil Aviation Organization
IDA- International Development Association
IFC- International Finance Corporation
ILO- International Labour Organisation
IMCO- Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
IMF- International Monetary Fund
ITU- International Telecommunications Union
UNESCO- United Nations Educational, Scientific &
Cultural Organization
UNIDO- United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UPU Universal Postal Union
WHO- World Health Organization
WIPO- World Intellectual Property Organization
WM0- World Meteorological Organization
A-1
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
0-Z9009000?000t1t171.001NLLdCIU-VIO : Z0/1.0/ZOOZ eseelet1 JOd PeA0AdV
INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL & SPECIALIZED ORGANIZATIONS
Name of Organization
IMF
IBRD
IFC
IDA
ITU
ICAO
IMCO
UPU
GATT
WIPO
FAO
UNESCO
WHO
ILO
IAEA
WMO
UNIDO >
-0
Date Founded
Location of Hqs.
Frequency of Assembly
Meetings
Number of Member-States'
Number of Members in the
Executive
Number of Regional Offices
Size of Secretariat Staff
Amount of Regular
(Assessed) Budget
US Contribution to the
Regular Budget
Revenue Sources Outside
of Regular Budget
1944
Washington
Annual
126
202
Liaison offices 2
1,324
Admin Budget (74)
SDR 48.4M
25% of total quota
Service charge on
sale of exchanges.
Rising periodic
charge to members
holding excess
currency quota
1944
Washington
Annual
123
202
23
3,989
Admin expenses
US $110M
Share purchase:
25% of equity
Repayment of loans
Investments
Fees
Exchange adjust-
merits
1956
Washington
4
98
4
5
207
Admin expenses
US $10.4M
Same as IBRD
Same as IBRD
1960
Washington
4
112
4
23
3,989
Management fee to
IBRD $47.6M
Holdings of 33% of
current useable
resources
Same as IBRD
1865
Geneva
Every 5 years
143
36
N/A
795
$45 , 000 , 000
$ 3,249,000
Publications;
voluntary
contributions for
technical
assistance
1947
Montreal
Triennial
129
27
6
465
813,357,000
$ 3,339,250
Publications;
voluntary
contributions for
technical
assistance
1958
London
Biennial
88
18
N/A
175
$3 , 001 , 500
$ 142,996
Publications
1875
Berne
Every 5 years
154
31
NA
195
$11 , 039 , 400
$ 273,777
Publications;
voluntary
contributions
for technical
assistance
1948
Geneva
Annual
143
N,A
N/A
190
826,335,000
$ 3,805,400
1970
Geneva
Triennial
92
NA
N/A
157
82 , 183 , 525
$ 64,215
Special contributions
Registration services
Publications
($4,758,000)
1945
Rome
Biennial
131
49
6
3,174
$62,650,000
813,547,500
Publications
libarary &
documentation
1946
Paris
Biennial
135
10
51
3,485
S77,890,000
822,211,152
Voluntary
contributions;
publications
1948
Geneva
Annual
143
94
6
3,850
8129,664,620
S 29,401,453
Publications
1919
Geneva
Annual
125
56'
4 6
3,200
$45,134,500
$11,283,625
Publications;
trust funds
1957
Vienna
Annual
108
34
NA
1,190
826,660,000
$ 7,429,204
Voluntary
contributions
for technical0
assistance;
publications
1873
Geneva
Quadrennial
128
24'
NA
320
87,465,630
$1,571,073?.
Publications;
voluntary
contributions
for technical
assistance
1967 -s
0
Vienna <
M
a
Annual
m
0
114 -s
X
45 es
(7
ca
1 U)
M
1,041 18
$21 , 393 , 000 2
o
25%, as part of a
general UN cont?-)
tribution 0
UNDP; voluntary 5
contributions to*1
general trust -0
fund -4
-4
g
0
o
?.
_r.
Except where otherwise noted, the data presented here is for calendar year 1975 (U.S. FY-1976).
1 There were 138 members in the United Nations as of 1 January 1975.
2 5 directors are appointed by the 5 member-states having the largest shares of capital stock (IBRD) or quotas (IMF).
3 The IMF maintains a quota system which is revised every five years. The present total quota is 6.7 B SDR of which the LS contributes 23%. Funds derived from interest charges and
other periodic charges to members holding currency in excess of their quotas are used for operating and administrative expenses.
4 The governors and exec. directors of the IBRD representing gov'ts which are IFC members hold identical positions for IFC. IDA's directors, officers and staff are those of the IBRD,
serving ex officio with IDA. Annual meetings of the IBRD, IFC, and IDA are held simultaneously.
5 28 govt members, 14 employers' members, and 14 workers' members. Ten of the gov't members represent "states of chief industrial importance:- U.S., Canada, China, France, India
Italy, Japan, USSR, U.K., and Fed. Rep. of Germany.
6 The ILO also maintains 18 area offices and 9 branch offices.
7 1 president, 3 vice presidents, 6 presidents of regional associations, 14 heads of meterological services elected by the congress.
tri
tri
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0
For Official Use Only
For Official Use Only
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300050052-0