SPY INQUIRIES, BEGUN AMID PUBLIC OUTRAGE, END IN INDIFFERENCE

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400003-0
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• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
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• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 12, 1976
• Content Type: NSPR

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NO. 9
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
GENERAL
EASTERN EUROPE
WEST EUROPE
NEAR EAST
AFRICA
EAST ASIA
LATIN AMERICA
14 MAY 1976
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, THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 1976
Spy inquiries Begun Amid Public Outrage
?
? .By LESUE If. GELB
Special to'fbe New York TIrrl.?.3
, WASHINGTON, May 11?The
iCongressional and Presidential
'investigations into domestic
;spying and political assassina-
tion plots by the intelligence
;community began. 16 months
,age amid ...public outrage but
lam now ending amid public
iindifference and Congressional
ttancertainty over whether there
Will eventually be adequate
'itaforms.
! "It all lasted too long, and
:the media, the Congress and
.the people lost interest," com-
mented Representative Otis G.
Pike, who headed the House ,
Select Committee on Intelli-
gence. The House voted against
publishing his cornm?ittee's re-
port and :ignored its proposals
for a basic structural overhaul
? of the intelligence community.
Administration officials take
the position that President
Ford has 'already done enough
o reinforce and streamline
policy control of intelligence
activities .and catch abuses, but
mostly through changes that
are being kept secret, even
from Congress. ? ?
Senator Frank Church, chair- ,
man of the Senate Select Corn-
rnittee on Intelligence, has ar-
gued that it is not, enough for
the President to put the Admin-
istration's own house in order.
The Church committee has
pushed for a new Congressional
Oversight committee on intelli-
gence, to consolidate .. and
strengthen the current system,
? which . is fragmented among
veral committees. ?
? What began with sensational
publicity accompanying 'disclo-
sures of the intelligence inqui-
? ries is. ending now in comprom-
ises. Why this happened and.
how it happened is a case study
? in the subtle ways in which the
.politics of this city werk.
Perhaps most important, the
political climate has changed
since the start of the investiga-
tions. Congress, once on the Of-
fensive, was thrown back
somewhat on the defensive by
disputes over disclosures of
classified information given :to
Congressional committees and
over responsibility for the as-
sassination in Greece of the
chief of the Central Intelligence
Agency operations there.
Then, as the details of covert
operations, illegal wiretappings
and mail openings became old
news, public interest waned,
and Congressional committees
and executive agencies turned
inward, settling their disputes
along the. usual lines of com-
mittee turf, bureaucratic tactics
and access to information. :
Equally In the
personalities and strategies of
the two Congressional investi-
gating coin mitt ees diverged
sharply, and thus Congress was
unable to face the Administra-
tion with a solid front.
Mr. Pike tried to operate 'in
the open and to confront the
White House, and he lost sup-,
,
port in the House. Mr. Church'
and his Senate committee made ?
compromises, doing some
things in the open and other
things in private, and generally'
tried to get along with the Ad- ?
ministration.
Support Is Sought
? Now, he must shepherd sup-
port among?and sometimes
against ? the Senate leaders
whose committees have long
handled intelligence matters
and who are reiuctant to sur-
render these prerogatives to the
.new oversight committee he
proposes. .
Throughout, the Congression-
al investigators have been hob-
hied by the difficulties of ob-
taining information on the in-
ner workings of the intelligence
community. .
7! Some officials, noting the re-
luctance of .the Administration
to share: information -;.--: and
through' it, 'power?Witli. Con-
gress, recalled,' that former Sc-'
cretary of . Defense Runes R:,
Schlesinger .once told..a White
House meeting. that sensitive
information should not be given
to the Pike committee *becanse,
the committee contained un-,
friendly foreign operatives.
According *to these seurcesa
William E. Colby, then the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence,'
ironically commented that this
was a good ?idea, and. he. was'
sure that Mr. Schlesinger had
evidence to support his allega-
tion and shouid turn it over to
House Speaker -Carl . Albert.. No.
more was said. .
Even, within ? the: executive
breech, rivalries and sensitivi-
. ties affected the flow of infor-
mation. Vice President Rocke-
feller reportedly 'lectured Mr..
Colby once for having given too
much information to the com-
mission set, up within the exe-
cutive branch do investigate
C.I.A., activities.. Mr. Rockefel-
ler headed that commission,
:himself. . " ?? -
? More common apparently,
was the frustration of the exe-
cutive branch investigators at
the refusal of intelligence agen-,
cies to disclose enough about
their past methods of: opeia-1
tion. "There were times when'
we wiehed we hart 'subpoena
power here in the White
:House," one official said. .
' Another said that ultimately!
the executive branch investigasl
don- succeeded; because the'
. White House WaS able to play
off the intelligence agencies
against one another, The White
Illouse, he said, "was . able to
I pry information out. of the
I agencies, because each. agency
I;didn't know what the White
House was getting from the
0Mthers, and they wereR afraid
'of getting caught in a lie.':
Confirmation that this tactic
was . effective came from a
C.I.A. official, "The biggest fear
here,". 'he said', "was the rest
of the executive branch more
than Congress." - Officials from
other agencies inecte the same
points. Each was concerned
about! opening . up its secret!
1
sources and methods to the'
-others.
Providing sensitiveinforma-
.
teen to Congressional com-
mittees was a separate prob-
lem. Early meetings of an inter-
agency committee headed by
John O. Marsh Jr., the Pres-
ident's counselor, were punc-
tuated by a lot -of speech-mak-
ing on the need for being rough
with the committees. Attorney
General Edward H. Levi would
often interrupt to say some-
thing like: "This is a fin:?.
:speech for Broadway, but how
will it sound when they throw
you in a cell :for violating the.
law?"'
The general view among offi-
cials in the Administration and
on Capitol Hill who have been
involved with the various in-
vestigations :is that the Main
obstacles to turning over infor-
Mation came from those con-
cerned with policy at the State
and Defense Departments, from
the National Security Council
:staff and from the beads of
operational staff.
Generally, on the other side
:were the White House staff,
'which believed that President
:Ford had nothing to hide, a:ndl
the leaders of the C.I.A., who'
:believed that :their agency.
'Could be saved 'only by being
candid.
The President decided early
to be more forthcoming with.
the Church.- committee 'than'
with., the Pike committee. This
was a reflectionof the very dif-
ferent ways in which the corn-
,mittees sought to get informa-
tion.
? Mr. Pike was made chairman
:of the House committee largely
because of the majority's cone
viction that representative Lu-
cien Nedzi, the chairman of the;
House Armed '.Services Comm i tee
tee, had not been tough onough.1
in. hie overaight? Mr. Pike hiredi
e young staff with few Wash:,
ington ties, and together they!
confronted the Administration'
at each step. :Committee unityi
fell apart When Mr.' Pike recom-i?
mended citing Mr. Kissinger for',
contempt when he did not turn!
over certain policy papers: .
Mr. Church, on the other.
hand, gave high priority to
,holding his committee 'together'.'
He built a ?staff of experienced.
Congressional aides, and their ?
approach was to cajole and:
. cooperate with the Administrag
?.
Senator Howard H. Baker Jr.,
Republican of Tennessee, who
was a member of the commit-
tee, said that its unity had been!
threatened only briefly during
the investigation of assassina-I
lions.
?Mere was a predisposition!
on the part of some to. protect!
the Kennedys or. not to sully1
the reputation of an Eisenhow-
er" he said, "In the early sta-
ges of the assassination investi-
gation, the committee gave the
impression of a carnival atmose
phere."
Although unity was restored',
when tee committer"s proceed-
ings bee,true lc-ss public. einfor-?
matiop - gat boring ? tgehniques,
End in
Indifference
Were alivvays ? a double-edged:
sword. 3
, For the Church committee,
getting all the' assassination
material set an important pre-
cedent for obtaining additional
documents. But the very vol-
ume of the ' assassination
material' forced diversion and
delay, Months were spent pre-
paring that report before the
bulk of the committee got down
? to its assigned business. ?
For the Pike committee, the
problem was that it could 'ob-
tain no information without a
confrontation, but unity and
House support were eroded by
confrontation.
. Mr, Pike's being "out .on the
point," as one Senate staff
member put it, made it easier
for the Church committee to
obtain information and helped
the Senate group . to . "look
more reasonable" in the short
run. .
But in the long run, the Pike
committee's confrontation tac-
tics may have hurt, leaving the
Senate commit'tee's campaign
for stronger Congressional
? oversight of intelligence activi-
ties without a corresponding ef-
fort in the House. The tactics
also changed the focus of de-
bate in Washington from howl
much Congressional oversight
is necessary to whether Con-
gress can keep a secret.
Mr. Pike sees sonic advantage
to his tough stance, however.
"I think. Church paid a price
for cooperation," the Repre-
sentative says. "Less inforrna-
don was made public,"
In this respect, there was a!
dovetailing of strategies be-
tween the WhiteHouse and the?
Church committee. "The Pres-
ident's attitude was that there
was no' reason to keep inforrna-
tio:n respecting mistakes and
abuses from Congress," one
White House official explained.
"but at the same time, the Pres-
ident felt he had the responsi-
bility that it not be made public
if, it would damage :the coun-
try."*
Most Administration officials
maintained that the President
had no grand strategy for deal-,
log with .Congress, except 'to
avoid any appearante. of a. cov-
er-up and to conclude the in-
'vestigationa as quickly as pos-
sible. "The longer It went on,
the more rocks would 'he turned
over:, the more. worms would
be found," one key participant
said. :
Delay was inherent ? in the
!practical steps taken by the Ad-I
ministration to insure its con-
cepts of secrecy. One who took
I part in the process of ileac...hi-
' ton said:
"If the committee asked for
'information, we'd brief them.
If they demanded the .doeu-
"merits. we'd give them a s;tni-
?tized 'version. If this ..t.Tsn't
.entlitgli, we'd eitas thetn the rest
on the condition thev would
toot publish without tini,.ent,"
Others in the Administration!
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!sought delay, one official said,
!"much the same way a lawyer
tplays for time, hoping some-
thing will come up to save his
client." Things did come up. .
'Pike, Welch and Schorr,
those were the three names
that caused us to pull back, not
because our constituents said
you're going too far, but be-
cause those names came to
have important symbolic im-?
portance in the currency of.
Washington," said a senator
.who did not want to be identi-
fied.
. Richard S. Welch was the
head of the C.I.A. office in
Greece. He was murdered
shortly after a magazine' identi-
fied him. Daniel Schorr was a
reporter for CBS -who obtained
and 'arranged for publication of
the still-classified Pike commit-
tee .report.
? Senator Walter F. Mondale,
Democrat of Minnesota, who
was a. Member of the Church
committee said: "There was a
sense of anarchy over, in the
House. Then came 'the, Welch
murder and what I believe to
be 'the careful orchestration of.
the Welch funeral to tie the
'murder, to the CongressiOnal in-
vestigations.''"
Administration officials de-
nied any orchestration, main-
taining that all of the funeral
'arrangements were made by
the Welch family.
"The Schorr matter," Mr.
Mondale said, "further under-
mined confidence in Congress
to deal With Secret 'matters."
As the public became "numb!'
with bad news, 7 in Mr. Mon-
dale's phrase, some members of
the Pike committee- apparently
sought to revive public atten-
tion through unauthorized, dis-
closures of information. Mean-
while, the Church committee
continued to keep to show that
Congress can do so and that
Congressional oversight can
work. , ?
From the start, the Church
committee's pals, according to
committee members, was to
generate support for standing
Congressional oversight com-
mittees, with full legislative
and budgetary authority and
new . laws governing intel-
ligence activities.
To some members'of the Pike
committee, his goals, in some
respects, went much deeper?
to a basic restructuring of the
intelligence community ? and
much 'beyond what the House
and the Administration seemed
prepared to support.
? The Pike committee 'wanted
to know how much intelligence
costs the ? taxpayer and wheth-
er the results were worth the
costs. and the risks. The' com-
mittee's report, which has been
criticized by many people,
came to the conclusion that the
taxpayer was not getting his
money's worth. The national
intellieence budget is estimated
at $4.5 billion. ?
The Senate is now 'about to'
!consider the Church com-
mittee's plan for a standing
!oversight committee that would
!supersede the three existing
cornmittees ? Armed Services,
Appropriationq and Foreign Re-
ions?with authority over in-
telligence agencie;4.
THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, MAY 14, 1976
Is Oversight Enough?
By Tom Wicker
, The Senate has reached agreement
on an independent committee to over-
see the budget and operations of the
, Central Intelligence Agency, and to
share such power over the Federal
; Bureau of Investigation and other
security agencies. That's better than
, doing nothing about the documented
abuses of the C.I.A., the F.B.I. and
, others, but skepticism about the new
committee still is in order.
For one thing, it's a compromise
between those who supported the
Church committee's recommendation
for an independent committee to over-
see all the security agencies, and those
who wanted oversight to remain es-
sentially in the hands or the Judiciary
and Armed Services Committees. That
such a compromise was necessary,
despite the proven inability 'or unwill-
ingness of these committees to exer-
cise control In the past, shows how'
little real determination there is in the
Senate to prevent security and intelli-
gence abuses in the future.
The likely reason is the decline in
public 'Interest in such abuses?at
least the decline in Congressional per-
ception of public interest?and the
success of the Administration, the
security agencies and their supporters
in shifting the burden of guilt. Now it
is not the agencies that are under fire
for abusing their powers, but members
of Congress and the press for airing
"secrets" and supposedly endangering
national security.
That climate does not augur well
for Congressional oversight, no matter
by which committee conducted; and in
any case, the history of oversight
suggests that those responsible for it
have almost invariably been co-opted
. by those supposed' to be overseen. The
?watchdog has become the agency pet
and, so far from protecting the public
against the agency, ended by protect-
ing the agency from the public.
, The compromise committee agreed
upon by the Senate, moreover, will
have to share its authority?save in
? the case of the C.I.A.?with Armed
Forces and Judiciary, those toothless
tigers who saw no evil, heard no evil
and certainly spoke no evil while car-
rying out their myopic "oversight" in
the past.
, Establishment of the new committees
, will force the Administration to sub-
mit an annual intelligence budget for
, Congressional review. But it is doubt-
ful that any oversight arrangement,
no matter how diligently pursued,
could prevent all the myriad forms of
abuse and violations of rights recently
documented. An oversight committee,
NEW YOI3K DAILY NEWS
10 MAY 1976
huses
Over :Rush
? San Antonio: Tex., May 9
CIA Director GeorLre
Bush says atok:es committrq
by the in agency
have been cleared up aml will
not occur in the future.
2
at best, is not much more than a use-
ful first step in controlling the opera-
tions of security and intelligence
agencies.
Another needed step is passage of
a perfected version of a bill by Sena-
tors Edward Kennedy, Charles Mathias,
Robert Byrd, Gaylord Nelson and
others, to require a Federal court
order to authorize electronic surveil-
lance for purposes of obtaining foreign
intelligence. The bill would require
also that such surveillance be limited
to "foreign powers," or to those for
whom there is "probable cause" to
believe that they are "agents of a
foreign power." This measure is aimed
at closing the last loophole by which
security agencies can wiretap and bug
American citizens on their own
authority, under the guise of seeking
"foreign intelligence."
Gerald Schneider, a political scien-
tist on leave from the University of
Delaware for study at the Brookings
Institution, has proposed two further
steps to several members of the Sen-
ate. Since many Senators and others
are genuinely concerned that security
IN THE NATION
agencies not be hamstrung In com-
bating terrorism and subversion, he
I would not flatly ban certain activities
I but would require that any "intrusion"
1, by them on the constitutional rights
of American citizens be authorized, if
at all, by a Federal court order, on a
, showing of evidence that a crime was
! about to be committed. .
In the fnrther belief that heads of
agencies and high officials will ustr-
ally be able to protect themselves
against criminal responsibility, Mr.
Schneider has proposed that lower-
level employees of the security agen-
cies be made subject to stiff manda-
tory penalties for committing any act
that would be a 'felony if a private
citizea committed it, and that there
be no statute of limitations on such
offenses for at least 25 years. Put in
that kind of jeopardy, Federal employ-
ees would be far more likely to refuse
to carry out illegal acts that might be
ordered by their superiors.
On that point, for example, the
Department of Justice has decided
that it will not defend two F.B.I.
agents accused in a civil suit of carry-
ing out burglaries at the New York
offices of the Socialist Workers Party.
Like some of Richard Nixon's "plumb-
ers," those who carried out the
F.B.I.'s burglaries might not have fol-
lowed orders had they known they
would not have the fall protection of
the Government if caught in the act.
? "I will not condone the
things that were wrong in the
past," Bush said in a news
conference on his first trip
bark to Texas 'After taking
ever as head of the CIA:
"In my view those abnses'.
have been cleared up," he
sold, "and I'm determined that
they remain cleared up."
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ItmS angtIrl Tittlf%
Sun.. May 2, 1976
ithik thy. on CIA Abuses:Criticized
?
Reform May Be Doomed by Complacency, Senators Fear
BY JACK NELSON
Times Washington Bureau Chief
WASHINGTON?The head of a
university professors' association
worries about the academic commu-
nity's indifferent reaction to the Sen-
ate Intelligence Committee's finding
that the CIA continues to have
covert relationships with hundreds of
academics at more than 100 Ameri-
can universities and institutions.
_
? A member of the Intelligence Com-
mittee wonders whether the public
can be convinced that the lawless-
ness of the FBI and the CIA that is
documented by the committee in two
voluminous reports actually occurred.
Two other senators. say that the
lessons of Watergate and other dis-
closures of domestic political spying
have been forgotten?or never
learned?and that no significant re-_
_
'forms have been adopted:
' All of this raises the question of
.whether America has become so. in-
sured to disclosures of government
wrongdoing that public. opinion--:-?a
.vital element necessary for reform in
.a democracy?is paralyzed.
Despite the Intelligence Commit-
tee's recent report disclosing a 40-
year pattern of political spying and
deceptive practices by the FBI, with
The knowledge and sometimes - the
encoUragemeritmf Presidents and at-
torneys general,' there has been little
public reactions
This apathy has led some commit-
tee members to wonder whether the
recommendations for reform the
-committee made as part of its repott
are doomed. . ? ?
7 I A deeper and perhaps more signifi-
cant -question? is ? whether principles
? Americans have assumed were part
of a free society will be sacrificed by
the public's passive acceptance of
practices heretofore ? considered an-
athema.
Will America tolerate covert ar-
rangements between intelligence
agents and academics, authors, jour-
nalists and publishers?
Although these questions are being
.asked in some quarters, there has
been little public debate: Some see
,this as a reflection not so much. of
.public*apathy but of the feeling of
. helplessness on the part of a people
bombarded with so many disclosures
of wrongdoing.
Dr. Joseph D. Duffey, general sec-
etary of the 85,000 member Ameri-
can Assn. of University Professors,
has been astonished by the lack of
outrage or even concern by most of
.the academic community to the dis-
'closures about the covert relation-
ships on campus.
"I find a bland acquicscmce to
what's really a total change in what
we always assumed were the ground
rules of a free society." he said.
Duffey was with a group of college
presidents when he first read of the
committee's finding about covert CIA
relationships on campuses.
"No one expressed any alarm," he
said. "Nothing shocks them any
more. We've had a change in our
level of consciousness. If 10 years ago
one had described these kind of acti-
vities going on he probably would
have been dismissed as an alarmist or
paranoid." .
: Duffey said he was sending infor-
illation from the committee's reports
to members of the association's
executive committee in the hope that
it would take some action demanding
an end to covert CIA relationships on
campuses.
. The association, he said, also may
consider using the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act as a means of exposing
the names of academic institutions at
which such relationships exist.
,
In documenting covert relation-
ships, the Senate committee decided
against identifying any individuals or
institutions in the media, publishing
'or academic fields.
The committee found that hun-
dreds of foreign journalists and more
than 25 American journalists were
working covertly with the CIA in a
worldwide propaganda network.
The FBI, it found, had covertly in-
fluenced the public's perception of
persons and organizations by disse-
minating derogatory information to
the press through contacts in Ameri-
can journalism.
It found that intelligence agencies
had influenced both domestic and
? foreign policy through such covert
relationships.
At the time the committee was re-
leasing its reports of such find!ngs,
however, the Senate Rules Commit-
tee, by a 5-4 vote, was crippling the
key recommendation for preventing
future abuses by intelligence agen-
cies?the creation of a permanent
congressional oversight committee.
The Senate Intelligence Committee.
has received no reaction from acade-
micians or any other groups either
supporting the committee reports or
protesting the action by the Rules
Committee, according to a spokes-
man for the Intelligence Committee.
Despite the lack of public support,
the spokesman said, committee offi-
cials believe they may ? be able to
muster enough support on the Senate
floor to override the Rules Commit-
tee and provide for an oversight
committee. ?
However, Senate majority leader
Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), who spon-
sored the legislation creating the In-
telligence Committee, expressed con-
;cern that opponents of he corwriittec;
may have the power on the floor to
defeat legislation creating an over-
sight committee.
"Frankly, it's in for a lot of trou-
ble," Mansfield said. "Other commit-
tees with vested interests in the in-
telligence community will fight to
maintain their interest and may have
the votes on the floor to do it. If they
do, what we have been trying to do
will have been wasted and more than
a year's work will have been for
naught."
At least one member of the Intel-
ligence Committee, Sen. Philip A.
;Hart (D-Mich.), believes that before'
.public opinion can be marshaled, the
public must first be convinced that
the intelligence abuses actually oc-
curred.
In its report on domestic intel-
ligence activities, the committee not-
ed an unwillingness on the part of
most persons in the past to believe
allegations from victims of intel-
ligence acitivity abuses. It Said the
following commments by Hart to a
'witness during committee hearings
"aptly described this phenomenon":
AS I am sure others have, I have
been told for years by, among others,
some of my own, that this is exactly
what the (FBI) was doing all the
time, and in my great wisdom and
high office, I assured them that they
were wrong?it just wasn't true, it
couldn't happen," Hart said,
"What you have described is a se-
ries of illegal actions intended
squarely to deny First Amendment
rights to some Americans. This is:
what my children have told me was
going on. Now, I did not believe it.
' The trick. . . is for this committee to
be able to figure out how to persuade
the people of this country that in-
deed it did go on. And how shall we
ensure that it will never happen
again? But it will happen repeatedly
unless we can bring ourselves to un-
derstand and accept that it did go on."
Looking back over Watergate, the
Nixon impeachment inquiry, whole-
sale bribery and illegal campaign
contributions, intelligence abuses and
other disclosures, Sen. Lowell P.
Weicker Jr. (R-Conn.) sald no sub-
stantial reform had been accom-
plished despite "three years of fact
upon fact upon fact."
"The media, the public and most of
our leaders are all too willing to say
that sensational revelations and suc-
cessful prosecutions are enough,"
Weicker said. "I know they are not.
The real work of reform in the sense .
of procedures that protect our insti-
tutions And Constitution has yet to
advance one iota."
. President Ford's staunch defense of
the intelligence agencies and his pro-
gram of reorganizing the intelligence
community and protecting govern-
ment secrets through executive or-
ders also have been cited as factors
militating against reform by Congress.
Sen. Gaylord Nelson tD-Wis.) said
emphasis in Washington was shifting
3
.?
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from the defense of constitutionally
guaranteed freedoms to protection of
the intelligence community and
maintenance of government secrets.
"After Vietnam, Cambodia, Angola
and Watergate, we are again told?
and are apparently willing to believe
?that the crucial issue is maintain-
ing secrecy in government," Nelson
said. "It is unclear whether the les-
sons of the past five years have been'
forgotten already or whether they
were never learned." .
Congress' failure to exercise over-
sight also is viewed as a factor in the
desensitizing of the public to ?disclo-
sures of wrongdoing.
"The public has a certain numbing.
reaction or feeling of helplessness
about such disclosures," Norman
Birnbaum, an author and sociologist.
WAShaNGTON POST
4 MAY 1276
Charles B. Seib
at Amherst University, said.
."And the behavior of certain peo-
ple in Congress encourages that," he
said. "Certain centers have represent-
ed the CIA to the people instead of
the people to the CIA.
,?!'EVen the Intelligence Committee
couldn't bring itself to release intel-
ligence budget figures or to, release
the names of people and institutions
involved in covert relationships,"
Birnbaum said.
"All of this represents a very grave
danger to a free society. It is disrup-
tive of that fabric of trust that is in-
dispensable to academic freedom."
The Intelligence .Committee's re-
port that "well over 1,000. books"
have been written or published at
Spies Under MedLt. Cover
The American press treasures its freedom,
and is quite willing to use Its muscle when it
perceives a threat to that freedom. A current
example of such a reaction has been the mas-
sive media battle against the so-called Ne-
braska gag order, which is now before the
Supreme Court: :
Yet the news business has been strangely
undisturbed by a threat to the whole idea of
a free press posed by some of its own in -ca-
hoots with the CIA. The attitude seems to be:
If we pretend that this little internal scandal
doesn't exist, maybe it
will go away. But it
keeps coming back.
Its latest manifesta-
tion was in a report of
the Senate intelli-
gence committee. The
report, issued April 27,
revealed that until
'early this year the CIA had undercover "rela-
tionships" with about 50 American journal-
ists or employees of American media organi-
zations, and that more than half of those rela-
tionships still existed when the report was
written.
The report also noted that more than a
dozen U.S. news organizations and publish-
ing houses have provided cover for CIA
agents abroad, most of them knowingly.
These disclosures came on the heels of ear-
lier ones with different figures but the same
message.
In January a leak from the report of the
House intelligence committee revealed that
the CIA had 11 full-time secret agents work-
ing as journalists overseas last. year. It re-
vealed also that 12 television, radio, newspa-
per and magazine companies provided cover
for these agents.
And back in 1973, William Colby, then the
CIA director, let it be known that the CIA
had three dozen American journalists work-
ing abroad, some of them as fulltime agents.
Each disclosure has brought an almost-
promise from the CIA that it would mend its
ways. The most recent one came last Febru-
ary from the present CIA director, George
Bush. He said his agency would not "enter
into any paid or contractual relationship
with any full-time or part-time news corre-
spondent accredited by any United States
news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or
television network or station."
That seems fairly definite, although there
may be some sleepers in it?that word "ac-
credited," perhaps.
The Senate committee, which noted that it
received only limited information and no
names on the CIA's use of the media, says
that covert use of staff members of general
circulation U.S. news organizations "appears
The News Business
to be virtually phased? out." But, assuming
that appearances can be? trusted, there is
plenty of room for relationships with freelan-
cers and stringers and with staffers of other
than general circulation organizations.
In the face of the disclosures, the press has
shown little of the investigative zeal so in
fashion these days. After the leak from the
House report, there was an effort to shake
the names loose, but the CIA stonewalled and
the effort soon died. And the cloud of suspi-
cion continued to hover over the heads of all
American journalists overseas.
I have seen just one specific result of the
Senate report: The executive board of the
National Conference of Editorial Writers
passed a resolution opposing the clandestine
CIA employment of any journalists, Ameri-
can or foreign, and noting the polluting ef-
fect of CIA material planted in the media
anywhere in the world.
It also called on the CIA to release the
names of American journalists employed by
it now or in the past.
So what should be done? The editorial
writers are right. The names of the journel-
ists and the news organizations that have en-
gaged in covert operations with and for the
4
the instigation of the CIA has met
with little reaction from the book
publishing industry. '
Townsend W. Hootes, president of
the Assn.. of American Publishers,'
whose members account for? about'
85% or more of the nation's book
market, said, "I, haven't seen any
reaction yet, but it may be prema-
ture."
Hootes said he had, asked for a
copy of the report and wanted to
"study it carefully."
"I share the disappointment ex-
pressed by a number of people that
Congress has muffed a unique oppor-
tunity to establish serious and mean-
ingful oversight," said Hootes, a for-
mer deputy assistant secretary of de-
fense for international security af-
fairs..
CIA should be disclosed. I am referring to the
journalists.who have accepted payment from
the agency and the organizations that have
permitted CIA operatives to use them for
cover or who have permitted their own peo-
ple to work for the agency.
It Should be noted that many journalists
have contact with the CIA, as they do with all
the other agencies of government. These con-
tacts, and even the occasional trading of in-
formation such as constantly goes on be
tween reporters and sources, are not what
we're talking about here. We are talking
about the deliberate subversion of the news
business for the CIA's espionage and propa-
ganda purposes.
Publication of names would solve part Of
the problem, but not all of it. The CIA appar-
ently views the use of foreign media for
propaganda and other purposes as a proper
agency function. But this corruption of the
foreign press has a fallout effect in this coun-
try. Inevitably some of the material CIA
plants overseas trickles back to Americans in
the form of wire service dispatches, special
articles, reprints from foreign publications
and the like.
So in addition to publicizing the names of
American journalists and news organizations
involved covertly with CIA, consideration
should be given to ending the agency's use of
foreign media as well. A presidential order
would do the trick.
Even without the fallout problem. we
should reject the idea that all will be well if
the taint of CIA can be removed from Ameri-
can journalism.
The concept of a free press is not the spe-
cial property of Americans. In the perfect
world that lies too far beyond the horizon, all
people will enjoy its benefits.
That millenium is a long, long way of f. But
is it right for an agency of the American gov-
ernment, of all governnients, to work against
It by subverting the foreign press? And is it
right for the American news business to fail
to oppose such activities tooth slid nail? Tr,
ask such questions is to answer thf.u.n.
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WASHINGTON POST
14 MAY 1976
Motives
Sought in
JFK Ieath
By George Lardner Jr.
Washinaton Por Slat( Writer
. The Senate i n t elligence -
committee voted yesterday
to recommend a congression-
al investigation of the mo-
tives behind the assassina-
tion of President John F.
?
Kennedy. .
The committee took the
action at a closed meeting
called to discuss the results
of its special inquiry into
the shortcomings of the FBI,
the Central Intelligence
Agency and other govern-
ment agencies that helped
investigate the murder.
' As chairman of a two;
member subcommittee that
took up the controversial is-
sue, Sen. Gary W. Hart (D-
Colo.) told reporters that he
had seen no evidence to in-
validate the Warren Com-
mission's finding that Lee
Harvey Oswald was Kenne-
dy's lone assassin.
.? But he added that "the re: ,
maining question, which the
Warren Commission ?did not
answer, was 'why?' "
"It's in that area," Hart.
said, "that I think the lin-
gering.doubts remain."
The 'other subcommittee
member, 'Sen. Richard S.-
SchWeiker (R-Pa.), predicted
that the committee would-
release a fairly detailed and;
he hinted, troubling report'
later this month on failures:
of the original investigation-
of the President's death and:
nagging issues that need to
be pursued.
Schweiker indicated that
he was not persuaded that ?
Oswald acted alone or even
that Oswald fired any of the.
bullets that clay in Dallas.
have always 'questioned the.
Warren Commission finding .
abput who did it and how it.
was done," he told reporters.
"My six months on this sub-
committee reinforce and
strengthen those doubts."
The committee, which is
about to go out of business,
recommended that the new
inquiry be undertaken by
the permanent Senate intel-
ligence oversight committee'
the Senate is considering es-
tablishing.
Meanwhile, documents
just made public by the CIA
In response to a -freedom-of;
information lawsuit Showed
that CIA officials were talk-
ing of assassinating Cuban
Premier Fidel. Castro and
his closest ads kers in early
March of 1960, apparently
'jiist a few days before se-
cret planning for a Cuban
invasion was approved by
the Eisenhower administra-
tion. ?
Some critics of the. War-
ren Commission's work have
suggested that Kennedy's
? 1963 murder may have been
in retaliation for the CIA's
reported sponsorship of
plots to kill Castro,
Others 'have contended
that the assassination could
be traced to anti-Castro Cu-
ban exiles bitter at Kennedy
for the failure of the Bay of
Pigs invasion and for his
secret gestures toward rap-
prochement with the Cuban
premier just before he was
killed.
In a 1975 memo drafted
for the Rockefeller commis- .
sion, a presidentially ap-
pointed panel that looked
into CIA abuses, and made
public last month. CIA coun-
terintelligence officials said
they still felt, as they did in
1964, that the Warren Com-
mission report should have
given more credence to the
possibility of a foreign con-
spiracy in light of promisins,
leads that were not pursued. ,
The Senate intelligence
committee's investigation of
CIA-sponsored assassination
plots showed that the
scheming against Castro
continued after Kennedy's
death.
Even on Nov. 22, 1963, the ?
day Kennedy was shot in
Dallas, 'a high-ranking CIA
official was meeting in Paris
with a secret agent who was
a Castro intimate to ..offer
him 'a Peri rigged "With?a
son hypodermic . needle for
use on the Cuban premier. s
The heavily censored CIA.
assassination .documents,
made public yesterday
touched not only on Castro,
but also on other foreign
leaders killed in coups or at-
tempted coups with various,
degrees of U.S. backing.,
The documents were re-
leased by Robert Borosage.
of the non-profit Center for
National Security Studies as
part of a freedom-of-infor-
mation project jointly spon-
sored with the American
Civil Liberties Union.
The records were all made
available last year to the
Rockefeller Commission and
then to the Senate commit-
tee, presumably with fewer
deletions.
One six-page document,.
dated May 13, 1961, titled.
"CIA Covert Activities, Dos ?
minican Republic." had ev-
erything excisad from it ex-
cept part of one paragraph.
It pointed out that tile CIA .
had supplied "internal oppo-
sition leaders" with three
.38 cal. revolvers, three car-
bines and accompanying am-
munition as "personal de-
fense weapons attendant to
their projected efforts to
neutralize Trujillo."
According to authoritative
sources, the CIA told the
White House in that same
May 13, 1961, report that it
also. had some submachine.
guns and. grenades in Ciu-,
dad Trujillo which could be
provided to the anti-Trujillo
group if the go-ahead were
given.
The spy agency, however,
deleted this from the docu-:
?ment it gave Borosage.
ACLU national stall coun-
sel John H. F. Shattuck said..
yesterday that he would con- ?
tinue pressing in court for.
more details.
He said he would
"suspend judgment" as to
whether the Rockefeller
Commission got still more
documents that have yet to
be acknowledged in any
fashion.
According to the records
released yesterday, Castro's
assassination was mentioned
as. early as March 9, 1960,
during a meeting of the
CIA's "Branch 4 Task
Force." Presiding was Col.
J. C. King, the chief of the
Western Hemisphesre 'Divi-
sion within the CIA's Direc-
torate of Plans.
He told the meeting that'
then-CIA Director Alan
:Dulles was "presenting a,
special policy paper to the
National Security Council's -
'5412 Committee, which su-
pervised covert operations.
The heavily censored
memorandum for the record
added: "Col. King stated
that (deleted) unless Fidel
and Raul Castro and Che
Guevara could lie - elimi-
nated in one package?
which is highly unlikely?
this operation can be a long,
drawn-out affair and the
_present government will
only be overthrown by the
use of force."
, Following the 111 deba-
5
cle at the Bay of Pigs, Presi-
dent Kennedy approved an
all-out secret war of sabo-
tage and propaganda against
? the Castro regime under the
code name "Operation Mon-
goose," whose de facto boss
was Attorney General Rob-
ert F. Kennedy:
. Reporting on a "Mongoose
meeting" on Oct. 4, 1962,
shortly before the Cuban
missile crisis, then-CIA Di-
rector John McConp noted
that Robert Kennedy, as
chairman,. made plain his -
and .:? :? the. . President's
"dissatisfaction with lack of
action in the sabotage field."
? " The documents showed
that the legacy Of assassina-
stionsinvolvement confirmed
to pursue the CIA even af-
ter last year's investigations
were starting to bring them
to the surface. -
In early April of 1975, a
few weeks before the final
U.S. evacuation of South Vi-
.etnam, for 'instance, CIA
;headquarters here was evi-
dently told of a "potential
coup" being planned against
South Vietnamese President
Nguyen Van Thieu in hopes
that the change would bring
:continued American support
.for the beleaguered country.
The CIA reacted with
-deep alarm, fueled by mem-
ories of the 1963 coup that
resulted in the death of
President Ngo Dinh Diem.
"With Diem precedent and
current allegations against
our agency," then-CIA Di-
rector William E. Colby ca-
bled Saigon on April 4, 1975,
"it would be both institu-
tional and national disaster
if there. were any remote
connection between us and
ssuch an event . . . If things
get .complicated at all, ad-
vise and .I will recommend
strongest effort. to facilitate
?Thieu and family safe pas-
sage' and .haven."
NEW YORK TIMES
4 MAY 1976
Not 'Deep Throat'
To the Editor: - ? . -
? On Ian. 29 .you published on your
Op-Ed page a piece by J. Anthony
Lukas, "The Bennett Mystery," which?
contained a - number of . inaceuracies.-
After an early, unsuccesSfutseffort to
have a letter in response published, I.
decida. to let the matter die.,
Yesterday, however,, another publi-.
cation picked up much the same-,
themes indicating that. Mr.. Lukas' era
rors are.. now assumed as truth, and ,
that ay "silence" has been. accepted.,
as praaf..
Shealy put, 1 am not, Mr. Wood-1
ward's "Deep Throat," I have never,'
been a C.I.A. operative, and I have:.
never dorre the, things, that uninformed
journalists like Mr. Lukas are telling,
the general public I did, And I wish.,
all these "experts" would read the
Rockeieller Commission Report before..
they. rush into print with things ?
they've heard but really know nothing
about. Roamer F. BENNiar
Wocsala' nd Hills, Calif., April 21, 197E
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BALTIMORE SUN
30 April 1976
Castro
Kennedy
lots tied
Mathias tells
of possible
Paris contact ?
By JIM MANN
? Washington Bureau of The Sun ?
Washington ? Senator
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R.,
Md.) disclosed yesterday the
Senate intelligence committee
will soon publicly report on the
."strong likelihood" of connec-
tions between American plots
. to kill Cuban Premier Fidel
!Castro and the assassination of
: John F. Kennedy.
If such a report were issued,
it would become the first time
that any branch of the federal
government ever linked the.
Kennedy assassination to the
Central Intelligence Agency's
designs on 'Mr. Castro's life,
which were first confirmed by
the Senate intelligence commit-
tee last year.. .. ? . ?
The senator, a member of
the intelligence committee,
said there are now "indica-
tions" that a Cuban official and
CIA operative code-named Am-
Lash?who was in Paris No-
vember 22, 1963,- secretly 're-
ceiving from the CIA a poison
pen directed at Mr. Castro?
was an "insecure" contact; Mr.
Mathias suggested the man
might have been a double-agent
reporting back to the Cubans.
For the first time- in his
career, Mr. Mathias, in a lunch-
eon address, publicly expressed
strong doubts about the Warren
? Commission report, which con-
cluded that Lee Harvey. Oswald
; acted alone in killing former
President Kennedy. The sena-
tor said he thought the commis-
sion members "were simply de-
nied information that might
have had a bearing on their
judgment." He later said both
? the CIA and the FBI held back
information from the commis-
sion. ? ? . .
"If the Warren Commission
had known that Am-Lash was in
Paris receiving a poison pen the
day Kennedy was assassinated,
we would have had a 24th
[additional] volume to their re-
port," the senator said. In addi-
tion, he said, Americans would
have been "alerted" at that
time to CIA activities. ?
? At the time of the CIA plots
against Mr. Castro, Mr. Ma-
thias, said, "There is reason to
think Cuban intelligence was
aware spaiettutel was going on
.The degree they were will-
ing to retaliate is unclear." But
he pointed out that in 1963, Mr.
Castro publicly threatened to
retaliate if there were plots
against him.
Mr. Mathias also told a re-
porter the subject of the Kenne-
dy assassination came up brief-
ly during the recent trip he and
Senator James G. Abourezk (D.,
S.D.) made to the Middle East.
He said Syria's president, Hafez
el Assad, asked them when the
American people were going to
be told the truth about the as-
sassination. But, he said, the
' conversation quickly returned
to affairs of the Middle East.
Though Mr. Mathias has not
previously questioned the War-
ren Commission report, another
member of the intelligence
committee, Senator Richard S.
Schweiker (R., Pa.) did so last
year. Since that time, Mr.
Schweiker and Senator Gary
Hart (D., Colo.) have been con-
ducting their own investigation
of the assassination for the in-
telligence committee.
A spokesman for Mr.
Schweiker said yesterday that
five staff members have been
working full-time on the Kenne-
dy assassination and that they
may receive help soon from
other members of the intelli-
gence committee who have now
finished the major portions of
the committee's report.
The report was released this
week, but the addendum to it,
' concerning the Kennedy assas-
sination, will not be released
until the end of May, Senate
staff members said.
The intelligence committee
reported in November that Am-
Lash, a Cuban agent, on the day
of the Kennedy assassination
was meeting in Paris with a
high-ranking CIA official, Des-fl Fitzgerald, who offered
him a poison pen rigged with a
hypodermic neddle for use
against Mr. Castro. According
to the report, Am-Lash rejected
the offer, telling the CIA he
thought they "could come up
with something more sophisti-
cated than that."
It was only one of a long se-
ries of CIA plots against Mr.
Castro, according to the report.
Mr. Castro himself, in an inter-
view with an Associated Press
correspondent in Havana on
September 7, 1963, warned,
"United States leaders should
think that if they are aiding ter-
rorist plans to eliminate Cuban
leaders, they themselves will
not be safe."
The final report of the War-
ren Commission said the mem-
bers had investigated "literally
dozens of allegations of a con-
spiratorial contact between Lee
Harvey Oswald and the Cubai
government" but was unable to
find any substantial evidence of
contact.
Mr. Castro both in a televi-
i ?
! sion interview and reportedly
in a meeting with Senator
Abourezk, has denied any in-
volvement in the Kennedy as-
sassination. In the television in-
terview he said he was "under
the impression that Kennedy's
assassination was organized by
reactionaries in the United
States...."
Levi finds no FBI tie
to slaying of King
Washington Bureau of The Sun
Washington?Edward H.
Levi, the Attorney General, an-
nounced yesterday that a pre-
liminary inquiry by his depart-
ment turned up no evidence of
any connection between the
FBI and the assassination of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., but
he ordered another, more thor-
ough review by another branch
of the Justice Department.
The King assassination was
studied for several months by
an assistant attorney general,
J. Stanley Pottinger, of the Jus-
tice Department's Civil Rights
Division. Mr. Pottinger said
yesterday he reviewed the
FBI's "core files" regarding Dr.
King and found no evidence of
FBI involvement in his assassi-
nation, although he said there
was considerable evidence the
FBI had sought to discredit the
civil rights leader.
Mr. Pottinger originally had
recommended that an inde-
pendent commission be estab-
lished to review the King assas-
sination more thoroughly. But
the attorney general instead as-
signed that task to the Justice
Department's office of profes-
sional responsibility.
The full review of the King
files requires so much work.
Mr. Pottinger said, that he
could not "do his job" as assis-
tant attorney general for civil
rights and complete the inquiry
, at the same time.
? He said Mr. Levi felt the in-
tegrity of the Justice Depart-
ment was strong enough so that
it could itself investigate the
King assassination and the FBI
without assigning the task to an
independent commission.
NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, MAY 14, 1976
.125 Questioned by Investigators
On Intelligence Study Disclosure
By RICHARD D. LYONS
rpects.1 to The is:m York Times
WASHINGTON, May I3?The the investigation, gave a two-
hour progress report to the?
ethics committee today in a
closed session.. - ? . .
. When questioned by news-
men after the meeting, Mr.
Flynt said "I am not going to
get into a numbers game" when -
asked how many suspects had
been turned up. He also de-
detectives hired by the House
ethics committee.- to investigate
. .
the unauthorized 'disclosure, of
the report of the House Select
Committee .on Intelligence, have
questioned 125 . persons hut
have yet to identify the source,
the chairm.an of the inquiry
said today.
Representative John J. Flynt,
the Georgia Dorkierat: who
heads. the ethics committee,
said it would probably be a
month before his force of 12
retired ? agents of the Federal
.Bureau of Investigation com-
pleted their inquiries. ?
Flynt said it was possible
that, once the investigation was
over, the ethics committee, for-
mally named .the House Com-
mittee of Standards of Official
Conduct, would hold. public
.hearings en- the matter. ? -
At issue is who transmitted
a copies of the report to news;
men including Daniel Schoor,
a correspondent here for ,CBS
News, .
For six weeks, the former
F.B.I. agents have been ques-
tioning representatives who.
served on the select committee,
headed by Representative Otis
G. Pike; Democrat of Suffolk,
their staff aides and personnel
who served on the Committee,
now disbanded. -
David Rowers, the former
F.B.I. inspector who is directing
6
dined to say whether Mr.
iSchorr.had been questioned.
'''Tbe release of the progress
report would compromise the
remainder of the investigation,"
the chairman said, adding that
he expected the investigation
to be completed "well within
six weeks."'
The intelligence committee
prepared a report highly criti-
cal of the Central Intelligence
Agency and other Federal intel-
ligence-gathering groups after
a long- investigation. Reports of
the document's contents ap-
peared In The New York Times
and -on CBS News. Last Jan.
29, the House voted not to
mite. the. report public.
But in February, Mr. Schorr
made 'a copy of the report avai-
1 'able .. to The -Village Vice, R
weekly newspaper in New York
'City. The -breach of secrecy en-
raged many ? representatives,
and the House voted for the
investigation that is now being
carried out by the ethics com-
mittee.
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THE NATIMAT, OBSERVER
15 MAY 1976
Our Passive, Timid CIA Needs
? By Greg-c:ry. G. Rtis. hford ?;?
HE CLASSIC intelligence failure
. Pearl Harbor, when U.S. intercepts?o
the Japanese attack plans remained
untranslated In a low-priority . "Incoming'
basket, sparked the creation Of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) after World War
H. Because the Japanese attack hinged on
complete surprise, an intelligence warning
would have made a difference. That knowl-
edge remains the driving force behind the
billions devoted to foreign analysis by the
CIA and Its sister agencies in the Defense
and State departments:
? Gregory G. Itushford was an investt? Leadership
gator for the House Intelligence Com-
mittee in its recent investigation of the
, CM.
Despite the billians spent, the United
States has been caught unprepared time and
time again because?there is no kinder way
to put it?our intelligence has failed. Even if
we assume the CIA would be able to detect
a nuclear attack on the United States in, ad-
vance, which I do not, continued failures to
anticipate important foreign developments
make the conduct of a sound foreign .policy
increasingly .difficult. To ignore our intelli-
gence system's flaws?continuing flaws that
stem from an uncertain leadershipeTis.to risk
our very security: -. ?
To examine the record, the House Intent-
gence-Committee? selected six major foreign-
policy turning ?points at random: the 1968
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the 1068
Tet offensive in South Vietnam, the 1973 Mid-
dle East war, the 1974 coups in Cyprus and
Portugal, and India's 1974 nuclear explosion.
(Because the House has voted not to release
the committee's findings, this article is de-
rived from the public record.)
Intelligence Failures
We knew that Czechoslovakia had dashed
the Johnson Administration's hopes for nu-
clear-arms talks with the Russians; that Tet
cost thousands of lives; that the Middle East
war resulted in the Arab oil embargo, a high
cost to the U.S. in terms Of military assisz
tame to Israel, and risked U.S.-Soviet con-
flict. We knew that the coups in Portugal and
Cyprus had raised the possibility of Com-
munist influence in a NATO ally and hurt
our relationships with Greece and Turkey.
We knew that India's nuclear explosion
threatened the spread of nuclear .weapons.
. We did not know Intelligence failures had
contributed to each unfortunate situation.
But we know it now.
U.S. intelligence agencies, we found, had
collected a considerable Indy of excellent
information, often at great cost and risk. But
the 'information was not always made avail-
able to those who needed it. Written esti-
mates lacked perspective. A few courageous
analysts who sounded alarms were not fully
supported by their more cautious superiors.
Technical breakdowns prevented valuable in-
formation from reaching Washington until
after the event had passed. Policy officials
In the State Department, the White House,
and Pentagon who were emotionally com-
mitted to their particular policies, regardless
of facts, hindered analysis. Post mortems of
intelligence failures tended to 'chime mid-
level analysts, yet the real problems were
caused by the leadership. And the intelli-
gence leadership lacks the stature to with-
stand political pressures that threaten to cor-
rupt the entire system.
After the 1073 Middle East intelligence
failure, the CIA acknowledged that the "ma-
chinery" of which the imolyst was a part had
not always cased an exceedingly difficult
task. The two most visible parts of that. ma-
chinery, or bureaucracy, are current-intelli-
gence publications and national intelligence
estimates. Neither runs well.
Our intelligence agencies cannot report
timely and accurate information consistently.
The initial and most obvious sign shows tip
in what the current-intelligence publications
said at the time of key foreign events. The
morning that Archbishop Makarios Of Cyprus
was overthrown by Greek strong man Dimi-
trios Ioannidis, the cm wrote that "General
Ioannidis takes moderate line while playing
.for time in dispute with Makarios."
The intelligence agencies had observed
signs of Arab military mobilization for more
than a week prior to Oct. 6, 1973, when Egypt
and Syria attacked Israel. But current-intel-
ligence reporting provided reassurances that
neither ? Egypt nor Syria would go to war.
? ? In the months prior to the April 1974 coup
. in Portugal, at least four signs of serious
political discontent--including an abortive
military coup?surfaced in the press. Yet
current-intelligence writings followed the
sound and fury, not significance, of each
"hard news" development. As the director
of State Department intelligence, William
Hyland, told our committee, "There was
enough information to suggest trouble, but it
wasn't really subjected to a detailed analysis
and a projection of where the trends might.
be going."
? Too ? Many Pressures
. Current-intelligence publications suffer
from lack Of depth not because those who
'write them are unimpressive. Most mid-level
' analysts who write Current intelligence are
knowledgeable individuals. But they are vic-
timized by the pressures imposed on able
people by the bureaucracy.
There are too many intelligence, publica-
tions: spot-reports, instant summaries, daily
reports, morning and afternodn reports for
the Secretary of State, Presidential briefs,
memoranda, communications-intelligence
summaries, national-intelligence dailies,
weekly summaries. Analysts have meetings
to attend, superiors to please (often by soft-
ening bold judgments), "positions" of their
office to "co-ordinate" with other offices RN
agencies, deadlines to meet. There is pre-
cious little time left to think and write well.
Those who read current intelligence often
complain about its redundancy, duplication,
and poor analysis. During Cyprus alone there
were 86 messages classified "CRITIC," or
critically important, yet "the significance of..
many . . . was obscure," the CIA found.
The National Security Agency (NSA),
which intercepts and decodes foreign corn-
MUnications, preduccs raw reports that are
nearly incomprehensible to the lay reader;
the written summaries are understandable
to few. The NSA collects so much data that
it must shred or burn more than 30 tons of
paper each day; it is literally burying itself
An classified information. NSA spews forth
so much data that the analyst Is burdened
with hundreds Of NSA reports per week, the
CIA complains. During the Cyprus crisis,
readers complained about "an excess of
cryptic raw reports from NSA which *could
not be translated by lay readers," as the CIA
puts It. The few who can comprehend NSA
reports often have no (line left to compare
them with other intelligence. So Intelligence
puzzles are left half-assembled.
U.S. Intelligence cannot follow trends
much better than It follows day-to-day
events because of weaknesses in the estima-
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live system. Before Tet, U.S. officials had
anticipated *attacks in Vietnam's highlands
and northernmost provinces, but not simul-
taneous strikes at nearly every urban center.
Our intelligence estimates had?in the CIA's
words?so "degraded our image of the en-
emy" that we were unaware the Communists
were capable of such attacks.
The CIA's post mortem of the 1974 Cyprus
crisis reports that analytical performance
"fell quite short of the ?mark," particularly.
because Of the "failure in July to estimate
the likelihood Of a Greek-sponsored coup
against Archbishop. Makarlos."
?
After the Middle East war in October 1973,
? the CIA realized there had been no National
Intelligence Estimate--.report prepared from
time to time?on the likelihood of war since
May?and that estimate had only addressed
the next few weeks. A brilliant analysis pre-
pared by the State Department's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, also in May, told
then Secretary of State William Rogers that
the Arabs mightr well resort to war by au-
tumn. That "wisdom," as the CIA rightly
called It, was forgotten in October.
The latest National Intelligence Estimate
prior to Portugal's 1974 coup was prepared
in 1994.
The National Intelligence Officer (NIO)
system at the top of the analytical hierarchy
Is weak and is responsible for the poor quali-
ty of estimates preceding the Portugal, Cyp-
rus, and Middle East crises. NIOs work un-
der the director of the CIA, in his capacity
as head of the entire intelligence community.
Their influence varies with the CIA direc-
tor's influence. If he's powerful., their voice
Is strong. If he's 'weak, their Influence Is too.
The NIO for Western Europe, an able
man, has more than 20 countries to cover.
But he has just one staff assistant. Instead
of command authority over the time of an-
alysts in the CIA and other agencies, the NIO
must "cajole and plead" for assistance, as
one close observer told me. When Turkey
was preparing to invade Cyprus, an NIO
memorandum that predicted the invasion
was never disseminated: The NIO was busy
preparing a briefing before the U.S. Intelli-
gence Board on a National InteWgence Esti-
mate for Italy.
Most NIOs have regional responsibilities,
yet some crucial issues, such as nuclear
proliferation, cannot be covered in regional
terms. There has been no NIO for Africa.
The value of the NIO system is consider-
able to busy policy officials who need quick
answers, say before a Kissinger shuttle to
the Middle East. But the very closeness of
NIQs to policy makes the system vulnerable
to pressures that can destroy the Indepen-
dence of their analyses. This is a far cry
front the expectations of some of its founders
that the CIA would provide independent
analysis of long-term trends.
When the Germans began losing World
War II, Hitler began disregarding accurate
Intelligence evaluations that conflicted with
the Nazi line. This lesson (fortunately for us)
J s worth remembering always, especially
when thinking of the Vietnam War.
Just as Vietnam tore our society, it
caused great pressures inside U.S. intelli-
gence agencies. The basic problem was ac-
curate intelligence that cast doubt on -the
wisdom Of Vietnam policy. That doubt be-
came heresy when the policy stakes rose.
The. first National Intelligence Estimate
that I'm positive was "shaded" to reflect
policy officials' optimism was published in
early 1963. That estimate was first weakened
during the drafting' process to reflect the
Kennedy Administration's hopeful views. The
draft estimate had forecast lona-range prob-
lems with our South Vietnamese allies with-
out Increased U.S. support. Instead Of heed-
ing such sound advice, the Administration
Influenced the CIA to weaken it.
The CIA uncovered evidence in 1965 and
1967 indicating the U.S. military command
had understated Communist strength, that
there probably were more than 500,000 en-
emy personnel, not the prevailing?and pub-
lic?estimate of fewer than 300,000.
The CIA's efforts to provide honest intel-
ligence ran directly into the overriding pub-
lic-relations concerns of military and civilian
policy makers. Like used-car salesmen, mili-
tary officials tried strenuously to set the
mileage back. If the higher figures became
known to those who had an "incorrect view"
of the war, the Saigon command cabled to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the command's
"image of success" would be undermined:
The military fought so fiercely with the
CIA's figures in Saigon in Septem-
ber 1967 that two categories of irregular
Communist forces were dropped from
the official order of battle: Immediately
thereafter the Saigon command pre-
pared press briefings on the war's prog-
ress that one CIA official labeled "one
:of. the greatest snow jobs since Po-
temkin constructed his village." ? An-
other CIA analyst termed the military
numbers "contrived," "phony," and
!`controlled by the desire to stay be-
low" the 300,000 public estimate.
. After the Tet offensive began, the
Defense Intelligence Agency agreed
there were at least 500,000 Communist
.forces in Vietnam, and the Joint Chiefs
asked for more American soldiers to
? fight them.
A Rancorous Uebate
A good example of policy abuse of
? Intelligence in the State Department is
shown in a memorandum State Intelli-
gence was asked ,to send to Assistant
; Secretary William Bundy in September
; 1967. "Unclassified" findings that could
? be made public said 'enemy morale and
recruitment were declining and Viet
; Cong defections .were increasing. But
' facts directly contradicting each Of
'-these points, and more, were classified
secret on "national security" grounds:
? Enemy morale problems were Of no
great military import; defections were
Increasing less than In the previous
year; and enemy recruitment statistics
Were Unreliable.
, American intelligence still suffers
because officials who could not hide
their disgust at such tactics found their
careers threatened. Those who kept
quiet' were promoted.
By 1973 the Vietnam debate had be-
tome so rancerous? it helped destroy the
respected Board of National Estimates.
The board, an interagency body of intel-
ligence experts responsible for esti-
,mates, had. become moribund in the
:eyes of some. Moribund or not, the
board fought for the integrity of its
Vietnam estimates to the bitter end.
; Three persons close to the board have
told me they knew the battles were
nearly finished when one of President.
, Nixon's favorite press leaks wrote that
'It,was unlikely 'Nixon's sharp eye had
escaped the "gloomy" CIA estimates
on Vietnam and that changes in the es-
timative hierarchy were needed.
Shortly thereafter a new CIA director?
a Nixon "team player" and a Vietnam-
policy supporter?abolished the board
for the weaker NIO system.
The lesson of Pearl Harbor has not
been absorbed by the CIA leadership.
The "watch committee" that met, to as-
sess the outbreak of war in the Middle
East on Oct. 6, 1973?after hostilities
had begun?could not discuss certain
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classified information because not
everyone present was cleared to re-..
ceive it. Other classified information
that would have been helpful to an-
alysis was not disseminated until the
war had begun. Similar problems
plagued the Cyprus and other crises.
The lack of dissemination of intelli
gence controlled by Secretary of State
Kissinger is disturbing .because it re-
veals the CIA leadership's lack of sta.
ure. nigh Intelligence .and policy offi-
cials.recognize the intelligence value in
diplomatic discussions. To study the
nuances of these conversations for their
hidden meanings, and to compare this
Information with other findings, Is es-
sential for accurate intelligence:
Prior to the 1973 Middle East war,
Kissinger was engaged in intensive dis-
cussions with Soviet, Arab, and Israeli
officials. According to The Secret
Conversciti.,3ns of Henry Kissinger by
Israeli journalist Matti Golan, .Kis.
singer later told Israeli Premier Golcia
Meir that an Egyptian official had
hinted at pcssible war, but he dis-
missed this as an empty threat. U.S.
intelligence was denied access to the
discussions which might have assisted
analysis.
During the Cuban missile crisis .of
19132?a notable intelligence success?
President Kennedy and his staff worked
intimately with senior intelligence offi-
cials. Yet Secretary Kissinger did not
even consult his intelligence arm in the
.THE MINNEAPOLIS TRII3UNE
27 April 1976 ?
State Department prior to the U.S.
troop alert of Oct. 24, 1973, which alleg-
edly r!arne in response to Soviet threats
to intervene with military force against
, Israel, Testimony before the House In-
telligence Committee that "'certainly
the technical intelligence available in
INR [State Department intelligeneel
did not support such a Soviet intention"
raises the question: Did the United
States risk war without. justification?
Embarrassed Officials
The CIA ?complained after the Cy-
prus crisis that "analysis . . May also
have suffered as the result of the nona-
vailability of certain key categories of
Information, specifically those asso-
ciated with private conversations be- .
tween U.S. policy makers and certain
principals in the dispute." The CIA
added: "Because ignorance of such
matters could substantially damage the
ability to analyze events as they unfolct,
In this or in any future crisis, the prob-
lem is serious and one which should be
addressed by the [intelligence] corn-
'rrtunity and by policy makers as well." ?
Yet CIA officials were so embar-
rassed when I esked them which policy
.makers they had in mind that the name
of one of Kissinger's principal aides
was excised from the House
InteiH-
gence Committee copy of the Cyprus
pest mortem. The phrase "key U.S. of-
ficial" was typed in its place. Such in-
formation is still "nonavailable" to the .
CIA on such important issues as U,S.-
Most approve U.S. intelligence
work- but not covert activities
copv? 1976 Minneapolis Tribune
Minnesota
Poll
? Minnesotans approve of the cloak
but not the dagger in United States
: espionage operations,. the Minne-
apolis Tribune's Minnesot a.Poll
? finds.
. Nearly six out of every 10 State
residents interviewed in an opinion
survey last month (59 percent) said
they generally approve of spying
to gather intelligence information.
Thirty-two percent said they dis-
approve and 9 percent are not sure.
The figures are the reverse when it
comes to the United States con- :
ducting secret operations ;n other
countries. Thirty-two percent ap-
prove and 59 percent disapprove.
.Middle-aged men with Republican
jeenings who attended college are
'more likely to approve of U.S. in-
telligence activities, if the survey
data are used as a guide.
Minnesota women who did not go
to college, who are young adults or
of senior-citizen age and Nvho. are
DELers or independent .voters are
a good bet to be critics of U.S. es-
pionage efforts.
U.S. undercover operations abroad,
normally a subject left to the im-
agination, have had ii n cornon
public exposure as Congress has
scrutinized the work of the Central
? Intelligence Agency and other in-
telligence units..
A balanced sampling of 593 Minne-
sota men and women first was
asked in telephone interviews tak,
en March 11-14: ?
"Some people say that gathering
intelligence . information a b o ut
other countries through espionage
is necessary to protect our na-
tional security. Others say that
such aLtivities violate the rights
of other countries and should not
be a part of our foreign policy. In
general, do you approve or disap-
prove of United States espionage
activities?"
Men approve by more than a ;1-1
margin, while nearly as many wom-
en..disapprove as approve:
Approve
Disapprove
.Not sure
All
whirrs Man Women'
rig% 72% 47%
32 22. 41 .
9 6 12
4----
100% 100% 100%
-The ?findings in a carefully con-
ducted survey simply are estimates
of the results that would be ob-
tained if all men and women in
the state had been interviewed.
9
China relations. '
Third-Level, Assistant
In 1973 some intelligence officials
were greatly concerned that Kissinger
might be suppressing intelligence re-
lated to alleged Soviet violations of the
SALT agreement. Two of them recom-
mended that acting CIA Director Ver-
non Walters (who has announced he
plans to retire soon) approach the Pres-
ident to ensure that Kissinger's condect.
was authorized. Walters, following the
pattern he established when Nixon's
aides had tried to abuse the CIA in the
Watergate affair, never approached the
President. CIA Director Colby later got.
in the habit of writing to Kissing.n's
aides for permission to disseminate cer-
tain Intelligence concerning Soviet
nuclear-arms matters. Thus the Presi-
dent's statutory intellieence adviser
was reduced to a thirdeceel assistant.
Kissinger' aides justify this by citing
numerous leaks that seemed desined
to undercut SALT policy., ?
Such timidity does nct, encourage
one to believe the CIA is ecluiPPed to re-
sist the inevitable encroachments from
dominating Presidential ti.ssistants... The
CIA has become not the "roetue ele-
phant," some fear, but a eassive circus
pray, ridden at will by Peeskiential as-
sistants. Newly appointed CIA Director
George Bush wouldeke well-advieed to
attract new leadership.
....-
The next question was: ?
"Some people say that our gov-
ernment should engage in secret
activities to, influence events in
other countries, so as to rnaintain
our national security. Others say
that such secret activities are a
violation of the internal affairs of
foreign countries. In general, do
you approve or disapprove-of sec-
ret efforts by the United States to
influence events in foreign coun-
tries?"
The replies:
? All
adults Men Women
Approve 40% 25%
Disapprove 59 53 63
Not sure .........9 7 12
100% 100% 100%
Again, more women held negative
views than do men, but the differ-
- ence is not as pronounced as on
the earlier question. Opinions also
fluctuated by age, political party
affiliation and education. The fol-
lowing table shows t hose differ-
ences for both questions with the
? "not sure" count not shown. ?
United States Espionage
Goan:Ana Secret
intelligence
A?-.
D,OVO
DiSOP.
P,OVO
Di10{/???
Alt 59%
32%
32%
59%
DFLers 57
35
30
61
.
Ind.-Republicans 68
27
37
64 ?
Independents... 58
32
31
60
Less than high.
school grad . 47
Digit school
34.
-31 '
50 '
graduate .... 59 .
34
36 ?
53
Some college .. 65
29 *
28
66
35-49 years 75 - 617,
37 ?
60 ..
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NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 1976
Senate Chiefs Back Single Panel
To Watch C .1 . A. and Its Budget
By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM
Spedal to The New YL,rk Times
WASHINGTON, May 11 which voted to give the new
.Senate leaders reached a corn- committee no law-making or
b
promise agreement today on audgetary authority. Senator
plan to create a permanent new
committee with exclusive au-
thority to monitor the Central
Intelligence Agency and author-
ize funds for the agency's op-
erations.
Despite the continued oppo-
Byrd led the effort in the Rules
Committee to strip the new
committee of real power.
Sources privy to the negotia-
tions that led to the comprom-
ise said that Senator Byrd had
become convinced that his ad-
vocacy of a weak intelligence
oversight committee would da-
sition of some conservative sen- mage his prospects of becoming
ators of both parties, the plan majority leader next year upon
is expected to be approved this ,Senator Mansfield's retirement.
week by a large margin in the His candidacy is supported
full Senate, by older, conservative Demo-
crats such as. John C. Stennis
The adoption of the compro- of Mississippi and John L. Mc-
mise by four key Senators ap- Clellan of Arkansas, who would
parently averted a ? full scale have to give up to the new
floor fight between members of committee some of their long-
the Senate's old guard and held jurisdiction- over intel-
younger, more reform-minded ligence inatters
senators. However, the sources said,
Such a fight might have had Mr. Byrd feared that by appear-
major implications for the con- ing to carry the spear for the
test for On Senate majority old Guard Senators he would
leadership next year. lose considerable support
The compromise was devised amonerb w
younger senators, ho
wantto keep tighter Congres-
sional reins on the intelligence
agencies.
Senator Byrd was a home in
West Virginia today. He is a
;ovorite son candidate for Pres-
ident in today's Democratic
presidential primary there. .
, For a time, since Senator
Mansfield announced he would
by Mike Mansfield of Montana,
the majority leader; Robert C:
Byrd of West Virginia, . the
majority whip; Abraham A.
Ribicoff. of Connecticut, chair-
man of the Government Opera-
tions Committee, and Howard
W. Cannon of Nevada, chair-
man of the Committee on Rules retire, the race to become ma-
and Administration. All are fority leader appeared to be be-
Democrats.
Senator Hugh Scott of Penn-
sylvania, the Republican leader,,
was consulted and agreed to
accept the plan. .
The critical element Of the
agreement was the concession
by Mr. Byrd and Mr. Cannon
that the new committee could
have the power to limit the
Central Intelligence Agency's
budget and restrict its opera-
tions.
For his part, Senator Ribicoff
agreed that the new committee
would have to share jurisdiction
over other intelligence agencies
with existing committees. Au-
thority over the budget for the
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
for instance, would be shared
with the Judiciary Committee,
and authority over the Defense
Intelligence Agency Would he
shared with the Armed Serv-
ices Committee.
The central finding of the
Senate Select Committee on In- power,... Senator Humphrey,
telligence Activities in its re- would take an active role on
port last month was that Con- the other side in the expected
gross had exercised far too little floor fight.
control over the intelligence If the compromise is acceptdd
agencies.
The committee recommended ? by the full Senate, as expected,
the creation of a new Senate' . it will mean that Congress Will
committee with broad power to: vote each year on the money
regulate the work and expendi-i ' to run intelligence agencies,
something it has not done: be-
fore. . ...;
Persons experienced in chtt
ment Operations Committee ing le.g,islaiion said. that j.fin.;
I
voted to create Such a commit-1 could not comprehend ? 410/+7
tee. But. its work was overt urn- Congress could /mad: such an.
ed two weeks ago by Senator authoriiation hitt without tmk-
ing public the amount of turids
Cannon's Rules Committee,
authorized. t2...
tween Mr. tyrd and Senator
Edmund S. Muskie of Maine'
With-Mr. Byrd the odds on .
fa-
vorite.
However the picture has be-
come complicated by the deci-
,sion of Senator Hubert H.'Hum.
phrey not to seek the Presiden-
cy and to run for re-election
to the Senate from Minnesota.
Senator Humphrey is poSsibly
the most popuar Democrat in
the Senate. Many Senate Demo-
rats are now predicting that
.Mr. Humphrey will run for ma-
jority leader, that Mr. Muskie
will drop out of the race and
;that Mr. Humphrey will have
an excellent chance to defeat
Mr. Byrd.
The gossip around the Senate
last week was that, if Mr. Byrd
pressed his effort to strip the
new intelligence committee tif
law-making and budgetary
tures of all intelligence agen-
cies.
Senator Rihicoff's Govern-
OREGONIAN, Portland
24 April 1976
CIA in new hands \
The unexpected resignation of Lt. Gen. Ver-
non Walters as deputy director of the Centrall
Intelligence Agency and the nomination of El
Henry Knoche as .his replacement indicate that
the White House intends that the CIA concen-
trate on its original mission ? intelligence gath-
ering and analysis ? rather than on clandestine
operations. :
President Ford's choice of diplomat-politician
George Bush as CIA director pointed in that
direction. Bush's two predecessors, Richard
Helms and William E. Colby, both rose to the
directorship through CIA ranks in the Plans
Division, which was identified in congressional
hearings as the source of such questionable oper-
ations as domestic spying and incipient plots to
assassinate foreign officials.
Knoche has been in the CIA for 23 years, but
his service has been chiefly in intelligence analy-
sis, with no hint of involvement in "dirty tricks,"
in the United.States or abroad.
It may also be significant that, if the Senate
confirms the Knoche nomination, as is necessary
under the law, it will be the first time since the
founding of the CIA in 1947 that a military man
has not filled at least one of the two top positions
in the agency. The CIA grew out of the World
War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and
inherited much of the personnel and the point of
vieW developed in confrontation_with wartime
enemies.
If the trend suggested by the Bush-Knoche
team engulfs the CIA, it will be a very good
thing. In the world as it is today, the United
States must have an effective organization for
the gathering and evaluation of intelligence to
aid in the nation's defense. But it does not need
an agency that is the source of the kinds of
"dirty tricks" that discredit the essential func-
tion of intelligence. ?
President Ford's reorganization Of the CIA,
announced a few weeks ago, suggested that this
is his view of the issue. His latest switch in CIA
leadership appears to confirm it.
10
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER .
6 MAY 1 976
News focus.
Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) de-
clares he'Os satisfied at last that the
CIA was pot ? involved in. Watergate.
i As an early?Watergate..investigator,
Baker deieloped. a concern that the
. agency. raity have had-more. than-a
pellpherah role in the affair, so he
had investigators work for?months on
all angle*/ the matter, lie is .still
disturbed some "nap,girig.. ques-
tions" onvhich no evidence is avail-
able. But pe. declared that in fairness
it was tinte:to.exculpate the CIA...
? 0 0
?
When George Bush became direc-
tor .of thcCIA, the agency's de-bug-
Ting expErs gave his home a thor-
ough going-over to insure that no
terring dayices had been planted.
They found no electronic bugs but
they did ;And termites, a nuisance
which they Were .not ? equipped to
combat. O.Bush had to call the ter-
mite manlike any citizen, .?
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WdElhington Post
2 May 1976
Was the CIA's Mau in Havana a Double Agent?
By George Crile HI
434 LASH is the cryptonym the CIA as-
-.tisigned to the senior Cuban Official it
had recruited in 1961 to kill Fidel Castro. The
Agency's dealings with AM LASH, which con-
tinued up to a disastrous end in 1965, encom-
passed the longest-standing anti, on the sur-
face, the most likely to succeed of its numer-
ous plots on Castro's life. It therefore seems a
remarkable suspension of curiosity that the
Senate Intelligence Committee, in its investi-
gation of the CIA's assassination activities,
passed so lightly over this critical chapter.
To begin with, any examination of AM
LASH's history would suggest that he had for
many years been far too close to insanity to
be relied on in any sensitive operation. And
from this a larger question presents itself.
Was AM LASH actually a conscious double
agent for Castro, or was he perhaps so trans-
parent and emotionally exploitable that he
unwittingly provided, an equivalent service?
And if so, and if Castro had become con-
? vinced that the United States would Stop at
nothing to kill him, could Castro have felt
compelled to strike first?
AM LASH has never been publicly named.
? But his history is well known among Cuban
exiles in Miami. He was a Cuban doctor, a for-
mer comandante of the rebel army, a hero of
athe revolution: Rolando Cubela, an intimate
of Castro. The CIA persuaded the Senate In-
telligence Committee not to identify Cubela,
who is now in jail in Cuba. It maintains that
alerting the Cubans to his role in early CIA
plots would expose him to reprisals.
But this argument is specious. The Cuban
government is filled with men who know Cu-
bela and his history and who must have read
the Church. Committee's report. It is difficult
to believe that Cubela now has any secrets
from his captors. The only people who stand
to gain from continued secrecy are those all
too eager conspirators at the CIA. For the
rest of .us this story is essential if we are to-
begin to make sense of the events surround-
ing the secret but deadly struggle that was
being fought in the autumn of 1963.
The Tortured Assassin
()UNDERSTAND Cubela fully. it is nec-
essary at once to introduce a Cuban ex-
ile in Miami, Jesse Aleman, whose assertions
are sufficiently important to make it worth'
reviewing his rceord for reliabditN',.
Aleman was educated in the United States
at 'Worcester Academy and then at the Uni-
versity of Miami. During the 1940s. his .father
At as .perhaps the most powerful man in Cuba.
Nominally minister of education, he was a
heavily guarded boodler and boss, whose,
most rewarding coup was to back a truck?lip
to the Cuban treasury and make off with the
Republic's foreign reserves. in Miami, he
CHI(' is WdshingiOn editOr of Ito rper'a
"trawl Zin o nd Iii?rr Imo
eubou OpetOhOns.,
beak on lac 'a
b? ought up most of Key Biscayne, retained
Sen. George Smathers as his lawyer and in-
vested as heavily in American politicians as
in American real estate.
ss them. Cubela had always been suspicious of
Castro. But now he was one of the towering
figures of the revolution, with an independ-
ent following. Castro needed his support. and
Cubela responded to his advances by accept-
ing an offer to become head of the politically
powerful federation of students at the Uni-
versity. , 1
-acubela exalted in. his new-found sta-
Ws as a triumphant revolutionary. .1t
:drove about. Havana in a gigantic tour-
ng scar, drinking and womanizing. He
avgs?blissful in his dissipation until he
,)all.jed a woman in a car accident, and
akairr began hearing Rico at night. As
before, he took to calling Aleman
. - .
vahenever he heard the voice.
'Aleman. now convinced that Castro
as a Communist, had decided that Fi-
de t had to be eliminaned. He says that
went v. ith another revolutionary
friend to convince Cubela to :take on
the assienment. "He was very upset
? ?
when we came to him." says Alernan.
:Ile said, 'I'm a nervous wreck. I'm just
.. -
getting better, and now you want me to
lilt Castro. I don't see the Communists,
,but if I recover, maybe I will ? I won't
say yes, I won't say nci." Aleman was
then paying for a psychiatrist for Cube-
-la, and he persuaded the analyst, who
-shared his political views, to try to con-
?
bvince Cubela that the only way to exor-
cise.Rico was by assassinating Castro.
The man who accompanied Aleman
-Was Jose (Pepin) Naranjo, an old revolu-
tionary colleague who shared Alernan's
-
antstrua.t of Castro. But not long after
the meeting Castro invited Naranjo to
join his government as minister of into-
-nor (director of all the nation's police
forces). It was a move on Castro's part
no win support among the rival factions
Of the revolution. Understandably, Ale-
man was alarmed; he expected to be ar-
_rested. But nothing happened. It was a
time of political paranoia .and Aleman
assumed that Naranjo had decided to
keep quiet so as not to arouse Castro's
'suspicion.
a-.
a, :When considering the possibility that
stile Cubans were aware of Cubela's
Jaters CIA plotting, it is worth bearing
.Naranjo's subsequent story in mind. By
1960 he had risen meteorically tc a posi-
tion of total trust with Fidel: it was he
-
'who tasted Castro's food to make sure it
Wasn't poisoned. Today he is constantly
at Fidel's side. In a CBS documentary
narrated by Dan Rather last year, Nar-
anjo was seen taking Castro's gun and
bandalero from him when Fidel settled
hack to relax.: Somewhere along the
line he proved his loyalty and managed
to maintain Castro's trust --a a not in-
His son chose a different path. A young,
handsome idealist, he became, like Castro, a
revolutionary ?against the Batista regime.
While Castro was in the mountains, Aleman
was helping to direct the most active and
dangerous part of the 'revolution in Havana.
Ile and four other young men ? including
Eugenio Rolando Martinez, the Watergate
burglar ? formed an underground cell that
provided the arms for the almost. successful
attack on the Presidential Palace in 1957. Cu-
bela was then one of the leaders of the stu-
dent revolutionaries at the University of Ha-
vana, and he began to work closely with Mar-
tinez and Aleman.
? "There were many nasty things we had to.
do to bring on the revolution," Aletnan re-..
fleets. The most difficult was the decision to
kill Blanco RICO, Batista's chief of military in-
telligence. The revolutionary logic of that
day called' for sparing sadistic officials be-
cause of the hatred they aroused.. "Rico
treated everyone like a gentleman. He
wouldn't even torture people," Aleman ex-
plains. So he had to be done away with. "Ro-
lando Martinez] and I participated in the de-
cision to get rid of him," and the man whom
they assigned to kill him was Culiela.
In October, 1956, Cubela shot Rico through
the head in the fashionable Montmartre
night club. As he died, Rico caught Cubela'S
eyes and? Cubela believed, smiled under-
standingly at him. Cubela escaped to Miami
where. he moved into the TradeWinds
one of the properties (including also the Mi-
ami Stadium) which Aleman owned there. a
A large number of revolutionaries had
been forced. to flee Cuba at that time and
many ended up staying at Aleman's expense
at, the Tradewinds. Cubela was now a hero
among these exiles, but he was tortured by
the memory of Rico's dying smile. He was
convinced that Rico was talking to him at
night and he had a nervous breakdown. Mar-
tinez, who had also gone into exile, shared a
room with him and .served as his confessor,
and analyst. After a few months Cubela ap-
neared to have recovered and returned to?
Cuba to join Castro's second front in the Es-
cambray mountains. Castro made him a coma
andante, then the highest rank in the Army,
and when Batista fled Cuba on New Year's
Day 1959, he swept into Havana several days,
before Castro and led the force that seized
the Presidential Palace,
The Plottino. Be,rins
z!,
T Is HARD to imagine the confusion that
marked the first year of revolutionary
government. Not all the revolutionaries sup-
ported Castro. Many, and particularly those
who had worked in Havana, mistrusted Fidel
deeply but not more than he mistrusted
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considerable feat given the fact that
Cubela was his number two man in the
Interior Ministry at the time of his re-
cruitment by the CIA. It is of some im-
portance that Aleman told me about his
meeting with Cubela and Naranjo a full
six months before the Senate assassina-
tion. report made the first public refer-
ence to AM LASH.
? In iC0. several months after talking
to Cubela. Aleman went into exile in
Miami. He was to play no further role
Cebela's life. But Cubela himself had
by then bacome a MarIchurian candi-
date,. at least Vulnerable to the surges-
tin of killing Castro, hut also a colossal
-seurity risk to whoever tried to tap his
serylces, as he was being tapped by the
-
CIA at the time of Kennedy's assassina-
tions;
1 111mi,, Risks
. ? .
1.
PERATION MONGOOSE, the se-
cret war that the United States
waged against Cuba after the Bay of
Pigs, was not a CIA initiative. It was the
product of the Kennedys and soon re-
sulted in the establishment in Miami of
the largest CIA station in the world ?
with an estimated 400 American case
officers and about 2,000 Cuban agents.
charged with the sole task. of de-
strOying Castro. But by 1963 Mongoose
was a demonstrable failure. It was at
this point that AM LASH emerged as
the Agency's last hope to accomplish,
With a single blow, the goal that had so
stubbornly eluded them. .
Cubela's relationship with the
Agency had begun at his initiative in
1951 when he contacted both the CIA
and the FBI, expressing a desire to de-
fect. But Cubela was the rarest of assets
? an agent in the very heart of the en-
emy system ? and the CIA did not
want him to leave. His case officer's as-
signment was to ensure that AM LASH
"stay in place and report to us."
At the beginning of September, 1963,
Cubela finally agreed to stay if he
"could do something really significant
for the creation of a new Cuba." Ile
told his case officer he would like to
plan Castro's "execution."
It was very shortly after this, on Sept.
7, 1063, that Castro summoned an Asso-
ciated Press reporter, Daniel Harker, to
issue an extraordinary threat: "United
States leaders should think that if they
are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate
Cuban leaders, they themselves will not
be safe."
"There can be no question," observed
Raymond Rocca, the CIA's liaison offi-.
cer with the Warren Commission, "that
this represented a more than ordinary,
attempt by [Castro] to get a message on
record in the United States." Indeed, it
was impreceneeted ? even for Castro,
who was in the habit of realeng all
kinds of accusations and threats m the
course of his seven and eight-hour-long
.speeches.
One possible explanation for the
warning was the CIA's recent paramili-
tary activities in Cuba. After the Cuban
missile crisis of October, 1e.32. Kenne-
dy, living up to the spirit as well as the
letter of his non-invasion agreement
with librushchev, had suspended /he:
massive secret war the CIA had been
waging against Cuba. But then in Au-
gust, 1933, he suddenly reversed tits
position and authorized 15 new com-
mando raids; by the end of the month.
the Agency had hit two major ind-
ustrial targets.
But however infuriating such strikes
might have been, they hardly endan-
gered Cuban leaders. Could Castro
somehow have learned of the CIA's..A.M.
LASH plotting? Cubela was not exactly
a good security risk; even his case offi-
cers were aware of their agent's inga-
bility. One described /0.1 LeaSH's "mer-
curial" temperament, telling how Ole
bela had proposed Castro's "execution:
only to become deeply disturbed when
the case officer used the word "assazis
nation." "It was not the act that he che
jected to," the case officer wrote, akt.
merely the choice of \cords used to de-
scribe it. 'Eliminate' was acceptable."
To the frustrated CIA men running
the Cuban secret war it must hase
seemed an .acceptable risk to put tip
with Cubent's disturbed state of
It was certainly worth giving him the
assurances he demanded as a precondis
tion to carrying out his plan. Accorclitg
to his case officer, he requested Mili-
tary supplies, a device with which tee
protect himself if his plots against Ces-
tro.were discovered and a meeting with
Attorney General Robert Kennedy.
? The meeting was-set for Oct. 29. Ken-
nedy did not attend, but Desmond ?Fitz-
Gerald, a social friend bf the Kennedys,
and the CIA roan in charge of the Cue
ban task force, did; he presented him-
self as Kennedy's personal representa-
tive. Cubela was apparently satisfied
with FitzGerald's credentials, for the
two arranged to meet in Paris again en
Nov. 22, when FitzGerald was to glen
him an assassination device and to fine
alize plans. ?
? At the meeting that day. FitzGerald
gave AM LASH a ballpoint pen rigged
with a hypodermic needle the pointat
which was so firea that its victim would
not notice the injection. According toa
later CIA inspector general's repo:telt
is likely that at the very moment Pr-
dent Kennedy was shot, a CIA officer
was meeting with a Cuban agent... and
giving him an assassination device for
use against Castro." ?
"This fellow was nothing but a doa-
ble agent," concluded Sen. Robert Mar-
gan (D.N.C.1e a member of the Intellig-
ence Committee who was briefed ty
'William E. Colby, then CIA director, en
the AM LASH plot but was told nothing
of Cubela's Carlier history. "When
Colby told us we'd been meeting with
AM LASH in Geneva, Paris and Madrid,
it occurred to me, how could the guy
get out of a little country like this au
12
easily? Colby said he could do it be-
cause he was a high official. I asked
Colby Who he [Cubela] was really work-
ing for and Colby said, 'Senator, that's
always a problem.' I was struck by how
naive these people at the CIA seemed to
have been."
But perhaps a more reasonable ?con-
elusion, based on Cubela's instability, is
that, even if he were not a double
agent, the Cubans were at least able to
find out what he was conspiring to do.
?'or one thing, the Cuban intelligence
the DGI ? and the Soviet KGB are
Cose working partners, and it is un-
:ely that one or the other organize-
tit a would have left 50 senior and pe-
en jar an official as Cubela unsurveyed
on nis frequent trips abroad,
ubela's ultimate fate seems to sup-
pot : this theory. According to. the Cie:
instector general's report, FitzGeraie
left he meeting "to, discover that Pees',
dent Kennedy had .been assassinated.
Beca se of this fact, plans with At
LASH changed and it was decided tnet
we wo have no part in the assana-
tion of a government leader ? includ-
ing Cas rt. ? and would not aid AM
LASH in tl is attempt."
But the did continue to plot with
AM LAS:: or another year. Incredibly.
the Agen ?y apparently did not try to
find out it there was something beyond
coincident in the simultaneous events
in Paris an 1 Dallas. A case officer con-
tinued to n-. 'et with Cubela until a few
months Ian e when a decision was
made to ret ;e all direct contact be-
tween Cubela and American case offi-
cers, choosing instead to work through
exile agents as cutouts."
"AM LASH w. s told and fully under-
stands that the United States Govern-
ment cannot be (:)me involved to any
degree in the 'fit t step' of his plan,"
Cubela's case offk :s.r wrote after Ken-
nedy's death. "FYI " he added, "this is
where B-1. could fit in nicely in Fiving
any support he woul request."
In the Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee's report, B-1 is sin ply described as
? the leader of an anti-C:tstro group. Inc
real life he is Manuel Arlene, the politi-
cal chief of the CIA's Brigade 2.e.%at
-
the Bay of Pigs and after that Keene-
dy's designated Cuban leader to organ-
ize and direct the large CIA-sronsared
commando operations run from bases
in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. (Arti;ile is
also the godfather of Howard Hunt's
son and was actively involved in Hunt's
activities at the time of 'Watergate.)
? Up until 1955 Artime's Central Amer-
ican efforts had little if any success. It
had taken hint months to get organized,
partly because of the Agency's esoteric
method of doing business. There were
'meetings in foreign countries, Swiss
bank accounts, arms to be purchased
through intermediaries in Luxembourg:
and through cover corporations. seller"
the Inn (Revolutionary Recovery
Movement) finally got under way in
MI, it was a week rained and ewe pped
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force. Artime says that Robert Ken-
nedy sent his 'congtatitlations via Ar.
time's case officer after the first com-
mando raid.
But subsequent operations were not
successful. Things always seemed to go
wrong now that the exiles were left
without American case officers to di-
rect them. The Agency provided Ar-
time with up-to-date intelligence, but
the raiding parties inevitably would
land in the wrong spot, run into bad
. weather or meet some other obstacle.
Morale was low at the cnin pa am there
were rumors of smuqeling activities
and embezzlement of funds. As before,
the Cubela plot offered a last hope for a
. touchdown pass . when the game
seemed all but lost.
Planned liendevous ?
A RTIME openly? aclinowIedges his
PI. part in the final- Cela plot. His
descriptions of the arra nge.ments made
with Cubela, which he related months
before the Senate assassination investj-.
gation, coincide with all of the senaters'
findings. Ironically, neither Cubela nor
.Artime knew that their initial contact
had been se.cret.;y arranged by the CIA.
An inspector general's report ex-
plained that the Agency "contrived to
put B-1 and AM LASH together in such
a way that neither of them knew that
the contact had been engineered by .
CIA. The thought was that 13-1 needed a
Man inside and AM LASH wanted a sil-
enced weapon, which CIA was unwill-
ing to furnish to him directly. By put-
ting the two together, B-1 might get its
. man inside Cuba and AM LASH might
get his silenced weapon from B-1."
? Artime, who faithfully reported all of.
his plans to his case officer, provided
Cubela with a silencer and some "small,
highly concentrated explosives." The
two men worked out elaborate arrange-
ments for Cubela's rate in the new Cu-
ban government after the revolution
and for the logistics of his escape. Ar-
time was to land with his commandos
as soon as Cubela struck. The assassina-
tion itself was to be carried out at Vet--
? adero Beach, where Castro was plan-
ning to spend the Easter holidays at a
house once owned by the DuPonts. Cu-
bela stayed at a house close by; from
there he planned to use the high pow- .
ered rifle.
-I had the U-2 photo of the beach,"
Artirne remembers. "At that moment
we had 300 boys [his commandosj and I
put them auTh the mother ships and in
the communication ship with the two
PT boats ready for the attack. Cubela
was supposed to Call somebody in New
York and say something like 'Look, the
tobacco that they smoke now in Miami
is not good. The good ,bacco is now in .
Spain because it's the Cuban tobacco.'
That would mean Fidel was in the
house and the plot was on." The call
was to be relayed to the CIA communi-
cations benk in Miami and immediately
to Artime's commandos at sea, -But the
call never came."
The circumstances surrounding the
latter Cubela plot were suspicious from
the start. By the time the final arrange-
ments were made in 1935, they had be.
'come ludicrous. "I think Cubela's real
Motive was a desire. to continue his
playboy life," says ?Artinae. "I met hirn
once in Rome, twice in Spain, and he
was always drinking and having a good
time. I gave him a lot of money and he
spent it like mad." Several of the exiles
involved in the plot turned out to be ev-
ery bit as unreliable. They began to
boast about the plan; it became an open
secret in Miami.
In June, 1965, the CIA finally termi-
nated all contact with AM LASH and
his associates. The explanation cited by
the Church Committee report was "for
reasons related to security." 'What ap-
parently alerted the Agency to the
questionable nature of the whole enter-
prise was a strong indication that the
Cuban exile agent it had used to put Ar-
time and Cubela together was actually
working for Castro.
It was not until the beginning of 1966
that the Cuban authorities got around
to arresting Cubela. He was charged
with treason, including the attempted
assassination of Fidel Castro..
At his trial in 1966 no one condemned
Cubela more harshly than Cubela him-
self. He ,called for the maximum sent-
ence for himself ? to be shot against
the wall ? and he seemed to confess to
everything. But he did not mention ?
nor did the prosecutors ask him about
?his earlier CIA plots. There appeared
to be a studied attempt to avoid any
public mention of Cubela's plotting be-
fore 1964. Finally, Castro himself inter-
vened on Cubela's behalf to ask for
clemency. The would-be assassin was
sentenced to 25 years in prison but is
now reported to be at a state rehabilita-
tion farm.
The Central Question
41here strongly suggest that Ken-
. ',THOUGH the events presented
P. here
and Castro;were loeked in a fierce
secret struggIF until the end, there is
another, often cited body of thought
which believes the two men were seek-
ing a mutual understanding. ,
For one thing, in the fall of 1953, Cas-
tro had intermediaries approach Amer-
ica's .deputy U.N. Ambassador .William.
Attwood with an offer to open talks.
Kennedy had authorize Attwood to
tat:'e. Castro up on the offer and thc-y
had agreed to a secret meeting in Cuba.
Kennedy had even sent an' unofficial
peace feeler through Jean Daniel, a
French journalist who left Washingtol
in mid-November to. interview Castro
.. NATION
8 MAY 1916
more than raischieg
. New York City ' '
. Re your editorial, "Night Work" Web. 141: Why do you, and
others, persist in referring to CIA clandestine agents as "profes-
sional mischief makers"? This "sweet," "lovable." "benign"
description of operatives whose function is death and destruction
is in other countries defuses your positive purpose of exposing these
"night workers"' for what they are. Leonard Zimmerman
'77
Daniel, who was lunching with Ca STri
at the moment of Kennedy's death
later portrayed the Cuban as being gen
ninety shocked and bereaved by flu
news.
)3ut U.S. Cuban policy since the Ea;
of 'Pigs had been boldly and consist
ently, duplicitous, and no man knec
. this better than Fidel Castro. One nee(
only listen to his fury in October aftert
hurricane had ravaged Cuba and hit
.CIA had followed with a major cora
rnando strike: "What does the: Unitet
States do as we are mobilizing to recu
perate from the hurricane?" he a5ket
rhetorically. "They send saboteurs
arms and pirate ships and explosives..
These were not the ordinary counter
revolutionary. bands . The import
ance is that it is an action carried otr
by an, organism of the United State
. government."
Later in the month Castro capturec
two of the Agency's Cuban comman
dos,. but he waited a full- week befort
forcing them to go on television to con
fess to their assignments. Coincidental
ly, this was two days after .AM LASH':
meeting with FitzGeraid ? the meet.
ing at which AM LASH appears to havt
become convinced that the Kennedy:
were backing his plot. The cemmandot
? gave a surprisingly full account of tiledt
mission; they even gave the names 91
their case officers and the location ol
their bases in Miami. Castro was infuri
ated by the glib U.S. denials of involve
ment and by the refusal of the Ameni
can press to report the .attacks ever
when confronted with evidence the}
could easily substantiate. "You car
see," he railed," that in this free. press
they boast of, the press, the wire serv
ices, the. CIA, everyone acts in unison
elaborating and developing the same
lie in order to disguise the truth."'
Perhaps the central question here is
whether Castro knew of Cubela's plot-
ting and thus knew that the CIA and
probably much higher authority was
still trying to kill him. To Sen. Morgan,
there is little doubt of Ibis. He thinks
Castro, after learning of Cubeia's plot-
ting, first tried to deter the CIA with
his Public warning and that he then re-
taliated when he learned of Cubela's
subsequent meeting with FitzGerald ?
now believing the Kennedys them-
selves were responsible. "Just exactly
how it happened I don't know and l?
don't know if we'll ever know," but
"there is no doubt in my mind that
John Fitzgerald Kennedy. was assassi-
nated by Fidel Castro or someone un-
der his influence in retaliation for our
efforts to assassinate him."
? C1275GeorgaCrils111
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NEW YORK TIMES
9 May 1976
Criminal `Superpatriots'
To the Editor:
I am adding, I hope, to a flood of
protest occasioned by your recent
news article about C.I.A. agents who
gavc LSD to people they picked up in
bars. If your readers don't get angry
at this sort of grotesque activity, I
guess they will swallow anything, in-
cluding, perhaps, drugs pressed on
them by strangers who turn out to be
representatives of the Government.
_In the recent past I have learned to
live with the fact that our Govern-
ment can kill hundreds of thousands
of people in-Vietnam for reasons which
become harder and harder to under-
stand. The Government can plan the
murder of foreign leaders and can be
remarkably friendly with members of
the Mafia. In view of all this, there
should be no reason why I am shocked
to find that "employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency randomly picked
up unsuspecting patrons in bars in the
.United States and slipped LSD into
their food and drink."
Still, I find it hard to get used to
this new knowledge. Are the agents
still hanging around bars with their
deadly sugar cubes? If they have given
Up this practice, are they sorry about
the people they sickened or killed?
Or does being a C.I.A. agent mean
never having to say you're sorry? '
I am convinced that most C.I.A.,
people are sure that they are super-
patriots. As a plain citizen, I must
confess that I believe that people who
lead the United States into criminal,
activities are doing their best to
weaken our beloved, country. I think
that such people should be punished,
like any other criminals. Are the
_agents who gave LSD to unsuspecting
people in bars going to be brought
to justice, along with their leaders, or
are they going to be conveniently
forgotten, or retired on rich pensions,
like the perpetrators of so many of
the disasters of the recent past?
? LOAN WILSON
Ticonderoga, N. Y., April 27, 1976
NEW YORK TIMES
9 May 1976
Domestic Spying.?
Is Barred by Biash?.p,
HOUSTON, May 8 (AP)--
George Bush the director of'
Central Intelligence, says the
intelligence agency is not in the'
domestic surveillance business
and says he is "determined tO?
see that we don't get into that
business.
Mr. Bush said at a news coif.'
ference yesterday that there`
had been some proved allege:-
tions of surveillance of Amerie,
cans in the past, but it was net
happening now.
"We do have some [current':
domestic operations," he said
'but they are very open. People,
come back from business trips-'
are debriefed and I hope they
will continue to cooperate with
he C.I.A."
He added: "I believe the
buses of the past are indeed in
the past. I think the American.
people support the concept ate
strong Central intelligence,
Agency, and if they don't,
they'd better because we are'
living in an extremely troubled:
world." ?
r,
THE WASIIINGTON POST
Clayton Fritchey
CI
Saturday, May 8, 1976
'The President's
rivate Army'
Despite all the findings and recom-
mendations of the Senate and House in-
vestigations of the CIA, it is a good bet
that it will continue to be the Presi-
dent's private army.
The congressional committees suc-
ceeded in uncovering almost unbelieva-
ble abuses in the covert operations of
the entire intelligence community, and
they have made a number of construc-
tive recommendations for reform, but
the question of how to rein in a willful
President remains unresolved. Perhaps
there is no sure-fire way of resolving it
or, if there is, Congress hasn't the nerve
to impose it.
The multimillion-word record of the
congressional inquiries disclosed
plenty of prereading by the agency, but
most of the major violations and most
of the major extralegal activities have
now been traced back to White House
pressure of one kind or another over
the last two decades, regardless of
, whether the Democrats or 'Republicans
were in power.
The CIA has often been denounced
for its "black" operations, including
overthrowing or trying to subvert gov-
ernments we didn't approve of in Iran,
Guatemala, Chile, Greece, Laos, South
Vietnam and Cuba, among others. The
CIA did the planning for the initial Bay
of Pigs invasion, but it was John F. Ken-
nedy who put it into effect. All the
other operations were also ordered by
the White House.
William Colby, the former director of
the CIA, had the candor to tell Con-
gress how the CIA used millions of dol-
'Jars in efforts to undermine the duly
elected Chilean government several
' years ago. At the same time, however,
be revealed he was carrying out a for-
mal decision of the White House for the
Forty Committee.
- The White House has consistently
gone to great pains to conceal its pres-
sures on the CIA, the chief reasons
being that the pressures were often mo-
? tivated more by political than security
considerations, as in former President
Nixon's efforts to subvert the agency in
the Watergate coverup. The full story
of the CIA's assassination activities is
still clouded, but all the evidence indi-
cates these initiatives were essentially
White House specials.
It is not easy even for the most coura-
geous CIA directors to resist the deter-
mined President when, in the name of
alleged national security, he wants
something done that may seem impro-
per, reckless or possibly illegal. Who is
the director to challenge the Com-
mander-in-Chief?
In any case, as. Richard Helms, the
former head of the CIA, discovered, un-
14
cooperative directors can readily be re-
placed. Helms, who ended up as U.S.
ambassador to Turkey, informed the
Church committee that in his opinion
"there is no way to insulate the director
of Central Intelligence from unpopular-
ity at the hands of Presidents or policy-
makers if he is making assessments
which run counter to administration
policy. ...."
So much attention has been focused
on the agency's sensational covert oper-
ations that little notice has been taken
of how the White House can also influ-
ence and subvert the CIA's important
function of providing intelligence esti-
mates on which critical decisions are
supposedly made. The evidence shows
that a number of key CIA estimates,
ranging from Soviet missile capability
to the effect of U.S. bombing on Cam-
bodia, were either doctored or sup-
pressed to accommodate White House
policy.
John Guzenga, former chairman of
the board of estimates, told the Church
committee that a CIA director "who
does his job will, more often than not,
be the bearer of bad news. When intel-
ligence people are told, as happened in
recent years, that they were expected
to get on the team, then a sound intel-
ligence policy relationship has in effect
broken down."
But Mr. Ford has made it clear that
he is going to resist every effort by
Congress to tie his hands. In that re-
spect, he is no different than other
Presidents. Mr. Ford tried to beat Con-
gress to the punch by appointing his
own tame intelligence investigating
commission. So did Lyndon Johnson al-
most 10 years ago when there was an
earlier demand for curbing the CIA. '
The 1967 Johnson study, headed by
then Undersecretary of State Nicholas
Katzenbach, was really intended not to
. study the nation's intelligence com-
munity but to shield it, according to a
finding of the Church committee,
which said the, White House "carefully
limited the mandate of the Katzenbach
committee's investigation." '
Katzenbach himsolf told the Church
panel "that his committee was designed
by President Johnson. . . to head off a
full-scaie congressional investigation.
All covert relationships were to be ex-
cluded from the investigation."
For most of its 290 years, the United
States got along all right without any-
thing resembling the CIA. But Presi-
dents love the agency. As long as they
have their multibillion-dollar private
army, they can always throw their
weight around covertly, should Con-
gress forbid them to do it openly.
I C 1V76, Lee Anscien Tinto
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CAPITAL, Annapolis
22 April 1976
Speaktng at foreign affairs conference
? By DAVID HUGHES
Staff Writer
CIA Director George H. W.
Bush said he won't release a
single name of a CIA agent or a
person cooperating with the
agency as long as he heads the
intelligence agency.
It was the only comment
during his speech that drew
applause from about 300
midshipmen and guests here
Wednesday night. But Bush got
a standing ovation at the end of
the talk.
Bush got onto the topic of the
CIA .following his speech on
Sino-American relations. He
delivered the talks as the
keynote of the 16th annual
foreign affairs conference at
the Naval Academy.
One student asked if the CIA
is going to be divided into two
branches: one for over in-
telligence collection and one for
covert operations.
"I don't believe it should
. happen. I don't believe it will,"
Bush said. "What is needed is
not the dismantling of covert
capability." The director added
that the nation should have an
alternative to sending in the
Marines or doing nothing.
He challenged the students to
enumerate more than a handful
of CIA abuses which he as CIA
director would agree are fac-
tual. Even so, the procedures in
'effect now at the agency are
different from those used at the
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
23 April 1976
iplomats
'working
for CIA'
Dar es Salaam,
April 22
Two US diplomats and ,one
American employed by the Tan-
zanian Government were today
named in letters from the
American-based "Committee to
Expose *Agents" as CIA agents
The letters, posted in Phila-
delphia,. were 'received by
reporters and government
officials here three days before
Dr Kissinger was scheduled to
arrive as part of his first.Afri-
can tour.
The letters said the exposure
of the government employee
was "particularly important"
because he is a "deep cover"
agent who " has been quite suc-
cessful in his work and has
remained undiscovered during
eight years of work In Tan-
zania."
The alleged " deep cover"
agent has just completed his
contract in Tanzania and
planned to return to Iowa
tomorrow. UPI.
THE WfiLTON STAR
P l.ky 3
time the abuses occurred, Bush
said.
"The sins of the past not
withstanding, you can'tcunduct
an intelligence business in the
open," he said.
The CIA will work -closely
with whatever oversight
procedure Congress prescribes,
said Bush, who predicted a new
era of openness between the
agency and Capital Hill.
Another student asked him to
explain China's ream for
inviting former President
Richard Nixon to visit during
the presidential primary rote in
New Hampshire.
"I don't think they were
trying to influence the New
Hampshire primary. They are
HOUSTON CHRONICLE
8 MAY 1976
Bush Says CA Disclosures
not trying ,to meddle in U.S.
internal politics," said Bush.
The Chinese could care less
about the primaries or the
Watergate scandal, and invited
Nixon to commemorate the
fourth anniversary of an accord
between our two nations, the
Shanghai Communique, said
Bush, who headed the U.S.
delegation to Peking before his
appointment to the CIA.
The former head of the
American delegation in Peking
said the Chinese Communists
.are more interested in reaf-
firming the ties established
between the two nations during
the Nixon administration..
At the end of the presen-
tation, the CIA director
received a standing ovation.
Have Damaged Foreign
? BY .1kNET SANDERS
Chronicle Staff ?
- ?
. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
.Director George Bush said here Friday
that recent disclosures about U.S. intelli-
gence operations have damaged his agen-
c y ' s friendly relationship with intelli-
gence services in other countries.
Secret agents in Latin America. AfriCa.
the Mideast and Eastern Europe "are
holding back intelligence information
they used to give us because of the risk
Viey will be exposed to in the Crated
States." said Bush. "They simply don't
trust us anymore."
Bush spoke at the 90th annualnieeting
of the Greater Houston Area YMCA
Friday night at ? the Rice Rittenhouse
Hotel. About 5C0 members of 20 local
YMCA branches honored the top volun-
teers of 1975.
Bush said. that "the CIA has taken a
tremendous battering" in the oast year
that has hurt. its image both at 'how/ and
abroad. -People are frightened- bout
what we do,*" he said. "But we're just
plain citizens that: go about life i\vithout
always sneaking around spying on peo-
ple."
Bush said recent reports of past CIA
activities singled out "peculiar?? aherra-
CIA Reported Funding Dewey
SAN FRANCISCO ? The CIA pumped more than $1
million into the 1948 presidential campaign of Thomas
E. Dewey and provided crucial evidence used by Rich-
ard M. Nixon against Alger Hiss, according to Rolling
Stone magazine.
In a copyright article in its issue dated May 20, the
magazine says the CIA was twice instrumental in
securing evidence used by Nixon against Hiss, the
State Department official accused of being a member
of the Communist party.
15
Ties
lions" and "sensationalized" them. He
agreed that foreign operations-, such as
The attempted sabotage of Fidel- Castro's
beard and CIA domestic spying were
wrong. but said that those "mistakes"
have been corrected. ?
"There are some grubby things we
have to do but not many." said. Bush. ?
And the public never hears, about- our
successes."
Bush said the public ? is slowly begin-
ning to realize the importance of the CIA
despite the -recent Congressional criti-
cism of his agency. -The pendulum is
starting to swing back in favor of us,"-be
said. -? .
A Senate-Select Committee headed by
Sen. Frank Church handed down a i:om-
prehensive study of the. CIA last ??eek ?
illustrating certain past covert operations
that the committee said violated constitu-
tional rkihts a n d wasted hxnavers'
money. The committee also outlined
recommendations for changing the CIA
and suggested that a special Senate
panel oversee CIA operations in the
future.
Bush. said Friday that he agrees with
some of the committee's recommended
changes but does not favor creation of
the oversight panel.
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NEWS & OBSERVER, Raleigh
14 April 1976
The Case Against Cove
One of the problems with covert
actions abroad by the Central In-
telligence Agency is illustrated in
the Sam Giancana articles by Ni-
cholas Gage of The New York
Times. That problem: the sorry
company sometimes kept by our
spooks.
. Gage recounts how the Cl/Lea:.
listed Mafia hoods in plotting fruit-
less attempts on the life of Cuba's
Fidel Castro. Once in bed with the
underworld, the agency found it
hard to get out, and later got?
caught in the absurd position of
shielding hoodlums from prosecu-
tion by other arms of U.S. govern-
ment. ?
Such an embarrassing embhce
of criminality wouldn't be quite so
offensive if it were clear that co-
vert CIA operations were essential
or productive. But that isn't at all
clear. In fact, the latest issue of
Foreign Affairs magazine offers a
strong, pointed argument by an ex-
pert 'against any covert? CIA
actions, defined as "operations to
rt Activities
secretly influence foreign govern-
ments, groups or individuals, often
by illegal means."
'Herbert Scoville Jr. served the
CIA for eight years in scientific
intelligence and research. In his
article, he expresses little faith in
secret. spy activities for any CIA
purposes except limited counterin-
telligence work. Other, modern
methods of gathering information,
including satellite photography,
are more honorable and accurate
and have just- about rendered
cloaks and daggers obsolete, Sco-
ville argues.
Nowhere is he more emphatic
than on the futility of outright CIA
meddling as notoriously practiced
in Cuba and Chile, where instead of
collecting data the agency was
trying to wreck governments. Sco-
ville thinks the CIA should get out
of that sort of covert-action busi-
ness ? period. It's possible to
score limited, local successes at
the game, he says, but ultimately
there's no way to win.
BALTIMORE SUN
5 May 1976
Garry Wills
CIA Makes Mafia
Look Like Jaycees
Spokesmen on the right
have for a long time been say-
ing our government is soft on
crime. Now we have proof
that they are right. We can
read, put down in black and
white, the lenient sentence
given to the largest crime
syndicate in our history.
Imagine a super-Mafia
financed by untraceable raids
on the United States Treasury,
one that teaches men to mur-
der and cheat systematically.
But this organization does not
steal money. It steals govern-
ments. It takes and gives gov-
ernments, .apart from the
knowledge or will of those
being ruled by the govern-
ments. It does not put out con-
tracts on rivals or police
authorities. Its "hits," accom-
plisLed with LSD and other
debilitating drugs, were ran-
dom?people in bars or at
parties, people of all sorts.
This organization was a fair
employment pusher and kill-
er; it did not distinguish
Americans from foreigners or
blacks from whites,
In movie mythology,
crusading newspapers fought
organized crime, rallying pub'
lie opinion to the cause. But
this organization took over
much of the press, writing its
own reviews, hiring newsmen
all over again and not letting
their first employers know
about it.
The funniest thing of all is
that the organization has been
been asked, repeatedly, to in-
vestigate itself and turn itself
in if it finds it has committed
any crime. When was the last
time you heard a judge send a
convicted felon out of court
with the request that he come
back if he decides he has com-
mitted any new crimes?
I am talking, of course,
about the Central Intelligence
Agency. It is hard to imagine
any crime, public or private,
it has not committed, and on a
scale brand new to history.
Yet Senator Frank Church's
pussy-cat committee meekly
let the criminals say what
crimes could be reported, and
asked the CIA to co-operate
with Congress after doc-
umenting that it systematic-
ally deceived Congress and
the public and even the Presi-
dent for decades, The commit-
tee writes a dreary history,
Scoville's practical objection is
that secret operations nowadays
stand little chance of staying se-
cret for long, and so they just
aren't very feasible. But even if
they were, they ought to be
banned. Over the long haul, he con-
tends, the nation's reputation and
security would be better served if
it fought "hostile influences by
using the good qualities of our
democratic society, not by copying
the reprehensible tactics of those
we are opposing!! He might have
added: And not by consorting with
some of the worst elements in our
own society.
In the push for a CIA cleanup,
the Ford administration is stress-
ing closer supervision of the agen-
cy, without significant curtailment
of its activities. Scoville makes a
(Tod- case for going further
that. Congress, -which has yet to
wrestle with intelligence reform,
could profit by studying Seoville's
comments.
then re-enacts that dreariness,
as if it were composing a
script for itself, not an investi-
gation of the agency.
The report tells us that
President Johnson issued
guidelines in 1967 meant to
keep the CIA from suborning
academicians to agent work
under the guise of independ-
ent research. The report also
tells us that the CIA just used
the President's guidelines to
speed up a program it had al-
ready launched for making
the subornation less obvious,
dealing with individuals in-
,stead of institutions, making
its influence less traceable.
? There is no reason to think
the Senate's report will he
used any other way. It just
gives the agency clearer rules
for deceiving us. The commit-
tee's submission to CIA direc-
tion led to the cutting of mat-
erial that was in no way dan-
gerous to national security?
what criminal would not like
to rewrite the judge's sent-
ence on him? Even the
blatantly unconstitutional
suppression of budget inform-
ation was acceded to by the
committee.
The committee found im
basis in law for CIA covert ac-
16
tivities, yet discovered 900
"major or sensitive" covert
projects, despite CIA noncoop-
eration and destruction of
records. As a result, the com-
mittee asked the agency not
to undertake such activities
unless it considers them nec-
essary?yet the agency ob-
viously felt all its "major or
sensitive" projects were nec-
essary, and there is no reason
to think it has changed its own
norms.
The committee was ob-
viously unable to face up to
the fact that covert activities
are the real reason for the
CIA's existence?as opposed
to more conventional intellig-
ence work carried on by other
agencies, which are larger
and better financed than the
CIA.
The fight to save the CIA is
not a fight to save good intel-
ligence work, which is per-
formed by at least a dozen
other parts of our govern-
ment. It is a fight to save just
those activities the committee
has called illegal, inefficient
and dangerous to ourselves.
And in that fight, the cops
have formally joined the rob-
hers. The ju-ig,es are mere
tools of our official crooks.
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READER ' S DIGEST
MAY 1976
,et's
Stop Undermining
the CIA
If the United States is to continue as a flag-bearer
against totalitarianism, says this former Secretary of
Defense, it must protect and preserve our international
intelligence network
ishe-d, often without a scintilla of
substantiation. For example:
Allegation: The CIA jeopardized
public health by conducting bio-
'logical-warfare experiments in New
York City subways. Fact: The
Army, to assess vulnerability of the
transit system to sabotage, placed
some innocuous powder in a sub-
way, then measured how far it was
wafted down the tunnel. The test
menaced nobody. The CIA had no
BY MELVIN R. LAIRD
E AMERICANS are on the
verge of doing ourselves
what our worst enemies
have been unable to do: destroy our
intelligence services.
Last year, Senate and House com-
mittees began searching investiga-
tions of the Central Intelligence
Agency. The investigators' intent
was honorable, and they have
brought to light malpractices- that part in it.
must be curbed. According to Con- Allegation: The CIA placed secret
gressional findings and CIA admis- informants on the White House staff
sions, during the 29 years the CIA
has existed-194 to 1976?agency to spy on the Presidency. Its chief
7 White
House "contact man" for a
personnel perpetrated the f llowing while was Alexander P. Butterfield,
They illegally entered four
questionable acts of domestic espio-
nage:later director of the Federal Aviation
Administration. Fact: Butterfield
homes or offices,lapped the phones never had any connection with the
of 27 people, placed five U.S. citizens CIA. For the past 20 years, like other
under surveillance and infiltrated
. agencies, the CIA, at White House
ten agents into the anti-war move-
,' ,.., request, has routinely assigned spe-
ment. ror over two decades, they cialists to the Presidential staff. ?
, opened private mail received by ? Allegation: The CIA has assassi-
: Americans from communist coun- nated foreign leaders and perhaps
? tries. Additionally, in examining ,
possible foreign influence on the ; even some Americans. Fact: More
than a decade ago, when a de facto
anti-war movement, the CIA ac- ,
: state of war existed between the
cumulated files on approximately
United States and Cuba, the CIA
to,000 American citizens.
The side effects of these investi-
involved itself in unsuccessful plots
to kill Fidel Castro. It also con-
gations, however, have proved
' sidered poisoning Patrice Lumumba
much more harmful to the country r,
than the ills that Congress sought to of the Republic of the Congo. But
remedy. As CBS commentator Eric the prosaic truth, as established by
Sevareid recently declared: "We've the skeptical Senate investigators, is
that the CIA never assassinated any-
had Congressmen breaking solemn
'
agreements with the Executive by one anywhere.
leaking classified information in the Hemorrhage of Secrets. As the .
name of higher laws of their sclec- CIA's legitimate secret operations
tion. We have had journalists break- are exposed and its sensitive intelli-
gence-gathering methods irresponsi-
ing their word on information bly illuminated, our first line of
received off the record by leaking it defense against attack?and. our
to other journalists, which is morally
the same as publishing it themselves, only defense against covert attack
----is
And, Nvorse, we've had zealots pub-
becoming increasingly para-
fishing the names of American in- ?lyzed. In foreign parliaments and
telligence personnel?which, in this press, the feasibility of confidential
time of terrorists everywhere, in-
collaboration with America has been
creases the risk of kidnapping d
publicly questioned. Some countries
an
have stopped confiding in us almost
murder. 'lb do this is to conitnit the
moral equivalent of treason."
entirely for fear their confidences
will be broken by Congress or the
The dubious acts committed by press. Individual foreigners who
the CIA have been distorted and phave risked their lives to secretly
magnified, while lurid charges flour-
17
serve the United States?including
agents well placed in the Soviet bloc
and the Third World?have quit
out of fear of identification. The
difficulty of enlisting reliable new.
foreign sources has increased greatly.
Meanwhile, scores of gifted
American men and women in the
CIA possessing priceless expertise
and experience have been disgusted
at the pillory with which their
patriotism has been rewarded, and
many have even left. Important in-
telligence undertakings, approved
by Congressional committees and
the President as. essential to the na-
tional interest, have collapsed in the
glare of publicity. For instance, dis-
closures that ;the United States has
used submarines in Soviet territorial
waters to monitor Russian weapons
tests have greatly diminished the
flow of? this vital intelligence.
Th hemorrhageof secrets is also
destroying the CIA's capacity to act
covertly in Western interes:s. Some-
times the discreet provision of
money, information, advice and
other requested help affords the only
practical means of countering sub-
version abroad.'Repeatedly? the So-
vier Union has sought to subvert
other nations by buying control of
politicians, bureaucrats, journalists
and trade-union leaders, by sur-
reptitiously supplying vast SUMS to
build the local communist party into
the dominant political force. Plans
to combat such subversion lose all
effectiveness if announced. if identi-
fied, recipients of our assistance for-
feit credibility and become instant
targets of venomous attack by com-
munists and others. .
Record of Success. In an ideal
world, we would need neither intel-
ligence services nor armed forces.
But we must have both if we are to
survive in the real world of 1976,
which has become very .unsafe for
democracy and the United States.
Of the earth's 158 nations, only 39
presently maintain democratic,.
representative governments and
open 'societies. Many of the totali-
tarian nations are fanatic in their
hostility to freedom and to Ameri-
ca. Our access to many indispensable
natural resources depends upon
fragile regimes. The complex daily
functioning of our society is threat-
ened by the phenomenon of inter-
national terrorism. Meanwhile, the
Russians?besides their worldwide
subversion, fomenting of revolution
and support of terrorism?persist in
an enormous, costly effort to attain
undisputed military supremacy with
which they hope to intimidate the
West into further retreat.
To cope with all these threats and
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uncertainties, we must keep our-
selves continuously and accurately
informed as to what is happening,
especially in those areas shrouded in
totalitarian secrecy. To repel covert
aggression, we must resort at times
to covert methods. President Harry
Truman and Congress recognized
this when they created the CIA in
1947. And this unchanged reality
has been recognized by every subse-
quent President?and Congress,
except the present one.
? Having served first on one of
the Congressional committees that
oversee our intelligence apparatus,
and later as Secretary of Defense, I
am familiar with some of the accom-
plishments of our intelligence serv-
ices. Consider:
During the past 25 years, the So-
viet Union has not developed a
single major new weapon without
our knowing it well in advance.
Without such knowledge, we un-
doubtedly would have wasted un-
told billions preparing to counter
threats which did not actually exist.
Current efforts to negotiate curtail.
ment of the nuclear-arms race are
possible only because our precise in-
telligence enables us to count every
Soviet missile, submarine and bomb-
er, and to monitor Soviet compliance.
with the treaties achieved. If we
destroy the effectiveness of the CIA,
we will destroy with it whatever
hope there is of negotiating any
significant disarmament.
Timely intelligence has helped
avert war. During the 1973 Arab-
Israeli conflicts, U.S. intelligence?
live agents and technical surveillance
?detected Soviet preparations to
dispatch troops to the Middle East.
Thus alerted, we were able to initiate
urgent diplomatic and other actions
that persuaded the Russians to forgo
military intervention.
A few years ago, our agents?or
spies, if you will?ascertained that
one non-communist country was
about to attack another. Details can-
not yet be made public. But we
quickly and privately brought the
countries together, laid out the facts,
induced them to negotiate. CIA
espionage thus prevented a war.
Since late 1973, U.S. intelligence
has given both Israel and Egypt con-
siderable sense of security by con-
tinuously showing each what the
other is doing militarily. Given
proof that neither is about to pounce
on the other, the Arabs and Israelis
have been willing at least to try to
devise. a formula for Middle East
harmony. Our intelligence has
bought the necessary time.
Through ingtration of various
iertorist 1130VeMents, the CIA has
aborted numerous plots. On at least
two occasions, the CIA has fore-
stalled assassins bound for the
United States with orders to kill
elected public officials. It has also
thwarted plans to kill prominent
Arrierican Jews with letter bombs.
While Israel's premier GoIda Meir
was visiting New York City on
March 4, 1973, police rushed to busy
midtown intersections and hauled
away two cars with enough Soviet-
made explosives to kill everybody
within a too-yard radius. The ter-
rorist explosives were timed to deto-
nate at noon, when streets would be
most crowded. The disaster was pre-
vented because we had advance
warning of it.
Shortly before Christmas, 1973, the
CIA learned that six small, hand-
carried Soviet SA-7 missiles?ex-
tremely accurate against low-flying
aircraft?were being smuggled in
Libyan diplomatic pouches to Black?
September terrorists in Europe. The
terrorists planned to shoot down a
747 landing in Rome. However, act-
ing on CIA intelligence, European
governments disrupted the operation
'and spared the lives of hundreds of
holiday travelers.
The CIA has Pustrated commu-
nist subversion of other nations.
After World War II, the Soviet Un-
ion sponsored a massive clandestine
effort to impose communist dicta-
torships on a weakened Western
Europe. Communist operatives, dis-
pensing millions of dollars, organ-
ized strikes to block Marshall Plan
aid and engender chaos. They in-
filtrated the press, tried to: buy elec-
tions. By providing intelligence,
money and counsel, the CIA gave
anti-totalitarian factions a fighting
chance to resist. Given this chance,
the Europeans proceeded to build
healthy democracies, indispensable
to our own Nvelfare.
During the 196os, with Soviet
backing, Cuba tried to ignite guer-
rilla warfare and violent revolution
in Latin America. While quietly
urging needed social reforms, the
CIA offered Latin Americans the
FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW';
APRIL 16, 1976
intelligence and training they needed
to repel Cuban aggression. The
communists were defeated .in Bo-
livia, Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay,
Guatemala and the Dominican Re-
public. Much the same pattern' was
repeated in sections of Africa where
the Russians sought to establish new
colonies for themselves. In the Mid-
dle East, too, the CIA has repeatedly
aborted Soviet plots to seize control
of Arab nations.
In retroipect, it is obvious that not
all of the covert actions undertaken
by the United States in the past zo
years have been wise or justified. I
strongly believe that we never again
should attempt to use military force
covertly. Military action can succeed
only if understood and endorsed by
the public as '?veIl as Congress. How-
ever, if we abandon our capacity to
discreetly help those who wish to
resist externally inspired subversion
?totalitarianism of either the left or
right?we will reduce ourselves to a
choice of abandoning them entirely
or sending in the Marines.
IN SUM: If we allow our intelli-
gence" services to be rendered impo-
tent, we will signal friend and foe
alike that we lack both the will and
the means to compete with totalitar-
ianism. Unable to protect ourselves,
.or our friends abroad, America
will shrink into isolationism, and
our economy, denied essential for-
eign resources, will shrivel. Then
we, and certainly our children, will
discover too late that there is no
place to hide from totalitarianism.
As a former Secretary of Defense,
I believe that we should maintain
armed forces stronger than those of
any potential enemy. But without an
equally strong intelligence service,
our nation can never be secure. I
know that. So do our friends and
antagonists throughout the world.
MELVIN R. LAIRD was a U.S. Congressman
from Wisconsin for ttS years, before serving-
as Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1973.
He is now Reader's Digest's senior counsellor
for national and international affairs,
THE CIA IN TOKYO: Claims by fanner US State Department official Roger
Hillsman that the American CIA has interfered in Japan's domestic politics.
confirmed long-standing Japanese suspicions. The CIA is thought to have been
infiltrating the country's top political, business and cultural circles since the
end of World War II. American intelligence agents reportedly relied on
Japanese officials to help them keep tabs on leftist movements in Japan, as
well as to monitor military and political developments in China and the
Soviet Union, and passed on anti-communist funds to conservative groups in.
the country via various US foundations set up in Japan after the war.
According to one source in Tokyo, a section in the US Embassy called the
Regional Programme Analysis Office is the current base for CIA, operations.
18
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THE TULSA TRIBUNE
16 April 1976
The
Congressional investigations of
the Central Intelligence Agency- un-
covered some juicy stuff ? assas-
sination plots. unauthorized snoop-
ing in private mail ? but there was
3ittle balance to the probes.
The result has been a weakened
.intelligence .community at a- time
when it should be at its strongest.
While most people obey humane in-
stincts, there is still a strong under-'
current of savagery threatening tt
undercut the foundations of civiliz-
e & society:
Thus, former Defense Secretary
MelVin-Laird's- article written for
? the Reader's Digest-. in ? 'defense of
the CIA, is needed, if belated, testi-
mony. Laird writes of terrorist plots
' to kill masses of people with bombs
and assassinate political leaders and
of the ?CIA's successful efforts in
heading off disaster
A -crucial' point worth .noting in
' Washington Post
7 May 1976
Cuba Plans Fiesta
? To Honor Its Spies
MEXICO CITY, ,May 6
,(AP)?The Cuban govern-
ment is planning a fiesta
June 6 in Havana to hon-
or Cuba's secret agents
and counterspies.
The Cuban news ae,ency
Prensa.Latina said yester-
day that the fiesta will be
one of several commernoe
rating the 15th anniver?
sary of the Interior Minis-
try.
"The efficient work of
the ministry has permitted
the Cuban revolution and
their top leaders to sur-
vive over the years." it ?
said.
It listed among the Min-
istry's achievements the
foiling of several plans by
the Central Inteili-
gence Agency to assusi-
nate Prime Minister IFflel
Castro and overthrow his
government.
It did not say if any of
the spies would attend the
festivities.
NEW YORK TIMES
7 MAY 1976
C.I.A.: The 534 Confidants
To the Editor:
The Church Committee's recom-
mendation to have future covert CAA.'
operations cleared in advance by
Congress (news story April 27) must.
come ,as a great relief to our under-
cover agents abroad. If put into law,
only 534 persons (all Senators and
Representatives) will have advantc.
knowledge of their dangerous missions.,
IlEarmar Lor.nEt,
Sherrnan, Conn., April 29, 197G
ther side
his account is that the terrorists
were prepared to kill hundreds of
innocent ? people to get their twisted
messages across. This is savagery
in its finest form. Yet, in the face
of this kind of threat. politicians
who should know better. have been
arguing that the CIA be put- on a
short leash. It is as if being gentle-
manly were more important than
being successful in dealing with
terrorism.
There should be limits; of course.
to the kinds of intelligence activi-
ties the CIA can undertake. But at
the same time those limits should
be 'placed with the understanding
that the other side .won't bother
with degrees of propriety.
While the debate on limits con-
tinues. so does political violence. As
New York Times columnist C. L.
Sulzberger noted on this page
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THE DALLAS TIMES HERALD
28 April 1976
Thursday, West Germany. France
and Britain have become so con-
cerned about it that they arc forget-
ting their differences to cooperate
more closely. They may not be able
Id unite economically, but. on the
issue of terrorism they are one.
Even so. they know that any ef-
fort to combat the waves of violence
will be more successful if the United
States' intelligence resources are
brought to bear. That is why they
express amazement at the attacks
-On the American intelligence com-
munity.
The CIA has made mistakes. some
of them serious. But it has also per-
formed well in its missions.
And it is one -of the hazards of
the game that all' of its successes
may never become known. Laird's
disclosure:: of a few of them should
suggest that there have been more.
reats to securN
THE ISSUE: The Senate intelli-
? gence committee's recommendation
for reforming intelligence agencies.
THE DEMOCRATIC majority of
the Select Senate Committee on
:Intelligence is ready to endanger the
security of the United States to
prove a point ? that intelligence
gathering agencies, and especially
the CIA, have gone to extremes and
committed abuses which go far
'beyond the intent of their creation.
This majority would prove the
point by passing detailed restrictive
legislation for monitoring and con-
trolling the operations of the
agencies, again especially the CIA.
The intent of the committee re-
garding hamstringing of U. S. intel-
ligence is apparent from. recom-
mendations in its report covering
investigation of the spy agencies'
foreign activities.
Certainly, t It e committee per-
formed a service in- revealing ex-
cesses, abuses and waste in the the
operations of the nation's intelli-
gence apparatus. These lapses
should be corrected.
But in its welter of recommenda-
tions ? 86 of them ? the cornm;t-
tee would not merely impose needed
reforms, it would so straitjacket the
agencies as to strip them of their
effectiveness.
The core recommendation, in
particular, is untenable on this
ground. It proposes the creation of a
single congressional committee with
virutally unlimited powers in the
monitoring and control of the intel-
ligence agencies.
This oversight super committee
would be kept informed in detail on
the activities and operation of the
CIA and other spy agencies and
would be authorized to release this
information to the public if it elects
to do so.
T h e experience wit Ii congres-
sional committees foretells clearly
what would happen if that recom-
mendation becomes law. What
information the committee did not
formally release ? and that no
doubt would be considerable ? it
would leak.
The result would be to keep the
whole world informed on U. S.
intelligence activites and the knowl-
edge this nation possesses about
adversaries' plans an d intents.
Also, the committee would be
informed in advance of foreign cov-
ert operations which would just
about nullify the possibility of such
operations.
Efficient, effective foreign intel-
ligence is vital to the security of
this country. The Senate commit-
tee's proposals, if enacted into law,
would effectively guarantee the ab-
sence of anything more than a token
U. S. intelligence program.
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WASI-il NOM) STAR
27 April 1976
Lots of Life Left Yet
In 'Rogue Elephant'
Just before the Senate Select Com-
mittee presented, amid conspicuous
self-congratulation, Volume I of its
report on the intelligence community,'
the CIA scored yet another coup.
Director George Bush hurried up to
the Caucus Room for a secret session
with the senators and implored them
to keep the intelligence budget a se-
cret. The committee voted a typical
compromise: They would pass the
buck to the full Senate.
So on page 270 of the report, where
-the numbers ought to be, there are
blank spaces. Considering that last
week the Supreme Court ruled that
it's okay for the Feds to look at your
bank account, you have to say that
government secrecy is, in this Biceff-
tennial of our liberty, gaining over
? individual privacy.
The Senate could, ot course, gather
up its courage and assert that people
who can't keep their own bank
records a secret have the right to
'know how money, they give to the,
government is being spent by the'
spooks.
One of the arguments made by
some who voted against immediate
disclosure was that it might make it
easier to persuade the Senate to
create an oversight committee. The
fact that there is any question at all
about such a committee ? one which
might include a soul or two who?
would not melt at the mention of
'"national security" ? suggests how
splendidly the CIA has weathered the
LONDON TIMES
29 April 1976
The
storm of congressional investigation.
FIFTEEN MONTHS AGO, when
the "rogue elephant" was dragged
into public view for examination of
its ugliness, some people said there
was nothing to do with the beast but
'shoot it. But as the revelations
mounted about its domestic spying,
its consumption of banks, newspaper
and airlines, its habits of buying
foreign elections and foreign officials,
a Watergate conditioned citizenry
turned away. People didn't want to
'war about it.
Now there is no doubt about the
beast's survival. The committee did
not even recommend an outright ban
on covert activities, although it did
suggest less promiscuous use.
Nobody has been punished, either,
for what was done, or for failing to
tell the truth about it.
The secretary of state and the for-
mer director of the CIA, Richard
Helms, who is our ambassador to
Iran, made contradictory ? to say
the least ? statements about Chile
and domestic spying to congressional
committees.
Chairman Frank Church, who is
running for the presidency, has not
made a federal case of it. The record,
he said was sent to the Justice De-
partment. Nothing has happaned.
, Atty. Gen. Edward Levi went be-
fore the committee just before Bush.
He was trying to censor some lan-
guage in Volume H relative to illegal
domestic spying. That suggests
whose side he is on. No prosecutions,
particularly in an election year, seem
likely.
THE COMMITTEE wants the'
attorney general to be added to the,
National Security Council. He would
presumably warn the plotters when
they were about to break the law.
Neither of two previous attorneys
general, Robert Kennedy and John
Mitchell, seemed particularly sensi-
tive on this point. Kenndy was involv-
ed in Cuban plots. Mitchell. appears
tines
11151fiZWEA? alga
lary
..L.4,4 ?
CIA settle a heated argument?
One of the revelations in the
latest report on the Central
Intelligence Agency settles an
old dispute. The CIA did,
indeed, fabricate the "Penkov-
sky Papers". These Were the
alleged memoires of Oleg Pen-
kovsky, a senior Russian official
who spied for the West, was
caught and shot.
The report says: Another
CIA book, The Penkovskp
Papers, was published in the
United States in I96S .` for
operational reasons", but actu-
ally became commercially
viable. The book was prepared
and written, by witting (sir)
agency ;ts,ets (sic) N., ho drew on
actual case materials.
"Publication rights were sold
to a publisher through a trust
fund which was established for
that purpose. The publisher
was unaware cf any US Govern.
ment interest."
The Penkovskp Papers were
serialized by The Observer when
the book came out and many
reviewers hod doubts about
their authenticity. Not so
Robert Conquest, who devoted
an article lost August, in his
news-sheet Soviet Analyst, to a
defence of the authtmicity of
the papers and an attack on
our Washington correspondent,
Patrick Brogan, who had ore n.
tinned them in an article as a
palpable fake.
never to have read the Constitution.
"We are trying to deepen account-
ability," says Sen. Walter F. Mon-
dale, D-Minn. A
Accountability was a word un-
known at CIA headquarters. Things
. were set in train on one man's orders
to a chosen few. He did not tell his as-
sociates or the inspector general.
. When things went sant.; the papers
were destroyed and all kept mum.
Nothing quite illuminates the ice-
cold arrogrance of the agency better
than a memo written by Richard
Helms during the period when the CIA
was conducting experiments with
LSD on unwitting subjects.
"While I share your uneasiness and
distaste for any program which tends
to intrude upon an individual's pri-
vate and legal prerogatives. I believe
it is necessary that the agency main-
tain a central role in this activity,
keep current on enemy capabilities
on the manipulation of human behav-
ior and maintain an offensive capa-
bility."
SO DR. FRANK OLSON, unbe-
knownst to himself, was given a glass
of Cointreau with 70 micrograms of
LSD in it on Nov. 19, 1953. Eight days
later, he threw himself out of a New
York hotel room window.
Nobody was responsible. The indi-
viduals involved were shown a repri-
mand for "bad judgment," one which
they were assured would not be made
part of their official personnel file.
George Bush says they don't do
things like that any more. He says
the, beast has been housebroken.
Many members of Congress want to
believe him, just as they preferred
not to know what was going on at the
time.
There ought to be a law, and Con-
gress may get around to writing one.
But as the vote on the money showed,
it's not a sure thing.
? .
LONDON TIMES
29 April 1976
y activities 'undermlned
constitutional rights'
From Our Own Correspondent
Washington, April 28
The second volume of the
Senate intelligence committees
report, issued today, says that
" intelligence activities have
undermined the constitutional
rights of citizens'.
It adds that this is because
"checks and balmtces designed
by the framers of the constitu-
tion to assure accountability
have not been applied":
The report contains very little
that is new. Earlier reports,
notably that prepared by the
Rockefeller counnissien last
year, gave roost of the details
of the use by various govern-
_
20 .
ments of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, the Federal
Bureau of investiga:ion and
other instruments of govern-
ment, to spy on Americans.
Like the first volume, pub-
lished on Monday, which dealt
with foreign intelligence, it
gives a detailed account of the
workings of the most secret
branches of the American Gov-
ernment. We now know for
more about the CIA and the
FBI and about how decisions in
intelligence matters are made
in Washington titan we do
about any other secret service
in the world.
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WASIIINGTON STAR
28 April 1976
Charles Bartlett _
That's no `rogue ele
The rogue elephant turns
out to be a. harness horse
under slack rein in the final
chapter of Sen. Frank
? Church's epic investigation
of the CIA.
To Church's credit, he
swallows his metaphor, ele-
phant and all, to erase the
picture he drew last year of
a wild agency on the loose.
The CIA is "not out of con-
trol," he concedes. It is a
tractable agency that has
been loosely supervised by
a series of presidents and
Congresses as it carried out
a difficult mandate under a
loosely-worded charter.
After spending $3 million
and 185 man-years, the
Church committee has
made no substantial addi-
tions to the abuses cited 10
months ago by the Rocke-
feller Commission. Since
President Ford has already
imposed strenuous precau-
tions against repetition of
those abuses, the report will
merely serve to stir more
?
,dust unless it persuades the
Senate to organize its sur-
veillance of intelligence
under a single oversight
,committee. This does not .
Washington Post
7 May 1976
7
.ttawel s As
7
Of
:Soy Grouns
I
seem likely to happen.
By sober handling of a
mass of sensitive material
and by negotiating respon-
sibly with the executive
branch at every turn, the
Church committee has
demonstrated that a perma-
nent committee would be
valuable in bridging the gap
between the secrecy requir-
ed by intelligence opera-
tions and the Congress's
need to know.
The committee went off
the track only once, in
bloodhounding the leads of
its chief counsel, Frederick
Schwarz, on the assassina-
tion issue. This diversion
protracted the inquiry by
six months, introduced
partisan concerns, and fed
an impression that Church
was bent on drawing atten-
tion to his presidential bid.
To force the nation to exam-
ine its conscience on using
assassination as a tool of
foreign policy, the commit-
tee paid the price of feeding
the Soviets some rich
propaganda.
A new dust storm will
arise from the report's dis-
closure that the CIA deals
HERALD, Miami
24 April 1976
Reflto Nm< servic,.
. PHILADELPHIA -- A na-
tional Quaker orqzmizinion
has called for the a;:c,litioa
of the Central
Ag:mcy and the Inter: :11 Se-
curity Division of the lr-
at of Irvesti.: eoin.
The, board of direc:ors of ?
the American Priencis Serv?
ice
Commit' .11."SC?
calle:1 on Con.:ress
hibit an2.7 Sltixesz:or
trom :.zurLeii-.
lance and in:rassineat i.f
,citizen's groups that have
not taken, par: UI LI lIla s* ul
activities. ?
."The repeated violations
of thcse alencies man-
dates." it said.. "havo so
uomisalkahly compromised ?
these two bodies Coat it is
ecftai:i they arc beyond sal-
va4e ta. a,4encies in which
Americans . corn idently
P!ace their trust:"
It aildi..t1 that -the prat,.
which brouiI. iht
two bodies nito Iir(' Mite.
roust be unequivocally co4.
ed, for the s:inie
commit: v(1 by
bo
ev,11,!:- as if tli?v %,?i?ri? under-
takcii bN' the (AA or toe lift"
'lane after all
with several hundred "aca-
demics" from over 10G
American colleges in its
pursuit of intelligerce. It
disturbs the committee-that
professors who take srbbat-
keels to ipteresting places
are invited to share their
observations with the gov-
ernment. Sometimes they
are paid; often they am not
They do not perform as
agents, merely as patriotic
citizens who have been
trained as specialists.
To most people, this will
appear a very normal,
harmless kind of coolvra-
tion. But to the Church com-
mittee,.it is a transgression
of the moral purity 'which
the nation must reflect. The
senators want the comtry?
to be a model of virtue and
self-restraint, not a st-tkied
back-alley scrapper- As
Church says, "The'United
States must acquire a long-
er view of history."
Happily, the committee
checked its impulse to
translate this sentiment into
a ban on all the dirty covert
actions. The senators react-
ed to a toughening of tle na-
tional mood and to intgna-
tion over the CIA circus in
the House by pulling back
from their inclination to
proscribe all the activities
which may muddy the na-
tional reputation. But this is
really the crux of the post-
Vietnam divergence on for-
eign policy and it deserves
to be debated until a con-
sensus develops.
This is the kind of issue
with which the committee
and Congress should con-
cern themselves instead of
focusing on the details of
intelligence management.
With Congress so badly
organized and unable even
to arrange for efficient
supervision of intelligence
activities, the committee
will not be taken seriously
when it attempts to shift
around the CIA's organiza-
tional chart. The committee
has tried to behave respon-
sibly, however, and time
alone will tell whether its
disclosures helped more
than they hurt. But a swift
test of the Senate's reaction
to all it has learned will
come on the May 6 vote to
create a single oversight
committee. ?
enate Report on Intelligence
Needs to Name Some Names
? ON Monday the Senate Select Com-;
mittee on Intelligence will issue A re-
port on the domestic activities of such
? agencies as the FBI and the CIA which
tells all. Well, some of alli?:fht--.-Teport,
? we are told, names no names.
Among the nameless are an uncount-
ed number of newspaper reporters who
acted as informants for the FBI. It is
not clear whether they were paid off in
money; which would be a conflict of
professional interest, or whether .they
were paid off in news tips, which is the
same as money in the bank for any en-
terprising journalist..
Anyone who knows anything about
the criminal justice system understands
perfectly well that many crimes cannot
be solved without the use of infor-
mants. Most police agencies maintain
funds for this purpose, and it is regard-
ed as legitimate. Further, any citizeu
who sees a crime committed or has in-
...formation about a breach of the law
should feel obligated to.report it to 1113
FBI or any other official investigative
agency.
The systematic ,use of journalists as
21
formers, then cloaking them in ano-
nymity, is quite another matter. Until a
halt supposedly was called around
1973, certain intelligence .services
were used for political purposes and the
informers were not criminal informers
- but persons reacting to someone's prej-
udice or pique.
? So a whole profession is left under a
cloud when only a few unnamed mem-
bers of it are guilty, as the Senate select
committee evidently thinks. in bringing
the matter .up at all, of improper con-
duct. .
Investigations of wrongdOing are less
than honest ? or worse than that less
than useful?when they name no names
and nail down no responsibility.
-Sen. Frank Church, the select com-
mittee's chairman, has won himself a
lot of linage, though not much mileage,
in weeks of sensational hearings. If
these are to be followed by a report
which fails- to identify the bodies, then
It will be, as wanting in credibility as it
excels in blind damaging accusati)n.
? We'll just have to see.?
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rilijE DESTRI1 NEWS, Salt Lake City, Utah ?
28 April 1976
rag)
r be, Ili
like hero than vil
ff The remarkable thing about the CIA
is not the number of abuses for which it
-is responsible but the fact the agency
t'didn't make considerably more blunders
'?-flian it did.
? .
e? If that point in the Central Intellig-
ence Agency's favor wasn't ,apparent
:before, it should be now with the release
.this week of the results of the exhaustive
'investigation by the Senate intelligence
,committee.
-- The inyestigation found there is no
e.systematic review by the White HOuse of
'either sensitive, foreign espionage or
counterintelligence activities.
For Congress' part, the lawmakers
'have failed to provide the 'necessary
guidelines to ensure that intelligence
'agencies Icarry out their work in accor-
41ance. with constitutional processes.
,
,...Moreover, the FBI rather , than
.being paranoid' about -foreign spies
vithin.the as ,some of its critics
eli.arged not given enough atten-
tion to this problem, partly because of
? insufficient manpower for counterintel-
1
t,e rice . ? .
The.. -Senate.: committee's report
i'Aiould be read, then, as not so much a
? le.riticKrn of the- intelligence community
qtseif asit is a criticism of those-elected
Officials in, both . the executive and
legislative branches..who bear ultimate
responsibility .for controlling intellig-
,enee operations. , ?
'Keep in. mind, too, that when the
Senate intelligence committee began its
investigation 15 months ago, the inves-
tigators were anything but friendly and
sympathetic toward the CIA.
When, even the CIA's toughest critics'
find the agency was given insufficient
supervision, it seems clear the CIA could
easily' hia've, committed many more.
"dirty tricks" abroad had it been of a
? mind to do so. The very fact the CIA was,
-in-Abe words of the Senate report, "not
.,out -.of control" is something of - a
-Itestiinony to the agency's self-discipline
"and internal controls.
The report contains no sensations or
"surprises. "Its'- major; recommendations
?..,-L:particularly establishment of a per-
in'anent intelligence oversight commit-
tee in Congress ? have been thoroughly
discussed .and analyzed before. Most of
them represent an objective effort to
prevent blunders by .making sure the
intelligence community gets outside
input, and to pinpoint responsibiIity,
which often lies outside the intelligence
.agencies.
One recommendation which seems
highly inadvisable, however, is that the
.overall budget for intelligence activities
be made public.
It's hard to imagine any useful
purpose being served by this suggestion.
The comparison of intelligence spending
during one particular year to that of
another year is, in. itself, largely mean-
ingless. Figures on intelligence sperairing
can't be evaluated in any meaningful
way without also disclosing the specific ..
intelligence programs involved. And
those specifics can't be disclosed without
impairing the effectiveness of the CIA.If
anyone thinks the disclosure of an
overall spending figure will help prevent
waste in the CIA, such disclosure
unfortunately hasn't prevented waste in
other federal agencies.
As Congress and the public read the
Senate corrfrnittee's report. the recom-
mendations for tightening control over
?the CIA should not be allowed to
overshadow a little-noticed facet of the
study ?
' Intense attempts by the Soviet Union
to get at American secrets require a
bigger and more sophisticated U.S.
counterintelligence effort than ever
before.
The opening of American deepArater
? ports to. Russian ships in 1972, w? the
committee note, has given Soviet ag-
ents easy access to all of the 'United
?States. Frequent attempts have been.
made- by Moscow to infiltrate federal
government and congressional offices.
An estimated 40% to 60% or the?
personnel in Soviet embassies are in-
volved in intelligence-gathering .ac-
tivities. Since 1960, Soviet access to the
U.S. has tripled and is still increasing.
Clearly; there is 3 continuing need for
the U.S. to maintain a strong:. and
effective foreign and military .intellig-
.ence apparatus.: ?
22
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
19 April 1976
From DAVID TONGE
Athens, April 18
? Efforts over a long period to
build up -.the Lebanese
Phalangists. from Athens, now
reportedly the CIA's command
post in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean, are alleged in an inter-
view with a former American
intelligence officer, Winslow
Peck, publi5hed here this
weekend. ?
One of the main tasks of
Richard Welch, the head of the
Athens CIA station who was
murdered on December 23, had
: been to activate the Phalangists
and right-wing Palestinian
groups. Mr Peck claims in the
magazine Anti, adding that his
task, "in other words had been
to kindle the war."
He 'says that the CIA now
uses American banks in Athens
to finance the Phalangists and
that the majority of the CIA
command here is now working
.on the stituation in Lebanon.
The US Embassy refuses to
make any comment on these
claims.
, Mr Peck had been an analyst
with America's main informa-
'tion gathering organisation, the
National Security Agency
(NSA), working for it in Istan-
bul, Vietnam, and at the Paris
peace talks, as well as in the
United States. He has now
"defected " to the anti-CIA
lobby and cooperates closely
with the Washington rnagane
Count er-spy.
argues that the only
- guarantee of safety for a'
former agent is to publish what
he knows but that he himself
'only discloses what he thinks
people need to kmow. He cri-
ticises the Cypriot Nikos Samp-
son for threatening to " reveal
all" saying that threats before
publication make one a "dead
man.".
The NSA, in Mr Peck's view,
is probably the "most effectlye
espionage organisation in the
world," with communications
posts- including installations at
"Checksey," in England ? pes-
sibly a misprint for Chertsey
?at Diego Garcia, on Malta,
and in one British base on
Cyprus also used by the CIA.
But the CIA he describes as'
a ? " secret criminal police
force." Ile attributes to it 25
coups carried out between 064
and 1973,. but says that its
various failures have meant
that since 1970 the Penatagon
has begun to compete with it
in this field.
' lie argues that developments
In ,the Middle .1.lo!it 111Ciirl that
the Athens CIA iitation,
he elaims now has .1
170. has taken over the re-it'
earlier by the ,tati.ils
in Cyprus, 1;i?init and T.
The CIA faces no danger /ram
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the present Greek Government,
he comments. The police ser-
vices in Greece "were always
controlled by the CUP.
? 'Mr Peck argues that the CIA
was involved in the 1967 Coup,
? one US official has told me
privately that it had known the
exact plans for the coup six
weeks before it happened..
Mr Peck also stresses the
links bdtween the CIA and the
Colonels while, separately, tin
an.interview with a representa-
tive of the Pike committee on
intelligence, the former US
Ambassador, Henry Tasea, was
specific about these and in par-
ticular about the regular con-
tacts between the former dic-
tator, Ieannides and the then
head of the CIA station, Stacy
Hulse.
The history of Cyprus : he
describes as a typical example
of CIA intervention" in . a
foreign country. The CIA was
behind the intercommunal vio-
lence Which came to a. head
in 1964, he claims, since it was
apparently concerned lest
Makariot establish too strong L.
? positi'on.
Mr Peck describes later meet-
ing Mr Welch, who had 'then
been serving for the CIA in
:Cyprus. He says Mr Welch
asked him proudly: "You saw
What .I did in Cyprus in 1964?"
' The accusation that the CIA
and Dr Kissinger had planned
the overthrow of Makarios ?
a charge which was being made
? angrily by Mr Papandreou in
.the Greek Parliament yesterday
?? is also made by ,Mr Peek,'
though he says they had not ?
foreseen the T,urhish landing.
"A Government of Sampson
in Cyprus and the Colonels in
Greece would have completely
served US interests in this part
of the world," he says, claiming
that Sampson had long been a
man ? of the CIA and EOKA
had been financed by it through .
the junta.
? Police investigations into the
murder of, Welch have failed
to throw up any leads so far.,
The death occurred after his
naming in the Greek press by
a "committee of Greeks and
Greek Americans concerned to
?prevent their fatherland being
perverted to the -uses of the
CIA" and this - committee
appears to have no connection.
whatsoever with the Counter-
spy magazine.
NE'..ISWEEK
? 17 MAY 1976
TERROR IN TEHERAN ?
Iran's revolutionary under-
ground has been getting guid-
ance from the Marxist Popular
Front for the Liberation of Pal-
estine led by George Habash
(top photo). One band of Iran--
ians that had marked Shah Mo-
hammed Reza Pahlavi and U.S.
Ambassador Richard Helms
(bottom photo) for death was
trained by PFLP Arab terrorists.
The CIA moved in after the
Helms plot was uncovered (and
three U.S. colonels were mur-
dered) and helped local securi-
ty forces round up the terrorists.
Nine were executed in January
and the organization, Teheran
says, has been broken up!
WASHINGTON STAR
3 MAY 1976
Charles Bartlett
Portugal and covert
In days when covert 'ac-
tion is condemned as a re-
sort not worthy of the
? United States, it is interest-
ing to examine the re-emer-
gence of Portugal as a
democratic state.
The elections in Portugal
have given the Portuguese
assurance they will not be
; swept into the iron embrace
, of Communists or oligarchs.
; They have a shattered
economy and a weak tradi-
tion of parliamentary rule.
But they have at least won
a chance to gratify their
taste for freedom and
democracy.
In a two-year revolution,
Portugal barely escaped
the steely reach of the
, Communists and the oppor-
tunism of military officers
, riding the emotions releas-
ed by the: end of the
Salazar-Caetano regime. In
smashing the oligarchic
control, the Portuguese
gave vent to an orgy of self-
indulgence that left them
badly exposed.
Having won 40 per cent of
the seats in the new assem-
bly, the Socialists intend to
'try to rule without coalesc-
ing to the left or right. They
will not join the Commu-
nists, who have 15 per cent
of the seats, because they
do not trust. their commit-
ment to free government.
They will not join the
parties of the right because
?they do not share their en-
thusiasm for restoring the.
capitalist past.
BALTIMORE SUN
10 May 1976
The Socialists will be toe-
ing a narrow line. They
need to keep faith with "the
revolution" while they build
confidence among investors
? at home and abroad. 'They
must lure the elite with tal-
ent and capital back from
;Brazil while they keep the
masses satisfied that the
?
game is being played in
their name. They will need
to placate and propitiate
the military, who will be
lurking in the background
as the ultimate guarantors
of the new constitution.
The balancing act will be
hazardous for the minority
of Socialists, unavoidably
hobbled by the intrigues
and frictions for which Por-.
tuguese politicians are
especially notorious. The
elections gave a majority to
the parties of the left but
economic recovery will re-
quire significant deference
to sentiment on the right.
The politicians will gain
some discipline from their
awareness that the nation
will land back in an authori-
tarian basket if they fail to
negotiate their differences.
; Delicate as it seems, the
evolving situation is an im-
pressive tribute to all who
struggled through dramatic
, days to keep the country out
of Communist control. And
to the extent that outside
help was furnished them, it.
is to the CIA's great credit
that the helping hand was
agile and light enough to es-
cape detection. -
The Killing of Joh
The assassination of President Kennedy
more than a dozen years ago still haunts and
troubles the nation. The Warren Commission re-
port, with its conclusion that Lee Harvey Os-
veld acted alone, has withstood the tests of
time better than the instant attacks on it. But
suspicions of a Cuba connection will not vanish.
On the contrary, they thrive. When such a non-
conspiratorially-minded, responsible lnd in-
formed official as Senator Mathias speaks of a
"strong likelihood" of such a connection, that
likelihood must be investigated.
What Senator Mathias did, however, was
throw out a teaser, not add to knowledge. The
Warren Commission knew that Oswald had been
to Cuba. A year ago, the nation understood that
President Kennedy, using the CIA, had been
trying to assassinate Premier Castro. That was
23
aid
The probings of the
Church committee on intel-
ligence have left some
Democratic senators highly
critical of covert action by
the CIA. Noting that the
CIA has executed some 900
covert actions since 1961,
they complain that these ef-
forts too often bring oppro-
brium on the United States
or weaken the will and self-
reliance of the anti-Commu-
nists being helped. They
suggest these efforts are
not worth their costs to the
ethics and morality of
American leadership.
But it seems reasonable
to assume that American
intelligence found ways to
strengthen the forces en-
gaged against the Commu-
nists during Portugal's or-
deal. The help that came
was unobtrusive, no swash-
buckling effort to preserve
the status quo or discourage
the reformers. The results
show that the help was not
? corruptive or disruptive. It
was essentially nourish-
ment for the cause of free-
dom.
A congressional determi--
nation that American
foreign policy must not be
tainted by the undercover
arts could have ruled this
help out. The Communists
would have been denied
their chance to talk of "im-
perialist intrigues." But the
Portuguese might also have
been denied their chance to
? elect a government.
Kennedy
motive enough, if the Cuban dictator chose to
reciprocate, and was withheld from the Warren
Commission. What Senator Mathias has added is
a lurid spy tale of a contact in Paris in the CIA
plot to kill Castro on the day Kennedy died, with
"indications" that the Cuban, "Am-Lash," was a
double agent who would have told all to
Havana.
The Senate intelligence committee, accord-
ing to Senator Mathias, a member, will soon re-
port on the strong likelihood of which he spoke.
If it is more convincing than what he has re-
vealed, and is as convincing as he implies, then
a new presidential commission to investigate
the first Kennedy assassination will be needed.
Its reference must be the Cuban activities of the
CIA as withheld from the Warren Commission.
That is, of course, a big if.
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Christian Science Monitor
20 April 1976
Charge denied
CV?I NSA
accises of
ii1V0hie e t
hi
Leban
By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Athens
The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
and National Security Agency (NSA) are now
using Athens as a main Mideast headquarters
and are aiding the rightist Phalange Party in
Lebanon's civil war. So charges a former NSA
staffer.
Winslow Peck, interviewed in Paris by the
Athens biweekly maga/me Anti, is with the
Washington magazine Counterspy which sin-
gled out Richard Welch as a CIA agent. Mr_
Welch was assigned as CIA station chief in
Athens and murdered last Dec. 23. His murder-
ers were not apprehended. Greek judicial au-
thorities forbid discussion of the case in news-
papers here.
Mr. Peck says he was assigned to the CIA
station here with the mission to keep the fires
burning in the Lebanese civil war by moving
aid to the Phalange and rightist Palestinians
through Athens banks.
(Top U.S. sources in Washington have firmly
denied to this reporter that there is CIA help
for any Lebanese faction. Christian Lebanese
refugees interviewed here said they believe the
CIA has made it easier for the Phalange to ob-
tain funds to buy arms. Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat
has produced no evidence for his frequent
charge that the CIA assists Lebanese right-
ists.)
Mr. Peck, who says he worked at the Istan-
bul NSA station from 1966 to 1968 and later in
Indo-China on communications intelligence,
claims that Mr. Welch bragged to him that
during his (Mr. Welch's) 1964 Cyprus duty, Mr.. -
Welch had helped instigate Greek-Turkish trou-
bles.
Mr. Peck further charges that Mr. Welch
was a CIA case 'officer for Nikos Sampson,
briefly president of the Greek Cypriot adminis-
tration set up by the Athens military junta af-
ter its coup against President Makarios in
THE CHICP30 TRIBUNE
2 May 1.97E,
Reporting the' new ,
Even superspies are proper sources
July, 1974.
Mr. Peck calls Cyprus a classic example of
a CIA-sponsored coup, with overall supervision
by U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.
He says the 1967 Greek military coup also had
CIA involvement, but that after 1970 responsi-
bility for overseas coup operations passed
largely to the Pentagon.
He calls Mr. Sampson ? soon due for trial in
Nicosia ? a paid CIA agent. He says the CIA
also channeled funds through Athens to the
anti-Makarios EOKA-B underground in Cyprus.
(Washington congressional hearings last fall
disclosed a CIA-EOKA-B connection. Former
U.S. Ambassador to Greece Henry Tasca's de-
position indicated Secretary Kissinger did not
inform Mr. Tasca of the two-way junta-CIA in-
formation flow.
(Prime Minister Caramanlis's government
has indefinitely postponed trials of Greek offi-
cers implicated in the Cyprus coup. Some of
them threatened to disclose CIA links. Sources
close to Greek police officials believe the
Welch murder probe indicated EOKA-type
Cypriot involvement. But like inquiries into the
murder of U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Rodger
Davies during an attack on the U.S. Embassy
in Nicosia in August, 1974, they never reached
the point of pressing charges.)
Mr. Peck says that during his own Istanbul
Service, Greeks and Turks often requested and
obtained information on each other developed
by the NSA.
By David Halvors'en
Assistant to the editor
? Last week's reports of the Senate Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence activities,
.may have given the . impression. that .
? scores of editors and reporters were
dupes of our nation's superspies. In fact, s
there are some newspeople who believe e
this Is the case and are quite voluble on,
the subject.
We have 'always believed that the .
highest calling in journalism is report-
ing and that the best reporters are the
shrewd, .street-wise ? men and women ,1
'who develop solid news sources.
A phone call, late at night,: a tip
passed along over a couple of beers, or '
secret meetings in some obscure place
have resulted in numberless stories that
have sent criminals to jails and saved
the taxpayers millions of dollars. To
me, there was never any doubt that
.this was what news work was all about.
, Furthermore, any reporter with ()Elsie
skills vil1 promptly ask himself why he
is. getting tips like those. He will check
, them out. If the information is correct
and he offers the story. to his' editors,
they?will challenge his?accuracy.
But there there is an emerging countervie?:
Proponents of this view seem to be say-
ing that sources pass on only informa-
tion which is self-serving. Therefore,
such sources cannot be ?trusted,' partic-
ularly , if they are in government, and
more particularly if they are in law
enforcement. or intelligence.
The' holders of this view reason that
any reporter friendly to the Federal I3u-
reau of Investigation, the Central Litchi-
gence. Agency, or state or local police,
must be a lackey of the government.
Friendly reporters get stories- that are
planted in the newspapers, it is held.
This argument seems to .suggest that
there exists a lever propaganda appa-
ratus set up by furtive agents, in the.
'abandoned coal bins of gray government
buildings. ?A reporter picks up his tele-
phone to hear Agent Q tell him in con-
spiratorial tones that all left-handed
golfers who drive pink station wagons
are Communists.
Then, this view holds ? that through
some journalistic mystique the reporter
is able to get the story into the paper
without the scrutiny of editors. We are
dubious of such an idea.
Such a view, seems to say that a re-
porter should have ,no sources at . all.
Bather, he best serves the public inter....
est by sitting in the 'newsroom and pon-
tificating on how things should be. At
the very least, the viewpoint suggests
that antiestablishment sources should be
heard and official sources, ignored'.
The Senate committee's reports con-
elude fairly that United States foreign
and domestic intelligence agencies have
tried to manipulate the press. There can
be no question that some reporters and
editors have been used and that some
stories unfavorable to the FBI or CIA
have been killed.
But the critics of the traditional news-
gathering processes are suggestinat' radi-
cal surgery, lopping off the hezid. ?
'rho Senate report includes what ap-
parently is a reference to a story written
by Ronald Koziol, a Tribune investiga-
tive reporter, about factionalism in the
Students for a Democratic Society in
if they
are ri
1968.. It said the story was planted by
the FBI with. a friendly reporter to stir
,up trouble.
? Some may think this column self-serv-
ing in that it defends a Tribune associ-
ate. Koziol needs no 'defense from this
quarter. Subsequent stories bear out the
fact that his story was substantially ac-
curate. Furthermore, his informa;:ipn.
'came from non-FBI sources outside of
Chicago.
Last year, .Koziol wrote stories that
were critical of the FBI search for Pa-
tricia Hearst. He described missed op-
portu?nities to find her. The FBI let The
Tribune know it did not like the Koziol
stories, .but it could not challenge their
?
accuracy. In total, Mr. Koziol's stories
were hardly the 'work of a friendly re-
porter.
Several years ago The Tribune pub-
lished a series of articles about police
brutality in ?Chicago. Some of the 'best
work was done by reporters. who have
close friends in the Chicago Police De-
partment.
If by any measure the so-called estab-
lishment has been successful in planting
contrived stories in the newspapers, its
victories have been few.
The Senate report said the FBI re-
peatedly and covertly attempted to ma-
nipulate the news media. It did not say
it succeeded, though assuredly it did in
some cases.
seems that some fellow newspcople
are suffering from paranoia. The te.M. is
Whether the story Is accurate and fairly
reported, not whether it came f;:ora your
friendly FBI agent. ,
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24
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POST, New York
28 Apiil 1976
)
r,i
% rT?
Harriet
Van
Van Horne
- `lea 47e27 IV?:=11,Ta THE SPY REPORT
If you could combine Grand Guignol horror, comic
opera, science fiction and the more brutish tactics of a
Fascist police state you would have a generally fair picture
of what the CIA has been up to?with our tax dollars?since
1947. -
After a 15-month investigation, the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence has reached the sensible conclusion
that new laws are needed to control the superagency that
has become a secret state within the state.
In one 14-year period, the report says, this agency, set
up to protect us from foreign devils, has broken the law
at home, plotted to assassinate heads of 'state and con-
ducted small, secret wars entirely on its own.
.* * ?*-
While noting that the agency had performed some mis-
sion S "with dedication and security," an average citizen gets
the feeling, as he pores over this report, that many CIA
operations were carried out with the idealism of Dr. Strange-
love and the finesse of Bugs Bunny., ?
Some of the incidents described would be hilarious were
they not so sinister. Others Make you wonder how so many
depraved minds could have functioned undetected for so
many years in a U.S. government agency.
Perhaps the most monstrous operation disclosed in the
Senate report concerned the dr u g gin g of unsuspecting
drunks in bars on the East and West Coasts. It's the sort
of story that brings back memories of those insane Nazi
scientists who performed unspeakable experiments on preg-
nant women and newborn infants.
For nine years, beginning in 1954, CIA agents randomly
picked up bar patrons and slipped LSD into their food and
drink. Great sport! Heroic work in behalf of national
security. At least two deaths resulted from this great drug
experiment. No follow-up studies were made of the innocent
victims. Some, says the report, "may. still be suffering from
residual effects." There was no medical supervision.
In the late 1950s the Inspector General of the CIA?who
must have been regarded by his super-spy colleagues as a
Nervous Nellie?wrote that precautions had to be taken not
only to protect these drug experiments from exposure to
enemy forces but also to conceal their existence from ?the
American public. This, noted the Inspector General, "would
RECORD, Hackensack
18 April 1976
be detrimental" to the agency's mission.
? The political and Moral cost of the CIA's deceit has been
high. We haVe tended, In recent years, to disbelieve the
government even when it has been telling the truth; The old
excuse for these 30 years of lies is still cited by the super-
' patriots, the CIA lackeys in the Congress. It goes: We must
mislead the American people in order to continue'misleading
the enemy. Rubbish! The enemy?presumably the Soviet spy
apparatus?often Arrows what is going on when we, the
'American people, do not. Viewed from any side, it's a rotten
game. . -
.If the CIA ever opens a Dept. of Fuller Explanation--
and that will be the day!?rd love to know how our national
security was served by having Machiavelli translated into
Swahili. And did the translator tarry a moment over the
passage that says if you leave a man's honor (and property)
alone, he will be reasonably content?
It's easy, of course, to dwell on the wilder aspects of the
CIA misadventure. By now we all know about the efforts to
- kill Castro with explo' ding cigars and the cheap ruse of send-
ing ,"wired" call girls into foreign agents' beds. Will our
dignity as a great nation ever recover from the CIA's merry
pranks?
? What troubles me, by hindsight, Is how many CIA
stories reached the ears of reporters years ago. How shame-
ful that they were not investigated and printed, then and
there!
In 1961, for example, our CIA operatives were training
.--you won't believe this?Tibetan parachutists In Colorado.
(Supposedly the Tibetans would be dropped somewhere over
Red China?someday.) One frosty morning a bus?windows
painted black?skidded off a Rocky Mountain trail, and out
fell 15 hooded, stunted Tibetans. Witnesses to the accident
were held incommunicado by the Amy.
But the news leaked out, and the New York Times had
an eye-witness accomet, according to David Wise in his book,
"The Politics of Lyirw." Then the inevitable telephone call-
came from Washington, the magic words !`national security"
? were invoked and the story died, I expect we'll never know
what happened to these poor duped Tibetans.
* ?
? Similarly, the mess refrained from publishing rumors
of the projected Bay of Pigs invasion. What we regarded as
patriotism at the time looks now, in retrospect, like stupid
cowardice.
This Senate committee report may beAncomplete and
overcautious, but it is bound to have a cleansing effect. It
calls for new laws eying Congress more control over the
CIA?a reform President Ford says- he will veto. Many
Americans Will take-that as -still another reason?not to vote-
for hirrrin'Noveinbers
rom gown to trench coat \
0.4'.Fhe times, they are, a-changin'," Bob bylan
sang in the early days of ttei Vietnam war, and thou-
sands of college students (C.,hoed his words demand-
ing that the American Establishment- change, its
ways.
But times keep changing, and the unemployment
blues have replaced songs of social protest on cam-
puses. And this has led to an interesting and ironic
phenomenon.
. At the height of the antiwar movement, the name
of the Central Intelligence Agency produced automat-
ic sneers among young idealists. Recruiters for the
CIA were not welcome then in academe.
Today, there is more reason to distrust the CIA
than in the 1960s. Then, we only suspected the agency
of misdeeds. Now we know. Yet the CIA might as
well have been printing job recruitment posters and
taking out 10-second advertising spots on network TV
for all the effect that congressional disclosures and
press exposes have had on college students.
Recent reports show that the number of college
Seniors applying for professional jobs with the CIA
went up 30 per cent during the Past year, when
adverse publicity against the agency reached its
peak. . , -
More revealing are statistics showing that inter- .
est in the agency isnot just a last resort: College stu-
dents' applications for government jobs:in general
went up only 10 per cent by comparison.
Some college officials attribute the renewed in-
terest in CIA work precisely to the had publicity. But
the change in attitude among students should more
properly be laid to a resurgence of pragmatism
among job seekers.
A student who has spent four years in college and
then perhaps another two in graduate school, perfect-
ing his skill at higher mathematics or Russian, may
find it a lot more palatablelo decipher codes or tran-
slate obscure journals for the CIA than to sell insur-
ance or collect unemployment insurance. The job
market is tight, aril it is squeezing idealism and mor-
al considerations out of graduates.
Bob Dylan's early songs are now poignant anach-
ronisms,from merehopeful years. Better suited to to-
day is the wry (lament from Cicero on changing
times and morals: 0 temporal 0 mores! .25
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BANNER, Nashville
27 April 1976
Involve
0
?( By FRANK VAN DER LINDEN
1Vashington Bureau Chief in the Watergate breakin."
Washington?Sen. Howard H. Baker, Baker's stand today is a sharp depar-
R-Tenn., virtually gave up today his ture from his statement on Sept. 19,
long attempt to prove that the Central 1974: "I believe there is no question that
Intelligence_Agency was involvenTM the Central Intelligence Agency was
Watergate burglary that led to the involved in Watergate; the question is
downfall of President Nixon. . ? rather, on whose order and for what
In separate personal views filed with purpose?" .
the Senate Intelligence Committee's ! The Tennessee Republican said the
final report, Baker said he had been following December that, because of
given access to secret CIA files denied the CIA's stubborn refusal to comply
to him in 1973 as vice chairman of the: withhis requests for evidence, he could
Senate Watergate panel. ? ? : only "guess" that its agents weren't
"I wish to state my belief," he said, ? involved in "a sinister plot by the CIA"
"that the sum total of the evidence does ;to destroy Nixon. .
not substantiate a conclusion that the In January 1975, Baker eagerly ob-
CIA per se was involved in the range of tamed a place on the Select Intelligence
events . and circumstances known as Committee, hoping that its subpoena
Watergate. powers might enable him to pry loose
"The investigation of Watergate and secret data that would link the CIA to
the possible relationship of the CIA Watergate.
thereto, produced a panolply of puzzle- Former White House aide Charles
ment," the senator said. . . -...; Colson had told him that convicted
"While the available information Watergate conspirator Howard Hunt
leaves nagging questions and contains i had often delivered secret information
from the White House "plumbers" to
the CIA long after the agency claimed it
had broken off with Hunt in 1971.
Colson had a theory that Nixon was
forced to resign the presidency when
bits and pieces of intriguing evidence,
, fairness dictates that an assessment be
rendered on the basis of the present re.
? cord.
"An impartial evaluation of that re-
cord compels the conclusion that the caught in a web of intrigue secretly spun
-CIA, as an institution, was not involved by veteran agents of the CIA.
NEW YORK TIMES
8 MAY 1?75
Taming the\136-asts
In retrospect, there is a striking similarity in the prob--
lems Senator Frank Church's Select Committee un-
covered in its separate inquiries into domestic and for-
eign intelligence. Presidents of both parties succumbed,
to the temptation to use intelligence agencies, with
their capacities to act in secrecy, as instruments to:
perform political magic for the Oval Office. In both
the domestic and foreign intelligence agencies, Presi-
dents found officials all too eager to engage in secret
and lawless activities for, as one F.B.I. man put -it,
"the greater good" of the citizenry. ? ?
The reports show from how many directions the
foundations of freedom were being undermined. First,
there was the growing tendency to ignore the Constitu-
tion and the laws. Second, .over the years, more and
more of what is legitimately the public's business was
being conducted in secret, depriving the people of in-
formation they needed to govern themselves effectively.
Finally, there were deep and often personally injurious
intrusions into individual rights.
? At the heart of the effort to re-establish the rule of law
Is the proposal to create a Senate committee with juris-
diction over both domestic and foreign intelligence,
empowered to legislate and to appropriate funds, in
addition to performing the oversight function of the
Congressional watchdog. All other proposed reforine
binge on this proposal, rendered all the more crucial
because the committees currently charged with this
responsibility, principally Armed Services and Judiciary,
tewo. EDit oppt,
Four of the burglars who broke into
? the Democrats' Watergate head-
quarters in June 1972 ? Hunt, James
McCord, Rolando Martinez and Ber-
nard Barker ? had CIA connections.
The Rockefeller Commission last June
said the CIA's failure to make "timely
disclosure of information and its des-
truction of certain tapes has led to
suspicions and allegations concerning
its involvement in the Watergate
! operation or the subsequent coverup."
The Rockefeller panel said Richard
? Helms, then CIA director, had used
-! "poor judgment" when in January.1973
he destroyed many CIA tapes and tran-
scripts.!Helms' act was one of several
events that aroused Baker's suspi-
cions.
.? The senator said the CIA gave "ex-
emplary" cooperation to him in his new
role on the Intelligence Committee. He
, expressed his appreciation to CIA
Director George Bush and his prede-
cessor, William Colby, "for cooperating,
to the fullest extent."
Much information that the CIA had
?withheld from the Senate Watergate
Committee "was examined at the CIA's
headquarters in raw form and without
sanitization deletions," he said.
have exercised little or no oversight and seem unwilling
to -initiate the changes required to prevent recurrence
of past abuses.
In the foreign area alone, the committee proposes that
the Director of Central Intelligence be given coordinating
and budget-making powers designed to improve his con-
trol over the whole range of intelligence programs and
to make them more responsive to the President. Covert
actions would be severely curtailed and, if declared es-
sential, made subject to Presidential and Congressional
treview of each proposal for such action, followed by
written approval of specific programs.
In the domestic field, the F.B.I. would be required to
:shut down its political intelligence operations. Preven-
tive intelligence activities would be permitted only in
' case of a clear threat of foreign spying or terrorism.
Domestic intelligence activities would be vested in the
F.B.I. and the guidelines recently drawn up by the
Attorney General to control the F.B.I. would receive
the legislative underpinning required to make them
effective.
Some critics of the Select Committee's work believe
that it should have outlawed covert action and domestic
intelligence entirely and that it is naive to believe that
the agencies in question can be controlled by law. Such a
view seems to us based on the defeatist assumption that
the nation has passed the point where it can impose
legal controls over its own arms. ,However the com-
mittee's work is itself proof that the rule of law still
has etrong defenders in Washington.
The legislative program recommended by the Church
Committee Is a test of the nation's will to be both free
and secure. It is up to Congress to meet that test.
26
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WASHINGTON POST
2 5 APR 1976
For the Record
From a statement by the Federation
?of American Scientists:
The proposed threshold test ban
treaty is worse than nothing. . . .
In the first place, it directly reneges
on U.S. declaratory policy of more than
a decade, which repeatedly emphasized
that the only problem in the way of a
test ban agreement was verification.
The clear implication of this position
was that any threshold agreement
would be reached at a threshold level
no higher than the capabilities of na-
tional verification demanded. This
.level is now somewhere around 10 kilo-
tons or less?not the proposed 150 kilo-
tons. . . .
In itself this situation does not make
the treaty worse than nothing but only
reduces its value to nothing. In addi-
tion, however, we doubt that this treaty
level will ever subsequently be low-
ered. The threshold treaty will, if rati-
fied, take the test ban treaty off the
political agenda. If a dozen years of say-
ing we wanted limits bounded by na-
tional verification capabilities could
not lead to better than this, the present
reversal of policy is likely to end the
matter for the foreseeable future.
The treaty is also worse than nothing
in its effect on the treaty's most impor-
tant audience: the nuclear-tending
powers. No treaty limiting tests would,
of course, make much difference to the
heavily armed superpowers. But the
test ban was supposed to set an exam-
ple of restraint to those who might'
build nuclear weapons themselves. .? . .?
Finally, . . .it advances the notion
that peaceful uses are plausible. But
our. country believes there are no sensi-
ble peaceful uses of nuclear explosions.-
Why then enshrine in a treaty elabo-
rate methods of verifying them? This
can only encourage new nuclear pow-
ers to justify bombs. . . .
Monday, May 3. 1976 THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR .
U.S.: self-defeating prophecies
By Walter C. Clemens Jr.
Influence in this world is purchased by what
people think rather than by objective realities.
American spokesmen ? inside as well as out-
side the government ? have unnecessarily low-
ered the image of the United States by deni-
grating its power and upgrading that of its ad-
versaries.
? Not only retired officers now running for
public office such as Adm. Elmo Zumwalt and
candidates of the right wing such as Ronald
Reagan are charging that the U.S. is becoming
a second-rate power compared to the Soviet
Union. The same impression is created by CIA
estimates of what it would cost the United
States to field a military establishment like
that of the U.S.S.R.
? Not only veteran distruster of the "third
world" Daniel P. Moynihan but Henry Kis-
singer is warning that the United States will
rue the day that Congress cut off aid to West-
ern-backed forces in Angola. The picture they
paint is not only that the Russians and Cubans
are "in" but that they will remain influential in
Angola for years to come.
? Secretary Kissinger, contrary to the ad-
vice of many specialists on Italian and world
communism, warns that communist participa-
tion in the Italian Cabinet will make Italy unfit
for NATO.
Each of the above arguments is unfounded
and unwise. Though Russia is gaining on the
U.S. militarily in some respects, U.S. and
NATO forces still maintain a commanding lead
in the key indexes of military power, including
numbers and accuracy of warheads. The quali-
tative advantages rooted in Western tech-
nology are overlooked in quantitative assess-
ments. The gross numbers that do favor the
U.S., such as total tonnage of the U.S. and So-
viet navies, are bypassed by the pleaders for
panic.
Having spent fabulous sums and gigantic ef-
4 forts to build a military force "second to
none," Americans are foolhardy to downgrade
WASH NGTON POST
13 MAY 1976
it merely to obtain a larger budget for the next
years. Such talk ? like the alleged bomber and
missile gaps of the '50s ? creates bargaining
advantages for the U.S.S.R. not warranted by
the military realities. Why should the U.S. Gov-
ernment talk so as to exaggerate Soviet
power?
As to Angola, Soviet advantages there result
primarily from Moscow's decision, taken some
years ago, to back the national independence
movement, while Washington tilted toward
Portugal. There is nothing inevitable about a
long-term Soviet presence in Angola, though
Washington's talk could make it more likely.
Rather than hinting that the Angolans are
locked in the vise of the Russian bear, Amer-
ica might better go about extending the warm
hand it should have proffered years ago.
What to do about Italy is less clear, but the
administration might begin by clearing the
decks and halting any remaining covert aid to
the Christian Democrats, who have shown
themselves so inept at governing their country
in a progressive way. After 20 years the U.S.
can no longer justify aid to them as an ex-
pedient to stave off a communist victory as in
the chaos resulting from World War II.
Since Italy's Communist Party may some
day come to power, why not prepare for the
possibility of an accommodation at least as
cordial as that which has evolved with Tito?
The Russians, also confronted with the possi-
bility of a "historic compromise" in Italy. have
till now shown the sense not to attempt ex-
communicating the heretical Italian party.
If the Italian or other West European com-
munists want to become independent of Mos-
cow, Dr. Kissinger's line makes it more diffi-
cult for them to do so.
Prophecies can be self-fulfilling and even
self-defeating. If U.S. leaders must prophesy:
why not put their country's assets on the
scales along with its liabilities?
Mr. Clemens is professor of political
science at Boston University.
Paying Iittern tional Ii es
,rin HE UNITED STATES a deadbeat? Embarrassing
L but true. This country is in arrears on its dues
for the second half of 1975 and for all of 1976 to the
International Labor Office, a venerable institution
founded by Samuel Gompers in .1919 and a major
channel of American influence on trade unions and .
. worker-related activities abroad. The sum involved is
small--$25 million. But the damage to American in- ?
terests ? and prestige, if the Congress does not
promptly pay up, could be disproportionately large. ? ?
The basis of the trouble is simple. A while back,
AFL-CIO president George Meany got fed up---not
without some good reasonat ,the way Communist
and Third World. countries were undercutting the
unique. tripartite worker-employer-government
structure of the ILO and manipulating it for anti-
American politica! purposes. The. Ford administra-
,? 27
tion reacted, in a damage-limiting mode, by giving a
.two-year notice of withdrawal; that threat, it was
hoped, would stir the ILO to start making some of the
changes necessary to keep the United States in. And
in fact some progress has been made. A cabinet-level
committee including Mr. Ivleany recently pronounced
itself guardedly hopeful of ILO change. An inatten-
tive House nonetheless cut out all ILO funds. The
Senate put the money in. The matter now hangs in
tho hala ;ice of an imminent conference.
The ILO funds should be, we believe, restored:
Americans cannot expect to gain a fair hearing for
their ideas on ILO reform while they are ignoring the ?
ILO constitution's requirement to keep up on dues.
The United States should not be playing games with
'int!.Arnational organizations, and setting a bad (-Nam-.
pie fur other nations. Moreover, valuable ILO activi-
"
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ties are going on right now. Next month in Geneva
the ILO will convene another in the United Nations'
: series of social/economic conferences. The point of
this one is to induce member governments and their
bureaucracies and citizens to leaven their pursuit of
economic growth with a greater concern for distribu-
tion of the benefits to the poor. It would be a particu-
lar shame if the American delegation had to slink
into that conference by the back door.
The larger issue of American participation in the
BALTIMORE SUN
11 May 1976
ILO remains. Our own view is that the provocation
would have to be very great to justify a decision?at
the end of the two-year notice period next year?to
drop out. That would leave an important labor field
to countries often 'unfriendlyto American values and
views. It would convey a signal of international flag-
ging. Mr. Meany is quite right in believing, nonethe-
less, that it is up to the other nations in the ILO, if
they wish the Americans to stay, to meet the United
States half way.
Finer _Points of Drug Suppression in Bangkok
Bangkok.
The Drug Enforcement Administration
has been operating for more than 10 years in
Thailand, the primary trafficking outlet for
the world's largest source of illicit opium ?
and a land where money and influence make
. things run.
, DEA agents gather intelligence and uni-
laterally pay informers. They work closely
'with their own Thai Police contacts, ex- ,
changing information, interrogating prison-
ers, and making raids. Only Thai police can
make arrests.
The consensus is that the DEA presence
has kept heroin syndicates on the run, with
. probably less than 10 per cent of America's
heroin coming through Thailand. The Thai
Police can point to an impressive record of
seizures.
On the darker side, not a single narcotics
fugitive has ever been caught and not a sin-
gle "drug king" has ever been successfully
prosecuted. Many cases are mysteriously
dropped for "lack of evidence." Trials drag
on forever, witnesses vanish, and prisoners
."escape."
Corruption and trust are the main prob-
lems in running a drug suppression opera-
tion in Thailand. A Thai Police rookie makes
only $50 a month, a general about $500. The
temptations are great, especially if it only
involves looking the other way.
. Thai society runs on a hierarchial clique
system. Members of a clique are "friends"
and develop ferocious loyalties, often tran-
scending family and institutional barrie:s. ,
? By FRANK LOMBARD ?
Outsiders are more or less mistrusted. Many
a cynical foreigner has been given to remark
that "the Thais do not trust each other."
With this backdrop, it is easy to under-
stand that narcotics intelligence within the
Thai Police flows along personal rather than
organizational lines. Officials are disinclined
to keep records and files for fear that they
cannot preserve their confidentiality. They
could be misused by jealous subordinates or
copied by other government units. .
Informers are reluctant to come forward_
The policemen they confide in may not be
the ones who arrest them. (The Thai police
are national, and any policeman can make
'arrests nationwide.)
Police have a tendency to forget about a
case after the arrest. They are mainly inter-
ested in the "body" and the "dope" and often
lack the incentive to follow-up on an investi-
gation. "
There is also no incentive to chase a fugi-
tive unless orders come from "above." A bus
driver can flee the scene of an accident in
the middle of Bangkok and never get caught.
Narcotics police tell about a raid at a
drug laboratory in which one of the opera-
tors shouted with surprise and indignation:
"What are you guys doing here? We just got
through paying you $10,000." They had paid
a different set of policemen.
After the police prepare a case, they turn
it over to the public prosecutor, a separate
branch of government. Police feel that the
prosecutor is not on their side. In any event,
they do not coordinate well.
At this stage bribes are attempted, usual-
ly through defense attorneys. The police or
prosecutor may respond by omitting key ele-
ments of evidence or by dropping the case
altogether.
This sometime,s backfires. State witness-
es often are not prepared by the prosecutor,
and they have been known to volunteer testi-
mony on their own, thus surprising the
judges. ? .
Prosecuting a possession case is fairly ea-
sy. Getting at one of the financiers or "drug
kings" is difficult, requiring many witnesses
and a great deal of preparation. Plea bar-
gaining is not allowed, though judges might
go easier on a defend.ent who co-operates.
The financiers have money for bribes and
the best lawyers. Police claim that even
? their competitors in the illicit drug business
will help them financially.
While awaiting trial, they pay wardens
for daytime liberty, returning to their cells
? at night.
During the day; they might work some
drug .deals .or maybe look up unfavorable
witnesses who, according to police, are
? threatened or bribed.
Another ploy is to play sick. If a critical
viitness is scheduled for trial, . the accused
gets sick or his lawyer gets sick. The trial is
then postponed for at least another three
weeks, because sessions do not run continu-
ously. Things can drag on forever, with key
prosecution witnesses slowly disappearing
from the scene.
Mr. Lombard is an American free-
lance writer based in Bangkok.
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Friday, May 7, 1976
11.1.111.0,
The Oceans' Use -
'fuming Point May Be Reached Today
the UN Effort to raft a Law of the Sea
By BARKY NEWMAN
Staff Reporter of THIS WALL STREET JOURNAL
NEW YORK -Negotiation:4 to write the
1031. 121w to govern use of the world's oceans
may he reaching a turning point today as
the third st'..2f)11 of the tinned Nations talks
volutes to end amid continuing friction be.
tween ;old tleveloping countries..
in Iwo y.-ars of elaborate meetingS, first
in (1.4t-aeas :1:1.1 then in (leneva, the 149
countries part leipating in the Law of the Sea
Cool-creme
lilt little more than jostle in the
starting gate of what has seemed like an im:
im meta dash for the wealth of the oceans. It
Ii,, s been the knottiest international bargain-
ing over. it has also been, Secretary of State
11..0ry Kissinger 1-',11,1 last month. "one of the
In ost sigtlifiema negotiations in diplomatic
history." -?
? 1)oring an eight-week New York session
jest clo,ung, wan, haxd compromises have
finally been strc kat. There now is :weep-
ta nee, for 10sbon-,:. of a $2 mile territorial
sea irephialhe the tht-ce?milc "cannon shot''
of :Inot her veal, and that hies been coupled
with a 200 mite "cottotnio V.M10.' where
r41a'0:4i coma: woubl hold sway over
commercial activity. ?
However, a crucial ,accord that was
thmight to be emerging on a way to organize
the mining of copper. nickel and manganese
on the floor. of the deep sea, beyond, the 2)0-
mile zone, ran into trouble yesterday. The
s..:alied milling plan ?which would give the
international community a share of the
ilth ? was offeced as a major concession
by the Milted States. The 'U.S. has been
$4051. 1(2 for a largt:ly free-enterprise min.
1:1c. system. but iiilyanced the compromise
tai'et th?? letirirgic eonfeeence a jolt
la?yeloping eountries, which have op-
28 ..,041.,t1 Any private exploitation of the seabed,
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'are finding the compromise hard to swallow.
lii reaction, many of them have come out
against Secretary Kissinger's proposal to re-
convene the ; conference with the hope of
completing a ireaty only two'or three months
from now in Geneva or New York.
Pitfalls Remain
As of 'late yesterday, the conference was,
still trying to decide in closed session
whether to call the summer meeting. But
even if the meeting is held, the law of the.
sea won't be home free. Numerous pitfalls
remain, any one of which could trip up the
; conference. There is harsh disagreement
over the composition of a council to oversee
ocean mining. There is a standoff over the
rights of one country to conduct scientific
research off the coast of another. And a new
coalition has arisen of landlocked and other
so-called "geographically disadvantaged'
states that are trying mightily to gain some-
thing for themselves from the sea. If these
52 countries don't get at least part of what
they want, there are enough of them to
block a treaty.
Moreover, even if every country in the
World signs an ocean treaty, there are still
substantial doubts that it would be univer-
sally ratified. The U.S. delegation, for exam-
ple, is already getting adverse domestic re-
action to its offer of a seabed.compromise,
and delegation members are clearly wor- ,
Tied.
l? One of the more voluble opponents of the
! compromise, a law professor named Gary
Knight from Louisiana State University,
calls it a "dead giveaway" of seabed min-
ing, and he predicts that "34 Senators could
easily be brought together to refuse to rat-
ify."; A mining-industry representative who :
ask$ not to be identified insists the compro-
mise has to be a "bottom line proposition;"
? any further movement, he says, would turn
; him against the treaty.
In Congress, a bill that would license
U.S. companies to mine the deep seabed
with or 'without a treaty is expected to be on
the Senate floor by June. Last March, Con-
gress passed a bill claiming U.S. control
over fishing as far as 200 miles to sea. Pres-
ident Ford signed the bill despite appeals
from his own diplomats. Treaty proponents
fear that political considerations in an elec-
tion year could similarly encourage unilat-
eral action on mining, especially if the con-
ference doesn't meet over the summer, and
could turn Congress and the public against a
?
treaty that doesn't measurably enhance U.S.
, interests.
Likened to Canal Issue
"Joe Six-pack doesn't know anything
; about the law of the sea?he never heard of
it," says Sen. Mike Gravel, Democrat of
Alaska, who is against unilateral moves.
; "As soon as extreme conservatives realize
we're planning to cede sovereignty to an in-
ternational body, they'll call it the worst
treason. They're doing this right now in re-
gard to the Panama Canal.. You'll see the
drawing of the line."
Hoping to head off legislation, the U.S.
and other countries are asking the UN con-
ference to give the treaty the force of law
when it is signed, instead of waiting for wide
ratification?a process that could take eight
years. Otherwise, says a U.S. diplomat, "the
whole thing could be for naught." A senior
UN official, asked what effect U.S. ocean-
mining legislation could have on the confer-
ence outcome, says, "I don't want to answer
that question because I wouldn't want to ;
sound gloomy and pessimistic."
The balance is delicate. Sonic people fear ?
that the conference could explode if pres-
sured too forcefully, or atrophy if not pres-
sured enough. For this reason, conference I
leaders over the last two years have thought
It too risky to take a vote ohanything. Sub- 1
stantive bargaining has gone ahead In se-
-
eret, and all agreements have been reached
through consensus. Records aren't even
kept. Information about what's happening
comes mainly from diplomats willing to talk
without being identified.
In the last week, conference leaders have
gone into seclusion to escape constant dele-
gate lobbying and have drafted a tentative
treaty that presumably reflects areas of
agreement. The text will be revised at least
(glee before a final treaty takes shape. The
end product will be the result of alliances
that have dissolved, and coalesced again, as
each nation has struggled to sort out its
principles and weigh them against its self-
interest.
Early in the negotiations, for instance.
more than 100 developing countries lined up
In favor of total coastal-state control over
activity in the 200-mile economic zone. It
has since dawned on countries that are land-
locked (or have short coastlines or coast-
lines .that are close to other nations') that
strong coastal states could squeeze them out
of the sea for good. So these countries?in-
cluding such unlikely couples as Bolivia and
Singapore, Sweden and Uganda?have re-
belled and erected one of the conference's
biggest roadblocks.
Their diplomats realize that these states
aren't likely to get a crack at oil and miner-
als in the coastal waters of other nations.
But they are demanding continued freedom
of transit for their ships in the 200-mile zone
and some sort of access to fish and other liv-
ing resources. If those rights are granted,
an Asian diplomat says, "then we won't tor-
pedo the conference."
Among other issues dealing with waters
relatively close to land, a few more snags
have developed,, but they are considered mi-
nor. For example, there are differences over
the definition of an archipelago. That may
not seem important, but it is very important
for archipelagoes. And while there is a good
amount of agreement on broad rights of pas-
sage through straits (a major military con-
cern of the U.S.)? the straits states don't en-
tirely like the arrangement. But it is be-
lieved they will ultimately come around.
A more novel issue?pollution from ships
?has produced surprising unity. (One possi-
ble reason is that shipping states and
coastal states are often one and the same,
and only have to shake hands with them-
selves.) "We've come very close to reaching
agreement on pollution in all aspects," says
a Latin-American diplomat, The plan calls
for *establishment of international pollution
standards for the economic zone. Coastal
states wouldn't be allowed to exceed the
standards with their own rules. That pleases
maritime states whose ships wouldn't be
closed out of areas where the rules are too
stringent. In return, coastal states would be
granted considerable. powers of enforce-.
ment.
(The tougher issue of what to do about
pollution that starts on land and ends up in
the sea was barely grazed by the confer-
ence. Environmentalists aren't happy with
that, and they also say the accord on ship-
ping pollution seems too vague. One pollution
expert on the U.S. delegation says reaction
from environmental groups to such a pollu-
' lion treaty would probably be "lukewarm to
opposed.")
The Research Issue
Another novel item on the bargaining ta-
ble hasn't been so gracefully handled. The
same committee that has found a solution to
pollution has been sturnaed by the question
of scientific research. Advanced countries
like the U.S. are asking freedom to do re-
search in another country's economic zone_
Coastal states want to control it, not because
they don't like scientists but because some
scientists could be soldiers in disguise.
"Coastal states," a diplomat says, "have
29
felt threatened by certain scientific-research
projects that in fact have been all sorts of
things."
The U.S. has budged a bit on this, but not
enough to satisfy coastal states. The posi-
tions now seem frozen. Some observers sus-
pect the reason for this adamancy is that
defense has become a "hidden agenda" at a
1 conference that had expressly excluded mili-
tary matters. The suggestion is made that
the large U.S. concession on seabed mining
was meant to insure that defense interests
would get their way on issues they consider
vital, such as freedom of "scientific" re-
search. Top U.S. diplomats deny it. They
say the seabed proposal was intended to ac-
celerate talks that seemed doomed.
"Nobody can have everything he wants," a '
U.S. negotiator says. "There's no point in a :
treaty that's completely one-sided."
Whatever the motives, the offer of a
seabed compromise has reportedly been in-
corporated into the tentative treaty text with
the hope that it may lead to a breakthrough.
Throughout the talks, developing coun-
tries, many of which export minerals, have
been digging in against private mining of
the deep-sea ;floor. They fear that minerals
from the sea could glut the minerals mar-
kets, and they favor giving an international
enterprise the exclusive rights to mine the
seabed. But nobody has said where such an
enterprise might find the technology, the ex-
pertise and the money to break into the
ocean-mining business. (And some develop-
ing countries that buy minerals have evi-
dently been having second thoughts about a
system that would prop up prices for devel-
oping countries that produce those miner-
als.)
The U.S. Proposal
Until now, the United States was standing
fast for ,a free-enterprise system for mining
the seabed. Its compromise proposal offers
to put two crucial constraints on private
companies. It would create a method for
handing over some, but not all, fully explored
%nine sites to an international authority,
which would exploit them and share the rev-
'enue. In addition, the proposal offers a for-
Mule that would tie increases in sea-mineral
production to increases in demand for min-
erals in general, so that prices wouldn't be
eroded. The mining companies, evidently.
are amenable to this middle ground.
Whether developing countries are willing to
drop their ideological opposition to private
exploitation remains to be seen.
There is another unresolved seabed issue,
and it goes to the heart of the law of the
sea. ;It. concerns the make-up of the interna-
tional council that will operate the deep-
seabed authority. The U.S. wants a dispro-
portionately strong voice on the council. Its
representatives are convinced that develop-
ing countries will use a one-country one-vote
system to advance their own views. Devel-
oping countries are just as distrustful of the
U.S. and other industrial countries, and
sim-
ilar worries abound at the conference about
I the fairness of the machinery being con-
structed for the settlement of all disputes
that arise after a treaty is achieved.
The mood confirms a feeling shared by
many conference participants: that the orig-
inal high-sounding notions about preserving
the seas as "the common heritage of man-
kind" have long since gone by the boards
and been replaced by the hard-nosed pursuit
of property and power.
"We are convinced that our \common
progress requires nations to acknowledge
their interdependence and act out of a sense
of community." Secretary Kissinger said in
this speech about the seas last month. But a
!diplomat from an island state is skeptical.
"When we are finished," he says, "we will
have buried the common heritage of man-
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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Tuesday, May 11, 1976
UNCTAD and Beyond
Henry Kissinger, who has long Department in a long time."
professed to be bored by interna- The IRB, we're told, will kill two
tional economics, last September birds with one stone. It will get cap-
unveiled before the United Nations ital flowing into vitally needed min-
his master plan for dealing with the eral resources and it will virtually
ing "Third World."
economic demands of the develop-
end Third World expropriation of
development projects. Private capi-
If you'll recall, he proposed crea- tal, you see, isn't going into such
tion of enough new international bu-
reaucracies that locating them all
in New York City would balance
Mayor Beame's budget. They in-
cluded: A Development Security
Facility (DSF); an International
Energy Institute (IEI); an Interna-
tional Industrialization Institute
(III); an International Center for
the Exchange of Technological In-
formation (ICETI); a World Food
Reserve (WFR); Consumer-Pro-
ducer Forums (CPFs); an Interna-
tional Fund for Agricultural Devel-
opment (IFAD); and an interna-
tional organization "to coordinate
and finance" technological assis-
tance in nonfood agriculture and
forestry, to which we applied the
acronym: IOCFTANAFP.
The UN's bureaucrats, of course,
were wowed by all these bold and
innovative jobs,er, ideas. Never one
to quit while 'he's on a winning
streak, the Secretary of State last
week went before the UN Confer-
ence on Trade and Development in
Nairobi with something new. Out of
his sleeve came the' International
Resources Bank (IRB), which Jack
Bennett of Exxon?who a year ago
was Treasury undersecretary?has
mildly described as "one .of the
worst ideas to come out of the State
WASHINGTON POST
. 0 MAY 1976
projects as easily as it might be-
cause companies fear expropria-
tion.
The bank would be capitalized at
$1 billion, with the United States
putting up a fifth, the other indus-
trial countries and the oil producers
putting up the remainder. The bank
would sell up to $10 billion in bonds,
lend the money to governments for
mining projects and such, with the
future output of the ventures
pledged as collateral for the bonds.
There's a vision of a company buy-
ing the IRB bonds, the money going
to a Third World government, which
then uses it to buy the company's
services in developing the project.
Because the developing nations
really want the industrial nations to
put up $3 billion to stockpile com-
modities as buffers against price
swings, they're not exactly 'en-
chanted with the IRB idea. And for
some reason Mr. Kissinger's IRB is
being portrayed by the United
States as a "free-market" alterna-
tive to the stockpiling idea, al-
though we fail to see how an inter-
national bureaucracy that parcels
out subsidized loans bears any re-
semblance to the free market.
And why should U.S. taxpayers
reating
IS AFRICAN TRIP prOvided Secretary of State
Kissinger with two occasions on which to re-
spond to the less developed countries' aspirations to
reduce the real.economic gap and the felt psychologi-
cal gap between the world's rich and poor. This is a
concern ever more central to American foreign poli-
cy,. Since there in the country a certain sense of
guilt about global poverty, reinforced by forebodings
of. OPEC-like reprisals by producers of commodities
other than oil. Ending too long a period of neglect,'
Mr: Kissinger joined the issue last fall in what ? was
widely taken as a 'constructive response to ::Third
World" demands for major changes in the world
economy. But the Third World's ?intemperate attacks
on Zionism and on other matters of 'American politi-
Cal concern subsequently dissipated much of that in-
cipient spirit of accommodation. The result was that
Mr. Kissinger 'went to Africa realizing that, whatever
the 'foreign policy considerations at stake, he did not
have much political room.
?,His first pronouncement, was a dramatic proposal
to "roll back the desert" in the sub-Saharan drought-
prone region of the Sahel. The price tag given was,
$7.5 billion and the impression given was that of a
huge American initiative. Actually, the plan, which
experts deem a promising one, had long been in the
support a bank that lends money to
countries that expropriate private
investments? If Third World coun-
tries want increased capital invest-
ment that is in fact discouraged by
the threat of expropriation, they can
easily work out iron-clad assur-
ances not -to expropriate, or simply
build a reasonable history of non-
expropriation.
Mr. Bennett fears now that Mr.
Kissinger has put forth his scheme
local governments will be tempted
to wait for these subsidized loans,
halting negotiations with private
companies who are now trying to
find ways to continue development.
But only the most foolish of Third
World governments would do this,
we think, not only because the sub-
sidized loans might never come, but
chiefly because they'll always be
better off with private direct invest-
ment. A state-run development proj-
ect will inevitably chew up three,
four or 10 times the value of any
subsidy, simply through bureau-
cratic inefficiencies.
There's no reason why Mr. Kis-
singer should be making any pro-
posals at all in this area, except
that it wins cheers from the interna-
tional bureaucrats and a few others
with day dreams about world gov-
ernment. Indeed, the floor of the
State Department that is given over
to economic affairs could easily be
collapsed into a medium-sized val-
ise and given over to the folks at
Treasury, who will know what to do
with it.
orld overt
30
international works. The money is to be provided by
many sources and.spent ?over a period of 10 years.
The American share amounts to the annual $100 mil-
lion-plus that the United States had already said it
would provide.
. -The more important occasion was the Nairobi ses-
sion of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, the leading forum in which the poor,
very poor and -newly- rich members of the Third
World (no monolith) have tried to work out their own
differences and lean on the developed states. Most
countries of this "bloc," finding self-reform difficult.
instead seek resources primarily from the -United
States: commodity agreements to support the price of ?
their main exports: cheap technology unencumbered
by patents; debt ?rclief, including relief of the im-
mense debts run up to Third World oil states; easier
access to Western markets; and Third World power
in global economic decision-making.
Skipping the touchy matter of self-uplift, Mr. Kis-
singer bore down principally on commodities. But
where many producers want the assurance of steady
and consumer-subsidized markets, he proposed a new
"bank" to funnel private capital into resource devel-
opment. Few people outside the State Department
see much need for a new bank. The idea is not strong-
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ly, supported by other executive departments. The
Congress will probably pay more heed than the Sec-
retary to corporate. misgivings. The controversial re-
-cord of Western corporations, in precisely the extrac-
? live industries that the proposal would most affect, is
bound to be revived. All this does not necessarily
mean it's a bad idea. It means the United States is en-
gaged in a negotiation. The Third World's purpose in
initiating the negotiation, with a demand for a "new
? international economic order," is nothing less than to
.:refit the.world economy to new political forces them-
selves still in a molten stage. It will go on for years. ?
There is something more immediate to do. The first
? American installment of $375 million to replenish the
World Bank's window for the very poor,' the Interna-
NEW YORK TIMES
? 5" MAY 1976
tional Development Association, fell due last Febru;
ary. The full amount'has not yet been authorized; the
incomplete appropriation was in The aid bill just ve-
toed. It is true that some countries seem more inter-
ested in exacting fresh psychic revenge from the
United States than in seeing real resources trans-
ferred through familiar channels like the World
Bank. But this does not absolve the United Slates of
commitments undertaken in the past; on this particu-
lar commitment, moreover, the commitments of ?
other donor nations hinge. The international com-
munity has good reason to be skeptical about Ameri-
can words while this country's obligations to IDA re-
main unfulfilled.
Why Was the Dragon Slain?
. PARIS?Something very unusual is
going on in Britain's nuclear program.
It is difficult to. conclude from avail-
able details on this highly classified
subject whether recent developments
should be linked to London's strategic
planning.
They are more probably related to
efforts at supporting the economy, to
preparations for a "European" atomic
weapons pool with France, or even to
political fears that United States neo-
isolation may curb access to vital
materials on which the United King-
dom has hitherto depended. ?
, Consider the following apparently
unrelated facts: (1) London's Ministry
of Defense announced it would halt
?iinports of weapons-grade tritium, a
radioactive isotope of hydrogen gas,
purchased for twenty years from the
United States; (2) it became known
that .a seven-nation London agree-
ment; controlling export of nuclear
materials, was running? into trouble
with the Common Market's nuclear
agency, Euratom; (3) and Britain last
Thursday formally interred in the
Organization of Economic Coordina-
tion and Development (0.E.C.D.) "the
Dragon," a unique installation.
. Tritium is a component of H-bombs
derived from many ores although
often associated with aluminum. In
the West it is now produced by Amer-
ica and France. It is not only costly.
but decays rapidly, with a half-life of
12.5 years as compared to millions of
years for uranium and thousands of
years for plutonium. But fusionable
tritium is enormously more explosive
than either of the above fissionable
elements. It is also far lighter and
therefore capable of propulsion by
smaller weapons systems.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
By C. L. Sulzberger
Why were the British giving up
their guaranteed American source of
tritium and constructing their own
facilities at Chapelcross and Galloway
in the U.K.? Britain is broke and curb-
ing almost every other expenditure
including the Dragon?of which more
later. Is the change to create jobs, to
save money by saving dollars, to make
a brand-new secret weapon,, or to
safeguard against the fear of a sudden
American cut-off?
Or is it to free Britain from U.S.
restrictions, thus allowing it to go
ahead with an oft-mentioned, never-
agreed plan to join France in building
a "European" nuclear force pooled by
the two countries? Fusion warheads
like those based on tritium have virtu-
ally no fallout, unlike fission weapons
based on uranium and plutonium. This
is vital in considering the defense of
tiny, populated Europe..
As for the Common Market flap:
Washington inspired secret meetings
last year to work out a secret accord
between three Euratom members
(Britain, France, West Germany) and
four other nations (the U.S.A., Russia,
Canada and Japan) restricting exports
of specialized nuclear materials.
But the other six Common Market
partners were told nothing about
their three partners' deal, until last
week. Why not? Also, why were they'
informed last week? Above all, why
did London and Paris spurn a Bonn
suggestion that reference to Euratom
(Common Market nuclear branch) be
made in the original pact?
31
Finally there is the strange Dragon
case. This is a unique nuclear reactor
built in Britain for the benefit of
0.E.C.D. members. It is the world's
? only versatile high-temperature experi-
mental nuclear facility and could ,
attain temperatures of 1,000 degrees
centigrade as compared with 300 to ?
. 500. achieved by ordinary nuclear ?
reactors.
With the Dragon's technology it
would be possible to produce metals
like iron or aluminum directly from
their ores by heat itself?like global
creation?instead of by indireet elec-
trical processes. The Dragon poten-
tially could gasify coal or produce
hydrogen as a fuel.
In the nuclear energy field the -
Dragon's demise is compared by scien- ?
lists with the kind of faulty judgment
which in the political field led to
Watergate. The remarkable facility it-
self, born in 1959 thanks to an 0.E.C.D.
protocol, came into operation five
years later in Winfrith Heath, England.
It was named for the renowned hot
breath of the mythical dragon.
Why was it killed? The slaughter
was allegedly pushed by Britain's en-
ergy minister as a money-saving gim-
mick. Is it worth the price to inter-
national knowledge? It will delay for
years the advance of Some types
of beneficial research. Will another
Dragon have to be constructed at far
greater expense later on?
And what has the Dragon's death
got to do with other nuclear develop-
ments? British manufacture of ?tritium
may cost more than is saved by mur-
dering the Dragon. And why the argu-
ment about excluding Euratom from
a secret nuclear agreement, largely at
London's request? These events ap-
proximately coincide. Something seems
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THE ECONOMIST MAY I, 1976
Russia
How big will
the giant get?
fect, and both have been used at various
times without qualification, and some-
times confused with one another, by
advocates on both sides of the spending
debate, to prove their own parochial
, points. ?
So when it became known a few
weeks ago that the CIA estimates might
have seriously underestimated Soviet
spending and were being reworked,
some American sceptics got their calcu-
lators out. One of them, Congressman
Les Aspin of Wisconsin, pointed out
that the dollar estimate in particular
made the Russian military? budget look
bigger than it actually is. This is because
of the "market basket" effect, well
known to economists: to compare a
basket of British groceries with the same
products bought in another country
usually makes the foreign ones look
more expensive. This does not mean
Britain lives more cheaply; it means
that the foreigners have different tastes
and needs, and their marketing system
is more efficient at delivering what they
want. So to put a cost on the Soviet
military establishment as if it were pro-
duced by the United States?which is
roughly what the CIA does?tends to
exaggerate its real cost.
Is the Soviet military ogre growing to
be 10 feet tall or only nine and a half?
Or is it possible that he is not growing
at all, and that the recent brouhaha over
increased Russian defence spending is
nothing more than gross misrepresenta-
tion by American militarists who want
to get the biggest possible defence budget
through congress for next year?
The answer to the first question is
that nobody really knows accurately
just how much Russia spends, or what
effect the spending will have on its
armed forces a few years hence. The
? answer to the second is that the CIA
and several other organisations have
produced estimates to serve as a rough
guide to what the Russians are spending.
They normally do two of these, a
"rouble" estimate to measure the burden
on. the Russian economy, and a "dollar"
estimate that tries to compare Soviet
spending with that of the United States,
or all of Nato. The problem is that both
of these figures are admittedly imper-
Christian Science Monitor
13 May 1976
V:
VF 'TS
ute
Strategic Survey: no
expansionist policy
By Takashi Oka
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
London
Does the Soviet Union's continuing military
buildup justify assumptions that the Kremlin
has embarked on a new era of expansibnism?
No, says the International Institute for
Strategic Studies, one of the world's most pres-
tigious private ? research organizations in the
defense field. The institute's annual Strategic
Survey thus takes issue with leading American
officials such as Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger and his assistant, Helmut Son-
nenfeldt, who said publicly last June that the
Soviet Union was just beginning "its truly im-
perial phase."
At ,a press conference unveiling the Survey
last week, the institute's director, Christoph
Bertram, also disputed some Western con-
tentions that detente had favored the Soviet
Union rather than the West.
Soviel exclusion
The fall of South Vietnam did not bring ludo-
China into the Soviet orbit, Dr. Bertram noted
Hanoi might be leaning toward Moscow, but.
Cambodia seemed to be favoring Peking.
Throughout Asia, the Chinese-Soviet con-
frontation has caused difficulties for Moscow..
yo take one example no sooner had Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko paid a visit
to Tokyo than Prime Minister Takeo Miki was
declaring that Japan would go ahead and sign
a friendship treaty with China, including an
anti-hegemony (i.e., indirectly anti-Soyiet)
clause to which Mr. Gromyko had taken ex-
ception.
The Soviet, UniOn has been effectively ex-
cluded from .Middle East peacemaking: It is
not participating in several significant inter-
national conferences seeking to rearrange rela-
tionships between the advanced industrial
countries of the West and the countries of the
developing world. The Conference on Eu-,
ropean Cooperation and Security has been a
disappointment likewise, for the Soviet Union
has failed to reap from it the propaganda ad-
vantages in the West that it had hoped for.
? On the militsry balance between East and
West. the strategic survey, coauthored by Dr.
Bertram and his colleagues, finds that while
numerical superiority rests with the Soviet
Union and its allies, the North Atlantic allies
still lead in the quality and sophistication of
their. weaponry. However, Dr. Bertram and his
colleagues warned that if the NATO allies con-
tinue to pinch pennies on defense, the-equilib-
rium between Soviet numbers and Western
quality could be changed in Moscow's favor. ?
Advanced vehicle
One institute official pointed out that in cer-
But Mr Aspin has found other pro-
blems as well, the most important of
which is that the Russians seem to be
using a lot of their military men to do
things civilians do in most western
countries?internal security, civil de-
fence, research and work on civil con-
struction projects. Not only does this
tend to skew the dollar estimates even
further, but it also makes the recent
growth of Soviet military manpower
look a lot less menacing than if it were
all pumped into the combat forces. Mr
Aspin's figures are generally confirmed
by estimates released last week by the
American Defence Intelligence Agency,
which frequently differs from the CIA
on fundamental military issues.
But there is another issue that is often
overlooked in the numbers game. This
is that the pay of conscripts in Russia
bears almost no relation to the economic
burden on the country of having its
men in uniform instead of growing
wheat or making television sets. Russia
is paying an economic cost for its large
army that is far greater than can easily
be measured by either dollar or rouble
comparisons. Sorting out this particular
tangle will be one of the major pro-
blems the CIA must' face as it produces
its revised estimates later this year.
lain limited fields ? for instance that of armed
vehicles ? the Soviet Union already deployed
the world's. most advanced vehicle, the BMP.
carrying a 73-millimeter gun and an anti-tank
guided-missile launcher. The BMP is better
than either the United ,States MI13 or the West
German Marder, the official said. However, as
production and deployment of Such sophis-
ticated weapons proceeds, Soviet defense costs
will require a dramatic increase. How will
Moscow, already pushed for resources, re-
spond to this need? The institute did not an-
swer the question, but noted the heaVy eco-
nomic burden a Soviet decision to push for -
quality as well as numbers would demand. ,
Whereas the Atrierican defense establish-
ment emphasizes the Soviet military buildup
and especially Moscow's vast increase in naval
strength over the past two decades, institute
officials here note that even last year they
recorded an American edge over the Soviets in
tonnage and number of vessels recently built.
In other words, the Soviet Union must face the
problem of an increasingly obsolescent and
outmoded Navy with large numbers of smaller
vessels, while the United States is building a
more modern Navy with larger ships. A recent
Library of Congress study reaches similar con-
clusions.
Of course, Dr. Bertram and his colleagues
note, there are worrying implications for the
future in the Soviet Union's- military buildup.
Certainly Moscow will take advantage of any
target or opportunity that may present itself.
But. so far, the institute judges there is in-
sufficient evidence to justify conclusions thal
the Soviet Union has already coloarkt-il on *0 0
confrontational policy of expansuinism. 32
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THE ECONOMIST MAY I, 1976
Eagles at odds
The German-American connection which now holds the
Atlantic community together is being bent by an argument
over weapons that needs to be settled swiftly
Germany is much the most important country in western
Europe. It has therefore begun to develop a special
relationship with the United States: not quite like the-
one Britain used to have, with the British-American
ties of language and alliance in two world wars; but
close enough to reflect Germany's economic strength
and military power, and its pre-eminence in both the
EEC and Nato Europe. The prospect of a part-Com-
munist government in Italy will certainly make the
Americans work even more directly with the Germans
on defence matters, rather than through the joint insti-
tutions of Nato. This American-German relationship is
the present linchpin of the Atlantic community. It is also
coming under severe strain, at just the wrong moment,
because of three arguments now going on between
Germany and America.
The first is the matter of "offset" arrangements, the
purchases Germany makes from the United States (and
services it renders to it) to offset what it costs America's
balance of payments to keep American forces in
Germany. Germany was willing enough to do these
things when the United States was running a large trade
deficit with Europe and some members of the American
congress were campaigning to bring their troops home.
But last year America's trade account perked up, and
when the most recent offset agreement expired Mr
Schmidt, the German chancellor, said he did not plan
to? negotiate another one. He then changed his mind,
and negotiations started again. One of the main bones of ?
contention this time is the cost of housing the new army
brigade the Americans brought to Europe last year and
want to station in northern Germany, where they also
want the Germans to pay for a lot of its barrack rooms.
This is an old story. The second argument is not.
This is about the airborne early warning system, the
radar-stuffed aircraft that Nato badly needs to detect
and identify low-flying intruders and send fighters to
intercept the suspicious ones. Everybody agrees that the
Americans' Boeing E-3A is the only aircraft to do the
job. But the Germans are being asked to put up a large
share of the money for it. Mr Georg Leber, their defence
minister, will ask the Bundestag this month for authority
to spend money to buy some early production material.
If he gets it, most of the other countries involved will
weigh in too.
So far, so good, it might seem. But the third argument
could undo the whole ball of wool. This is the growing
quarrel about whether the Germans or the Americans
should provide Nato's next main tank.
Are the Americans weaselling? ?
The United States is now testing two of its own proto-
types of a new heavy tank, and will select the winner .
this summer, recording the result of the tests. It will ?
then allow a prototype of the Germans' new Leopard 2
tank to show its paces next autumn, and compare
the result with the American winner's recorded perfor-
mance. The United States originally said it would buy
the ultimate victor, even if it is the German tank. But
many German officials?and some Americans as well-
33
have begun to have their doubts. They believe the only
true way to get a real comparison between the Leopard
and the American tank is to test them side by side. The
doubters also point out that a project like a new tank
tends to develop a life of its own. The Americans make
no secret that they will continue to develop their own
tank through the summer, and even after the Leopard
tests start. This sort of thing, the Germans argue, makes
it almost impossible for the Leopard to be chosen.
Recent testimixty before congress by Mr Malcolm
Currie, the defence department's research director,
suggests that the Americans' willingness to buy the
Leopard if it beats their own tank is a lot less firm than it
first appeared to be.
These growing doubts have made the Germans angry.
Germany buys much of its military equipment from the
United States; now that Germany has a good product
of its own, they say, it is time for the United States to
come across and prove it is really serious about sharing
the arms market more equitably with Europe. Some of
them also believe the time has come? for Germany to
use its political weight to try to bring this about. Mr
Karl Damm, a Bundestag member, said in America
recently that Germany will not put up its share of the
early-warning aircraft money unless the United States
buys the Leopard.
That is an extreme view, and will probably not be
the Germans' laSt word: they can hardly demand
a fairer tank-versus-tank competition and then say the
United States must buy the Leopard regardless of its
outcome. But Mr Damm's remark has drawn attention
to the Germans' new tendency to put all of these military
negotiations in the same basket, and their growing
readiness to argue toughly with America about them.
This is no had thing if it makes the Americans
realise that the issues are political as well as military.
There is more at stake than a few details of tank con-
struction. The United States has to accept that it cannot
forever sell weapons to Europe just by demonstrating
that they are cheaper and technically superior; the
Europeans want to be able to produce good, cheap
weapons for the alliance too. This should be both sides'
ultimate aim. But the danger of putting politics into
military matters is that the wrong military decisions
can get made.
Separate is best
Both Germany and the United States can help to stop
this happening. First, the three things should not be
allowed to trip each other up. The argument about
German offset payments for the new American brigade
in north Germany is a basic one: whether Germany
should continue to provide some sort of compensation
for' the balance-of-payments costs of American pro-
tection. The ansi.ver is probably yes, because it can
afford it. The early warning aircraft is harder to keep
separate, because Germany's final decision about that
will not be taken until well after the tank competition
is over. But it is probably a mistake to think of this as
an Americanp.-kaject that Germany is supporting. It is
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in reality a project to defend Nato Europe, to which the
United States proposes to make a generous contribution
both by its direct investment in the aircraft, and by a
handsome write-off of its research and development
costs. The German part in defusing the dispute would
be to accept both of these basic points.
But it is reasonable for Germany to ask for, and
America to accept, changes in the tank competition.
These should certainly include the side-by-side test the
Germans want. Each country should then say, publicly
that it will buy the winner, or build it under licence: some-
T1--E CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Friday, April 30, 1976
thing the Germans will not do under the present compe-
tition rules. It is important not only to get the best tank for
a large part of Nato's armies in the 1980s, but for both
Germany and the United States to believe that the best
tank has been fairly chosen. Side-by-side tests would
delay the American tank programme a bit, but that is
a small price to pay for persuading everyone that the
right decision has been made. That German-American
connection is too important, when so much of the rest
of western Europe is so weak, to let it be cracked by
nationalism over the instruments of the common defence.
Possible Italian Communist victory poses problems
ouah
By Guy Halverson
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
The possibilities of Communist Party victory
in the upcoming June Italian general elections
presents Pentagon strategists with a number
of tough decisions:
* Since Italy is the home of the U.S. Sixth
Fleet in the Mediterranean, and fills a key role
in the defense of central Europe, should the
U.S. military share NATO defense secrets with
an Italian Government ? even a coalition gov-
ernment ? including Communists?
O Should Defense Department officials be
speeding up possible "pull-back" plans to
Spain, or U.S. East Coast ports?
Because Italy remains a strategic link in
NATO's European and Mediterranean defense
plans it is not surprising the upcoming elec-
toral test between the ruling Christian Demo-
crats and the 1.5-million-member Italian Com-
munist Party (the largest in Western Europe)
has stirred up the U.S. defense and intelligence
community.
Pentagon consensus ,
The consensus in Pentagon corridors is that
whatever the outcome of the upcoming elec-
tions, ways will be found to maintain the large
(13,000-man) U.S. military presence in Italy,
while shoring up Italian military links within
NATO itself.
Some defense officers note that Communist
Party government participation in Iceland and
Portugal, for example, has not meant irrevo-
cable military breaks with the U.S. in past
years.
Nevertheless, the military importance of
Italy is not underemphasized here:
o It is the home of NATO's southern com-
mand and home base for the large U.S. Sixth
Fleet, which daily patrols the Mediterranean
Sea.
O The world's seventlrilargest industrial
power, Italy is opposite Yugoslavia, which de-
fense intelligence experts believe will face pos-
sible Soviet take-over plans after the passing of
President Tito:
0 U.S. bases in Italy include Camp Darby at
Livorno and Camp Ederle at Vincenza, both
Army bases in the north; a Navy base at Sigo-
nella in Sicily; the Sixth Fleet home port at
Naples, and a Navy support base at La Matti-
lena in Sardinia; and Air Force installations at
Aviano Air Base below the Austrian border and
San Vito facing Albania.
If the U.S. were ever 'forced to pull back its
military presence in Italy, one likely option
would be Spain, says some experts.
New base treaty
A new, five-year base treaty for Spain, now
before the Senate, would allow the United
States to maintain its important military links
on the Iberian Peninsula. The U.S. currently
has two strategic air bases in Spain ? at Tor-
rejon and Zaragoza ? and a major submarine
base at Rota, on Spain's southwest coast below
Portugal.
The Sixth Fleet, now rivaled by an equally
formidable Soviet Mediterranean fleet, many
consists of 45 vessels. Navy officials say that if
the fleet were to be moved out of Italian wa-:
ters, such as back to the U.S. East Coast. fuel
and maintenance costs would rise quickly.
It is for that reason, say Defense Depart-
ment officials, that it is expected that even
with Communist Party inclusion in the govern-
ment, ways will be found to maintain the U.S.
presence in Italy. -
Several other reasons why Italy looms so im-
portantly in defense thinking: a major manu-
facturer of machinery, Italy has a large and
important merchant marine.
Moreover, there is the fear that a swing to
the Communists in Italy would dramatically
accelerate the coming to power of Communists
in France ? again ? most likely in a coalition
government with French Socialists.
34
in
rren,nean
NEW YORK TIMES
7 May 1976
CHINESE EXPRESS
DOUBTS ABOUT ES.
Its Commitment to Europe Is
Questioned, Britain Says
PEKING, May 6 (Reuters)?
iThe British Foreign Secretary,
iAnthony Crosland, said tonight
that Chinese leaders had ex-
pressed ,doubts about the Unit-
ed States commitment to West
:European defense.
After meeting here with
:newly appointed Prime Minister
.Hua Kuo-feng and Foreign Mi-
nister Chiao Kuan-hue, he said
at a news ? conference that he
had been questioned about the
reliability of the American com-
mitment to use a nuclear deter-
rent.
Mr.. Crosland said the Chinese!
were under a misapprehension
about United States reliability
and he had tried to allay their
'"unnecessary doubts."
Peking's leaders, had ham-
mered home their/ concern
-about the Soviet military threat
.to Europe and need for West
'European unity, Mr. Crosland
said:
! He said the two sides had
:differed in their interpretation
of East-West detente, which
China sees as a Soviet plot to
'full the Western affiance.
But Mr. Crosland added there
was agreement on the need for
a strong NATO and for the
United States to "remain corn-
Imitted and determined.".
. The news conference con-
cluded Mr. Crosland's three
days in Peking?the first visit
here by a West Euronean minis-
:ter since last month's changes
in the Chinese leadership.
Tomorrow he leaves on a
provincial tour before flying on
I to Japan on Sunday.
I The Foreign Secretary said
it was stressed by every Chi-
nese minister he met th the
leadership changes would not
seriously affect foreign policy
or trade:
He reported his 75-minitte
meeting with Mr. lioa today
covered the global balance of
power and tfbin.:,e anxiety
about detente with Moscow.
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The Japan Times Tuesday, April 27, 1976
An Untenable Aspect of Detente
There seems to be a firmly Implanted suspicion, rightly or
wrongly, in Europe now that American foreign policy under
Secretary of State henry Kissinger is based on acquiescence of
Soviet domination of Eastern Europe in exchange for political
noninterference by Moscow in Western Europe.
A furor of speculation erupted after a leak to the press of a
speech given by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, U.S. State Department
counselor and close confidant of Dr. Kissinger, to U.S. am-
bassadors in London last December. The first accounts, later*
said to be inaccurate, quoted Mr. Sonnenfeldt as saying "per-
manent organic union between the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe is necessary to avoid 1Vorld War III."
In the United States and Europe, charges were made that a
new Sonnenfeldt doctrine had been proclaimed that abandoned
Eastern Europe to perpetual "Soviet enslavement." Such in-
dependent-minded Eastern European nations as Yugoslavia
and Romania voiced?their uneasiness if not distress over what
was considered a sellout. And the Sonnenfeldt briefing became a
campaign issue in U.S. election year politics.
Later Mr. Sonnenfeldt explained that what he had said in
London was that Soviet domination in Eastern Europe rested on
power and that this was dangerous and could lead to an ex-
plosion. He said "organic relationship" was used to contrast
with a relationship based totally on power, force and repression.
He denied that the U.S. was abandoning attempts to influence
events in Eastern Europe. He said U.S. policy supports "in-
dependence, autonomy and various aspects of sovereign in-
dependence" in Eastern Europe while, of course, recognizing
the fact of Soviet influence.
Some commentators said Mr. Sonnenfeldt was only stating
what everyone knew about U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe
and no one should have been shocked even by what Mr. Son-
nenfeldt said were distorted versions of his speech. Obviously,
? the U.S. has no intention of fomenting revolt in Eastern Europe
'since it would not aid the rebels. This was proved in the
uprisings against Soviet domination in Poland, East Berlin,
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Then the U.S. did nothing and
would do nothing in the future:So in reality, the United States
has. been acquiescing to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe
since World War II.
And Mr. Sonnenfeldt's p.romise of support for independenee in
Eastern Europe convinced no one that the U.S. really would or
could do very much to help.
However, in the past several years the United States and the
Soviet Union have been trying to establish a new relationship.
And every time.detente appeared to be working, there .were
35
flickerings of suspicion in Western Europe that the two super-
poweis were, if not by diplomatic agreement, then tacitly in
accord on dividing up the world. After the Sonnenfeldt explosion
Dr. Kissinger emphatically stated that the U.S. recognized no
"spheres of influence."
However, Dr. Kissinger's almost frantic campaign to beat
back the spread of Communism in Western Europe indicates
that he considers Western Europe an American preserve. He
has approached Socialist parties, warning them not to permit
the participation of Communists in government. He is par-
ticularly concerned about Italy where Communist participation
in the Government of this NATO ally is almost a foregone
conclusion.
Dr. Kissinger has been criticized for .not recognizing the in-
dependent nature of Communist parties in Western Europe.
However, the secretary of state apparently believes that no
Communist party once it has attained power will ever relinquish
it.
Dr. Kissinger's activities do not ?prove the point alone.
However, many question the strange behavior and attitude of
Moscow toward the Communist parties of Western Europe. Last
year, Moscow seemed indifferent to the fate of the Communist
Party in Portugal when it attempted to seize power. In 1974
during the French presidential election, the Soviet ambassador
called on Valery Giscard d'Estaing just before the voting. Many
believed this act swung votes away from the Socialist-
Communist coalition.
At the same time, the Kremlin is actively feuding with the
Italian, French and Spanish Communist Parties. This, of
' course, stems from the Russian desire to keep ideological
leadership on them. However, many believe that Moscow values
detente, shaky as it is, with Washington more than Communist
victories in Western Europe, which most certainly would anger
the U.S.
Even if the United States and the Soviet Union are acting on
some tacit understanding, however, it is doubtful if either will
really succeed in holding onto their zones of dominance. In the
U.S., public opinion against any such deal is too strong. Also, a
policy of trying to hold back independent Communist Parties in
Western Europe seems doomed to failure. And the changing
style of national Communism in the free societies is having its
influence in Eastern Europe.
It is likely that both the Soviet Union and the United States will
have to acquiesce to political changes within their own spheres
- of influence eventually , since the trend toward political
'fragmentation appears irreversible.
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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Wednesday, May 5, 1976
'U.S. Apparently Favored Building Base
Over Eviction of Soviet Troops in Somalia
VINI???
I By a WALL STREET JOURNAL Stall Reporter
WASHINGTON?The U.S. last year re-
jected a chance to get Soviet troops evicted
from Somalia because it feared this would
? remove justification for building a contro-
versial new military base, testimony before
? a- Senate subcommittee indicated yester-
day. ?
The U.S. base in question is on Diego
Garcia, a remote Indian Ocean island where
. a "logistical support" facility is under con-
struction. The main reason for building the
base, Pentagon officials told Congress last
July, is that the Soviet navy has established
a major presence in Somalia, an African
state facing the Indian Ocean.
According to James Akins, former U.S.
ambassador to Saudi Arabia, the Ford ad-
ministration had a?chance to get the Rus-
sians thrown out of Somalia but declined to
try. He said he assumes?but doesn't know
for sure--that the reason WRS an administra-
tion fear that Congress would then refuse to
finance the Navy's Diego Garcia base,
? which already faced strong opposition.
"One would have to be pretty dense not
? to get this connection," Mr. Akins told the
? Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations. He also said a
State Department official told him later that
that was the reason, though Mr. Akins said
he couldn't be positive that the official in
question knew why the decision was made.
Saudi Arabian Offer
The offer to get the Russians evicted
came from Saudi Arabia, where Mr. Akins
was stationed at the time. He said the Sau-
dis shared U.S. concern about the Soviet
presence, so they discussed the matter with_
Somalia, a poor country just across the Red
Sea.
The Saudis offered to take over econom-
ic-aid projects being financed by Moscow.
and to buy U.S. arms for Somalia as substi-
tutes for Russian weapons then being deliv-
ered, according to Mr. Akins. He said only
$15 million of U.S. weapons would have been
needed?at Saudi expense?to make the ef-
fort.
However, the former ambassador said he
I couldn't get any Washington response,
either positive or negative, to the offer. Nor
could he get an official explanation for this
official silence. But Mr. Akins testified that
the Ford administration may have been
afraid that evicting the Soviets would re-
move the official rationale for building the
Diego Garcia base, so it didn't dare encour-
age the Saudis to go ahead.
Preferred Soviet Threat
If true, this makes it seem that Washing-
ton preferred a Soviet threat and the means
to counter it, rather than no threat and no
? base. Sen. Frank Church (D., Idaho), sub-
committee chairman, called it "disturbing'
and Sen. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) termed
it "outrageous." Sen. Church, a presidential 1
aspirant, promised further investigation of
the matter. ?
Saudi officials told Mr. Akins that So-
malia was ready to make such an agree-
ment, the former ambassador said. How-
ever, he cautioned the subcommittee that
the attempt mightn't have worked?it's pos-
sible the Somalis couldn't or wouldn't have
thrown out the Russians even if Saudi Ara-
bia provided economic aid and U.S. weap-
ons.
However, Mr. Akins testified that he
I strongly favored making the effort, and he
recommended it to the State Department. It
was embarrassing, he said, that he couldn't
tell the Saudis why the U.S. didn't respond
to their offer.
Mr. Akins, one of the more outspoken
State Department officials, was fired by
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger last De-
cember after assorted disagreements. He
said yesterday that he never received any
explanation for this, but assumes Mr. Kis-
singer found him too abrasive. Mr. Akins for
years was the department's senior expert on
petroleum matters.
Although yesterday's testimony didn't
say specifically when the Saudi offer about
Somalia was made, Mr. Akins and Sen.
Church said it occurred about the time the
Senate was considering the Diego Garcia
, matter. Last July 27 the Senate voted 53 to
t 43 to finance construction of the naval base
there.
THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, MAY. 6,1976
KISS' GER'S VIEW
O SOMALIA ASKED
dor to Saudi Arabia, "a serious
matter."
Mr. Akins told the Senate
Multinational subcommittee
yesterday, under oath, that the
Saudis had offered to give So-
malia the amount of economic
Senator Calls for Comment aid promised Somalia by the
on Reported Saudi Offer
Soviet Union if the United
States would furnish Somalia
with arms also promised it by
. By ROBERT M. SMITH Moscow. According to Mr.
sIssii to The New York Timed Akins, the Saudis even offered
WASHINGTON, May 5?Sen- to pay for the American-sup.
ator Dick Clark, chairman of plied arms.
the Senate African Affairs sub- The former ambassador said
committee, asked in a letter the State Department had
sent to Secretary of State Hen- failed to respond to the Saudi
ry A. Kissinger today why the offer.
State Department reportedly ig- Senator Frank Church, De-
nored a Saudi-Arabian proposal mocrat of Idaho, noted yester-
day that the Saudi offer came
about the time that Congress
was considering the Adminis-
traton s request for a naval
Iowa Democrat, called the alle. base at Diego Garcia in the Isi-
Igation made. by James E. Akins, than Ocean.
to diminish Soviet influence in
Somalia. Mr. Kissinger is now
in Africa.
? Senator Smith, who is an
linked its case for a Diego Gar-
cia base to the Soviet naval
presence in Somalia
Mr. Clark said that Mr.
Akins's allegations were impor-
tant "not only because of the
way in which the Soviet pre-
sence in Somalia was used to
justify development of the U.S.
base at Diego Garcia, but be-
cause an important Opportunity
for countering Soviet influence
and re-establishing Somali ties
may have been missed."
The Senator told Mr. Kissin-
ger that he had spoken with
representatives of the Somali
Government on several occa-
sions and had come to believe
that Somalia "is a government
which would prefer genuine no-
nalignment."
Alluding to the Saudi offer,
Mr. Clark said, 'The alleged
failure to react to the sugges-
tion raises' serious doubts about
the genuineness of U.S. concern
shout the Soviet jpresence
?Ithe former American ambassa- The Administration had there."
At the State Department to-.
day, Frederick Z. Brown, direc-
tor of the Office of Press Rela--
tions, said inferences drawn
from Mr. Akins's testimony;
were "misleading."
During a news briefing, Mr.i
Brown refused to confirm thati
the Saudis had made the offerl
described by Mr. Akins, and in-
sisted that "the Saudi issue has
no relationship at all to our de-
cision to build up Diego Gar-
cia."
Mr. Brown said the former
ambassador, a 22-year veteran
of the Foreign Service and spe-
cialist in Arab affairs, was "not
aware of all the facts," but he
refused to say what the facts
were.
"The situation is far too com-
plex for me to go into in an:,'
detail," Mr. Brown declared. In
response to another question,
he said that he could provide
no assurances that he i.vould
ever be able to. offer more in-
formation on the subject.
NEW YORK TIMES
6 MAY 1976
KiSSingerIS Call for Ban on Chrome Ore
rom Rhodesia Stirs Congress Debate
IV STEVEN RATTNER
Last week, Secretary of
State Henry A. Kissinger an-
nounced during his swing
through Africa that he would
seek to end imports of
Rhodesian chrome into thr
United States.
56
The speech prompted what
has become an annual ritual
in Washington ? a debate
among legislators, ?riith help
irom business and sacial.ac-
tion groups, over the five-
year-old amendment devised
by Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr.,
Independent. of Virginia, to
circumvent the United Na-
tions embargo against
Rhodesia. -
At the heart of the debate
is Rhodesia's position with
two-thirds of the world's re-
serves of highest grado
chrome and as one of three
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major suppliers ? Soviet
Union and South Africa are
the two others.
High grades of chrome, a
dull black ore in its natural
form, put the "stainless" in
stainless steel. Chrome is
also important in the produc-
tion of jet engine parts, cast
iron and alloyed steel. Lower
grade chromes, such as those
used to make automobile
bumpers shiny, are available
in abundant supply from al-
ternative sources.
U.S. Is Key Importer
But with no domestic sup-
? ply of high-grade chrome, the
United States last year was
forced to import 570,000 tons
of ore and 275.000 tons of
ferrochrome, the purified
I form. Of this, 17 percent of
the ore and 28 percent of the
ferrochrome came directly
from Rhodesia. The majority
of the imports came from the
Soviet Union.
This has spurred Senator
Byrd and his allies to assest
that the United States must
not become dependent on a
Communist country for a raw
material essential to national
security.
Opponents of the measure
contend that supporting the
United Nations resolution is
proper and in the long run
would prove fruitful if a
black regime came to power.
At the same time, they calcu-
late that -an import ban is
likely to have minimal eco--
, not= cuences.
The business community
stands solidly behind Senator
Byrd 's efforts, at least partly
on the argument that a re-
turn to the ban that existed
between 1966 and 1971
would only exacerbate exist-
ing supply and price problem.
Price Changes Traced
"Whenever the amendment
has been up for reconsidera-
tion,? the Russians have
doubled their price and cut
shipments by 35 percent to
reduce American invento-
SUNDAY.TIMES, London.
*2 May 1976
ries," charged E. F. Andrews,
a vice president of Allegheny
Ludlum Industries, which is
I a major user.
According to a spokesman
' for Union Carbide, the price
of Soviet chrome moved from
$27 a ton in 1966 to $56 at
. the height of the ban in 1971,
then to $38 in 1973. Today
the price is $170. Prices for
both South African and,
Rhodesian chrome have re-
mained lower. .
Moreover, according to F.
Perry Wilson, chairman of
Union Carbide, "there are in-
dications that the Russian
ability to supply is less than
in the past." By every esti-
mate, the Soviet Union is be-
lieved to have less than 5
percent of the world's resour-
ces.
? While in the long run,
American producers expect
to become mote dependent
on South African supplies,
the ore is not so good as the
Rhodesian variety and the
QUITE a-case can be made :out :against
Henry Kissinger's speech last week in
-Lusaka. He, like his compatriots, knows
'very little about black or white,African
affairs. For ? years the United -States.
- Government has had ? no - identifiable
African policy.- Now, humiliated by the
Set-back in Angola, and fearful of further
'Soviet and Cuban intervention in African
"wars of liberation," Dr Kissinger
? barnstorms his Way round black Africa,
? giving warm encouragement to those-
. African countries who oppose the white-.
. minority regime in Rhodesia. He may
well have - succeeded; the critics could
-claim, .in unleashing fresh violence and
unrest south of the Zambesi: '
It is undeniable that the American
:Government's -awareness of African
issues has been sharpened by the Ango-
lan experience, and by the wish to pre-
vent a repetition of foreign intervention
elsewhere in Africa. To this end,
Kissinger underwrites the cause of black
nationalism, to ensure that that national-
ism does not turn to Moscow, Cuba or
elsewhere. He is certainly not to be
blamed for this. Indeed, allowing for
the rhetoric and show-business aspect
which is an inseparable part of his
travelling diplomacy, it is difficult to
know what other speech Kissinger- could
have made at this moment if the Ameri-
can and Western position in Africa, in
general, is to be strengthened. Nothing
could exceed the folly of those, in
Britain and elsewhere, who think that
the white in governments in
Southern Africa are the surest bastion
sl
ht
availability of South Africa's
high-grade chrome is limited.
During the previous ban,
however, according to op-
ponents of the Byrd measure,
few dislocations of conse-
quence occurred. They attri-
buted the price increase to
the general upward trend of
commodity prices and con-
tended that domestic indus-
try was never shut down for
lack of chrome.
? Moreover, American stock-
piles are high?no one seems
to know precisely how high.
When combined with grow-
ing South African supplies,
this suggests to Byrd op-
ponents .that the United
States could safely withstand
air end to Soviet chrome even
without Rhodesian supplies.
The recession has also
meant a sharp drop in the
demand for stainless steel
and that has in turn reduced
the need for chrome. As a
result, despite the price in-
creases by the Soviet Union,
supplies of , chrome on the
world market are plentiful.
? -
against present -and future Communist
threats. -
A more pertinent approach to the new
American policy is to ask whether it is
likely to work. By promising substantial
aid to the nations surrounding Rhodesia,
as well as to "newly independent Zim-
babwe," that policy will presumably
encourage and strengthen, politically
and financially, the guerrilla forces
ranged against the Smith regime. How
far and how quickly that will lead to
their pressures on Rhodesia reaching a
point where the white minority finally ?
hauls down the flag; is anyone's guess.-
But after years of obdurate refusal by :
the SmithiteS to face fads, any new.
effort to make them realise that tithe,
history, geography and demography are '
not on their side, is to be welcomed.
There is one risk to the West in the
Kissinger style of diplomacy. For all its"
power, the United States does not have
a great capacity to influence men or ;
events in Africa. The manufactured
build-up to a speech formulating- a new
policy, which unavoidably is long on '
ends and short on means, may: produce .
a dangerous disillusion. It is not even
certain that Kissinger's pledge to seek
the repeal of the arrangement which
enables Rhodesia to export her chrome
to the United States, will be honoured by
Congress. That would make a practical
farce of the initiative. For all that,
in its unequivocal expression of support
for legitimate African aspirations, the
Kissinger speech is a welcome, if be-
lated, sign that Washington is reading
the African portents aright.
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itrA:-2,. '1976 ?TITE?WA-31111C-GTON- POST
...
ith
ver ihnor
By Peter Costigan ?
5.1-rint to The Washington Post
CANBERRA?A bitter dis-
pute between Australia and
Indonesia over East Timor,
the internationally forgotten
tail end of Portugal's aban-
doned empire, is causing
U.S. officials in the area
deep concern. ?
Both the rightist military
government of Indonesia's
President Suharto and the
rightist democratic govern-
ment of Australia's Prime
Minister Malcolm Fraser
have reluctantly acknowl-
edged their dispute.
? But both maintain that
,they will,, not let the argu-
?
oncnt?generated by grow-
ting anger in Australia over
lIndonesia's invasion of East
Thnor in November and its
tcleterminalion to incorpo-
rate the tiny territory into
i Indonesia?disturb the basic
ifriendship between the two
nations.
American concern over.
f. the dispute has deepened in
i -recent weeks with signs of a
?possible long-term split be-
tween Australia and Indone-
sia. The two nations militar-
ily and economically domi-
nate the confluence or the ,
Indian and Pacific &cans. ?
With the State " ?Depart-
ment and Pentagon watch-
ing closely, American diplo-
mats in the area have
worked overtime 'since early
? April to contain the dispute.-
. Indonesian and Australian
officials have gone' out of
their way to avoid any refer-
ence to the American inter-
est in their dispute.
The ? death of five young
journalists from Australia?.
three of them Australian cit
izens, one British and one a?
New Zealander?in October,
.has threatened to escalate
',he dispute into confronta-
tion. They were killed near
East Thnor's.: border. with
the portion , of Indonesia
that shares the same island.
The five television jour-
nalists went to East Timor
Last September to cover the
' exploding civil war there af-
ter the Portuguese adminis-
trators left the island.
? -told a Pres conference in
Jakarta attended by Austra-
lian correspondents, "and
we will erect a monument to
them." -
'r. Jose Martins, the ? leader
'of one of several small polit-
ical parties in East ? Timor
that until recently encour-
aged the Indonesians to
move into the tiny country,
.; last week gave a detailed
yersion of how the jour-
nalists allegedly wer e
gunned down by Indonesian
troops:
Australian Foreign Minis-
,
ter Andrew Peacock man-
:. ? ,
aged to perstiade...the Indo-
nesian government to
three Australian officials to
? visit East 'Timor in :an effort
. to find Oat 'what happened.
But government officials
? in Canberra are pessimistic
a
fbont how much they will
? ind out.
Since the fate. President
Sukarno was eased ;out of
power beginning 1965,
In dctober they disap-
peared and. the Indonesian
government 1. originally
claimed that they acciden-
tally burned to death when
mortars set. fire' to the house
they Were in during cross-
fire between warring ?Ti-
Morese factions. ? ?
At the time, the Labor
Party government of Gough
? ?Whitlam was in the middle
? of a constitutional crisis
that resulted in Whitlam be
ing sacked in November.' ?
On Dec. 13, Prime Minis-
ter , Fraser's conservative
government was elected by
a landslide majority. Austra-
lians paid little- attention to
the fate of the five news-
men. .
But suddenly ? the mood
has changed. Newspapers
and: the Australian journal-
ists' -,:associatiod generated
parliamentary' pressure that
? pushed the government into
ordering an inquiry,
Australian concern was
? heightened by the realize-
tioh . that 7 Indonesian
"volunteer" forces had in-
staded 'East Timor while
Australia was consumed by
its December domestic poli-
tical crisis and had set up a
? provisional government that
planned to supervise the in-
corporation of the 600,000
people of East Timor into
-
Indonesia. ?
?
Indonesian Foreign Minis-
tet- Adam Malik, added fuel,
to the fire of Australian an-
ger last week by announcing
that President Suharto
would have an "important"
announcement in August,
that there would. be a
new national day and that
Indonesia would then invite
foreign correspondents to
visit East Timor.
Nobody doubted what he
was talking about?the in-
corporation of East Timor.
Even more in for
Australians, Malik proposed
a very Asian answer to the
problem of the five journal-
ists' deaths.
"Let us forget them," he
Australian-Indonesian ..rela- ?
tions had been stable. De-
spite cultural and economic
contrasts. But Australians
. have always been extremely
nervous about. events to
their immediate north.
Australians have regarded
Papua-New Guinea, immedi-
ately to the north, and In-
donesia as buffers, against
the more powerful nations
of-Asia farther north.
During the Sukarno years,
Indonesia demanded control .,
of the western part Of New
Guinea, known as West
Irian, and annexed it. This
made Australia worry about
Indonesia,. and 'later ? it or-
dered. American .pdll.:jets,
fitted .as strike .,aircraft,,ts a
deterrent. ? ;?-:: ?
Australians ? iiieb?nniug
to believe, that the ..Indone-
sian invasion of ,East Timor
is part of a, pattern of mili-
? tary expansion .; by their
most powerful neighbor, ..
The ??' Fraser -:government '
has.ealled for. withdrawal of
Indonesian frees-.mm East
Timor. and.supports U.N. ini-
? tiatives calling ",f(3T- self-de-
termination for the people
there.
That aggravates 'the jal-
karta government, Which be-
lieves that Australia gave it
the diplornatic ? go-ahead
with its invasion of East 'ri-
'nor in the pragmatic inter-
ests of maintaining stability
and keeping out any leftist
rule on .the island?which is
only OG miles from the
northern Australian coast.
Both nations are, allies of
the United States, and Aus-
tralia is formally linked to it
through the ANZUS treaty.
? Both, Australia and the
United States have been in-
volved in efforts to develop
Indonesia's largely . untap-
ped resources and' to tackle
poverty among its 120 mil-
lion people. ?? ,
The last thing American
'.diplomats in the area want
is a split between the two
? friends, especially one that
? current Australian emotions
could force into a confronta-
,tion in which Washington
swi oeu4l.d. ' be asked to choose
d
TIME, MAY 10, 1976
VIET NAM
river
38
ry Two St
the PoHs
II was, trumpeted North Viet Nam's
official daily, Nhan Dan, "a festival of
the completion of national reunifica-
tion." In Hanoi and Saigon, as well as
scores of other cities, towns and ham-
lets in between, streets and squares were
festooned with banners and painted
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maps that showed North and South with
all demarcation lines removed?and
Hanoi prominently marked as the cap-
ital. Called out by Communist ward
bosses?and, in Saigon, by the pealing
bells of the city's churches?some 11
million Vietnamese trooped to the polls
clutching pink voter-registration cards
to elect the new, 492-member National
, Assembly that will serve as the legis-
lature for a formally unified Viet Nam.
With characteristic reverence for
calendar milestones, the Communists
scheduled the election for the eve of the
first anniversary of the North Vietnam-
ese triumph of April 30, 1975. That was
the date on which Hanoi's tanks rum-
, bled through the gates of former Pres-
ident Nguyen Van Thieu's palace in Sai-
gon, completing the military conquest
of South Viet Nam that had been the
Communists' goal ever since Ho Chi
Minh drove the French out of the North
in 1954. Also characteristically, the vic-
tors took no chances with the outcome
of the Assembly election. In Saigon, lo-
cal party chiefs lined up families, 20 or
so at a time, for roll call, then marched
eligible voters off to the polls, where
their political choice amounted to strik-
ing a few less favored names from a list
of preselected candidates. Under such
conditions, participation tends to be
high: in Saigon, officials proudly an-
nounced, the voter turnout was 98%, al-
most as praiseworthy as Hanoi's 99.82%.
Figurehead President. Reflecting
the demographics of the unified coun-
try, which will have a population of 44
million people, membership in the As-
sembly is weighted slightly in favor of
the North; it has 249 representatives v.
243 for the South. Sitting in Hanoi, the
Assembly will be mainly a rubber stamp
to the ten-man Politburo of North Viet
Nam's Lao Dong (Workers' Party). The
legislators, warned Politburo Member
Pham Hung, who is the party's chief rep-
TIME, MAY 10, 1976
resentative in the South, will be expect-
ed to carry out Lao Dong policies "most
scrupulously."
Hung himself is an Assembly mem-
ber, as are most of the important North
Vietnamese Communists. When the leg-
islature convenes for the first time, pos-
sibly around May 19, it will choose a
figurehead President for the unified
country, plus a Premier and a Cabinet.
Most likely choice as Premier is North
Viet Nam's Premier Pham Van Dong.
Others who will probably hold top lead-
ership posts include Le Duan. First Sec-
retary of the Lao Dong, and Mrs.
Nguyen Thi Binh, who was chief ne-
gotiator for the Viet Cong in Paris.
The Assembly's agenda includes rat-
ifying a new constitution and choosing
a flag, national anthem and a new name
for the unified country. While the leg-
islators may also be allowed to consider
a new five-year plan, which will set the
pace and nature of social and economic
reunification, the real work will be done
by the Lao Dong chieftains at a party
congress, the first in 16 years, scheduled
for later this year.
So far, the Communists, who remain
mildly astonished by the lightning suc-
cess of their 1975 spring offensive (see
box), have been cautious in their treat-
ment of the South. The new government
claims that 90% of the officials, civil ser-
vants and army members of the Thieu
regime who were packed off to country
camps for hoc tap (re-education) have
since resumed normal lives. But many
top officials remain in the camps; one es-
timate of the current total, by Italian
Journalist Tiziano Terz,a.ni, is 150,000 to
200,000.
Saigon itself still retains much of
what the puritan Northern Marxists de-
cry as its decadence. Prostitution has
made a comeback, bars are busy and
rock music can still be heard on down-
town streets. A curfew exists?which of-
The Final Days: Hanoi's Version
Two Hanoi newspapers have lately
been publishing a serial account of last
year's conquest of South Viet Nam. Writ-
ten by North Vietnamese Chief of Staff
General Van Tien Dung?second in mil-
itary command to Defense Minister Vo
Nguyen Giap?the remarkably candid
narrative offers an intimate glimpse of
North Vietnamese thoughts on the suc-
cessful offensive. Some of Dung's main
disclosures:
b. The planning for the final offen-
sive began fully a year before the at-
tacks that signaled the end for Saigon.
During a series of meetings in the spring
of 1974, Hanoi's generals decided that
the balance of military power in Viet
Nam had swung in favor of the North.
Though they were confident of eventu-
al victory, the North Vietnamese did not
expect the offensive to reach a climax
until 1976. The abrupt collapse of Sai-
gon's forces surprised Hanoi almost as
much as it did everyone else.
tp Dung admits that beginning in
1974, Hanoi broke the Paris accords by
transporting massive reinforcements to
South Viet Nam: "Great quantities of
such materiel as tanks, armored cars,
missiles, long-range artillery pieces and
antiaircraft guns ... were sent to var-
ious battlefields." In addition, a 1,000-
kilometer all-weather supply road was
built to the south, as well as a concealed
5.000-kilometer gasoline pipeline. Ac-
companying the supply effort was a re-
cruitment drive in the North that fun-
neled "tens of thousands" of new troops
into Hanoi's army.
t? Hanoi recognized the reduction of
U.S. aid to the Saigon government as a
key factor in the war's outcome. Says
Dung: "Nguyen Van Thicu was forced
to fight a poor man's war." He adds that
Saigon's "firepower had declined by
nearly 60% because of bomb and am-
munition shortages. Its mobility was re-
duced by half, owing to the lack of air-
craft, vehicles and fuel."
b. A "heated discussion" took place
in Hanoi regarding the possibility that
the U.S. would reintervene in the South.
In the end, however, Hanoi determined
39
ficials lifted for a day-long anniversary
celebration "to allow the people to move
about freely and make merry." Though
there has been little official pressure on
them to leave the overcrowded city,
about 500,000 people out of Saigon's
peak wartime population of 3 million
have done so. But there are signs that
the regime may become less gentle about
effecting its plans for social and polit-
ical reforms. Recently, the remaining
foreign news organizations in Saigon
were told they must close down their of-
fices by the end of this month.
Bad Shape. Hanoi has been almost
as equivocal in its postwar foreign rela-
tions as it has been?up to now?in deal-
ing with the South. Rhetorically, the re-
gime has been truculent, urging more
guerrilla activity among its non-Com-
munist neighbors. On the other hand,
last month a polite Vietnamese delega-
tion turned up in Jakarta for a meeting
of the Asian Development Bank. The
Vietnamese, says one Japanese official,
"openly admit that their economy is in
bad shape and that they need outside
help. They are very interested in joint
ventures in which they would guarantee
private foreign capital."
So are some U.S. corporations, es-
pecially banks and oil companies that
held concessions in the oil-rich waters
off South Viet Nam's coast. But Wash-
ington has adamantly opposed congres-
sional proposals that the U.S. embargo
on Vietnamese trade and aid be lifted
experimentally. The Administration has
repeatedly requested information from
the Communists on the 2,518 Americans
still officially listed as missing in action
in Indochina. But Hanoi has held out,
demanding $3.25 billion in reconstruc-
tion aid promised by Richard Nixon
?subject to congressional approval?in
conjunction with the 1973 peace talks.
Thus the conflict, at least on a level of
dollars and diplomacy, still drags on.
that the U.S. would probably stay out.
One important factor: Watergate. Says
Dung: "The Watergate scandal had se-
riously affected the entire U.S. and
precipitated the resignation of an ex-
tremely reactionary, imperialist Presi-
dent?Nixon."
Hanoi knew the South Vietnam--
.ese expected the first attack of the of-
? fensive to be either in Tay Ninh prov
? ince, near the Cambodian border, or
farther north imPleiku. Hence the Com-
munists' decision to launch the initial
;. thrust Against the Central Highlands
city of Ban Me Thuot. That came as a
complete surprise to Saigon and led
President Thieu to his hasty decision to
withdraw his forces from the Central
Highlands. Dung calls Thieu's decision
! a "grave strategic mistake." Thereafter,
he says, Hanoi's main problem was mov-.
ing fast enough to maintain the ?mili-
tary initiative. For example, the Com-
munists sent a commander from Hanoi
to take charge of the battle for Danang
on March 26. Much to Hanoi's aston-
ishment, the city fell only three days
later?without a fight.
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wp,.sialloTcN POST
2 !'",Y 1976 o Kla
,?or
Army Chief
E.e I,
110C1 erki, r 69) ' 171-7
0 0
By Greg Chamberlain
Manchester Guard In
LONDON? A right-wing
palace coup in Haiti has
wrecked years of careful
U.S.-backed efforts to give
the 18-year-old Duvalier
family dictatorship a less
bloodthirety international
image as a way ofi keeping
the political situation stable
in America's Caribbean
backyard.
Extensive changes this
month have brought . to
power as interior and de-
fense minister Pierre Biam-
by, the late Francois Duval?,
ier's former private secre-
tary, who first gained noto-
riety as the Supervisor of a
massacre 12 years ago in
the southwestern town of Je-
remie in which about 100
persons were killed.
.Biamby's success ? In -the
Jeremie operation led to the
-public execution of two
anti-Duvalierists in the capi-
tal which was watched, on
"Papa Doe's" orders, by
2,000 schoolchildren. The
date, Nov. 12, 1964, has been
an emotional rallying cry
amcng the exiled opposition
ever rine
Biamby, 54, a former, soc-
cer star, rose to be a chief-
tain of the old dictator's
Prime terror army, the Ton-
tons Macoutes. His victory
,in the political battles in-
side the gleaming white
presidential palace in Port-
.au-Prince, capital of Latin
America's poorest country,
:follows the return .to work
of some Tontons Macoutes
warlords who Were sacked
few weeks after Papa Doe
died and was succeeded bY
his teen-age son,..- Jean-
Claude, in 19-71.
i" They include the reap-
! ?
pointment of Rosalie Adol-
phe, a gun-toting woman
who was a favorite of Papa
? Doc, as chief of the Fort Di-
manche prison, where hun-
dreds of political prisoners
, have been tortured and ex-
Saturday. May 8, 1976
TtlE WASHINGTON POST -
rbsA A.adtagn: an Wh_ tteni?
Hidden
? ecuted. The Macoutes have
also received new weapons
over the past year, to the
muted annoyance of the reg-
ular army.
The palace coup appears ,
to have been organized by
secret police chief Luc
Desyr, a former 'taxi driver,
acting With Papa Doe's
eaetesee,.. sheene, end Henri.
Sielait', who heads the state
agency which handles much
of the country's food and
staples and controls an un-
accounted-for fund of some
$20 million annually. The
trio comprise the core of the
regime's old-guard hard-
liners:.
They apparently moved
out of fear that relative lib-
erals in the government
might destroy the dictator-
ship with even minor re-
forms. The coup also follows
a reported assassination at-
tempt on President-for-life
Jean-Claude. Duvalier in
January after which he is
said to have b eert flown
secretly overnight to the
nearby U.S. naval base at
Guantanamo, Cuba, for treat-
ment and a cheek-up.
[State Department officials
denied the report that Du-
valier had been flown to
Guantanamo. for :treatment..
They said they had no evi-
dence of any assassination
attempt against him in Jan-
uary.]
The purge swept away In-
rids for. Unk
In defiance oriaoth congress and the
United Nations, the Ford administra-
tion, has gone behind -the barn to bole-
ter the military dictatorship of Chile. ?
The United Nations, following up our
own reports of repression and torture
inside Chile, has condemned the junta
for violating human rights. ? And only .
last week the respected Inter-American
Human Rights Commission denounced
the junta for its torture tactics.
Congress has reacted by imposing a
$90 million limit on economic aid for
Chile this fiscal year. It was the intent
of Congress, clearly, that the aid should
go directly to needy people. Other na-
tions have also refused'to extend credit.
to the beleaguered dictatorship.
Nevertheless, the administration has
shaken loose hidden money to bail out
the junta. Here are the hush-hush de-
velopments:
The Overseas Private Investment'
Corporation, a quasi-official U.S. insti-
tution, has quietly agreed-to begin in-
suring cempanies that ineest in Chile.
The sne'e Denert went, according to
our sou?-es, twisted arms. This
shottel ethnulate a Heed of investment
capital info the country.
Both the State and Treasury Depart-
ments have encouraged le U.S. end ea.
tership $100 to $125 million. The loan is
needed to pay off short-term obliga-
tions to other countries. Britain and It-
aly have refused to re-schedule Chilean
debt payments because of the regime's
human rights violations. New York's
First National City Bank will put up
most of the money roe the junta, with
the financial support' of the Bank of
America, several New York banks and
two Canadian banks. '
U.S. advisers have also brought pres-
sure upon the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank's President Antonio Ortiz
Mena, who has promised that the bank
will lend up to $125 million to ? Chile.
The first 620 million already has been
approved.
The State Department gave Chile a
$55 million housing guarantee that a
House subcommittee believes excee led
the $90 million congressional ceiling.
"The administration clearly has sought
to evade the spirit, if not the letter, of
the congressional aid ceilings to Chile,"
declared Chairman Donald. M.Fraser,
ID-Calif.)
We have been chronicling the Chi-
lean saga since we reported on March
21, 1972, that the Central Intelligence
Agency and international TelephOne
and 'relegraph Corp, were conspiring to
widian banks to lend the military dicta- underinine the c bile in economy. lawn*
4-0
ntijective was to oust President Salva-
tenor and Defense Minister
Paul Blanchet, who had
pushed a largely unsucess-
ful nationalist line against-
foreign companies over the
past two years; Transport
Minister Pierre Petit; and
Social Afairs Minister Max
Antoine, who had tried to
get the dozens of mainly
American light assembly in
dustries to obey labor laws
on pay and working condi-
tions. Another victim was
Aubelin Jolicoeur, the dimin-
utive deputy tourism direct-
or, whose role as an eccen-
tric socialite' and informer
earned him characterization
as "Petit Pierre" in Graham
;Greene's novel, "The Co-
medians."
The role of the 24-year-old
president is thought to have
been minimal in the face of
the resurgence of these who
are known in Port-au-Prince
as "the dinosaurs."
The first, tiny glints of
press freedom had begun to
appear under Blanchet, who
never managed to establish
himself as the strongman
he had been expected to be.
For eign investment con-
tinues to increase from the
United States and France,-
who are competing for in-
fluence in the former French
colony, but recently the goy;
ernment has been hit by ac-
cusations from abroad of
bribes being paid to officials
ter foreign companies.
?
dor Allende, an elected Marxist, from
t power. ,
The CIA at. first denied participating
in economic sabotage against the Al-.
lende regime but, three years later, was
forced to confess that our story was
true after the Senate intelligence com-
mittee published the proof.
The Nixon administration, mean-
while, phased out economic aid to the
Allende regime on the grounds that the
Chilean economy was unstable. Under
Allende, the inflation rate shot up from
22 per cent in 1971 to 1e3 per cent in
1972, with a 4.4 per cent unemployment
'rate. Since the military junta seized
power, the inflation rate was soared to
a stratospheric 340 per cent, with a 16'.6
per cent unemployment rate.
We have taken pains to point out, by
the way, that the military rulers halie
oppressed not only the Marxists but the
Caristian Democrats.
? Footnote: A spokesman for First Na-
tional City Bank confirmed that the
bank was studying the Chilean loan. A
Bank of America spokesman refused to
comment on our story. At the State De-
partment. a spokesman acicnowiteleel
only that discussions had been held
with OPIC. A Treasury official said the
department was careful not to tell
banks who should get loan: but ac-
knowledged: "They may have Neel en-
couraged by what our desk people tell
them."
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