THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RESPONSIBLE AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000300030007-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2002
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 16, 1975
• Content Type: STATEMENT

r 5 CnY"c ,r~, {,4 'o the
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Foreign Relations. Committee.
Hearing on Southern Africa. Angola
THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
A RESPONSIBLE AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA
In addition to our discussions today of the current situ-
ation in Angola, I would like to direct my remarks to the ques-
tion of what role, if any, the United States should play with
regard to Angola, and concretely, how the Congress can assist in
the formulation and execution of a responsible American policy
toward Angola. We have all learned a, number of important lessons
from recent revelations about the conduct of American policy
in Southeast Asia, about Government coverups such as Watergate,
corporate bribery of foreign officials and political parties,
and about the illegal and unacceptable activities of the CIA as
described in the Rockefeller Commission report and elsewhere.
Certainly we can apply some of these lessons to our present
consideration of U.S..polic_y -toward Angola; hopefully we will
.learn the vital facts and ask the necessary questions now,
rather -than, as has too often been the case, after the fact.
A lengthy appendix of my views on the current situation
in Angola (through May 1975) is attached. It provides the back--
ground for my conviction that the U.S. should not contemplate---
let alone provide---overt or covert assistance to any Angolan poli-
tical party, faction or pressure group. It is no secret that
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Angola is sitting on a powder keg which has been threatening to
erupt for months; the Portuguese authorities in Luanda and Lisbon
and all major nationalist leaders acknowledge this fact. The
causes are also clear: Angola is afflicted with deep racial,
ethnic, regional, class and ideological cleavages; intense distrust
and personal animosity among the nationalist leaders; and the
active interest (and occasional involvement) of major and minor
foreign powers. For most, the only mystery is exactly when and
where the eruption will occur. Our concern should be to guarantee
that the U.S. is not directly or indirectly involved in any Angolan
conflicts if or when they take place.
The 1970 National Security Council study of American policy
in southern Africa (NSSM 39) noted that the U.S. had no strategic
interests in Angola which were vital to our security. Subsequent
events--especially the recent opening of the Suez Canal--have made
Angola even less important to American strategic interests.
Moreover, the total value of fixed U.S. investment there is very
small--under $70 million (an overwhelming majority of it by
.one company, Gulf Oil). Therefore, regardless of the outcome of
the present struggle for power in Angola, the U.S. in reality
has very little to win or lose by remaining resolutely neutral
unless we mistakenly assume that what is good for Gulf Oil is good
for the United States.
This should not suggest, however, that all of the feuding
factions in Angola lock equally favorably upon American foreign
policy objectives or the presence. of U.S. corporations in the coun-
try. In fact, we have a host of journalists, scholars and ideo-
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logical soothsayers who have provided us with convenient, if grossly
misleading, shortcuts to an understanding of the ideological con-
figurations of the nationalist parties. The MPLA is usually labeled
Marxist or pro-Communist, the UNITA is alleged to follow the
Maoist line, while the FNLA is said to be strongly pro-West. Yet,
for every piece of evidence which supports these labels there is
a fact which contradicts it. For example, although UNITA is alleged
to be the Maoist party, it not only receives very little support
from China but there is no trace of "Chinese economics" in the
party's endorsement of a vigorous private sector or its rejection
of any attempt to reorganize the rural peasantry. In fact, the
bulk of China's' support (including weapons, numerous military in-
structors, and financial aid) has been directed to the "pro-Western"
FNLA whose economic policies are even less Maoist than UNITA's.
Similar contradictions obtain with respect to each party's
position toward whites. Before the April 1974 coup in Lisbon,
conventional wisdom held that the MPLA was strongly multiracial
while both the FNLA and UNITA were almost exclusively oriented
toward Africans. Today the 14PLA is increasingly accused of being
"anti-white," UNITA is often portrayed as the rallying point of
most white settlers, and even the FNLA is said to have considerable
financial support from whites as well as a number of Portuguese
serving as its uniformed soldiers.
There is considerable evidence supporting both the old and
new views of the economic and racial (and other) policies of the
three nationalist parties; we should therefore be extremely
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cautious in accepting simplistic analyses which predict how any of
the parties would proceed once in power. Whereas each party has
proved to be inflexible on many issues, all. have manifested a
degree of pragmatism in adapting to Angola's economic, regional,
racial and ethnic exigencies. This should not be surprising to
those who have followed the policies of the Viet Cong--especially
their initial reluctance to abolish the private sector or under-
take massive retribution against their former foes in South Vietnam
after their recent victory. How many "experts" foresaw this and how
many warnings did we receive to the contrary?
The point I wish to emphasize is that it is simply not possible
for anyone to predict with certainty which Angolan party would best
serve the interests of Angola, or the United States. Naturally, our
views are conditioned by our own perceptions of Angola's or Ameri-
ca's interests and whether we are looking at the long or short
range. However, even within these parameters, the present fluidity
of Angolan politics is such that any prediction, and especially one
based on the recommendations of professional diviners, is hazardous
at this time. I believe that this reality may account for why we
see so little urging, in or out of government, that the U.S. overtly
support one of the contending parties.
Covert support, however, is another matter and this is
precisely where Congress must exercise its responsibility to monitor
and sanction the covert activities of American intelligence
agencies--a responsibility which has been abdicated too often in-
the past. One cannot overemphasize the potential dangers which
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Angola presents or the ., the most important ein
of becoming embroiled in yet another civil war through the covert
activities of government agencies or private corporations.
Therefore, those in Congress who agree that it is both imprudent
and dangerous for the U.S. to support any of the factions in Angola
have a special obligation to ensure that neither the CIA, DIA
nor any other intelligence agency or private corporation is
currently providing covert assistance to any of the Angolan parties.
Let us find out now where we might be "committed" or compromised
in Angola so that there will not be a necessity later to carry out
yet another painful autopsy, to produce even more "Pentagon Papers"
to discover how and why we became involved! If the United States
is in the process of becoming committed or actually is committed
in the Angolan struggle, let us not only find out now but
publicly debate the policy to see if it has general support.
Concretely, many respectable people are convinced that the
United States is aiding the FNLA, and possibly FLEC, presumably
through our connections in Zaire. In recent months this charge
has appeared in the world press almost daily. Because the accu-
sation is so ubiquitously accepted, we are associated with this
policy; therefore this Committee, the Senate (Church) or House
(Stan-ton) Committees on intelligence activities or some other
Congressional committee should investigate the charge to determine
its validity. I can only speculate about it from my personal .
("soft") information and knowledge that U.S. intelligence agencies
have intervened in a number of countries in the developing world,
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such as Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, and in ways ranging from the
fielding of an entire army of (Meo) mercenaries in Laos to the
expenditure of over $3 million to "destabilize" the Allende regime
in Chile. The Congress, however, is in a position to do more
than speculate on U.S. covert activities related to Angola.
For example, it should be possible these days to inquire if the
CIA, DIA or any of the other dozen or so federal agencies which
have intelligence gathering functions are involved in assisting
any of the legitimate or illegitimate Angolan parties, and if so,
determine who authorized such support and under what policy.
For the Congress to fail to exercise this power and responsibility
now would constitute a gross act of negligence!
The dangers of American covert intervention are not confined
to our various intelligence agencies. U.S. and multinational
corporations have shown themselves to be equally disposed to
providing covert funds for foreign leaders, parties and pressure
groups. Significantly, the corporation which is among the most
notorious in this respect is Gulf Oil--the same company which
accounts for nearly three quarters of total U.S. investment in
Angola. Because of the prominence of Gulf's operations in Angola
and its proven tendency to provide covert corporate funds for
political bribery, it is vital that there be a thorough investiga-
tion of Gulf's activities in Angola. This is especially important
because Gulf is almost certain to be a focal point of conflict
in Angola's future, no matter who comes to power and even if the
company is not providing covert assistance. In fact, it is so
probable that Gulf will present problems for the U.S. Government
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 in the fi pp edd=d+v Relela7se-200tiK08 Os :dIA 77M 0143@ 3Df 21 any
day or they may be nationalized) that the Government should
determine now whether the company is committee. to any of the
partisans in the present power struggle. In a hypothetical.
example, if it were discovered that Gulf had been helping to
finance the advocates of Cabindan secession (FLEC) and the secession
attempt failed, what would be the responsibilities of the U.S.
Government to protect the company against possible retributions
by one or all of the Angolan nationalist parties?
I put this example hypothetically, but it is commonly be-
lieved that Gulf is doing precisely this as well as possibly
providing assistance to the FNLA. What is not hypothetical is that
over the past six to eight months Gulf has been threatened publicly
or privately by FLEC, FNLA and the MPLA and these threats have
included blackmail-i.e., if the company does not provide money
their installations will be destroyed. Exactly one month ago
today Gulf President, Bob Dorsey, sat here before another Senate
Committee and explained that the company's covert payoffs in Korea,
Bolivia and Italy resulted from situations where "we were subject
to pressures which were simply not possible to resist." The
"pressures" in these three countries do not appear to exceed
those the company faces in Angola where the magnitude of Gulf's
investment is not appreciably smaller than that in Korea---where
four milli-on dollars were paid under the table. The Senate should
investigate to see if there are any parallels between Gulf's
financial machinations in Angola and those in Korea, Bolivia and
Italy.
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Gulf should not be singled out, however. Other large American
corporations, such as Texaco and General Tire, have millions of
dollars invested in Angola and operate in politically sensitive
areas there. The Mayaguez incident illustrates. how a private
corporation can involve the United States in a military conflict
when it sails into troubled waters. The oil-rich waters off
Angola's coast are clearly troubled.
A Congressional investigation into the covert activities of
American corporations in Angola would clarify whether these com-
panies are undertaking any political activities which may be con-
trary to U.S. interests; it could also serve as a forum for
Congress to investigate the general question of how to deal in
the future with pressures on American companies abroad. If it is
true that "the hard fact is that even the most powerful multi-
national corporation is almost helpless when it comes to even the
smallest banana republic or dictatorship" demanding undercover
payoffs, as former Deputy-Secretary of the Treasury Charles E.
Walker recently argued in the New York Times (8 June 1975), then
such an investigation should be welcomed by the corporations.
Clearly there is a need for the Congress to examine.fully this
difficult problem and hopefully draft legislation which can help
the corporations manage future pressures which are "simply not
possible to resist."
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 A Apo e66crrlRe6aa 2tOB flSU M- 73M:04 Q O ;gWrke
to Angola. A situation could develop before or after Angolan
independence making it necessary for some outside power to help
restore the peace. At present, Portugal is almost overtaxed in
its capacity to do appreciably more than its excellent performance
during the past difficult months. It is likely that there will
be suggestions or demands that the U.S. make a contribution to
any peace-keeping efforts. I strongly suggest that if we offer
humanitarian assistance we do not undertake it bilaterally. The
UN, OAU or Portugal itself offer the best channels for directing
our support. Portugal presently has very close ties with Zambia
and Tanzania, among other African countries, and is in contact with
Zaire. In addition to the Portuguese general knowledge of Angola,
this suggests that it would be wise to work very closely with
Portugal with respect to any potential American assistance. In
fact, the U.S. Government may wish to explore with the Portuguese
Government the means by which we could assist with the costs or
logistical problems attendant to any expanded peace-keeping efforts.
This would help Portugal and Angola at the same time, while main-
taining a low profile. It would not be unlike the recent British
offer to assist Mozambique with the added financial burdens which
will occur from the imposition of UN sanctions against Rhodesia.
Senators, the United States is presently undergoing an
agonizing but healthy reassessment of our foreign policy throughout
most of the world, from Russia and China to Southeast Asia, the.
Middle East and even Cuba. We are realizing that many of our
past policies and approaches are not well suited to the world we
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 10
find in ~pp/r9yed fgrriRtjgasg1 2W~05 : -, P97Mgj, R O QQ03Q7}
forgotten in this reassessment. Yet nowhere in the world is a
major reassessment more in order than with respect to Angola
and Mozambique. Our policy in the past toward these former
Portuguese colonies is a source of little pride for Americans-
Thus, it appears worthwhile to briefly review that policy up to
now in order to appreciate better the full context in which these
hearings are taking place.
From the late 1960s until the Portuguese coup, U.S. policy
toward Angola and Mozambique was based on two mutually exclusive
goals: (1) to express sympathy with the aspirations of Angolans
and Mozambicans for self-determination, and (2) to help support
Portugal, a NATO ally. In pursuit of the former goal the U.S.
adopted a policy of "communication" and "dialogue" under the
assumption that the most efficacious means for realizing self-
determination was communication, not violence. The assumption
was naive (at best) and hypocritical because no one honestly
believed that Salazar or Caetano could be convinced through
"communication" of the need for self-determination in the colonies.
In fact, no example in the public or private record indicates that
the U.S. ever successfully moved the Portuguese an inch closer
to granting independence to Angola, Mozambique, or Guinea-Bissau.
Furthermore, the policy of communication was not extended to the
nationalist movements, who were generally ignored so as not to
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 11
offend
prompted Americnths, lies in full support
transition
for the Portuguese Government, the High k'jo,,-LYa_J_ss1_.3n0r in
Luanda, and the National Defense Corn.itteo,to carry out
out the provisions of the =?lvor Agreement with the
I.S of as many Angolans as possible in -m=Lnde
interests L
Five. In sty personal opinion, American policy in the
t 5me before Nove-rilb er 11, 1975 should concentrate on
encouraging and b~::ac's.hin the established machinery of
roe17aent in order to maintain pcace,law and or.?c1 rr.
I3y all moms we should avoid any form of intervention
in Angola's internal affair s, We should adhere to the
spirit of the }ecuri_t,~r Council resolution of -August ;',1960
7
regarding the; United. 'Sations' Force .n tie 'onr o; nt`,te -porti,p; lose Rel qtior,.s : Before and aftEr th`: Coxt , lcal in s
zbccrar.aitt:ee. on iAfric^...NirlotJ-'f~h=ird Congress;
Second Session(,~i - ch 1)I ,October 01(jJ
9 and 22, l_97f- . S.?.Tovt
Pr_intin-; Office, 1971,,-) , pp. 239-2L1..0. For one view on
acr_ic,n rolicir toward 1.)o1-1thern. Africa , see my article
or-, that subject in r
Iq
and K v f GtM007,f2197L. )
-u-nai_ o:c iit-ricanist Op_in an
( IV, r_ o, 2;.~zxaraer l-o
~7TI) pP- h mans
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4t
E 1""'N
ND J'C~
CE
MINISTRY OF MASS COMMUNICATION
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The Portuguese State and the Angolan National
Liberation Movements --- the National Angolan Li-
beration .T"rout (F. N. L. A.), the People's Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (M. P. L. A) and the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(U. N. I. T. A.) - having 7net at Alvor, in the
AUgarve, from 10 to 15 January 1975, to negotiate
the procedure and the calendar of the access of
Angola to independence, have agreed the following:
On the independence of Angola
Art. 1 -The Portuguese State recognizes the Liberation
Movements - National Angolan Liberation Front (F. N. L. A.),
the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M. P. L. A.)
and the National Union for Total Independence of Angola
(U. N. I. T. A.) - as the sole legitimate representatives of the
people of Angola.
Art. 2-The Portuguese State solemnly restates its recogni-
tion of the right of the people of Angola to independence.
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Art. 3 -- Angola forms one indivisible unit, within its
3resent geographical and political boundaries, and in this
:ontcxt Cabinda is an unalienable component part of Angolan
erritory.
Art. 4-The independence and full sovereignty of Angola
hall be solemnly proclaimed on 11 November 1975 in Angola
)y the President of the Portuguese Republic or by a specially
appointed representative of the President.
Art. 5-Until independence is proclaimed, the power shall
7e wielded by the High Commissioner and by a Transitional
:government, which shall take office on 31 January 1975.
Art. 6-The Portuguese State and the three Liberation
vovements formally affirm, under this agreement, a general
:easefire, already being observed de facto by their armed forces
hroughout Angolan territory.
After this date, any use of force other than as decided by the
rightful authorities to prevent internal acts of violence or acts
of aggression from outside the country shall be considered to
be illicit.
Art. 7-After the ceasefire the armed forces of the
F. N. L. A., the M. P. L. A. and the U. N. 1. T. A. shall take up
positions in the regions and places where they are at present
stationed, until such time as the provisions. laid down in
C'r,apter IV of this Agreement shall be put into practice.
Art. 8-The Portuguese State undertakes to transfer pro-
gresaivcly, no later than the term of the transitional period,
all t:-he powers it enjoys and wields in Angola to the Angolan
organs of sovereignty.
Art. 9-With the conclusion of this Agreement, an amnesty
is held to'be granted to cover all the effects of the patriotic
acts performedJin the course of the national liberation struggle
in Angola which would have been considered to be liable
to punishment under legislation in force at the time of their
performance.
Art. 10-The indeocndent State of Angola shall exert its
sovereignty fully and freely, both internally and on the inter-
national plane.
CHAPTER 11
On the HHigh Commissioner
Art. 11 - During the transitional period the President of the
Republic and the Portuguese Government shall be represented
in Angola by the High Commissioner, who shall defend the
interests of the Portuguese Republic.
Art. 12-The High Commissioner in Angola shall be
appointed and released from office by the President of the
Portuguese Republic, by whom he shall be sworn in and to
whom he is politically responsible.
Art. 13-1t is for the High Commissioner to:
a) Represent the President of the Republic, ensuring and
guaranteeing, in full agreement with the Transitional
Government, the observance of the law;
b) Safeguard and guarantee the physical security of
Angolan territory, in close co-operation with the
Transitional Government;
c) Ensure the fulfilment of this Agreement and of such
others as may come to be.made between the Liberation
Movements and the Portuguese State;
d) Guarantee and promote the process of decolonization
of Angola;
e) Ratify all acts which concern, or refer to, the Portuguese
State;
f) Attend the meetings of the Council of Ministers, when
he thinks fit, where he may participate in their discussions
but without the right to vote;
g) Sign, approve and have published the decree-lays and
the decrees drafted by the Transitional Government;
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l,; ^,SU th . Pres!Ck. tlai Corn'?Ines"., the
dirrc;icn of the National Defence Committee, and to
direct the foreign policy of Angola during the transitional
p,
may return to their own villages and hc?
The mixed equal-representation committees shall propose
to the High Commissioner and to the Transitional Government
social, economic and other measures to ensure a speedy return
to normal ways of life of displaced persons and the reintegration
of their various forms of activity in the economic life of the
counntry.
CHAPTER VI
On general elections for the Constituent Assembly
of Angola
Art. 40-The Transitional Government shall organize
general elections for a Constituent Assembly within not more
than 9 months from the date of its installation, that is,
31 January 1975.
Art. 41 - Candidatures to the Constituent Assembly shall
be put forward exclusively by the liberation movements
- F. N. L. A., M. P. L. A. and U. N. 1. T. A. --- as the sole legiti-
mate representatives of the people of Angola.
Art. 42 --- Once the Transitional Government is installed,
a Central Committee shall be instituted, with equal representa-
tion of the liberation movements, to draft the Basic Law and to
prepare the elections to the Constituent Assembly.
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Art, 43---When the Basic Law has been approved by the
Presidential Committee, the Central Committee shall:
a) Draft the Electoral Law;
b) Organize lists of voters;
c) Register the lists of candidates for election to the
Constituent Assembly put forward by the liberation
movements.
Art. 48-A mixed committee with equal representation,
will study special agreements to regulate the forms of concession
of Angolan citizenship to Portuguese citizens domiciled in
Angola, and the status of Portuguese citizens resident in Angola
and of Angolan citizens resident in Portugal.
CHAPTER VIII
Art. 44-The Basic Law shall remain in force until the
Constitution of Angola comes into force, but it may not run
counter to the terms of this Agreement.
On Angolan nationality
Art. 45-The Portuguese State and the three liberation
movements - F. N. L. A., M. P. L. A. and U. N. 1. T. A. - under-
take to co-operate to eliminate all the consequences of
colonialism. On this topic, the F. N. L. A., the M. P. L. A. and
the U. N. I.T. A. stress their policy of non-discrimination,
according to which the quality of Angolan citizenship is
definable by birth in Angora or by domicile therein, always
provided that those domiciled in Angola identify themselves
with the aspirations of the Angolan Nation through a conscious
choice.
Art. 46 - The F. N. L. A., the M. P. L. A. and the U. N. 1. T. A.
hereby undertake to consider as Angolan citizens all individuals-
born in Angola, provided that they do not declare, on the
terms and within the time-limits to be laid down, that they wish
to maintain their present nationality or to choose another one.
Art. 47--Individuals not born in Angola but settled there
may seek Angolan nationality in accordance with such rules
governing Angolan nationality as come to be laid down in the
Basic Law,
On economic and financial topics
Art. 49-The Portuguese State undertakes to regularize
with the State of Angola the situation arising from the existence
of property belonging to the latter outside Angolan territory,
so as to facilitate the transfer of such property, or the equivalent
value, to the territory and ownership o~ Angola.
An. 50-The F. N. L. A., the M. P. L. A. and the U. N. I. T. A.
declare themselves ready to accept the responsibility arising
from the financial undertakings assumed by the Portuguese
State on behalf of, and relating to, Angola, always provided
that they have been assumed in the real interest of the people
of Angola.
Art. 51 -A special mixed equal-representation committee,
composed of experts appointed by the Provisional Government
of the Portuguese Republic and by the Transitional Government
of the State of Angola, shall list the property mentioned in art. 49
and the credits referred to in an. 50, shall effect such acts of
valuation as it thinks fit and shall put before the two Govern-
ments such solutions as it holds to be just.
Art. 52-The Portuguese State undertakes to provide the
Committee specified in the previous article with all the infor-
mation and data at its disposition and which the Committee
may need in order to reach well-thought-out conclusions and
to propose equitable solutions within the principles of truth,
respect for the legitimate rights of each party and the most
loyal co-operation.
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A
A i*a. .C.~J"+ TL. 1- i vr~ .i Ju ,Y;11 a'rl 0- Ct~?t Of Angola
setiing up a Central Issue Bank. The Portuguese State under-
akes to transfer to the State of Angola the powers, the assets
nd the debits of the Angolan Department of the Bank of Angola,
n conditions to be agreed in the mixed committee for financial
)oics. This committee will also consider all questions related
)l the Portugal Department of the same bank, proposing just
D!utions to the extent that they concern and affect Angola.
Art. 54 - The F. N. L. A., the M. P. L. A. and the U. N. 1. T. A.
ndertake to respect the property and the legitimate interests
f the Portuguese citizens domiciled in Angola.
On co-operation between Angola and Portugal
Art. 55-The Portuguese Government on the one hand,
nd the liberation movements on the other, agree to set up
etween Portugal and Angola. links of constructive, lasting
o-operation in all fields, specifically in the cultural, technical,
cientific, economic, commercial, monetary, financial and military
pheres, on the basis of independence, equality, freedom,
iutual respect and reciprocity of interests.
On Mixed Committees
decolonization arising from decolonization and to lay down. ,t e
foundations of active co-operation between Portugal and Angola,
especially in the following spheres:
a) Cultural, technical and scientific;
b) Economic and commercial;
c) Monetary and financial;
d) Military;
e) The acquisition of Angolan nationality by Portuguese
citizens.
Art. 57-The committees mentioned in the previous article
shall carry out their work and negetia' :. in a climate of
constructive co-operation and loyal spirit o compromise. Their
conclusions shall be put as quickly as possible before the High
Commissioner and the Presidential Committee for their considera-
tion and for the drafting of agreements between Portugal and
Angola.
CHAPTER XI
General provisions
Art. 58-Any questions arising as to the interpretation and
application of this Agreement which cannot be solved on the
terms of art. 27 above shall be settled by negotiation between
the Portuguese Government and the liberation movements.
Art. 59-The Portuguese State, the F. N. L. A., the M. P. L. A.
and the U. N. I. T. A., true to the social and political ideals
repeatedly stated by their leaders, reaffirm their respect for
the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations
and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and also
actively repudiate all forms of social discrimination, especially
apartheid.
Art. 56--Technical mixed equal-representation committees
vil! be set up by the High Commissioner, in agreement with the
residential Committee, to research and propose solutions for
Art. 60-The present Agreement shall come into force
immediately after it has been approved by the President of
the Portuguese Republic.
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The delegations of the Portuguese Government, the
F. N. L. A., the M. P. L. A. and the U. N. I. T. A. stress the climate
or perfect co-operation and cordiality in which the negotiations
took place and feel great satisfaction' at reaching this
Agreement, which will meet the just aspirations of the Angolan
people and of which the Portuguese people are rightly proud;
henceforth they will be linked by ties of profound friendship
and common desire for constructive co-operation for the
progress of Angola, of Portugal, of Africa and of the world
as a whole.
Signed at Alvor, Algarve, on 15 January 1975, in four
copies in Portuguese.
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 Statement APURpaYV g~' tt1~a G6~Z5fiiYn~'Cf e q i7cTNOR fi sQOd3PO 909ZAte
Foreign Relations Committee, June 16, 1975
John A. Marcum, Provost, Merrill College, University of California Santa
Cruz, and President, African Studies Association
After a fifteen year colonial struggle, Angolan nationalists are on
the verge of realizing or destroying an independent Angolan state. With
the collapse and exit of the old colonial regime, three rival liberation
movements have been left to compete for political ascendancy. It may be
useful therefore to focus briefly on (1) the genesis and character of this
political tripolarity, on (2) the tendency for it to encourage extensive
external intervention and on (3) some thoughts concerning what, under the
circumstances, might constitute an appropriate American response.
I.
Angola's nationalist movements are products of and responses to the
extreme conditions of what might be termed Portugal's integral colonialism.
After the Second World War, while Britain, France and Belgium were
reluctantly permitting Africans under their rule to organize and gain
increasing measures of political power, Portugal still blocked even the
organized expression of African cultural life. The government of the late
strongman, Premier Antonio Salazar, ruthlessly rooted out and destroyed
groups and individuals suspected of nationalist activity and sympathies.
Underground political groups were decimated by the police. Few
survived. Those that did were deeply impacted by the anxieties and
distrust of clandestine politics. And they were unable to extend their
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organizing beyond constrictive regional limits, were unable to build a
cohesive nationalist movement extending to a pan-Angolan structure and
As nationalist leaders or would-be leaders from the thin ranks of
Angola's tiny educated elite (one to five percent African literacy)
sought refuge abroad, they reaggregated along regional and ethno-
linguistic lines. The insecurities and frustrations of exile tended to
reinforce parochial loyalties among them. And colonial authorities,
infiltrators and money manipulated divisive political ambitions within
them.
Angolan nationalists did manage to organize among other refugees,
emigres and laborers in neighboring African territories. From exile
they helped to trigger and then sustained more than a decade of small,
scale anticolonial insurgency inside Angola. During those years, how-
ever, they were never able to fully transcend their constricted origins
and harsh conditioning. They clustered within three major movements,
each of which was anchored in a different one of Angola's three major
ethno-linguistic regions. And over time, each movement developed its
own military force and sources of external support. As each movement
sought military and political advantage in the conflict with Portugal
it collided with its competitors. The result was a complex three-way
struggle for revolutionary primacy interspersed with fratricidal clashes
and suffused with a profound and bitter political rivalry.
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When the government of Salazar's successor, Marcello Caetano, fell
to the anticolonialist Armed Forces Movement in 1974, no Angolan group
had yet achieved the sort of clearcut preeminence that FRELIMO insurgents
had won in Portugal's other large colony, Mozambique. Under pressure
from Portugal's new military government and African states, Angolan
nationalists did agree to form a tripartite coalition government pending
general elections in Autumn 1975. But the goal of merging three
separate armies and melding three separate parties into new national
structures promised to be elusive.
Twice the size of Texas, Angola possesses subsoil (oil, iron,
diamonds) and agriculture wealth on a scale that suggests great economic
potential for a unified state. But will Angola emerge as a unified
state? By scheduling October elections in advance of November independence,
Lisbon placed a premium on political process, on coalition building and
trans-ethnic alliances. By creating the need to reach out, mobilize
popular electoral support and organize on a national scale, Lisbon
encouraged the construction of.a single polity. And by placing each
Angolan government ministry under a tripartite team of nationalists,
Lisbon provided representatives of the three movements with an opportunity
to gain positive intergroup experience and to work, compromise and, hope-
fully, coalesce across party lines. As they transformed themselves from
exile/guerrilla movements into legal political parties, moreover, the
movements brought into their ranks new leadership unscarred by the long
years of exile and fratricidal competition. Older leaders who were locked
into the quarrels and grudges of the exile years would be replaced in due
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course by a new, internally generated leadership. But would this new
leadership itself emerge from a peaceful process of national consolida-
tion or as the result of civil war and/or partition?- The answer, it
seemed, would depend in part upon external forces.
II.
As Lisbon withdraws its war weary forces -- and not to do so'could
provoke mutiny -- Lisbon's capacity to umpire the zero sum gaming of
Angola's contending movements must decline. Contrarily, the influence
of neighboring African states, notably Zaire, must increase. Since 1960
successive Zaire (Congo) governments under Patrice Lumumba, Cyrille
Adoula and Mobutu Sese Soko have supported the National Liberation Front
of Angola (FNLA) which draws its principal backing from among the
600,000 to 700,000 Bakongo people of northern Angola. Under the leader-
ship of Holden Roberto, an Angolan emigre and Mobutu's brother in law,
the FNLA has become an extension or branch of Zairian politics. When
Mobutu turned to Peking in 1973, Roberto followed just behind and ended
up with a Chinese military mission training his largely Bakongo army at
bases in Zaire. The exclusive recipient of Zairian backing, Roberto's
FNLA was able to recruit and arm a military force of between 15,000 and
21,000 which now controls much of Angola's northern coffee country and
possibly petroleum-rich coast. It appears unlikely that Mobutu would
willingly let the Bakongo north, border areas such as the diamond center
of Dundo, or the Benguela railroad which links mineral rich Shaba
(Katanga) to the Atlantic, fall into what he considered unfriendly hands.
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Indeed, 14pjREqVeqf
g a forces are still or once again
active in Eastern Zaire, give reason to speculate that the government in
Kinshasa will continue to relate to much or all of Angola as properly a
Zairian "sphere of influence." In the view of the former Angolan High
Commissioner and left-wing critic of Mobutu, Admiral Rosa Coutinho, a
"progressive" regime in Angola would constitute a "terrifying prospect"
for President Mobutu. Consequently, Coutinho believes the Zaire
Government is attempting by all means to prevent the Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) from coming to power in Angola.
According to him, .a "progressive" Angola under MPLA rule would quickly
"spell the end of Mobutu."
Mobutu's commitment to the FNLA has not prevented him from also
extending backing to secessionists who would detach the oil rich enclave
of Cabinda from Angola. Like a Danzig astride the tip of Zaire's "Polish
corridor" to the sea, Cabinda, whether to be annexed or satellized, is
certainly a prime target for Zairian political-economic control.
Just how far Mobutu would be willing to extend his prestige and
purse in quest of Cabinda or in support of the FNLA is unclear. But he
is in a position to intervene through the FNLA so as to at least minimize
chances for the rival MPLA to assume power outside the Luanda region,
election or no election.
The MPLA, centered among 1.3 Mbundu and mesticos in Luanda and its
hinterland, benefits from the support of both the Portuguese Left and
the Soviet Union. Intercession by Lisbon's new leftwing government in
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effect blocked maneuvers from Kinshasa to eliminate the MPLA by urging
the recognition of dissident elements who had challenged the legitimacy
of MPLA leadership under the Marxist poet and physician, Dr. Agostinho
Neto. And Soviet arms shipments have given it a capacity to slug it out
with FNLA military units in Luanda and elsewhere -- at a cost of untold
hundreds of lives.
The third movement, The National Union for the Total Independence
of Angola (UNITA), has received less external support than its two
rivals. With leadership from and roots in the Central and Southern
regions of Angola among the two million Ovimbundu and. smaller ethnic
groups of those areas, UNITA has relied more upon political than
military action. And during the last years of the war, its Ovimbundu
leader, Jonas Savimbi, lived and led a small guerrilla force inside
Eastern Angola -- not from exile. Since 1974 his political acumen and
charisma have enabled him to build alliances and support among diverse
groups, including resident Portuguese,
And he has won diplomatic backing
from President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. A long time ally of the South
Eas-t Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), UNITA has continued to enjoy
a cooperative association with Namibia's principal nationalist organiza-
tion. But contrary to some speculation it does not favor the cession of
Ovambo (or Kwanyama speaking) areas of Southern Angola to Ovamboland
(Namibia). And the government of South Africa has little or no reason
for favoring or fearing it over one of the other two.movements.
External support, especially arms, for the FN-LA and MPLA is fueling
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the flames of incipient civil war. The result could well be a four way
partition: Cabinda under local secessionists (FLEC); the Bakongo north
under the FNLA; the Luanda-Mbundu region under the MPLA; and the vast (two
thirds of the country) Central/Southern regions under UNITA.. Efforts by
Lisbon and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to persuade the
Angolans to hold together in coalition and build a unified state under
their transitional government represent a countervailing influence.
Civil war or partition could only be destructive of Portuguese.economic
interests in Angola and disruptive of African diplomatic and political
efforts to advance the political cause of Black Africans in white ruled
Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. But what are American interests in
all this.
According to Denis I-Ierbstein writing in The Sunday Times (London,
May 18, 1975), the United States has intervened in the Angolan imbroglio.
"Today Roberto," he alleges, "receives support from the United States."
Other accounts would have the U.S. covertly supporting Zaire's efforts to
eliminate the MPLA or have the Gulf Oil Company selfservingly engaged in
conducting its own foreign policy in support of Cabinda. secessionists.
What is the basis for such speculation? Others are better placed to.
answer this question. But it is encouraged in part by Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger when he professes to be gloomy about the spread of "Marxist
ideologies and perceptions of the world which are contrary to our values"
and proceeds to read dangers and threats into foreign situations that for
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us should be of little or no concern. Indeed, perhaps the most important
thing the American government can do in Angola is to refrain from
projecting parochial or ideological intolerance into its perception of
the situation there. Washington should, above all, avoid the trap of
overreacting to hostile rhetoric and socialist advocacy and of identifying
potential "enemies." Necessarily, all Angolan liberation movements resent
American aid to Portugal during the years of insurgency. And if one, the
NIPLA, is particularly distrustful of American economic and political
motives and itself the beneficiary of substantial aid from the Soviet
Union and other Communist sources, even it presents no real threat, no
cause for alarm. The United States should find it just as possible to
have mutually advantageous economic relations with a Marxist regime in
Angola as with a European state such as Yugoslavia. Flexibility and
caution coupled with a cultivated bent for trap aversion should protect
us from getting caught up in an internal conflict in which we have no
vital interest.
That said, the United States can and should seize the opportunity to
exert its diplomatic influence on behalf of a political as over against
a military solution to Angola's political crisis. In doing so, it should
limit itself to modest and constructive support of efforts by Lisbon and
the Organization for African Unity to further the cause of a unified
state. It should set a big power example and desist from any overt or
covert intervention thus putting it in a credible position to discourage
such intervention on the part of others, except for possible peacekeeping
action by the OAU. American economic, technical or educational assistance
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should be provided but through multilateral (UN, OAU, ECA) efforts and
Washington should be enthusiastically supportive of Portuguese-African
cooperation based upon mutuality of interest.
Mutuality of interest should, in fact, be the guiding principle
behind all our future relations with Angola (as well as other African
states). Even American strategic interests can thereby be best served.
A relationship based upon equitable commerce and reciprocal trust would
be the most likely to see an accommodation of any legitimate future need
for American naval or aircraft to use Angolan facilities. Contrarily
the case of Thailand shows how quickly action that violates this
principle of mutuality of interest can render useless expensive bases
and formal alliances.
During the months immediately ahead, the United States should
unobtrusively but wholeheartedly encourage efforts by Lisbon or the
OAU to promote Angolan unity and discourage civil war. It should also
be openly and convincingly prepared to establish respectful relations
with those who end up governing Angola, whoever they may be.
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