COLBY OPPOSES DISCLOSURE OF CIA'S ANNUAL BUDGET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 18, 1976
• Content Type: NSPR

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CONFIDENTIAL
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
19 MARCH 1976
NO. 5
PAGE
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
1
GENERAL
33
EASTERN EUROPE
39
WEST EUROPE
45
NEAR EAST
48
AFRICA
50
EAST ASIA
52
LATIN AMERICA
54
Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose
or within 60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
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By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Stet Writer
Former CIA Director Wil-
liam E. Colby has testified
that the disclosure of the
agency's budget for a single
year would set a precedent
for an annual release of the
figure and in 'turn would
harm national security.
Comparing the dollar
amount spent yearly on CIA
programs to the "missing
piece" in a jigsaw puzzle
sought by intelligence agen-
cies of other countries,
Colby said foreign economic
analysts could use the infor-
mation , to determine the
CIA's spending priorities.
Colby also described as in-
accurate published esti-
mates of the CIA's budget
as being $750 million a year.
His testimony came in a de-
position,taken in an Amer--
tan Civil Liberties Union
lawsuit seeking disclosure of
the intelligence agency's ex-
penditures in fiscal 1974 and
its budgetary spending au-
thority in 1976.
? Colby made it clear th,at
disclosure of the budget
would not reveal the full
scope of its operation, since
funds are often transferred
to and from other. govern-
meat agencies to finance
public and covert CIA pro-
jects.
? However, he said he con-
sidered the CIA's budget
alone important enough to
be kept secret. He said the
U.S. intelligence community
had used similar figures
_from. other countries t?.
make estimates of "certain
'important things," which he
would not describe.
Colby's defense of
CIA budget secrecy was the
strongest and most detailed
he has made publicly, ac-
cording to attorneys in-
volved in the litigation. He
said the agency's budget has
been subject to "substan-
tial" fluctuation over the
last 15 years. -
While ? saying that
"intelligence tod,ay is more
and more the study of open
material" and that even the
President's State of the Un-
ion message is useful to for-
eign intelligence agencies,
Colby said the CIA still does
"secret work."
"We are not just reading
copies of Pravda around
here," Colby said. "We are
looking ,a little more vigor-
ously than that for informa-
tion held by closed societies.
" I think we have a
problem of protecting this
WASHINGTON POST
1 9 MAR 1976
State Dept. Halts
2. Person,nel Lists
ByLars-Erik Nelson
? Reuter
containing the names of all
Foreign Service officers
serving both in Washington
and at embassies abroad,
used to he issued every
. three months but has not
appeared since last August.
It is the only listing U.S.
officials have on which dip-
lomats are in which embas-
sies and its disappearance
will b ? a handicap. .
dials trying to locale col--
leagues around the world.
The Biographic Register,
which provides thumbnail
sketches of all employees in
the field of foreign affairs,
is normally issued once a
year. But it has not ap-
The State Department has
halted publication of two of-
ficial booklets that made it
easy for, outsiders to iden-
WY Central Intelligence
Agency, personnel posing as
diplomats.
Department officials said
yesterday that one of the
documents. the Foreign
Service List, woould not ap-
pear again.
The other, the Biographic
Register, is being revised
and, when eventually ' reis-
sued, will be classified "for
official use only." Both
booklets' had previously
been on Sale to the public.
The Foreign Service List.
democracy of ours and in
the process we need to run
some secret operations, and
will in the future run them,"
he said.
The Rockefeller commis-
sion that studied the CIA
had recommended that per-
tions of the CIA budget be
made public. The House of
Representatives last October
rejected an attempt to make
the appropriation public.
Colby was questioned by
ACLU attorney John IL F.
1Shattuck at CIA headquar-
ters in Langley, Va., on Feb.
4 17. Colby left the CIA Jan.
30 and was replaced as di-
rector by George Bush The
deposition was filed yester-
day in U.S: District Court
'here in the Freedom of In-
formation Act suit brought
'against the CIA by former.
1National Security Couitcil
aide Morton Halperin.
I The former CIA director
, said he "hardened" his posi-
tion against any disclosure
; of the agency's budget while
; he was serving as the dime.
? :tor.
He cited the case of the
Atomic Energy Commission,
which issued a total budget
figure in 1947 that amounted
to one line and 25 years later
was issuing 15 pages of
' detailed explanations of its
budget. .
Instead of starting a dis-
closure precedent, Colby
said, he preferred that only
:the congressional oversight
committees be kept aware
,of the agency's budget.
, He added that he thinks
the American intelligence
community "is in great dan-
ger of too much exposure."
Colby, who is writing a
book on his government
service, said there probably
:would be no immediate ef-
' feet on national security if
the agency's budget for one
I year was announced. But, he
:added:
"I think they [foreign in-
telligence agencies] would
; just take that back and start
; doing some studying. They
, might study for three
, Months or they might study
for six months and at that
time they might start turn-
ing electronic gadgets on or
off or they might start fol-
lowing people around, they
might start covering things
up that were left open.
"There are a whole vari-
; ety of things. They might go
out and sail around the sea
in different places than they
were in the past?various
things."
Christian Science Monitor
12 March 1976
CIA seen losing
- confidence abroad
Washington
The criticism and disclosures
that marked 1975 as a year of tur-
bulence for the Central In-
telligence Agency are costing the
agency a unique opportunity to
develop Soviet sources, accord-.
ing to a former agent.
"Because of the dissidents': -
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE: MONITOR
9 MARCH 1976
CIA aide sees rise
of world terrorism -
Washington
A CIA official is predicting that
incidents of international terrorism ?
will increase and may sante day
include holding a whole city hos-
peared since 1974.
In the past. year, a number
of people disaffect ed with
the CIA have written books
or articles explaininr how
the two booklets ,,emid be
used to help identify CIA
agents serving at embassies.
movement, the CIA has a ?unique
opportunity to work with the So-
viets today," said Mike Ackerman.
who quit the agency last May to
defend it publicly and because he
felt the year's debate made his job
impossible to perform.
He said in an interview, how-
ever, that the sources have be-
come reluctant to cooperate with
the CIA because "we don't look
like a winner" and because they
fear their identities will not be kept
secret.
tage to the threat of nuclear
dis-
aster,
William E.- Nelson, deputy direc-
tor of operations for CIA, speaking
before the VIterans of Foreign
W ? s
, he
sees an Increase in Soviet subver-
sion because of the "military;
standoff" between the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R.
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THE ATLANTIC
April 1976
THE
INTELLIGENCE
TANGLE
The CIA and the FBI face the moment of truth
by Sanford J. Ungar
Once the secret agents of the republic
patrolled what Dean Rusk called "the
back alleys of world politics" without
much question about their mission. No
longer. The Atlantic's Washington editor
examines the past and present of the
tangled "intelligence business" and the
prospects now for reform.
"The committee does not believe that the acts
which it has examined represent the real American
character. They do not reflect the ideals which
have given the people of this country and of the
world hope for a better, fuller, fairer life. We re-
gard the assassination plots as aberrations.
"The United States must not adopt the tactics of
the enemy. Means are as important as ends. Crisis
makes it tempting to ignore the wise restraints that
make men free. But each time we do so, each time
the means we use are wrong, our inner strength,
the strength which makes us free, is lessened.
"Despite our distaste for what we have seen, we
have great faith in this country. The story is sad,
but this country has the strength to hear, the story
and to. learn from it. We must remain a people
who confront our mistakes and resolve not to re-
peat them. If we do not, we will decline; but, if we
do, our future will be worthy of the best of our
past."
?Epilogue to the interim report of the Senate
Select Committee to Study Governmental Op-
erations with respect to Intelligence Activities,
"Alleged Assassination Plots involving
Foreign Leaders."
I. What We Have Learned
I: seemed at times the cruelest kind of juxtaposi-
tion. Crises were breaking nearly everywhere, at
home and abroad, demanding official attention
.and perhaps action. Terrorism: a siege at the head-
quarters of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries in Vienna; a bomb explosion at a bag-
gage claim area of La Guardia Airport, in New
York. International tension: a civil war in the
newly independent African nation of Angola be-
tween factions loyal to the communists and the
"free world": a situation that threatened to reach
the same point in Angola's former colonial parent.
Portugal. a NATO ally. A United Nations increas-
ingly unfriendly toward and uncomfortable tin- its
American hosts. A virtually complete underground
society in the United States that permits fugitives
ito evade the authorities for years without serious
'threat of capture. Religious and ethnic strife: in
.Lebanon, where it could explode a fragile Middle
,Eastern peace; and in Northern Ireland, where
,many of the arms were paid for by American par-
tisans. Doubts about d?nte; curiosity about the
Chinese; ominous-looking antennas on the roof of
the Soviet Embassy on Sixteenth Street in Wash-
ington, which may be intercepting the most sensi-
tive deliberations of the American government. In
an ever more complex world, full of trouble and
danger, the need, obviously, was for information,
for good "intelligence?a loaded and often unde-
finable word?and for some formula that would
permit the country to cope and to calculate its
roles carefully, to avoid the prospect and the ap-
pearance of becoming a helpless giant.
At the same moment, the nation was steeped in
self-doubt, painfully examining events in the recent
past that raised questions about the society's com-
mitment to its own most fundamental principles.
In the post-Watergate era, when nothing is any
longer sacred, men and women once considered
the ultimate patriots who could do no wrong?the
likes of J. Edgar Hoover?are put under a micro-
scope, and the enlargement is not pretty. The mis-
behavior of those responsible for gathering this
commodity called intelligence has been so severe,
says Senator Gary Hart of Colorado, that at one
point "the possibility existed of destroying freedom
in order to save it." A black congressman from
Detroit, Charles Diggs, travels to Addis Ababa,
where the Organization of African Unity is meet-
ing, to denounce his own government's policy in
Angola as "the biggest blunder in the history of
(American] relations with Africa." The inter-
national image of the United States has been
severely damaged. Once regarded as the bulwark of
freedom?and as the country which saved Western
Europe from successive totalitarian threats in the
1940s?it has come to be widely identified with the
torturers in Chile, the racial separatists of South
Africa, and assorted minor anticommunist despots.
Richard Welch, the station chief for the Central
Intelligence Agency in Athens, is murdered, setting
off a new round of recrimination about who is re-
vealing too much and who concealing too much. Is
Welch's death a result of American policies and
practices, or of their disclosure? Or of sloppy
"cover"? Or is it a coincidence shamelessly played
Sanford J. Ungar is the author of FBI: An Uncensored
2 Look Behind the Walls, which has just been published.
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upon by an agency seeking relief from its pain?
At the center of this affair of state is, naturally
enough, the United States Congress, itself. dizzy
with dreams of renewal and enhanced power at a
time when the presidency stands discredited. The
accusations are a bit overdrawn at times, the per-
sonalities flawed, and the exultation over disclosure
sometimes extreme. There is an air of examining
yesterday's events with today's morality, and an oh-
so-much-wiser perspective than that of the last
generation. One of the ironies is that many of the
examiners-the bright young professors and lawyers
on 'the congressional committee staffs-are out of
the same mold and tradition and education as
those who once went into the CIA with notions of
saving ihe world.
The political climate is typical, suggests Attorney
General Edward H. Levi, of a country that has just
come through a war, this time an especially un-
popular war which left wounds not yet healed.
William E. Colby, the career spy in reformist
clothes whose term as director of central intelli-
gence was cut short by the gproar, says the, situ-
ation reminds him of the 1920s, when the Western
world was inclined to ignore realities because it
was tired, disgusted with war, economically de-
pressed, and myopic about better days on the hori-
zon. Yet the intelligence-spying debate of
1975-1976 has also renewed some of the most en-
couraging qualities of a self-conscious democratic
government. The country has been forced to eval-
uate itself, discuss some very embarrassing facts in
public, and pick up the pieces and move on-while
much of the world watches with a mixture of
amazement and horror. It is an all-American ad-
venture.
F' or Congressman Morgan F. Murphy, an
old-line Democrat from Chicago who
seemed at once honored and pained by the
opportunity to participate, the congressional in-
quiries were a matter of "getting into the bowels of
the FBI and the CIA." Senator Richard S. Schwei-
ker of Pennsylvania, a liberal Republican who had
been quiet through most of his first term in the
Senate, discovered in himself a sense of outrage
and found an exciting issue to apply it to: the
need to re-examine President John F. Kennedy's
assassination. To Democratic Congressman Ronald
V. Dellums, a black man from Berkeley who has
been the target of official surveillance now and
again, there was a genuine danger that the con-
gressional investigations would turn out to be a
charade: "We are working with people who have
been trained to disinform, to lie, and to falsify," he
warned. Senator Barry M. Goldwater of Arizona,
guardian a the conservative Republican faith,
could not be bothered to attend many of the hear-
ings; he took every occasion to proclaim that
"enough is enough," and he advocated suspending
the investigations in midstream before they dam-
aged national security and "prove[d] harmful to
the United States and to freedom everywhere."
Henry Kissinger, the aggrieved secretary of state
whose world view was challenged by the nature
and substance of the inquiries as by other contem-
poraneous developments, saw it all as one more-
case of American "self-flagellation," the kind of ex-
ercise that, he believes, makes it impossible for the
country to deal confidently and confidentially in
international affairs.
Frank Church of Idaho was selected as chairman
of the Senate Select Committee precisely because
he was not among the many Democratic candi-
dates for President; but soon the national exposure
and opportunity for center-stage performing inher-
ent in his role as chief inquisitor aroused old
dreams and aspirations. He showed genuine con-
cern over and insight into the intelligence business,
but he began indulging in routine pronuncia-
mentos. Church's tendency to speak slowly and
sanctimoniously, in near-perfect syntax, brought on
the accusation that he was converting the hearing
room into a campaign platform. Otis Pike, a Dem-
ocratic congressman from Long. Island with half an
eye on a New York Senate seat, became chairman
of the House Select Committee when it was
reorganized and sent belatedly into the fray. Sassy
and sarcastic, Pike aimed for the jugular and the
headlines. His pyrotechnics, including staged per-
sonal confrontations with Kissinger over access to
classified documents (at one point he tried to ob-
tain a contempt-of-Congress citation against the
Secretary of State), tended to obscure the real sub-
stance of his committee's inquiry. He was accused
of rank showboating.
It was, at best, a confusing and chaotic effort,
this congressional surge to investigate, expose, and,
presumably, improve the intelligence community.
There were moments when the investigating legis-
lators appeared to be shouting, "Here, look! We
have discovered a corner of the executive branch
that has been misbehaving all these years. Let us
tell you about it." What they were not saying, but
were dramatically demonstrating, is that Congress
is a reactive institution, moving clumsily now to
unravel a web and to expose a subculture that it
had itself been weaving, creating-and, at least on
paper, overseeing-for decades.
Congress was reacting this time, as in other re-
cent crises of public conscience, to newspaper
stories: the revelation by the New York Times that
the Central Intelligence Agency had, probably in
contravention of its legal mandate, conducted ex-
tensive domestic intelligence investigations and
kept improper files on American citizens; and the
timely reminder by the Washington Post (repeating
what the Chicago Tribune and others had said pre-
viously) that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
had extensively wiretapped and bugged the Rever-
end Martin Luther King, Jr., most notably at the
1964 Democratic national convention in Atlantic
City where it was also doing other political chores
for Lyndon B. Johnson.
Those were the starting points, the stimuli, for a
grand round of public, and well-publicized, con-
gressional hoopla. To unravel and expose, and to
demonstrate unwittingly the degree of Congress's
own dereliction since World War II-the .extent to
which it has permitted and encouraged these gov-
ernments-within-a-government to develop and
flourish-the Senate Select Committee will have
spent about $2.5 million, and its counterpart in the
House some $400,000, by the time they close up
shop. It is an investment with an uncertain return.
Even before the congressional committees were
formed, Gerald Ford-who, as a graduate of the
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Congress, had every reason to anticipate how Slow
and scattershot in approach the investigative pro-
cess would be?moved to upstage them. He named
a commission of eight public figures, chaired by
Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller (then still
useful to the President and in his good graces) and
including Ronald Reagan (whom the President
then thought he could. neutralize), to study CIA ac-
tivities within the United States. Although many of
its members had at some point helped to design,
direct, or defend the Agency's mirk, and although
its investigation was hurried and superficial, the
Rockefeller Commission produced a report that
showed the CIA to be systematically insensitive to
its legal limitations and to the civil liberties of
Americans. The report's tone was mild and almost
apologetic?it used language on the order of "such
missteps as did occur" to describe circumstances
that others might have called a shockingPattern of
abuses?but it included an impressive litany of
Agency wrongdoing.
But even with some of the most significant infor-
mation about the "CIA already skimmed off the top
of the investigative pot, the committees would try
to catch- uP. Church's committee stepped into the
uncertain legacy?and the same locale, the Senate
Caucus Room?of the "Watergate Committee" that
broke open the Nixon Administration scandals in
the summer of 1973. While millions of Americans
had thrilled to the televised folksiness of Chairman
Sam Ervin, many of his Senate colleagues had not;
they criticized Ervin's investigation for being politi-
cally stagey, disorganized, riddled with leaks of
sensitive information, and for failing to come up
with any reform legislation. Church, desperate to
avoid comparable bad notices from his peers, in-
stalled a security system worthy of Fort Knox at
his committee offices and pursued a course of stud-
ied moderation: "Unless I could instill a sense of
confidence that we were doing this in a responsible
manner," he said later, "I knew we would create a
tremendous backlash."
When, after six months of private mulling, the
Senate committee finally did go public in Septem-
ber, it was with a set of hearings on how the CIA,
apparently out of control and beyond supervision,
had disobeyed presidential orders by storing ?a
deadly cache of shellfish toxin and other poisons
(information made available to Church by the
Ford Administration and already rejected by Pike).
To Church it was evidence to support his favorite
theory of the CIA as "rogue elephant." Eventually,
as evidence gathered that higher authorities had
known about and approved of many other Agency
capers and misdeeds, Church, embarrassed, backed
away from his characterization. -
Before long, Church was .on the defensive. His
committee looked grossly overstaffed (120 at its
peak) and sounded pompous, especially by com-
parison with the sparer (a staff of 31) and more
earthy House committee, which held quick and
lively hearings on what Pike called the fundamen-
tal issues?the costs and risks of intelligence-gather-
ing, as well as the value, accuracy, and usefulness
of the product. Although the preparation was at
times shallow and inadequate and the questioning
(except for that of the chairman and a few of the
younger members) dreary, Pike's group stayed in
the news as it hopped from one topic to another
like a pack of waterbugs. But in contrast to the
senators, the congressmen had little hope of win-
ning legislative support, from their brethren; 122
members of the House had voted against letting
the committee go to work at all, and still others
were alienated by Pike's tactics of confrontation with
the Ford Administration (by a two-to-one majority
the House refus-t, to release the Pike committee re-
part without censorship by the White House). While
Church appealed kr reason and calm and the long,
careful view; Me charged that the intelligence
agencies had so lost their bearings that they might not
even be capable of alerting the nation to the possi-
bility of an impending foreign attack.
Some of the congressional revelations were not
so new or, by the ,time they *came, devastating.
Press stories based on leaks, many from within the
Ford Administration or from CIA alumni, told
most of the details about Agency involvement in
assassination ploz against foreign leaders whose
philosophies and policies put them on the hit-lists
of successive Presidents and secretaries of state: Fi-
del Castro in Cuba, Patrice Lumumba in the
Congo (now Zaire), Rafael Trujillo in the Domini-
can Republic, Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam,
and Rene Schneider in Chile. It was known that
American intelligence had failed to predict inter-
national crises like the 1968 Tet offensive in Viet-
nam, the 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Middle
East, and the 1974 Greek and Turkish moves on
Cyprus. The Justice Department and regularly con-
stituted congressional committees had been reveal-
ing bits and pieces of the FBI's counterintelligenCe
programs (COINTELPROs) since late 1973. Attor-
ney General Edward Levi had already provided an
unusually extensive accounting of some of J. Edgar
Hoover's secret personal files.
Yet when the investigating committees addressed
these subjects, they lent additional credibility, an
official imprimatur, and a certain drama to the in-
formation. And much of the detail was fresh and
sordid: back-room mail-openings; COINTELPRO
actions, justified on the basis of preventing vio-
lence, but used to frighten people and to destroy
their family life and livelihood, even when there
was no sign of violence or illegal activity on their
part. The FBI, it emerged, was handy at the im-
personation of newsmen; at "DO NOT FILE" proce-
dures to prevent the uncovering of illegal "black
bag jobs"; at looking the other way while local po-
lice wiretapped illegally and then shared the catch
with their friends the Feds. Frederick A. 0.
Schwarz and Curtis R. Smothers, majority and mi-
nority counsel respectively for the Church com-
mittee, one white and one black, scored a theatri-
cal coup when, silting before the senators and the
television cameras, they testified in grotesquely
specific detail about Hoover's vengeful pursuit of
Martin Luther King, Jr. Church's controversial re-
port on the assassination plots, perhaps the most
significant document to emerge from the entire
process, drew a stark portrait of the well-bred gen-
tlemen in the CIA and the White House scheming
to take the lives of foreign statesmen who posed
no actual threat to the United States?a secret gov-
ernment at its worst that had flourished in an at-
mosphere of euphemism, subterfuge, and cynicism.
The committees also shed new light on the intel-
ligence activities a the Internal Revenue Service.
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and the fact that its reservoir of personal informa-
tion on individuals had long been exploited for po-
litical purposes, converted into, as Church put it,
"a lending library of tax information." And there
'*as .a first public glance into the National Security
Agency, ostensibly responsible to the secretary of
defense, exposed as a sort of electronic gun for
hire that does little thinking about who its targets
will be, but stands ready to zero in on one or an-
other "watchlist" when so ordered by its superiors,
listening for evidence of everything from travel to
Cuba to international drug trafficking and "pos-
sible foreign support or influence on civil distur-
bances." It became clear how easily the NSA made
the transition from matters of foreign concern to
domestic ones. And all of these findings came in
the context of a General Accounting Office report
to the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Inves-
tigations that the federal government spends $2.6
billion a year on police, investigative, and intelli-
gence-gathering activities (including $482 million
for the FBI, but not including the budgets of the
CIA, NSA, and "certain sensitive activities of the
Defense Department"). Piecing evidence together,
the Pike committee estimated that the United
States spends $10 billion on all intelligence activi-
ties, more than three times what is acknowledged
in the annual appropriations budget.
IL How the &unite Grew
he real importance of the congressional
probes lies less in headlines about assassina-
tions or statistics than in the investigations'
long-range impact: the universalization of concern
about federal agencies that have slipped out of
control and strayed from their original purpose;
the lessons they teach about the past; and, with
any luck, the creation of a climate for thorough-
going reform of the system and the structures that
led to the abuses.
The investigations also had a subtler lesson: that
the "intelligence community" has indeed become ?a
genuine community within the government, a
special-interest group that lobbies for its own
positions, struggles for influence and authority in
policy-making circles, and becomes haughty or de-
fensive When it is challenged.
This community consists largely of intelligent,
well-educated, well-motivated, and patriotic men
and women. But they?especially those whose atti-
tudes are formed during assignment to CIA and
FBI headquarters in Washington?are inclined to
act as if they are above the public dialogue, forced
to deal with politicians and other petty men who
do not share their wisdom.
Where did this intelligence community come
from, and how did it evolve into a many-headed
monster? The clumsiness and heavy-handedness
may be explained in part by the fact that Ameri-
cans are new to the intelligence business. Unlike
Ole European powers that had empires and a wide
range of. vested interests to protect, and thus have
intelligence establishments dating back centuries,
the United States used to view, intelligence, both
offensive and defensive, as it did armies and arma-
ments: something to build up in wartime and dis-
mantle in peace. As a result, the country was an
easy target for spies and terrorists; indeed, German
Approved
agents had a field day here in the years leading up
to both world wars,, and the Soviets were suspected
of doing the same during the 1930s. It was out of
concern over that gtuation that Franklin D. Roose-
velt ordered the FBI back into the intelligence
field in 1936 (it hat been ordered out more than a
decade earlier, when Hoover was appointed direc-
tor by Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone, be-
cause of the abuses of its authority during the
post-World War II "red scare" and the Harding
Administration scnadals). The threats from foreign
agents and from their domestic allies?in such or-
ganizations as the German-American Bund and
the American Communist party?were seen as one.
Only as actual American involvement in the Eu-
ropean hostilities became a prospect did the
United States contemplate setting up its own appa-
ratus to conduct espionage. Espionage was not a
part of American tradition; it involved exhorting
foreign citizens to commit treason and otherwise to
violate their own countries' laws and standards of
behavior. But varE3us government agencies clam-
ored for the job, and Roosevelt, in a Solomonlike
solution, split it up among them: the FBI won ju-
risdiction over all of the Western Hemisphere ex-
cept Panama; the Navy over the Pacific; and the
Army over Europa. Africa, and the Canal Zone.
The derring-do or ?Ile Bureau's Special Intelligence
Service in Latin America, mostly unheralded at the
time, was soon to be overshadowed by the newly
created. quasi-milkary Office of Strategic Services,
which operated mostly in Europe, including behind
enemy lines.
Thus began a competition that has continued to
this day. Hoover mid the chief of the OSS, Gen-
eral William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan, were old ri-
vals?dating back so the 1920s, when they were
both in the Justice Department?and their organi-
zations tried to match each other in currying favor
with the British chose secret intelligence service,
MI-6, had trained most of the OSS teams) and
with the White House. After the war, Donovan's
successor. Allen Dulles, and his regiment of well-
bred Ivy League spies beat out Hoover's corps of
law-enforcement awes for the ongoing foreign in-
telligence assignment. They became the Central In-
telligence Agency and were given responsibility by
the Truman Adrthlistration and its successors for a
major piece of the American action abroad. Still,
Hoover did not give up or forgive easily. He kept
some of his men snrseas as "legal attaches"; they
were billed (and gRII are today) strictly as liaison
officers with foreign police, but they also collected
(and still collect) intelligence. And the Bureau held
on to its growing domestic role in the fields of
counterintelligence and internal security.
The charters of the CIA and the FBI that
emerged from Werld War H were designed to be
open-ended, and were fitted out with loopholes.
Roosevelt's dispatch of the Bureau into the security
field had been accomplished through executive or-
ders and press statements. As Hoover wrote to
Roosevelt and Attorney General Homer Cummings
on October 20, 1938:
In considering the steps to be taken for the expan-
sion of the present structure of intelligence work. it
is believed imperative that it be proceeded with the
.utmost degree of secreey in order to avoid criticism
or objections whiah might be raised to such an ex-
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pansion by either ill-informed persons or individ-
uals having some ulterior motive. . it would seem
undesirable to seek only special legislation which
would draw attention to the fact that it was pro-
posed to develop a special counterespionage drive
of any great magnitude.
And there, in bureaucratic ambiguity, the matter
would stand; the FBI had a splendid reputation,
and the country seemed prepared to trust it with
virtually any job. Similarly, the National Security
Act of 1947, which formally created the CIA, was
deliberately written to be vague. Because the
drafters "were dealing with a new subject with
practically no precedents," says one of them, Clark
Clifford, a Truman adviser and later secretary of
defense under Lyndon Johnson, "it was decided
that the Act . . . should contain a 'catch-all' clause
to provide for unforeseen contingencies." So it was
that the CIA would be asked to "perform such
other functions and duties related to intelligence
affecting the national security as the National Se-
curity Council may from time to time direct."
Within the framework of Cold War policies, the
United States would be vigilant against the com-
munists abroad and, in the name of "internal secu-
rity," against the Left at home.
"A desperate struggle (was] going on in the back
alleys of world politics," is how former Secretary of
State Dean Rusk perceived the situation, and the
United States would have to meet the challenge. In
order to measure up, said a special committee that
reported to President Eisenhower in 1954, the
country might have to reconsider "long-standing
American concepts of fair play" and adopt tactics
"more ruthless than those employed by the
enemy." Out of this philosophy came a heavy reli-
ance on "covert actions," in which the Agency
moved beyond its reporting and evaluation roles to
try to influence the course of events more directly.
As William Colby puts it, "You were asked to go
do the job, without anybody telling you what it
was or being willing to share the responsibility for
it." The CIA's covert operatives had advanced
technology and brilliant technicians available to
them, they had the confidence of the rest of the
government, and they had to report to no one out-
side the Agency about how they spent their
money.
There was another complicating?and, for the
intelligence community, liberating?factor: a
double standard in international affairs be-
tween the pretense of official behavior and the
reality of what went on behind the scenes. Looking
back on the crisis in 1959 when Francis Gary Pow-
ers was shot down and captured by the Soviets
during his aerial reconnaissance mission for the
CIA. Colby recalls that "the Soviets knew for some
years that we were flying U-2s over. When we
used the cover story that it was a weather plane,
they weren't going to do much about it." It was
only after a controversy developed within the
United States over the fact that the intelligence
collectors were responsible, and after Eisenhower
admitted that this was true, Colby says, that
"Khrushchev went up the wall," not because of
that specific flight but because the Americans were,
in effect, breaking the unwritten rules by publicly
asserting the right to violate the Soviet borders and
airspace. Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy
went on to sign the Vienna Convention of 1962.
which stressed, among other points, the inviolate
nature of each other's embassies. But as one source
close to the CIA puts it, "The embassies are to the
intelligence agencies as the bank was to Willie Sut-
ton?where the money is. That agreement was
never intended to be respected, and it never was."
Other treaties and agreements paid ritual lip ser-
vice to the sanctity of the mails and of other inter-
national communications; but each side seemed to
assume that they were written to be mutually bro-
ken. "Oh, that mail?yes, that mail was opened,"
CIA officials would acknowledge discreetly, when
pressed to say whether the agreements, not to
mention domestic laws, had been honored. Little
wonder, then, that Nathan Gordon, a CIA scien-
tist, could not fathom a presidential order to de-
stroy the Agency's precious ,reserve of shellfish
toxin, so powerful that 11 grams (a couple of tea-
spoons), if properly administered, could kill 55,000
people. Gordon had spent much of his career de-
veloping the potion; to destroy it must have
seemed tantamount to destroying himself. Yes, the
United States had signed a treaty outlawing chem-
ical and biological warfare, and yes, CIA Director
Richard Helms had issued a directive implement-
ing it; but nobody bothered to tell Gordon
whether this was one of those things we really
meant to do.
The CIA's daring and profligacy was reinforced
by a certainty that its Soviet counterpart, the
KGB, was far more ruthless about its covert activi-
ties. Everyone knew, or assumed, how nasty the
KGB could be and how often the Kremlin sent it
to the ramparts to implement its needs and desires.
At times, the conception of the threat posed by the
KGB was based less on actual evidence than on an
assumption that they must be playing the same
subversive games abroad that we were playing, and
that even if they were not we had to keep the
game going lest they join in. The logic became a
conundrum that could only have the effect of
strengthening both the CIA and the KGB, throw-
ing them into a symbiotic relationship. They be-
came an international community of interest, prob-
ably more similar than either would ever admit.
Each needed the threat of the other to justify its
own existence.
There was a home-front parallel to overseas
covert action, something the FBI came to
call "preventive action" and to justify under
the rubric of "counterintelligence programs." Do-
mestically, too, the threat was ill-defined and the
development of tactics left in the hands of the im-
plementers. Although the Bill of Rights officially
guarantees certain basic freedoms to every citizen.
political hysteria made some people less equal than
others under the Bill of Rights provisions. First
communists, then fringe Marxist groups, and even-
tually others?the Ku Klux Klan, the "New Left,"
and "black extremists"?came in for special treat-
ment. Unchecked, unmonitored, that treatment in-
cluded disruption of personal lives and maneuvers
that seemed to be intended more to foment vio-
lence than to preunt it. As with the CIA, intelli-
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gence came to mean both investigation and action.
The tvio activitieS seemedInSetiarable. The world
had to be set right.
The community was not only doing what it per-
ceived to be its duty, but after a time it was also
having fun. As times grew more tense and com-
plicated, business got better. Presidents, secretaries
of state, attorneys general, aroused politicians, and
editorial writers fulminated in the most general
terms over the need to "do something" about the
likes of Fidel Castro, the Klan, or the Black F'in-
thers. The agencies did something: they developed
exploding cigars and poisoned diving suits. They
ordered Klansmen informants to sleep with the
wives of other Klansmen. They wiretapped and
bugged beyond the most energetic agents' ability
to read and digest the product. The CIA, ever am-
bitious and sensitive to presidential whims, got
more into the FBI's line of work, and the FBI,
ever defensive and the best of bureaucratic in-
fighters, got into the CIA's. The Bureau reached
out further for targets, finding among ecologists
and women's liberation groups and other pur-
veyors of discontent sure signs that the revolution
was at hand. The CIA zeroed in on the Grove
Press and the American Indian Movement, among
other purely domestic targets. The higher authori-
ties winked and went about their work, taking ref-
uge in "plausible deniability," express or implied.
Congress saw clear enough hints of what was going
on to have set off alarms, but none came from
Capitol Hill. The secret war in Laos was funded
time and again; J. Edgar Hoover's quite public
lists of targets for special attention were perused
regularly in the course of annual congressional ap-
propriations testimony.
III. What Can Be Done?
Those congressmen who expected some degree
of contriteness from the agencies under in-
-
vestigation were in for a disappointment. The
first level of reaction was more on the order of an-
ger, coupled with a warning that the committees
might be doing grave harm to the FBI and the
CIA, not to say the national security.
Old rules of the game and standards of behav-
ior, a sense of politesse and stoicism in the service
of a noble cause, prevent the community from ex-
pressing publicly the full outrage it feels over
being dragged ungratefully through the mud. But
there is plenty of complaining in private. "The
whole ambience these days, the increase in the
decibel count . . . is damaging," said one CIA
man; "you begin to wish that something harmless
would come along, like a typhoon, to distract at-
tention." FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley, who
had the delicate problem of trying to renounce the
abuses of the past without damaging the morale
and pride of old-timers still in powerful positions,
was fuming. "Some of the charges people have
made against us are absolutely ridiculous," he said,
"but were just going to sit here and take it. We're
not going to fight back." "Fight back" is exactly
what the FBI would have done in the old lloover
days?with a public relations offensive, even to the
point of seeking to undermine the reputations of
the congressmen. and journalists who were the
bearers of bad tidings about the Bureau.
But the best revenge, the proof of the commu-
nity's strength, may be business as usual. Even
while the congressional committees were con-
ducting their investigations, the CIA set out on
new secret and controversial projects?about $50
million worth of aid to pro-Western factions in An-
gola (the exact amount of the assistance was un-
known, because the Agency undervalued some of
the arms it shipped to Angola via Zaire) and an
infusion of $6 million to the noncommunist centrist
political parties in Italy, to bolster their effort in
that country's next parliamentary elections. Both
initiatives were dear to the heart of Kissinger, who
was determined to prevent the Italian Communists
from joining a coalition government in Rome, not-
withstanding their well-known differences with
'Moscow, and who wanted to use Angola to score
points with critics of his policy of d?nte with the
,Soviets. The only reason the American public
,found out about these two involvements was that
Congress passed a law in 1974 requiring the direc-
1
tor of central intelligence to brief six congressional
'subcommittees on any plans for covert actions; An-
gola leaked through the Senate and Italy through
the House. The leaks, rather than their substance,
gave the agencies a new ground for crying foul.
But beyond the charges and countercharges the
leaks gave proof, if any was needed, that for all
the CIA's humiliations and consequent internal re-
forms, the basic 'process had not changed a bit: the
Agency could be sent off on chores that bore little
ckar relationship to any national policy known to
the public.
There were modest reforms at the FBI too,
'aimed at avoiding repetition of past abuses, begin-
, ning with Acting Director L. Patrick Gray's 1972
!order that every "security" case state some formal
rbasis for the Bureau's jurisdiction, and continuing
through to Attorney General Levi's decision in the
Ilast days of 1975 to scrap the "administrative in-
dex" (ADEX), a catalogue of people who would
come in for intensive investigation in time of na-
tional emergency. (Under the old "security index,"
predecessor to the ADEX, they could have been
put in detention camps.) FBI Director Kelley,
! while defending some of the Bureau's excesses in
! the 1960s on grounds of the "temper of the times"
then, swore that they could not happen again. No
more professors getting fired because of their polit-
ical views and associations; no more agents flying
from Washington to Atlanta to mail poison-pen
letters. And yet the FBI was still conducting vo-
luminous domestic intelligence investigations
against targets of its own choice, coordinated out
of the Internal Security Section of its Intelligence
Division at Washington headquarters. A study by
the General Accounting Office showed that barely
3 percent of these actually led to federal prose-
cutions.
oth agencies invited?in effect, dared?Con-
gress and the executive 'branch to, go be-
yond fighting- the last war and to write new
rules that would be appropriate for this and future
seasons, that would respect civil liberties_without-
neglecting the genuine dangers of the real world. 1t
'is not an easy job,_ especially if one wants- to do
something more than tinker (an-.extra deputy direc-
tor here and strengthened powers- for an inspector
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general there), but stop short of dismantling the in-
telligence community entirely.
A fundamental problem is how to define, and
perhaps realistically limit, modern-day American
;ntelligence needs. The United States does not con-
front the threat of invasion by a foreign power.
With new electronic and photographic capabilities,
fewer and fewer people are directly involved in the
collection of tactical military intelligence. What na-
tions want to know about each other, and need
live bodies to collect and analyze, is more in the
nature of political, economic, and social informa-
tion, the kind of knowledge that helps governments
to perceive the intentions and understand the mo-
tives of both their friends and their potential ene-
mies. Much of that can be learned through the
press, especially in the Western world, or through
normal diplomatic channels. But dealing with
closed societies may require some use of clandes-
tine sources and methods.
There is strong sentiment in Washington in favor
of new ground rules that would be based more
squarely than ever on American concepts of fair
play and due process. Senator James Abourezk,
Democrat of South Dakota, for example, has re-
peatedly proposed legislation that would, in its
broadest application, prevent the United States
from doing anything in its overseas intelligence op-
erations that would be a violation of the law if
done at home, and he has a small but solid bloc of
votes on his side. But Walter Mondale, Abourezk's
colleague from Minnesota, no unreconstructed cold
warrior himself, criticizes this as a "simple answer"
that ignores crucial realities. The United States
might gain something in self-righteousness and
moral certitude if it stops listening in on private
conversations overseas and no longer urges foreign
nationals to commit espionage and treason against
their own governments, even if most other powers
continue to do these things with impunity, but
would it not at the same time lose in other very
important ways?
In the same vein, the American Civil Liberties
Union. has proposed that the FBI give up "all for-
eign and domestic intelligence investigations of
groups or individuals unrelated to a specific crimi-
nal offense," without suggesting anyone else who
could take over the Bureau's counterintelligence
function. The intent is ptire, but does the proposed
remedy go too far when, according to Colby, every
year sixty to eighty Americans are approached
overseas and asked to spy for the Soviet Union,
and when there is evidence of a substantial net-
work of illegal foreign agents operating in this
country? Should the government not be looking for
those agents well in advance of any hard probable
cause to believe that specific acts of espionage
have been committed? Even Mondale, disturbed as
he is over FBI abuses, thinks that it should. "We
have to be able to keep track [of foreign agents]
without abiding by all of the 'requirements of due
process," he concedes. But then what about the
"agents of influence," the American citizens, fully
protected by the Constitution. upon whom the for-
eign agents depend? And the "dormant assets," the
potential spies who are in place and waiting to be
activated? Where to stop?
The best solution, obviously, would be to
achieve some measure of detente in those back al-
leys of the world, as well as in the official chan-
nels. Indeed, during the dosing days of World War
II, when Soviet-American cooperation against the
Axis was still operatEsfe, "Wild Bill" Donovan pro-
posed an exchange of security delegations in Mos-
cow and Washington between the OSS and the
NKVD (forerunner of the KGB). The intended
purpose was to trade information about sabotage
operations behind German lines, but the coopera-
tion presumably wirild have continued after ?the
war. At the time, Heaver interceded to shoot down
Donovan's plan; and the CIA and KGB agents in
the embassies in Moscow and Washington today
are hardly there ori formal exchange basis. Even
if Kissinger and Leonid Brezhnev were to startle
the world by swapp-171g lists of secret agents, as
some seriously propose, each would suspect the
other of a nasty trEek, and they would probably
both be right.
Failing that. when-e can and should the United
States draw the lines? Much of the recent dialogue
has focused on the red herring of the intelligence
? investigations, covert actions. The Abourezk pro-
posal, in a somewhat milder form, and recommen-
dations of the Center for National Security Studies,
among others, would ban them completely. Morton
Halperin, a former ancial of the Defense Depart-
ment and the Natioml Security Council, and now
director of the center's "Project on National Secu-
rity and Civil Liberties," told the Church com-
mittee that "covert operations are incompatible
with our democratic institutions." But Cyrus
Vance, who was himself concerned with national
security issues as deputy secretary of defense and
in other government positions, argues, "It is too
difficult to see that dearly in the future. . . . I be-
lieve it should be the policy of the United States to
engage in covert actions only when they are abso-
lutely essential to the national security."
The real question is whether the United States
wants, and considers it to be in the interests of na-
tional security, to influence events in other nations.
If the answer is yes, as it probably is, then some of
that influence may have to be exercised secretly,
because sovereign governments are not likely to
welcome open interference in their affairs. Ironi-
cally, a democratic system like the American one
has a problem the Soviets do not. Our government
cannot funnel its aid through an organization like
the Communist party and say that it is simply
helping kindred politizal spirits.
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ertain hypothetical dilemmas are easily
solved: the United States almost surely
would have liked to be able to assassinate
Hitler before or during World War II; that act
might have saved millions of lives and earned the
gratitude of people the world over. In drawing up
standards for peacetime, however, it is easier to de-
lineate what should be prohibited than what
should be permitted. No assassinations or even pe-
ripheral involvement in plots that might lead to
them; no interference in the electoral processes of
other countries; no more secret wars; no mis-
leading propaganda that distorts the truth about
the world situation; no drug-dealing or other activ-
ity that affects the fzealth, livelihood, and well-
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being of people at home or abroad. But what
about secret support for an underground publish-
?
ing network in" the Soviet Union which advances
freedom of expression by making the writings of
dissidents available to Soviet citizens who want to
read them? And what about continuing the post-
war tradition of American help to democratic par-
ties in' Western Europe that might otherwise be
swamped, and eventually repressed, by minority
parties that are heavily endowed by Moscow? Or
help even to the Western Communist parties that
have broken from the Soviet Union and are corn-
mitted to working for Marxist principles through
free elections? Those are tougher cases.
Mitchell Rogovin, a liberal Washington attorney
who has represented the CIA through its recent
trials and tribulations, proposes a three-part stan-
dard.for evaluating future proposals for covert ac-
tion: "Does it advance the legitimate interest of
the country [the United States]? Is the means [of
carrying out the action) acceptable in a moral
sense? If it is revealed, would it hurt more than it
would help?" But even that kind of standard
would make sense, Rogovin acknowledges, only
within the context of basic, well-defined and -artic-
ulated national policies?which are nonexistent
right now. If those policies were openly debated
and established (along with reformed and strength-
ened procedures for review and accountability),
then ,even if the actions themselves remained se-
cret, the public could know the fundamental atti-
tudes being implemented.
As for "preventive action," the FBI's equivalent
of the CIA's "covert operation," it is only a little
easier to decide. Again, there is no trouble drawing
up a list of prohibited activities: no character as-
? sassination; no interference with freedom of speech
and association and travel; no indiscriminate elec-
tronic surveillance; no provocation to violence.
Tentative guidelines drawn up by a Justice Depart-
ment-FBI committee named by Levi would permit
some official preventive actions?at times when vio-
lence threatens, on the condition that the attorney
general authorize the action in advance and later
report on it to Congress?but Senator Mondale,
for one, feels that this might set a dangerous
precedent. He argues for use of the arrest power,
when necessary under the conspiracy laws, in such
circumstances. (People who share his view contend
that even an occasional "bad- arrest, which is
thrown out of court later, would be preferable to
an express government policy of disruption.)
Whatever the standard, all police and intelli-
gence work is bound to continue to include a cer-
tain number of unofficial counterintelligence tech-
niques; any smart policeman or agent will make a
pretext phone call to try to determine whether a
fugitive is home before he goes out to arrest him.
And doesn't society want and expect its protectors
to find out about terrorist plans in advance and
then prevent occurrences such as the bomb explosion
at La Guardia?
policies and actions (that is, if more of the
agencies' superiors in the executive branch have to
record their approval of such steps) and share re- .
sponsibility for the outcome, they are likelier to
foster and enforce caution and care. But the recent
sorry record of abuse of trust and sheer neglect by
government officials at all levels provides little
basis for relying on the human instincts and per-
sonal judgments of those to whom the FBI and
CIA must answer. Nor can the solutions be left to
the courts; their arbitration of such matters gener-
ally comes after it is too late to protect the in-
nocent victims of government excesses.
Proposals for assuring greater accountability and
?better behavior are now as numerous as the past
abuses, but general agreement is crystallizing
around a few basic propcisitions:
?? A new apparatus?either a single special assis-
tant or a small committee?reporting directly to the
President on intelligence matters. As envisioned by
Ralph Dungan, who was ambassador to Chile
when the CIA launched its program of covert ac-
tivity as a parallel to official American policy,
; there, the new chain of command would assure
that all controversial activities could ultimately be
said to be carried out in the President's name, and
would make the decision-making process on covert
actions less casual and informal.
? A new system of congressional oversight of
' and participation in intelligence decisions. Al-
though it would mean offending both the powerful
apologists for the intelligence community and some
' of the more effective existing units, the wisest
;course would probably be to establish a new Joint
1Committee on Intelligence or, preferably, a sepa-
rate committee in each house, with exclusive juris-
diction in the area. The members would be se-
lected to represent a cross-section of the Congress,
and they and their staffs would automatically ro-
tate off the committee after fixed terms to prevent
the kind of cozy buddy system and protection of
the agencies that has characterized congressional
oversight in the past.
Once a reasonable system is developed? for pro-
tecting that narrow category of confidential infor-
mation that legitimately deserves to be kept con-
fidential, Congress could begin to be consulted in
advance on any covert actions. (The threat of fines
or even suspension from Congress might be neces-
sary to assure adequate security. As matters stand
now, a single member of Congress can effectively
sabotage or even veto delicate Administration
plans with a clever leak.) Some procedure might
ultimately be devised for the legislative branch to
overrule plans that it considers to be in clear viola-
tion of the public interest. The committees could
weigh the question of whether the CIA's budget
should continue to be kept secret, in apparent vio-
lation of the Constitution.
N The writing of deailed charters for both the
FBI and CIA, so that they no longer have to rely
? upon loopholes, outdated executive orders, and se-
cret communications from the White House for
major areas of their jurisdiction. Enacted into stat-
utes, the charters should be specific enough to
make it clear , what the agencies are forbidden to
do. (The GAO has privately told the Church corn-
mittee that Levi's draft guidelines for the FBI
would permit a repetition of virtually all the ques-
oW Much reform and restructuring is really
necessary? Levi insists that however many
fail-Safes are built in, "you 'have to trust
someone at some point; 7' Otis Pike believes that if
"more .people have to sign otr on controversial
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tionable activities it discovered in its audit- of the
Bureau's domestic intelligence operations.) But
they should not become so specific as to eliminate
executive discretion altogether. (Levi has pointed
out that once rulemakers get into the business of
proscribing certain areas of investigation?for ex-
ample, personal sexual preference or drinking
habits?they may also change their minds and re-
quire just such areas of investigation later.)
In all of these areas, Congress, the Executive,
and, for that matter, the public must realize that a
durable solution will not come overnight. Exact
definition of terms and the ability to forecast all
hypothetical situations may well elude the drafters,
just as they did in 1947. The intelligence commu-
nity wilt probably require frequent checkups and
routine re-examination of its ground rules. And
other problems lie ahead: one is the issue of what
Senator Mondale calls "idle hands," large bureauc-
racies within the bureaucracies whose job it is
to spot subversion or dream up covert actions.
Many people, including Dungan and former
CIA covert operator David Phillips, suggest taking
covert actions out ?of the Agency and attaching
them instead to the Department of State or De-
fense. A similar solution might be necessary for the
Internal Security Section of the FBI. One problem
that when reform of the FBI and the CIA is
complete, the old ways of doing business might
crop up in the NSA and other lesser-known dark
corners of the intelligence community. (Exact num-
bers vary, depending on whom you talk to about
what figures, but an informed estimate is that even
now the CIA's budget of approximately $1.5 bil-
lion accounts for only 15 percent of the total intel-
ligence community's budget, compared to the
? NSA's 25 percent.) As Senator Gary Hart puts it,
HOUSTON POST
20 FEBRUARY 1976
Ft
"The danger is not so much the assassin or the
black bag job as the Orwellian electronic capac-
ity. . . . It outruns the human ability to control
it."
ittle can be accomplished, however, until public
confidence in the intelligence community is
restored. That will take time, and the ap-
pointment of a politician like George Bush to be
director of central intelligence does not help. One
of the most tangible effects of the congressional in-
vestigations was indeed to lower this confidence
still further, to reinforce and legitimize the fears of
dirty tricks that were so widespread in the 1960s
and early 1970s. For all the assurances that the
FBI and the CIA have changed, that they are no
longer misbehaving, many people remain skeptical.
They are still not sure whether they are getting the
truth. Washington reporters working on sensitive
stories still retreat to pay phones for their most
delicate calls, and controversial politicians worry
about the privacy of files in their offices and
homes. (Indeed, when the homes of two members of
the Church committee, Howard Baker and Charles
Mathias, were burglarized, valuables were ignored
but documents were gone through. Police were un-
able to solve the crimes.) Otis Pike asked the Capitol
police to sweep the offices of all members of his com-
mittee for wiretaps and bugging devices.
Some executive branch officials agree that it is
always .a good idea to be careful?one never knows
to what lengths the spies of the Soviets, the Chi-
nese, and other potentially hostile foreign powers
might go. But it was not those spies whom the
journalists, senators, and congressmen feared; it
was the ones who work for their own govern-
ment. 0
The KGB. the the C
Strip by strip, publications are peeling away the
anonymity that has Protected American CIA agents
.and contacts. The process is" so widespread and so effec-
tive that observers experienced in the ways of the Sovi-
et Union are convinced that this is no matter of chance
but a new, deliberate and successful offensive launched
by the Soviet KGB against its longtime adversary, the
CIA. .
So many names of American agents and their in-
formants have been published, with whereabouts and
home addresses included, that we have to see this as a
threat comparable to the Soviet build-up in arms and a
strategy as damaging as the Soviet thrusts into Africa.
British security services, so closely allied with Ameri-
can, have watched in alarm and are expecting to be-
come the next target for this unwanted and destructive
publicity.
Oddly, few questions have been raised publicly as to
where the sudden spate of name-lists have been coming
from. They could not come from defectors like former
CIA agent Philip Agee. His knowledge was fairly
limited to Latin America and dates back to the 1960s.
Instead, some observers believe, the publication of CIA
names is the second phase in a KGB offensive that
began three or more years ago with the marked in-
crease in the number of KGB agents throughout West-
ern Europe and Britain.
NATO reports that there are now more than 900
KGB and GRU (military intelligence) officers in West-
ern Europe, compared to the 776 suspected or known in
1972. Even then, the intelligence personnel made up
more than a third of all the Soviet officials in the area.
An. American news magazine recently cited the large
Soviet embassy in small Luxembourg and estimated
that of its 36 staff members, 12 are KGB agents, com-
pared to 7 in 1972. Though Austria was guaranteed
neutrality by a 1955 state treaty signed by the USSR,
the number of KGB and GRU men has increased from
50 in 1972 to 75 now. In neutral Sweden the number has
grown from 35 to 43 since 1972. Switzerland's comple-
ment has swelled from 87 to more than 100.
It is possible to grant that some of the newspapers
publishing the American CIA lists are striking back at
what they believe to be CIA malpractice in some coun-
tries like Cuba or Chile. But it is not possible to believe
that the KGB had no hand in providing at least some of
them with the CIA lists to publish.
10
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=Approved For Release 2001108/Q8 : CIA-RbP77-00432R0001004100b1-1
THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, MARCH 12, 1978`
Excerpts From Nixon's Responses to the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
*petal to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, March 1 I?Follow?
-
pg are excerpts from the text of the
sworn answers, in writing, to ques-
tions put to former President Richard
M. Nixon by the Senate Select Corn-
tnittee on Intelligence. The ,answers
Were released by Mr. Nixon's attor-
neys.
Opening Statement
?? The following submission of responses
to the interrogatories propounded to?
? me by the Senate Select Committee
to study governmental operations with
respect to intelligence activities, as was
my offer to meet informally with the
ranking members of the committee to
? discuss any matter within the com-
mittee's jurisdiction, is made voluntarily
and following careful consideration of
? the propriety of a former President
responding to Congressional questions
? pertainings to activities which occurred
during his term in office.
It is my opinion that Congress cannot
? Compel' a President to testify concerning
the conduct of his office, either in
justification or in explanation of actions
he took. The existence of such power
In the Congress would, without doubt,
Impair the Executive and his subordi-
nates in the exercise of the Constitu-
? tional responsibilities of the Presidency.
The end results would be most unfortun-
? ate. The totally uninhibited flow of
communication which is essential to
? the Executive branch would .be so
? chilled as to vended candid advice unob-
tainable. No President could carry out
his responsibilities if the advice he
received were to be filtered by the
? prospect of Completed disclosure? at a
future date. The result would be the
Interference and interruption of the-
open and frank interchange which is
absolutely essential for a President to
fulfill his duties.
? Truman Letter Quoted
As President Truman stated in a
? letter to a Congressional committee
? in 1953, this principle applies to a
former President as well as to a sitting
President. In his words:
"It must be obvious to you that
the doctrine of separation of powers
and the independence of the Presidency
4s to have any validity at all, it must
be equally applicable to a President
after his term of office has expired
when he is sought to be examined
with respect to any acts occurring while
he is President..
? 4The doctrine would be shattered,,
and the President, contrary to our fun-
damental theory of Constitutional
? government, would become a mere arm
of the. Legislative branch of the Govern-
ment if he would feel during his term
of office that his every act might be
subject to official inquiry and possible
distortion for political purposes."
In their wisdom, the founders of
this country provided?through the
Constitutional separation of powers?
the safeguards prerequisite to three
strong, independent branches of govern-
ment. The real with which the Cong,rr A
has guarded and defended its own ine-
rogattves and indepence is a clear, indi-
cation of its support of that doctrine
where the Congress is involved.
The Decision to Respond
/ believe, -however, it is consistent
with my view of the respective powers
'and privileges of the President and
? Congress for me to reply voluntarily
to the committee's request for informa-
.tion. In responding, / ? may be able
to assist the committee in its very
difficult task for evaluating the intel-
ligence community of this nation. By
doing so voluntarily, future Presidents
or former Presidents need not be con-
?cerned that by this precedent they may
be compelled to respond to Congres- ?
stonal demands.
? Whether it is wise for a President,
In his discretion, to provide testimony
concerning his Presidential actions, is
a matter which must be decided by
each President in light of the conditions
at that time. Undoubtedly, as has been
the case during the 200 years of this
nation's history, the instances warrant-
Ing such action may be rare. But when
the appropriate circumstances arise,
each President must feel confident that
he can act in a spirit of cooperation,
' if he so decides, without impairing
either the stature or independence of
his successors.
.. Finally, I believe it Is appropriate
to inform the committee that the re-
sponses which follow are based totally
upon my present recollection of events ?
.--Many of which were relatively insig-
nificant in comparison to the principal
,activities for which / had responsibility
as President?relating to a period some
Six years ago. Despite the difficulty
in- responding to questions purely from
memory, I wish to assure the committee
that my responses represent an effort
to respond as fully as possible.
Interrogatory 10
With respect to my answer to Interro-
gatory No. 2 concerning N.S.A. Nation-
al Security Agent] intercepts of non-
voice communications, it is my recollec-
. ton that:
A. The Intercepts occurred in the.
course of two -investigation programs
I authorized for the purpose of discover-
ing the sources of unauthorized disclo-
sures of very sensitive, security-classi-
fied information. The first investigation
Involved primarily members of the Na-
tional Security Council staff. The second
. investigation involved an employee of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
B. The first investigation occurred be-
tween approximately May 9 1969 and
Feb. 10, 1971. The second investigation
? occurred betweep approximately Decem-
ber 1971 and June 1972.
C. My knowledge of both investiga-
tions stemmed from my participation in
authorizing their -implementation.
? IX I authorized both investigations.
E. I did not participate in the term-Ma-
tion of the first investigation. With re-
tard to the second investigation, I did
? not participate in the decision to ter-
trtinate the intercepts. However, when
the identity of the individual who had
disclosed classified information was dis-
covered. I directed that he be reassigned
from his then present duties to a less
position and that his activities
? bezut.:ntoied for a period sufficient to
insure that he was not continuing to
disclose classified information to which
he had been exposed during his earlier
assignment.
Secret Service Intercept
With respect to my answer to Inter-
rogatory No. 3 concerning the secret
service intercept of telephonic communi-
cations, it is my recollection that:
A. The intercepts occurred as a result
of efforts to determine whether my
brother, Donald Nixon, was the target
of attempts by individuals to com-
promise him or myself.
B. The intercepts occurred during an
approximately three-week period in
1970.
C I discussed with? John Ehrlichrnan
? my concern that my brother's trips
? abroad had brought him in contact with
persons who might attempt to com-
promise him or myself. I directed Mr.
Ehrlichman to have my brother's activi-
ties monitored to determine whether
this was in fact occurring. I subsequently
learned that the surveillance revealed
? no attempts to compromise my brother
or myself and that the surveitlance was
? therefore terminated.
With respect to my answer to Inter-
rogatory No. 3 concerning F.B.I. or
? C.I.A. capability to intercept telephonic
or other communications involving cer-
tain foreign embassies, the complete
state of my knowledge is as set forth
? in that answer.
With respect to my answer to Inter-
? rogatory No. 4 concerning the unauthor-
? ized entry into a place of business, it is
;my recollection that: ?
? A. The entry was into the office of a
? psychiatrist.
! 1.1 do not know? on what date the
entry occurred.
C..! recetied the information front
the counsel to the President, John Dean,
In a conversation on March 17, 1973.
? D. I did not directly authorize or ap-
prove of the action.
E. I learned of the event nearly two
years after it occurred and therefore had
? no reason to act to terminate it.
With respect to my answer to Inter-
rogatory No. 5, the complete state of
my knowledge is as set forth in that
answer.
With respect to my answer to Inter-
rogatory No. 9, it is my recollection
? that:
A. I learned from J. Edgar Hoover
? that during each of the five previous
Administrations which he had served as
Director of the F.B.I., that agency had
conducted, without a search warrant,
? telephonic intercepts in connection with
Investigations to discover the sources
of unauthorized disclosures of classified
Information. I also learned, perhaps
from Mr. Hoover or others, that prior
? Administrations had engaged in sur-
reptitious entries and intercepts of voice
? and non-voice communications.
B. My understanding was that these
activities, or certain of them, had taken
place at various times during each of
? the five Administrations preceding mine.
? C. My information concerning the ma
of telephonic intercepts by prior A+Inmt-
istrations to discover the sources of
? unauthorized disclosures of classified
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information came from the Director of
the F.B.I. in discussions in which he in-
formed me that based upon over 20
years' experience, the F.B.I. had con-
cluded that this investigative method
e. as the most effective means of dis-
covering the source of unauthorized dis-
closures, with regard to the use of un-
authorized entries and intercepts of
voice and nonvoice communications by
prior Administrations, I cannot specif-
ically recall when and from whom I re-
ceived the information except as re-
flected in the special report of the Inter-
agency Committee on Intelligence (ad
hoc).
Interrogatory 34
I assume that the reference to "actions
otherwise 'illegal'" in this interrogatory
means actions which if. undertaken
by private persons, would violate crim-
inal laws. It is quite obvious that
there are certain inherently governmen-
tal actions which, if undertaken by
the sovereign in protection of the
? interest of the nations' security, are
lawful but which, if undertaken by
'private persons, are not. In the most
extreme case, for example, forceable
removal of persons form their homes
for the purpose of sequestering them
? In confined areas, if done by a person?
or even by government employees under
normal circumstances?would be consid-
erect kidnapping and unlawful imprison-
ment. Yet under the exigencies of war,
President Roosevelt, acting pursuant
to a broad war-powers delegation from
Congress, ordered such action be taken
against Americans of Japanese ancestry
because he believed it to be in the
? interest of national security. Similarly
under extreme conditions but not at
that point constituting a declared war,
President Lincoln confiscated vessels
? violating a naval blockade, seized rail
and telegraph lines leading to Washing-
ton, and paid troops from Treasury
? funds without the required Congression-
al appropriation. In 1969, during my
Administration, warrantless wire-
? tapping, even by the Government, was
unlawful, but if Undertaken because
of a Presidential determination that
It Was in the interest of a national
? security was lawful. Support for the
legality of such action is found, for
example, in the concurring opinion of
Justice White in Katz v. United States.
This is not to say, of course, that
any action President might authorize
in the interest of national security
would be lawful. The Supreme Court's
? disapproval of President Truman's
seizure of the steel mills is an ex-
ample. But it is naive to attempt
to categorize activities a President
might authorize as "legal" or "illegal"
without reference to the circumstances
under which he concludes that the
activity is necessary. Assassination of
a foreign leader?an act I never had
cause to consider and which under
most circumstances would be abhorrent
to any President?might have been less
abhorrent and, in fact, justified during
World War II as a means of preventing
further Nazi atrocities and ending the
? slaughter. Additionally, the opening of
mail sent to selected priority targets
of foreign intelligence, although imping-
ing upon individual freedom, may never-
theless serve a salutory purpose when?
as it has in the past?it results in
preventing the disclosure of sensitive
military and state secrets to the enemies
of this country.
? In short, there have been?and will
be in the future?circumstances in
which Presidents may lawfully author-
ize actions in the interests of the securi-
ty of this country, which, if undertaken
by other persons or even by the Pres-
ident under? different circumstances,
would be illegal.
Interrogatory 39
It is my present recollection that
the Sept. 15, 1970, meeting referred
to in Interrogatory No. 36 was held
for the purpose of discussing the pros-
pect of Salvador Allende's election to
the Presidency of Chile. At that time,
as more fully set forth in response
to Interrogatory No. 44, I was greatly
concerned that Mr. Allende's presence,
in that office would directly and ad-
versely affect the security interests of
' the United States. During the meeting
, in my office, I informed Mr. Helms
? that I wanted the C.I.A. to determine
whether it was possible for a political
? opponent of Mr. Allende to be elected
President by the Chilean Congress. It
' was my opinion that any effort to
bring about a political defeat of Mr.
Allende could succeed only if the partic-
ipation of the C.I.A. was not disclosed.
Therefore, I instructed Mr. Helms that
the C.I.A. should proceed covertly. I
further informed Mr. Helms that to
be successful, any effort to defeat Mr.
Allende would have to be supported
by the military factions in Chile.
Because the C.I.A.'s covert activity in
supporting Mr. Allende's political op-
ponents might at some point be discov-
ered, I instructed that the American
embassy in Chile not be involved. I
did this so that the American embassy
could remain a viable operation regard-
less of the outcome of the, election.
I further instructed Mr. Helms and
Dr. Kissinger that any action which
the United States could take which
might impact adversely on the Chilean
economy ? such as terminating all
foreign aid assistance to Chile except
that for humanitarian purposes?should
be taken as an additional step in pre-
venting Mr. Allende from becoming
President of Chile, thereby negating
the Communist influence within that
country.
- Interrogatory 44
In 1964 Salvador Allende made a
very strong bid for the Presidency of
Chile. I was awake that at that time
the incumbent Administration in the
United States determined that it was
In the interests of this nation to impede
Mr. Allende's becoming President be-
cause of his alignment with and support
from various Communist countries,
? especially Cuba. It is important to re-
member, of course, that President Ken-
nedy, only two years before, had faced
the Cuban crisis in which the Soviet
Union had gained a military base of
operations in the Western Hemisphere
and had even begun installation of
nuclear missiles. The expansion of Cu-
ban-styled Communist infiltration into
Chile Would have provided a "beach-
head" for guerrilla operations throughout
South America. There was a great deal
of concern expressed in 1964 and again
in 1970 by neighboring South American
countries that if Mr. Allende were elect-
ed President, Chile would quickly be-
come a haven for Communist operatives
who could infiltrate and undermine in-
dependent governments throughout
South America. I was aware that the
Administration of President Kennedy
and President Johnson expended ap-
proximately $4 million on behalf of
Mr. Allende's opponents and had pre-
vented Mr. Allende from becoming Pres-
ident.
It was in this context that in Septem-
ber 1970, after Mr. Allende had received
a plurality but not a majority of the
12
general electorate's votes, that T deter-
mined that the C.I.A. should atlernnt
to bring about Mr. Allende's dele..t:
in the Congressional election procedure.
The same national security interests
which I had understood prompted Pre,:-
Idents Kennedy and Johnson to act froei
1962 to 1964 prompted my conceiai
and the decision to act in 1970.
Interrogatory 45
I do not recall discussing during
the Sept. 15, 1970 meeting specific
means to be used by the C.I.A. to
attempt to prevent Mr. Allende from
assuming the Presidency of Chile. I
recall the meeting as one that focused
upon the policy considerations which
should influence my decision to act
and upon the general means available
to accomplish the objective. As I have
previously stated, I recall discussing
the direct expenditure of funds to assist
Mr. Allende's opponents, the termina-
tion of United States financial aid and
assistance programs as a means of
adversely affecting the Chilean economy
and the effort to enlist support of
various factions, including the military,
behind a candidate who could defeat
Mr. Allende in the Congressional confir-
mation procedure.
?I do not recall specifically Issuing
Instructions that the activity being con-
ducted by" the C.I.A. in Chile not be
disclosed to the Department of State
or the Department of Defense. However,
? I do recall instructing that the C.I.A.'s
activities in Chile be carried out covert-
ly in order to be effective and that
knowledge of the C.I.A.'s actions be
!kept on a need-to-know basis only.
Interrogatory 48
I do not recall being aware that
the C.I.A.'s activities in Chile were
being carried out under designations
such as "Track I" or "Track II." In
any event, I do not know what, if
any, of the C.I.A.'s activities in Chile
were known to:
t A. Secretary of State Rogers;
. B. Secretary of Defense Laird;
C. Under Secretary of State for Politi-
cal Affairs U. Alexis Johnson;
D. Deputy Secretary of Defense (Da-
vid) Packard; or
E. Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff
Adm. (Thomas) Moorer.
Interrogatory 52
My present recollection is that in
mid-October 1970, Dr. Kissinger in-
formed me that the C.I.A. had reported
to him that their efforts to enlist the
support of various factions in attempts
by Mr. Allende's opponents to prevent
Allende from becoming President hld
:not been successful and likely \voc:d
not be. Dr. Kissinger told me that
under the circumstances he had in
-
strutted the C.I.A. to abandon tli;.1
fort. I informed Dr. Kissinger that
agreed with that instruction.
Interrogatory 54
I do not recall receiving information,
while President, concerning plans for
a military coup in Chile involvim; the
kidnapping of Gen. Rend Schneider or
any other Chilean.
? Interrogatory 55
My recollection is that I -wes not
aware that the C.I.A. passed m.tchin
guns or other material to Chilean mili-
tary officials known to the C.I.A. to
be planning a coup attempt.
Interrogatory 56
I recall that during I believe, 5ptru
her 1970, I received a call from ;',1r.
Donald Kendall [chairman of I;(1,1,1..,/,
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Inc.] who informed me that Mr. Augus-
tin Edwards [owner of the Chilean
newspaper El Mercurio of Santiago],
a man I had met during my years
in private life, was in this country
and was interested in informing appro-
priate officials here concerning recent
developments in Chile. I told Mr. Ken-
dall that be should have Mr. Edwards
talk to Dr. Kissinger or Attorney Gener-
al Mitchell, who was a member of
the National Security Council. I do
not recall whether I subsequently in-
structed either Mr. Mitchell or Dr. Kis-
singer to meet with Mr. Edwards. It
is quite possible that I did.
Interrogatory 57
I do not recall directing Mr. Helms
to meet with ?Mr. Edwards nor do
I recall instructing anyone on my staff
to so instruct him.
Interrogatory 58
I do not recall that either the timing
or the purpose of the Sept. 15, 1970,
meeting concerning Chile had any rela-
tionship to Mr. Augustin Edwards' pres-
ence in Washington or the information
he may have conveyed to Dr. Kissinger,
Attorney General Mitchell or Director
Helms. Therefore, I do not believe that
any instructions Director Helms may
have received during that meeting were
given as a result of information, con-
cerning conditions in Chile, supplied
from Mr. Edwards to Mr. Kendall.
Interrogatory 59
I do not remember informing Mr.
Kendall, in words or substance, that
I would see to it that the C.I.A. received
appropriate instructions so as to allow
It to take action aimed at preventing
Allende from becoming President of
Chile.
Interrogatory 60 -
T do not recall_ receiving information,
while President, that the International
? Telephone and Telegraph Corporation
had made any offer of money to the
United States Government to be used
for the purpose of preventing Allende
from taking office.
Interrogatory 65
None of the instructions I recall issu-
ing prior to Mr. Allende's becoming
President of Chile, nor any of the infor-
mation I recall receiving during that
period, led me to believe that it was
necessary to issue instructions to the
C.I.A., to insure that Chilean military
officials, with whom the United States
had been in contact prior to Allende's
inauguration, knew it was not the desire
of the United States Government that a
military coup topple the Allende Gov-
ernment.
Interrogatory 67
It is my opinion that the actions which
I authorized the C.I.A. to take in Sep-
tember 1970 to prevent Mr. Allende
from becoming President of Chile, and
which with my approval were termi-
nated in October 1970, were not a fac-
tor in bringing about the 1973 military
coup.
Interrogatory 73
Considering the pressures and the
enormous problems confronted by the
intelligence community, I believe that,
with some unfortunate exceptions, the
quality of intelligence received during
my Administration .was relatively ade-
quate. Intelligence collection is a very
difficult, highly sophisticated art and
the United States has progressed in its
_development. Naturally, any President,
holding the tremendous power he does
?including the power to wage nuclear
war--desires and needs the very best
intelligence information available. It is
comforting, for example, when sitting
down to difficult negotiations, to know
the fallback positions of our adversaries
or their areas of vulnerability?an ad-
vantage that can be gained or lost not
only through adept intelligence work
but through deliberate or unwitting
leaks of such information; 'a' problem I
faced at various times during my Ad-
ministration and have referred to earlier.
Desiring the very best intelligence
information, of course, will in itself
lead a President to believe that inprove-
ments are possible and warranted. On
the international level, for example,
better intelligence concerning the 1973
Yom Kippur war in the Middle East
might have permitted moves to avert
it. On the domestic front, the need
for improved information is equally
as great. Terrorist activity, in the United
States, which had reached unprecedent-
ed heights in the late 1960's and early
1970's, seems again to be on the in-
creas. The tragic bombing at La Guardia
Airport, in which 11 persons were killed,
may only be a forerunner to a new
round of premeditated violence. It was
In a similar context in 1970?a time
at which incidents of bombings and
hijacidngs had reached an all-time high
?that I requested officials of the vari-
ous intelligence agencies to evaluate
domestic intelligence capabilities in this
country and to recommend steps for
Its improvement. What many persons
'refused to recognize when the existence
of the Huston evaluation became
known, but what your committee's in-
vestigation has now established beyond
doubt, is that none of the recommenda-
tions contained in the Huston evaluation
departed from actions taken under at
least four or five earlier Administra-
tions. Indeed, the recommendations set
forth in that study were in most re-
spects similar to the recommendations
emanating from the current reviews
of the intelligence community. The dif-
ference, of course, was that in utilizing
the various intelligence methods sug-
gested, such as C.I.A. informants within
;the United States to trace Communist
;alliances with terrorist organizations
:who had threatened domestic violence
to protest the iVetnam War, any Admin-
istration was viewed as bent upon
stifling dissenting political views. The
intermixture of protected political ac-
tivity, civil disobedience, and acts of
terrorism?all under the antiwar rubric
?was so great that to move against
terrorism was to be guilty of political
suppression. Unfortunately, the tools
available to get at the one while avoid-
ing the other were not as delicate
as the surgeon's scalpel. Perhaps this
committee's recommendations In the
area of improved domestic intelligence
will more closely resemble the in-
struments of a surgeon. If, however,
by overreacting to past excesses this
committee impedes domestic or foreign
intelligence capabilities, it may later
find that in a period of terrorists bomb-
ings, kidnapping and assassinations, the
public interest will require more author-
itarian measures?despite their impact
on personal liberties?than the more
delicate but less effective alternatives.
Interrogatory 77 .
In 1947 as a freshman Congressman
and member of the Herter Committee.
I visited a devastated European conti-
nent. Seeing Berlin in the agonies of
partition and seeing Italy under the
severe challenge of Communist take-
over. Indeed, seeing Europe emerge from
war in an age of stark ideeloeical con-.
'filet?all these as well as other factors
fostered my firm belief in the need for
13
strong, determined and effective in-
telligence system- during a period of .
cold war.
The world has change since 1947, and
_ i-have been privileged to have played
a role in much of that change. Traeical-
CY. however, there is much that has not
changed. The realities of international
war Man age of stark ideological con-
intelligence or for an agency of intelli-
gence. Throughout history, where the
great powers are concerned, during a
period of d?nte the danger of war
goes down but the danger of conquest
without war goes up.
Consequently, I have found recent ef-
forts to emasculate the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and related intelligence
organizations to be not only incredibly
shortsighted but potentially dangerous
to the security of all free nations. The
greatest disservice of the Select Com-
mittee would be to take any action or
make any recommendation which would
diminish by the slightest degree the
capabilities , of our intelligence corn-
. munity.
Even as a distant observer I can say
without reservation that the revelations
and investigations over the past year
have had the obvious effect of lessening
United States intelligence capabilities
-in the world. Even the least sophisti-
cated among us can see that morale
among these essential public servants,
is probably at .an all-time low.
The Issue of Responsible Journalism
The secrecy that is crucial to a suc-
cessful intelligence system has been
_routinely violated, causing in many
quarters a casual indifference to the
need for security. For the national me-
dia to publish and disseminate classified
national security information is in my
view irresponsible journalism. That they
and those who leak classified informa-
tion to them in violation of the law
would continue to be oblivious to the
harm they are doing to the nation
reflects not on their patriotism but
on their intelligence and judgment.
From my experience in the Executive
branch I would be prepared to predict
that because of what has happened
over .the -past year, vital intelligence
sources have dried up. I am certain
that other governments' readiness to
accept our word as bond and to be
assured that we can keep their confi-
dences have steadily diminished. What
new opportunities have been lost or
what unwished consequences we might
have suffered becaus of constant at-
tacks in the media and by the Congress
are not possible to know. It is all
too likely that we will learn of them
"the hard way."
I realize it is in vogue to rail against
covert activities and clandestine opera-
tions. Some have even rhetorically ques-
tioned the very need for secrecy in
the conduct of foreign affairs. Perhaps
there was a time when some of this
criticism was necessary or even helpful.
However, I think that paraphrasing an
old aphorism is apt here: Nothing ex-
ceeds like excess.
The pendulum has swung too far.
? Were today's conditions in existence
seven years ago it is highly questionable .
whether the historic new opening could
have been made to the People's Republic
of China. Efforts to get the return
of our P.O.W.'s and achieve an honora-
ble peace in Vietnam might well have
been aborted. Significant new initiatives ?
in the Middle East would have been
delayed. Nuclear arms limitations arel
other agreements with the Soviet Unieo.
--difficult.achievements under 1.1.e! le
of conditions?would have been mu ee,
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more difficult.
Recommendations For Reform
Therefore, I make the following rec-
orimendations:
1. That Congressional oversight re-
sponsibilities, which are appropriate as
a mechanism for legislative participation
in the policy decisions affecting intelli-
gence activities be delegated to a joint
Committee consisting of not more than
12 Senators and Representatives.
2. That no information or material
made available to the Joint Oversight
Committee be made available to any
Congressional staff member, except the
staff of the Joint Committee, which
should be limited to not more than
six members.
3. That a statute be enacted making
It a criminal violation to reveal to
any unauthorized person information
classified pursuant to applicable law
or executive order.
4 That a committee consisting of rep-
resentatives from each of the intelligence
agencies be established to coordinate.'
their respective activities.
5. That the Joint Intelligence Commit-
tee study the question of the extent
to Which continued limitations on C.I.A.
'domestic intelligence activities, where
there is a direct connection to matters
of foreign espionage, sabotage or coun-
terintelligence, should be continued.,
Freedom without security produces
anarchy. Security without freedom pro-
duces dictatorship. Maintaining the deli?
cate balance between freedom and se-
curity has been the genius of the Ameri-
can democracy and the reason it has
survived for 200 years. Failure to pro-
vide this balance has been the cause
for the failure of democratic govern-
ments to survive in many other parts.
of the world.
The Executive, the Congress, and
the Judiciary have inherited a great
legacy and have a special responsibility
to maintain that balance so that Our
'American system of government will
continue to survive in a time when
security and freedom are in jeopardy
at home and abroad.
? It 'is important at this 'time to step
back and assess not only what action
should or must be taken with respect
to a particular matter, but also the
"Immediate circumstances which seem
to compel that action be taken at
all. In assessing the present circum-
stances, it is my opinion that the indis-
criminate denigration that has been
heaped recently upon the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and our other intelligence
agencies has been most unfortunate. In
the zeal of some to reform and others
to expose, we have come very near
throwing the baby out with the bath
water. We live in imperfect times in
an uncertain world. As a nation we
need every possibly capability, not
merely to survive but to be better
able to ? build the kind of world in
peace that has been man's perpetual
goal. I fear that the moralizing and
posturing with regard to our intelligence
agencies over the past year have caused
us to lose much or that capability.
Let us hope that it does not cause
us to lose the peace.
Approved
EDITOR & PUBLISHER
28, FEBRUARY 1976
The intelligence report
The Daniel Schorr?VillageVoice?intelligence report con-
troversy will continue for some time and could be damaging
to press freedom. Certainly, it has done nothing for the
advancement of a "shield law" in Congress..
Publication of the secret document, the leaked story, has
been prevalent in recent months and years. This one,. how-
ever, has an ingredient not present in other such cases. ?
Editors, columnists and reporters ought to examine it from
the point of view of the average reader or citizen. .
This was not a report being suppressed by a bureaucrat,-a
government agency, or a congressional committee. Essen-
tial parts of the report had been reported but the full text
:was not available until Schorr obtained a .copy. Schorr
noted: "I could not be the one responsible for suppressing
. the report."
. What made him think this was his sole responsibility?
Publication of the report had been approved by the House
? Select Committee on Intelligence. But, the full membership
of the House voted to countermand that decision until the
report had been cleansed of what it believed to be important
classified information.
This was not a whimsical decision. Enough members of the -
House were convinced of its importance to national security
to take another look.
? We are aware of and sensitive to all the arguments about
the "people's right to know." We have used them repeatedly
on this page and we remain dedicated to that Principle.
However, here, for the first time to our recollection, the
people's elected representatives (the House of Representa-
' tives) decided in behalf of the people (its constituency) that
information of importance to the national security (the
people's security) should be re-examined before it was re-
leased.
At that point, a member of the press disagreed and took it
upon himself to act as the people's surrogate in releasing the
information in .spite of the fact that the people's elected
surrogate decided otherwise. It brings up the charges we
have all heard before: "Who elected the press?" And, more
and more people are asking themselves that question,
rightlY or wrongly.
This is a difficult issue for the press. It must insist on its
right to investigate, to probe, to uncover, to expose, to re-
port. But, can-it expect the support and appreciation of its
readers if it exposes national security and/or international
intelligence information that a majority of the House of
Representatives believes should not be revealed? It is a
confrontation in which we believe the press. will come out
second best.
WASHINGTON POST
6 MARCH 1976
ersonali ties
? Seven Days, a successor to the radi- ?
, cal magazine ' Ramparts, was an-
nounced Thursday night in New York.
David Dellinger, former Chicago
Seven Defendant, who will be an edi-
tor, announced the new magazine.
whose first issue will be out next
week.
Ramparts was the first American
publication to expose covert activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Dellinger said Seven Days will have
as contributors New York Times in-
vestigative reporter Seymour Ilersh,
and former CIA agent Philip Agee,
tvho has written a book about. the
14
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SATURDAY REVIEW
6 March 1976
Have We Gone
Overboard
on "The Right
to Know"?
Ironically, requirements
for complete disclosure
of information could
make it impossible
for government
to operate effectively.
by Warren Bennis
The British Foreign Office gives its
he
diplomats three cardinal
rules of behavior: (1) never tell a lie,
(2) never tell the whole truth, and (3)
?never miss a chance to go to the bath-
room. An old Tammany boodler, who
disliked leaving any traces of his deal-
? ings, had a terser rule: "Don't write.
Send word." Both sets of rules, I fear,
are likely to become more and more a
? tacit standard of conduct for those who,
in the post-Watergate climate of suspi-
cion, share the hazardous privilege of
running large organizations, including,
in my own case, the nation's second
largest urban multiversity.
? Never before have the American peo-
ple felt such universal distrust of their
presumed leaders?whether in govern-
ment, the law, the clergy, or education.
After years of calculated deception
over Vietnam, compounded by the con-
? spiracy, skulduggery, and chicanery of
Watergate, they now trust almost no one
in authority. Consider a recent Gallup
? survey in which college students were
asked to rate the honesty and ethical
standards of various groups: political
officeholders (only 9 percent rated
"very high") were eclipsed only by
advertising men (6 percent); lawyers
were rated 40 percent, and journalists 49
percent. I am proud that college teachers
rated highest (70 percent), but inasmuch
as college presidents were not included,
I can't seek shelter under that umbrella.
Ralph Nader received a higher rating
than President Ford, Henry Kissinger,
and Ted Kennedy. Labor leaders came
out even worse than business executives
?19 percent of the former rated high
versus 20 percent for the latter.
In short, virtually all leaders tare in the
doghouse of suspicion. And the under-
Warren Bennis. an authority on manage-
meta. systems and organizatiimal develop-
ment, is president of rhe University of CM-
cinnad. his article appears heir by special
. arrangement with Harvard Magazine.
standable reaction to all these credibility
gaps is creating a growing insistence that
every public act, of whatever public in-
stitution, be conducted, as it were, in
Macy's window.
Here are some symptoms.
? "Sunshine laws" have now been
passed by numerous states, prohibiting
closed meetings. Hawaii has even made
it a crime to hold a private meeting of
any sort without giving advance notice.
? The Buckley Amendment requires
that in institutions with federal support
all records (particularly those concern-
ing students) be open to inspection by
persons concerned.
? The Freedom of Information Act,
first passed in 1967 and recently strength-
ened over the President's veto by amend-
,,meats that became effective on Febru-
ary 19, 1975, requires that most records
of federal agencies be provided to any-
one upon request.
The intended purpose of all such mea-
sures is wholesome. It is to create a stan-
dard, for all public business, of what
Woodrow Wilson called "open cove-
nants openly arrived at." I believe whole-
heartedly in such a purpose. During many
years of consulting, teaching, and writ-
ing on the achievement of organizational
goals (for all organizations, but particu-
larly those of business and government),
I have always stressed the importance of
openness.'! have argued that goals will
be achieved effectively almost in propor-
tion to the extent that the organization
can achieve a climate in which members
can level with one another in open and
trusting interpersonal relationships. I be-
lieve this, because denial, avoidance, or
suppression of truth will ultimately flaw
decision-making and, in the case of busi-
ness, the bottom line as well.
So, I dislike secrecy. I think the
prophet Luke was right when he wrote,
"Nothing is secret, that shall not be made
manifest." And I believe Emerson's law
of compensation: "In the end, every
secret is told, every crime is punished,
every virtue rewarded, in silence and
certainty." At the same time, as a prac-
tical administrator, I am convinced that
these well-intended goldfish-bowl rules
will have unintended results worse than
the evils they seek to forestall. They are
likely to produce more secrecy, not less
(only more carefully concealed), and on
top of it, so hamstring already overbur-
dened administrators as to throw their
tasks into deeper confusion.
For secrecy is one thing. Confiden-
tiality is another. No organization can
fu iction effectively without certain de-
grees of confidentiality in the proposals,
steps, and discussions leading up to its
decisions?which decisions should then,
of course, be open, and generally will be.
An amusing case in point: the Nixon
government moved heaven and earth
seeking to restrain, perhaps even im-
prison, New York Tinier editors in their
determination to publish the Pentagon
Papers. The Times won the right from
15
the Supreme Court (under some continu-
ing criminal risk) to resume publishing
these assertedly "secret" studies of Viet-
nam War decisions. Yet the editors them-
selves surrounded their preparation of
these stories with a secrecy and security
that the Pentagon might have envied?
renting a secret suite of hotel rooms,
swearing the members of a small secret
staff to total secrecy, for weeks confining
them almost like prisoners, restricting
their communications to an elite hand-
ful with "need to know," and setting the
stories themselves on sequestered, closely
guarded typesetting machines. Thus the
, ultimate challenge to "official" secrecy,
was performed in ultimate "private" se-
crecy. What the Times editors knew, of
course, was what every decision-maker
knows instinctively. The mere fact of dis-
cussions' becoming known, at the wrong
stage of the procedure, can prevent a
desirable decision from ultimately being
carried out.
We have seen this happen in the case
of the long, arduous, confidential nego-
tiations Secretary of State Kissinger was
making with the Soviets to tie trade con-
cessions to larger, mutually agreed
quotas of emigration for Soviet Jews.
Through quiet negotiation he had al-
ready obtained large but unstipulated
expansions of the actual numbers of
?gr? who began arriving in Israel
by the thousands. He obtained similar
agreement to larger expansions. But
zealous senatorial advocates of larger
emigration demanded that all this be put
in Macy's window?that it be publicly
recorded, that the Soviets publicly con-
firm what they were privately conced-
ing. The outcome was to rupture d?nte
itself and the progress already gained in
emigration.
ON A LESS COSMIC LEVEL, some experi-
ences of my own bring home how vital
confidentiality can be in determining
whether or not "open decisions openly
arrived at" can be made at all.
CASE NUMBER ONE. Shortly after I
had become president of the University
of Cincinnati, of which General Hospi-
tal, the city's largest, is apart, a U.S.
senator announced an investigation of
the whole-body radiation that was car-
ried out at General on terminal-cancer
patients. The charge, that the program
constituted "using human beings as
guinea pigs," was false, but there were
some awkward aspects in the way the
whole thing had been handled which
caused me to investigate the reasons pri-
vately.
The investigation was on the eve of a
Hamilton County election that was abso-
lutely crucial to the hospital, on which
thousands of the poor rely for treatment.
It was far from certain whether a major
bond levy for General Hospital would
pass or fail. It did pass, but during three
critical weeks I had either to evade all
questions, or fuzz my answers, relating
to my own and to the senator's investtga-
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tion. I never lied. I never told the whole
truth. I often went to the bathroom.
CASE NUMBER Two. Our university,
which began as a city-funded municipal
college and still receives from the city
of Cincinnati $4.5 million of the annual
$140 million budget, now draws the bulk
of its funding from the state. But it is
not a full state institution like Ohio
State. If it were fully state affiliated, it
would receive sufficient extra funds to
meet a worsening financial crisis. The
possibility of such affiliation therefore
not only needs to be considered but also
has to be considered; I would be derelict
in my duty to do otherwise.
But if we decided to seek full state
status, timing was very important, be-
cause it would involve not only action
by the legislature but also a change in the
city's charter. What was even more im-
portant, I learned to my sorrow, was con-
fidentiality. One of our state senators,
preparing for a television interview,
asked me whether it was all right for him
? to say that the university was "consid-
ering" such a move. I said certainly, be-
cause obviously I had to consider it. By
night this statement of the obvious was
"big" news flashing across my television
screen. By morning local and state poli-
ticians were making a pro-and-con bean
bag of the question, and by then the
furor was so great that it was difficult
even to weigh or discuss the problem on
its merits. Happily, that frenetic period
has now passed, and the question is
being calmly and thoughtfully debated:
but I learned a lesson.
CASE NUMBER THREE. Last year a
group of black graduate students
charged their college faculty with racism.
I met with this group and heard out their
grievances. I told them that if the fac-
ulty agreed, I would ask a blue-ribbon
panel of distinguished local citizens, in-
cluding two black leaders, to investigate
and report on the matter.
That was Wednesday. On the next
day, Thursday, the dean of the college
had arranged to meet with the faculty.
The plan was to make this proposal for
such a committee. I had no reason to
think that the faculty would object. But
by late Wednesday afternoon, the Cin-
cinnati Post was blazoning the entire
story: the protest meeting, my proposal
to the blacks, the Thursday meeting
arranged with the faculty, and so on.
Obviously, the protesters had "leaked"
the details of our meeting, apparently
assuming the disclosure would further
their cause. The opposite happened. The
faculty members were irritated by read-
ing about arrangements they had not
been consulted about. By the time I
could consult them, they were sufficiently
angry to vote down the whole proposal
of an outside committee. Werner Heis-
enberg's "uncertainty principle" affects
human as well as molecular relations:
the mere act of observing a process pub-
licly can impede the process itself.
So, in my own mind it is certainly
clear that there are times when confiden-
tiality is a necessary prerequisite to pub-
lie decisions for the public benefit. Bul
when one asks, or is asked, where this
desirable good blends into the undesir-
able evil of secrecy?for secrecy's own
sake or for concealing mistakes?it is
hard to set any very clear or definitive
? standards or rules of thumb. One almet
has to come back always to the charm-
? ter and the integrity of the individual
concerned. If he or she is worthy of
, trust, his judgment must be trusted as C..s
when, and under what circumstances,
? confidentiality is required.
Unquestionably, however, certain in-
dividuals are by nature so obsessed with
secrecy and concealment that one sw-
pects that, as infants, they were given ta,
hiding their feces from their parents.
One thinks immediately of Richard
Nixon. His former speech writer, Wa-
liam Safire, reveals in his book, Aftw
the Fall, that Nixon was so secretive tit=
prior to his election, he mistrusted even
the Secret Service men guarding him. His
foreign-policy adviser, Richard Allen,
wanted to bring him together with Anna
Chennault, widow of the Flying Tiger
general, who was pulling strings to block
a Johnson bombing pause in North Viet-
nam. "Meeting would have to be absz-
lute top secret," wrote Allen, to "D
(Nixon's code name). Secretive ?la
D C scribbled opposite this referensa
to "top secret": "Should be but I don't
see how?with the SS [Secret Servicel
If it can be [secret] RN would like
see?if not could Allen see for RN?'
Note that for extra secrecy, he even
writes of himself in the third perso4
C, even to himself, is R N.
We all know where this excessive pas-
sion for secrecy led. Kissinger not only
had Safire's phone tapped but also re-
corded?without his knowledge?conver-
sations with such co-equals as budge
director George Shultz. Safire has
written: "This tolerance of eavesdrop-
ping was the first step down the Water-
gate road. It led to eavesdropping by
the plumbers, to attempted eavesdrop-
ping on the Democratic National Corn-
mittee, and to the ultimately maniacaa
eavesdropping by the President, on the
President, for the President, completing
the circle and ensuring retribution.
Eavesdropping to protect Presidential!
confidentiality led to the greatest hemor-
rhage of confidentiality in American his-
? tory and to the ruination of many good
men."
? Indeed, I sometimes think it is such
needless passion for secrecy in many of
our institutions, corporate as well as gov-
ernmental, that has set off the present
demand to wash, as it were, all public in-
formation in Macy's window. It has set
off, as well, the unprecedented epidemic
of public litigiousness, so that every
leader of any institution now has to con-
sult his lawyer about even the most
trivial decisions.
So even while I defend the need for
confidentiality, I argue for the utmost
possible openness?for "leveling"?in
every institutional hierarchy. In the Six-
? ties, when I made some organizational
studies for the State Department, I quick-
ly learned that junior foreign-service offi-
cers often decided not to tell their boss
what they knew from the field situation
(they believed that the boss would not
accept the advice) only to learn later
that the boss felt the same way but in
turn kept silent for fear that his boss
would disapprove. This went on, up and
down the line, to the very top. Although
each privately knew what was right, all
enclosed themselves in a pluralistic
ignorance, much like the husband and
wife, neither of whom wants to go to a
movie but thinks that the other does, so
that both go although neither wants to.
It is reminiscent of Khrushchev's an-
swer, at his New York press conference,
to one of the written questions handed
up to him: "You were close to Stalin.
What were you doing during all his
crimes you later exposed?" Khrushchev
was livid with rage. "Who asked that
question? Let him stand up." Nobody
stood. "That's what I was doing," said
Khrushchev.
People in power have to work very
hard to get their own key people to tell
them what they do know and what they
truly feel. But the whole Vietnam mess
is a study in the failure, by people who
knew better, to say what they really
knew?either while they were in power
or after they had resigned because they
could no longer stomach the ascending
pyramid of lies and deceptions.
WE ARE LEFT with a paradox. The more
.we can establish internal truth?true
openness, true candor, true- leveling?
within an organization and its hierarchy,
the better able it will be to define, and
defend, the proper areas of external con-
fidentiality. Once an executive is con-
vinced that the enemy is not across
the hall but across the street, the less in-
clined he will be, so to speak, to hide his
feces.
Nevertheless, the national mania for
"full information" is very much with us
and is now part of the turbulent social
environment that every administrator
must deal with. Dealing with it wisely
will challenge all his tolerance for am-
biguity. Freud's definition of maturity
was the ability to accept and deal with
ambiguity.
Among colleges one result is already
clear. The Buckley Amendment is laud-
able in its intent. But henceforth school
and college administrators are going to
be chary of putting any very substan-
tive information into any student's rec-
ord. What will be set down will be so
bland and general as to be useless, for
example, to college-entrance officials
who want to make a considered judg-
ment of an applicant's overall merits. If,
for example, he had threatened to cut a
teacher's throat but had not done so, he
could scarcely be described as "possibly
unstable." The student or his parents
might sue.
Edward Levi, the new Attorney (fen -
16
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eral, who was the dean of Chicago's
law school and president of the univer-
sity, is able to see these problems from
all those perspectives. As a respected
? civllr libertarian, he has publicly ex-
posed flagrant abuses by the FBI's late
director, J. Edgar Hoover?most notably
an asinine "Cointel" game of sending
anonymous letters to both Mafia and
? Communist leaders with the intention
of stirring up conflict between them. At
the same time Attorney General Levi
has stressed the necessity of confidenti-
? ality, not only for government but also
? for private groups and citizens. As for
Wilson's famed "open covenants," Levi
quotes Lord Devlin: "What Wilson
meant to say was that international
agreements should be published; he did
not mean that they should be negoti-
ated in public."
In government the Macy's-window
syndrome is going to make for greater
inefficiency, because officials are going
to spend more and more of their time
processing requests for documents on
past actions instead of? applying the
same energy to future actions. Levi
? points out that the FBI, which received
447 "freedom of information" requests
in all of 1974, last year received 483
requests in March alone.
? Such demands can, it seems, be self-
defeating. One suit to compel disclosure
of Secretary Kissinger's off-record brief-
ing on the 1974 Vladivostok nuclear-
arms negotiations yielded 57 pages of
? transcript, but three pages were with-
POST, Vicksburg, Miss.
19 Feb. 1976
held on grounds that "attribution to Mr.
Kissinger could damage national secur-
? ity." What is more important is that it
? raised the question of whether any
future briefings would be equally infor-
mative?or, in some cases, discontinued
entirely. As the Supreme Court ob-
served, even while denying President
Nixon's right to withhold the crucial
Watergate tapes: "Human experience
teaches that those who expect public dis-
semination of their remarks may well
temper candor with a concern for ap-
pearances and for their own interests to
the detriment of the decision-making
process."
In the case of meetings of public
bodies?school boards, college regents,
and the like?the disclosure mania will
make for more and more cliques that
meet privately beforehand to agree on
concerted actions subsequently revealed
only at the public meeting. What is
likely to emerge are the "pre-meeting
meetings" that novelist Shepherd Mead
described in ad-agency conferences in
his The Great Ball of Wax.
In every important decision that is
likely to impinge on this new "right to
know," there will likely be far fewer
written, recorded discussions, far more
private, verbal discussions, far more
tacit rather than "official" decisions. And
there will be more winks than signa-
tures ("don't write; send word") if for
no other reason than the avoidance of
some new capricious lawsuit. The pub-
Dean Rusk On The CIA
Speaking: at the John, -.Stennis
Forum on POlitics at Mississippi
State Unii;ersity, foal-ter Secretary
of State Dean Rusk said there is a
? "definite need" for a strong Central
Intelligente Agency and some form
of secrecy should be maintained in
? CIA operns. Mr: Rusk also
?enterrted7There is a mean, dirty,
unpleasant back-alley contest going
on in the.world and many countries
are participating. We must keep our
hands .in it with some form of in-
telligence gathering." He said the
American people have a right to
know about intelligence operations,
but America's press should not play
a "snooping game" with the CIA.
Probably no agency has been
under such deadly publicity as the
CIA. It has become fashionable to
charge the agency with every type
of wrongdoing whether. In this
country or .abroad. It is. trite that in
many instances the CIA has over-
stepped its bounds; and has violated
constitutional rights on some in-
dividuals. But wedo not believe the
sins of the CIA, so publicized, have
brought any type of. confidence in
lie will be learning more and more about
things of less and less importance. It will
be poorer served- by administrators try-
ing to fight their way through irrelevant
demands for "full information" about
old business, to the neglect of attending
to new business.
I am not saying that individuals who
have been unjustly accused should not
be able, as Freedom of Information pro-
vides, to examine their own dossiers. Nor
am I saying it is unwholesome for any
government or public agency to be
prodded out of its passion for hiding its
mistakes under "classified" labels. That
kind of file cleaning is needed. Further-
more, scholars are finding the law to be
a great boon in gaining quicker access to
needed documents and archives.
' What I am saying is that in the long
run we are likely to get better govern-
ment, better decisions, if we focus our
energies on finding leaders whose innate
integrity, honesty, and openness will
make it unnecessary for us to sue them
or ransack their files later on. Attorney
General Levi, it seems to me, cuts to
the heart of the dilemma in this obser-
vation: "A right of complete confiden-
tiality in government could not only
produce a dangerous public ignorance
but destroy the basic representative func-
tion of government. But a duty of com-
plete disclosure would render impossible
the effective operation of govern-
ment."
0
0 1975 Harvard Magazine Inc. Reprinted by per-
mission.
what should be our teal source of
international intelligence. The CIA
is absolutely necessary to counter
the intelligence of other nations,-
particularly,those who are . un--
friendly. The Soviet KGB and other
international agencies of in-
telligence, have gained a definite
advantage over our intelligence
apparatus, which has been muted
while the present rage of in-'
vestigations has been carried on
and which has been reported in such
a widespread manner.
. There is dirty work in the world,
and it is to our very best interests to
be able to know about it and to..
counter. it. The Angola situation is a
good example, as Soviet-backed
Cubans are in the process of
din/eloping a foothold in that;
African country, but America, the:
supposed Champion of the free
world, has its hands tied because of,
the CIA investigations.
There should be strong and force-
ful supervision of the CIA but w.
should, avoid actions which tend ti-)'
restrict the effectiveness of tlie
agency.
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/1Er7 YORK Trms
12 March,. 1976
Colby and Semantics ?
To the Editor:
. William Colby's Feb. 26 013.14 arti-
cle, "After Investigating U.S. Intelli-
gence,"is surely a challenge to the
intelligence of mast Americans. Vir-
tually- the entire piece rests upon the
- existence and honorable behavior of
an undefined someone or something he
calls "intelligence." Only in the last
line is the shift made to "the best
intelligence service in the world." ?
If Mr. Colby means by "intelligence"
those Government agencies which con-
duct spying, data-gathering and covert
actions against foreign governments,
the limited Congressional and public
scrutiny he praises has already in?
validated his claim. If, on the other
hand, he is referring tO the data gath-
ered, the results of spying and the
long-run outcomes of covert actions,
his claim is hatdly justified without a,
much fuller disclosure of intelligence
agencies and their activities?at the
least the release of the House Com-
mittee report.
In light of President Ford's recent
initiatives to block forever the oppor-
tunity for accountability to anyone
other than himself, Mr. Colby's sug-
gestion that C.I.A. stand for "constitu-
tional intelligence for America? is an
utter debasement of both the U.S. Con-
stitution and the English language. Ilia
efforts to capitalize on a purported
swing of public opinion toward secrecy
.and national security are clearly bas.t.l
on air assutoption of American unto-
telligenCe. RICHARD K. SCHARC
Chicago,. Feb. 27,
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THE NEW REPUBLIC
13 March 1976
An Oriana Fallaci Interview
The CIA's Mr.
Oriana Fallaci, the Italian journalist, spent "one long
Friday morning and a long Sunday afternoon" in
February interviewing former CIA Director William
Colby at his home in Washington. She regards the
encounter as an "exhausting and nasty fight" between
spy and victim. But it was a strange fight. While her
voice "trembled with rage," Colby was unperturbed?
coo!, controlled, polite?as he ? answered ? her ac-
cusations. She thought she saw anger occasionally in ?
his blue eyes, but "his lips did not stop smiling, his
hands would not stop pouring coffee in my cup."
Oriana Fallaci: The names, Mr. Colby. The names of those
bastards who lock OA money in my country. Italy isn't some
banana republic of the United Fruit Company, Mr. Colby, and it
isn't right that the shadow of suspicion covers a whole political class.
Don't you think that Mr. Pertini, the president of the Italian
Parliament, should have those narneV
William Colby: No, because our House has said by vote
that those reports must- remain secret. CIA should
protect its associates and people who work for them. Of
course the decision to give or not to give those names
does not depend on CIA; it depends on the government
of the United States and I am not speaking for my
government; I'm speaking for CIA. But my judgment is
no; my recommendation would be no. No names. It's
the only thing I can do to maintain my agreement with
the people I worked with. . Those who feel covered by
the shadow that you talk about only have to stand up.
and deny Eirivolvement]. They only have to say, "It isn't
true, we didn't get the money." It's fine with me. I
cannot sacrifice Somebody for this theory that
somebody 'is under suspicion. I have promised those
men to keep the secret and !must maintain it because, if
I break my promise, when .I go to someone new he'll say
that my promise is no good. Why don't you ask the
Soviet government for the names of the Communists
who take Moscow's money in Italy? The Soviets are
doing exactly the same.
Fallaci: We'll talk later about the Russians, Mr. Colby. Now let's
talk about CIA. Tell me, please, if I came here, as a foreigner, and
financed an American party, and 21 of your politicians, and some of
your journalists, what would you do?
Colby: You would be doing an illegal thing and, ill found
it out, I would report it to the FBI and have you
airested.
Fallaci: Good. $o I should report you and your agents and your
ambassadors to the Italian police and have you all arrested.
Colby: I won't say that.
Fallaci: Why not? If it is illegal that I come here to corrupt your
politicians, it is as illegal that you come there and corrupt my
politkiaus.
Colby: I am not saying that you would corrupt. I am
saying that it is against our law for you to come and do
that.
Fallaci: It is also against mine, Mr. Colby! And I'll tell you more:
by
there is only one human type Mot is
corrupted one. It is the corruptor.
more disgusting than the
Colby: We don't corrupt at CIA. You may have a problem
with corruption in your society but it was in existence
long before CIA got there. Saying that we corrupt is
like saying that we give money to do things for us. That
isn't why we give money. We give money to- help
somebody to do what he wants and cannot do because
he hasn't enough money. We are basically supporting ,
the democratic countries and, of all the countries that
should understand this, Italy should. Because the
American assistance in Italy helped it from becoming an
authoritarian communist state for 30 years. . .
Fallaci: Your clients, as you call them in the Pike report. Tell me,
Mr. Colby, what do you mean by the word -clients'?
Colby: Well. . .what is an attorney doing when he deals
with a client? An attorney helps a client.
Fallaci: I see! Yoz consider yourself the attorney of the Christiani
Democrats and of the Social Democrats in, Italy.
Colby: Right. Well, no...1 will not Comment about any '
particular situation.
Fallaci: Why? Had you answered with a lie when saying "right"?
Colby: I don't lie And I suffer when they accuse me of
lying. - _Sometimes I refuse to give information;
sometimes I keep a secret; but never lie. My Congress
won't let me, my press either. The head of intelligence
in America cannot say that it is not true when it's teue.
Our intelligence is undee the law, not outside the law.
Anyway, I want to put a question to you: would it have
been right or not if America had helped the democratic
parties against Hitler? . ?
Fallaci: Here is mg answer, Mr. Colby. There is no Hitler in Italy.
And the 5S00,000 that Ambassador Graham Martin wanted to
' give to Gen. Vito Miceli, with Kissinger's blessing, did not end up
in democratic halals-. It ended up in the hands of Hitter's followers,
the neofascists.
Colby: I will not discuss any specific CIA operation. First,
I have great respect for Ambassador Martin. We have
been together indifferent parts of the world and I have
always found ,him a very strong ambassador, alwa3s
taking positions and responsibilities in the interest of
? the United States. Secondly, I believe that in this kind of
activity CIA can have a view and the government can
have another. It is up to the President to decide. In any
of these kinds .oloperations, CIA follows the directions
of its government. . . . Until a year ago, the President
' could call the head of CIA and say to him: "Do that and
don't tell anybody."
Fend: Good, goo-S. So it was really Nixon, with Kissinger of
course, who wantal to gine that money to Miceli. If you see them.
please thank them for the bombs ihat.neofascists built with L'Iitt
money.
Colby:. I cannot talk about that. I don't know. But 1 know
that neofascists in your country represent only eight
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? percent and I know that the real threat in Italy comes
from the Communists. Since the end of World War II
we have been helping the various democratic forces
against the Communist threat. And this lasted for 25,
no, 30 years.
Fallaci: And the result of that help, Mr. Caby, is that the
Communists are now alike borders of government. Let's be honest:
do you think all that money was well spent? Do you think that your
intelligence has been acting intelligently? '
Colby: .Usually we don't spend money for foolishness.
And you cannot judge things from-one factor alone, like
the last elections in Italy. Maybe American activities in
Italy.haven't been perfect, since World War II, but they
have been useful. Yes, positive. This includes NATO,
the Marshall Plan, CIA. When I was in Rome, in 1953,
people were riding Vespas. Now they are in cars. You
live better today than you would have lived if you had
had a Communist government in 1945. Or in 1960. The
average Italian has a better life than the average Pole.
So the American policies have not been a mistake in
Italy.. We did a good job. In Italy you always see things
catastrophically. In 1955 Italians said that Italy was
going to collapse, that the government was no good,
hopeless. Now I hear the same words I heard in 1955.
But you did not collapse then and you will not collapse
now because there are good Italians.
Fallaci: Not certainly those who serve you as clients, Mr. Colby.
Colby: I'm talking of the ordinary people.
Frani: Tell me, Mr. Colby. Who was the man that you liked hest
when you lived in Italy?
Colby: De Gasperi, I would say. But I cannot mention
names. I must not. Besides I did not know many people.
I was a junior, officer, I was interested in collecting
information . . . because I spoke Italian. But I can tell
you that yes; I was for an opening to the left at that
time.' mean to the Socialists. I respected them; I still do
because the Socialists are Western Europeans. They are
liberal; they are not authoritarian as the Communists
are. They can be trusted.
Fallaci: To what extent did your work take place within the
American embassy? Does it still?
Colby: Very much. Sure. I used to work a lot with the
embassy. I was political attache. We always work with
the embassies. Most information we get through our
embassies, of course.
Fallaci: But it isn't only through embassies Mai CIA works abroad.
We all know that SID Malian Secret Ser vice) is the pied-l-terre
of OA initaly.- Now tell me, Mr. Colby, what right do you have to.
spy on me at home and use the secret service of my country? What
right do you have, for instance, to control my tekplione there?
Colby: 1 get news from around the world. There is
nothing wrong with trying to understand what. is
happening' in the World, What 'people .are doing or
thinking. It isn't a matter of invading others' privacy.
It's a ? matter of looking to set': if yOU have a pistol?to
shoot me or. another weapon to hurt me, and prevent it.
You ask if a nation has the right to .conduct clandestine
intelligence activities in other nations? Well, there is a
law in every country that says no, and almost every
? country does it. So do! have the right to try to find out
: what happens in order to protect my -country? Yes, I -
morally have it. Though it is illegal:.
Fallaci: Let's see if I have understood you. You're saying that it is
illegal yet legitimate to spy on me in my country even through the- ? -
secret service of my country. . .
Colby: It depends. Sometimes another intelligence
agency will help you. It depends. on a country's policy.
Sometimes two countries have a mutual interest and
they are very close to their allies and very concerned
? about penetration, so we work together.
Fallaci: As I said. Now tell me, is it or isn't it true that your best
operation with SID was the case of Stalin's daughter. Svetlana? .
[Allegedly, the CIA and SID had cooperated in placing an Ito han.
colonel close to Svetlana and charged with bringing her out of
Russia.)
Colby: I couldn't tell. I have said . . . that we must not tell
about our associates nor about our relationship with
foreign intelligence services because if we talk about
them they will not trust us anymore. An intelligence
service cannot talk about its associates. You -cannot
imagine how much these leaks hurt around the world.
A lot, a lot. There are people now saying: my goodness,
can I have anything to do with you, can I trust my life to
you, my job, or will you tell it to your Congress and leak
it? People turned away from us, people who had been
working with us said no, I am not staying with you
anymore. Even other international intelligence services
have said no, we used to give you very secret material
but we are not going to give it to you anymore. We lost a
few agents because of the fear that the secret wouldn't
-be kept.
Fallaci: Only agents or clients also?
Colby: Those too. Some have Said, don't give me
anything anymore because you will reveal it. People
.who were new and people who were old clients. They
felt betrayed. We have fought very hard at CIA to keep
those names, you know. Very hard. And we have won, I
must say. But the publicity has hurt us all the same.
These things do not happen with KGB. You have quite
a few KGB 'agents in Italy and there are many Italians
working for KGB of course. Yet nobody asks KGB to
make those names public. One finds all these wrongs
about CIA, and KGB-,nobody accuses them.
Fallaci: You're wrong, Mr. Colby. We don't Want either you or
them. We are sick Da tired of you th41:. -
Colby: fine,. fine. Americans and the Soviets help about ? ?
the same in Italy. Al! the material that ?goes back and
. forth to the Soviet Union passes through agencies that.
give a percentage .to the Italian Communist party. A ?
good system. Complicated yet good.. What would you
say if a percentage of all American trade .went to one
. party?
Fallaci: You don't need that. Mr. Colby.11's CIA that takes rare of
that, .1nd your ambassadors like Graham Martin, and Lockheed
And Gulf. . . .
Colby: Wonderful how' you 'rationalize and indirectly
conclude that theyare just nice fellows, just marvelous-
ly good people. In. Poland. ..if .they don't want .to
do what the Soviets want them to do, a delegation ?
comes from Moscow, and it sits with the .Central.
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Corrimittee of the party, and says that they better
behave. Would you like Italy to be run like that? But
suppose that the CommUnists are clean. And because of
that you let them run the government? Are you going
to run that risk, letting them run the government?
Name a country that has been Communist and has then
changed from Communism. Name one! Name one!
Felled: Mr. Colby, what would you do to us if the Communists
win the election; in Italy?
Colby: Name a country! Name one!
Failed: Mr. Colby, wouhl you punish us with a coup as in Chile?
Colby: Name a country. Just one! Romania? Poland?
Czechoslovakia, Hungary?
Fallaci: Please answer ow question, Mr. Colby. Another ,Chile?
Colby: And suppose there is not another election? The
way it happened with Hitler and Mussolini? Don't you
understand that they played .at the democratic game all
these years because they. were a minority? Do you
really think that when they are on the top they will still
go on being democratic?
Failed: You 'could be right. Yet I remind you that it is .you
Americans who throw the' countries into the arms of Communists,
always. You who buy and corrupt and protect all the Fascists in? fur
world. America; Mr. Colby, is the biggest factory of Cominunists
he the -whole world_
Colby: I don't accept that and I say that you are speaking
out of your own ideological bias.
Failed: As you like. But tell meptiase: according b(ke information
you had as director of CM, do on see any difference between the
Communist party of Cunha! and the Communist parties of Carillo,
of Marchais, of Berlinguer?
Colby: The Italian Communist party is trying to build a
bridge between the Soviet way and the Western way of
life, trying to live in both camps. There is an
ambivalence in them that the French and the Spanish
have just followed. The Italian Communist party has
always pretended to be very revolutionary . . . at the
same time it pretends to be very Italian . . . And if you
ask me "Do yatt trust Mr. So and So when he says he is
for pluralisrn," I answer: it is not a matter of trust in the
individuals. It is a matter of political imperatives. At this
time, with Western Europe reasonably united and
strong and protected by American interests, the
Political imperative for the Communists is to join
Western Europe, to be a part of it. But if the political
Imperative changes, if you have economic ,problems in
Western Europe, or a change of leadershipin the Soviet
Union, their political imperative could change. And .
they could become more 9uthoritarian and more loyal
to the Soviets.
Felled: Recently the Italian Communist party and the French
communist party, and the Spanish Communist party have clearly
attacked the Soviet Union.
Colby: This is easy to do. They did it also in 1968 on
Czechoslovakia. But they also support the Soviet Union
in many Situations; and they continue to have a good
relationship with them. Their policy is that there
shouldn't be NATO or the Warsaw Pact. But the easiest
thing is to eliminate NATO. It is hard to eliminate the
Warsaw Pact. And their policy is to reduce Italy's
contribution to NATO. They say, well, we will get to
the Warsaw Pact later. But what do you think the
degree of collaboration would be between the Italian
military and the American military, between the Italian
government and the American government if you had a
Communist prime minister? I have no doubt that
there would be great difficulties.
Fallaci: Perhaps. And I insist you answer the question. What would
Ike Americans do to us if the Communists came to power in Italy?
Colby: I don't know. This is the policy of the United
States. I don't .know.
Fallaci: Sure you know. Another Chile?
?
Colby: Not necessarily. This is an hypothetical question I
cannot answer. It depends on so many factors. It could
be nothing, it could be something, it could be some
mistake.
Fallaci: Some mistake like Chile? Come on, Mr. Colby. Do you
think- it would be legitimate for the United States to intervene in
Italy with a Pinochet. if the Communists came to power?
Colby: I don't think 1 can answer that question. Your
Pinochet is not in America. He's in Italy.
Fallaci: I know. But he-needs you. Without you, he can do nothing.
Mr. Colby, I am trying to make you admit that Italy is an
independent state, irate banana republic, not a colony of yours. And
you don't admit it. 1 am also trying to explain to you that you (aunt)!
be the policemen of the world. Chian)?
Colby: Chiaro ma sbagliato. After 1Norld War I we said
that the war had been wrong and badly fought, and we
had a period of innocence. We reduced our army to
something smaller than the Romanian army, 15o,tte1O,
. and we decided to have an open diplomacy, and the
Secretary of State dissolved the intelligence service
saying that gentlemen don't read others' mail. And we
thought that we were going to live in a world of
gentlemen, and that we wouldn't involve ourselves any
more in foreign affairs. Then we had problems rising in
Europe. But we did not intervene. And we had
problems in Manchuria, it was too far away. But we did
not intervene. Then Spain. And we were neutral. But it
did not work very well, no, and we had economic
problems; 'authoritarian leaders who .believed they
could dominate their neighbors. And then came World
War H. And after World War II we did as we had done. In
1945 we dissolved our intelligence service, the OSS,
and we said: peace again. But the cold war started and it
was obvious that Stalin was . . . becoming a threat in
Greece, in Turkey, in Iran. And we learned the lesson.
And we applied the lesson. We collected our security
again, and we attempted to contain the expansionist
Soviet Union through NATO and through the
Marshall plan and through CIA. Liberals and conser-
vatives together, both. of us convinced that we had to
help. I Was one of those liberals. I had been a radical
when I was a boy and . .
Fallaci: For Christ's schet How could you change that mr.ch?
Colby: Clemenceau said Unit he who is not a radical
when he is young has no heart; he who is not
conservative when he's old has no brain. But let me go
on. NATO work.d. The containment of Soviet
expansionism worked. The subversive plans of the
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.:Communists were frustrated. It wasn't the right
against the left. It was a democratic solution: We
decided that. we would go- any distance to :fight for
freedom. And.in the course of .this there were some
situations in which local leaders were somewhat
authoritarian or More authoritarian than people liked.
Fallaci: From Gen. Franco to Catlano,. from Diem to Thieu, from
Papadopoulos to Pinochet; without counting al! the Fascist dicttitors
? in Latin America, the Brazilian torturers for instance. And so, in
the name of freedom, you became the supporters of .afl those who
killed freedom on the other side..
Colby: Like in World War II when we supported
?
Stalin's Russia against a greater threat. We work now, ?
in the same way..we worked with him then. In the '50s '
wasn't coinmunism the biggest threat? If you support
some authoritarian leader against a Communist threat,:
you leave the option that the authoritarian state could.
become democratic in the future. With the Corn-
munists, the future offers no hope.! mean,! don't see
any scandal in certain alliances. One makes an alliance'
in order to face a bigger threat. My government ?
;recognizes Pinochet's Chile as the legitimate govern-
!tient. True. But don't I accept that 200 million Russians
live under Soviet Communism? Pinochet is not going to
conquer the world. Nobody is worried about Pinochet.
Fallaci: ill tell you who's worried about Pinochet, Mr. Colby. The
Chileans, first, who are imprisoned and Persecuted and tortured and
killed by Pinochet. Secondly, those who really care about freedom.
Thirdly, the countries that are afraid to become a second Chile. Like
Colby: You're so wrong in choosing Chile. If you read
carefully the Senate report on Chile you'll find that
from 1964 we helped the democratic center parties
against a man Who said that he was associated with
Castro and the Communists. CIA had no part in
overthrowing Allende in 1973. Read my denial in the
Senate. report when I say: "with the exception [off
about six weeks in 1970."?
Fermi: Sure. November 1970 when Nixon called Richard Helms
and ordered him to organize a coup to overthrow Allende, who had
just won the elections.
Colby: It only lasted six weeks . .. And we did not
succeed ... We had no part, later.
Fallaci: Really? Tell me about the financing of the strikes that
ruined Allende's goveniment, Mr. Colby. Tell we about the
inkrventions through ITT.
Colby: Well, we gave a little bit of money, yes. A tiny
amount that, I remember, was about $10,000. We gave
it through other people. I mean we gave it to a group
that passed it to another . . . The rest of our program in
Chile was to support the central democratic forces from
the threat of the left. The Senate Committee has found
no evidence against us, except in 1970. It wasn't our
policy to overthrow Allende in 1973. We were looking
to the elections of 1976 where we hoped the democratic
forces would win. Certainly we did not help Allende but
we are innocent of that coup. The coup came from the
fact. that Allende was destroying the society and the
economy in Chile, from the fact that he was not acting
democratically as the Supreme Court of Chile and the
Congress of Chile and the controller general said when
issuing statements that Allende ivas. Outside the
constitution: Even the free press had been suppressed
? by Allende .
Fallarii What, Mr. Colby, are you out of your mind? But you
cannot falsify history like that. The opposition press tormented
Allemk till the end. ,
Colby: The opposition papers had lots of difficulties
under him. And saying that Allende was democratic . . .
well, it. is your opinion. There are his own words when
he said that he wanted to suppress opposition. He was
an extremist: And an oppressor. I have good in forma -
tion.
Fallad: If' till your. Woe:nation is like, that, Mr:: Colby.. .1
understand. who CIA. makes. itself ridiculous, so often. Bn t here is
what .1 want Ia know from you .who claim to fight in the name of
democracy: haring won. the elections donocrettically.. did Alknde
have the .right ta gooeni I:is country? Yes or no?. . . Don't- be silent.
Mr. Colby. Do answer, Mr. Colby. ?
Colby: Didn't Mussolini win elections? Didn't Hitler
become. the chancellor of Germany in .an election?
Fano& This is what I tall had faith. You know very well that those
were not free elections. Mr. Colby. And you cannot, just cannot.
compare Allende with' Mussolini and with Hitler. This is pure.
fanaticism; Mr. Colby!. -
Colby: I am not fanatic. I believe in a Western liberal
democracy..
Alla& What? hi what way? Through killing. Mr. Colby?Tell inc
about the murder of Gem Schneider in Chile, Mr. Colby.
Colby: CIA had very little to do with the assassination of
Gen. Schneider. Very little. It's 'written in the Senate
report. Apparently the group that tried to kidnap
Schneider wasn't the same group that received money
from CIA. Your view of CIA is purely paranoiac. You
behave like the American press when it got so excited
about the Black Pistol 'the poison dart gun]. We never
used it. Never. It is you, the press, who give a false
impression of CIA. Sure, somebody got killed in the
course of our activities in the world! Our agents too got
killed, and people ..on the other side-. But no
assassinations. I know those who work for me, I know
them, and they are good Americans, real patriots who
fight to protect their country. And it is their right, our
right, to protect freedom in the world ..
Fallaci: Why don't you take that right with Pinochet, Mr. Colby?
Colby: This is a matter of policy and it is up to the
government to decide it. Each nation has a decision to
make. You don't see it because you're being ideological
in your logic. I am not being ideological, I am being
rational and pragmatic: And, pragmatically,l say to you
that it's up to the United States to decide where they
want to help and where they don't. And it was our right
to support the opposition to Allende as well as it is our
right to help in-Europe those who oppose the growth of
communism. And CIA has done this for 30 years, I
repeat, and does it well, and Italy is ti :a best exaMple.
Fallaei: Mr. Colby. yol, portray the CIA as an its.z.v ior ef Boy
ScOuts :nab: ty o.-eurial reading books and speeches in some library.
Lel's be Seriou. ?basin with. you are spies.
Colby: One moment_ Yes; in the old image, intelligence
used to br pying Mata Hari and so on. Today
21
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intelligence :s. an intellectual .process of assembling
information from the press, radio, books, speeches..
Which is why we're called Central Intelligence Agency.
All.?his information is centralized and studied by people
who are specialists in various fields. And then there are
elactronics, computers, technology. In the last 15 years
technology has so changed intelligence that we don't
need to spy to get secrets to give to generals to win
battles.. . Intelligence is far beyond that. It is a
technological phenomenon. We used to wonder how
many missiles the Soviets might have. Today we don't
wonder; we count them .. .
FaIlaci: Mr. Colby, CIA may be that partly. But it also is
something Worse; something dirtier. I mean a political force that
secretly organizes coups d'etat and plots and assassinations. A
second government that punishes whoever is against the interests of
the United States in the world. Spying is much nobler than that.
Colby: What you are talking about is five percent of our
budget. Only five percent goes for any kind of political
or paramilitary activity. And this is an activity that is
necessary in the world we live in because a little help in
some countries to some friends can avoid a serious
crisis later. In the '50s this was 30 percent of our
budget. . In the '80s, if the world goes on facing
totalitarian developments, we might go back to that 30
percent again or more. But now it is five percent, and all
this excitement is about that five percent. Which is
legitimate because isn't it easier than to defend
ourselves with bombs and soldiers? Isn't it easier to
help some political group?
Fallaci: Yes, but the point isn't financing here and there, or
corrupting here and there to protect your interests that are not
always noble interests. The point is the assassination of foreign
leaders, Mr. Colby!
Colby: In 1973, long before this excitement started, I
issued a directive against assassinations. I have turned
down suggestions of assassinations on several oc-
casions ... saying that assassination is wrong. But
there are people who will say to you that if Hitler had
been assassinated in 1938, the world would be better.
Fallaci: Lionumba was not Hitler, Mr. Colby. Caitro is not Hitler.
Colby: Well, Castro allowed the Soviet-Union to place
nuclear missiles in Cuba, which put American cities
under nuclear threat.
Fallaci: And because of this you kill Castro.
Colby: In Italy, at the time of Renaissance, there were
many people inside and outside the church who
discussed the 'rights and wrongs of tyrannicide. And
discussion had started long before the Renaissance; it
isn't new. Yes, this assassination business did not occur
in America . yesterday, it's been, a political tool for
centuries. How did the princes die in the various states.
of Italy? i- !my did Caesar die? Don't, as an Italian, stand
on moral lessons on this. I don't accept moral lessons
from you..?
:allaci: Caesar was not killed by an American. Ile was killd by
me Romans. 'The Medici, in the Ren.aiss?ance, were killed by the
lorentines not by Americium;. And Pericles ereeted monument; to
'le Greek who killed the tyrant, not to the Americans who killed a
'tiban iii Cuba.
22
Colby: I tell you that this has always happened and I say
that it is difficult for any country to give moral lessons
to another.
Fallaci: By God, Mr. Colby! It is you who claim to be more moral
than others. It is you who introduce you rselves as the Angel Gabriel
sacrificing for democracy and freedom.
Colby: Maybe our morals are not perfect but they are
better than others. American policy is regarded all
through the world as a pillar of freedom. There are a
few things, over 28 years, that we shouldn't have done.
Like opening the mail. Yes, there was a period in the
'505 when we opened the mail to and from the Soviet
Union. And we shouldn't have done it, though one can
understand why. There were Soviet spies running all
over America. However we shouldn't have done it
and . . .
Pollack Come on, Mr. Colby, I am not larking about opening
letters! I am talking about murdering people!
Colby: CIA has never assassinated anybody. Including
Diem. Saying that CIA does assassinations all the tirne
is unfair. There were a few occasions in which we
wanted to try, and none of them worked.'
Fallari: Even if you spoke the truth, Mr. Colby, which I doubt, isn't
it shameful enough for CIA to plan such projects like Al Capone?'
Colby: People do it all over the world.. Lots of different
countries, whether it's wise or not. Personally I was
always against it. People came to me with such
proposals and I said: "You will not do it."But I recall that
Jefferson said: "The tree of freedom has to be watered
every 20 years by the blood of tyrants."
Fallaci: In other monk
religious, Mr. Colby?
Colby: Sure I am. I'm a Catholic and a rigid one.
Fallaci: One of those who go to church every. Sunday?
Colby; Yes, sure.
once in a while is all rigid. Are you
Fallaci: One of .those who It in Ilell and in Paradise?
Colby: Yes, sure. I believe in everything the Church
teaches..
Fetlock One of those who kve propte je:;:is arist wanted?
Colby: Yes, sure. I love people.
Falfaci: I see. Tell meabon t the Mafia; I mean the use CIA makes of
the Mafia.
Colby: One case. Only one case. 1960 for Castro! After
Castro took over Cuba there was some consideration
given to working with some people who . . . whose
friends were still in Cuba. Friends who had been in the
Mafia and who would try to kill Castro. And it was very
. . well, it did not work. Allen Dulles and then [John)
McCone were directors of CIA at that time. And -
McCone said later he did not know about it:
Fallaci: Bobby Kennedy knezo. And that allows one to think that
John Kennedy knew as well. WhO is the more discredited by these
? revelations, CIA or the American presidents?
Colby: The revelations shOw. that CIA was working *as
part of American policy. I mean, CIA was not a wild
elephant, or a separate state or a state in the state, or a
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government in the government. And now that the
country is going through a process of revisionism, CIA
? in a way is the scapegoat of that revisionism. The
evidence that presidents wanted specific things is not
very dear. In some cases it isn't even clear whether the
president knew it or not. The facts simply indicate that
CIA was operating within a policy that seemed to allow
it to go in that direction.
Fallaci: Which means that, from Eisenhower to Nixon; none of
them gime mil totally clean. :What happened under Johnson? Oh,
yes. Papadopoidos? coup in Greece.
Colby: CIA did not support the colonels' coup. No, it
? didn't. When the colonels ran Greece, we had a liaison
? for exchanging information, yes. We did not reject
? them, it's true, but we did not support them either. We
just worked with them and the rest is myth. Dealing
with authoritarian leaders doesn't mean to support
them.
Fallaci: You are the one who opened up. Don't you ever regret that
you fold those things to the congressional committees? Could you
have refused?
Colby: No,! don't think! could have: I don't think I would
be allowed to. I did not have much choice. But certainly
. don't regret having told the truth. There was no doubt.
:in my mind. Not that I expected things to stay secret,
but I did not appreciate the way those cases were
sensationalized. The point is that there are some
problems with hying in a society, as open as the
American society. just consider the case of Richard
Welsh, the CIA officer they killed in Athens. An officer
named John Mark wrote an article in a magazine here in
Washington alleging.that he could tell how to identify
CIA people in the embassies. And he did so. An
American. So they started the publication of names and
we couldn't forbid it. We have very weak lep,isiation in
that sense, legislation that doesn't take care of the fact
that we cannot run serious intelligence unless we
protect some of our secrets. And Welsh was killed by
some terrorist. And it took Welsh's death- to -mike
people understand the problem, for the Congress to
stop the Pike report's publication. And it was a great
loss, the loss of Welsh. He was an extremely good .
officer. ' ?
Fallaci: Let's talk o while of the Pike report, Mr. Colby. Because, if
in the Church report CIA sounds so bad, in the Pike report it looks
rather ridiculous. Is it true as.Pike recta. rked that, if America Were
to be attacked by another country, CIA would not know of it in
? 'advance?
Colby: The House Committee report is totally partial,
totally biased, and done to give a false impression of
CIA. The Church report, that is the assassination
report and the Chile report, well. . .1 think they were
reasonably fair. Yes, fair reports. Also the Rockefeller
commission's report is a fair report. Pike's report is not
a fair report. And that Pike remark. . .it's nonsense. He
? did not publish things we did right. He chose %vhat we
had done wrong. For instance, in the spring of 1973 we
told our government that, unless there is movement on
a political level, there probably will be a war in Middle
East. And we helped our government follow everything
that was happening. On October 5th in the evening we
made an assessment: "There are certain signs that
indicate that there shouldn't be a war. In balance we
think that there will not be a war:' Well, this was ?a
23
mistake. 'Why dirkwe make that 'mistake after having
given good advice? Well, %ve don't ?havea crystal ball, we
don't know ion percent what is going to happen. - ?
- Let's face it, Mr: Colby: .Saying Mal war is no: going to
?
happen whenatiorrtki happen doesn't reflect wry well on What ?
you portray as the -best- intelligence hi the world.- Nor was it the
only .case. Take. Portugal; for instance. You hadn't the vaguest idea
that the army would overthrow Caelano.
Colby: We 'did know- something, despite Pike's report.
We knew that there was unrest and dissent in the army.
We reported it. But, as with the Arab-Israeli war, one
, may know the general background and then make a
mistake on little things. The fact is that Mr. Pike takes
the little thing and applies it to the whole. It isn't true,
as he says, that We. had a total ignorance of the
Portuguese situation. . People see CIA under every
sofa. People see CIA. all the time, even in a contest for
the best sheepdog.. . We really haven't the time to be
in every village. It is reasonable to think that, later, in
Portugal, we .had -to. work harder on ? what was
happening.
Fallaci: A little help here, a little help there . . .
Colby: No comment. Not on Italy, not on Portugal, not.
oil- any specific country.
Fallaci: MK Colby, you don't want me to believe Mal Italy :vas the
only country hi Europe where CIA spent billions. Let's lake
Germany . . .
Colby: You cannot compare things, they are quite
different. Each country is a different case. We worry
and have been worrying about all Europe of course. All
, of Europe is very important to the United States. And I
don't -think that Italy was the country where we had
more work to do. But I will not comment on any specific
operation. What I can say is that the place where CIA
policy has been more successful is Western Europe. A
real success program. I'm glad you did not mention
Vietnam.
The fact about Vietnam is that we made some major
mistakes, and the first mistake was to turn against
President Diem. We did it, saying that he was too
? authoritarian, and, first of all, he was not. He was nsot a
dictator. Secondly what did we get from opposing him?
We got five years of instability. Only at the end of those
five years did we have a reasonably steady government
? under President Thieu, who was very much like Diem.
The next mistake we made in Vietnam was to fight a
? military war when the enemy was fighting a people's
war. The technique in a people's war is to get people on
your side, like the Communists were doing with a
combination of nationalism and discipline. And they did
it pretty well. Diem had begun a program to get people
on his side in 196/ with the strategic hamlets. The
overthrow of Diem was the end of that approach.
Because of that we had to fight the war on a military
? level. Only in 1967 did we decide on the pacification
program to get people on our side and. . .
Pollack It went so well that in 1968 you had to suffer the Tel
? offensive. Come on, Mr. Colby.
Colby: The pacification program really started in 1963?
organizing the villages, having elections in the villages.
? Shortly after the Tet offensive the proposal was made
.to give guns to the people in the villages to defend
.themselves. And many people said that it was a bad idea
because the people would give the guns to the
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Communists. But President Thieu decided to provide'
those guns, and. he gave out 500,000 of them. And it.
worked. The people did not give them to .the Corn-
munists. They did defend themSelves. And then there
was the economic aid; and you will agree when I say
that there were no guerrillas in the 1972attack.
Fallaci: Sure. You ? had exterminated them With the Phoenix
program. Mr. Colby.
Colby: ?Now, you are wrong: They were. not exter-
minated. They corned to . their government. The
Phoenix.. prograrri did not exterminate. It Was a
necessary program to identify who the Communists.
were, who the leaders were. We were not interested in
the followers. And the program was .so organized in
such a way that we had to have three different reports,
not just one, to determine whether a man was a leader.
ora cadre ora follower. And we had limits-on how long
a man could be kept in jail without a trial; the followers.
would have a maximum six-MQI1 t h sentence. Were you
in Vietnam then?.
Fallaci: I was in Vietnam in 1967, and 1.96S, .and 1969, and
1970; and 1972, and in 1.975, Mr. Colby, and I knew enough
about that dumb war to have a good fight with you about what you
arc saying. Please do not try to tell mestories as you did about Chile!
The murders of your Phoenix program... .
Colby: I lived continuously in Vietnam for seven years. I
have worked on Vietnam for 12 years altogether. And!
tell you that the Phoenix program was not a secret
? program. It was publicized with posters carrying the
photos of leaders and saying.. ."and, Mr. Nguyen, if
you want to come as a Chou Hoi, you may come in and
you will not be punished." And a lot came.
Fallaci: Not a lot, Mr. Colby. A few, despised by et,e rybody as:
cowards or deserters. Even du; American soldiers rejected them. I
remember being in the field. in 1970, in the fishhook area. and. . .
Colby:. 200,000 came.
Fallaci: And you won the war in Vietnam.
-Colby: We did not. lose the war. I. mean, we won the
guerrilla war, we lost the military war. Just as France
had lost the military war. The fact is. . . Well, President
Thieu expected. the main attack to occur in 1976 when
the Americans would be holding elections. So he had to
save equipment for that time. And when the attack
came in 1975 he decided to withdraw and return to a
more restricted area in order to. . ?
Fallaci: It was not a withdruwat, Mr. Colby! It was a shameful
disordered flight, with the South Vietnamese generals trying only to
save their lives and their properly, with the soldiers killing civilMns
to scramble onto the planes and the helicopters. We all saw that. You
cannot change history like that, .Mr. Colby!
Colby: Listen, I know a lot about Vietnam: I'm writing a
book about Vietnam too and. . .
Mind: Olt Cod! Will you write that you had the right in be there?
Colby: I have no doubt, even today, that we Americans
had to be there. And when you say that it was none of
our business you are saying that Manchuria was too far
away.
Fallaci: Mr. Colby, why don't you talk about Watergate in4ciuf of
IvItinchttria?
Co/hip: CIA had two contacts with Watergate. Just two.
Howard Hunt used to work.for CIA; he came to CIA
with Ehrlichman's request. And CIA gave Howard
Hunt a couple of things like that speech device. We also
produced photographs for him. Hut we didn't know
what Hunt was doing in that psychiatrist's office in Los
Angeles. We did not know. And when Hunt asked for
several other things, CIA said no. We said: it isn't our
business. The second connection we had was when the
White House asked CIA to write a psychological profile
of Ellsberg. And we did it..He was an American and we
shouldn't have done it. They also tried to get us to stop
the FBI investigation, but we said no.
Fallaci: OK, Mr. Colby, OK. Let's forget now this old bitterness of
yours. There is another Ming that puzzles me when you say that
CIA is the best intelligence in the world. Is it really? Hasn't KGB
been more successful than you?
Colby: Oh, no. Besides, it's so different, you can't
compare. Most of the work ofKGB, for instance, takes
place inside the Soviet Union: they are the FBI, the CIA,
the State police, the Carabinieri, everything. And most
of its effort is there. Well, when they used to spy here
they had some good operations, some very impressive
ones. I mean the atom spies. When they recruited a
young lady from the counterespionage section of our
Department of Justice, for instance. She told them
everything we knew about their spies, and this was a
good operation indeed. And when they put a bug inside
the shoe of one of our diplomats. That was very
impressive too. Very. You know, those people are
serving their government and I disagree with their
philosophy, but about their professional side I must say
that they can do a good job.
Fallaci: How interesting. I smell a touch of professional admiration
in you.
Colby: Well . . . the fact that they can do a good job
doesn't mean that . . . I mean, one must distinguish
between the ability and the end. The ability may be
good and the end may be bad. Our philosophical
justification is a good end: the self-defense 'of our
country. Theirs instead is . . .
-Patina: . ? . the self-defense of their country. Mr. Colby, who
-
wanted you out of CIA? Was it Kissinger?
Colby: No. Kissinger has always been a great supporter
of intelligence and, though sometimes _I agree with
Kissinger and -sometimes I disagree, we are not
enemies. Both Kissinger and Rockefeller have been. nice
to me,. and I think that Kissinger has been a brilliant.
Secretary of State. I also say that he deserves another
Nobel Prize for the Middle East, I am out of CIA
because the President indicated that he wanted to offer
me another job and.. . . The President may have many
reasons why he wants somebody else as head of CIA. It
is his privilege. He is the President, not me. Make a
change? Fine. Bgides I knew it would happen. I had f.aid
many times that I would probably be replaced when this;
investigatic7n came to, an end. Then the President
offc:recl me many jobs, good jobs, but I said that I could
help snore if I write a. book about ? what intelligence
really is. As I am doing. One on CIA and One on
Vietnam.
Fallaci: And you do not fed bafre.
(Wily; Not at all. I do not feel hkc, a scapegoat.
24
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Fallaci:' Do you fed relieved then?
Colby: Neither bitter nor relieved..
Fallaci: Sure. What could shate your icy imperturbability? You
never show your emotions, do you?
Colby: I am not emotional, I admit it. Just a few things
bother me. For instance, what happened when I was
nominated and some people put posters around
Washington?posters illustrated with a very poor
picture of me, by the way. They called me a murderer.
And my children had to live with that. But it didn't
really bother me. Not much. Oh, don't watch me like
that. You're looking for something underneath which
isn't there. It's all here on the surface, believe me.There
is nothing behind or underneath. There are not two or
three layers. I told you: I'm religious, I'm conserva-
tive...
Fermi: Do your children euer call you "reaaionary- or worse?
Colby: No. We have different views They were against
the war in Vietnam. We discuss things at the dinner
table. And I admit that .
Fallaci: . . you like .1Vizon?
Colby: I voted for him. Ile appointed me. And I think
that, in international politics, he did a splendid job.
CONGRESSIOIAL RECORD-HOUSE
10 FEBRUARY 1976
-BILL COLBY?AN OUTSTANDING.
DEDICATED AMERICAN
(Mr. STrcrS asked and was given per-
mission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include extra-
neous matter.)
. Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker; the swearing
In of George Bush as the new Director
of Central Intelligence has brought an
end to the career of one of the finest
Americans ever to serve in the intelli-
gence profession, William E. Colby.
The dimensions of Bill Colby are truly
extraordinary. He is a consummate intel-
ligence professional, a brilliant and
innovative administrator, and a true -
patriot.
Mr. Colby's intelligence career had its
beginnings in parachuting behind enemy
lines In France and Norway during World
War II. He continued to serve his Gov-
?ernment in a series of demanding assign-
ments which called for ingenuity, intel-
ligence, and integrity, not to mention
personal courage, which he was always
able to provide. Finally, the crowning
touch for a dedicated professional, Mr.
Colby was appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate as Director
of Central Intelligence.
Man is plagued by not knowing what
could have been. It is obvious that the
energy and talents he brought to the
office of Director, his contributions to a
stronger, more effective, and more effi-
cient foreign intelligence service to serve
his country's needs have been of in-
estimable value. No man served more ably
In this difficult task. It is indeed unfor-
Splendid. Just think of China, of the SALT agreement.
Fallaci: Just think of Chile, of Cyprus. Mr. Colby, lin exhausted.
Only when I interviewed Canlial did I suffer as nuet as I did todat,
zoitli you.
Colby: Tell me, tell me: what kind of fellow is he?
Fallari: I told you. In the end, a type like you.
What?
&Ala: Yes, a priest like you, 01:, Mr. Colby! You'll never know
how much you two resemble cach Had you been born on the
other side of the barricade, you would hare been it rerfea Stalini5t.
Colby: I reject such a statement. But . well . it might
be. No, no. It might not: And I am not a priest. At the
Most, I'm a puritan. Any other question?
Fallaci: Only one, Mr. Colby. Can I sre the file that CIA Leers on
me?
Colby: Under American law, you can write a letter to
CIA and ask for anything they have on you. They must
charge you a little, but then they will give it to you,
unless they have some reason to keep it secret_
Fallaci: 1 think if is discetkertiny. Rut errrytkins. you said Was
disconccaing. Mr. Colby. /I net very. very $ad.
timate -that his services were at a time
when congressional investigatory hear-
ings on CIA operations worldwide were
In progress. Those who conscientiously
sought to learn the facts about the CIA,
to correct its mistakes, to avoid a repeti-
tion of mistakes, were overshadowed and
much of their efforts to: improve the CIA
were lost through sensational disclosures.
In fact,- the destruction of the CIA has
appeared to be uppermost in the minds
of some -individuals and the hearings
were used to advantage for this purpose.-
Attempts aimed at full disclosure of every
secret known to the CIA through leaks
or Otherwise, provided the news service
with a happy new circus replacing
Watergate. Mr. Colby, despite his ability,
his candid recital of his important work
of CIA, and his strong administration
-of that-organization, had the misfortune
to serve during this chacitic period. -
? But let no man believe, Mr. Speaker,
that Bill Colby as Director of Central
Intelligence has left anything behind
him other than a record, of. outstanding
achievement. - - ? ;? ? ? ?? ???
He has served as CIA Director during-
the most tumultuous- period in that
Agency's 28-year history. In this role, he
. must take his place along with others in
our history who haveserved their coun- -
try with- distinction, dedication, and
sacrifice. ? . ? - . ? --
During these trying times, Mr. Colby
assumed full responsibility, as Agency
spokesman for certain misdeeds of the
past. He made extraordinary efforts to
communicate his views of the past, the
present, and the future. This included
the termination of all questionable activ-
MN YORK TIMES
16 March 1976
The Pike-CI.A. Battle
To the Editor:
I would like to see a national refer
endinn to decide which WOUid he more
dis.tst rolls for the country: the destruc-
. tiou of Otis G. Pike by the C.I.A., or
the destruction of the C.I.A. by Otis
.0. Pike. BERT GoLosTurrit
New York, March IO, I97ti
1.4AS1.Itto NGT M1
ST 19P706?
?A U.S. Congressional re-
- port on the U.S. Central In-
telligence Agency does not
name any Italian politicians
who may have, received
money from the agency
U.S. I louse Speaker Carl Al,
bell said in a letter to the
president of the Italian.
Chant her of Deputies, .-
. 25
ides which were identified in an inter-
nal Agency-. review which he and his
- predecessor, Dr. Schlesinger, initiated:
- Mr. Colby realized that part of the
price for restoring confidence in the CIA
was openness and candor in discussing
the* past. My personal view is that this
erosion of confidence Was not so much
justified as it was an illusory image
created by those who should have known
better or by -those who were not well in-
formed. ??-? .s. ? ? . ?
In taking the brunt of the clamors
against the Agency,' in never failing to
meet with those he considered respon-
sible Americans no .matter how much
they differed with him in viewpoint, and
in telling the unvarnished story of a
modern 'intelligence structure serving
our country within our constitutional
framework, Mr. Colby had no peer. He
was Mr. Integrity; he was inflappablel
indefatigable; and he was undefeatable.
'But there are other ways of measuring
the length and breadth of a man?the
reaction to him of those who work for
and with him. This was reflected in the
spirit of the tribute and emotional fare-
well he received from his colleagues dur-
ing ?the swearing-in ceremony of Ambas-
sador George Bush as the new Director
of Central Intelligence. Mr. Bush, I am
sure, -will receive from CIA employees
that same loyalty and the same intel-
lectual and moral commitment which
Bill Colby perceived as contributing to
the effort to provide an able anti effec-
tual intelligence service.
? WASHINGTON POST
? 16 MAR .1976
? ? The directors of five
r- ? ?
..4reeK newspapers were sen.
'tented to four months in jail
each on charges of defying a
ban on rePorts of the after-
_mai Ii of the assassination or
CIA station chief
\ II were freed pond-
-. ing ;11)Poat-,
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ApPiOied For Re1ease-20131/08/018 :"CIALRDP77-00432R000190419001-1--,?
THE INTELLIGENCE DIGEST ?
1 Merch 1976
Expansion of the!Soviet KGB
While the morale. and operational efficiency of America's
CIA, DIA, and 1:111 ? have been seriously lowered, and
various state,' 'Congressional, and *police aiuntersubversive
...agencies have been completely disbanded- due to left wing
pressure. (much-of it Communist-inspired), the Soviet KGB
as, expanding ?steadily and now ? numbers :slightly. over
300,000 personnel; including border 'police and internal
-security units.' This ? figure ? includes approximately 9,000
"legal" (with? official Soviet diplomatic coeer) KGB espion-
age agents, but it does not include thousands of "illegal"
(without !some type' of 'official cover). KGB agents and
their, covert contacts, nor does it include ?a ?massive. glo-
bal fifth-column 1of'? indigenous. Communist parties and
Their sympathizersacting 'under- guidance ? from Moscow.
? ? Also: being expanded is the Soviet GRU, the military
intelligence division of the Soviet General 'Staff, headed
by General .PetreIvanovitelt" Ivashutin:" The KGB .over-
sees the ? GRU and?"controlS the' propaganda and counter-
intelligence services within the Soviet 'armed forces. An
unclassified US Army intelligence 'document (International
?Communisne published by the US Army Intelligence
School) states the following:
"Soviet intelligence objectives may be classified into two
major fields. First, to maintain the Communist dictatorship
within the Soviet Union. Second, to contribute toward
world revolution in order to achieve world domination......:.
it The Soviet intelligence service -is- extensively involved ? in
subversion, 'sabotage, and espionage in furtherance of the
established goal ? world conquest.". .eee
'Major KGB intelligenCe. targets. -
? . Acquisition ? of ? classified. ? scientific,' industrial.- political.
and military data remains the. major KGB intelligence
-target. The KGB. is also involved in shadowy special
tasks on a global basis, including subversion, armed in-
urgency, sabotage. chiception, ? political .and military pene-
tration, psychological .operations, -bribery, blackmail, and
.specific assassinations. Yuri ,V. Andropose KGB director
since May _1967, is now :increasing the number Of. KGB
pl r
egal" and "illega?es ionage agents 'in America, thus
:exploiting the- current, crisis ine the US -.intelligence . coma
munity. . . ? .
'110 1959, Na to : intelligence had identified some f1.300
"legal". KGB agents 'in the United States; today,. there
are at least 900 under 'surveillance. A January 1976, re-
-port from Rome states that the "Soviet Ueion has about
90 KGB .agents and almost a thousand ittforniants working
in Italy,. primarily in political, econemic, cultural and
other circles to _collect information on the eecurity and
defence' systems of Italy in. Nato. 'Another. 1976 report'
from 'Paris claims that approximately 1,000 KGB agents
are operating in France under the KGB resident-director,
NEW YORK .TIMES
1 3 MAR 1976
INTELLIGENCE PANEL lligence agencies do not infringe
EXPANDED BY FORD zens."
on the rights of American citi-
Mr. Connally is a former
WASHINGTON, March II Treasury Secretary and Mr.
(UPI) ? President Ford an- 1.aird formerly served as De-
nounced yesterday that he was tense Secretary.
expanding his Foreign Intelli- Mr. Ford announeed that he
gence Advisory Board from 10 was appointing the following
to 17 members and that two nanel:
former Cabinet memhers, John FOrMiT R,T..11.4ii,;0 Leslie C, Arend,
B. Connally and Melvin R. r:7uhliran 0s1 , iiii"i''
Laird, would serve on the panel. s;;;-, \R"Z;t1 r'vt;:riYi?S,1,7": wA i,117h'ingion
In a statement, Mr. Ford said lawyer and nrnalinprd Dsmccrid,
he was expanding the panel as Gordon Cray, 'a broadcasting execuhve and
for Army L Lrm
cmy Se,pir
,,tiaY.
,
:part of his overhaul of the (en-
Oman
rrr, rolitYci..
pal Intelligence Agency and Ft ohyrt 0, MUrPh'i, a dl ,Inrnat.
I other intelligence. gathering wilciam J. osey, a Wilshmqlon lawyer.
lagencies. Mr. Ford said that Reappointed were the follow-
Leo Cherne, a New York econ- tog: .
omist, would. serve as board (1;10,, Booth Loy, tormrr Antho-sAdor to Hair,
chairman. .
"My actions.' were designedf Adm.
.to achieve two objectives," Mr. .:
Ford said. "First. to insure I c,,,# w Andrrsnn, riled,'
1, rlwArd Telles-, the atomic n iefflist,
! I fit:1Y'l Pliltrar:4'.1('',1:rtro7.4710'7 ?I Ili(' bond a?
1.,1:11. 1 Robert W, C, Ilvw, / hairmen Of thy ? hoard,
We have the hest p,,,,,,dik. io.i 1, , 4 I"' ?
formation 00 which to has', our t I S. " .1.''-' , ?v" e .?Pi''''''Ii."1. Iii,T'.1:W.
, ?. . .ilo, f 11::9 , , ,IPlil ,, l , rn, 0 Of
?policies to other liarlob,-;. See-:,2fr-ii--"' - (Al-
i (1)1a, 10 111,ti 0 re (fur fo re !I.;1 in14.,1. ,I,?,,,,(:)f,:isai, et, I, rIret, Bel! Te,irtitio.11.
? ? ? ;es/meld 1,1-e-e:o9
'thd third ranking counsellor of the Soviet embassy in Paris. -
The ? director of clandestine ..GRU ? opera: ioes ,in France
also 'holds 'counsellor "rank ' the? ? Sov:etTernbassy. A
January' 1976: report from Amsterdam states that the KGB
Contingent in'. the' Netherlands' 'now numbeed about' ?,(4),
double what it WaS in! 1_972; A 1976- Pentagon report
lions 'stepped:up- Soeiet nCtivities in 'Africa, including .the
overt stationing of -2.900. Res.' sian ' military advisers . in 11 ?
African tediums. Gabonese. security- forces recently 'seized
a Soviet ' Anti.nov An-30.'aircra ft," specially equipped for
aerial' photogriphy, ewhich'.'was?' on a .covert 'air,. recon-
naissance' misSicu -titer' 'Chad,' Canieroon'.' Ghana ; 'and
Ga-
bon.,eebeei /-j';.:,:a,; I ? a?;J:Vis?S'.: ai:Ja ? .? la ?
? I ? ! :? e?e!ir . (,b ;:???! 41:",:: s; lir
? '
The fight againa the, KGB ' '
et?lie
Unfortunately, it has 'never' been the policy of -Washing- .
ton to "roll back" Communism but. merely :to.Containi;
it. The containnuestepolicy, as witnessed -by Celia. South
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, has not been' successful.
.1)6tente is proving to lie an even greater failure. In Soviet ?
powerepolities. the KGB serves as a clandestine advance
guard of internation C`onireunist ? aggression. The ? fight
against the KG13 is beet waged by the, West's counterinteh
also'! the only effective eansever
to the current expansion.ef the KGB.? As 'pointed out . on
numerous occasions . by Ids Service,- Western, counterin?
tell?igence agencies have ibem. seriously weakened and of-
ten neutralized by left wiig pressureepeeoutright Com-
munist, subversion. ??;,..,.? ? vie r
"The telephone lareine of eonte 2,000. Soviet. -Bloc" per-
sonnel in . the, US hasended. this was fonnerly?a routine
counterintelligence service of the. FBI whilst Ittevas be-
ing directed ? :by . Je-Edgar? Mover.: Tleteee.CIA counter-
intelligence staff has:been .purge and the DIA:is
of being_ a bolislueL Ray S. -dirk...former director. Of-the
US -State Department Bureau of htellie.,ence and Research;
has recently . accused US Secreery of State .Henry ? -A.
Kissinger of withholding vital "rae" intelligence of Soviet.
activities detrimental to detente ant? as -having-"ended ? tip
,?..
controlling diseynination..iii-0 analys; of enteuigence" The
time to strengthen:: not 'Weaken. NVeee,rt intelligence 'agen-
cies is now at ehand.?This must be cene?if Ireedorie.'is- to
survive., .The previously' quoted -US 'Arrny':inteiligci
document. conclutlekr."111'the current- 11i foe" the' melee .
and loyalties of-men; 'we' who believe 'xi feee(10.121 cionot
faller or tun- ? cause..svil: ....he lost. ? We ? r.u.st. be COnvineed
of the rightness of- our cause end we ritet lie' willing "10
tight for it. -In the weeds of a famous. :ineriain or,,fdr;
Jetinings arynti: 'We stand ,at'..A,jaageadoli"and
we battle for the world.' "
-
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
13 March 1976
CIA buys British
Ely MARTIN WALKER
A British technological break-
through ? a combined minia-
Jure TV camera and micro-
. phone bug ? is to be used by
the CIA and other Western
intelligence agencies, according
to a former CIA officer.
-The camera is tiny, with the
visible part of the leas and
directional microphone having
a diameter smaller than Ain.
The machinery behind the
camera is only about ffin, long
and less than 41n, deep, accord-
ing to one of the few men who
has handled the device, the
chief' security officer of a lead-
ing London rc tai iv
" At the moment we have no
such device in our store." he
26
said Yesterday, "although' we
are interested in this one. I saw,
this device in London about
three months ago. There are
certainly many areas in wheeh
it could he used."
The camera hug was origi-
nally developed to help retail
stores to deal with shoplifting
hut its intelligence potential
quickly led to a wider market
arid to a security blanket being
imposed.
?
We have nothing to do. with
bugging deviees. We haw no
information on this at all," a ,
Ministry of Defence spokesman j
said yesterday. Would he say I
anything even if there i''
infor?mtion ? " No, we prob?hiv
wouldn't," the spokesman said.;
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? NEW YORK 'TIMES ?
0 MAll.1976.- ?
Pike Charges.C.L.A:ifffint
t.1? odiationfeirFinditigs
Accuses Agency of Seeking to Discredit
Him and Congress So as to Gloss Over
Report by House Select Committee
?
By RICHARD D. LYONS
special to The Neve York Mmes
WASHINGTON, ?March 9 ? report, and previous accounts
Representative Otis G. Pike ac- in The New York Times of the
cased the Central Intelligence report's contents.
Agency today of waging a came of the House
paign to discredit both himself' tooThtehremflcornorDe tr o their
sdescribe
l awareness that copies of the
and Congress in an effort to
report had bobbed up in van-
gloss over the findings of his oue Government agencies, both
House Select Committee on In-; in Washington and overseas.
telligence. j Representative Robert N. Gi-
The Suffolk County Democrat
took the House floor twice to
relate hitherto undisclosed
aimo, Democrat of Connecticut,
said he had been told "in a
trans.;Atlantic" telephone con-
cidents of his dealings with the
I venation that portions of the
report had appeared in Gov-
including a telephone, ernment offices "on the other
conversation in which he quoted
the agency's special connsel as
having stated:
-"Pike will pay for this, you
wait and see?we'll destroy him
for this."
According to Mr. Pike, :the
conversation was between Mit-
chell Rogovin; special counsel
to - the -Director of the Central
Intelligence, and A. Searle Field,
the committee's staff director.
Mr. Rogovin, reached in a
telephone interview, denied
that he had ever threatened Mr.
Pike's political standing or
said anything that could have
been construed as ?a political
threat. ..Representative Charles H. Ben-1
. Mr. Rogovin said he called nett, Democrat of Florida, said;
Mr. Pike today after learning after the meeting, it kind ofi
sad to waste all this time and
of the Congressman's .remarks energy and money, but I guess
we've got to do it.
The House voted overwhelm-
ingly last month on a resolu-
tion directing the committee to
him by ? Mr. Field.. "I told him; investigate the circumstances
.surrounding the leaking of the
the was dead wrong and tnat Pike committee report. Al-
Field Was dead wrong," Mr. though the resolution was not
Rogovin said. "I flatly deny directed at any individual, the
every inference of Mr. Pike's board of governors of the Na-
statement." tional Press Club announced
Moreover, he said that he has today that it "condemns" the
met with Mr. Pike on several action of the House, "in singling
occasions since the ?alleged out a reporter in its investigaH
tion of a leaked document." I
threat and that Mr. Pike never "The National Press Club
mentioned it before. "He was considers this action to have al
always very cordial," Mr. Rogo- chilling effect on the constitu-
yin said.. . tional guarantee of freedom of
Mr.: Pike's continents came the press." the statement said,j
A adding, "There is no intent on
?during a day of ciiar an
ges
: the part Of the National Press!
' countercharges focusing on the
: Club to defend or condemn thou
investigation into the circum-
actions of Daniel Schoor. ofl
stances of the publication ht CBS, the reporter involved,",
Month of the Pike committee's
side of an ocean.
Meanwhile, the House Com-
mittee on Standards of Official
Conduct formally started its in-
vestigation of the Pike commit-
tee leak today with a meeting
attended by seven committee
members, David Bowers, the re-
tired official of the Federal Bu-
reau of Inestigation who will
direct the committee's investi-
gators, and C. B. Rogers, the
Atlanta attorney who will serve
as general counsel to the com-
mittee.
After the meetings, members
said the discussion had cen-
tered on how the inquiry would
be conducted and who wouldi
take part.
One committee member,'
and asked him where he heard
about such political threats. He
said Mr. Pike had told him that
the threat had been relayed to
- NEW YORK TINES...
12 March 1976
Senate Intelligence Panel
Is Given an Extra Month
WASHINGTON, March 1:0
(UPI) The Senate 'approved
pday a resolution giving its
!Select Intelligence Committee
an additional neinth to coin-
plete -a report on the Central
Intelligence Agency and other
intelligence agencies.
The resolution, approved by
voice vote, gives the committee
until ? April 15 to submit the
summary of its investigation. it
was originally. due March 15.
7.,YtaRhic iT9i7J-r?
ATELCDEPLORES
TREATMENT OF
Faculty Committee Declares
That Freedom of Speech
oniCampus Was Violated
By HAROLD FARBER
- ppeciat to The New York Mos
ITHACA, N.Y. ? A special
faculty committee on academic
freedom at Cornell University
issued a report last week con-
eluding that freedom of speech
on the campus had been viol-
ated when Nguyen Cao Ky, the
former vice president of South
Vietnam, was booed off the
stage here last December.
The report took on special
significance because it was is-
sued a few days before another
controversial speaker was
scheduled to appear on the
campus, with student groups
organizing heckling and booing
demonstrations and other pro-
test activities.
William H. Colby, the former
director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, is to speak at
8 P.M. tomorrow in his first
appearance on a college cam-
pus since his retrement His
topic will he "Secrecy in a Free
Society."
In an editorial last Thursday,
The Cornell Daily Sure the un-
dergraduate newspaper, drew
a distinction between the two
appearances, criticizing Mr. Ky
. as "a mercenary" but describ-
ing Mr. Colby as "In his own
eyes a patriot." It urged stu-
dents to listen to Mr. Colby
, as an educational experience.
Academic Freedom Affirmed
"For if William Colby could
come to believe that Illegality
In the name of liberty is not
a crime, what is to prevent
the products of the rest of
America's bureaucratic and
educational establishment from
doing the samex" the atfitorial
said. "The answer can only
be found by listening to Colby
and by trying to understand
him."
? Both speakers were Invited
by the same student groups,
the Interfraternity Council and
the Oliphant Fellowship of the
Sigma Phi Fraternity. The fel-
lowship was set up as a private
endowment by Sigma Phi
.alumni to bring contemporary
speakers to the campus. The
fee for Mr. Colby's speech was
reported to be $2,500.
, The faculty committees re-
port on Mr. Ky's appearance
was a strong affirmation of,
academic freedom on the cam-I
pus, withal recommendationl
that faculty members who In-
terfere with or incite others
to interfere with free speech
be subject to suspension or
dismissal.
The report, issued at a special
faculty meeting last Wednes-
day, defined the rights of dis-
27
seaters to make their opinions
known as long as they did
not interfere with the speaker's
ability to give his views or
of the rights of others to listen.
? The report listed the rights
of dissenters as the following:
distributing leaflets outside the
meeting room, picketing peace-
fully, boycotting the speech.
walking out, asking pointed
questions and, with limits set
by the moderator, expressions
displeasure with evasive an-
swers.
"Exercise of the right of free
speech ought not to depend
on the speaker's willingness
to endure prolonged, massive
verbal ? hostility and a shouted
collective demand to leave,
lasting over two minutes," the
report said, referring to the
Ky incident
About 1,500 people attended
that meeting, which the report
described as a boisterous and
demonstatrative gathering, hos-
tile to the point that the moder-
ator concluded that Mr. Ky
could not give his prepared
address. By agreement with
some of those attending and
the speaker, the format was
changed to a question-and-an-
swer session.
Report Called Unfair
Although the faculty commit-
tee said it was not reaching
a judgment that any indiviival
had violated any law or univer-
sity regulatuonion, it singled
out two professors by name
as those who had spoken at
the meeting before Mr. Ky left
the stage. They were Michael
C. Parent', visiting professor
of government, and Richard
M. Miller, assistant professor
of philosophy.
"I feel that the report Is
not fair and misrepresents my
role," Professor Parenti said,
adding:
"It implies, without present-
frig evidence, that I had some-
thing to do with a disruption.
There were those there who
were dead set to disrupt the
meeting. I attempted to salvage
the meeting by offering another
format, which was voluntarily
accepted."
Professor Miller, who is on
leave teaching at the University
of California in Los Angeles,
was not available for comment.
But Professor Parenti said he
felt that the report also misre-
presented Professor Miller's
role. "All he did was make
a statement," he said.
The report said that, follow-
ing Professor Parenti's re-
marks, Mr. Ky had made a
three- minute statement and
then had answered suestions
for 10 minutes, when Professor
Miller spoke.
"kt this point the crowd
exploded," the report said. It
"The response was electric.
Part of the crowd (common
estimates are 150 to 250) rose
to their feet. At first the crowd
was shouting and clapping. It
then turned to rhythmic ap-
plause and the chant or 'Out.
out, out, which continued until
ley left the stage."
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Senday, March 14, 1976 The Washington Star
Agee and Viekh: Fuse
By the 6Corr,?,any's9 Events
By Torn
Dovding
"This American risked his life to tell
the truth about the CIA" ? so reads the
legend beneath the photo of the stern,
apparatchik-looking Philip Agee on the
back cover of his Bantam paperback,
"Inside the Company: CIA Diary."
What, then, of Richard Welch, the slain
CIA station chief in Athens, whose high-
domed, blandly cerebral SOish features
have merged into a blurred identity with
Agee's appearance of penetrating inten-
sity, of youth recaptured through com-
mitment? Did Welch die because Agee
told the truth?
Moreover, how odd that Agee's paper-
back publishers should choose to promote
their author with the one phrase best de-
signed to conjure up recollections of
Welch. Crass commercialism? An innocu-
ous copywriter's touch coincidentally
overtaken by developments in Athens?
Another instance of CIA propaganda wir-
ing on the domestic front. As Graham
Greene, himself a World War II British
secret agent, has observed: In the intelli-
gence business you never can be sure
? whether you're getting the fat or the
lean.
STILL, LIKE IT or not, ?Agee and
Welch have become irrevocably fused by
events; the death of one and the book of
the other have made them men whose vil-
lainy or heroism ? depending on your
point of view ? resists finality in an
espionage world where fat can be lean
. and vice versa.
So, the juxtaposition of Agee (the man
who risked his life to tell the truth?) and
Welch (the man who lost his life by hav-
ing it told?) is so neat, so perfectly timed,
so uncanny in its presumed cause and ef-
fect relationship as to be blatantly sug-
gestive, even suspicious.
Let us suppose that working for the
CIA and betraying it are alike occupa-
tions Of some risk. Who has the .highest
actuarial odds of an unexpectedly violent
demise: Agee the disaffected fugitive
operative whose four-year kiss-and-tell
book project was well-known to the Lang-
ley establishment? Or Welch, a desk-
hound senior bureaucrat who had spent
the last 15 years working under U.S.
embassy cover so flimsy as to be obvious
to even the most slow-witted rival spook
browsing through the foreign service Bio-
graphic Register ? a book available to
the public from the U.S. Government
Printing Office?
IWO CENTRAL FACTS would seem to
stand out on the face of things. First,
there is nothing in the recent, if only par-
'ally disclosed record of CIA operational
theory to lead one to suppose that the
"company" had squeamish aversions to
taking out anyone, particularly anyone
even half so troublesome as Agee. Sec-
ond, all ? or at the very least practically
all ? CIA agents functioning with an
overseas State Department cover are as'
readily identifiable from the Biographic
Register as Welch was. Yet while numer-
ous legitimate State Department foreign
service officers have been murdered
abroad, Welch is the first CIA agent with
a diplomatic passport to be singled out
for assassination.
So why Welch and not Agee? Perhaps
the CIA is more chary about dusting a
fellow countryman than a Castro, a
Trujillo or a DeGaulle ? though it is hard
?
tt
to see why this should be. Perhaps
Welch's slaying had nothing to do with
his CIA connection, or perhaps his elimi-
nation marks an abrupt change in the
"live and let live" gentleman's agree-
ment by which world intelligence serv-
ices have hitherto operated. Indeed, wild-
ly improbable as it may be, perhaps it is
Agee who is still the CIA loyalist and
Welch, the spy who decided to come in
from the cold. That, certainly would be
the standard plot denouement in any CIA
thriller that made use of the Agee-Welch
connection ? and it is a twist very much
in keeping with the notion of black propa-
ganda, which is the CIA's most regularly
employed operational tactic.
THE EN WE have no definitive
answer to the question of why Welch and
not Agee. Yet their juxtaposition is ines-
capable ? even above and beyond the
eerie echoes struck by the blurb on the
back of the Agee paperback. This is so
because the publication of Agee's book
and the murder of Welch increasingly ap-
pear to be seminal events in their inter-
connection.
To deal with matters consecutively, let
us begin with "Inside the Company,"
which Agee brought out in 1974 in Great'
Britain in order to prevent the CIA seek-
ing judicial restraints prior to publica-
tion. Assuming that Agee's book is what
it purports to be ? an ex post facto diary
account of a CIA field agent's workaday
experience ? would judge it to be among
the single most important documents on
U.S. post-World War II foreign policy yet
published.
This is not one of those orotund states-
man's apologias for a life of unremitting
self-sacrifice and nobility at the top. On
the contrary, the book's function is ca-
thartic, not self-celebratory. It is a
retrospective diary written with a re-
searched denseness and exactitude
:meant to capture precisely what Agee did
as a CIA man in Ecuador, Uruguay and
Mexico and how he felt about it at the
time. The flat, impassive narration is a.
remarkable piece of self-discipline; the
external facts of CIA operational prac-
tice are presented with a mastery of de-
tail that is astonishing in its variety and
significance. It is the book Kim Philby
must have given the KGB in his debrief-
ing. As an invaluable primary source for
historians of the future, it will ? again
assuming its legitimacy ?,surely stand
in such select company as the "Civil War
Diaries" of Gideon Welles.
AND THIS IS PERHAPS the most bi-
zarre aspect of Agee's book. Welles was,
after all, Secretary of the Navy under
Lincoln, an influential insider at Cabinet
deliberations, whereas Agee went to
Ecuador as a GS-9, hardly a slotting de-
signed to put a man at the center of the
American foreign policy maelstrom in
the ordinary scheme of things.
But the extraordinary thing about
Agee's book is that it documents just how
much of an insider, a shaper of events he
really was. Indeed, if his account is to be
credited, it can be argued that the real
contours of American foreign policy are
drawn at the field operational level far
removed from Washinelon's control, its
knowledge, and even at total variance
with its official pronouncements. What
28
this posits are two radically new implica-
tions about the implementation of ot ; Y.
En the first instance, Agee's experi-
enses indicate that an American over-
seas bureaucracy becomes respneOve to
its own immediate environneeit, -at
Washington. Thus the American ;7'i, 'on
in Quito ultimately operates in an
derail context, not an American one, e'ith
the upshot that the embassy in Quito be-
comes not so much an extension of
American policy made in Washine.on as
an independent institution oeernting
vn'thin the Ecuadoran infrastructure.
Secondly, the American mission ite2li
- is bifurcated into two distinct units., oee
evert and largely meant for public coo-
sumption and the other covert and maent
to run things. Needless to say, the two
carts of the whole often work at cress
purposes, and in a way that assurss
dominance to the covert part of the
operation.
- THUS, DURING AGEE'S tour in Ecua-
dor the official Washington policy in
Latin America is the Alliance for Pro- .
gress, trumpeted by Kennedy, Rusk, et
al, as an effort to use foreign aid for
feverage to promote liberal reforms. This
sounds fine and the overt part of the
American mission in Ecuador is compel-
led to pay lip service to the Alliance for
Progress even though the American
diplomats are astute enough to know that
the Ecuadoran oligarchy's interest in
liberal reform is nonexistent and, in any
case, unnecessary since they'll get their
aid money anyway merely by floating
rumors of the Communist menace, Che
Guevarra's presence in the jungle, that
sort of thing.
So the upshot is that the diplomats on
the spot have no illusions about the effi-
cacy of the Alliance for Progress. Indeed,
it seems doubtful that Kennedy was all
that serious about it. According to Agee,
Ecuador's President Arosemena, a hope-
less lush, makes a big hit with Kennedy
labile visiting Washington by jovially re-
marking in his cups that he can name.all
the American presidents since Washing-
tea but cannot perform the same feat
with Ecuadoran presidents since they
Lave been deposed with such eye-blind-
ing regularity. As it would turn out,
Arosemena's remark had a certain pres-
cient gallows humor about it. -
LI ANY EVENT, whatever the overt
Ea service to liberal reform, the reality
el Ecuadoran national life is dominated
Eee- the American mission's covert opera-
tions. Almost every influential segment
d Ecuadoran society is on the CIA pay-
ral in one form or 'another: The presi-
dent's family, his personal physician,
cabinet officers, journalists, bankers:
basinessmen, police, the military n,s.t:n1-
ire'arnent. Some are selling information,
.cf?ers are paid to disseminate rnisio:or-
ravion. But the bottom line is that the
Ecuadoran ruling class, already carrout
ko'custom, is encouraged to become even
lir ore corrupt by the CIA. Who do Ecue-
deean leaders believe: Agee, on the spot
delivering his monthly retainer check, or
Kennedy back in Washington delivering
his pronouncements of reform, integrity,
democracy? Well, in this kind of show-
n the man with a shoebox full of
money is the effective policymaker. So in
Eenador the real president of the United
Stntes is Agee, the GS-9:with the leink-
re:21? not Kennedy, the presidential
sorkesman whose every grandiloquent
utterance is a comical sham.
The same pattern prevails throil,;13,1;t
lozin America ? and presumably t.?.?
res-,1 of the world, for that mutt io
Ikkenico, for example, President !
Diaz Ordaz, the legatee of the.rt4?.,$h,
gelsthe CIA to present a new autoink
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to his mistress. -When the sitting Mexican
president gets wind of Diaz Ordaz's ar-
rangement. does he wire Kennedy,
complaining that this is an apparent deni-
al of everything the Alliance for Progress
stands for? No, he insists that the CIA
supply his own girlfriend with a new set
of wheels.
NO DOUBT THE CIA has been consid-
erably discomfited by Agee's decision to
name names; not only the three succes-
sive Mexican presidents who were CIA
men, but dozens of Latin American emi-
nences who enjoyed similar arrange-
ments, not to mention scores of CIA
agents, some of them secreted away in
"deep cover" positions. But while these
revelations unquestionably invest Agee's
diary with a compelling literary sense of
verisimilitude, the groundbreaking sig-
nificance of his work lies in another area.
In the intelligence world new politi-
cians can always be bought, new Ameri-
can spies recruited, new informants
squirreled away in the host country in-
frastructure. No doubt the process of
replacement is embarrassing and even
complicated, but, like having a code
cracked, the damage is finite. The real
devastation of Agee's diary is that it so
painstakingly and precisely describes the
institutional system by which the CIA
operates. If there is one fundamental rule
of modern bureaucratic life, it's that men
come and go, but large organizations are
immutable, unalterable. The CIA, like
the Veterans Administration or the De-
partment of Defense, is a self-perpetuat-
ing monolith, a piece of machinery condi-
tioned to run in a repetitive pattern that
no directive from on high can alter. The
CIA has 16,500 employees, all of them
taught to function by second nature in a
given way, to approach every problem
with one particular strategy and a time-
tested set of tactics. It is a highly syste-
mized and interconnected bureaucratic
process ? and from Agee's account an
unusually efficient one. His diary, then,
is not an individual's autobiography, but
a manual of operations.
THE KEY ISSUE raised by Agee's dis-
closures is whether a secret agency can
function at all when every last detail of
its rote operations is laid out on the pub-
lic record. The answer, if history is any
guide, is that the CIA will continue to
operate as if nothing has changed. After
all, the CIA that Agee worked for in the
1960s continued to employ exactly the
same operational techniques of the 1950s,
even though Kim Philby, who had com-
plete run of the CIA as the British secret
service liaison in Washington in the
meantime openly defected to Moscow.
The fact is that a spy organization has
only two choices when its whole opera-
tion is blown: to disband or pretend that
nothing has happened. Needless to say,
no bureaucracy ever disbands. It simply
keeps a stiff upper lip, draws up a few
new organizational charts and expands.
After all, the meaning of Philby's defec-
tion, in the words of one CIA man, was
that from the period -of 1944 to 1951 the
whole Western intelligence community
was "a minus advantage. We'd have
been better off doing nothing."
And true to form after Philby went
WASHINGTON POST
10 MAR 1976
Colby Says Hill
-:-Con141 Handle 1)ata
yrnAcA, March 9
? tAlnWilliam K. Colby, for-
.mer director of the Central
Intelligence Ageney, said
Monday night that a small
group of legislators could be
told all of the nation's Se-
crets ';1s long as they don't
:leak them .to everybody
else."
Colby's speech was inter-
rupted several times by ap-
plause and about an equal
lalliihtV Of times by, jeers
ft'* on a rapacity -crowd of 2.-
000 at Cornell UniversiVs
Bailey Ball.
over to the other side, the CIA merely continued in the
same fashion but on a larger scale so that Agee's defec-
tion could put it at another "minus advantage."
Agee's diary spills the beans to the whole world with
consequences presumably as disheartening to the KGB
as the CIA. Moreover, his direct public disclosure of a
"minus advantage" came at a time when the very con-
cept of secret government was under intense, wide-
ranging public attack as a result of Watergate. The
whole secret, extralegal American establishment seem-
ed poised to come unraveled, with unknowable, poten-
tially chaotic consequences ? not only for the CIA, but
for the multinational corporations, the political estab-
lishment, the whole power structure.
AGAINST THAT BACKDROP, the role of Richard
Welch's martyrdom becomes especially instructive. We
are told by the CIA that his murder was indirectly in-
spired by the publication of Agee's book ? although
Welch, an old Latin American hand, is not mentioned
therein. Nonetheless, President Ford gives implicit sup-
port to the notion that the breach of CIA secrecy has
gone too far by attending the Welch funeral. News-
papers by and large take the same editorial line, with
the result that the whole thrust of journalistic and gov-
ernmental exposure of CIA secrecy is suddenly blunted
and then reversed.
The Rockefeller Commission confines itself to a few
domestic red herrings and then turns matters over to
the Congress. The Church Committee appears to have
limited its investigation mostly to subjects for which the
already disgraced Nixon can take the blame. The Pike
Committee comes up with a largely bland document that
is leaked to Daniel Schorr that CBS can make an exam-
ple of him. Ford caps the whole investigation by propos-
ing an American version of the British Official Secrets
Act ? a law which has kept the full consequences of
Philby's treachery covered up to this very day.
SO THE CIA IS off the hook. Interestingly enough,
alternate spoors have been offered up to the hounds of
discovery. We can if we wish explore which news execu-
tives were in the CIA's hip pocket, which American cor-
porations bribed which foreign leaders to peddle their
wares, which American politicians had unsavory pasts.
What we are confronted with, of course, is a rather
pointed warning that our own infrastructure is positive-
ly Ecuadoran in the variety and depth of its corruption.
Needless to say, this is a form of self-incrimination that
our institutions are not very likely to visit on themselves
by pursuing. And so the curtain of secrecy will no doubt
descend again, allowing us to pretend that our total
"minus advantage" does not exist.
The remarkable thing in retrospect is that Nixon must
have had the goods on everyone ? the CIA, the multina-
tionals, the CIA's news media connections, his predeces-
sors in the oval office. Yet unlike Samson, he did not
choose to bring the temple crashing down. Born, bred
and reveling in the pervasive code of covert power, he
went out as its meek, silent martyr, the establishment's
surrogate villain, just as Richard Welch was its surro-
gate hero. In such a world even a book like Agee's
makes no difference ? if indeed we can even be sure in
such a world which is the lean and which is the fate
THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
6 March 1976
MIsioi?try, prohe..ii$keti
THE-AMERICAN Friends Service Committee has-.
asked Sen. Frank Church' [D., Idahol,:head of the
Senate select committee on intelligence; to hold
..pUblic hearings on Central Intelligence Agency. rela-.
-..tionships with missionaries. "We urge most strongly
. that you take- into-account the wrongness of.gOv?!rn-.
".-rnent .agents..-making-nse of, or 'infiltration of,-reli- ? ?
gious, pdticatinnal, -or philanthropic' 1.?,rroups,". the
Friends committee told Church. Church's committee
is drafting legislation to increase. Congressional ov,
ersight of the nation's intelligence actiy.ities. George
:?Bush,..the.' new CIA director, has said the agency - ? ?
would stop 'recruiting of' agents among clergy but
. would continue to accept information volunteered by
? "missionaries or other clerics.' Lt?gislation has been
introduced, to" prohibit any use of missionaries for
. CIA. operations. - "
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NEVI TIMES
20 FEBRUARY 1976
Naming names: The CIA's men in charge of Angola
et
?
y Robert Scheer
The assassination of Athens CIA
station chief Richard Welch the day -
after he was identified in a Greek
? newspaper has made the Western
press very reticent about publishing
the names of CIA agents, and indeed
has taken much of the wind out of
investigations of the CIA's
abuses.While it is understandable that
the press does not want to precipitate
vendettas against individuals who are
carrying out policies they did not
formulate, this new self-censorship
begs the question: Is it not necessary
on occasion to expose the identities of
agents when their activities are
suspect and worthy of public scrutiny?
I believe it is?particularly in the case
of Angola. And in the attempt to
illuminate the myriad CIA activities in
that country, I have decided to print the
names of three CIA agents most
instrumental in the field decisions of
the.Angolan war.. .
? The most controversial aspect
of the Angolan war concerns the entry.
of South African troops. There is some
evidence to indicate that the U.S. CIA
was behind this-South African entry.
The one person who would know if that
is true or not is the man who was CIA
station chief in South Africa when the
.decision was made, Francis Jeton.
Journalists and congresspeople ought
to-be asking him some pretty tough
questions about what the hell he has
been up to.
I learned Jeton's identity from a
news release of InterNews, an
extremely useful and sober leftist
news-monitoring group based in
i Berkeley, California. Steve Weissman,
I the InterNews correspondent in
ILondon, filed a report on January 28 of
, this year that one of the leading South
African newspapers, the Rand Daily
Mail, would on the following day reveal
the names of past and present CIA
officials stationed in South Africa. The
Daily Mail never ran its story, probably
for fear of prosecution under South
Africa's very stringent Official Secrets
Act. But Weissman named Jeton and
went on to report that he had recently
- been moved to the CIA's Paris station,
which is now the planning center for
attempts to ally the French, South
Africans and the CIA in a new arms
:deal for Angola. This end-run was
made necessary by the fact that the
American Congress had voted to cut
off direct aid. It is a highly
questionable practice to have a U.S.
secret agent working fora policy
objective that the U.S. Congress has
specifically rejected. Jeton ought to?
be held accountable by Congress,
which might also want to question
Drowin Wilson, who, according to
InterNews is Jeton's replacement in
South Africa._ ? -
. These gentlemen seem to have
been central to the Angolan operation.
and it would be therefore useful to
query them about current efforts of the
CIA to recruit foreign nationals to fight
in Angola, an activity that seems to
contradict the expressed intent of
Congress. Evidence of such recruiting
has cropped up recently in the British
press. On February 1, Reuters reported
that "the conservative Sunday
Telegraph said more than twenty
million dollars was being supplied by
the CIA to recruit British mercenaries
to fight on the side of the pro-Western
factions in Angola." Reuters also
quoted the head of one such
mercenary recruitment outfit, who
identified an imerican military
attache, Major ,Ames Leonard, as a
liaison officer who funneled some
American money for the recruitment of
the mercenaries.
White House Press Secretary
Ron Nessen promptly denied the
- English reports but conceded that"a
limited amount of money is going to
countries which support our goals in
Angola," and then added, "We do not
know to the last penny how it is being
spent."
It is clear that if Congress wants
to find out what's going on, it must
interview people below the level of
Nessen and newly appointed CIA
Director George Bush. Major Leonard,
Francis Jeton and Drowin Wilson
wouTd be good people to start with.
Another important point of
contention in the Angolan episode is
whether the active U.S. involvement
came before or after that of the
Russians. It is therefore interesting that
. InterNews and Weissman, in another
dispatch from London, have identified
the build-up of a major U.S. CIA team
in Zaire, a country deeply involved in
support for the American-backed
forces irt Angola. This build-up
occurred in November 1974, which
comes before the March-April 1975 -
? date commonly used for the start of the
Soviet Angolan escalation. Weissman
relied on information provided by
? -former CIA agent Phillip Agee to
identify at least 18 CIA agents in the
Zaire team. Ten of the 18 are assigned
to handle top-secret telecom-
munications. Additionally, there are
six "case officers" and two secretaries
working under cover in the political
? section of the American embassy. The
substance of Weissman's report is
printed here for the first time.
? According to Weissman and
? Agee, the team is headed by Stuart E.
Methvin, who was formerly active in
_Laos and Indonesia, two countries that
have had their share of CIA meddling.
Methvin and the members of his team
must know a good deal about many of
the murkier aspects of U.S. -
involvement in Angola, and if that
country i6 not to become another
Vietnam, it is best that a congressional
investigation begin sooner rather than
later.
In the event that Mr. Methvin
proves uncooperative, a congres-
sional committee should talk to the
ether members of his team, and, in the
hopes of aiding such an investigation,
2would be happy to provide upon
request the names of the other 17
agents working for the CIA in Zaire, as
? supplied by Mr. Agee. Again, these
are all men and women known to
various political factions in Angola
and elsewhere in Africa.Their identity,
as usual, is secret only to the people in
this country who should be
questioning them?the members of the
ess and Congress. Indeed, it is my
view that these names should also be
? printed in this column, but
unfortunately the editor and publisher
fait otherwise. C;*
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CCET4ONWEAL
13 FEBRUARY 1976
Inside the Company:
? CIA Diary
PHIPP AGEE
Stonehill, $9.95
- STU COHEN
Thanks to two disillusioned CIA of-
ficers, a former state department em-
ployee, and a series of Congressional
investigations, the American people are
beginning to learn about their "invisi-
ble government." We are at last ? dis-
covering truths long known to those in
countries where our "secret police
force" plies its trade.
The hearings have concentrated upon
? CIA activities within our borders. The
excellent book by Victor Marchetti
and John Marks, The CIA and the Cult
of Intelligence, explores the structure
and policies of "the company" (as it
is known internally). This is natural,
? for Marchetti's experience was at the
upper echelons -of the agency.
The most exciting revelations, how-
ever, have come from a man who
spent 12 years as an operations of-
ficer, on the line in Latin America,
Philip Agee. In 1956 Agee was a
bright, patriotic and bored college
graduate looking for something mean-
ingful to do with his life. Those qual-
ities were to lead him into the com-
pany, just as his sensitivity and
changing conceptions of political mo-
rality were to lead him out.
For the first time, in Agee's book,
we have a detailed account of the
training of CIA officers. The descrip-
tion of his indoctrination is fascinating,
especially the growing boyish pleasure
in being a member of a "secret so-
ciety":
I'll be a warrior against commu-
nist subversive erosion of freedom
and personal liberties around the
world?a patriot dedicated to the
- preservation of my country and
our way of life.
Once achieving the status of an op-
erations officer and on his first assign-
ment in Quito, Ecuador, there is a
bowing sense of Power, too. The Quito
CIA station launches a campaign
against a leftist minister and suddenly,
"Araujo's out!" "I've taken over my
first operations and met my first real-
live agents?at last I'm a genuine
clandestine operations officer.".
And so it goes, recruiting and pay-
ing agents, tapping telephones, writ-
ing outright lies for propaganda pur-
poses--and always with the same goals;
to isolate Cuba and reduce any So-
viet influence in the hemisphere.
After successful years ia
dor. Agee is transferred to Montevideo,
Uruguay, a step up the ladder. He fit
in easily and worked very effectively
until April 28, 1965: "I don't quite
understand this invasion of the Do-
minican Republic." The Dominican
adventure, the use of U.S. Marines to
assure the defeat of Juan Bosch's popu-
lar constitutionalist government at the
military's hands, was an opening chink
in Agee's cold war armor.
By September, the rift is widening:
The more I think about.the Do-
minican invasion the more I won-
der whether the politicians in
Washington really want to see re-
forms in Latin America . . I
think I may not have chosen the
right career after all. '
One year later Agee is back in Wash-
ington, -separated from his wife, work-
ing on the Mexican desk at headquar-
ters, and desperately looking for a way
out. An assignment to the 1968 Olym-
pics in Mexico City comes up and he
snaps at it as a way of making poten-
tial job contacts outside the agency.
His work at the Olympics is apprecia-
ted by 'the chief of the Mexico City
station, Winfield Scott. Scott asks Agee
to transfer to political work after the
Olympics. The thought of more covert ?
operations was repellent and, thus,
"One more CIA career comes to an
end. It was a little earlier than I had
expected.. .." That day Agee formally
resigned.
By January, 1970, he had begun
working on a book about the CIA. He
is more than aware of the potential
dynamite and personal danger inherent
in the enterprise: "One word to the
Mexican service and I get the one-way
ride to Toluca?except it's a lovely
way to go, disappearing down one of
those canyons." .
Agee's most important decision
about the Wok was, ". . . to name all
the names and organizations connected
with CIA operations and to reconstruct
as accurately as possible the events
in ?which I participated.. No more
hiding behind theory and hypothetical
cases. . . ." It is this decision which
gives the book its flavor and? impor-
tance. Not only because some of the
names belong to Presidents, senators,.
police chiefs,. or high ministers of state
but because the inclusion of such
names helps corroborate the events re-..
ported.
The last sections of the book are
taken up with some of its most ex-
citing moments?the writing of the
manuscript, itself. Agee traveled to
Montreal. to Paris in search of a pub-
?
usher and to Cuba for research ma-
terials. In October of 1971 he decided
to speak out and sent a letter to the
Uruguayan leftist periodical, Marcha
concerning CIA meddling in Uruguay-
an elections. The letter, he admits,
... was a mistake." Almost immedi-
ately an old friend from the CIA ap-
peared with "advice." Not long after
the visit Agee found himself followed,
in the streets. He was befriended by a
man and a woman who planted a bug-
ged typewriter on him. His family was
visited by company representatives. As
a result his wife refused to allow his
children to come to Europe for a visit.
The agency thus hoped to force Ape
back to the U.S. for "discussions." He
finally fled to London and began utiliz-
ing the resources of the British Mu-
seum. A British publisher, Penguin,
with a solid interest in the third world,
gave him a contract. After approach-
ing every major publisher in the United
States, all of whom demurred, a small,
w publisher, Stonehill, was found
and the book finally appeared- in print
Ir-re.
We have before us then an impor-
tant and reasonably well written book.
And yet, somehow, it doesn't complete-
ly succeed. Agee adopted a diary for-
mat and Inside the Company presents
itself as a (reconstructed) diary of the
times it describes. This format is valu-
able and helps to impart a sense of
immediacy to the events. But there-are
also inherent defects. A great diarist,
say Samuel Pepys, speaks not only of
events but also of their emotional con-
tent. This. is Agee's great failing?the
book is -cold. Even when be mentions
emotions (rarely) be is of course writ-
ing of reconstructed feelings. Are they
accurate? We'll never know. You can-
not express emotions merely through
exclamation points.. Real diaries are full
of ephemera?little- flashes of stuff
which, although unimportant in retro-
spect, give the work flavor- and body.
This too is missing. Nor is this mere
stylistic quibbling. When Agee's con-
version comes we are emotionally un-
prepared to accept it and it becomes
ifefficult to accept at face value.
Another weakness, although less seri-
ous, is Agee's occasional bursts of
tbetoric. Increasingly toward the book's
conclusion the reader is lectured about
politics, economics- and the class strug-
gle. The writing here never approaches
real analysis and the attempt unneces-
sarily clutters the whole.
These, however, are comments about
what the book is not. What it is is a
frighteningly clear window on a world
supported by public funds for longer
than some of us have been born. We
have long feared these truths. Now we
know them beyond any doubt. What
shall we do with the knowledge?
31
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DAILY 'TELEGRAPH, London ?
4 March 1976
11{A agentsin
0_111 (rz,731
crir?:77-74
arriLeid
'paper
? ? -By -GERARD KEMP ? ?
THE International Marxist Group's. news-
?-paper "Bed ' Weekly,' 'formerly "Red
Mole," today publishes the names, addresses.
. and telephone numbers of what it claims to be
. "the largest list "yet 'given of agents of the
.,American .,Central
,Intelligence Agency.
-.0Ver .60 " agents " are
identified as working in
American -.Embassy ,iri
`:LOndon,. the head of " the
I A . station in London'!
:being named as Mr Cord
Meyer junior, whose address
given ? together with
his Embassy telephone
extension. - ?
Mt Meyer has been fre-
'quently: named over the past
lyear' as, the CIA chief in
' -
,
,.? As well as the list of agents;
' the Marxist- .paper names
Cabinet Ministers Mr Crosland
and Mr Healey as having been
linked in the past with- the CIA,
newspaper claims that
,they. "have . in fact , been
_assisted. by the CI A, though
. doubtless.. without. their know-
. ledge.'
Accurate information ? !
? The International.. Maretisi
.Group G) first 'spratig to
prominence in 1963 under the
direction of Tariq All wile) has
now handed over his role a?
national secretary to Mr Bob
Pennington.
Last night Mr Mick Gosling,
the "Red Weekly" reporter
who compiled the dossier . of,
CIA names, said: "As far as
we know, this is the largest list
of American intelligence opera-
tives published at a single go
!' anywhere in the world. All the
information is accurate as of a
few weeks ago and sonic of if
was unearthed as recently as
last week. Jr has been exhaus-.
tively checked.
? " The largest list previously
published appeared in an Italian
newspaper?they revealed 45
names? and ?I know that a
Spanish magazine published
about 11 names."
Numerous C I A men \\TIT he
trayed earlier by Mr Phillip
Agee, an ex-C I A at.tene ill his
book " Inside the company:
C I A Diary." Me Alia, is con-
nected with " Filth est ate " IIIt
Aillerican org 1 fl.i :u 110,1 operat-
ing from a poky office in Wash!
ingtoti. He is-on the board.
? Last. year the organisation
printed the name of the C I A's
man in Athens, Mr Richard.
Welch, in,its publication-
"
"Counterspy." Mr Welch was
subsequently shot dead outside
his Athens. borne last December.
He' was one of. seven people
named as CIA men in the
English-language daily Athens
News. . . .
Mr Agee, a close friend of Afte
Paul Foot, a prominent member,
of the International Socialists
?and nephew of the Einployntent,
Minister, Mr Michael Foot, was
indirectly referred to recently.
'by Lord Chalfont who denounced.
as " enemies of, the state any-
one who exposed. C I A agents.
Lord Chalfont 4 a former.
Junior. Minister, at the Foreign:
Office in Mr Wilson's 1964 Gov-
ernment, defended the work of
.the CIA as part of the West's.
-defence system against Commu-
nism. He said that naming CI A.
agents made them "vulnerable
to every psychopath with the,
price of' a gun or a stick of
gelignite."
" Referring to- alleged IMO be-
tween the- CIA and Mr Cros-s
land and Mr Healey, "Red"
Wekly" says today: "Crosland
was for a Whole period a paid'
-adviser tothe Congress for Cul-
tural Freedom, a CIA: front'
organisation . . . Healey was the
paid London correspondent of
the 'New Leader,' a virulent anti--
Communist magazine financed by
the C IA." .
Last night a spokesman tor
Mr Crosland tpld me: "The sag-.
gestion that Mr Crosland was
ever in any way linkeo with the
C IA is just too laughable for
words.
I understand that Mr Crosland,
together with a number of other
prominent people were connec-?
led with the Congress for Cul-
tural Freedom through paid
articles written for the magazine
" Fie:emitter."
One source told me: " At the
time these, people were writing
for Encounter ' none of them
hail any idea of there brine; any
links between it and the C IA."
. A spokesman for Mr Dennis
ittsale,e said last. nieht : " Mr
ledley is at the opera tonight.
,IVe are informitie hint of this
nowspaper's reference to him."
TIlE WASHRIGTO7TAII
MARCH 1.91(1
SAInNG
The CIA Agent as
Conservationist -
Except for a close circle of co-
workers. few people knew the
three men were CIA ame.-nts when
they arrived on the tropical is-
lana. They came separately and
quietly. Natives.paid little heed.
The men moved into nice. up-
per-middle-class neighborhoods
?, and settled into the community.
? gradually taking active roles in
its young revolutionary move-
ment. the revolutionarie
wanted independence: they
called it Thorne rule." The three
newcomers Lad lived in Wash-
? to,
inon and they knewwhat thosel
words could mean.
Realizing the power of the
press in such battles, the three
joined two other revolutionaries
and set up a local newspaper.
appropriately called the Island
Reporter. They set out to give
readers all the facts. a switch
for Agency men..As it turned out.
the facts presented a pretty good
case for home ntle.
And thus the revolution was ;
successful ?in a very demoeratie ;
way. In a referendum on the is- ;
land. the people voted 689-394 I
for home rule. A new city was !
born. One of the CIA men be-
came mayor and. backed by the '
newspaper. plunged into the
? grueling task of protecting the ?
city from the menace of outside
' aoitators.
This is neither a fable nor an-
other CIA scandal. It is a true
story. The men have left the CIA
(although some say there's no
, such &nit as a "forr=r" CIA
agent) and are deeply involved
in the government of a 13-mile-
long. crescent-shaped island off
the west coast of Florida. The
FLOrjA:?
island is Sanibel. named it is said...
by explorer Ponce de Leon for ;
his queen. Isabella. Is recently '
has become popular with tourists
lured by its wildfowl sanetuaries. '
shelliritt beaches. and the boat-
ing. fishing. and swimming in
the Gulf of Nlexico and Pine Is-
kind Sound. ?
For years Sanibel wasrernoTe,
accessible only by ferry. In 1952. .
its permanent populatiaa was es-
32
timafed at lf,H. In 1975. it was
3.000 and climbinn rapidly. San-
ibel last year was the Iastest-
nroaving city in the fastest-grow-
ing county in the nal 4)11. Is-
landers were horrified. -
The turning point came in
1961 with the opening of a three-
mite causeway linking Sanibel
and the mainland. Cat s streamed
onto the island. As if the cause-
way weren't bad enough, the hie
Florida building boom hit Sani-
bel in 1973 and threatened to
engulf the place. The Charlotte
County government, remote and
unsympathetic, extended its own
liberal zoning codes to the tiny
island. Unchecked. county Or-
dinances eventually would have
allowed for 90.000 people.
It was the sight of condomin-
ium apartments rising along the
Gulf beach that provided the
impetus to get the revolution yo-
ing. The spooks-turned-conser-
vationists quickly joined in?
Porter Goss, who had served in -
London and was to become may-
or of Sanibel: Don WIMehelel,
who had served in Paris and was
to become editor of the paper:
Fred Valtin, who had served in
Germany and was to oversee the
paper's business and advertising
departments.
Even with all their fingers in
the dike, however, it may be im-
possible to stem the a&ancing
tide. During Christmas week, for
instance, the island's narrow
roads were so crowded the traf-
fic jam never ended. As an
emergency measure, the new city
council adopted an ordinance
barring big motorized campers
from staying the night on island
streets. But there's no Way to
keep them away altogether. and
they lumbered across the cause-
way in a steady stream, cyan
thoueh there are no parks or pie-
Mc areas on Sanibel.
The Sanibel of graceful: wild
birds and exotic shells and soft
sandy beaches has become a
city. Porter Goss often sounds
like any other mayor, talking
about budgets and plans for bond
issues. But he does offer some
hope. He won't vote for trafin:
signal lights, for example. Traf-
fic lights are sort of a symbol:
Once installed, the game is over
?the developers have won.
-1Ve're out to preserve the
unique natural assets of this is-
land for all," he says. "We're not
going to blow the appeal of this
place... It's not a crusade exactly.
but it's close.','
Now, isn't that a fine project
for the CIA? ?Smut EY ELDER
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SATURDAY REVIEW
6 March 1976
Is Detente Worth Saving.
? A distinguished student
argues that detente has been
U.S.S.R. but is still a goal
? by George F. Kennan
Some years ago, for reasons I have
never entirely understood, an im-
pression got about that there was begin-
ning, in our relationship with the Soviet
Union, a new period of normalization
and relaxation of tensions, to be sharply
? distinguished from all that had gone
before and to be known by the term
"detente."
This image of detente, in which, for
all I know, there may have been at one
time some slender basis of reality, came
to be rather seriously oversold. It was
? oversold?for different reasons in each
case?by our government, by the Soviet
government, and by the American press;
and as a result of this overselling, many
people came to address to the behavior
of both countries expectations that were
unreal and could not be met fully.
Today an almost predictable reaction
has set in?a reaction against what peo-
ple understand to be "detente." It has
set in partly as a consequence of the
earlier overselling of this idea; partly be-
cause real mistakes have been made
here and there, on both sides; partly
because an improvement in political re-
lations appeared to threaten the formid-
? able interests vested in a continuing state
of high military tension. In addition,
there seem to be a number of people in
our political and journalistic world for
whom a certain Cold War rhetoric has
long been the staff of life, who have
been alarmed by an apparent favorable
trend in our relationship to Russia that
has threatened to undermine the basis
for this rhetoric, and who now welcome
the chance to attack that trend. The re-
sult has been the emergence of a school
of thought which appears to believe that
something useful could now be
? achieved in our relations with Russia by
a policy of strident hostility on our part,
by reversion to the Cold War slogans
of the Fifties, by calling names and
making faces, by piling up still greater
quantities of superfluous armaments,
and by putting public pressure on Mos-
cow to change its internal practices, and
? indeed the very nature of Soviet power.
Granted this tangle of motivations
? and outlooks, just where should the
United States stand regarding detente?
Is it a mere governmental public-rela-
tions ploy, without grounding in the
realities? Or is it a major fact of inter-
of American foreign policy
"oversold" in the U. S. and
certain parts of the Continent. We bore
that must be pursued. with us, to be sure, the traditions, the
customs, the inherited outlooks of the
European societies that had mothered
us. But we were now in the process of be-
ing changed to some degree by the very
THE BEST WAY of getting at these ques-
discipline of our physical encounter with
tions is, it seems to me, to step back the great American wilderness and were,
from them so that the riddle of d?nte in any case, appearing now for the first
can be brought into historical perspec- time as something in our own right,
tive.
something visible and active on the land-
There is no need to dwell at any great g scape of world politics, preparing to take
length on the curious sort of symmetry an independent part in the affairs of the
?sometimes one of similarity, some- world.
times of diametrical opposition?that has i To this concept we must add, now,
marked the development of the Russian the reflection that around the same time
and American peoples, particularly in both of these two peoples, starting from
the modern age?by which term I am
a position of what we might call prox-
thinking of the past 200 to 250 years.
national life, which will lead on to ever-
widening vistas of mutual Soviet-Ameri-
can support?
Many thoughtful observers?including
even Tocqueville, who had ? never been
to Russia?have noted it and commented
on it. At the start of that period, the
two peoples were marked by their re-
spective inhabitation of vast, underpop-
ulated, and relatively underdeveloped
but potentially enormously fruitful ter-
ritories in the north temperate zone
of the planet. In the 18th century both
were just emerging out of a former
obscurity onto the great stage of the
international life of the civilized world.
The Russians were emerging into this
limelight after several centuries of rela-
tive isolation?which one might call a
historically compelled isolation?from
the main cultural and religious and poli-
tical centers of Western civilization.
They were emerging in the manner with
which we are all familiar. By that time
a limited westward territorial expansion
had brought them to Poland and to
the Baltic Sea. The construction of a
new and partially Europeanized capital
on the banks of the Neva was creating
a governmental center reasonably open
to contact with Western Europe, in con-
trast to the former remote and self-im-
molating Grand Duchy of Moscow, with
its religious intolerance, its dark suspi-
cion of the heretical outside world, its
pious abhorrence of contact with the
individual Western foreigner.
In that same century we Americans
were emerging onto the world scene
for the first time as a discrete entity,
but emerging in quite a different way:
not as an old people, isolated from
Europe by the workings of a long and
unhappy history, but as a young people
newly born, so to speak, out of the
wombs of old England and Scotland and
33
imity to the main centers of Western
European power and culture, began in
earnest their respective processes of de-
velopmental expansion away from those
centers: the Russians eastward across
the Volga and the Urals into the im-
mense expanses of central Asia and
Siberia; the Americans westward across
their own empty, magnificent, and un-
derdeveloped continent. Both were des-
tined, in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, to close the circle and to meet,
in a sense, on the shores of the Pacific
?to meet as peoples by this time of im-
mense demographic, physical, and po-
tential military power, each towering
already in these respects over any of
the individual entities, if not the totality,
of the old Europe from which they had
taken, in so high degree, their origins
and their inspirations.
So far I have dealt mostly with simi-
larities. But these similarities in physical
and geographic experience were ac-
companied by profound, almost anti-
thetically related differences in political
and social outlook. With these differ-
ences, too, most of us are familiar. The
Russians inherited the outlook of a
great continental land power, almost
George F. Kennon, author, historian, and
former U. S. ambassador to the Soviet
Union, is :professor emeritus at the Institute
for Advanced Study in Princeton, N. I-. and
a founder of the Kerman Institute for Ad-
vanced Russian Studies in Washington. ?
D. C. The article is adapted from remarks
made at a meeting of Washington area
Slavists held under the auspices of the
-Kennon Institute.
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totally cut off from the world oceans,
sur.ounded over great periods of their
history by fierce and dangerous land
neighbors; and they became accustomed
to that intense concentration of political
authority that marks all societies and
communities that find themselves virtu-
ally in a state of siege. The Russians
learned to regard as natural the subor-
dination of the individual to this con-
centration of authority. They were grate-
ful, no doubt, for whatever liberties and
immunities might be conceded to the
individual at any given moment, but
they tended to accept these as the prod-
uct of an act of grace on the part of
constituted authority rather than as ab-
solute rights, inherent in the condition
of individual man. We Americans, on
the other hand, were heirs to the mer-
cantile and commercial traditions of
latter-day England and Scotland. Shield-?
ed in effect on the oceanic side?whether
we recognized the fact or not?by En-
glish sea power, and facing on our
mainland only insignificant military chal-
lenges, we were able to proceed in rela-
tive peace to the development of our
continent, enjoying, indeed taking in-
creasingly for granted, these rights and
procedures of self-government that were
actually in high degree the achievements
of the European civilizations out of
which we had emerged.
The differences between these tw
outlooks were, as you see, profoun
But the two peoples had one thing i
common: a tendency to attribute t
their own political ideology a potenti
universal validity?to perceive in it vi
tues that ought, as one thought, to corn
mand not only imitation on the pa
of other peoples everywhere but als
recognition of the moral authority an
ascendancy of the respective nation
center from which these virtues wer
proceeding. The Russians had inherite
this messianic view of their own plac
in the world from old Byzantium, wit
its strong sense of religious orthodox
and its universalistic pdlitiCal preten
sions. We Americans had it because
failing to recognize the relationship be
tween our freedoms and achievement
on the one hand, and the uniquely fa
vorable conditions in which it was given
to us to lead our national life on th
other, we mistook those achievement
and freedoms as the products of some
peculiar wisdom and virtue on our own
part and came to see in the system o
government we were now enjoying the
ultimate salvation of most of the res
of the world. So each of these great
peoples went along into the 20th cen-
tury nurturing vague dreams, if not of
world power, at least of a species of
exemplary and moral world leadership,
which entitled it to some special form of
admiration, deference, imitation, or
authority?call it what you will?at the
hands of other less favorably endowed
peoples.
34
d.
al
r-
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It was, then, against this background
that the relations between the two peo-
ples and their governments developed up
to the end of the 19th century. In the geo-
political sense there were no serious con-
flicts between them; on the contrary,
there was much, particularly in their
respective relationships to England, that
gave to each of them a certain limited
positive value in the other's eyes. Bu
ideologically the two official establish
ments remained poles apart. They
viewed each other with uneasiness and
distaste. The image of Tsarist autocracy
remained no less .repulsive in American
eyes than did American republicanism
in the eyes of the court and bureaucracy
of Petersburg. And over the whole pe-
riod of Tsarist power these differences
continued to constitute a complicating
factor in Russian-American relations,
not wholly inhibiting the development
of those relations but limiting in some
degree the dimensions and intensity they
could assume.
certain melancholy way, to recall that in
December 1911 the House of Represen-
tatives adopted almost unanimously a
resolution calling on the President to
terminate the old trade treaty with Rus-
sia that had been in force ever since
1832; and the purpose of this resolution
was to compel the Russian government
to liberalize its treatment of the Jews
within Russia. The one vote cast against
_ ; the resolution in the House of Represen-
tatives was cast by a man who com-
plained that this sort of pressure by a
foreign government would not help the
, Jews in Russia but would appreciably
damage American business; President
Taft, pursuant to this resolution, did so
, terminate the treaty, with the result that
Russian-American relations, down to the
Revolution of 1917, remained very cool
and unhappy indeed.
This, then, was the general shape of
Russian-American relations as they
existed in the final years of the Tsarist
Empire, and it was against this back-
ground that the whole question was over-
taken by the Russian Revolution, in
' 1917.
The initial impact of this revolution on
the relationship consisted primarily of
sheer confusion. The reaction of the
American public was confused by the
fact that it was not one revolution but
two: a moderate-democratic one in Feb-
ruary 1917, with which all Americans
tended to sympathize; and an extreme,
left-wing-Marxist one, dictatorially ori-
ented, in November, the seriousness and
durability of which was at first widely
traestioned. This reaction was even more
r?ifused by the fact that there was at
tlat time a war in progress?a great
European war which the United States
was then just in the process of entering.
The emotional reaction to the experience
cf being at war soon came to dominate
American opinion and to distort all other
issues. Thus the Russian Provisional
Government, resulting from the first
revolution, was idealized because it at-
tempted to carry on in the war against
Germany, whereas the Bolshevik regime,
taking over in November 1917, was
seamed, resented, and opposed in large
=easure because its first official act was
ta take Russia out of the war entirely.
Similar confusions prevailed, of
caurse, on the Bolshevik side. Lenin and
Es associates attached enormous signifi-
cance to their own seizure of power.
They saw it as the first step in a political
transformation of the world far more
important than any of the issues over
which the world war was being fought.
And for this reason they insisted on see-
k-T. America's reluctant and trivial par-
ticipation in the Allied military inter-
vention in Russia, in 1918-1920, as the
ezpression of an ideological hostility to
faemselves, rather than as an event in
the prosecution of the war against Ger-
many, which it really was.
These early confusions and misutikicr-
?'slending,s yielded only slowly and par-
TOWARD THE END of the 19th century,
another complication began to make it-
self felt in the form of the growing rest-
lessness of the non-Russian nationalities
within the framework of the Russian
Empire and the growing power of their
appeals to congressional and, to some ex-
tent, popular sympathies within this
country. This was a factor that has to be
distinguished from the general incom-
patibility of the two political systems to
which I have just referred, because this
restlessness arose not mainly from dis-
content with the general political system
prevailing in Russia (although there was
this, too), but rather from the treatment
by the Tsarist regime of the particular
non-Russian nationality in question,
which was a different thing. The phe-
nomenon became a complicating factor
in Russian-American .dations only
when individuals from among these mi-
nority nationalities began to appear in
significant numbers among the immi-
grants to this country. Particularly was
this true, of course, of the Jews?Russian,
Polish, and Lithuanian?whose migration
to this country in considerable numbers
began in earnest in the 1880s, and whose
powerful resentment of the treatment of
e their co-religionists in Russia soon he-
s gan to become a' factor of importance in
American political life. ? The legislative
branch of the American government has
f always ? had, it would seem, a peculiar
sensitivity to the feeling of compact
t blocks of recent immigrants residing in
our great urban communities. So, at any
rate, it was in this case, with the result
that the tales of the , sufferings of these
non-Russian nationalities soon came to i
exercise upon political and congressional
opinion in this country an influence ,
stronger than anything ever evoked by
the tales of the sufferings of the Russian
people themselves at the hands of their
autocratic government. It is curious, in a
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tially to the passage of time, and they
helped to engender a deep mutual an-
tagonism between the two parties con-
cerned. But they were not the most
important cause of the antagonism. The
most important cause was another situa-
tion produced by the revolution?a situa-
tion that was not at all a misunderstand-
the.fact, namely, that the Bolshevik
leaders looked upon the political and so-
cial system of this country as a miscon-
ceived, regressive, iniquitous one, dis-
reputable in its origins and purposes and
deserving of violent overthrow; and they
conceived it as their duty, however poor
the prospects for success, to encou
such an overthrow and to contribut
its realization wherever they could. Th
too, of course, bred a reciprocal react
here. It was a reaction flowing in part
from resentment of the Soviet attitu
resentment, that is, of the hostility ad-
dressed by the Bolshevik leaders to
cherished American ideals and institu-
tions. But it also flowed from a very
genuine distaste on the part of most
Americans for what they could learn of
the ideology of the new Communist lead-
ers and of the manner in which their dic-
tatorial authority was being exercised.
changes that stand out in my mind. Both
were of a quasi-military nature.
The first was the elimination of Ger-
many and Japan as major military
powers standing between the United
States and the Soviet Union, the atten-
dant creation of great political and mili-
tary vacuums, and the advance of Soviet
military power, by way of filling one of
these vacuums, into the heart of Europe.
This produced a direct confrontation be-
tween American and Soviet military
power that had never existed before.
As far as conventional forces were con-
cerned, even this was not necessarily a
rage fatal complication. The presence of both
e to Soviet and American forces in the heart
is, of Europe is an anomaly of history, awk-
ion ward in some ways to both parties and to
the peoples whose territory is affected.
de?
So THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN relationship
came to be burdened in the Twenties and
Thirties not only by the great differences
in historical experience and political tra-
dition of which I have spoken but also
? by those special elements of ideological
and political antagonism introduced by
the establishment of Communist power
? in Russia.
All of this was sufficient to render re-
lations in the period between the two
wars?not just in the early years of non-
recognition but even after diplomatic
relations were established in 1933?dis-
tant, meager, and unpleasant. Now these
sources of contention were in their en-
tirety a serious burden on an interna-
tional relationship (and no one could
have been more aware of their serious-
ness, I think, than those of us who served
in the American Embassy in Moscow at
the time). But they were not, I would
point out, the source of any particular
military tension between the two coun-
tries; and there was no great urgency
about the resolution of the conflicts they
produced. They represented serious long-
term problems, but these were not prob-
lems wholly immune to those immutable
laws of change that eventually affect all
societies, transform all customs, and
erode all militant ideologies; and for this
reason there was no need to despair of
their ultimate peaceful resolution. Above
all, the preservation of world peace, not
to mention the inviolability of civilized
life on the planet, did not depend on
their early solution.
It was in this last respect, above all,
that the outcome of World War 11 worked
its most significant and most fateful
changes. There were two of these
35
For this very reason, given continuing
restraint and patience on both sides, it
may be expected to yield eventually to a
more normal and less dangerous state of
affairs. ?
The same, unfortunately, cannot be
said of the second of the two great mili-
tary-political consequences of World
War II, for this was the acquisition and
cultivation by both American and Soviet
governments of the nuclear capability?
of the capability, that is, of putting an
end to civilized life not Only on the
territory of the other party but on great
portions of the remainder of the surface
of the planet as well.
The fears and other reactions en-
gendered by this nuclear rivalry have
now become.. a factor in our relations
with Russia of far greater actual im-
portance than the underlying ideological
and political differences. The real con-
flicts of interest and outlook, for all their
seriousness, are limited ones. There is
nothing in them that could not yield to
patience, change, and a readiness for
accommodation. There is nothing in
them, above all, that could really be
solved by?and, therefore, nothing that
could justify?a major war, let alone the
sort of global cataclysm that seems to
preempt so many of our plans and dis-
cussions. Yet this fact is constantly being
crowded out of our consciousness by the
prominence, and the misleading implica-
tions, of the military competition. An t
image arises, if only initially for purposes
of military planning, of an utterly in- e
human adversary, committed to our total
destruction and committed to it not for
any coherent political reason but only b
because he has the capacity to inflict it. ki
This unreal image presents itself to both be
parties; and in the name of a response to ca
it whole great economies are distorted, 0
whole populations are to some extent c
impoverished, vast amounts of produc-
s
tive capacity needed for constructive a
purposes in a troubled world are devoted ba
to sterile and destructive ones; a pro- to
liferation of nuclear weaponry is en- ra
couraged and pursued that only increases an
with every day the dimensions and to
dangers of the problem to which it is
supposed to be responsive; and the true
nature of our relations with the Soviet
Union and its peoples becomes obscured
and distorted by the cloud of anxieties
and panicky assumptions that falls across
its face. The nuclear rivalry, in other
words, begins to ride along of its own
momentum, like an object in space, di-
vorced from any cause or rationale other
than the fears it engenders, corrupting '
and distorting a relationship that, while
not devoid of serious problems, never
needed to be one of mortal antagonism.
OUR FIRST TASK, then, is to master, and
to bring under rational control, this fear-
ful capacity for suicidal destruction that
has been let loose among us; and of this
I would say only that so terrible are the
dangers of a continued failure to master
it that we would be fully warranted in
accepting very considerable risks to
avoid this failure. The risks, for example,
of a total ban on the testing of nuclear
weapons seem to me to be trivial in com-
parison with the risks involved in the
continued proliferation of these weapons
on a world scale. Yet we shrink from it.
Is this timidity really justified? Is the tail
of military fear not wagging the dog of
constructive and hopeful political op-
portunity at this point?
I find myself disturbed by these reac-
tions not only because of their obvious
negativeness and sterility, and not only
because they stimulate exaggerations and
distortions of the real situation in world
affairs, but also because they tend to ob-
scure both the real limitations and the
real possibilities to which our relations
with the Soviet Union are subject. Let us
remember that for the reasons I have
just outlined there has always been an
area where collaboration with Russia, as
we would like to see it, has not Lieen pos-
sible. This was true before the revolu-
tion. It is true today. It will continue to
be true long into the future. But there is
another area in which collaboration?and
mutually profitable collaboration?is pos-
sible. The relative size and nature of
these two areas is not immutable; it has
not failed to change with the years; and
only someone unfamiliar with the history
of Soviet-American relations could fail
o recognize that since Stalin's death the
direction of this change has been in gen-
rat a favorable one?the one we would
like to see.
This has been, if you will, a small gain,
ut it has been a real one and the only
nd we can hope to make. And it should
recognized that none of the compli-
ting factors?neither the asperities of
ur military rivalry, nor the apparent
onflict of our aims with those of the
viet Union in specific geographic areas?
ad countries. nor the somewhat dated
t now traditional Communist rhetoric
which the Soviet leadership is com-
itted?none of these things constitutes
y adequate reason, nor do all of them
gether, why we should not exploit to
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the full those areas in which our relations
with Russia are or might be capable of
constructive development and where ex-
changes, might be pursued, cultural as
well as commercial, which would be
mutually profitable and would give
greater depth and stability to the rela-
tionship as a whole.
We have burdens enough in Soviet-
American relations without adding to
them by the neglect of those areas where
possibilities for improvement do actually
exist. In a world so troubled as ours of
today, the favorable opportunities have
to be cherished and nurtured, not sacri-
ficed to prejudice, vanity, or political
ambition.
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
26 February 1976
R. H. C.- STEED on the ? continuing debate on detent
TEN years of so-called "d?nte"
have been a period of
astounding strategic and
political success for Russia and of
discomfiture for the West. Russia
has achieved the fastest and most
far-reaching reversal of the global
balance of power in history. In
addition she has consolidated And
secured international " legitimisa-
tion " for her illegal East European
empire.
From this 'power base she
exercises an immense and
threatening military preponderance
over Western Europe, which in
effect she holds hostage for
overseas adventures. She turns
the tables on the West on the
"human rights" issue by winning
Third-World-wide acclaim as the
" liberator " of Africa. Western
democracy is in disarray, while the
Italian and French Communist
parties, cleverly exploiting
d?nte," are reaching out to-
wards power through the ballot
box.
Clearly the West has not found
the fight formula for dealing
with the mighty, nuclear, world-
revolutionary, imperialist, chess-
playing Russian bear, and has no
time to lose if it does not want
to join those already in its com-
radely hug. In a book most op-
portunely published today,* 15 of
the world's leading experts seek
the right method of handling this
unique animal ? whether by feed-
ing, taming, restraining, house-
training or by some combination
of all four.
It is a collection of interviews
broadcast from Munich to EaStern
Europe by Radio Free' Europe.
Every West European. still possess-
ing an instinct for self-preserva-
tion, and every Prime, Foreign,
Defence and Interior. Minister,
should keep it by his bedside.
Several of the contributors com-
plain that Russia has largely
succeeded in imposing on the West
the argument that the only alter-
native to " d?nte " is nuclear
war, and that this involves
acceptance of " d?nte " on Rus-
sian terms. This, they explain, is
the familiar technique of " term-
inological subversion," " dialectical
casuistry " or the " semantic trap."
Russia's aim, .most agree, is to
secure the fruits of victory without
the risks of %var. But as Prof.
Brzezittski, of Columbia, .points out
Russia, even if firmly opposed,
does not want nuclear war any
* " editcrf bq C. R. Urban.
illauri,w Temple S!1711 h,
it E.
ow ao
YtiU5511aTrA
P
OU
more than America does. If
America allows Russia to get away
with this blackmail she is showing
herself unequal. to the game that
Russia is playing.
The next Russian ploy under ex-
amination is the assertion that
"d?nte,' far from excluding
"ideological conflict," predicates
its intensification. This justifies
the tightening-up of ideological
control in the 'Communist countries
against any contamination- from
Western ideas.
In addition, it is 'intended to legi-
timise whatever action against the
? West that the Russians think they
can get away with without sacrifi-
cing the benefits of " d?nte " or
risking war. This does not only
mean that the Russians can carry
on- subversio:n, disruption and in-
dustrial sabotage in the open de-
mocratic societies by all means, in-
cluding the "institutionalised
leverage" of the _Communist
parties.
The "ideological 'struggle" also
covers Russian activities like those
in the Middle East---whieh keep the,
area in a state of actual or suspen-
ded war, and which engineered the
crippling ail emban? against the
West. The far-Flung apparatus for
training, arming, and directing ter-
rorists and "freedom fighters"
also comes under this heading. So,
of course, in the last few months
since this book was written, does
the supply of Cubans to Angola
and Syria, of North Korean pilots
also to Syria for service against
Israel and of North Vietnamese
to assist Libya and Algeria in the
coming war against Morocco in
the Spanish Sahara.
Helping 'the people'
Surely, the Russians say, the
West is not so afraid of a sporting
may - the -best - creed-win political
competition as to suggest thia t this
constitutes interference! It is just
proletarian solidarity, helpintg " the,
people " everywhere .agaitist "the
class enemy " ? wherever he may
crap no, whinh happens to include
all Il.overnitnents and instil ut ions
aim/where ii the ?vorld not yet
under the Kremlin's control.
On top al all this, wliart
wants from " detente "
tame
amounts of credit, technology and
economic aid.
So long as Communist bureau-
cracy and dogma maintain their
stultifying political grip, so Ion
will industry and .agriculture lag
far behind the West.
The cream of what is available
goes for defence, regardless of
cost and living standard's, while the
civilian sector does not even get
the normal "spin off" because of
obsessive secrecy and compart-
mentalisation. Thus Western aid
not only benefits . the Russian
military sector. but is also an al-
ternative to political reform.
The majority in the symposium
was against support for the Soviet
' regime in this way unless the ap-
propriate Price was extracted in
terms of human rights, disarma-
ment and .so on, an the basis of
strict accounting. Sir ? Willia.m
Hayter, former Ambassador in
Moscow. did not believe, however,
that the Russian Government
would submit to such pressure,
and quoted the failure of the
Amendment V), secure
fre-r rmignatien from Russia in
return for credits.
Another difficulty is competition
between Western countries an?d the
eagerness of the business com-
munities to get Russian contracts.
Opinions also differed as to
whether Western contracts would
lead to the increasing sophistication
of Russian scientists, technologists
and managers and thus generate
pressures for liberalisation. The
same. applied as to the effect of
accelerated " consumerism " on the
general. public. The general view
was sceptical.
In startling contrast, however,
to general concern about the dif-
ficulties of projecting liberalising
influences throogih the Iron Cur-
tain, Prof. Kern ig of Trier feared
that success in this field would be
oosilively daugerotts for the Weq.
It could, he argued, upset the bi-
polar h.irlatire on ?vhicti the safety
of the world depends.
Tle.:sia, he MIS not an,
arIV;:,*y modern State. It shoulel
riot mihjecteil to shocks.
1141 a ve:?,1m1 intoiest in the
St,,iii ii the Soviet syslota and
36
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? regime. For this reason too it
might. be tie crssary to support the
leaders against the dissidents.
- Prof. Kernig maintained that
the supreme nerd was for co-oper-
? ation with Russia to meet global
ecological dangers. Mr Leopold
Labetz said that this was difficult
in view of the fact that Russia
? used these terrifying problems for
political ammunition.
For the rest, the majority view
was that bogus " d?nte had
? exploited and contributed to a
? growing decay of morale and poli-
tical will in the West. had accel-
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Friday, March 12, 1976
I The Change in
Eldridge Cleaver
By BENJAMIN STEIN
Los Angeles
Can America love .a former revolutionary
Black Panther who used to want to destroy
"the pig power structure"? Can a middle-
aged, former terrorizer of police find, hap-
piness. as an upholder of the status quo?
Eldridge Cleaver is going to give Amer-
ica and himself the chance. He came back
1 last November from seven years in various
Third World, -Communist and West Euro-
pean. countries along with his -beautiful
wife, Kathleen, and he sees things very dif-
.:ferently from--the. Way he saw them when
he left.
He is currently awaiting trial on a va-
-riety of charges in-Alameda County jail,
'near San 1 Francisco, tinder restrictions
which make it hard to talk to him. But his
wife 'wag recently in Los Angeles talking
abbut the changes they have been through
?Changes-that are amazing when one ra-
members his former image of 'gun-toting
antisocial desperado.'
Cleaver believes that two things have
happened. First, he sees a vastly changed
America, and second, he sees a vastly
more educated Eldridge Cleaver.
Since 1968, Cleaver believes, America
his shown enormous evidence of political
progress. -He considers the removal of-
President Nixon from office a sign that the
people, through their political. processes,
can make their ? views felt and can have
their wishes carried out.
He sees far greater participation by
blacks and other minorities in-the govern-
ing process. Legal and governmental dis-
crimination against minorities have vir-
tually vanished, he thinks.
Moreover, American participation in the
Vietnam war is over, and Cleaver sees no
signs of American imperialism in the
world. This too is the result of the people
making their voices heard through the gov-
ernmental process. Cleaver believes that
this working out in practice of the princi-
ples of democracy is unique, and makes
Americo. the best place, politically, In the ,
world.
That, in itself, from Eldridge Cleaver,
would be enough to make a: person wonder
if his, wife were playing an elaborate prac-
tical joke, but there is more.
During his. seVen years as a
posed exile,' Cleaver traveled all over the
world. He did not like most of What he saw:
He thinks that Most Third World countries
are minuscule dictatorships.
Their governments do not represent
their per,ple as a particular ruling
las_zutd we,Ainertcatis should pay no al-
tentiou to them. tie .-ree:-; no reason why
they should have an equivalent, vote in the
crated its one-sided demilitarisa-
tion and also conferred prestige
and respectabilit, on the Western
Communist parties.
There are many notable dicta.
The Fihnish General Haisti, who
describes Firdandisation from the
inside, says: "America has gone
mad. A country that does not
know how to use its enormous
power, has none." And again:
"Russian confidence can only be
gained by submission"'(a course
which he urges the West to resist
at all costs).
Bruno Pittermann, former
I United Nations to the -United States.
The Communist countries are the worst
of all. They supply certain minimum ne-
cessities of life to their citizens, but they
are completely unresponsive to the will of
their people. Their governments exist only
to perpetuate themselves and do this by de-
nying any political rights to. the vast ma-
jority of the people. -
This all came as . a big surprise to
Cleaver. He had been part of a movement
that systematically denigrated America
and touted the Third World and Communist
countries, and he now sees that as com-
pletely wrong. ?
He sayS that all the elites in Third
: World and Communist countries promote
.? only their own countries and 'What is in
their own selfish interest. American intel-
lectuals, on the other hand, spend their
time criticizing American society and
praising the countries which Cleaver sees
as fundamentally politically rotten.
He wants American intellectuals to ex-
perience a rebirth of American patriotism,
as he has., American ideologues should do
all they can for America, which is good not
Only for America, but also for-the rest Of
the' world, since America is -the best politi-
cal example for the rest of the world.
This means supporting a strong Ameri:-:
can military establishment, which he now
sees not as an instrument of repression,
but as the means to defend freedom. The
world would-not be a good place, he be-
lieves,' if the Only countries with strong
militaries were totalitarian countries. ,
Cleaver has some particularly 'harsh:
words for the Arabs vis-a-vis the Israelis.
For the Arabs to call the Israelis racists,
Cleaver thinks, is the height of hypocrisy.
In fact, the Arabs are the most racist pea-
pie in the world, he says, especially to-
wards blacks.
Kathleen Cleaver says that she and Eld-
ridge actually saw blacks as slaves and in-
dentured servants, even in Socialist Arab
countries like Algeria. The Israelis, on the
other hand, being Jewish, have a long his-
tory of being violently discriminated
against, yet nonetheless lead in helping
other minorities.
The change in Cleaver's thinking about
the United Staten is by no means complete. -
He still sees America as a monopoly capi-
talist society where people do not have the
economic rights they have in many coun-
tries whim are far worse politically. But
he says that Watergate has shown that all
necessary changes can come from within
the system.
It does no good to blow up a factory, as
he and Kathleen see it, because that
doesn't give anyone a job or a decent
home. f.ait economic goals can be achieved
through the political process.
There is a lot more to Cleaver's think-
ing, but he clearly has changed draniati-
en anti he sce:.; America changed dra-
matically ter the bettor. It is profoundly
moving to hear all this from the lips of
Kathleen-Cleaver. The air of the prodigal
Austrian Vice-Chancellor,. refers
to Western gullibility on d?nte.
"Cheat me once, shame on you.
Cheat me twice, shame on fine."
Rod finally G. R. Urban: "The'
old observation that humanity
abhors chaos more than it abhors
unjust government is poignantly
relevant to our condition. If the
wort-WS nal i call and demo-
graphic problems prove intractible
to the kind of order that the idher-
tarian societies of the West can
impose on them or inspire by their
example, then the promise of a
harsh but orderly world . . . may
prove irresistible."
son having come home or the convert to
the true light surrounds her.
' What she and Eldridge Cleaver are say-
ing is perhaps not new for readers of this
page, but it is brand new for the circles in
which Cleaver used to travel. It would be
wonderful if those people were open-
minded enough to listen. (A fund-raising
effort for his legal fees, led by Bayard
Reatin, has had little success.)
But so far the remnants of "the move-
ment" have given Cleaver the cold shoul-
der since his return. Apparently he will
have to use all his revolutionary rhetorical
skills to turn on his former comrades-in-
arms to some painfully acquired common
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MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
10 March 1n76
ROD CHAPM AN, Geneva, Tuesday, on the UN's "instrument of evil"
The Cntroll
cc.
ONCE ? upon a time, before ,
the days of the dragon
Daniel Patrick . to .fruton
States and others saw the
United Nations as the cham-
pion of human rights and
Impartial defender of general
faiths.
?
Disillusionment ? and not
just American disillusion-
ment ? has now reached
such a level that the US dele-
gate at this year's annual ses-
sion of the UN Human Rights
Commission could call the
Commission's work a 'tra-
vesty of human rights" and
accuse the Commission of
having become an "instru-
ment of evil."
On the evidence of the
five-week meeting which
ended last Friday, the UN
has now become so bogged
down in obscure procedures
and secrecy, and so deferen-
tial to power blocks, that the
Commission will turn a blind
eye to many widespread vio-
lations of the most fundamen-
tal human rights.
The saddest aspect is that
the confidential procedures
laid down over the years are
now a guarantee that coun-
tries violating human rights
get off without even a public
mention.
Under the Catch 22 proce-
dures, prisoners and other
victims write to the UN
Human Rights Division in
LONDON TINES
8 March 1976
zavest
7-
Zorin played a majar role
this year in heading off every
American proposal and con-
tributing to the immense
frustration of the US dele-
gate, Leonard Garment, a
former adviser to ex-Pre-
sident Nixon and Mom-lean.
The Americans called cm the
Commission to complete a
declaration on religious into-
lerance (which it has been
working on for years) but
were blocked by Zorin.
Many h u in a n rights
experts and UN officials have
become ove.rtly cynical- The
UN working group on Chile,
whose report was adopted by
this year's commission meet-
ing, treated Dr Sheila Cas-
sidy well ? but witeasses
with less standing eften
received highly unspnpa-
thetic treatment.
The group interrupte one
witness who was recoixting
how he had been starve-7e in
gaol with a comment shout
the need to break for l'exch.
Geneva. which decides to exa-
mine countries accused of a
pattern of widespread viola-
tion of human rights. The
division then obtains replies
from the governments con-
cerned, and a special working
group studies the cases.
By the time the govern-
ments get around to replying,
the original allegations are
usually so outdated that
group decides it cannot possi-
bly condemn the country con-
cerned. Catch 22. .
So the demonology of the
Commission virtually never
changes. Chile, Israel and
South Africa are the only
devils ever cast out, while
perpetual offenders against
human rights such as Indone-
sia and Iran never figure in
the debates.
Even more serious is the
accusation made by an
Amnesty International '
observer at this year's meet-
ing that governments are now
receiving secret "pardons"
from the Commission ?
which they flaunt like Good
Housekeeping seals of appro-
val. Indonesia has even writ-
ten to Amnesty stating that
the UN has found it not
guilty of violating human'
rights.
Tne credibility gap bet-
ween original UN ideals and
current practice is most
cruelly evident in the UN
Human Rights Commission.
The Soviet delegate for
several years has been
Valerian Zorin, an old hard-
liner.
P IS NERS
Political freedom ought steadily
to be growing, yet the evidence
of the past decade has been dis-
couraging. To some extent other
priorities have seemed more im-
pelling. Nevertheless conscience
will everywhere be found alive
and responsive as Mr Solzhenit-
syn's appeal has shown. Threats
to political freedom have always
existed. What is new in our era
are those systems of government
'that stake out the future as their
own possession, claiming to offer
progress and expecting the price
in repression to be accepted or
overlooked. Governments of
other kinds, whether or not they
profess any political doctrine,
may also care_ nothing for politi-
cal freedom and put away those
they dislike or fear. The political
prisoner may thus be regarded as
the symbol of repression, as the
first victim of a limitation on
political freedom. All political
prisoners everywhere must be the
concerti of those who care for
ii berty.
The Times publishes today the
first in a weekly series that will
tell -the story of individual poli-
tical prisoners wherever they are
found. Mr Ashok Mehta, a man
prominent and generally respec-
ted for years past in Indian
life, is one such Prisoner
held under Mrs Chandi's emer-
gency. Many of the prisoners
chosen 101 be less well known
than he is; some will be entirely
?
Another witness emerged? in .?
tears, claiming that the czoss-.4
examination made her wish
she was back in Chile.
In theory, ',,the work e the
Commission lehould assume a
renewed importance fee two
reasons. Theifirst is theintro-
duction 'of the new interna-
tional tovertants on kaman
rights, which are a tar
stronger liegel instrument
than the ivaguer unitee_rsal
declaration) of human tights-
But sof? far few Govern-
ments hare signed the con-
F CONS CIE
obscure. The publicity will not
only, we hope, encourage their
release; it will mark down all
those countries where the fitst
rule of political freedom is being
transgressed: that a man should
not suffer simply on account of.
the political opinions he holds,
expresses or promotes in any
reasonable way. This excludes
the guerrilla or the terrorist.
Whatever arguments may be
advanced for violent revolu-
tionary action of this kind such
activists are not in the same cate-
gory as the political prisoner who
is obnoxious to the government
solely for advocating a peaceful
change of policy or government,
or for expressing other opinions
unwelcome to those in authority.
The choice of prisoners will be
made by The Times and the
articles to be published on our
foreign pages will be written by
staff members. The assistance of
Amnesty International and other
bodies has been sotedit and any
other individuals with knowledee
of particular countries will be
consulted. Information of such
cases is not always eoeily arrived
at. Amnesty's experience has
shown how ready governmeets
are either to cleny otttrirht that
they hold any political orisonus
(in fact because they define them
as criminals or subversiveel or to
ienore the pies made on beholf
of such prieonere with the argu-
ment that they are no business
ventions,land some that have
are nowptrying to back out.
One of ;the most vociferous
participants at the Commis-
sion was:iUruguay, which cast
several'i.aspersions on the
integrity/ of the Commission.
Uruguay/ signed the conven-
tions when it still had a civi-
lian Gavernment.
The !second reason ds that
_pressure groups in the US
are now attempting to make
both emilitary and economic
aid dppendent on whether a
country has a clean human
rights bill of health. Senator
Kenriedy's Bill cutting off aid
to Chile and other violators
has !already passed through
the / Senate. while Senator
Donald Fraser ?is one of those
urgiMg that economic aid he
cut off?except tit the neediest
eases--forr similar violations.
But the State Department
hest/ toad Congress that it
ccrOld net adjudge gross viola-
tions of human rights
because so many countries
violate rights in one way or
another, while mach military
ad has been transferred to
other aid budgets. The
Department is understood to
be sitting on comprehensive
idossiers on human rights
'violations In "friendly"
countries.
Meanwhile, many countries
? are becoming increasingly
sceptical of the UN Human
Rights Corinnisslon's ability
to regain past prestige and
take action which, in Leonard
Garment's words, "could
command universal respect."
le ?
el
Aedee.ei?
of outsiders. When such govern-
meats have refused to allow
inquiries to be made by a repre-
sentative of Amnesty their
excuses can carry no weight. ?
Governments of all kinds will
be found among those who ?
imprison ? -people for their
political opinions. They may be
ceeemunist or anti-communist;
deerocratic or dictatorial; right-
seg or left-wing.' Often govern-
ine=ts that are demonstrably
ifereroving living standards for
the:7 people thanks to successful
ceenomic development will he
especially irritated by charges
that they hold political prisoners
?Singapore and Iran are
emmples?but means are .as
inreertant as ends.
Same governments deny
cherges that they hold political
prisoners when they arc simply
exercising inadequate control
oi.w their own security police.
In seine countries torture has for
SO lone been habitual that no
reel effort is made to stop it.
Bet all these acts are offences
ageinst ? political . freedom and
Inimen rights. They must be
prezested against, always in hope
of change, for it is particularly
in those countries where better
(duration and living si :111 dards
are bringing greater political
w..tzteness that political freedom
sINzild find its Proper place in i
the advance Of the society..
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? wAsaNGTON POST
19:MAR 1976
ubcek's
? Spy Fails to
? By Dusko Doder
Washington Post Poreign Service
PRAGUE?A Czechoslo-
vak spy's "proof" that Alex-
ander Dubeek is secretly
receiving money from the
CIA throueh Radio Free
Europe appears to be little
more than a batch of emi-
gres'. letters containing no
clearly identifiable refer-
.ence to the ousted leader of
the 1963 Prague Spring.
In an interview in the
Foreign Min!stry here. Capt.
Pavel Minarik. a Czechoslo-
? vak intelligence agent who
Infiltrated RFE and worked
there seven years, repeated
his widely publicized charge
that Dubcek and his associ-
ates were paid by the CIA
to- make statements ,critical
*Of the present government
in' Prague.
? 'The accusation against
? IYubcek and other charges
niade by Minarik after he
returned to Czechoslovakia
in January have been publi-
shed throughout Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union
as part of campaign against
Radio Free Europe and
other Western organizations
that broadcast to the East.
? But the Material that NB?
narik offered clueing the
two-hour interview as
"proof" to substantiate his
charges in .no way implicat-
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London
7 March 1976
miser Shows No Proof
Back Charge That
ed Dubcek- or any of his
close associates. When this
was pointed out. Minarik
said he had "some other,
documents" that he could
not show at this time.
Most of the docunzents he
produced were letters writ-
ten by Czechostovak,emigres
to each other or to officials
of RFE, a U.S.-operated
station in Munich, West Ger-
many, that broadcasts to
Eastern Europe.
In the letters, Minarik
pointed to obscure phrases
such as one asking that
funds be,''sent in the agreed
upon way" and another say-
ing that "money for Sasha
has already arrived," Sasha
is a nickname for anyone
named Alexander but Mi-
narik insisted this was a
refernce to Dubcek.
Only last month, in a rare
press conference with West-
ern reporters. Czechoslovak
Prime Minister Lubimir
Strougal, when questioned
about Minarik's charge, said
he assumed that Minarik
"would certainly have proof
of this assertion."
Wearine a blue blazer and
khaki trousers, the bespec-
tacled, 30-year-old agent ap-
peared calm and relaxed
throughout his interview.
He said he was sent by the
Czechoslovak intelligence
CIA Paid Former
service in September 1968:
a month atter the Warsaw
Pact invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia, to infiltrate RFE,
Which was then financed by
the CIA.
He hinted, for the first
time, that he had provided
evidence against a U.S. citi-
zen, Fred Eidlin, who was
arrested in Prague in 1970
and convicted on espionage
. charges. ?
Minarik said he had a
"close personal relationship"
with Eidlin who, he said,
often discussed CIA matters
with him.
Eidlin, according to an
RFE spokesman in Munich,
worked for the station as a
Czechoslovak policy adviser
from August 1968 until De-
cember 1969 and was not a
CIA agent. Eidlin, who was
arrested while on a private
visit to Czechoslovakia, was
freed and left the country
after serving one year of a
four-year sentence.
Minarik said he had been
an actor before going to
Munich at the age of 23,
and this training enabled -
him to play the role of a
defector, simulating anti-
communism despite his loy-
alty to the Communist
Party.
Besides Dubeek. Minarik
had accused former Foreign
Czech Leader
Minister Hajek and
former party leaders Navel
Kosik and Frantisek Krie-
gel of receivimz CIA money.
Minarik offered as one of
the most important docu-
ments a letter written by
Pavel Tigrid, an emigre
politician who edits the
quarterly Svedetsvy, pub-
lished in Paris. .
The letter purports to des-
cribe a meeting between
emigre representatives and
RFE officials in. Munich on
June 20, 1975.
The letter says the con-
sensus at the meeting was
that outside publication of
works by dissidents in Czech-
oslovakia "gives a great im-
petus, to the domestic au-
thors . . and if. this is sup-
ported by some ?remunera-
tion, the better." ? ?
Minarik said that emigre
groups working with the
CIA provide instructions for
dissident intellectuals in
Czechoslovakia who, in turn.
write anti-government . ma-
terial that is then smuggled
to the West. where, it is ?
distributed to .journalists
and broadcast by RFE.
-None . of the ducuments,
however mentioned pubcek
or other senior officials nor
are there any indications
that they have ever been in
contact with the emigres.
So znenits n rk,?
By J. W. M. THOMPSON it may be through very
times that are to come.
rPHAT an event of some
significance occurred in Eng-
land last week I am certain, even
though it is not yet possible to
!. be sure of its full extent. But
so many people, of such different
kinds, have' said that what they
saw and heard last Monday even-
ing was unforgettable that I must
conclude (and gladly) that here
Was a happening of true import-
ance.
?
'This is strangelanguage.to use..
of teleyi?Sion- .?programme. I
nevertheless share: the feelings of
all those who have . spoken of
Alexander . Solzheititsyn's haunt-
?ing prese?nte? tin ? the ? television
- screen as being in 'some way di-
:- maelic. a few profound mo incurs
? to be stored up anti remembered,
bleak
Why was this so? Others be-
fore have tried to sound the alarm
about Russia's preparations for
war only to meet, as Mrs. Thatcher
did, the familiar, effete -blend of
mockery and indifference. Others,
God knows, have tried to shine a
light on the -dark ways in which
our freedom is being restricted
and imperilled,, and small thanks
have been?forthcoming for the
effort. ? . ?.
Yet this -man, saying these
things, apparently sent a shudder ?
of realisation through a large -part
of the nation: Even the scattering
of trendy sniggers seemed for once
a little . abashed. That invincible
integrity, shining out of ?I he screen
which so often trail-sinks fatuities
or lies, overcame all tile cosy, self-
deluding menial ? delehres which .
39
have been erected against the on-
slaughts. of the truth.
Perhaps it will be, like almost
everything else, only a nine days'
wonder. Already nimble analysts
complain that Solzhenitsyn's view
of the struggle between Com-
munism and the West is ? too
simple?although, given the way
the "free world " Works, what
else but a- grand simplicity can
ever unite its people to defend its
?civilisation? Hardly the artful
diplomacy of a Henry Kissinger
or the . stipple pragmatism of ? a
Harold -Wilson. Inthat sense
Solzhenitsyn was - profoundly:
right and his critics no less
wrong. .
- But if the event proves not to
he a nine days' ? wonder, and
suspect it may not, then it vill
he because the Speaker, and his
message; and the. hour, wen- in
harmony; because this man Iv ho
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has walked through the flames
and miraculously escaped was
able to crystallise the misgivings
or fears which today lurk in the
corners of many minds.
Hence the force of the paral-
lel which he drew between the
"social phenomena" which he
now witnesses in the West and
those which marked the period
in Russia before its collapse into
Communist tyranny; and in spite
of all that he had to say about
the military threat, it was his
vision of the West defeating
itself, not of the West being
defeated in battle, which formed
the most powerful and disturbing
element in his exhortations.
Perhaps he would now agree
that there are seeds of optimism
to be found in the very fact that
his words were so shattering to so
many. For us, at least, that fact
permits the hope that the tide .may
be ?turning, that a sense of the
fragility of much that we had
thought to be immutable is dawn-
, ing,?that ours may prove to be a
civilisation which has not lost the
will to defend its values.
We may note also that the
gruesome deceptions associated
with d?nte are fast losing their
lulling, mesmeric spell. "My
warnings, the warnings of others,
go unheeded." _ Thus Solzhenitsyn:
LONDON TIMES
2 March 1976
The ian
?
urn
and yet does he not do himself
too little honour? His sense of
failure hardly agrees with what the
voters of the United States are
saying at this moment. It under-
estimates the strength of the many
voices in this country which warn
against an ensnaring conspiracy.
There is a counter-attack, in
short. Better late than never.
That much at least can be said
in optimistic answer to this elegy
for a civilisation. The odds may not
be as heavily against us as
Solzhenitsyn conveyed. Under-
standing of the perils may not be
as feeble as he fears.
It would be compounding the
very crime against which he rails
to put it more strongly than that.
In our own domestic affairs, even,
the retreat from a society dedica-
ted to individual freedom proceeds.
We have a Government which
seems too often to think freedom
to be a necessary casualty in the
political 'struggle of the day. We
have an overweening trade union
oligarchy which spits on freedom
if it seems even slightly to threaten
its own power.
Let me cite this week's
example of the contraction of
liberty. Would you, reader,. scan-
ning this newspaper on a Sunday
morning in spring, have believed
even a few years ago that the
freedom of the Press in Britain
would so soon be in peril" (as it
o b
i4114
bit
new is) from such forces? That
the State regulation of the Press
would so abruptly become. a real
pt-expect, thanks to politicians'
shameful disregard of a funda-
mental freedom?
dare say you would not: yet
sorb is the case. I can imagine
what' Solzhenitsyn would remem-
ber, if his attention fell upon this
'? latest example of our progress
dawn the slippery slope. He would
remember . ;.he day when he was
ereaelled from the closed shop of
the Soviet Writers' Union, thus to
be gagged, as it was thought, for
ever.
The gift which he brought us
last week, having almost incredibly
survived the tormenting over
many years of the overt enemies
of freedom, was his reminder of
the danger we all stand in?from
its covert enemies as well, and
from the indifferent and those
tempted to surrender.
The other gift he brought us
was the inspiration of his own
magnificent spirit, which, after
sufferings such as few of us can
imagine, even after reading those
werhs of his in which they are
laid bare, still trusts in Gad and
remains unafraid. Our answer to
him must be to heed the message,
and to do our poor best to imitate
the fortitude of its bearer.
rrd Levin
Heves that the
trU LiiiL IS
rtant than the c .nsequences
How rarely heroes live up to expecta-
lion, and how satisfying when they
-surpass it ! That is what, last week,
I felt after meeting Alexander Sol-
zhenitsyn for the first time?'that,
and the familiar and inexplicable
feeling of exhilaration 'that comes
from talking to those who know What
it is to live in hell; and who,
_although they can say only
I. tell you naught for your comfort,
Yea, naught for your desire,
Save that the sky grows darker yet,
And the sea rises higher
xievertheless radiate a kind of invul-
nerable optimism that comes from
within, and is the mark of those who
are eternally secure in the knowledge
that their tormentors are not only
wrong but doomed. This was said
some time ago in the form ; "He
that findeth his, life shall lose it;
and he that loseth his life for my sake
shall find it", and it is still true
today.
I remember this feeling very
vividly from my only visit to South
Africa ; all the misery and cruelty
and despair I could see around me,
which were in themselves almost un-
endurable, were transmuted into a
kind of joyous hope by the indomit-
ability of those I talked to who were
resisting evil with a serene gaiety
and a courage that it is fortunately
beyond Our necessity to measure. r
felt-the absence of this feeling more
stroogly than anything eke in my
life on my only visit to the Soviet
Union, because I was there before
either the dissident movement or the
emigration movement had broken sur-
face, and the cruelty and misery and,
despair all around me were unre-
lieved by anything that might sug-
gest, however irrationally, that there
was Cause for hope. But I have ex-
perienced that uplift of the spirit
whenever I have met any of those,
from Valentin Prussakov to Viktor
Fainberg, who have managed to get
out, and I also felt it intensely the
night before I met Solzhenitsyn, when
I met Garfield Todd. The gentle Rho-
desian and the Russian Titan could
scarcely be more different, in the
experiences they have undergone, the
situations in which they find them-
selves, or the nature of their life-
work ; yet the sante current of delight
ran through me as I met them, and
the same lightness of heart accom-
panied me as I left. Good, brave men,
it seems, are the same the world
over, and their goodness and bravery
can no more be hidden than they can
be counterfeited. ?
? Alexander Isayevitch SoNhenitsyn
Came into the room smiling, and that
was the first surprise, for he is one
of those people whose faces are
I rozen by the camera, and he is con-
sequently alnmst always portrayed
looking solemn, if not actually seem-
let scowl ; in fact, he smile, very
readily, and laughs a great deal. The
7.ext surprise was also physical, and
if have not got over it yet. I am a very
=observant man, but we sat side by
side on a sofa, our faces only a few I
Eches apart, and I could not have
!):-...een mistaken; I tell you that this
man of 57, who spent eight years in a
Siberian concentration-camp in tor-
ments that we can-hardly even guess
at, and then spent something like 20
years doing unceasing battle with the
fmd thing that has stolen his country
fsern its people, has not a single grey
or greying hair on his head or in his
'beard, and his blue eyes and the skiti
el- his face are as clear and smooth
and young as those of an untroubled.
taild. Even as he spoke, in halting
English (which broke constantly into
torrential Russian, while our inter-
preter struggled to keep up), of his
despair at the folly, nervelessness and
lack of imagination and understand-
ing the West now displays in the
face of Soviet imperialism (he blames
Darope more than America, saying
tLat Europe has not had the excuse
o./ America's thankless and debilitat-
ir:ar. struggle in Vietnam), his
emeanour was that of a man in a
mate of grace. There was no need t?o
as him where he gets such inner
strength and intensity; this is a matt
v,7:3 walks with his Cod, and mal.pl
one understand what " Holy Russia"
40
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once meant.
That was a private occasion: But
last night, in an interview for
Panorama -,admirably conducted,
with self-effacing tact,, by Michael
Charlton), Solzhenitsyn mounted a
? public indictment of the supine in-
? attention of the West that tang like
. the blows of the haremer. with which
Luther nailed his manifesto to the
doors at Wittemberg. "For nearly
all of our lives ". he said, "we 1%or-
? shipped the West--note that word
worshipped; we did not admire it,
we worshipped it." (Beneath the
simultaneous translation you could
? hear the stabbing emphasis of the
Russian word.) But now?
a My warnings, the warnings of others,
Sakharov's very grave warning
directly from the Soviet Union?these
warnings go unheeded. . . We rea-
lized with bewilderment that the West
was . . . separating its freedom from
Our fate, and before I was exiled I
had already strong doubts whether it
was realistic to look to the West for
help. . . And when I came here un-
fortunately my doubts increased very
rapidly... During these two years the
West . . . has made so many conces-
sions that now a repetition of the
angry campaign which got me out of
prison is practically impossible . . .
the campaign to get Sakharov to
? Stockholm was almost as strong, but
It didn't help, because . . . Moscow
? now takes infinitely less note of the
West.
And then, just as he so often
? speaks in the accents of Tolstoy, he
spoke in the voice of that other Rus-
sian giant whose philosophical
descendant he is, the man who saw
as clearly into the heart of man a
century ago as Solzhenitsyn does to-
day. Is this not Dostoievsky writing
about Peter Verkhovensky and his
wretched father?
? One can say that this is what forms
the spirit of the age, this current of
public opinion, when people in
? authority, well-known professors,
scientists, are reluctant to enter into
an argument . . . It is considered
embarrassing to put forward one's
counter-arguments, lest one becomes
Involved. And so there is a certain
abdication of responsibility, which is
typical here where there is complete
freedom . . . there is now this uni-
versal adulation of revolutionaries, the
more so the more extreme they are I
WASHINGTON POST
MAR 1915
Bernard Nossiter
Similarly, before the Revolution we
had in Russia. if not a cult of terror
In society, then a fierce defence of the
terrorists. People in good positions.
Intellectuals, professors, liberals, spent
a great deal of effort, anger and indig-
nation in defending terrorists.
Then the hammer ceases to be
Luther's, and becomes Thor's :
It would be more appropriate if it
sere not you asking me which way the
Soviet Union will go, but if I were to
ask you which way the West is going.
Because at the moment the question is
not how the Soviet Union will find a
way out of totalitarianism, but how the
West will be able to avoid the same
fate. . . I am surprised that pragmatic
philosophy consistently scorns moral
considerations . . . one should not
te consider that the great principles of
freedom finish at your own frontiers,
that as long as you have freedom, let
the rest have pragmatism. No, freedom
Is indivisible and one has to take a
moral attitude towards it . . . The
West is on the verge of a collapse
created by its own hands. This quite
naturally makes the question one, for
you and not for us.
Once only, in the course of the
Interview,, did he become excited; the
pencil in his hand became a con-
ductor's baton or a rapier, and his
voice rose towards a shout. This was
when he told the truth about what
d?nte" means to those being
persecuted in the Soviet Union.
What does the spirit of Helsinki . . .
mean for us . . . ? The strengthening
of totalitarianism. . . . Someone went
to visit Sakharov ; he went home by
train and was killed on the way. No,
It wasn't you, he was killed. . .
Someone knocks on the door of
Nikolai Kriukov ; he opens the door.
They beat him up nearly to death in
his own house because he has defended
dissidents and signed protests. . . .
They let Plyushcn out and they are
putting others in lunatic asylums. . .
What can we do about the presence
in our midst of such men as
Alexander Solzhenitsyn? Well, first
what do we do? We turn away in
embarrassment?an embarrassment
that rises to act as a protection
against the pain of admitting both
that he is right in his analysis of
evil, and that his very existence is a
reproach to our society, embedded as
it is in the granite of his faith. I do
not believe_ (though presumably he
does) that faith has to be a religious
faith to be effective ; but what is
wrong with the West?and one can
sense in his condemnation of us that
it k this which excites his anger and
contempt, more even than the
strategic, political and moral retreat
in which the West is engaged?is that
we do not even have the courage of
our secular convictions, we do not
seem to care enough about our liberty
to be willing to consider that it is
under assault and to think about ways
of sustaining it, indeed to consider
that it ought to be sustained. Is it any
wonder that a man who has dragged
logs all day in alemperature of minus
30 degrees Centigrade has to make
an almost visible effort to stop him-
self spitting in the face of a society
that refers to Oz as the ?" under-
pound " press, persuades half a
government that the "Shrewsbury
Two" are martyrs, and runs howling
to the Bar Council and the corres-
pondence columns of The Times
when Sir Robert Mark says that there
are crooked lawyers who are helping
crime to flourish
So what can we do with Solzhenit-
syn? Well, if I may conclude with
a modest proposal, I suggest that the
West, when he has provoked it a little
further, should, possibly under the
auspices of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly, formally condemn
him to death, and execute 'him either
by obliging hint to drink hemlock,
or by crucifixion. After all, the two
most noted figures in history who
respectively experienced those fates
were condemned, whatever the ideo-
logical niceties involved, principally
because they told their own societies
? truths that made those societies un-
? comfortable, and since our own
society is even more averse to dis-
comfort than those were, it seems
only fitting that the man who is,
mutatis mutandis, doing much the
same thing to us should suffer a like
fate. Meanwhile, at any rate, I can
look at the hand that shook the hand
of the man who shook the world, and,
if he will allow me, say: "Alexander
Isayevitch, do not despair just yet.
We understand."
? Times Newspapers Ltd, 1976
'Alexander Solzhenitsyn Has
? LONDON ? Alexander Solzhenitsyn
spent 40 minutes on the BBC ? the
other night describing with passion the
? imminent collapse of the West and the
forthcoming triumph of Soviet tyranny.
It was a powerful performance and
had an astonishing impact on the Sup-
posedly phlegmatic British, at least
those who write and speak.
D. Bernard Hadley wrote from Twy-
ford, Reading, Berkshire to The Times
of London:
"How small our national ? leaders
look before the towering figure of
Solzhenitsyn ... I was. moved.., as I
have never been moved by any. living
politician or philosopher."
The Guardian's television critic, the
normaly caustic'Nancy Banks-Smith -
wrote: ?? .
"He talked like an angel. You could
hear the 'great whoosh of wings that
makes great orators seem to hover a
foot or two off the floor."
Lord Cleotge. Brown, (ince the No. 2
man in the Labor Party, resigned front
Warned Us
his party after 45 years, declaring he
was shattered by Solzhenitsyn's mes-
sage that Western leaders had failed in
their responsibility to f re edom.
(Brown's effect was dampened a hit by
a familiar weakness; his television in-
terview was a shambles and photogra-
phers caught him stumbling in the
gutter.)
Nevertheless, the force of Solzhenit-
syn's.words were undeniable. Almost
every national paper wrote a reveren-
tial editorial and pundits of all politi-
cal stripe joined in the 'chorus of near;
unanimous praise.
? The exiled novelist's theme was fa-
miliar but lost no drama because of
that. ?
"The West has become much weaker
in relation to The East. The West has
made so many eoneesions that now a
repetition or the angry eanninign
which got me out of prison is 1racti-
41
? ? ?
Mr. Nositcr is the London corre-
spondent for The Post.
rally impossible ... over the last two
years, terrible things have happened.
The West has given up not only four,
five- or six countries, the West has
given everything away so impetuously,
has done so .much to strengthen the
tyranny In our country. . ."
The speed of your capitulation has
so rapidly overtaken the pace of our
moral. regeneration (that) the question
is not how the Soviet Union will find a
way out of totalitarianism, hut how the
West will be able to avoid the sante
Late?' -
Alt this was so ? potent that Lynda -
Jr-Potter, who usually writes oa
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mothers-in-law and similar problems in
the Daily Mail, devoted her column to
declaring, solemnly:
- "Alexander Solzhenitsyn has warned.
Its we are truly threatened by total-
itarianism."
Bernard Levin, The Tittles of Lon-
don columnist, insisted that the Rus-
sian was so transcendentally right, so-
ciety had better administer hemlock to
him as the Athenians did to Socrates.
Levin also compared the novelist to
Martin Luther, the Norse god Thor
and Dostoyevsky.
In the Observer, Michael Davie top-
ped this, lib likened Solzhenitsyn to
Charlton Heston playing Moses, the
Marquess of Salisbury and the Julia
Cameron portrait of Alfred Lord Ten-
nyson. -
All this in the land of understate-
ment.
The episode probably says more
about the state of Britain, or at least
its literate middle class, than it does
about the West. Despite a Shrinking in-
flation, those who write feel sharply
diminished in income and morale. An
? uncongenial Labor government is seen
LONDON OBSERVER
7 March 1976
as the tool of 'a crass trades union
movement held in thrall to Moscow.
Prophets of gloom like Solzhenitsyn
light up this apocalyptic mood.
By the end of the week, however, an-
other -perspective began to edge into
the public discussion.
Peter Jenkins, the Guardian colum-
nist, was openly saying that Solzhenit-
syn is an impressive figure hut a dubi-
ous political guide. Angola may now be
a Soviet satellite, but can this compare
with the striking Western gains in in-
fluence all through the Middle East?
Jenkins might have added the equally
important Soviet defeats in Portugal
and within the Communist parties of
Spain, Prance and Italy.
Perhaps the best-balanced apprecia-
tion came from Richard A. Peace of
the Department of Russian Studies at
Hull University. He wrote the Times:
"Solzhenitsyn is a courageous and
noble figure (who) falls into a well-es-
tablished pattern: the Russian intellec-
tual caught in the inverted trap of an
excessive veneration for the West
which has turned into strong criticism.
In the 19th century we have seen this
by EDWARD
CRANKSHAW
I HESITATE to. take issue with
, ?
orfe of the outstaddingly great
men of the age, a writer of
genius; -tremendous in vision,
heroic in spirit, unimaginably
enduring. It is impossible to
be?in his company withopt be-
ing,all but overwhelmed by a
sense of his superiority, to use
a term now (to our loss) out
of fashion. This does not make
him infallible.
Very well,. Solzhenitsyn is
superior. Besides being a hero
and. a genius, he is also a
prophet. Prophets, when they
bring the sort of credentials
Solzhenitsyu carries wit- him,
must be listened to. They are
too often right, in the spirit if
not in the letter. tut they are
not necessarily the best people
to go to for a cure. The
Am-
provetuent or society calls, as
we all rather drearily know,
for the arts of the possible,
and it is the very soul of a
prophet to have no truck with
the possible, and to lix himself
on the ideal.
Of course, Solzhenitsyn is
right: :Amin many things. Ile
is right about t he present
demoralisation or the West,
above all of this country and
America, in their different
ways. He is right about the
military might and the malign
hostility of Russia. But I
think the conclusions he draws
from both perceptions arc, in
important particulars, wrong.
There is no need for me ? to
.go on about the West. At the
moment we are pretty far
gone. I could fill this page
-with a catalogue of last week's
public ineptitudes, sillinesses,
hypocrisies, funks, muddles,
greedinesses and betrayals.
So, now, could almost every-
body else. And this it seems
to me is critical. MOFC and
more of us are feeling ashamed
and resolving to do better. For
the West changes. It changes
constantly. Time and time
again in this country, or al-
together, we seem to be on the.
edge or final ruin, and time and
time again we pull back. This.
Present moral collapse is so
radical and universal that it
surely must presage some very
great change, unless the whole
development of Western his-
tory has broken MI. We shalt
emerge, I tattered, hut at
least partly purged, on the
approaches to a new sort of
society. 1 think the change is
- ?
in Iferzen, in Dostoyevsky, in Mikhay-
lovsky and others. In fact, it is an old ?
story and the strong apocelyptie not
is always present."
"In spite of Solzhenitsyn's champion-
ship of the freedom and pluralism or
the West it is precisely these aspects
which defeat him. The West is not
monolithic; its variety of inslitetions
and cultural attitudes is easily inter-
preted by the Russian mind as an.
arch, and there is a love of order and
discipline in Solzhenitsyn."
Jenkins makes a similar point, al-
though whether it will rally the shat-
tered middle class here is another
question. The Guardian columnist
wrote:
"Solzhenitsyn is unduly gloomy
about the state of the West ... He un-
derestimates the resilience of the
Western democracies as they come
through the worst socio-economic cri-
sis since the thirties. 'My warnings,' he
laments. 'go unheeded? That is not
true either. His prophetic warnings,
with the impact of their totality, have
been in no small measure traeslated
into the pluralistic politics of Western
societies."
taking place even as:Solzhen-
itsyn speaks. And parts of his
speech will acceleratuthe pro...,
cess by making us look more
closely at ourselves.
Change of this kind is alien ?
to a Russian. ? Russia, when.: t
is not engaged in blowing
itself up, Langes with such
glacial slowness that it is hard
for any Russian to grasp our
chronic condition of instability
and flux. Nor. does SOlzhenit- :
syn :really like the West. He
thinks he is disliking the shah-
bier,, tawdrier aspects of
it?
drug. culture, porn shops, a
Parliament,: guardian .of our ?
liberties, that listens With re-
spect to Mr Michael Foot. He
thinks that, what most of us
regard as a passing phase of
unusual squalor is permanent
and irreversible decline.
But I believe that, with so
many of his countrynien ? now -
and in the past, he does not
like our basic ways. He says
he used-to worship the. West,.
and seems to think it has only
recently betrayed itself. But
:he would have felt the same,.
coming from Russia, at any
time in centuries past. Alex-
antler 1-1erzen in the 1830s also
? worshipped the West, and was
sustained in adversity by his
faith. When he came here he
was tilled with immediate
revulsion and spat in our
faces. What he had worshipped
was not the West, but his.,
? image of it. So it is, I believe.'
with Solzhenitsyn. , ,
Deeply imbued with the
quasi-religious, quasi-mystical -
tradition of Russian patriot-
ism, he is not democratic by
nature and cannot really
understand how any society
can allow the inferior to
obstruct the improving activi-
ties of the superior. The way
we go on seems to hint anarchy,
not freedom. Contrast hint
with his friend and admirer.
42
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. that other hero, Sakharov,
who is so remarkably free from
? Russian preconceptions. He
could write from the pit:
'Only in democratic con-
ditions can a people develovi
-a character fitted for sensible
existence in an ever more
complicated world.' .
This may prove to be impos?
sible even in democratic con-
ditions, but certainly character
of the kind required cannot be
developed in any other way?
only corrupt servility. So many
excellent nineteenth - century
Russians steadfastly opposed
the very idea of a representa-
tive assembly because, they
?said,.the people were not ready.
to participate in government.
How were they supposed ever
to learn without practice ?
They were given no practice?
and we know what happened.
The high and
the migh.ty
It was ironic that on the day
- when Solzhenitsyn in London
was urging us to contemplate_
"- the invincible might 'f Russia,"
? the . terrible power. of .. the .
official ideology and the grow--,
ing hold of ? the Governmenti
over the people, Messrs Brezh-
bev
.
and Kosygin - and. the.
assembled high and mighty of
-"the Soviet Union were beating:-
.-.their chests and droning on
about the very same .thing, in-
what turned turned out. to be a very
changeless way indeed, on the
occasion of their 25th. Party.,
Congress in Moscow. ?-
...do not ? believe ,in Abe,
Soviet Union as a dynamic -
Power. Patient readers of this::
paper over the last 30 years
: will know that I have never
believed in it, and why. Cer- ?
? tainly Angola has not made me
change my - mind. ? Anybody
reading' the total 'output of
speeches at this Party. Cc 1-
' gress (or any preceding one)
mould, I am sure, feel the
- same. ' They are the speeches. ;
of men without vision or real
. drive, even the ? ? drive, or
? vision of conquest.- They are
.frightened men, greedy ? for
power, desperate for security.
? They preside .oyer.a deliber-
ately- crippled country, vaster
. and richer in resources
than any other in the World
which still cannot feed itself
;after GO years of the new
regime, which still finds .itseN7
unable to maintain what it con-
siders to be an appropriate
military establishment as well
as ?a decent standard of living,
.a country in which initiative
? and independence of mind,
though not erased at sight as
under Stalin, are still officially
. discouraged and kept down by
a monstrous police force. Men
without an idea in their heads,
other than parrot cries front
Lenin and deep cunning in
ways and .means of clinging to
, power, they hang like a blight
over a richly gifted people
who are not allowed to think.
Solzhenitsyn, it seems to me
; (and in this ense Sakharoy
has also spoken very com-
mandingly), thinks far too
much in terms of Marxist
ideology as the key to Russian
actions,, far- too little in terms
of conventional but extremely"
..cautious imperialism. lie
also .says that the Soviet mili-
tary establishment is now such
that - the Politburo cannot
avoid war even if it wants to.
lie says that the nuclear
deterrent of the? West is un-
important. Why should Soviet
Russia need nuclear war to.
conquer you, he asks. It can
-take you with its bare hands.-'
I wonder.... Why then does
the Soviet Union spend all its
riches to the point of exhaust- ?
ing its people, on the nuclear
deterrent'? Why, if it wants
? to, doesn't Russia take us
with its bare hands instead of
-spending the substance of its
people on making expensive
trouble in ? the Middle East.
and elsewhere? What does
-Solzhenitsyn's statement.
mean? That Russia will
overrun first Europe, then
America, and colonise us?
How? What for? Russia can
de very little with its bare
hands when .it cannot tell for
certain that America will not
counter intolerable aggression
with the atom bomb. Russia
can never be sure that this
won't happen. And if it comes
to bare hand against bare
hand, where does Russia stand
?? against China? A little reflec-
tion 'indicates that thelaSt-
- thing Russia can want at the
moment is the collapse of the
West, for obvious reasons.
This remains true even if we
deserve to collapse.
- Angola has come at a .
critical moment in African
history: Russia, after cen-
turies of trying, has at last, a.
hundred years too late,
' broken ? out into the Mediter-
. ranean,:and the Indian Ocean
.and is. feeling its oats. After
? the shock and humiliation of
its Cuban defeat (far deeper
than most of us here realise).
. Russia. is getting its own :deli-
Cious ? revenge in Africa?
though doubtless rather wryly.,
asking (the more sensible ones'
'among the Politburo) how
much this luxury is going to
cost.
- Adventurers
?
MOSCOW.
We have to remember that
Mr Brezhney is in fact what
he looks?three-quarters' of a
century behind the times. It
will take some years for the
intoxication of free naYal.
? 43
movement to wear off. In
Russian eyes it stands.for that
long -deserved, long - denied
parity with .the Great Powers
of the West. Of course there
are:voices. in Moscow urging
adventurism : ?there were
always such voices Under the.
Tsar s. Traditionally, the
voices of caution, pulling the
other way, ostially won. It is.,
? Possffile that the adventurists ?
will overreach themselves and
go a little too far. But-unlikely.
Provided the West does not
continue to appear too naked
and too uncertain for too long.
? Meanwhile, if Solzhenitsyn
helps the Americans to get
over their Vietnam guilt and
come to life again, that will
be good. If he could, improb-
---abry, perSuatie Britain to make
at least a show of the will to
defend itself, that would be
good. If he can make us all
stop chattering about d?nte,
that will be excellent. .But
already, even as he was speak-
ing, President Ford was
announcing the burial of that
idiotic and deceptive word.
? (This is an example of what I
mean by change.) But it will
not be good if he?encourages
the adventurists and the panic-
mongers on our side to embark
on further Vietnams:
? .
With .intermittent lunacies,
we have managed to keep our
heads for the 30 years since
? the war. We have lost them
'lately. But it is about time
? that we came back to our
? senses. This sort of thing
happens quite often. Mean-
? while, Russia appears always
? the same, - but it is. indeed
? slowly changing. We should
forego quid: profits for busi-
nessmen, or even our own
treasuries, if this is necessary
to keep up the pressure for
change. Change must come, ,
however slowly. It is impos-
sible even for Russians to con-
tinue for ever under the sort
of leadership exhibited at this
last Congress. Sooner or later
younger men will come up
. who are sufficiently detached
from the past to modify
present rigidities. ?
It is possible, indeed,' that
anions the new names now
coming forward there may be
some of these. May Solzhen-
itsyn live to see the beginning
Of this change.- I hope and
believe that this splendid
figure will have the satisfac-
tion of seeing himself proved
as wrong' in his political
diagnosis as lie is unerring in
matters of. the spirit.
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SUVDAY TTS, London
7 Maxon 1976
Solzhenitsyn heroine a, work
By Villjain Shawcross and Reuben Ainszlein
.LAST Monday, Alexander Sol-
zhenitsyn accused .the western
Press of playing down the
importance of dissidents in the
Soviet Union, and in particular
of ignoring the case of Malva
Land-a. She is one of thousands
of people whose courage allows
the'llussian human rights move-
ment to exist, and through her
we have news of the deteriorat-
ing condition of a Londoner who
has been imprisoned in the. summer s Budulak Scharvein who
he took up the ease of
'
USSR since 1967 and is now in
poor health. -
Moscow City -Court. At my in- British Government has washed
terrogation I was aked whether its hands of him; the Foreign
I was receiving psychiatric treat- Office replies there is not much
ment. I replied that I was not it can do because he is a state-
in need of it." less person. his only friend
Other 'Russians have been seems to be Malva Lancia.
locked into mental hospitals for She often writes to frilitical
less: Malva Lancia was lucky and prisoners and sends them post-
was freed. She has since written cards "so that the dark con-
frequently for the Chronicle and ditions in which they live can
campaigned -for prisoners. Last be brightened up a little." Last
summer she wrote to Scharygin
and in September received a
reply. He said poor food rations
and the lack of exercise had
severely strained his heart,. and
last spring he was told he could
move to the prison hos121. He
declined because conditions
there are even worse than in
the hospital.
Scharygin wrote: "I have
talva Lancia. a 57-year-old
geologist, lives in .Krasnagorsk.
10 miles beyond the Moscow
suburbs. She started working
for the human rights movement
in 1970, and, .has had several
articles and essays published in
the movement's samizdat
(underground) Chronicle of
Current Events.
She was arrested in 1971. "The
examining -magistrate then told
was born in the Ukraine but
made his home in London after
the war. In 1967, when he had
requested but not received
British citizenship, he was
arrested in illoscow while on a
business trip. He was sentenced
to 10 years for betraying his
eountry?beeause he had been a
forced labourer in a German
camp during the war.
He was sent first to Mordovia
prison camp arid then as punish-
ment for protesting, to Vladimir
me that a criminal case had prison, one of the harshest in
been instituted against me at the the USSR. His wife says, the
THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, MARCH 7, 1976
-10=-1,ayer or
By C. L. Sulzberger
PARIS?One astonishing aspect of
the Soviet system is the Way it turns
against itself so many of its 'brilliant
members by seeking to fetter their
minds and punish their hearts. One
has but to think of the musician
Rostropovich or the scientist Sakharov
to see how much the U.S.S.R. is con-
sequently deprived.
Outstanding among men of genius
who have suffered is Aleksandr Sol- .
zhenitsyn. After years in concentration ? ?
' camps and prisons, he survived by
enormous courage and durability?
and was, deported. He now lives in -
Europe and never ceases to write and
speak for human liberty and against
the dictatorship he considers Marx-
ism's inevitable concomitant.
He insisted in a lengthy conversa-
tion that it is Karl Marx's doctrine as
applied by Lenin's strategy Which corn- -
bined to produce existing Soviet so-
ciety; there is not the faintest heritage ;
of earlier Russian autocracy involved.
? He urges the West to recognize this
and erase any assumption that, since
its own past was non-Russian, it can
escape totalitarianism if its own brand
of Communism takes over.
Solzhenitsyn says Lenin spent years
in Europe preparing his revolutionary
actions purely on the basis of Marxism
and unaffected by Russia's own his-
tory. He adds: "What the Soviets
produced is entirely due to Marx and
Lenin. 13olshevism had conceived every
one of its doctrinal decisions before
the revolution."
Tim famous author stresses this
because, much as he detests the
Soviet system which made him suffer,
fallen ill and although I trust
the saying that a strong spirit
can save a weak body I and it
hard to collect my thougats. My
fingers will not hold the pen. -1
simply do ? not know how to ex-
Joo sa
ee'?
he is proud of his "Russianism." He
contends Lenin was "infiltrated" into
Russia by the Germans, who provided
hirn with ample funds, and started off
by promising civic rights, free press,
? peasant ownership of land, workers'
control of industry and, above all, a
prompt peace with the Kaiser's
Germany.
But, he says, Lenin applied the iron
fist of his Bolshevik Party to start
violating all these pledges as soon as
he -gained, power by halting the war.
Workers were placed under disciplined
party control, their factories taken
over by the state. Peasants only
theoretically held their land from the
start because its production was
"grabbed by the state." In 1922 even
fictional ownership ended.
The revolution banned none
Bolshevik publications and parties,
established a massive secret police
plus concentration camps, and finally
installed total, absolute dictatorship.
He argues there was never a chance
of any other result: "Communism
developed from the original philosophy
of Marx. It was inevitable that it
should develop in the direction it
took. Leninism is Marxism's logical
Solzhenitsyn is a unyielding anti-
Marxist. The great suffering he ex-
perienced?and witnessed?turned this
wartime combat officer and creative
genius into an ardent champion. And
he warns the West to make no mis-
take about the truth, as revealed to
him; not to be deceived by catchwords.
He complains that the Helsinki ac-
cord merely weakened Western sup-
port of dissident opinion in the
U.S.S.R.; that not even the concept of
embourgeoisement could occur to any
44
press on paper my gratitude and
joy for your letter. Regretfully I
cannot .promise to answer you
frequently. But we do not for-
get and shall never forget those
who write to us, those who sym-
pathise with us and remember
us."
For sympathising and remem-
bering. and for distributing the
Chronicle (which she regards as
a duty), Malva Landa was
briefly detained last December.
"Under the very eyes of passers-
by, they shoved her into a car
and took her to prison" said
Solzhenitsyn. After Solzenitsyn's
interview, we telephoned Andrei
Sakharov, the dissident physi-
cist; despite KGB interruptions
.he confirmed she was now free.
She has been given two chances.
and will no doubt risk the third
She hopes to see the British
public exerting pressure on
behalf of Nicolai Seharygin
"
who has not committed any
crime. In order to save his life
no time mufit be wasted."
Soviet citizen.
He would never recommend curbing
food exports to the Soviets "because
that is a humane question." Yet, "if
Moscow gets nice gift packages of
African and Asian countries, that cer-
tainly doesn't fill people's stomachs.
If a state is unable to feed its own
people and at the same time manages
to capture outpost after outpost
abroad, the problem isn't being solved.
'The U.S.S.R. has not had to give up
'am inch of territory it controls, and
wages ideological war remorselessly
during the so-called detente, which
is a one-sided capitulation by the
West." He condemns eastward sales
cf advanced technology, recalling
Lenin's quip that the capitalist
rations would compete to sell Moscow
rope to hang them with. "When the
Soviets intend to bury you," he asks,
'why send them excavators?"
When I remarked that the ultimate
nonclusion of his viewpoint seemed
gobal war, he insisted: "It is moral
daermination that counts. Don't
forget I was released from prison
largely because of Western firmness,
2oscow retreated before this moral
=gliness, not military threats. But
such resolution seems to have dis-
appeared. Moscow is justifiably con-
vinced the West has lost its will.
"I suspect that at its closed meet-
bgs Soviet leaders simply laugh at
what's going on and wonder what new
Mild of rope the West is getting ready
to sell. All that is needed is for the
Soviet radio to announce the moment
ka.s come to liberate the world from
tlie aggressive powers of the West.
This is what d?nte means."
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TIME, MARCH 15, 1976
Resf S
r veF
ropag Ti-TreW ?7 Chimera?
Contmunistn has sometimes succeeded as a scavenger, but nev-
er as a leader. It has never come to power in any country that was
not disrupted by war,. internal repression or both.
?John F. Kennedy, July 2, 1963
It is doubtful. that an American President could confidently
make that kind of statement today. In a handful of European
countries, Communist parties are approaching the threshold of
political power?not at the barrel of a Soviet cannon but in
open and free elections. As a result, the specter of a Communist
presence in Western Europe is stirring more concern and de-
bate than at any time since the early years of the cold war,
when the Marshall Plan, the Truman 'Doctrine and the Atlantic
Alliance blocked Moscow's attempts to suborn democracy in
France, Italy and Germany. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
broods about this new Red menace in background talks with
newsmen and in conferences with aides and U.S. ambassadors,
at which he has called the Communists the Trojan horses of to-
talitarianism and NATO officials meet secretly to discuss the Com-
munist threat. The focus of the debate: How dangerous would it
be if the Communists came to power and what should and could
be done to prevent it.
The country most likely to vote Communists into office is
Italy. Such an occurrence would greatly encourage the French
Communists, who for almost four years have been closely allied
with the Socialists. In Portugal, the Communists have been in
the government since the 1974 coup, and Spain's Communists
(though still underground) have formed a coalition with left and
center groups.
The Communist gains are, to some extent, the result of local
conditions. In Italy, for example, there is dissatisfaction with
the flabby, scandal-ridden 30-year dominance of the Christian
Democrats. Western Europe's Communist parties, though, have
also benefited from the policy of d?nte with the Soviet Union.
'Just as the Russians are now said to be less threatening to Peace,
local Communists?who were long suspected by many voters be-
cause of their tie-in with the Kremlin?similarly seem less dan-
gerous. Moreover, a new generation in the West is.too young to
remember the militantly Stalinist attitudes arid often violent ac-
tions of Communist parties in both Western and Eastern Eu-
rope in the post-World War II years.
The Communists have deliberately tried to make themselves
appealing to a wider spectrum of voters. The Italian and French
parties have explicitly disavowed the old Marxian dogma of a dic-
tatorship of the proletariat as well as the need for violent revo-
lution. Instead, they claim to be committed to such democratic
: principles as political pluralism and freedom of speech and re-
ligion. Italian Party Boss Enrico Berlinguer?perhaps Western
Europe's most articulate advocate of "socialism with a human
: face"?has often proclaimed his commitment to "a pluralistic
and democratic system." He most recently and dramatically re-
affirmed this in Moscow, at the 25th Congress of the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union.
' Is the "new look" of Communism genuine? Some political ob-
servers think it could be and argue that bringing Communists
into Western governments might speed their conversion from rev-
olutionary, potentially disruptive outsiders to evolutionary in-
siders. It might also widen the gap between the local parties and
Moscow. The Soviets, in fact, do not conceal their irritation with
the independence shown by some of their Western comrades. So-
viet Party Boss Leonid Brezhnev recently complained that "some
have begun to interpret (proletarian internationalism] in such a
way that little is left to internationalism."
Some political analysts have argued that the Communist par-
ties would allow themselves to be voted out of office if and when
ii the electorate rejected their programs. According to this argu-
ment, the Communists in Europe have clung to power illegally
1 ' only when the Soviet army was at the border, ready to enforce a
COUP with armed might. But there is always the possibility that
a Communist government in Western Europe might not need
Russian help if it had firm control of the country's police and in-
ternal Security forces and key segments of the armed forces.
The striiiigest argument in favor of allowing C'inninunists to
pa rticipa ie in Western governments is that neither the U.S. nor
any other country has Ilm right to block from office a party free-
ly elected by the voters This argument would have more va-
lidity if the Communists differed from other leftist parties mere-
ly in their programs. Yet history advises skepticism ? where
Communists are concerned. Unlike Socialists, they have not
sought the democratic guolution of a Marxian society: instead.
until very recently they have always stressed the radical trans-
formation of a society by authoritarian means.
For all their talk about democracy. the Communist parties
themselves are closed and often conspiratorial societies. The Ital-
ian party, widely regarded as the paradigm of humanistic Com-
munism, does not permit dissent to grow within the ranks. De-
cisions are imposed from above, and a political control
commission enforces the orthodoxy of the moment. French Par-
ty Leader Georges Marchais has stated his belief in a demo-
cratic multiparty political system. Exactly what he has in mind,
however, may not be =ssuring: in 1974, for example, a French
party congress praised the "democratic achievements" of the
near-totalitarian regimes of Eastern Europe. No wonder Har-
vard Sovietologist Adam Ulam concludes: "Communist parties
have always tried to maximize their power to the point where
they would eventually achieve a one-party state." If progressive
party leaders like Berlinguer are sincere, they still may not be
able to deliver on their promises that their parties would ob-
serve the rules of democracy. Irving Howe, editor of the socialist
quarterly Dissent, warns that in a moment of crisis "the old Sta-
linists anclyounger neo-&alinists . . . could become a serious force
pressing for an authoritarian 'solution.' "
The coming of Communists to power in Western Europe
would have serious consequences for the Atlantic Alliance. If
they do not force their countries to quit NATO, the Communists
would probably fashion a foreign policy that favored the Soviet
Union and undermined the alliance. To be sure, Western Eu-
rope's Communists are no longer under the Kremlin's thumb as
they were in Stalin's days, but even Italy's Berlinguer, one of the
West's most independent Communists, has repeatedly empha-
sized his party's historica2"unbreakable ties of solidarity with So-fl Russia." Thus them is at least some danger that a Com-
munist Cabinet member, for example, might take orders from
Moscow and deliver up NATO secrets. A more likely prospect is
that the presence of Communist party members in a NATO gov-
ernment would result in their country being kicked out of the al-
liance. There is no guarantee, moreover, that a Western Com-
munist party currently independent of Moscow will always
remain so. A change in teadership could push that party?and
the country it ruled?into the Soviet orbit.
If Communist ministers did not take direct orders from Mos-
cow or deliberately try to undermine NATO, they nonetheless
would probably be unsympathetic to the alliance and would try
to slash defense budgets even in the face of mounting threats of
a Soviet buildup. In the long run, this could affect the East-West
military balance upon which coexistence rests. The disparity of
military might between the democ-
racies and the East bloc might then
lead to the -Finlandization" of
Western Europe, producing a kind
of neutrality that would he respon-
sive to pressure from Moscow. In
addition, the gains of Communism
within the ever shrinking commu-
nity of democratic nations would
represent an ideological setback for
the West.
a
A weakened NATO and a less
credible American defense commit-
ment to the alliance might prompt
Bonn to reassess its security needs.
One possible result: a mere heavily
rearmed West Germany, perhaps
even with a nuclear deterrent. This
would unsettle all of Germany's
neighbors and might re-create the
tensions that twice in this century
45
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sparked a.general war. Short of this
"worst case" scenario, the strategic
balance still would probably shift
decisively toward Moscow, since
the Soviets could start drawing
?undoubtedly, at favorable terms
?on Western Europe's advanced
technology and industry.
A strong case can be made
that there are unacceptable risks
to the West in allowing the Com-
munists to come to power. But what,
if anything, can be done about it?
Washington has been pursuing a
kind of quarantine policy, to deny
read Italy out of NATO. Bertram's policy might also be applied
to Greece and Spain, both of which hope eventually to gain full
membership in the Market.
Beyond that, the established socialist parties of northern Eu-
rope could provide moral and financial help for their relatively
weak ideological allies in the south?as they have, to some ex-
tent, with Mario Soares' Portuguese Socialists. Above all, the rul-
ing non-Communist parties could and should undertake inter-
nal reforms to become more
appealing to the millions who vote
Communist not because of ideology
but as protest. These moderates
must again demonstrate?as they
did after World War II?that they
are capable of responding to the as-
pirations of dissatisfied voters.
If diplomatic, political and eco-
nomic measures failed to keep
Communists out of a Western gov-
ernment, the U.S., and the rest of
the West, could isolate that coun-
try by cutting off all but minimal
economic and diplomatic relations.
This, however, might lead to the
kind of chaos that would justify the
Communists in taking strong au-
thoritarian measures.
A more advisable policy, at
least initially, would be one of vig-
ilant tolerance. Risky though it may
be, the major Western countries
should perhaps not interfere with
Communist participation in West-
ern Cabinets, if it comes, but? in-
stead give the party. a chance to
prove that its democratic protesta-
tions are genuine. At the same time,
however, the West should make it
unmistakably clear to the Commu-
nist party involved, and to Moscow
as well, that any move to establish
an authoritarian or pro-Soviet re-
gime would not be tolerated. Ap-
propriately tough action would then
follow. Burton Pines
the Communists any claim to legitimacy; American diplomats
in Europe maintain only minimal contact with local Com-
munist politicians. Current U.S. policy seems to be that the
most hard-lining ruling Communist parties represent the least
threat to the strategic balance. At a closed-door meeting in
London last December, a top Kissinger aide told European-
based U.S. ambassadors that "overzealous" attempts to woo
the East bloc countries away from Moscow might be counter-
productive. The reason: pluralistic ferment there, like the 1968
Alexander Dubdek experiment in Czechoslovakia, could lend
respectability to Communists in the West.
Washington could provide sizable economic aid to Europe-
an countries with growing Conununist movements, to bolster ex-
isting regimes and help create strong economies that would less-
en the Communists' appeal. Beyond this, however, there seems
little the U.S. can do. Military intervention is out of the question
so long as the Communists act legally. Any excessively mus-
cular U.S. action runs the risk of a backlash, arousing popular
sympathy for the Communists, because they would appear to be
bullied by the Americans.
Action by Common Market states might be far more ef-
fective. Christoph Bertram, director of London's International
Institute for Strategic Studies, suggests that tough political con-
ditions could be attached to continued EEC support for the Ital-
ian economy?with an understanding that the present govern-
ment, which excludes the Communists, stay in office until the
next elections. Because of the vital importance of the Common
Market to Italy's future, Bertram feels the impact of such con-
ditions would be much more effective than any U.S. threats to
WASHINGTON POST
7 MAR 1976
Freirch
By -Tim Hoagland
t
Washington Post Foreign Service .
? PARIS, March 6?The
French Communist Party's ?
declaration of independence
from Moscow has boosted
its standing in public opin-
ion polls at home, spurred
sharp reactions from both
Washington and the Krem-
. lin, and given rise to at least
one insightful political joke.
The major step in the
French party's accelerating
campaign to establish a new
image as a nationalist force
independent of Moscow has .
has to he seized and wielded
by 'Hie dictatorship of the
pf?Oletariat."
Aecording to a current
joke. ?vages and working
condilntis hare inlOroved so
timch in modern France that
the exploited working class
- - the proletariat consists
largely of .11,,erians. Portu-
guese and women. -rveo
a Communist." itts th0
rillId111110, o "tad
10 IO. nik'd hy 1141:111.1111p
onittniunis
of Algerians. Portuguese
and women7"
Underlying this jest is the
reality that the once-Stalin.
1st French Communist Party
has decided that it has to
broaden its appeal to sur-
vive in a more affluent
France where foreign work-
ers have taken over many of
the menial. ..lobs.
Communist Party figures
show that only 32 per rent
of its 300.000 in are
laborers. While?conar work-
ers aecount for 20 per tent
of he membership and
leachers. muljneers and civil
servants hold it quarter id
the total membership. only
a per 'cent, of the members
are peasant farmers.
French Communist Party
leacler Georges Alarch?is
has underscored it decision
Ii) follow the! lead of the in.
dependentaninded. Initiate
Communist Party hy eriticiz-
?ing the soviet 1.11ion in re-
cent tYl'eliti Mi labor camps
and the inte?rnmeni or politi?
46
cal dissidents in mental asy-
lums and by staying away
from this month's Soviet
Communist Party congress
in Moscow.
This has angered the Sovi-
ets, who see Marchais as an
Opportunist seeking domes-
tic political gain by attack-
ing them and thereby seri-
ously weakening the inter-
national Communist move-
ment. according to well-in.
formed Communist bloc
sources, who leave no doubt
that the split between the
Kremlin and Marchais is
genuine.
Washington has also been
disturbed by the new
French Communist "opening
to democracy," but for the
oppeisite reason. ?
While the kremlin fears it
could he genuine. the
Uni eel St a les. has been
warn int!, WeSICTII Ettruncans
that the ehtur2e, made by
liii French anti Italian Coto-
!mullsl earth?. are .?tiperri
t 1;11 Idutical ;tunes in a colt.
111111 Ii bid rm. 110kA1,1*.
eaLe
The French party has not
significantly changed its for-
eign policy. It still stands
against bringing France
back into NATO and is
against the Common Mar.
ket. Alarchais is now echo
hie the Italians, however, in .
calling for the disbanding of
NATO and the Warsaw Pact
at the same time.
Gen. Alexander Haig, now
the NATO commander-in-
chief and once Richard Al.
Nixon's chief of staff at the
White House, made the new
American concern explicit
in a speech two weeks ago
to a study group in, Munich.
As disturbed, as the
United States was about the
growing strength ot the
Communists in poor south-
ern European countries like
IRdy and Portugal, it would
react even more negativele
to the prospect of conunit?
lusts partieipaling in the
government or the itulu-
trializell countries of north
ern Europe. incikatc0
Likt. 1101, rai'?
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tiveness of the Alarxist sys-
tem has grown over the past
decade among the people of
the Western world. ? [the.
problem is far more sophis-
ticated and far More conse-
quential in terms of ?West-
ern industrialized society
per se ... death can be as
fatal from within as from
across existing bor-
ders," Haig said in part.
The French ? ?Communist
Party polled 21 per cent of
the vote in National Assem-
bly elections in. 1973. It has
gained four to five percent-
age points in opinion polls
since the beginning of the
year.
This new strength is
deeply troubling the govern-
ment of President Valery
Giscard d'Estaing and
France's Socialist Party.
h HI is in nominal national
allianee with the. Commu-
nists but which still strongly?
distrusts them
"At this point, the impor-
tant thing is ? not whether
the change is genuine or tac-
tical," one of Giscard's ad,
visers observed this week.
"In a party dominated by id-
eology and language, the
change in words has to have
an important effect in ?itself,
whatever Mr. Marchais may.
intend."
Like Haig, Giscard's advis-
ers seem to be concerned
? that the continuing eco-
nomic recession and high
unemployment figures in .
Europe and a general lack
of confidence in Western
leadership will produce a
swing to the left. The Com-
munists are-, evidently mak-
ing the same diagnosis.
There' are 'about 1,000
Communist mayors in
France's 36,600 municipali-
ties. The Communists hope .
to translate their new stand-
ing in the public opinion
polls into an increase of
their representation in can-
tonal elections that begin'
Sunday. Since the regional
offices are largely honorific
and the races are usually de-
cided on local issues and
personalities. ? 'rhe elections
can hold national signifi-
cam-e only in a psychologi-
cal sense.
The Communists are also
launching a . longer-term
public relations campaign to .
sell-their new liberal image
to French voters. They are
printing and distributing A
Million copies of the repiirt
Oil" their party con fere iii
last month and Marchais
has liven pushing the new
line in telcvOon and radio.
in 1 erv ie
THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY MARCH 6, 1976
Giscard: II? European
By C. L. Sulzberger
PARIS'
RANCE makes no secret
..of the fact that it, is seri-,
iously concerned about
. a . growing appearance
of, paralysis in United'
'States foreign policy, as
recently displayed in Africa and even
Europe. This-, is not a matter of con-
flirt between Paris and Washington,
only 'of .preoccuption here. .
Certainly in the Elysee Palace, there.
is' reluctance to discuss' this delicate
subject. Yet the n-)ere fact that its
existence is known not only to 'diplo-
mats but ? also ..to leaders of other-:
European 'states; above -all West Ger-.
man Chancellor Helmut .Schmidt,.whe
reviewed' it feat month in. a meeting
-"with President Giscard- d'Estaing,
,! makes- the matter moot:
, :Even Mr. -Giscard d'Estaing is said
, by- 'his, friends to feel it is wrong for.
, ,Washington. to. advertise so, openly
its inability?for, reasons of internal
'political debate?to react to. threats
:--abroad.: At the highest 'level this. is,
'considered- Very serious. It 'should 'not
be forgotten that the French Govern,-
-menti- since de Gaulle, his consistently
, endorsed strong executive .authority,
_Which. it now finds lacking across. the
Atlantic,- ? -
?
? While France feels "that; its 'own
'P'olicy during the *Angolan crisis 'was
logical 'ant ,ultimatelk led Paris to'
-take .an initiative in recognizing the-
.-- :Popular Movement's Government once.
it had clearly won, the French ,point
out there Was little chance of an alter-
native because of. U.S. flabbiness.-?
?Had the United States given explicit
indication,
,
indication. that it .would -ezunterbal, ?'
ance any external intrusion. in the'.
contested' area?like that of Cuban
troops and Soviet equipment; or had
) it threatened to break off key negoti-
ations with Moscow unless a halt was
called, it is. felt the result might have
been less immutable. The Course of
Russian intervention could have' been
changed. But. the necessary opposi?
tion never occurred.
This is a realistic nation and it
. would seem that Giscard has decided
-on two basic courses of action. To
start with, he appears to feel that
the European Community must make
a greater defensive effort because of
the apparent irresolution.and political'
weakness of its superpower partner.
There are only two countries in
' West Europe that can seriously at-
tempt this, France and Germany. Brit-
ain is again reducing its military
budget. The other allies can 'make
scant additional effort. ? Therefore,,
both Paris and Bonn agree to step up:
. :defense, with . the West. Germans
working directly within the NATO set-
up, the Frevii continuing tangen-
tially.
47
Giscard apparently feels France!
should concentrate on two aspects
of the problem. The small -nuclear
deterrent force should not be allowed.
to remain static but should t e sub-,
jected to continuing technological
provement. And, over the next five"
years, France's conventional forces'
must be reorganized and strength-
ened.
It is often -felt that General.
Gaulle believed France should 'always :
work for international equilibrium and ;
that while the United States wai
tarily, much stronger than the Soviet.
'Union, it was sensible to give Moscow,
more sympathy and support than ?
might normally have been expected.
The Giscarrlien ;theory, is complex..
It insists that foreigners tend,.too.
' often: to analyze trench policy in'
!terms of past appearances. Each Paris:
government pursues its: own' calcula-
tions. -Anyway, it is clear today that,
Paris, is less- concerned with a precise;
balance than a -search for d?
tente and the means of avoiding East-
West confrontation. '
ad ariaiiaiS that
, One may -a
Oikard is not as convinced as some'
Others' that 'the world strategic
&ice has betn-upset; Rather', than al
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Military ,':greversal,", perhaps there is ,
only creation of overall. equality, .he
' feels: but that altine, meaning an end
tor previous US. advantages;' makes
it. necessary for Europe to- increase ;
its effort: France never opted out of
. the.Atlantic alliance although it did.,
. quit .. NATO's. integrated. "organiza-
tion."
The greatest , concern here, now. is.
, not -over the degree of shift in rela-
tive armed Strength but in the political
,Weakness of the West, both the United
States and the European Community:
;. America's paralysis is seen' as political;
, Europe's as structural. : -
Paris can Only hope the U. .S. debili-
tation will be corrected after this
year's Presidential election. But for
Europe the Giscardien, solution seems!
to he basic- reform. This envisions
, initial creation of .a de facto "direc-
torate!'- of France, , Germany and,
Britain to get things moving. .
Thrn,, ultimately, a formal threc-
torate could be negotiated once a
method has been worked out to con-
vince the lesser E.E.C. nations. They
must first realize they aren't going to I
be ignored and that their full par- ?
ticipation is needed. In all events, a
new sense of guidance and leadership
is rmiered urgent in this changing
world.
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BALTIMORE SUN
18 March 1976
77,77,
.?.- America
Publication of excerpts from the Pike
Committee's report has raised serious ques-
tions about the American government's role
in the Kurdish struggle for autonomy in Iraq.
After former President Nixon's visit with
the Shah of Iran in 1972, a plan was endorsed.
to use the Kurds as pawns in a guile of pow-
er politics to stir up trouble for Iraq, which
was overly committed to the Soviet Union at
the time. Millions of dollars were spent to
equip the Kurds for a suicidal no-win war.
Who master-minded this cruel maneuver?
The men who made this clandestine
agreement should have known better. If the
Kurdish question were new, perhaps ignor-
ance would be an excuse. But the Kurds have
existed for centuries as a distinct, non-Arab
ethnic group with its own culture and a large
measure of freedom. ?
Their most famous ruler, Saladin, as
known for courage and chivalry when he re-
conquered Jerusalem for Islam and defeated
Europeancrusaders in Palestine in the 12th
century. Today most of the 10 million Kurds
are orthodox Sunni Muslims.
After the fall of the Ottoman empire at
the end of World War I. the Kurds hoped to
establish a country of their own, as stipulat-
ed in the Treaty of Sevres.
' Kurdistan never became a reality, and
the rugged region was subsequently divided
between Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. The Turks
suppressed the Kurds' bid for self-determi-
nation and now call them "mountain Turks"
in an effort to minimize the differences.
Iranian Kurds may feel more at home be-
cause their language and culture is related
to Persian, but hopes of independenee there
ere dashed years ago. In fact, a successful
rebellion by the Iraqi Kurds would have been
a threat to Iran's status quo. for Iran's Kurds
expressed great sympathy for their kinsmen
fighting in Iraq.
Iraq's 21/2 million Kurds, continuing their
struggle for autonomy were encouraged to
fight a devastating war they were never
- meant to win. the Pike report says.
To supply the Kurds with captured Soviet
arms that fit in with their arsenal. Israel
was used as a conduit Most material was
routed overland via Iran.
When the Soviet Defense Minister, Andrei
Grechko. tried to work out an agreement be-
tween the Ba'ath government of Iraq and the
Kurds in i974, the Kurds were advised bv
Inn and the U.S to
So they kept on fighting. This would not
have happened without U.S. support. Al-
though their leader, Gen. Mustafa Barzani,
did not trust the shah, he had faith in Ameri-
ca mid believed that it would guarantee
Iran's ph.d,:.e of support. Without U.S. back-
ing the kaTils ingloatedly would have made
a peaceful compromise with Iraq.
q-".; that no cue realized how dif-,
ficuit it would be to fulfill a eomnutment to
A Did to the Kurds
y LINDA FISH CO: PTON
those landlocked tribes if the Shah ever de-
cided to close the borders and withdraw his
support. Why was this cynical policy so will-
ingly carried out?
Thousands of Kurds have died from bul-
lets, bombs, hunger and cold. "We should
have realized what was going on when no
one provided adequate anti-aircraft weapons
to shoot down planes which bombed our vil-
lages or antitank artillery to use on the
plains," a Kurd explained. "An attack on the
oil fields would have resulted in retaliatory
raids against Iran's oil-producing area. so it
was safer to confine us to the mountains."
Radicals who disagreed with Barzani's alli-
ance now say, told you so.-
? Apparently the Kurds were only supposed
to be a thorn in Iraq's side. By March. 1975.
enough pressure had been applied Iraq was
willing to negotiate a settlement-with Iran.
This lessened Iraq's dependence on the
Soviet Union and opened the country to.
Western commerce. The border dispute be-se
tween the two countries was alio resolved:;
But at whose expense?
Right after the settlement; Iraqi forces-
launched search-and-destroy operation;-
closing in on the Kurds, who suddenly found
themselves abandoned by their allies.
Despite the fact that refugees were given'
asylum in Iran and a, period of amnesty was:
granted by Iraq, the Kurds are worse off
than before. Why, at the least, didn't the.U.S. U.S..
offer humanitarian aid?
The rebellious Kurds now suffer from iner
evitable recriminations and reprisals whielf
follow in the wake of armed insurrection.
According to the Kurdistan Democratier,
Party, many uprooted families haven't been'
allowed to return to their villages, especially
in the oil-rich areas like Kirkuk. Other Kurds _
have been moved to Arab-dominated -prove:
inces in the south, and it is claimed that ap-
proximately 25,000 Kurds who defected 'toe
join their people's Pesh Merge ("we who-
face death") forces are in prison camps. -
The KDP also reported that Kurdish cute:
tural institutions, newspapers. and educa-
tional facilities have lost former govern--
ment support and that refugees returning'
from Iran are forbidden to join political par-. ?
ties or professional organizations through
which they might seek redress.
Kurds who did not join the revolt have
fared better, but the atmosphere is under-
standably more hostile for them as well.
The Iraqi government also has reason to.
be bitter, for the point of the deal was to
weaken its regime. Thousands of Iraqi sol-
diers were killed.
Lives were needlessly lost on both sides,
and the rifts between Arabs and Kurds were-
widened when they might otherwise have
started to mend.
'rhe State Department maintains that
there are inaccuracies in the Pike report yet
will not point them out. Why does our 1;017..
ernrnent remain inscrutably silent when it -
could make a disclosure of its own to
count for these actions?
The Kurdish people have received a treue
ma.. and so has the reputation of the
sates. Kurds still believe in their mere bus
mut in American commitments Ls gone. ?
Mrs. Comptah teaches Middle E4isi
wtrrses at the Johns Hopkins
TIME, MARCH 22, 1976
r1.9
ZQ.J
IDCZ
V\\.:9rul
"We are grown men playing with
dangerous toys." So said one veteran Is-
raeli officer last week, referring to the
race for arms in the Middle East, which
is now outdistancing the search for
peace. Hardly a week passes without the
announcement of a new weapons deal
somewhere in the region. Initially, the
goal of the race was the replacement by
Israel and the Arabs of weapons lost
during the 1973 October War. But this
seems to have triggered a cycle of ac-
tion and reaction in which each side now
strives to better the arsenal of the oth-
er. As a result, both sides are not only
stronger than before the October War
but are also acquiring some of the
world's most sophisticated weaponry
(see chart). Thus they have raised the po-
tential destructiveness of another Mid-
dle East war to chilling new heights.
The Arab arms buildup is particu-
larly worrisome to Israel and its Amer-
ican Jewish supporters. With predict-
able grumbling from Jerusalem, the U.S.
has sold arms to Jordan, Saudi Arabia
and other Arab states that played mi-
nor roles in the 1973 war. This month.
though, Washington announced that it
intends to sell six C-130 Hercules mil-
itary transport planes to Egypt (total
cost: $50 million). Fearing that this may
merely foreshadow future large-scale
arms shipments to the Egyptians. lead-
ers of American Jewish organizations
last week warned President Ford they
were "strenuously opposed" to the deal,
and that any further sales to Cairo might
alienate Jewish voters. The Administra-
tbn, which anticipated the "calculated
outrage" of the Jewish community, ar-
gues that the sale helps Cairo preserve
its independence from the Soviets. It also
enables Egyptian President Anwar Sa-
dat to demonstrate to his radical critics
that his willingness to make some ac-
commodation with Jerusalem can pay
dividends. This is in Israel's interest as
much as in America's.
Whether or not war breaks out, the
participants?with the possible excep-
48
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Lion of Egypt?are better prepared than
ever. Items:
ISRAEL now has more tanks, ar-
mored vehicles and long-range artillery
than ever, most of it from the U.S. Next
year the Israeli air force will take de-
livery of the first of 25 F-15 Eagles, the
newest, fastest (top speed: Mach 2.5) and
most agile U.S. fighter. Israel's other
combat planes (principally F-4 Phan-
toms and the Israeli-designed Kfirs) are
being outfitted with the latest electronic
gadgets to aid in night flying missions
and foil antiaircraft missiles. The Shrike
air-to-surface missile has been deployed
to knock out the radars on which anti-
aircraft batteries depend. In addition, Is-
rael is receiving "smart" bombs, which
can be guided onto targets. Still on Je-
rusalem's shopping list are American
RPvs (remotely piloted vehicles), which
can counter the Arabs' Russian-built
SAMs by drawing antiaircraft fire. To
bolster its ground forces, Jerusalem is ac-
quiring the TOW antitank missiles, the
Cobra helicopter gunship and the most
lethal version of the M-60 tank.
SYRIA has replaced and upgraded all
the equipment it lost in 1973, thanks to
the Soviet Union. Damascus has re-
ceived hundreds of top-of-the-line T-62
battle tanks, 45 mio-23 fighter-bombers,
tinpiloted drone planes and hundreds of
antiaircraft missiles. Its 50 Scud surface-
to-surface missiles can reach virtually
all of Israel's populated areas. To en-
able Damascus to operate properly all
its new, ultrasophisticated military
hardware, there are now more than
2,000 Soviet advisers with the Syrian
armed forces, while Cubans serve in Syr-
ian tanks and North Koreans and Pak-
istanis fly some of the Was.
JORDAN, which committed only two
brigades to the 1973 war and suffered
small losses, will get 14 Hawk antiair-
craft batteries from the U.S. in 1977. It
has also obtained 42 secondhand Amer-
ican-made F-SA jet fighters from Iran
and 36 of the newest version of that
plane?the F-5E?from Washington. In
addition, Amman is busily improving its
vintage M-48 Patton tanks by installing
diesel engines and more powerful guns.
EGYPT is perhaps the only Middle
East nation that has not fully replen-
ished its arsenal since 1973. Reason: the
chilly Cairo-Moscow relations led to a
xi= cessation of arms deliveries from
the Soviet Union. With cash provided by
Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich states,
President Anwar Sadat has been turning
to Western sources of supply: to France
for as many as 150 Mirage 5 fighter jets,
Britain for up to 80 Jaguar fighter-bomb-
ers and 20 Westland Lynx helicopters,
and Italy for electronic equipment. With
French and British help, Egypt soon
hopes to start constructing its own arms-
manufacturing plants. If Congress ap-
raroveeslyththeasat le of theCto-h13w0sul
tothCeanirooffeirt
Egypt a range of such combat support
items as communication equipment and
mine detectors.
Middle East states not on the front
line in the Arab-Israeli dispute have also
expanded their arsenals. Saudi Arabia
has bought 300 tanks from the U.S. and
Britain, and has an additional 500 on
order, it will also soon receive 128 fight-
er jets from the U.S. and France. Iraq
is beefing up its arsenal with orders to
the Soviets for 40 MIG-23s, in addition
to the 30 they already have. Libya last
year sifmed a $2 billion arms dell with
the Soviets that includes 24 m tu-23s,
1.100 tanks, 800 armored personnel car-
1
! I
1.
T1 'I
:
Arrned forces +Combat planes .e..7.5-tanks
Artiller); j SAM botteriei
?..
'
LIBYA
32,000
110
1,100
sl 145
1 50
j EGYPT
A332,500
+ 450
2,000
)t 1,760
1 90
ISRAEL
41 426,000
4. 450
esc 2,900
)4 670
1 20
SYRIA
* 192,500
+400
aImr 2,200
1,200
1 38
IRAQ
* 135,000
+ 350
4/5- 1,500
"1 700
riers and 50 batteries of antiaircraft mis-
siles. Since these enormous quantities
are well beyond Libya's defense needs,
Israeli officials view them as a kind of
"Arab weapons-supply depot" accessi-
ble to any nation willing to fight Israel.
The huge Saudi and Iraqi arsenals could
be put to the same use. Compounding Je-
rusalem's worries about the Arab arms
buildup was the creation last year of a
joint Syrian-Jordanian military com-
mand On Israel's eastern front.
Although the arms balance is heav-
ily stacked numerically in favor of the
Arab states, most Western experts still
feel that Israel could defeat any com-
bination of its enemies' forces. What
gives the Israelis this edge is their su-
periority in such areas as targeting mis-
siles, electronic countermeasures, heli-
copter support and the ability to
mobilize rapidly 400,000 superbly
trained reserves. Israeli military officials
JORDAN
70,250
+ 70
oris. 600
)1 221
SAUDI
ARABIA
51,000
+ 100
.aer 300
10
agree with this assessment, but they also
fear that by 1980 the sheer quantity of
the Arabs' arms could cancel Israel's ad-
vantage. Privately, some Israeli politi-
cians warn that if the military balance
' tips against them, they may have no al-
ternative but to develop a nuclear strike
force, for which they already possess the
materials and technical capability.
Even if that did not happen, anoth-
er war in the next year or so would be
far more costly to both sides than the
last one. For Israel alone, according to
U.S. intelligence estimates, the next
round, if it involved the same combi-
nation of states that fought in 1973.
might leave 8,000 Israelis dead and
36,000 wounded, compared with 2,527
killed and 6,027 wounded during the Oc-
tober War_ Using the same ratio, Arab
losses could soar from 22,000 dead in
1973 to 72,000; the number of wounded
could increase from 54,000 to 325,000.
BALTIMORE SUN
21 Feb.. 3976
You Can't Buy Fri
Washington's decision to cut off develop-
ment-aid talks with India will hardly induce
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to be more cir-
cumspect about her charges that the CIA is plot-
ting against her. government. The CIA's track
record elsewhere makes it a handy rhetorical
tool for a Prime Minister much in need of rea-
sons to offer for dismantling her country's free-
doms. A dictator could hardly have bought such
a public relations theme at any price, and Mrs.
Gandhi is unlikely to trade it for a $75-million-
a-year development program. She is more like-
ly to flaunt the all-too-public American threat
as "evidence" to back the very charges for
which Washington seeks to punish her.
If the United States government was pre-
pared to resume development aid to India at a
rate of some $75 million a year, that aid should I
have been in expectation that it would serve a
long-term American interest in economic sta-
bility in the Indian Subcontinent. Any such ex-
pectation is neither enhanced nor diminished by !
Mrs. Gandhi's rhetoric, however much Amen-
cans may be saddened by her dismantling of de- '
mocracy and defamation of America to justify
her dictatorship. But American officials man-
aged both to deny that the suspension was
endship
caused by any one act and to describe it as "a
measured response to the totally unjustified
charges of Mrs. Gandhi."
'You can't buy friendship," American critics
of the massive foreign-aid budgets of the last
two decades long argued. It might have been ex-
pected that when one of those critics became
President, he would accept the slogan's implica-
tion and be satisfied if the development-aid dol-
lar bought what its name implies?development
in areas where poverty can be a source of
chronic political instability. Instead, the new
Ford administration policy is, according to one
unnamed State Department official, "not to let
' any nation get away scot-free with using us as a
whipping boy in its domestic politics or in tilt-
I United Nations." The use of aid to reward
friendly governments and punish those hostile
to the United States is a dangerous and delicate
business. If it is to be done at all it should be
done with great subtlety and in a manner that
holds American interference in the affairs of
other countries to a Minimum. Governre'2nts
come and governments go, but the nee,!:5 of
Third World peoples remain an obligation Et
the United States cannot ignore if it is tc)
any hope of securing a more peaceful
49
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NEtt YORK TIMES
10 MAR 1976
U.S. Aides Td iCoverd
By LESLIE H. GELB
Special to The New York Times
zgropearra Ne4). tet, Angolev:s
uary, the French and British
Governments made frequent
public condemnations of inter-
WASHINGTON, March 9 vention by outsiders in Angola.
France and Britain, as well as In mid-February, they came to
the United States, provided , the conclusion that the civil
covert aid to the Angolan fac- iwar was about over and recog-
tions that were defeated in the nized the Soviet-supported fac-
Angolan civil war, according
to Ford Administration officials.
The officials reported that the
French aid was substantial but
less than the $30 million sup-
plied by the United States. They
described Britain's aid as mod-
est.
Another official related that
these actions were part of an
effort by a number of western
European allies, including West
Germany and Belgium to stem
the erosion of Western influ-
ence in Africa by the Soviet
tion, the Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola, which
had established a government
in Luanda. The United States
has not recognized the Luanda
Government.
The Administration officials
said that French aid was mostly
in the form of cash and was
used ?to pay the salaries of
mercenaries and regualr forces,
and to buy small arms and
ammunition.
They said that to the best
of their knowledge the French
Union. started their effort late last
All the officials said that summer and that it was direct-
there was no joint planning or, ed almost entirely to the- Na-
or with the United States. One tional Front for the Liberation
official said, however, that of Angola; led by Holden
"intelligence operatives in the Roberto.
field knew in a general way
what each other was doing,
and of course, we and the
British kept each. other in-
formed."
Embassies Deny Report
Asked for comment, both
the British and French Em-
bassies denied that their Gov-
ernments had aided the An-
golan factions.
The Administration officials
said that they did not know
exactly when the French and
Sri sh aid ended, but that it
was either before or around
the time that United States
aid began to dwindle in Decem- ?
ber. 'United States in Angola, broken
Beginning markedly in Jan-I off about 1969,. resumed in Jan-
Christian. Science Monitor
15 March 1976
Like covert aid provided by
the Ford Administration,
French aid was primarily fun-
neled through President Mobu-
tu Sese Seko of Zaire.
The officials said that British
aid went exclusively to the
National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola, based
in southern Angola and led
by Jonas Savimbi. They said
they bei ieved that ft began
'last spring and included some
communications equipment.
"The Brftfsh dfd the absolute
minimum just to keep their
hands in, one offfcfal said.
50
poL_cy
m[stakes
in Afr?ca?
,uary 1975 with $30(030 in
cash, then leaped to $28 infilfon
in the late spring after heavy
soviet aid began pouring into
Angola. Early this year. Con-
gress prohibited the Admfnis-
Aration from sending $all mil-
lion more in covert aid after
direct intervention in Angola
by Cuban and South African
forces
, The one official who main-
tained that the West Germans
and Belgians had also been
involved said that West raerma-
ny had promised some cammu-
nications equipment to 2!r. Sa-
vimbi and that Belgium had
provided some cash.
Asked for comment, Richard
Samuel, a spokesman fa-: the
British Embassy here, said:
"Her Majesty's Goverment
have never given financiali
assistance of any kind. Our
policy has - been consistently
one of impartiality as between
the liberation movements. To
have given the aid would have
amounted ? to interferenne in
Angola's internal affairs."
Renaud Vignal, the spokes-
pan of the French Erraassy,
'translated from a statement
by Foreign Minister Jean Sau-
vagnargues: "Some arms have
been given to Angolan factions,
and ?I don't know by tatiom,
but they were not given by
the French Government."
He also provided a statement
that President Valery Giscard
d'Estaing made on Jan. 7: "The
French Government dennitnces
the massive shipment of war
material and even more the
' dispatch of foreign soldiers that
have been publicly observed
in Angola over the past few
By Robert P. Hey
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
Is the United States, which backed the losing
side in Angola, making similar policy mis-
takes in southern Africa?
A number of African-affairs specialists in
and out of the government here believe it is.
They fear that the Ford administration's
policies, most particularly the warning to
Cuba to keep its troops out of southern Africa,
if continued will result in the United States
alienating moderate black African leaders --
and ending up on the losing side, as the United
States did in Angola. ?
Tins deep concern emerges from talks with
' weeks. It asks that these be
'stopped.. To continue such in-
tervention would create a situa-
tion of permanent tension and
division in Africa, destroying
the climate of peace which
had until now accompanied in-
dependence, and would distract
this continent from its priori-
ties for development."
One Ford Administration of-
ficial said, in explainging
French involvement: "The
French are the only European
Government with an African
policy, and they have big plans
for Zaire."
He pointed out that to em-
:phasize the French-Zaire rela-
tionship, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing
Ivisited Mr. Mobutu in Zaire
in late August 1975..
1 The French have extensive
investments in Zaire, a country
,
rich in raw materials, and are
particularly interested in Ca-
binda, the oil-producing pro-
vince of Angola bordering
Zaire. The Gulf Oil Corporation
had been drilling in Cabinda
until last winter and is now
negotiating with the Luanda
Government to resume drilling.
Another official said: "It
should be remembered that
when the Organization of Afri-
can Unity voted a couple of
months ago on which Angolan
faction, if any, to recognize,
most of the former French colo-
nies voted not to recognize
the Soviet-backed group."
These two officials main-
taihed that many European
governments were as con-
cerned about Soviet and Cuban
penetration in Africa as the
Ford Administration, but that
given their domestic political
situations, they are not in a
position to do or say much
about it.
a number of WashlaN, on sources in recent
days. Many say Arneeizan strategy is fluid in
dealing with the aoroaching crisis in Rho-
desia and Namibia, and that there remains
little time for the United States to alter its
policies regarding these nations if it is not to
alienate moderate blaak African leaders.
What is needed, in this view, is renewed
public recognition by the United States of the
rights of black Africaas to majority participa-
tion in both governments, flat U.S. refusal to
support militarily either white government,
and public support of moderate black African
leaders.
They add that the United States also must
. provide economic aid to African nations led by
moderate black leaders, such as Mozambique
. and Zambia ? bo1.. of which have been
sustaining difficult ecaaomic times as a direct
result of the current ti.a?moil.
But these sources also acknowledge that
taking such steps windd be difficult for the
U.S. Government. They say it would require a
major shift in the Ford administration's
position; and would be difficult ? if not
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impossible ? to convince a majority in
Congress to support.
? They believe, however, the alternative is for
the United States to invite almost certain
rejection from moderate black African lead-
ers who still would like to have good relations
with Washington, if only in order to lessen
? their dependence on the Soviet Union for
military and economic assistance.
In this view, several sources say, the United
? States has only five or six months in which to
alter its African policy. By then, they believe
black African nations may begin moving
against white-dominated Rhodesia. Once that
occurs, sources here believe, moderate black
African leaders will be unable to prevent their
? people from wiping out the white rule.
It is known here that there were sharp
divisions within the Ford administration last
year over its Angola policy. Publicly, Presi-
dent Ford and Secretary of State Henry A.
? WASHINGTCN POST
1 1 MAR 1976
Kissinger's
Rhodesia
Remark Hit
? By David B. Ottaway
? Washington Post Foreign Service
SALISBURY, March 10-
- An African nationalist
leader involved in the cur-
rent negotiations with
Prime'Minister. Ian Smith
for a settlement to the Rho-
desian constitutional dispute
said today that Secretary of
State Henry A. Kissinger's
recent statement about the
? situation here was "very
? badly timed" ?and could
serve to stiffen white resist-
ance to black-majority rule.
Willie Musarurwa, a mem-
? ber of the African negotiat-
ing team, said that the ef-
fect of Kissinger's com-
? ments "is to create intransi-
gence at a time when things
were going very well" in the
? negotiations.
Kissinger warned Cuba
that the United States might
react in a different manner
than in the case of Angola if
the Soviets and Cubans be-
come directly involved in
? the nationalist struggle to
overthrow the white-minor-
' Kissinger were urging that $28 million in
American military equipment be provided to
two Angolan factions; when Congress refused
to go along, the administration blamed Con-
gress for causing the two factions to lose.
At the same time, many officials in the
government's intelligence-gathering areas
were reporting that the Angolan war already
was lost; that the two Western-backed fac-
tions, especially the one in northern Angola,
had no chance of winning. The United States's
only chance of influence, they were telling top
administration officials, was to stay out of the
internal conflict and work diplomatically with
the pro-Marxist faction ? which, as they
forecast, ultimately won.
Some of these same officials ? as well as
nongovernment specialists testifying before
the Senate subcommittee on African affairs?.
now see the Ford administration as moving to
repeat that Angolan mistake.
ity government here.
"I don't expect Kissinger
to make such blunders," Mu-
sarurwa said. He compared
the Kissinger warning to
Prime Minister Harold Wil-
son's statement just before
the whites declared their in-
dependence from Britain in
1965 that the British govern-
ment would not use military
force to crush a possible
white rebellion in Rhodesia.
Musarurwa said that Kis-
singer was totally misread-
ing the situation here and
asserted that there is no
parallel between Angola,
where the Soviets and \ Cu
bans had been "invited" in,
and Rhodesia, where he said
they had not been asked to
intervene.
' "There is no such thing
(Soviet and Cuban presence)
_ involved here," he said, add-
ing that Angola and Rhode- -
sia "are not ...similar situa-
tions."
Negotiations between the
Smith government and
Joshua Nkomo, leader of the
internal faction of the Afri-
can National Council negoti-
ation on behalf of the six
million blacks of Rhodesia,
have now reached a delicate
stage where either a break-
down or a breakthrough is
possible.
Musarurwa _also dismissed
Smith's denial, in an inter-
view published here today,
that his government had of-
fered parity in the white-
51
dominated Parliament to
the country's black majority
during last week's negotia-
tion session.
The official African Na-
tional Council line seems to
be that what Smith says
publicly to calm his white
electorate does not reflect
what is actually being said
or negotiated in the consti-
tutional talks.
The African negotiators
express concern that state-
ments like the one Kissinger
made could harden the atti-
tude of the country's 270,000
whites and lead to failure of
the talks. The feeling seems
to be that Kissinger, per-
haps unwittingly, may have
complicated the talks by giv-
ing the whites here the hope
that the United States might
eventually Intervene on
their side.
Like Musarurwa, a top
aide to Prime Minister
Smith also denied yesterday
that there was any indica-
tion so far of Cuban or So-
viet involvement in the step-
ped-up guerrilla wet along
Rhodesia's eastern border
with Mozambique.
The denial by Musarurwa
is all the more significant
since his faction of the Afri-
can National Countil has
long been considered Soviet-
backed while its external
faction, led by Rev. Ndabi-
ningi Sithole, is regarded as
Chinese-supported.
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
Monday, -Mai-ch 15. 1976
Ern D. Canharn
in new E
? Just returned from a State Department
mission in the Far East (it was a study of
certain foundation-handled activities funded
by government) I can report the obvious: that
the friendliest nations in the Pacific part of the
world are filled with uncertainty about the
United States.
? They are, of course, puzzled by the com-
plexities and ambiguities of the American
presidential election process. Who wouldn't
be? But, far more fundamentally, they won-
der whether the American sense of purpose in
the world is still strong and clear. They ask
whether U.S. public thinking is lapsing into
isolationism. They do not know what kind of
nation the United States is at this time in
history. Do we?
Attitudes in the six nations we visited ? the
Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia,
Thailand, and Pakistan ? were concerned but
not appalled by the American withdrawal
from Vietnam, now nearly a year ago. I
gathered that most thoughtful people felt
withdrawal to be inevitable, delayed longer
than might have been the case, leaving
problems but not insurmountable ones in its
wake.
In Thailand, where the pressures from
nearby Communist-controlled Indo-China are
strongest, the government continues its pres-
sures on the Americans to complete their
withdrawal of obvious and compromising
military forces. The Thais have bowed to the
storm before, as during Japanese domination
in World War II. They expect the winds to
blow severely from Vietnam, supported by the
Soviet Union, but they expect compensating
forces from the. People's Republic of China.
Thailand is the most exposed nation but it is
aware that it will be saved mainly by itself. It
is internally turbulent, with political a.csassi-
nations of useful and respected people taking
place frequently. It is uncertain about the
planned election in early April. There are
scores of so-called political parties. -
There are varying versions of one-man rule
in all six countries. Some democratic forms
are observed. Elections are scheduled and
held. Rut the executives are authoritarian. In
WASHINGTON POST
1 2 MAR 1976
Victor Zorza
st
44A
Thailand another r-Titary coup is always a
possibility. But in pl,zes like the Philippines,
Singapore, Indonegi- Pakistan the strong arm
of the leader is re enly felt but, I believe,
extensively accept.,Z and welcomed. The
disorders of less ar`..thoritarian rule are re-
garded as worse ftn the infringements of
civil liberties imp.=1, by the present execu-
tives.
It is against tfr pattern of domestic
firmness that one =templates the Asians'
uncertainties about e United States. They
see a weak executta, a beleaguered Secre-
tary of State, an a:7;ays unpredictable but
powerful Congress. .7e.ey would like to see the
tangles of Americz) government straighten
out, and a sense of &r purpose return.
? -
With all this corn, however, there re-
main vast friendli17,-ess and respect for the
United States. The izari things of the past are
remembered, as v as the mistakes and
blunders. An egree=s American know-it-all
attitude from the d of U.S. domination has
not been lived down.
Even the preseal gditical floundering in-
side the United Ststes is viewed sympa-
thetically, since Asrs shiver at the concen-
trated power and 7:zpose of the divided
Communist giants.
Somehow, I thir. the Asians we visited
believe U.S. Gullivea? will pull through. While
they yearn to be tolf Ele United States is not
becoming isolation, and they accept a vast
amount of U.S. and f..7ternational aid, never-
theless they know tl will be saved primarily
by their own efforts_
Considerable eca--...mic progress is being
made in all six coueLes we visited. This goes
even more for f= places our colleagues
visited: Korea,. Taiwan, Hong Kong.'
Really fabulous grcth has taken place in the
great cities of Eaa Asia. The people have
poured into the iLta.n areas with mixed
benefit, but the citiglitter with skyscrapers
and are clogged willIfraffic jams. It is a new
world in East Asia, and the United States
plays a different rf:a there than it has for
three decades.
China Debates the Anfierica,
? The Peking radicals are sharpening
their knives for Hua Kuo-feng, the
new acting prime minister, on the
grounds that he wants to develop Chi-
' na's links with the United States and
to acquire U.S. military technology.
? Both his own position and Peking's.
pro-American policy are seriously
threatened. The radicals, who tasted
blood last month when they got rid of
deputy prime ininister Teng
ping, jUSt as he was about Io take ovpr
formally the country's management on
52
the death of prime minister Chou En-
lai, are not going to give up easily.
The evidence between the lines of
the Chinese press which leads to these
conclusions also makes it clear that
Ilua has powerful allies, and that he
is fighting back. The army, which would
stand to gain front a policy designed
to secure modern Western weapons, has
not so far joined in the attacks on Ma.
But the military commanders also favor-
ed his predecessor. Teng, who restored
the cent rali?fed military system. Yet they
could not save hint, even though he
too was anxious to give therm the
n cection
militr technology they wanted.
Theattacks on Ifua are disguised in
sevesr...! ways, but politically the most
sIgnant is the press campaign
whida blames him for imparting the
wromg direction to China's science
and Lelmology program. Rua, who is
not =led in the press attacks, has
been la charge of the science and tech-
nolozTprogram for about a year, and
it mairtherefore he deduced that he is
the 1.2-Lzet of the campaign. Ile has
never Eteen publicly. named to this
post, t a number of signs?stall as
his.,...,1,etings with foreign scientists
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visiting China?clearly identify him as
holding it.
The press campaign makes it clear
that the unnamed man in charge of
the program has been saying that Chi-
nese science "is now in a state of cri-
sis"?"stagnant, confused, paralyzed."
He complained that Chinese technol-
ogy had tried to rely on its own re-
? sources instead of getting help from
? abroad. He argued that the crisis
"could be resolved only by relying on
foreign experts."
The radicals answer? that to do so
would be to act "as if China's destiny
is tied to the waist-belt of foreigners."
If China gave up the policy of self-reli-
ance, they maintain, it could neither
attain economic independence nor as-
sert its "political independence." They
hint at the defense aspects of the de-
bate by decrying China's space satel-
lite program.
China, they argue, succeeded in
launching its satellite, but only at the
cost of a modernization program which
diverted the country from the leftist
path of Maoist-communist virtue. "The
satellites going up to the sky are but a
sham," they say, "while the Red Flag
falling to the ground is the reality."
The satellite effort is, of course closely
linked to China's ballistic missile pro-
gram, which is several years in ar-
rears, and to its space reconnaissance
program.
Without a spy satellite, China would
be in no position to anticipate a Soviet
attack. But Chinese purchasing enqui-
ries in the West suggest that, without
foreign help, it may be another 10
years before Peking develops an effi-
cient spy satellite of its own. Those
who want Western scientific aid, says
the Peking People's Daily, claim that
this would provide "the only way to
avoid being blind."
The Washington debate on whether
China should be given military-techno-
WASHI NGT ON POST
1 8 MAR 1976
logical aid came to the surface last
September with an article in Foreign
Policy by Michael Pillsbury, a Rand
analyst whose passionate advocacy of
ibis course is said by some of his oppo-
nents to spring from ulterior motives.
They point to Rand's connection with
the Pentagon, which believes that a
China armed with modern weapons
could draw off some of the Russian
heat from the United States, without
presenting a serious threat to the
West.
Dr. Kissinger's main concern is that
to give such aid to China would upset
the Russians and could deal yet an-
other blow to detente. Although he
must be well aware of Chinese needs,
he argues that Peking has not asked
for U.S. aid, and that it is not for
Washington to raise the matter with
them. No doubt he would prefer them
to come to him with a request, for this
Would put the United States in a posi-
tion to name its own price.
Yet this is precisely why the Peking
leaders who want to develop the links
with the United States cannot ask di-
rectly for U.S. aid. They have already
been accused by the radicals of selling
out to the United States for a mess of
potage. Any formal request for U.S.
aid from acting prime minister Hua
would lay him open to the charge that
he is indeed willing to abandon. Chi-
na's "political independence"?as the
People's Daily hinted?in exchange for
arms.
In today's climate in Peking; with
Flua's own political survival at stake,
he is hardly likely to take such risks.
In today's climate in Washington, with
the administration and Congress at
odds over the use?or misuse?of arms !
aid, any request made by Peking
would become involved in the political
struggles of an American election
year. The outlook is bleak?yet the
question is probably more important
than any other issue in the Soviet-Chi-
nese-American triangle.
Its importance derives from the cen-
tral place which it occupies in the Chi-
nese internal debate. The debate is
about the pace and direction of Chi-
na's modernization and the means to
be used in achieving it. A faster pace,
favored by the moderates represented
; by Teng and to some extent by Hun,
! would entail a departure from the
Maoist model. Instead of giving prior-
ity to agriculture and to the preserva-
tion of the peasant society which
forms the base of the Maoist model,
the new five year plan?which was clue
, to begin in January?would in effect
have given priority to industry.
The Chinese press has hinted that
this was one of the major issues. But
industrialization too could have been
carried out only with aid from the
West.
Once again the ISsue is the same as
it has been in every one of the Peking
power struggles of recent years.
Should China pull itself up by its own
bootstraps, however long it may take,
and at whatever cost it may entail,
while maintaining its isolation from
the rest of the world? Or should it
open its gates to the West, speed up
the development of industry, accept
the West's technology and modern
weapons?at the risk, as the radicals
maintain, of losing its national charac-
ter. its unique Maoist individuality.
There is a third way, to restore the
alliance with Russia, and there are
strong hints that some Chinese leaders
have been contemplating even this pos-
sibility. Perhaps offering China some
of the arms it wants may help the pro-
Western faction in Peking buy the
time it needs. It could also discourage
the Kremlin from trying to follow up
its Angola adventure elsewhere.
CO 1976. Victor Zona
Harassment by Korean CIA
? By Jay Mathews .
Washington Post Stall Writer
, South Korean intelligence ?
agents are waging a cam-,
paign of harassment. against
Kdreans living in the United ,
'States who oppose the Seoul
government, a House
committee was told yester-
day.. . ?
-,Korean Central
ince Agency .(KCIA)
agents have disrupted dem-
onstrations in U.S. cities,
brought pressure to close an
anti-Seoul government
newspaper in Los Angeles
and ignored warnings from.
the State Department about
their activities, according
? testimony by an American
. university professor, a for-
? mer State Department 'offi-
cer and a Korean-language
newspaper editor. . ?.
-QuestionecI by a reporter,
a:.spokesman for the. South
Korean embassy attending
the hearing before the '
notional arganiZation:'; .
ebmtnittee . the I tOteie.
(lominittee on Internattou,41
Relations said he did not be-
lieve the allegations.
He said he had no knowl-
edge of any KCIA harass-
ment activities in the
United States.
Kim Hyung II, president
of a Korean residents associ-
ation in Los Angeles, told
the subcommittee he knew
of no cases of KCIA intimi-
dations in his community.
However, Donald L. Ra-
nard, who retired in 1974 af-
ter four years as director of
?the State Department Office
of Korean Affairs, testified
he asked the FBI to investi-
gate KCIA agents' activities
in 1973 but got few results.
"An investigation began
but for reasons which . I
never quite understood, it
:never really got off the
ground," Raliard ? said.
"When it finally petered out
several months later it had
produced little more than
it ? omfirmhtion of the
itasic information Litad sub-
mitted initially." ?
. ? .
"Much . . . seemed to be
made of an explanation that
to proceed properly, the FBI
would need to talk directly
to KCIA personnel at the
Korean Embassy which ob-
viously the State Depart-
ment had no power to direct
because of their diplomatic
immunity," Ballard said: !
But Itanard said he knew,.
based on U.S. intelligence
reports, that the KCIA 'has
organized demonstrations.in
support of the [President
Park Chung lice] govern-
ment, and at other times at-
tempted to break up demon-
strations against that gov-
ernment."
Ile offered to provide
more specific testimony in
closed session, which a sub
Committee staff in ember
said Would probably be
scheduled soon. -
Kim Woon I la, editor of
New 'Km-en, a Korean4ao-
image newspaper pichlistied
in Los Aim said said llte
53
liege
KCIA tried for months to
close his paper or end his
criticism of the Park govern-
ment by ? pressuring busi-
nessmen to cancel advertise-
ments, offering him money,
free tickets to Korea or a
government job, and spread-
ing rumors he Was a Com-
munist. ? ?
He said that . when two
staff members quit he could
find . no one . willing to re-
place them . and now puts .
out his newspaper with the
help of his wife. . .
A fourth witness before
the sub committee, chaired
by Rep. Donald M. Fraser
(D-Minn.), was Prof. Gregory
Henderson of Case Western
.Reserve University. "lender-
son, .a Korean expert,. called .
the KCEA "a vast, shadowy
world of an estimated 1.00,-
000 to .300,000 bureaucrats,
intellectuals, ? agents and
thugs," and said he knew at
least' 18 te-tents vere sta- .
tinned in the United States.
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WASHINGTON POST
1 3 MAR 1976
Jagan Says Cubans
Should Defend Guyana
By Terri Shaw
Washington Post Staff Writer
Cheddi Jagan, leader of
Guyana's main opposition
party. says Cuban troops
should be invited to defend
the South American country
if it is threatened by neigh-
boring countries with terri-
torial claims.
"If there's any threat of
foreign intervention. I
would welcome Cuban
troops," Jagan said in an in-
terview Thursday night. "If
I were premier I would in-
vite them in."
Jagan was ousted as pre-
mier in 1964 following dis-
turbances widely acknowl-
edged to have been covertly
encouraged by the British
and U.S. governments. His
Peoples Progressive Party
"joined the international
Communist movement" five
years later, Jagan said, add-
ing: "We can thank the CIA
for that."
The Guyanese politican is
visiting Washington on his
way home from Moscow
where he attended the So-
viet Communist Party Con-
gress.
Jagan said there are no
Cuban troops "that I am
aware of" in Guyana now.
In the interview and in a
speech at Howard Univer-
sity, Jagan said reports pub-
lished by the Venezuelan
and American press alleging
that there are Cuban troops
in Guyana were part of an
effort to "destablize" the
government cif Psime Minis-
ter Forbes Burnham, which
has recently moved to the
left in its foreign and do-
mestic policies.
"If you move against im-
perialism," Jagan said, "you
have to anticipate that you
will be attacked."
Jagan attributed the Burn-
ham government's change of
policy to "pragmatism which
is akin to opportunism." He
said his party would support
the government's "progres-
sive steps" while "criticizing
the government for its short-
comings."
Jagan said he had been
meeting with Burnham to
negotiate the terms under
which the opposition party
would end its boycott of
Parliament.
He said the government
should set up a "popular mi-
litia," because the "army is
deliberately organized to ex-
clude our supporters." In a
case of military intervention
from Brazil or Venezuela,
Jagan said, "the army and
police couldn't last 24
hours."
Neighb oring Venezuela
and Surinam have made
claims on part of Guyana's
territory, and Brazil's gov-
ernment is strongly anti-
Communist.
In foreign policy, Jagan
said the Burnham govern-
ment should seek closer ties
with the Soviet Union and
Cuba.
54
Approved
THE CHRISTIAN SCONCE MONITOR
Thursday, March 11, 1976
v?A ger:7) 7F).-1.:-
L.3:CA
By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America =respondent of The Christian Science
Monitor
Guyana's vehement denial that Cuban troops are now or
ever have been stationed on Guyanese soil raises questions
about the origin oldie reports.
There are, however, no ready answers. The reports first
began circulating in Brazil and Venezuela ? and then
cropped up in newsmapers in the United States and Britain:
Some Guyanese commentators are convinced the reports
are part of an amti-Guyana campaign in .both Brazil and
Venezuela. They express concern that the campaign could
lead to ugly border incidents and note that Venezuela claims
well over half of Guyana's territory.
Guyanese officials, meanwhile, clearly are incensed over
the whole affair. Foreign Minister Fred Wills used extremely
'sharp diplomatic language to deny that Cuban soldiers were in
Guyana.
"I will state ceegorically and emphatically that there are
no Cuban troops in Guyana and there have never been such
troop's," he declared, adding:
"The repetition of the reports leads one to the conclusion
that the lying is dell- )erate, wicked, and malicious."
The Guyanese anger extends to the United States ? with
commentators wondering about Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger's stand-in the affair. He was quoted in Guyana as
saying that while Washington has no evidence that Cuban
troops are in Guyana, the U.S. is checking it out.
"He knows there is no truth in the charges," a Guyanese
spokesman said.
The charges of a Cuban military presence in Guyana began
circulating in late December after the Barbados Government
stopped allowing Cuban troop aircraft the right to use that
island for a refueling stop on the way to Africa.
. There was wide.s?-oread suspicion at the time that the
government of Cnan Prime Minister Fidel Castro would
seek to use Guyana for refueling purposes.
But Guyana also refused Cuba permission to refuel, and
Cuba began using Inger-range Soviet planes that could cross
the Atlantic without refueling.
Several incidenas in :January might have lent substance to
the already-cirealaIng reports. But a careful study of the
incidents would 11E3,2 dispelled any suspicion of a Cuban troop
presence, Guyanae officials state.
In the' first, Czhana de Aviacion planes on regular
Caribbean service End at Timehri international airport near
Georgetown, the Gnyanese capital. This service is once a
week, and Georgetzma is used as the turnaround point.
There were two unscheduled landings of Cubana planes at
Timehri in january. In one, a plane returning from Africa
made an emergency landing at Timehri. The other reportedly
brought material from Havana to the Cuban Embassy in
Georgetown. Neither flight carried any Cuban soldiers.
Another incident in late January may have supported the
suspicion of a Cuban troop presence in Guyana.
A small band of Cuban engineers spent several days at
Timehri installing an _emergency fuel storage tank for
Cubana's use. Such tanks occasionally are put in by airlines at
airports with limited fuel facilities such as Timehri.
In commenting en the tank, Cubana claimed that it has
experienced diffiemlies from time to time in getting United
States oil companies, which run fuel concessions at many
airports, to service Cubana aircraft and wanted a reserve
supply of fuel. The U.S. firm, Texaco, handles the concession
at Timehri.
One Guyanese souree termed the reports of this incident as
"little more than a tempest in an oil drum."
And for his part, aNigh Guyanese Government official said:
"There simply is urt one shred of evidence, even with I he. e
isolated incidents, to support the Cuban troop presence
charge."
For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100410001-1
'