OXCART DEPLOYMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77B00403R000100010002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
1 5 JUN 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR THE 303 COMMITTEE
.: 'BJECT . OXCART Deployment
REFERENCE: DCI Memorandum to the 303 Committee
dated 22 March 1966
1. My proposal that CIA deploy the OXCART system to
Okinawa to acquire urgently needed photographic coverage
of South China and North Vietnam was made to this Committee
on 28 March 1966 and was discussed again on 11 May. It was
decided chat further action by the Committee should await
the co...)ietion of certain tasks, namely: (a) an analysis of
the quantitative capability of various photographic collection
assts, (b) an analysis of the qualit of ich
these assets might obtain, c
and (d) the formu-
lation of the proposed U.S. posture in'the event of various
contingencies arising from the OXCART deployment. These
tasks have now all been completed.
2. I believe there is substantial agreement that
there is a continuing urgent need for high resolution photo-
graphic coverage of selected targets in South China and
North Vietnam to provide warning of possible Chinese involve-
ment in the Vietnam war. It has been clearly demonstrated
that satellite photography, by itself, cannot meet this need.
There is also agreement on the fact that the OXCART vehicle
can add significantly to the photographic collection capa-
bility and that its contribution will increase steadily as
thi_: weather improves later this summer.
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3. In addition, there is agreement between the Joint
Cry e:fs o,` Staff and CIA in light of experience gained
during he past three months that the will
not mee;, the need for coverage of Sou ina and at we
shoul now turn to the OXCART for primary coverage with the
I Isupplementing as feasible in lightly defended areas.
It is i.-,.y understanding that the JCS and CIA are also in
s,-:)stantial agreement that current coverage in North Vietnam
as been inadequate; however, the JCS feel that presently
available JCS assets can be tasked to provide more of the
required data base coverage in North Vietnam and they have
recently directed priority tasking to that end. The next
few months should indicate whether adequate coverage of
North Vietnam can be obtained by these means or whether
supplemental coverage by OXCART may be desirable.
4. In view of the foregoing developments and of the
conditions now existant, I now modify this proposal with
the following recommendations:
(a) That we deploy the OXCART to Okinawa,
beginning 15 July so as to have it in place and
operational by mid-August when the weather will
begin to improve,
(b) That we decide now that OXCART will be
committed as required to obtain photographic
coverage over South China and in other areas in
China where the U-2 cannot penetrate,
(c) That, at the same time, we hold the
OXCART in readiness to obtain photographic cover-
age of targets in North Vietnam, if required.
5. This proposal is responsive to the continuing
urgent need for photographic coverage of South China and North
Vietnam. In this connection, it is my understanding that the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has recently
reviewed the status of our existing reconnaissance coverage
of North Vietnam and South China and is of the opinion that,
from a strictly intelligence point of view, the OXCART should
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be employed in these areas. My proposal likewise is also
consistent with the realities of the bad summer weather which
has closed in since our original discussion. The proposed
scl.edule provides for an orderly movement of the OXCART to
Okinawa in advance of good weather and affords an adequate
opportunit
W. F. Raborn
Y41 ~: ~I ki F~ 3 ~Y'p
Um 1W 4 1- 9
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 D/Recce/CIA:
Distribution:
1 - Special Assistant to the President (Mr. Bill D. Moyers)
vial
2 - Special Assistant to the President (Mr. Rostov) via
5 -
6 -
7 -
8 - y , la Iona. Reconnaissance Office
- Joint Reconnaissance Center
10 - Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
11 - Executive Director/Comptroller
12,13 - Director of Reconnaissance, CIA
14 - DD/S&T
15 - DD/I
16 - Special Group Officer, DDP
17 - Special Group Officer, DDS&T
18 - SA/DDS&T (COMOR) -
19 - BFA/OSA/DDS&T
20,21 - DDS&T Registry
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The Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Political
AfiLlirs (via State TCO)
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (via DIA/TCO)
Director of Central Intelligence
General Taylor (via Mr. P. Coyne)
Office of the Special Assistant to the President
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