THE C.I.A. CLOUD OVER THE PRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 20, 1976
• Content Type: NSPR

25X1A
CONFIDENTIAL
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NO. 13 -
GOVERIVENT AFFAIRS
GENERAL
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airs
THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, JULY 20, 1976
The C.I.A. Cloud Over the Press
By Daniel Schorr
ASPEN, Colo.?One of Wil-
liam E. Colby's less exhilarating
moments as Director of Central
Intelligence was having to call
a news conference to demand
deletion from the Senate report
on assassination plots of a
dozen names, including such
underworld figures as Sam
Giancana and John Rosselli.
However misguided the re-
cruitment of these worthies in
the C.I.A.'s designs on Fidel
Castro, they had been promised
eternal secrecy about their
roles, and, for the agency, de-
livering on that promise was an
,article of faith as well as law.
'Again, when Mr. Colby was
subpoenaed by the House In
telligence Committee for the
names of certain intelligence
officers, he faced up to a threat-
eneck contempt citation by mak-
ing, .it clear that he would
rather go to jail' than com-
promise intelligence sources.
. This goes, as well, forrn the,
names of journalists who have
served the C.I.A. And Mr. Col-
by's successor, George Bush,
has said there, will be absolute, .
ly no change in that policy. ,
because he is "dedicated to the .
protection of sources." The
principle is that an intelligence
agency that rats on its agents, past or
present, won't have very many in the
future.
This poses a problem to the journal-
istic community, 'which, out of concern
for the compromising of the First
Amendment, would , like the intelli-
gence community to expose the infil-
trators. . .
- But banging on.a closed door seems
a. fruitless diversion, and there may.
be a more fruitful way of going about
this. There has clearly been a pattern
of cooperation between the C.I.A. and
employers of journalists. Managers,
with less legal restraint, should be
able to provide some of the informa-
tion about their employees' roles and
their own. .
"Where an American news organza-
tion provided cover, for a C.I.A. offi-
cer," says an intelligence veteran, "the
practice was to make arrangement
with management."
Such an arrangement was necessary,'
if only to cover transfers, absences
and other hard-to-explain movements.
There is reason to believe that some of
these arrangements may have original-
ly been formalized irimemorandums of
understanding between C.I.A. directors
and the employers concerned.
There have been published sugges-
tions of management involvement with
the C.I.A. For example:
Wayne Phillips, former staff member
of The New York Times, has stated,
with the support of documentary
Material, that the C.I.A. tried to recruit
him in 1952 while he was studying at
Columbia University's Russian Insti-
tute. He said an agency official told
him that the C.I.A. had "a working
arrangement" with Arthur Hays Sulz-
berger, then publisher of The Times;
and that the agency could arrange to
get him assigned to Moscow. ?
(Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, the present
publisher, has said: "I never heard of
The Times being approached either in '
my capacity as publisher or as the son
of the' late Mr. Sulzberger.") -
Sig Mickelson, former president of
CBS News, has said that in 1954 he
was called to the office of William S.
Paley, CBS board chairman, in whose
presence two C.I.A. officials told him
that Austin Goodrich, a CBS News
stringer in Stockholm, was a ? C.I.A.
agent. (Mr. Paley has denied that there
was any such meeting.)
There are also unconfirmed reports,
pursued by investigative reporters, of
arrangements by newspapers in Flor-
ida and California to provide cover.to
C.I.A. officers.
Most of this goes back to the 1950's,
when the C.I.A. deputy director Frank
Wisner cultivated news media execu-
tives and was reputed to have boasted
of playing the press. like a "mighty -
Wurlitzer." No such formal arrange-
Tom Hachtmark-
ment is believed to exist today. The
C.I.A. says it has stopped using "ac-
cedited" correspondents of American
news media, and more recently has
stated that it will also phase out the
use of part-time correspondents of
American news organizations.
Current trews executives profess to
be mystified about the nature of the.
clandestine lines that C.I.A. ran into
their organizations in past years. But-
there are executives and retired ex-
ecutives, who could help dispel the
cloud hanging over the press by com-
ing forward to tell the arangements
they made with the C.I.A.
If restoring the fair name of the free
press requires exposure of reporters
who served the C.I.A.. often after ap-
peals to their patriotism, then the
parade could well be led by employers
who made the practice possible?pre-
sumably out of equally patriotic mo-
tives.
Daniel Schorr is a CBS television in-
vestigative reporter under suspension
pending Congressional resolution of its
inquiry into his leak of the House
Select Committee on Intelligence's re-
port on the Central intelligence Agency
to The .Village Voice. ?
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On the Separation of Church and State
Some preliminary observations on the lamentable consequences of
the Senior Senator from Idaho for the national intelligence services.
by James Aneleton and Charles J. V. Murphy
siez.imorrawiravolems
Mr. .Angteton spent 31 years with the Office of Strategic
Servtces [OSS] and the Central Intelligence Agency. and through
the last 20 years was Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA.
Mr. Murphy is a retired writer. Time-Life and Fortune
magazine.
When the first revelations in Washington of the alleged mis-
deeds of the Central Intelligence Agency became a sensation in
the European press 17 months ago, a veteran diplomat in Bonn
expressed his consternation that the government of a great
country should let itself be driven to disgorge vital state secrets
affecting the security of the nation and its allies. "You don't
have a country over there," he scolded The New York Times"
correspondent, "you have a huge church."
? That subtle witticism went right over The New York Times'
good, gray, humorless head. The friendly diplomat had shrewd-
ly perceived at the source of the orgy of self-criticism convulsing
Congress and the press alike something more primitive than
witch-burning or the whiplash of Puritan conscience. What he
had discerned was not so much the return of a rebuking godly
in-
stitution to American politics as the emergence of a fresh evan-
gelical phenomenon in the affairs of State--a church spelled with
a capital "C." Frank Church, to be precise, the senior Senator
from Idaho. Events have borne out the diplomat's appraisal.
In May, Senator Church emerged as a bustling candidate for
the Democratic Presidential nomination. In June, he was ma-
neuvering on Jimmy Carter's coattails for the Vice-Presiden-
tial spot.
Church is a blown-in-the-bottle, copper-riveted, 24-carat ex-
ample of the rough diamond from the frontier polished into a po-
litical celebrity within Washington's liberal left-wing Establish-
ment. At 51. to be sure, he still ?slides easily when out on the
hustings into the arm-waving, tub-thumping and rolling
rhetoric that earned him in Time the accolade of -the boy orator
of the Snake River Valley." But he is also master. as The Wash-
ington Post's senior political analyst David S. Broder re-
cently noted, of the ?cool, controlled" style that is most effec-
tive on television and over cigars and brandy in Averell
Harriman's drawing rooms. And, in common with most am-
bitious politicians, he has kept both ears glued to the ground.
Broder makes this additional observation: "He is a man who
says, with a straight face, that only someone with 20 years' ex-
perience as a Washington insider has the know-how to take on
: the dreadful bureaucracy."
It takes more than a straight face for a man of Church's asso-
ciations to carry off such a posture. It takes a strong stomach,
too. Church has been a member of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee for 19 sears. During his service there he made
his mark as an Establishment man. When the Johnson admin-
istration presented the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964, he
voted for it. He was ranged alongside the rest as the calls
; tame for ever bigger appropriations to carry on the Vietnam
war*. The sea change in his?opinion about the American role in
the outer world came only after the public had become disillu-
sioned with the feckless strategy devised by l'resident
Johnson and Defense Secretary McNamara to satisfy the lib-
eral establishment of which he is part. By Nixon's day,
Church's interventionism had turned isolationist. Under the
2
new colors he, enlisted with the turncoats. and co-authored
the divisive legislation trimming the President's war powers
and bringing disgrace and shame to the American exit from
Southeast Asia. He was all for suspending foreign aid as early as
1971. While our troops were fighting in the field, he took his fam-
ily on a junket to the Soviet Union, the chief arms supplier to our
enemies. His virtuosity on the negative .side of foreign policy
makes him the logical successor to the aging Sparianan as
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--or, as
Church would render it, the Little or No Foreign Relations
Committee.
The Statesman as Muckraker
Church's swift rise inside the Liberal. left-wing Establishment
has been sped by far more dramatic actions than these, however.
In April. the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, of which
he was Chairman and in full control, issued a two-volume. 815.
page report advocating no less than 183 measures designed to re- -
strict the various intelligence activities conducted by the Federal
Government. That work was 13 months in the making and dur:
; ine that interval scarcely a day passed that a bewildered nation -
did not see Senator Church's name on the front pages of the
newspapers or his round. bejowled presence crowding the tele-
: vision screen.
All that while he kept a sideshow going in an adjoining tent
that was almost as destructive as the other. Four years ago, he ?
took over the Chairmanship of a subcommittee of the Foreign Re-
lations Committee that was set up to investigate the operations
of American-owned multinational corporations. His progressive
disclosures of certain regrettable practices adopted by famous,
corporations to sweeten thiir sales pitches in foreign lands have
been hardly less destructive of our nation's reputation abroad
than the shocks produced by his exposes of the CIA and the FBI.
Eminent personages in Japan. the Netherlands, Italy, and
Saudi Arabia have been embarrassed. possibly ruined, by the
details which he and his staff leaked to the press. Governments
of friendly nations have been dismayed and shaken by the evi-
dence of scandal in their own ranks, sprung upon them without
warning and certainly without the benefit of judicial process.
There is an old-fashioned word for these lurid enterprises.
The word is muckraking. The Economist of London, a journal
; which follows American affairs with a perceptive eye, described
! Church in January as "the scourge of immorality in undercover
intelligence operations, and the inquisitor of corrupt practices by
1 American corporations. abroad"--prosecutor-cum-judge-cum-
jury on the dirty tricks of his countrymen in other lands.
?
Let us give the muckraker his due. The CIA and the FBI in
their arcane and overlapping responsibilities did engage in some
illegal and ill-advised operations, although these were by no
means altogether reprehensible when weighed in light of the na-
tional security considerations prevailing .at the time. The CIA
?
did briefly consort with political assassins who appear to have
been recruited from ?the gang that couldn't shoot straight." and
it did allow itself to be briefly drawn into unworthy technolo-
gies associated, among other things. with explosive cigars. And
in the realm of international commerce, where saints would
starve, such respectable corporations as Lockheed and Northrop
did pay out large sums to foreign agents and middlemen in ways
which abroad, in most cases, were within the prevailing custom
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and usage for paying commissions. finder's fees, Or whatever.
h has all been laid out for the rest of the world to see--the crum-
bled skeletons rooted out of the closets of six administrations.
Now is the time to measure the benefits, if any, from the
muckraking-and to take the measure of the muckraker as well.
The truto-da-fe proceedings against the plane makers and the
arms dealers remain alive, and while they last it is quite impos-
sible to tell how many jobs of American workers they will even-
tually lose, how much foreign exchange will be sacrificed, and
.how much of the market for the world's best goods of their kind
Will be dosed off. But the Select Committee on Intelligence has
finally been disbanded, without tears, and its huge staff returned
to the rear corridors of the Federal ant heap. Now the Senate in
its collective wisdom must decide for itself how far it is prepared
to go in fining to the intelligence services, and most importantly
to a now shaky and harassed CIA, the straitjacket Senator
Church and the Committee's staff have brazenly tailored for it.
.It's a good time, too. for the rest of us to start making up our
minds about the real lessons to he drawn from the whole. nntidy
experience and deciding what is to be salvaged from the
A Fantasy to Match the Idaho Mountains
For these weighty* deliberations, Senator Church's report
isn't much of a help. He personally pays lip service to the max?
int that reliable and timely intelligence is desirable in the inter-
est of national security. He praises himself and the committee
staff for the discretion he would have us believe they exercised
where national secrets were concerned. The truth is. of course.
that it was an open secret in Washington that just about every in-
telligence secret revealed in Camera before the committee found
its way to the press. The Committee's report had exhausted its
surprises long before it ever went to the. printer.. -
The document is disappointing in other and more serious re-
spects. Senator kihn G.. Tower of Texas, the Vice Chairman.. re-
fusedto vat his name to the report. and he was joined in his ab-
stention by Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona: Senator Tower
reproved the Chairman and the majority members for ignoring
the main task laid upon them by The Congress: that was to weigh
the nation's needs in intelligence, measure the performance
of the various intelligence agencies in meeting those needs.
and suggest how best the intelligence work could henceforth go
forward without upsetting "the delicate balance between indi-
vidual liberties and national security."
Instead, the document is overwhelmingly a political tract for
those Senators who wish to reduce the American position in. the
world: a scornful sermon on the inequities that, by their li.ahrs,.
are inherent in the intelligence process. especially in the field'
, of covert political action. The report.-by and large. denigrates:
the virtue of vigilance and prudence. Ir takes a harpy's delight in
dogging the occasional misdeeds and misdemeanors, the impro-
prieties. the blunders. There is contemptuous reference to the
CIA's implied proclivity for the "dark arts Of secret interven-
tion-bribery, blackmail, abduction. assassination"--put at "the-
service of reactionary and repressive regimes," a bias which the.
chairman and his staff has caused U.S. foreign policy to become
generally identified With "the claims of the old order, instead of
the aspirations of the new."
! Beyond all that. Senator Church argues airily that the CIA's
covert activities, as well as those of the FBI in espionage mat-
ters, are largely stimulated by an exaggerated and now outmod-
ed fear of Soviet intentions which be fails to define. American in-
terests abroad, he would have us believe, would be far better
served if the CIA were to become less edgy about Soviet aetions
and indeed if it ignored altogether the less blatant Sovi-.-fos-
toted interventions in distant parts of the world. "We have ;pin-
ed little, and lost a great deal from our past policy of compalSive
intervention." he argues. and from this conclusion he has com-
pounded a peculiar prescription for taking the United States out
of the Cold War, which was not of our making. and out of the
world itself.
He urges us all to take "a longer view of history"--hardly an
original piece of advice. He becomes more specific. though.
when he bids the Executive Branch to rid itself of "a fantasy"--a
figment of presumably overheated imaginations-that has -en-
trapped and enthralled our Presidents.- His precise term for
this deranged condition it "the illusion of American amni-
poissy Pattie eeho of former Senator J. Wiliirtni
?FeVtril.?;:t's acid phrase, -the arrogance of power." . which
retzked.earlier American efforts hont 'Truman throtigh Lyndon
,lohnson -0) stay communist aggression and -sull?ersion;
? Yet on the recent evidence, it is Senator Church and his 'feat- -
ous supporters who have become enthralled with fantass --the
frnta that the Russians have called off the Cold War. ? His-long
service on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should have
. armored hint against such a fancy. ? It is even more bewildering..
that he should still hold that notion after devoting &) much time.
inquiring into the work of an agency whose principal business it
is to contend with Soviet subversion and strategic deception.
'The CIA. files on the. counterintelligence. side of the. House .
have been?consistentiv clear sln the point that the Kissinger di-
p:omacy has not deflected the Kremlin from its basic objectives:
Detente is a sham, a tactic: it is Soviet communism's Potemkin
Village for waging Cold War.
. It could be that Senator Church is only a cynic, as Mr. Broder
suggests. That is no uncommon trait in a politiciao. Or it may be
that he has decided to present himself as detente's man for all
seasons. Be that as it may. the intellectual boundaries that sepa-
rate him from the real world in which the CIA until recently op- .
crated so spiritedly and the one that fills his private vision are as
stark as the 'mountains that wail off his native heath in Idaho. ?
One has only to examine the ,Cornmittee's findings on the
CIA's intermittent intrusions in Chile. between 1963 and 1973,. to
appreciate how successful. the man from Idaho has been in rais-
ing a fantasy to match his mountains.
The High Stakes in Chile
? ? That the United States Government, starting with President
Kennedy, channeled support;some of it through the CIA, to pro-
American conservative and moderate political groupings in Chile
is not in dispute. although one might. question the wisdom of
. making the issue a shuttlecock in our domestic politics. The ef-
forts of the late Salvadore Allende-Gossens to capture Chile for a.
'communist minority in 1964 were foiled in some. part by the CIA.
Allende was already looking to FidelCastro?and.. through him, to .
Moscow for the funds and managerial skills he had to have for
, making full-scale revolution. Th; American motive .was to pre- ?,
vent Castro from Spreading his influence into the Andes. The
? .
i CIA's Intervention in the Chilean political process consisted of
!little more than of providing funds for political rallies and ?edi- '
I
tonal debate aimed at inducing the Christian Democrats and the.
moderate parties, who commanded a massive majority, to put
j aside their differences in the common interest of ? keeping. .
Allende and his Marxist coalition from slipping into the Presi-
dency through the gap between them.
' That glancing intervention succeeded on an investment of but
?I a few million dollars and the talents of a handful of specialists.
Six years later,' the contest was re-enacted, with the noncommu-
nists again split and Allende and the radicals- still controlling
only 36 percent of the popular votes. This time he won because
:.Kissinger was too much engrossed in wangling a visa to Peking.'
coming to terms with Hanoi. and cultivating detente with Mos- .
cow to heed the intellig?ence warnings from Santiago. -.Had the
Army not risen against Allende in September 1973. he would to- ?
dav rank se...ond only to Castro in the communist 117.er:welly out-
? side tin.! Swier
The mischief in Church's handling of the CIA role in Chile is-
sue, from the crude attempt orhis staff to sadtlle the CIA with .
the Hanle for Allersic's fall. A scpai.qe report issued by the. .
!?:tali. which w-a, drafted outside the Committee's cognizance hut ?
issued v.-ith the Chairman's sanction. chil.rged the agency with ..
. .
1 having -worked through the covert proecss to subvert demo-
cratic processes" and having thereby. Itroaght **an end to consti-
tutional government- in 'that Storni-tossed country. .
? Such a finding is. to say the least, the shameless (4s:ration of
the facts that Senator Goldwater in his dissent said it was. To ar-
rive at in. Seeator Church's scholars had to Ooze Allende's
avowed schemes. in open association with platoons of Soviet and
!Cuban advisors. for silencing all political opposition.
nationaliL-
int industry. collectivizing the /and, and firing up a resolution% .
? that would support Castro's campaign to destroy .American ia-
.11ticnce. root and braach. below the Rio Grande. ?
'Cuba in the Caribbean.- Allende pro...I:limed in 1970. "ano.
a Socialist Ch.:ie....will make revolution in Latin America.- Cas-
tro touted Chile hclote the 1970 election to rall.? the discontented
to Allende's harmer. Allende hintsell made no less than' nine -
trips to /lava na bet teen 1936 and 19-0.. In ?1468. he saw to it. as
3
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President of the Chilean Senate. that Cuban survivors from .Che
GueVara's fkaindered. guerrilla war- in Bolivia were 'given safe
-passage home; and, later, as President he permitted Castro
use Cuba's diplomatic offices in Chile to run his espionage and,
political agents in Bolivia: the Argentine, Brazil and Uruguay.
There was no doubt about Allende's ambition.: i4 was to set the
Andes all
Chile escaped sinking into a communist t.Sctatorship by the
skin of its teeth. The U.S. had little influence in .0te outcome.
As for the liberal. left-wing panjandrunis in the Congress and the
press, it is depressingly plain that they still would have us be-
lieve that the overthrow of Aliertde was a crime against the con-
stitutional order. They seem to have learned nething from the
test: Castro and the Soviet revolution-makers did. Allende's in-
it ial.success in 197(./. for which they orchestrated the strategy, en-
courancd.them in the belief that Chile would provide communists
in other societies v?ith a model of how an electoral minority
could achieve mastery inside parliamentary soeieties througIL
skillful Manipulation of the democratic process-a strategy ores.-
ently being pursued with delicacy in Italy. France and Portugal.
Allende's failure drove home the lesson that where the margins
are thin the power cannot be held .unless the armed forces have
been brought under communist control.
When. therefore, Moscow's man in Portugal. Alvaro Cunha},
made his move in Port ugaljn1974. just about a year later, he did
so from what appeared to.be a solid base of support within the
armed forces themselves.. Fortunately- for Europe. the base was
. not as solid as at first it seemed. Once it started to arumble, as
it finally 'did last winter, Cunhal prudently yielded the fida with
scarcely a shot. Then in Angola. &textbook application of Cuban
military force .behind a locally contrived "Popular Front"finallv
produced a decisive result-another fallen domino.
We would do well to ponder two inescapable questions: What
weight would American counsel carry throughout Latin America.
now that Castro has conquered an immensely promising strate-
gic base for communist expansioa in southern Africa. if Allende,
his grateful ally. stood astride the Andes' today?
? What if anything can we expect from a Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee dominated by a man as befuddled as Frank
.Church is by the fantasies of detente. when Castro returns his at-
tentions to Latin America, as in due course he will and must, to
knock down for good the Chilean domino Allende all but toppled?
' The Missed Opportunity
?
The missed meaning of the struggle for Chile is central tO an
understanding of the Church Committee's failure in what could ,
and should have been a landmark inquiry into the methods and
worth of intelligence. Quite above and beyond the question of
whether the CIA was a "rogue elephant" running amok inside a
constitutional society-the Committee to its credit ruled other- -
wiSe-there was the larger continuing question of whether it is up
to the job. To understand what the job is, one has to take stock of
the threat that .the communist bloc presents to national security.
On this crucial subject the report is all but silent.
Nowhere in its wordy, censorious document is there to be
found a reasonable appraisal of the threat which the CIA was
created to meet and fend off; nor of the changing disguises which
that threat wears; nor of the changing targets at which it is
aimed. There is no helpful information for American citizens
about the character and resources of the KGB and the 27 other
clandestine intelligence and espionage organizations which the
Soviet bloc has mounted against the Vest. One looks in vain for
a judicious assessment of the competence of the CIA to cope with
these adversary services. And as for judging the performance of
our own agency in appraising the Soviet Union's true capabili-
ties and'exposing its intentions, the pages are disgracefully
blank.
American. intelligence, along with its brilliant successes in the
reconnaissance technologies, has sufferedat least three serious-
failures over the last eight years. It was surprised by the Soviet
bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. It failed to call the Tet
offensive in Vietnam earlier that same year. And it missed the
Arab strike prepared for Yom Kippur. What is even more em-
barrassing, the communist war memoirs that have lately ? ap-
peared in Hanoi convey a sinister hint that the highest Amen-
AMERICAN CAUSE, INC. 905 16th St., N.W.
can and South Vietnamese war councils were thoroughly pene-
trated by the enemy.
Finally, on the analytical side. the CIA has lately concluded
that it has been underestimating the annual Soviet investment in
weapons, forces, and military research and development by as
much as 100 percent.
These are matters that Senator Church might profitably have
addressed. Last fall, the House of Representatives own parallel
Select Committee on Intelligence under Representative Otis
Pike of New York made a promising start toward identifying the
reasons for these failures. Unfortunately, that high purpose was
quickly knocked aside by a left-wing majority bent on surpassing
the rival committee in the volume of its leakage. Its final and
still classified report, passed to a radical newspaper in New
York. was consigned to the dust in by an embarrassed House.
Unfortunately, the mischief has by no means ended. In May,
the Senate responded to the Church Committee's report by cre-
ating a permanent I5-member select committee to oversee the
operations not only of the CIA but also those of, all the ?the--; in-
telligence agencies?the National Security Agency ant -De-
fense Intelligence Agency as well. The Armed Services Corn-
mittees and the Appropriations Committees in both Houses
will, as in the past, retain a jurisdiction in intelligence opera-
tions. The range of oversight had earlier been greatly widened
by the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of October 1974 requiring that
six committees in Congress?with half the Senate and 20 Repre-
sentatives on their rosters?be apprised in advance of any covert
action by the CIA under consideration by the President.
In emptying the CIA's "bag of dirty tricks," in Church's melo-
dramatic phrase, the Congress had thus ended up by unclothing
and all but disarming that agency at the same time. The vulnera-
bility of the new committee to the vagaries of political self-in-
terest can be ascertained from a cursory examination of the
_ stands taken in the Senate on defense and foreign policy issues
by the majority of its members. A sobering benchmark is the
National Security Voting Index published in April by the Ameri-
can Security Council. This index rates the members of both
Houses of Congress, on a scale ranging from zero to 100, by
their votes on ten critical national security defense issues which
a poll taken by the Opinion Research Corporation has estab-
lished are favored by most Americans. On that index and in
terms of the relative weights of their support of legislation most
Americans consider critical to the nation's security, the eight
most liberal members of the new intelligence oversight com-
mittee rank as follows:
? Hart, Colorado
Bayh, Indiana
Stevenson, Illinois
Biden. Delaware
Case, New Jersey
? Hatfield, Oregon
Huddleston, Kentucky
Inouye. Hawaii
0%
17%
0%
0%
11%
0%
25%
43%
It comes as a shock to realize that the paramount authority
over the CIA and the associated military intelligence agencies
will henceforth be exercised for the Senate by a body the major-
ity of whose members are convinced, with Church, that the
Soviet threat has waned. They will be supported, as he was, by a
staff drawn from specialists of congenial outlook. Senator Mans-
field has assured us that the traditional rules of self-discipline
binding these bodies to reticence can be depended upon to pro-
tect the nation's intelligence secrets from disclosure. Alas, the
feeble gestures the House of Representatives has so far made
toward uncovering the source of the leak of the Pike Committee
report to Daniel Schorr of the Columbia Broadcasting System
hardly makes for confidence on that score.
Intelligence is the nation's first line of defense. In weighing
the numerous other proposals put before it by the Member from
Idaho, for further crippling and truncating the intelligence
function, the Senate would be well advised in the Bicentennial
year to give heed to the wisdom of the Founding Fathers: to
keep Church (Frank) and State (affairs of) separate. at least
where these life-and-death matters are concerned.
Suite 304 ? Washington, D.C. 20006 ? [phone]
4
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? .
The Washington Star
By Walter Taylor
Waskngtoo Star Staff Writer
The only Democrat on the
? now-defunct House intelli-
? gence committee testified
today that the leak of the
panel's final report pro-
vided a "bonanza' of secret
information to enemy intel-
? ligence agents.
In testimony before the
? House Ethics Committee.
? Rep. Dale Milford, D-
. Texas, said the report,
which was published in
? February by a New York
? newspaper, ccntained "bits
and pieces" of classified
? information the disclosure
of which "seriously jeop-
ardized on-going intelli-
? gence operations.'
? Milford told the ethics
? committee, which is inves-
tigating the leak of the re-
port, that it must obtain
testimony from CBS report-
er Daniel Schorr as to how
? he obtained the confidential
document.
?
SCHORR HAS acknowl-
? edged that he received the
? report and passed it on to
the Village Voice, a weekly
New York newspaper which
published the document.
The ethics committee has
been investigating the leak
of the report since Febru-
? ary, but, testimony during.
? two days of public hearings
? has indicated, it has not
? uncovered the source of the
leak to Schorr.
However, beyond an
? informal invitation 'to
voluntarily discuss the case
-with its investigators, the
? committee has not sought
? to compel Schorr to disclose
his source. Committee
sources have indicated that
the panel hopes to avoid a
First Amendment clash
with Schorr on the question
? of a reporter's confidential
? sources.
IN A 54-PAGE state-
ment, chief leak investiga-
tor and former FBI agent
David Bowers detailed an
extensive investigation of
? the intelligence commit-
tee's security procedures in
general and the steps taken
to safeguard its final report
in particular ? testimony
? that painted a picture of
only the loosest type of
protection for the 77,000
pages of classified material
that passed through the
lands of the panel.
For example, Bowers
gave this.description of cir-
cumstances surrounding
the dissemination of a draft
copy of the report, a docu-
ment which other testimony
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Tuesday, July 20, 1976
indicated contained more
classified material that the
version later adopted by the
committee but which was
supressed by the full House.
"There was no specific
control system." Bowers
testified. 'Copies of the
draft contained no identi- ?
fication whatever. They
were not? numbered, nor
were they charged out so
they could be accounted
for."
Copies of both the draft
report and the more sani-
tized final version appar-
ently received wide dis-
semination within executive
agencies, including the
CIA, the FBI, the White
House and State, Justice
and Defense departments,
according to the Ethics
Committee investigator.
BOWERS REPORTED
that his investigation had?
revealed a number of otlier
? leaks of supposedly secret
information ? including
one that might be a key to
uncovering the original
source of the document that
Schorr had admitted giving
to the Voice.
Ironically, that leak was
to the CIA, itself he prime
target of the committee's
investigation.
Bowers testified that the
intelligence committee
chairman, Rep. Otis G.
Pike, D-N.Y., had refused
to make a.. copy of his
panel's final report avail-
able to the CIA, but that an
unidentified member of the
committee had secreted one
of the documents to? the
agency.
It later was learned that
Bowers, during a closed-
door session of the Ethics
Committee early yesterday
afternoon, had identified
Rep. Les Aspin, D-Wis., as
the source of the leak to the
CIA.
? Aspin, who was to appear
as a witness before the
Ethics Committee today,
later confirmed that he had
loaned a copy of the report
to the CIA. He told the As-
sociated Press that he did
so in negotiating with the
agency to get as much
information as possible de-
classified and into the final.
report.
The report turned over to
the CIA on Jan. 24 essen-
tially was the same version
of the document obtained
by Schorr and passed on to
the Village Voice.
THE BOTTOM LINE in
Bowers' report to the
? Ethics Committee, how-
ever, was that there still
was no hard evidence of
who actually slipped the
document to Schorr.
He said he and other
investigators have recover-
ed or examined most of the
copies of the report known
still to be in existence and
that the wording of none of
them precisely matches the
document published by the
newspaper.
For example, Bowers
said, the copy reportedly
given to the CIA --- and
subsequently duplicated
and circulated within
several executive branch
agencies, including the
?White House ? "had one
page the Village Voice did
not have, was missing two
pages itich the Village
Voice did have and contain-
ed significant differences in
test on two other pages."
FACED WITH the con-
tinuing mystery, the Ethics -
WASHINGTON POST
2 2 JUL 1976
Ford Orders.
CIA 'Briefing
1For Carter
By Cynthia Kadonriga
Washington Post Staff W.aitgr
i President Ford yesterday
I instructed the Central Intel
iligence Agency to give Dem-
ocratic presidential nominee
Jimmy Carter an intern-,
hence briefing.
Presidential spokesman
Ron Nessen said CIA Direc-
tor George Bush, and possi-
bly other agency offIcials.
would go to Carter's home,
in Plains, Ga., for the brief- -
ing next week.
Bush would provide the
same information to Demo-
cratic vice presidential :nom-
inee "Walter F. Mondale "if
Committee has begun haul-
ing in members of the
Intelligence Committee and
its staff for' public interro-
gation on the leaked
material ? after conduct-
ing some 420 private inter-
views already with no suc-
cess in pinpointing the
source of the leak.
There also is the possibil-
? ity that the committee will
subpoena Schorr and other
reporters who received
information about the Intel-
ligence Committee's inves-
tigation. Thus far, all of the
newsmen involved have re-
fused to talk to committee
, investigators about their
stories.
A spokesman for the
panel said that public hear-
ings on the matter could go
? on for up to two weeks. He
declined to say who would
be called to testify or
whether witnesses would be
asked to testify voluntarily
or would be subpoenaed.
he wants it," Nessen said.
Such briefings ?are tradi-
tional, but usually are pro-
vided by the Secretary of
State. Carter, however, 'has
said he would prefer the
CIA to brief him rather
? than Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger, whose
policies Carter has criti-
cized.
Nessen said there are- no
plans for Kissinger to brief
Carter.
The way such briefirigs
are handled has varied un-
der each administration.,
President Johnson, for ex-
ample, personally briefed
the 1968 Republican nomi-
nee, Richard M. Nixon. N.cs-
,sen said. Democratic nand-
-nee George McGovern de-
' clined such a ? briefing in
? 1972. McGovern sharply crit-
icized U.S. foreign policy,?
?particularly in Vietnam,
during that time.
U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
12 JULY 1976
* *
Nelson Rockefeller's choice to replace
him as No. 2 on a Ford ticket: George
Bush, one-time Republican National
Chairman and now head of the CIA.
5
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? WASHINGTON STAR
20 'JULY 1976
What the House of Representatives
needs least right now is a further
demonstration of its infinite capacity
for low comedy. .
It is, nevertheless, grinding ahead
with two weeks of activity on that
front, putting to itself a question that
never should have been asked: Who
gave the CIA report to Dan Schorr?
If the Ethics Committee knew the
answer, it might be one thing. But
although the staff has been hard at it
since April I, it has been unable to
crack the case.
Oh Kojak, where are you when we
need you most?
The House sleuths have tried, but
in 970 interviews they have not even
found a good lead. The members of
the Ethics Committee are not self-
conscious about their failure; for
reasons beyond comprehension, they
insist on airing it.
The amateur theatricals taking
place in the Armed Services subcom-
mittee room, which is decorated with
manly, murals of jungle warfare,
tend to reinforce the impression that
the real scandal about the House is
not its gaudy and well publicized sex-
ual revels, but its incompetence.
THE POINT ABOUT the Pike
Commmittee report on the CIA was
not that it got out, as Chairman Otis
Pike, D-N.Y.., kept telling the Ethics
Committee, but what was in it. But
the members of the Ethics Commit-
tee, like the members of the House
NEW YORK TIMES
22? JUL 1976
Ex-Counsel Asserts
Security Was Lax
In Intelligence Unit
, WASHINGTON, July 21 [UPI)
?Security in the House intelli-
gence committee was so lax
that staff members kept top se-
cret papers n their desks and
copied material for their own
files, a former committee coun-
sel testified today.
The description of sieve-like
security at the now-defunct
panel came during hearings by
. the House ethics committee on
the matter of who gave a secret
Congressional intelligence re-
port to Daniel Schorr, a CBS
reporter.
The ethics panel went into
closed session as soon as the
security details came to light,
presumably for fear that sensi-
itself, cannot see it that way.
? They quail at the thought of Wayne
Hayes and company, and the terrible
repercussions at the polls. But the
reminder that they spent a million
dollars of the taxpayers' money for
an investigation and then refused to
look at the results strikes them as the
height of patriotic virtue. They still
do not want to know about CIA blun-
ders in places like what one of the
members called "Angolia."
As Rep. James Quillen, R-Tenn.,
round face contorted with worry,
said, "The House voted 246 to 129 not
to read the report."
Pike, who was a much better wit-
ness than he was a chairman, replied
sharply, "The House voted not to re-
lease a document which it had not
seen ? our committee voted, to re-
lease a document it had seen."
How, Pike asked the members,
could a committee of Congress
investigate a secret agency without
publishing classified information?
If he had acceded to the deletions
requested by the CIA, the report
would have been cut in half. The
House hates to get into controversies
like that. They decided that they did
not want to know anything about the
CIA that the President, the agency's
shield and defender, didn't want
them to know.
"Our basic problem," said Pike,
after he had reviewed for the Ethics
Committee the security procedures
of his own group, "is that almost no-
body in Congress has read the re-
port."
HIS BASIC PROBLEM was illus-
trated by the fact that one of the
members of his own committee, Rep.
Les Aspire is said to have taken it
_ upon himself to give an early draft to
the CIA. without Pike's authorization.
This was an exercise in unilateral
declassification that invites compari-
son with Dan Schorr's, but so far
Aspin's action has escaped censure.
live or embarrassing details
might be made public.
During the open session in
the morning, James Oliphant,
counsel to the intelligence
panel, said proper security
rules "were not followed" by
the panel during its long inves-
tigation late last year and early
this year of covert operations
by the Central Intelligence
Agency.
"Security was very, very lax"
Mr. Oliphant said. 'People in
charge of files did not have any
library or any security back-
ground. People kept materials
in their own desks, includng
classified material ? top se-
cret."
He said some staff members
even copied confidential ate-
rials on office duplicating ma-
chines and put the copies in
their own files.
The ethics panel is in the final
phases of a $150,000 investiga-
tion into who gave Mr. Schorr
The Pike Commmittee fiasco was
the CIA's most successful operation.
Nothing known in its long history of
infiltration and subversion quite
matches its record in turning the
tables on its investigators. The
chairman could never keep his troops
intact when he hurled his contempt
threats at the White House. He could
not keep the members from telling
secrets. He could not convince the
House that the report did net endan-
ger either the agency or its agents.
By the time the Village Voice
printed his findings, his colleagues
were so impatient with his perform-
ance that they would have refused to
read the report if it had been publish-
ed by the Book of the Month Club.
PIKE TRIED without any success
to tell the members that Congress is
really as good as the executive
branch, and in fact coequal, quite as
able to declassify material as the
executive branch is to classify it.
Congress had a brief spell of thinking
it was as smart as the president dur-
ing the Watergate business, but it
went back as soon as it decently
could to the old habit of deferring to
him on foreign policy, and. Pike was
as much a victim of that syndrome
as of his own haplessness.
His colleagues chose him for his
judgment and his ability to control
difficult situations. But when they
sent him in against the CIA, they
asked too much of him. The CIA tried
to preempt him, which was out of the
question. When that failed, they went
to war with him. Th4re is no question
of who Won.
1. He says, as pointedly as he dares
to, that the only beneficiary of the
Schorr leak has been the CIA. But the
Ethics Committee does not take the
hint. By giving the report to the
lage Voice, Schorr unwittingly as-
, sured the.agency of a new lease on
life and gave Congress the chance to
: play detective, a role in which it is as
miscast' as it was to be' investigator
of he CIA.
a copy of the intelligence
,committee's .final report, a
document laced with confiden-
tial material and highly critical
of C.I.A. operations.
. The House voted to keep that
report secret unti.l. President
Ford could censer it. Mr. Schorr
admitted he got a copy from
a source he refused to name
and gave it to The Village Voice
-neWiPaper of New York, which
published much of it.
Ethics panel investigators
have testified ,they have only
been able to narrow the field
of suspects to a broad range
of individuals in government,
because so many copies of the
report were distributed around
Washington.
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
? 8 JULY 1976
Belli comes to Ruby's defense.
?AN FRANCISCO?Attorney Melvin Belli says it is
not true that Jack Ilithy met secretly with Fide! Castro
In 1961 to pint thc essassinclion of President John
Kennedy. Belli, who knew Ruby as a irend and client,
says Ruby was "an intensely loyal /one:lean who wor-
shiped Jack Kennedy." Ruby, a Dallas nightclub own-
er, killed Lee Harvey Oswald, the an believed to
have assassinated Kennedy, in Dallas on Nov. 24, 1053.?
A former CIA agent has charged that Ruby met Castro
while in Cuba trying to make a drug deal. But Belli
6 said Ruby never saw Castro and called the allegations
"CIA bull."
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WASHINGTON POST
2 2 JUL 197i
Joseph Kraft
Dropping the
Schorr Case
'? An underlying ? condition' of Anglo'. -
? Saxon democracy is that sensible peo-
ple .do not press 'to the. liniit questions
to whieh there are no good. answers.
:That rule of thumb applies with a
. vengeance to the current investigation .
by the House ethics committee of the
intelligence comniittee report given by
Dan Schorr of CBS News to the Village ?
Voice.
The investigation touches an unset- ?
tied area of constitutional law. The in-
?terest of all parties?including both the
Congress and especially. the -press?is
that the unsettled area be kept unset-
tled, that the moment of Constitutional
truth-be avoided. .
The elementary facts of the case are
simple. A House conulaittee 'under Con-.
-gressinan 'Otis Pike prepared a report ?
on activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency. Copies of tlfeir.eport were ac-
nuked by Mr. Schorr' of CBS:ind John,.
Crewdson of the New York Times. Both
men made known the contents of the'.
:report through their respective news.
agencies.
The full Congress then voted to make
the report secret. - WheregpOn, 11r.
.Schorr, after some complex inanew.
. 'yen, passed his copy off to the Village
..;Voice, a weekly put out In New York,
'which it claimed, possibly wrongly, was -
'the full text of the report
That sequence of events -setup 'a po-
tential conflict between two traditional
: rights rooted in the Constitution. One is
the freedom of the press, as guaranteed
.by the First Amendment. The other is
the right of the Congress to discipline
Its members, and to. punish bY con-
tempt proceedings persons refusing
'cooperate with legitimate -congres?
sional investigations.
? , The freedom of the press 'aid. the
First Amendment need' no endorse-
ment in this quarter. Democracy means.
government by the people which. im- ?
plies? open discussion and the circula...
tion of information as distinct front en-
forced orthodoxy. The right to a free
press is thus a peculiarly cherished fea-
ture of our system, rightly :enshrined in
the Constitution. .
. , The exercise of that right was central
to revelation and prosecution of the ? .?
. Watergate scandal, and di the public .
awareness of the true nature ? of the
Vietnam war. The right deserves to be?
guarded jealously, as it was by those.
who successfully fought in the Su-
preme Court the attempt of a Nebraska ?
judge to apply a gag rule to coverage of .
a murder trial;
By extension, moreover; the First
Amendment confers certain rights and
privileges. The courts have given al-
most blanket immunity to news agen-
cies against civil suits.for? libel. But the
privileges and rights growing out of the
First Amendment are not unlimited?
especially in the eyes of the present Su-
preme Court Thus in 1972 the Supreme
Court, in the Branzburg case, held that
the right of a grand jury to investigate
crimes took precedence over the First
Amendment privilege. In consequence,
reporters are now obliged to divulge
sources to grand juries in criminal cas-
es.
- The same issue Is potentially posed
by the Schorr case, with the congres-
sional committee in the place of the
grand jury. The ethics committee
clearly has the right to investigate the.
leak of the secret report.
It can discipline congressmen and
staff members responsible for the leak.
It can certainly subpoena Mr. Schorr
and, if he refused to answer questions,
hold him in contempt
So far the committee has refused
such an approach. Wisely,! think, from
its point of view. Politically, the Con-
gress would suffer by pressing to the
ultimate a case in which the breaking
of the secrecy seal caused no discerni-
-ble harm. ?
But 'those of us in the ?press should
not be gloating over the -corcunittee's
behavior. We should be applauding its
restraint. For we have nothing to gain
? from a constituional test of First
Amendment rights against the congres-
sional right to discipline and Invest!-
gate. On the contrary, the circumst-
ances of the Schorr case suggest that it
affords the weakest possible ground for
such a test.
Mr. Schorr, though, a veteran re-
porter with a fine record, seems re-
cently to have been prompted as much
by entrepreneurial and self-glorifica-
tion interests as by civil liberties con-
siderations. At one point he offered to
_write up the material in a series of
newspaper articles. ? At another he
made it a condition of publication that
he write the introduction to the text
In the end, after having refused bona
fide offers from responsible press or-
gans to' print parts of the text they
thought were newsworthy, he let it go
to a paper with poor credibility which,
used the document, as Laurence Stern
pointed out in the Columbia Journal-
ism Review, for heavily promotional
purposes. It is even asserted by Mr.
Stern and Nora Ephron in Esquire Mag-
azine, though denied by Schorr, that
when the going got rough inside CBS,
he had a brief fling at trying to put the
blame on a colleague, Leslie Stahl.
What is at stake here, is professional
behavior, not constitutional liberty. We
will all be better off if the affair is al-
lowed to fade away without being
made a federal case.
WM Field Enterprises, Inc.
BALTIMORE SUN
23 July 1976
Staff leak
to Schorr
is denied
By JIM MANN
Washington Bureau of The Sun
Washington?A. Searle
Field, the former staff director
of the House Intelligence Com-
mittee, denied under oath yes-
terday that he played any role
in leaking a copy of the com-
mittee's report to a CBS report-
er, Daniel Schorr, or to the New
York weekly Village Voice.
"I did not provide a copy of
the report to anyone outside the
committee, at any place, at any
time," Mr. Field told the House
ethics committee. When he dis-
covered that the report had
been leaked, Mr. Field said, "I
was extremely disturbed . . .
This was the one thing that
could destroy our committee
and discredit it."
Mr. Field said he felt certain
no one on his Intelligence Com-
mittee staff had leaked the re-
port, which the House voted not
to publish. But, he added, "I'm
not going to speculate about
committee members" that is,
-the 13 congressmen on the com-
mittee. He said Mr. Schorr also
might have obtained the report
from the Central Intelligence
Agency or other agencies with-
in the executive branch.
Under questioning, Mr. Field
conceded that at one point, less
than a month before the report
was leaked, he telephoned Mr.
Schorr for help in trying to de-
cide whether to hold a news
briefing. Mr. Field explained
that he merely -wanted to find
out whether CBS had news pro-
grams on New Year's Eve.
Mr. Field, 31, a Connecticut
lawyer, came to the Intellig-
ence Committee after serving
as legislative assistant to Sena-
tor Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R.,
Conn.).
Both Mr. Weicker and Rep-
resentative Otis G. Pike (D.
N.Y.), former chairman of the
Intelligence Committee, sat be-
hind Mr. Field for most of th
three hours in which he was
questioned by the ethics com-
mittee.
Mr. Weicker also took the
witness chair himself to tell th
ethics committee, "What this
town needs is more Searle
Fields." The senator said his
former employee, like himself,
was willing to "stand up against
the establishment and be count-
ed."
The ethics committee, offi-
cially called the House Com-
mittee on Standards of Official
Conduct, is holding hearings to
determine bow Mr. Schorr ob-
lathed the Pike committee re-
port. Mr. Schorr himself has ac-
knowledged supplying the copy
that was published in the Vil-
lage Voice after the House vet
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WASHINGTON STAR
2 1 JUL 1976
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A copy for everyone
The House Ethics Committee has spent
some might say wasted ? $150,000 and four
months time trying to find dut who leaked a
House Intelligence Committee report on the
Central Intelligence Agency to Daniel Schorr,
the CBS investigative reporter.
The investigators don't appear to be much
closer to the leaker than they were when they
started, despite having interviewed 420 persons
and reinterviewed 385. Now the Ethics Commit-
tee has begun hearings to see if it can find out in
public what its gumshoes couldn't find put in
private.
Significantly, the investigators never ques-
tioned Mr. Schorr, who peddled the leaked docu-
ment to the Village Voice in New York, which
printed the report for anyone to see who had the
price of the paper. They haven't questioned Mr.
Schorr apparently because the committee, hav-
ing been told that Mr. Schorr would not tell it
where he got the report, is leery of getting into a
constitutional confrontation over freedom of the
press.
It has never been clear exactly what the
House intended to prove when it authorized the
probe of the leak. Surely it did not intend to set
Mr. Schorr up for a contempt citation and throw
him into the hoosegow when he refused to name
the person who gave him the report. It might not
? get away with it, and in any event such a specta-
ed not to release the report.
Mr. ,Ield sought to counter
allegations that his committee
staff had been lax in its hand-
ling of classified and sensitive
intelligence materials.
"I don't think the CIA pos-
sesses any God-given ability to
organize and maintain informa-
tion," he asserted. "They lost
records. They lost receipts, the
receipts they kept on the back
of envelopes. We found records
for them." He said the intelli-
gence agencies were "sloppy"
in their handling of materials.
The former staff director
made it clear he considered the
press an ally of the Intelligence
Committee in its frequent bat-
tles with the agencies it was in-
vestigating.
Last New Year's Eve, for
example, he said, the commit-
tee was told that a witness tes-
tifying about a kickback scan-
dal within the FBI had partially
recanted his testimony as a re-
sult of threats by the FBI.
"I was quite concerned that
the FBI was going to unleash a
publicity wash on us, saying a
witness had recanted his testi-
mony," Mr. Field said. He said
be called Mr, Schorr to find out
if CBS had a news show and lat-
er held a New Year's Eve press
briefing to counteract such a
"publicity wash."
TIMES, Roanoke
26 June 1976
cle probably would heap more discredit on the
House than on the press.
If the leaker turned out to be a congressman,
that certainly would be an embarrassment that
the House had not counted on. And if the leaker
were an employe of the House, the House prob-
ably couldn't do much more than fire him.
There may be something of value in the probe,
though. The investigators reported that the
House Intelligence Committee maintained an al-
most total lack of security over reports and se-
cret material. Copies of the report, at various
stages of drafting, were distributed widely
through the legislative and executive branches
and these were multiplied by copying machines
all over town. Three copies of one draft even
wound up overseas within a few hours of being
distributed.
Classified material reportedly was sometimes
left lying around committee offices and disclo-
sures to reporters were almost commonplace,
according to the Ethics Committee's chief inves-
tigator; Mr: Schorr was among three reporters
given a New Year's Eve 1975 briefing on one as-
pect of the investigation.
But it doesn't take an expensive investigation
to discover the laxness of Congress in handling
confidential material. Everyone already knew
that Congress can't keep a secret. Maybe it will
be worth the $150,000 if the investigation causes
Congress to tighten its lip.
CIA: Power corrupted
Anyone inclined to pooh-pooh the
, -dangers and arrogance of the old Cen-
ltral Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the
!Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
should take note of the findings of the
Senate Intelligence Committee.
t A President of the United States
had been assassinated (John F. Kenne-
dy, Nov. 22, 1963). The nation was in a
; state of shock and anger. A commis-
, sion of most trusted citizens was' put
together to get to the bottom of the
affair (the Warren Commission). Few
things could have been more important
than finding the truth of the Kennedy
tmurder.
But nobody in the CIA came for-
ward to tell its piece of the truth: that
the CIA had an operation going on to
kill Premier Castro of Cuba. Nobody
from the FBI, which included agents
with knowledge of the CIA plot, re-
vealed the truth even though the FBI
was charged with the investigation. -
Neither intelligence, nor goodwill,
nor patriotism, nor sense of duty, nor
ethics, nor concern for the national se-
curity, nor any other good impelled
these Great Protectors of the Nation to
come forward with a piece of informa-
8
tion that might have made a differ-
ence.
The whole affair confirms a con-
clusion we reached long ago: The cov-
ert action (dirty tricks) division of the
CIA should be rooted out and the soil
for it permanently sanitized. The de-
gree of control now established over
the J. Edgar Hoover-less FBI should
be made permanent.
Perhaps the CIA's anti-Castro af-
fair had nothing to do with Lee Os-
wald's assault on President Kennedy.
But the Warren Commission had a
right to know of it; the nation had a
right to assume that all the pertinent
facts were revealed to the commission.
The right of the commission and of the
nation was denied because trusted
Americans in the top echelons of the
CIA and the FBI lacked the simple
courage to come forward and do their
simple duty.
Never was more vivid the proof of
Lord Acton's axiom: Power Corrupts
and Absolute Power Corrupts Abso-
lutely.
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BALTIMORE SUN
23 July 1976
Mary McGrory
House Hears, Reads
No Evil about CIA
Washington
? What the House of Repre-
sentatives needs least right
now is a further demonstra-
tion of its infinite capacity for
low comedy.
It is, nevertheless, grinding
ahead with two weeks of ac-
? tivity on that front, putting to
itself a question that never
should have been asked: Who
gave the CIA report to Daniel
Schorr?
If the Ethics Committee
knew the answer, it might be
one thing. But although the
staff has been hard at it since
April 1, it has been unable to
crack the case.
Oh Kojak, where are you
when we need you most?
The House sleuths have
tried, but in 470 interviews
they have not even found a
good lead. The members of
the Ethics Committee are not
self-conscious about their fail-
ure; for reasons beyond com-
prehension, they insist on air-
ing it.
The amateur theatrics tak- -
lug place in the Armed Ser-
vices subcommittee room,
which is decorated with man-
ly murals of jungle warfare,
tend to reinforce the impres-
sion that the real scandal -
about the House is not its
gaudy and well publicized
sexual revels, but its incom-
petence.
The point about the Pike
Committee report on the CIA
was not that it got out, as
Chairman Otis Pike (D., N.Y.)
kept telling the Ethics Com-
mittee, but what was in it. But
the members of the Ethics
Committee, like the members
of the House itself, cannot see ?
it that way.
They quail at the thought
of Wayne Hays and company,
and the terrible repercussions
at the polls. But the reminder
that they spent a million dol-
lars of the taxpayers' money
for an investigation and then
refused to look at the results
strikes them as the height of.
patriotic virtue. They still do
not want to know about CIA
blunders in places like what
one of the members called
"Angolia."
As Representative James
H. Quillen (R., Tenn.), his
round face contorted with
worry, said, "The House voted
246 to 129 not to read the re-
port.,.
Mr. Pike, who was a much
better witness than he was a
chairman, replied sharply,
"The House voted not to re-
lease a document which it had
not seen; our committee voted
to release a document it had
seen." How, Mr. Pike asked
the members, could a com-
mittee of Congress investigate
?a secret agency without pub-
lishing classified information?
If he had acceded to the
? deletions requested by the
CIA, the report would have
been cut in half. The House
hates to get into controversies
like that. They decided that
they did not want to know
anything about the CIA that
the President, the agency's
shield and defender, didn't
want them to know.
"Our basic problem," said
Mr. Pike, after he had re-
viewed for the Ethics Com-
mittee the security proce-
dures. of his own group, "Is
that almost nobody in Con-
gress has read the report."
His basic problem was il-
lustrated by the fact that one
of the members of his own
committee, Representative
Les Aspin, is said to have tak-
en it upon himself to give an
early draft to the CIA, without
Mr. Pike's authorization. This
was an exercise in unilateral
declassification that invites
comparison with Mr. Schorr's,
? but so far Mr. Aspin's action
has escaped censure.
The Pike Committee fiasco
was the CIA's most successful
operation. Nothing known in
its long history of infiltration
_ _
and subversion quite matches'
-its record in turning the tables
on its investigators.
The chairman could never
keep his troops intact when he
hurled his contempt threats at
? the White House. He could not
keep the members from tell-
ing secrets. He could not con-
vince the House that the re-
port did not endanger either
? the agency or its agents.
By the time the Village
Voice printed the commit-
tee's findings, his colleagues ,
? were so impatient with his
performance that they would
have refused to read the re-
port if it had been published
by the Book of the Month,
Club.
Mr. Pike tried without any
success to tell the members
that Congress is really as good
as the executive branch, and
in fact co-equal, quite as able
to declassify material as the
executive branch is to classify
it.
Congress had a brief spell
of thinking it was as smart as
the president during the Wat-
ergate business, but it went
back as soon as it decently
could to the old habit of defer-
ring to him on foreign policy,
and Mr. Pike was as much a
victim of that syndrome as of
his own haplessness.
His colleagues chose him
for his judgment and his abili-
ty to control difficult situa-
tions. But when they sent him
in against the CIA, they asked
too much of him. The CIA
tried to pre-empt him, which
was out of the question. When
that failed, they went to war
with him. There is no question
of who won.
? He says, as pointedly as he
dares to, that the only benefi-
ciary of the Schorr leak has
been the CIA, but the Ethics
Committee does not take the .
hint.
By giving the report to the
Village Voice, Mr. Schorr un-
Wittingly asssured the agency
of a new lease on life, and
? gave Congress the chance to
play detective, a role in which
it is as miscast as it was to be
investigator of the CIA.
ST. LOUIS POST ? DISPATCH
? 29 JUNE 1976
Bung-ling
Hidden
, At the time of the assassination of President
Kennedy in 1963, both the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
? tion seem to have been more interested in
pursuing their own ways and protecting their
images than in helping make possible a
thorough investigation of the Kennedy murder.
These are the obvious conclusions to be drawn
from a report by a Senate panel on the
intelligence agencies' involvement in the as-
-,sassination ipluiry; - '
In its final report, produced by a subcommit-
tee, the Senate Select Committee on Intern;
? gence said the intelligence agencies did not
f011ow up significant leads relating to the
? assassination and that Richard Helms, a
?seniqr CIA official, and J.:-Edgar Hoover,
? director of the FBI, kept important informa-
tion from the Warren Commission, which was
investigiting Kennedy's death; The "unpur-
"sued leadt3:' concerned travel between the
' United-States and Cuba by two persons who
might have had some connection with the
assassination. Not only did the agencies fail to
investigate fully these persons!. movements
? right after the Kennedy murder but they also
apparently neglected to tell the presidentially-
appointed Warren Commission about the sub-
jects. ? . ?
Moreover, the CIA, represented by Mr.
Helms, failed to' tell the commission that on
? the very day Kennedy was shot a CIA agent
met with a Cuban% official to advance a plot to
murder Cuban Premier Castro. For its part,
the FBI, _represented by Hoover, failed to
? inform: the commissions about a threatening
letter written by Lee Harvey Oswald, the
reputed assassin, and about the disciplining of
17 FBtagents for not recognizing Oswald as a
securitythreat
? Although the Senate-panel emphasized that it
had no evidence that Premier Castro or other
Cubans had plotted Kennedy's death in retalia- 1
tion for CIA-backed plots against Castro, it did !
say its inquiry should be followed up by the
permanent Senate Intelligence Committee.
With the trail now more than 12 years old,
such an inquiry may not produce much, and
surely not enough to satisfy numerous doubt-
ers of the Warren Commission. But one clear
? lesson that emerge from the latest Senate
report is that bungling and cover-ups by the
CIA and FBI show more than ever that these
agencies must be brought under stronger legal
control and supervision. ?
9
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THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY
JULY /AUGUST 1976
NL ki
t, G
Facts
by Gregory G. Rushford
Woodrow Wilson observed that
"Congress stands almost helplessly -
outside of the departments. Even the
special, irksome, ungracious investiga-
tions which it from ? time to time
institutes... do not afford it more.
than a glimpse of the inside of a small
province of federal administration....
It can violently disturb, but it cannot
often fathom, the waters of the sea in ?
which the bigger fish of the civil
service swim and. feed. Its dragnet stirs
without cleansing the bottom.",
This elegant statement summarizes
what I learned during the irksome,
ungracious, congressional in vestigat ion
of the CIA,
As a staff 'member of the 1-house
Select Committee on Intelligence, I
was charged with investigating how.
well the intelligence agencies had been
doing their job. It was a simple and
reasonable question, but in trying to
get an _answer, I encountered the -
bureaucratic obstacles that hide the
truth about government performance.
The 'story of those obstacles, and
our attempts to surmount them, sheds
light oil the present balance of power
between the executive and legislative
branches. Despite recent press stories
that Congress is reasserting itself, the
CIA-exceptional in many ways but in
this one quite typical-used every 'ex-
ecutive branch tactic to frustrate our
investigation.
The CIA's idea of a perfect investi-
gation was roughly as follows: The
committee's staff members woidd he
investigated by tile IF :tad if ee
passed, we would rekx iv:: Top Set. ret
security clearances. We would sign
CIA employee secrecy oaths and
would be denied access to the com-
partments of information beyond Top
Secret-that is, to most of the files. ?
CIA censois would read every docu-
ment we requested. Those censors
would have authority to delete words,
paragraphs, even entire pages. If we
took notes tiorn documents at agency
headwiarters, the notes would be ccn-
Gregory G. Rust:ford ll'US On the staff of the
House Select Committee on Intellience.
sorecl. Monitors would be present
every time we interviei.ved, agency
employees.
Moreover, the committee would
sign agreements limiting the areas of
investigation and agree to disclosure
restrictions. The chairman of our com-
mittee, so the CIA intended, would
keep much of his information from
other committee members. The com-
mittee, in turn, would keep inforrna-
? tion from the rest of Congress.
Whenever I requested documents
from the CIA (or the State Depart-
ment, or the Pentagon, or whatever
agency we were studying) the liaison
officer would ask why I needed them.
Did I realize how sensitive they were?
Wasn't I worried about showing such
secrets to congressmen?
We started off with a series of
hearings on the. intelligence budget.
Senior officials came from all over the
intelligence community to brief us..
But the briefings were canned affairs -
in ? which the .officials took hours to
read from tables and charts and to
initiate us into the nuances of bureau-
, cra.tese. We saw the same budget
books they present to the appropria-
tions conunittees and learned how
vague they were. After repeated tele-
phone calls, we managed to get a few
documents delivered right to our of-
fices, but when we looked at them, we
found entire pages missing,-only the
"Top Secret" stamp remained. Staff
investigators who asked for further
details could not get them. With only
a week left before the scheduled
opening ot. our tl.-ar.-int5,, Rep. Otis
? Pike had to call the Pentagon and
threaten to hold a press conference
before we received any information
from therm The National Security
Agency (which monitors foreign com-
munications) would not give us even
the basic document which controls its
operations.
Despite all this, we had, by July
31, assembled at least as much infor-
mation as the standing appropriations
? committees traditionally have, a re-
flection less of our diligence than of
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. the other committees' timidity. ?
During the next eight dayS we held
our first seven hearings.
:Deaf and Dnmh ?
The Comptroller General Of the
United States, Elmer Staats, was the -
first witness. He testified that he knew
very little about where the intelligence
agencies put their money because he
had to depend on them for all the ?
information about their programs.
The General Accounting Office, which
. Staats directs, had written to the CIA
. in January 1975, for instance, but
never received a reply. Ever: when the
CIA came up with the? information
? Staats wanted, he had no way to
? verify it independently. ?
Next came James Lynn, director of
the Office of Management and Budu-.
? et. Lynn repeatedly refused to discuss
anything of substance as long as the
committee sat in open session. If we
,would only lock the doors and go into
closed session, Lynn said, he was
ready to answer all questions. The
committee closed the doors:
After waiting for nearly a half
hour, while experts "debugged" the
hearing room, we discovered another
? problem. Lynn said he would not
discuss certain subjects because the
stenographer was cleared only for Top ;
Secret: When the 'committee finally
:got . to question Lynn, he was ? not
. I much more specific than he had been
:in the public session. Pike later called .
the experience "miserable and worth-
; less." Lynn Certainly, could not dem-
?. onstrate that his organization had any
i sort of grasp on the CIA's budget.
The Lynn experience Was repeated ,
!time and again that week with other'
'witnesses. In public, we were prorn-
ised full cooperation; in private we clic'
,not get it. William Colby, then the
!director of the CIA, gave us little
;lectures on the evils of COmmunism,
iillustrated with a "Freedom of Infor-
' :rnation" chart. "We live in a free
.society," ht said, pointing to a series
I of X's on the American side of the
!charts The X'S marked off such insti-
tutions as newspapers, television, gov-
ernment publications, and, naturally,
.;congressional hearings. That was how
the Russians gathered intelligence on
us. But on the Russian side?aha!?the
X's were controlled. Such gimmickry'
prompted Rep. Philip Hayes to tell
Colby he was tired Of hearing "appeals
to a very low level of political sophis-
tication."
The testimony of Colby and Gen. .
Lew Allen of the National Security
. Agency illustrated one other way the
intelligence agencies have traditionally
thwarted congressional oversight. Over
the years both the CIA and the NSA
have answered hundreds of questions
from congressional 'committees by
providing summaries of internal docu-
ments, almost always self-serving, and
not the documents themselves. What
. is the difference? Colby .had said, in
one of our closed sessions, that "cer-
tain differences had arisen between a
certain ambassador and the CIA per-
sonnel" over the .wisdom of one coy-,
.ert operation. .We finally'got hold of
? the Original document, which put the
matter in somewhat different terms.
?.The ambassador had actually said to
the CIA station chief, "To hell with
your headquarters. if ? you don't go
.along with this, I will instruct the
Marine guards. to take you and place.
-
you oh the airplane and ship you out
? of here."
? In August, we questioned the Pen- ?
? tagon's top civilian intelligence offi-
cial, Albert Hall. He explained, help-
fully, that his organization worked
:very well. When asked if the system
..had 'broken down at any time in.
I recent crises, Hall responded, "Well, if
you are talking about the 1973. Middle'
1East war, in .fact, the outbreak of war
was foreseen, and this information
I was handled correctly and was pro-.
vided to the people who should have
?I had it." Here -too the documents told
I. a different story. Weeks later we
.1received the basic CIA post-mortem
- ?
on that war, Which began: "There was
an intelligence failure in the weeks
?...preceding the outbreak of war in the
Middle East on October .6.. Those
elements of the intelligence commu-
nity responsible for the production of
? finished intelligence did not perceive
? the growing possibility of an 'Arab
?'attack and thus did not warn of its
imminence.".
? Hall also demonstrated some of the
more incongruous aspects of the clas-
sification system. Published informa-
? tion put out by the Defense Depart-
? silent revealed that military attaches
were stationed in 86 different coun-
? tries, including two recent additions,
Algeria and Bangladesh. But the De-
fense Department said that the
numbers and locations of the attaches
? were ? classified as "secret." 'Hall,
looking embarrassed, could not
? explain the disparity. Rep. Aspin
? . termed such. practices "bizarre" and
pointed out the weaknesses of a
.'classification system which permitted
executive branch officials to decic
I apparently on whim, What to lass.
.ss..cret. Repeated experiences with th.'
sort of, capriciousness fostered Cis.
committee's subsequent decisions to
.? publish information despite the
? executive branch's unwillingness to do
so. .
Many frustrations lingered after
the August hearings were over. On
? June 10, ? before the hearings had
begun, President Ford said publicly
that he would give the committee
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material .from the Rockefeller -Com-
mission's investigation of intelligence
abuses, "plus. any other material that
is available in the executive branch."
Yet we did not receive an tmcensoreil
-version of the "family jewels," th.
Ix house CIA study of abuses, unt
mid-October, 15 minutes' before Pita.
held a press conference to Charge :tins:
there had. been a coverup and ntor
than four months after Ford had .
promised to supply the material_
On September II,the committee ?
? held a hearing .On one or the mos
widely suspected instances of incom-
petent intelligence?that associated
with the 1973 Middle East war. We
knew- of several instances in the past
? when the intelligence system had
failed?the 1968 sTet offensive, the
Soviet iavaSion of Czechoslovakia in
.1968, the 1974 coups in Portugal and
Cyprus, and India's nuclear explos.io:-
.in 1974. The Mideast hearints
, designed to explore why the intell-
'? gence agencies had failed at the.
they were supposed to carry oto --
namely, to provide accurate informs-
' tion on international developments..
, Just one day after we held that
hearing, President Ford announced
that we 1.von1:1 be denied any fuethe.r
? clessified information_ Ile asked us to
'return our files and later compared us
to 'common criminals. What the com-
mittee had done the previous after-
noon was to vote in closed -session to
? .publish a portion ,of an official CIA
post-mortem of the Mideast failure..
Under ?the resolution which SCE up
the committee, we were supposedly
'authorized to disclose information
which related to the intelligence
agencies' activities.. In public ?session
the CIA .had read. us two of the seven
paragraphs of the post-mortem, both
moderately favorable to the agency.
But it had refused to declassify the
other five. That afternoon the core
mittee Spent hours on those five pare--
graphs and realiied the CIA had ra
;reasonable grounds for keeping them
. secret. They did not reveal any intelli-
gence sources and methods?the two
items the CIA might legitimately want
1 to protect?but they did demonstrate
Just how badly .U.S. intelligence had
!performed prior to the Middle East
war. There was no "national security"
:at stake, only bureaucratic self-
. protection.
For example, the CIA wanted to
suppress one sentence which revealed
only a misjudgment: "The movement
of Syrian troops and Egyptian mili-
tary readiness are considered to be
coincidental and not. designed to lead
to major hostilities." Another para-
graph the CIA wanted to censor noted
that a "Watch Committee," which was
supposed to judge the imminence of
hostilities, failed to do so even after
the war had begun.
12
So the committee decided to pub-
lish. The CIA's reaction was predicta-
ble; among other things, it called a
press conference and told reporters ?
that the release of four words ("and
greater communications security") en-
dangered national security. ,
President Ford finally agreed to
deliver more classified information,
promising we would get everything we
needed?but only after a full month of
negotiation and on the condition that
he could veto any material the com-
mittee chose to publish.
But we still faced repeated delays.
On ? October 20, for example, Pike
wrote to ?the President, asking permis-
sion for me to visit the National
Security Council. There I was to
obtain a list of all CIA covert opera-
tions authorized by the top-level "40
Committee" since 1965 and to find
out the committee's procedures for
approving the operations. We needed
this information in order to confirm
or refute other indications that the
procedures had often been haphazard.
After repeated calls I did get the list.
On it I found each CIA operation
described as follows: "On [date giv-
en] the 40 Committee approved a
covert operation in ----." Or, "A
-media project was authorized for
---." Not one actual operation
was disclosed.
CIA Monitors
In ? one way, however, even this
document contained a major revela-
tion. Beside each blank from May
1972 until the end of 1974, the word
"telephonic" appeared. I asked Gen.
. Brent Scowcroft, Ford's National Se-
curity advisor, what that meant. He
said that the approval had been given
, over the telephone, without formal
meeting. In other words, the 40 Com-
mittee, the most sensitive committee
in government, had not met in more
than two years. Nearly 40 CIA opera-
tions had been approved without the
. opportunity for debate, or a consider-
ation of risks and alternatives by
anyone outside the CIA. (We held a
public hearing on that point the fol-
lowing week. Since then, -President
Ford has taken steps to -insure that
meetinas are Mil and accurate records
maintained.)
As the investigation progressed, the
CIA dropped even the pretense of
cooperation. All of the intelligence
agencies went to great lengths to keep
us from informal contact or interviews
with their employees. They were also
adamant about having, monitors pres-
ent. A monitor came along from the
National Security Agency when I in-
terviewed an NSA Middle East ana-
lyst. The poor monitor panicked when
1 left him behind in the front office..
After a quick phone call to NSA
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?
headquarters, he broke past our Capi-
tol Hill police guard and ran through
the committee room yelling that the
witness should not say anything to
'those people," Genuinely afraid that
the scene would lead to violence,
committee staff director Searle Field
agreed that the monitor could sit in
on just this one interview.
Kissinger Balks
The NSA had reason for its fears.
:? The analyst I interviewed was one
Who had accurately forecast war in
' the Middle East before it broke out on
October 6, 1973. The NSA leadership
had discounted her coutamous predic-
tions. Truly excellent technical intelli-
gence had gene unheeded.
Henry Kissinger, of course, threW
up the most obstacles. We had to
request information from him; he.
chaired three crucial panels?the Q.
? Committee, the NSC's Intelligence
.Committee, and the Verification Pan-
el, which handled intelligence related--
to the Strategic Arms Limitations
Talks (SALT).
But Kissinger refused to give up a --
single piece of paper without a fight.
He termed one of - our subpoenas .?
? merely a. 'request" and refused to
honor it. It took a contempt of
Congress resolution approved by the
committee to get him to honor several
*subpoenas. He silenced witnesses and
at one point issued instructions. that,
nobody in the -State Department was.
? to talk to anyone from the Pike
? Committee unless an official' State
Department monitor was present. .
We wanted, for example, to ask
one of Kissinger's subordinates'to
explain a mysterious contradiction in
? our policy toward Greece. We had
heard that, when tensions were rising
,On Cyprus, the State Department had
warned that Greek dictator Dimitrios
loannidis was moving to overthrow
Archbishop Makarios. But the CIA, at
just that time, was conducting diplo-
matic talks with loannidis? in Athens.
!We learned that Thomas Boyatt, a
; foreign service Officer, might be able
to explain what the CIA station had
.been up to. But Kissinger refused to
?. let us talk to Boyatt without a State
Department monitor present, and the
monitor forbade the .man to tell . us
? even the most .basic. Later I
interviewed another foreign service
officer on the same subject, with the?
same result. We called one of Kissin-
? ger's deputies to ask for cooperation.
lie asked us to put the F50 on the
phone and.then told .him again not to'.
give us any help.. -
The committee was getting angry
. about treatment like this, especially
because we had received almost no
? documents on the Cyprus affair. So
the committee voted to subpoena a
memo which Boyatt had written to .
Kissinger after the Cyprus affair. Once
more we found ourselves in trouble.
Among the other accusations that
? rained down upon us was a compari-
son to Joe McCarthy. The State De-
partment said we were ?interfering"
with advice given on policy by a
subordinate. .But Boyatt, the subordi-
? nate in question, had said that he was ?
willing to give us the information.
Under existing law, there was no way
the 'State Department* could prevent
its employees from giving information
to Congress.
The State Department's claim .that
it was protecting Boyatt from "inter-
ference" like ours was somewhat dis- -
ingenous. Boyatt had been denied
normal reassignment by two ambassa-
dors and one assistant secretary, both
for his Cyprus dissent and for his
activities on behalf of the Foreign
Service Association, which lobbies for
employee rights. We eventually pres?
sured the State Department to reas,
sitn him. ?
A human victory, only we never
. learned what the intelligence network
had told Henry Kissinger before the
Cyprus coUp, nor did we receive all
the documents We sought.
Bureaucratic Lessons
Despite all these obstacles, by De-
cember we had acquired a great deal
of information the CIA did not want
us to have, thereby -meeting one of the
tests of a good. investigation. We had
data about the intelligence budget
which Congress had never obtained
before. We had *learned about every
CIA operation the National Security.
Council had approved since 1965. We
also had original docurnents on an
especially vital issue?Soviet compli-.
ance with SALT agreements?thanks
to committee votes. to cite Henry
Kissinger for contempt of Congress
when -he first refused to honor . our
subpoenas.
These were our sucaesses. To a
large extent they were achieved be-
cause of our reaction to the dismal
failure of those first eight days of
hearings, when the administration of-
ficials just refused to cooperate. This
inspired us to it our teeth. Pike and
Field set a basic rule for the investiga-
ttors: be so aggressive you get com-
plained about. There were complaints
every week. When the CIA tried to
distract us With proposals that we
investigate sexy trivia, such as a minor
;official's indiscretions with shellfish.
toxins and other poisons, .we fefused.?,.
We learned one of the timeless ?
lessons of bureaucratic life?that it is
. necessary to talk to people at the
"working levels" of the bureaucracy
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and not just the. leadership. Leaders of
he agencies, responsible for any ?
? mismanagement, will always resist giv-
ing evidence Of 'their own corruption'
or incompetence. One senior official. ?
? close to the CIA's hierarchy told me ?
privately that he considered the CIA's
analytic system "rotten," and. that
Colby's management was ruining :the!
agency. "But why should I risk all and! ?
tell these things to the Pike. CoMmit-
tee?" he asked. "Where were those
congressmen when the CIA was not
? on the front pages, and where will .
they be when the Pike Committee's
jurisdiction expires?" It was an argu-
ment I heard often and could not
? really .refute..
It was different one step down.
The majority of mid-level officials,
. contrary to the conventional wisdom,
are competent.. and hard working.
Above all, they are concerned with
poor tranagement and will talk about
it to anyone who seems interested hi
improving their codition. And teke!
when these officials don't give, you
any valuable information, the 'simple
knowledge that you've talked . with
them 'makes their superiors more can-
did. ?
These interviews helped us pick
out some of the' weak points in the
intelligence bureaucracy. Pentagon an-
alysts would tell us What they thought i
of their counterparts in the CIA.!
Asking one agency about another,. or
one office in the same agency about:
? another, is a ' simple but effective
device. Everyone wants tci.tell his side
of the story, and the rivalries among ?
? the intelligence agencies ? are as fierce ,
as those anywhere in government
From analysts in the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency, CIA, and State De-
partment, I learned that the intelli-
? gence studies made on the Soviet
Backfire bomber might have been
dishonest. The most important ques-
tion was whether the Backfire could
(or ? would) be deployed against targets
:in the United States. Answering this
:question correctly obviously was ?
;important for SALT. ?
? The accusations about the Backfire
ranged all through the intelligence
,eeommunity. The Air Force ? was al-
leged to have put pressure on a de-
? fense contractor, simply because the
Air Force disagreed with a study the
contractor had done for the CIA. One
office of the CIA accused another of
deliberately hiring a consultant who
was known as a "downgrader" of
Soviet aircraft in order to influence ?
the Backfire study results. Another
CIA office was accused of misrepre-
senting the plane's performance char-
acteristics, because that office had its
own policy line to peddle to our
negotiators.
The CIA takes great pride in its
intellectual integrity, so. these at;cusa-
tions could hurt. The SALT .negotia-
tions were under way even as we car-
ried out our investigation, and Pike
did not want to risk complicating?
them by having a public hearing on
the Backfire. But the CIA did not
know that I wes able to imply several
when dealieg \vial the CIA
ceitAn., that this issue could be very,
very upplezbant if it wee.: putilicized..
When 1 gut far enough into the story
to present a threat, the CIA censor
decided to call The agency had found
some documents I might want to look
at, he said. Those documents?which
were "secret," but which served the
agency's ends-revealed,. among many
other things, that the director of the
DIA aad a high CIA official onee
thought that Henry Kissinger might be
suppressing vital information about
SALT. Upset, they had gone to the
acting CIA director, Vernon Walters,
and asked him to approach President
Nixon about the problem. Those doc-
uments, which told us a great deal
about the bureaucratic politics of
SALT, were essentially a damage-limi-
tation exercise by the CIA, which was
concerned about its own reputation.
Otherwise, we 'would never have ob-
tained them..
A Sorry Picture
The intelligence administrators had
shown us neat organization charts,
outlining their functions. What we,
actually found, however, was a very'
poorly administered intelligence sys-i
tera The NSC's Intelligence Commite
tee, for example, which looked im-
pressive on the charts, had had only
two meetings?one of them to organ-
ize itself..,
Perhaps .our more important find-
he; was that Congress cannot oversee
the intelligence agencies without mak-
ing a determined effort to sepitrate. the
truth front lies. Other less aggressive
committees had .bt:en over the same
ground before. The House Armed
.Services Intelligence subcommittee,
for example, had been told about ib:
official CIA post-mortem study of the
,
intelligence failure before the Middle
'East war. But that subcommittee nev-
er saw the actual document; its brief,
ing consisted of reading selected ma-
terial from the study displayed on a
slide projector_ And it was not told
there was a second Middle East post-
morttlf% which documented it shock-
ing intellieenee N-rforroance at Cee
time of tee. 1.1.S.-Soeiet control:teflon
in Sate Occolie.r 1973. or did the
know the official post-
mortem covered up key weaknesses in
the intelligence bureaucracy_ Other
britfit!,_crs I saw, including thosc
related to uticEar arms matters. were
14
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always vague, always incompIe.-te.
We also found tittence that the
true intellieence budget is several
times larger than that which the Con-
gress annually approves. The six for-
eign episodes we ? selected for closer
study revealed mismanaged intelli-
gence on a large scale. The CIA could
offer no major .analytical success.
"Current intelligence" reports suf-
fered because the leadership kept the
analysts busy with meetings, phony
deadlines, and "coordinating" policy
differences between offices. There was
precious little time left to think and
write. The CIA's longer-term intelli-
gence estimates were also weak, and
the bureacratic structure promised lit-
tle improvement. We found an alarm-
ing number of cases in which 'crucial
information had been collected in
time, but had not been disseminated
until after the war had begun?just
like the classic Pearl Harbor failure.
We found that Henry Kissinger kept
valuable information away from the
CIA. We had only to go beyond the
official explanations to realize that
reform of the analytical side of U. S.
intelligence is long overdue and sorely
- needed.
We also found pressures which
distorted honest intelligence during
the entire Vietnam war. The pressures
came from the military, the State
Department, and the White House,
and had one purpose: to force the
CIA to report "facts" about Vietnam
which would support the war policy,
regardless of truth. Many officials who
resisted such pressures found their
careers finished; those who kept quiet _
were promoted.
Fight Like Hell
But it was the question of how
well we monitor Soviet adherence to
the SALT aue,ements which 1 round
most troublesome. It shoWed how
' dangerous bureaucratic rivalry can be-'
come for the whole country when the
bureaucrats operate in secret . .
?
On -October 17, 1972, when the
agencies established a steering mech-
anism to ..monitor ----'Soviet ? SALT
compliance with the agreements
signed the previous May, a colonel on
Kissinger's NSC staff called the CIA's
Director of Strategic Research to say:
"Dr. ,Kissinger wanted to avoid any
written judgments to the effect that
the Soviets have violated any of the
SALT agreements. If the Director
believes that the Soviets may be in
violation, this should be the subject of
a Me mo ran du m from him to Dr.
Kissinger. The judgment that a viola-
tion is considered to have occurred is
one' that will be made at the highest
levet"
What this meant, in effect, was
that the intelligence' service had been
deprived of its basic rationale. Henry
Kissinger, the official most responsible
for making SALT polies', also con-
trolled information about how well
the policy was working?an affront
not only to the purpose of the CIA
but to every prudent- notion about
avoiding administrative disasters.
To be sure, Kissinger had his prob;-
lem with some elements of the intelli-
gence community who were leaking to
the press inaccurate information
about Soviet violations, but the way
. to handle that problem was with a
rifle aimed at the sinners not a shot-
gun blasting away at the entire area of
factual reporting of SALT violations..
Even more disturbing than what
Kissinger was doing was his passion
for concealing it from Congress. And
even. more disturbing than that is the
fact that Kissinger and the intelligence
chiefs are typical of the executive
branch leadership in their determina-
tion to protect Congress from know-
ledge of their affairs; in their tendency
to iDtore the fact that, after all, the
?executive and legislative branches
work for the same employer.
'I am convinced that Wilson was
?irong in thi-?;;;;!y, cannot,
Overcoine (...:iftleses-
sional committees can probe the
depths of the federal bureaucracy, and
provide the infiarreation that we all
need to know. But pending the day
when irrational adversary attitudes
between the branches are replaced by
a cooperative spirit of .scaNice, they
had a4aratter be prepireitfter4i*
hell
NEWSWEEK
26 JUDI 1976
LAM
A day after Jimmy Carter selected
him as the Democrats Vice Presiden.-
tial nominee, .Fritz Mondale head- .
ed home to Washington. Aboard- a
storm-tossed plane, Mondale granted
. his first interview ,about himself and,
the fall campaign to INIEN;vswEEk's ?
John 3. Lindsay.. Excerpts' from the ?
interview:
?ill:0101.061jr
EXCERPTED:
- Q. Haven't you gone too far with that In
04 area of the investigative agencies?
A. Take the CIA. I never joined -
those who wanted to prohibit covert
activities. I did say they should be
much more limited; put -under respon-
sible control and used only .in those ?
rare instances where it is essential.
And I think that is the proper line to
.draw.. I never attacked the need for
? .the best intelligence apparatus in the
world. I never attacked the need for
. the Federal Bureau of Investigation.. I
. attacked the abuse of power.
ea
15
WASHINGTON POST
1 0 JUL 1975
Castro Is Linked.
To Ruby; Oswald
7.11IAMI, July 9 l'UPD?
Cuban Premier Fidel -Cas-
tro and Jack Ruby dis-
cussed "removal of the
President" at a 1963 meet-
ing 10 weeks prior to
President Kennedy's' as-
sassination, according to
Watergate burglar and
. one-time Central Intelli- ?
gence Agency agent Frank
Sturgis.
Sturgis claimed in a
telephone interview Thurs-
day he had been assigned
to investigate possible in-
volvement of Cuban exiles
'in the Kennedy assassina-
tion. He would not say
What agency had ordered
the probe.
The investigation failed
to show any Cuban exile
links to Kennedy's death,
but produced evidence
that Kennedy assassin Lee
Harvey Oswald and Ruby,
who'. shot Oswald in
Dallas, were "involved in
the same conspiracy, along
with other people," Stur-
,?gis said. He said he and
'!other agents" gave infor-
- illation of the meeting to
-*several government
agencies in .1964.
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Sc IENCE
25 June 1976
Glonzar Explorer: CIA's Salvage Ship
a Giant Leap in Ocean Engineering
NelA information about the CIA's
deep sea. recovery vessel.. the Gloom,-
Explorer. makes it possible for- the first
time to ens isaue rough's how the ship
and its a?sociitted s4Ntem-, %, ere designed
to operate in their iechnoloeicalls tm-
precedented mission. According to ac-
counts that appeared in larch and April
last year. the recover) system w as de-
signed to salvage a Russian submarine
that sank in 17.000 feet of V. ater some.
750 miles northwest of Oahu. Hass au.
The new facts. made avaikable as part.
of the government's effort to lease the
ship. are at variance with man) details of
the descriptions reported in the national
press last year. They also are hard to
reconcile I.:1th the leadine version of
? what the mission accomplished. accord-
ing to which the submarine a es raised- in
one piece. hot during the ascent two
thirds of it broke away and pluneed hack
to the ocean floor, never to be recov-
ered. Yet neither the Glomar Explorer's
interior well, nor its associated barge.
the. HMB-.1, were designed to accommo-
. date a full length submarine.
The CIA's tleep sea recovery system,
despite its unique capabilities. has now
been broken up. The submersible barge
has been given to the Energy Research
and Development Administration for an
ocean heat experiment. ERDA also has
custody of the "strongback.- which was
the main frame of a crucial and still
secret component of the system. the
grappling machine that enveloped the
submarine wreckage. The st rong.back..
reputedly the largest single piece of steel
ever made, was recently saved from the
cutter's torch at 24 hours' notice; ,
The Cilornar Expii.irer, itself is .moored
at Lone Beach. California. No goverri-:
ment agency has an immediate use for it.
Unless a civilian User can be found in the
next few months the ship. which cost
about S250 million to build. ssill probably
go to the scrapyard.
Yet the National Advisory Committee
on Oceans and Atmosphere described
the vessel in a recent letter to the White
House as a. "great national Wit-
liun A. Nierenberg. director of the
Scripps Institution of Oceanoeraph v and
a consultant to the National Security
Agency. has compared the achievement
of constructing the Glomar Explorer
with that LA- the Manhattan project. And
Admiral J. Ed w ard Snyder. until re-
centls the Oceanographer of the Navy.
told Science that the system "is prob-
ably ? the greatest technical achievement
in ocean engineet ing in my lifetime.-
The chief reason for these plaudits is
the considerable leap by tt hich the. Glo-
mar Elidorer exceeds the best existing
technology. Hitherto the deep sea
wi:ight-lifting record has been held by
the Alcoa .S'eaprolye. txhich can raise 50
tons from 15.000 feet.. According to a
Global Marine Corporation brochure,
the Glomar Explorer can. handle "pay-
loads in excess of 1500 tons- to about
17.009 feet. an increase of more than 30-
fol d .
"lhe advantage seems to have been
gained by skillful use of existint tech-
niques rather than any dramatic break-
through. The ship was built with im-
pressive speed. The design contract was
let in May 1971. the hull delivered in July
1973. and the system completed by May
1974. Designed specifically for salvaging
the Russian submarine. the Giontar Er-
plorer could also raise manganese nod-
ules in accordance with the CIA's cover
story that the ship was a mining vessel in
the employ of Howard Hughes.
Three sources of information about
the system are now available. The Gener-
al Services Administration., the govern-
ment's housekeeping agency. has put
? the Glomar Explorer's operating manual
'on public view .as part of its effort to
lease the : ship. The GSA has also re-
leased a Global Marine brochure which
gives a brief description of the strong-
hack, and ERDA has released details of
the barge. None of these sources de-
scribes how the three components oper-
ated together as a system, which remains
a matter of conjecture. .
The key operation of the system .was
to raise and lower the grappling machine.
With a weight in air of 2130 tons, the
device was almost as massive as the
entire submarine it was to salvage. The
machine was equipped with a seawater
hydraulic system. presumably to power
the attachments that secured the IA reek-
age. and with thrusters for fine position-
ing.
A principal purpose of the submersible
barge was to transfer the grappling ma-
chine into the central ss ell. or "moon
po.o1.- of the Glamor Explorer. The ma-
? chine was too big and 'heavy to come on
board from above, so it had to be in-
troduced from below water. The barge.
hich could dive to and return from a
depth of 165 feet w ith a load of 2500 tons.
was the solution to this problem. Pre-
: sumably the barge carrying the grappling
machine was towed out to the rendez-
vous point, whereupon it sank to the
!bottom and rolled back its roof.
The Glamor Explorer would then have
maneuvered overhead, flooded its moon
pool, and slid back the gates on its bot-
tom to open the moon. pool to the sea.
Visible on either side of the main dell ick
(see figure) are two tall towers. V. hose
purpose. according to one account last
16
year. was -to deceive observers (inch al-
int; Soviet fishing ships) into believing
that the Explorer was deep sea mining.''
In fact the towers are steerable docking
legs. Placed at. either end of the moon
pool, their purpose is to slide down until
they penetrate the barge below and mate
with docking pins on the grappling ma-
chine. The machine is then drawn up.
probably by the docking legs alone, the
gates are closed, and the moon pool de-
watered. By the reverse of the same
operation, the barge could have been
used to transfer the grappling machine
or large pieces of submarine from ship to
shore.
According to bargemaster Harvey ?
Smith. the only voyage the . barge has
ever Made is to Santa Catalina Island. a -
few miles off Long Beach. It was presum-
ably here that the transfer to and from
the ship took place.
With the grappling machine on board.
its weight still supported by the docking
legs, the Glamor Explorer would has e
journeyed alone to the mid-Pacific site of
the sunken submarine. Equipping the
.ship for its task were a.number of unusu-
al features. A dynamic positioning sys-
tem kept the ship hovering to within an
average of 10 feet from its target site. To
insulate the. pipestring from strains
caused by the buffeting of Ix ipds and
waves, the derrick was mounted on gim-
bals which allowed the ship to pitch
around while the derrick and its pipe-
string kept steady.
Transfer of the grappling machine
from docking legs to pipestrine Would
have been a maneuver of some delicacy.
since the two would be responding differ-
- ently to the movements of the sea.
The pipestring was formed of seg-
ments 60 .feet long and weighing about 13
tons apiece. An automatic system of
cranes and elevators selected the 'pipes
from .their storage racks and delivered
them to the derrick at the rate of one
every 10 minutes. Each segment was
screwed into the growing string. The
string was lowered or raised by a heavy
lift system consisting of two yokes. each
powered by a pair of hydraulic cylinders.
which grasped the pipe alternately in a
hand over hand motion.
The 17.000 foot string. which had ex-
traordinary stresses placed upon it. was
no ever) day piece of pipe. It was made
of enriched gun tube steel, and tapered in
six stages from pipe segments a massive
151/2 inches in diameter through to seg-
ments 123/4 inches across. The inner di-
ameter of all segments was 6 inches. .
To the- bottom of the. pipestring was
attached a strengthening device know n
asn dutchman. and an apex block with a
three-leveed bridle w hich attached to the
grappling machine.
Divers fastened an electromechanical
cable to the outside a the pipe as the
string was let down. According to the
Global Marine brochure, the seawater
hydraulic devices on .the strongback
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can be operated by pumping water down
the bore of the string. The ship's oper-
ating manual also states that the pipe has
the capacity for air. injection when rais-
ing materials. If both statements are
true. possibly seawater was first pumped
down to power the grapples. followed by
air injected into chambers in the grap-
pling machine, perhaps, so as. to offset. '
some of its weight.
The possibility of air injection into the
grappling machine makes it hard to as-
sess the Glomar Explorer's lifting capac-
ity. According to the operating manual.
the heavy lift system -is not intended to
oPerate above 14.8 million pounds (6607 .
long tonsI static load." although higher
loads can be tolerated for short periods.
Much of this capacity would have gone
? into lifting the pipestring and grappling '
? machine. Figures given in the operating
manual for. the weight of the various pipe
segments indicate that the full string
would have weighed about 9 million
pounds in air. giving a we; weight of 3525 .
tons. The operating manual also gives
the wet Weight of the "mining machine"
(presumably the grappling machine?the
manual is written to accord with the
mining vessel cover story) as 1830 tons.
? Subtraction of these two figures from
that for the capacity of the lift. system
gives 1252, tons. which, with the 11/2 safe-
ty factor that salvors like to allow for,
would suggest a Payload of 835 tons.
(Curiously enough. the figure of 800 tons
? turned up in last year's accounts, being_
quoted by the Washington Post as the
, lifting Capacity of the barge and by the
New York Thnes as that of the derrick.
These quantities are as far out as Time's ,
figure for the weight of the pipestring.
400.000 pounds. and Newsweek's esti-
- Mate of the lift system's capacity as.
12,000 pounds.)
? The Global Marine brochure. how-:
ever. states that payloads in excess of
1500 tons can be deployed, the differ-
ence perhaps being due to the capacity
for offsetting the weight of the strong-
back by air injection. And a figure quot-
ed by R. Curtis Crooke. president of the
Global Marine Development corpora-
tion, to a recent meeting of the National
? Advisory Committee on Oceans and At-
mosphere. implies a Payload of just un-
der 2000 tons.
The Glomar Explorer's exact payload
is a figure. of sonic interest because of its
bearing on whether the Russian subma-
? rine could have been salvaged in one 7
piece. The first press accounts. including
? that of the Los Angeles Times. which .
broke the Story. had the submarine being
picked up in pieces. But the Los Angeles
Times in a later story specifically denied
earlier information that -the submarine
was found in three separate sections" in
favor of a version that the vesSel. -intact
but badly damaged, was raised about
5.000 feet . .'? before two thirds of it
broke away:-
The significance, perhaps, of the latter
version is that it provides a neat explana-
.
don for the one piece of information on.
which all Press accounts were 'agreed?
that- the CIA recovered only one third of
the submarine. ,Yet this. version of the
Glamor .EXplorer's mission. though pos-
. sible. seems unlikely for several reasons.
. First, submarines implode on sinking be-
low theirdesign depth. and the crumpled
'wreck may then smash into the bottom at ?
high speed. an experience which the sub-
marine is unlikely - to survive in ? one
piece. Of the two American nuclear sub-
marines that have sunk. the Scurpion lies
?
with its bow and stem broken off from
..the midship section, and the Thresher
disintegrated .into , a larger number of
pieces surrounded by a debris field half a
mile in radius. ?
Second even if the Glomat. Explorer
had lifted the Russian submarine off the
bottom in one piece, it is hard to see
what would have happened next. The
obvious way for the ship to recover ob-
jects is to bring them. into its flooded
Moon pool, then close the gates and
water the pool. According to Jane's -
Fighting Ships. however the length.of a
Golf class submarine is 320 feet, too long
by far to fit into the 199 foot moon pool.
Alternatively, the Glomar Explorer
might have kept the submarine sus-
pended just beneath her. sailed for the
nearest shallow water, and dumped the
. submarine there within easy reach of
divers. But if this were the approach, it
? would make more sense to dump the
submarine into the barge: Yet though the
. barge is. 324 feet, long,, its interior enve-
lope is only 256 feet in length. Since the
:whole system was designed, with no ex-.
.pense spared, for the specific purpose of
salvaging the submarine, it would seem
? . reasonable to infer that the largest piece
,the CIA expected to retrieve was . no
longer than the moon pool. . .
Grappling Machine Stoppily.Designed?
As for the submarine breaking free,
?, from .the grappling machine, it .seems
. surprising that the designers of the recov-
ery system should have been caught .out
by so obvious a contingency. Since the
wreck would clearly have been in fragile
-condition, it would make sense to design
the grappling' machine so that it could
, wrap .securely arollnd the entire Object -
beingrecovered. ?
-Another reason for doubting that the.
. submarine was raised in one piece is that
such a .task, may .have been a little bit ?
? beyond even .the Glopiar Explorer's ca-
pacity... The displacement weight of a
? Goliciass submarine is given by Jane's
as 2350 tons. Soviet publications on sub-
marine design suggest that about 80 per-
cent of such a vessel would consist of
metallic objects. With a factor of .0.87 .
to offset the weight of Steel in Water, -
the wet weight of the flooded out subma-
rine might be estimated' as 1640 tons.
Payload capacity to lift .such an object.
with a prudent 50 percent safety. factor. .
would be some 2500 tons. which Seems
17
more than the Minor Explorer probably
had. .
? Assuming for the moment that the sub-
marine was not in fact raised in one ,
piece, why should such a cock-and-bull '
story have worked its way into several- .
.circumstantial accounts of the Glomar
Explorer's mission? Speculation can go
only so far, but it seems reasonable to
expect that the CIA, which had kept the
project secret for so long. was in control
of most of the information that appeared
last year. Intelligence agencies are not
on oath in their communications with the
press. Remembering the affair of the U-2
Spy plane. which the Soviet Union toler-?
ated until the first official confirmation by
the U.S. government, the CIA would
? presumably have sought to avoid humili-
ating the Russians by admitting that any-
thing of much interest had been. recov-
ered from the submarine. Yet the agency
Might not have wished to pretend that
the Gloom,- Explorer's mission was a
complete failure at a time when it was
under heavy public criticism for activi-
ties nearer home.
As it happens, the story that emerged
? last year Seems almost tailor-made, as it
were, to justify the Glomar Explorer's
operation without embarrassing the So-
viet Union. A third of the submarine was
recovered, according to most of the
.newspapers briefed by the CIA. but it
contained no missiles, no code room.
and only the indication of two nuclear
tippable torpedoes. The CIA specifically .
denied reports that the whole submarine.
or two of its nuclear torpedo warheads.
had been recovered. ?
Yet most accounts. while agreeing on
that. differed with each other and the
probable truth in many technical details,
of the Glomor Explorer's operation and
in most estimates of the system's charac-
teristics. That might reflect simply the
'difficulty of acquiring hard to come by
inforpation against tight deadlines. It
might also reflect a pattern of manipula-
tion by the chief source of information.
If the latter is the ease:, the actual
results of the Molnar Explorer's mission
? can only be guessed at. The expedition
may. have been a total failure. On the
other hand, the ship bears the stamp of .
; such powerful design and superior capa-
bilities that a technical failure through.
lack of foresight would be more surpris-
ing than not. It seems quite possible that
the 'Russian submarine was broken into
several pieces. For what it is worth, the
Glamor Explorer is reported to have
spent a month at the recovery site in
1974. From the information now avail-
able this would seem to be time enough
for the grappling machine to have made
perhaps as many as five journeys to the
oeean floor and back, retrieving a piece
of submarine on each occasion. Just con-
ceivably, the Gloniar Explorer has been
declared surplus because she scooped up
almost everything her designers intended
her to garner.?NicHoLAs WADE
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girctitgim
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Sat., July 17,1976
--11
,/-. '1;":
'41\
_
r8utlarie's
reaor? Ad its?
BY NORMAN KEMPSTER
Times Staff Writer
WASHINGTON?The CIA has
committed burglaries to obtain infor-
mation about Americans living or
traveling abroad, Director George
Bush admitted in court papers Made
public Friday.
In a sworn affidavit, Bush also said
that the CIA had overheard with hid-
den microphones or wiretaps the con-
versations of Americans in foreign
Countries.
Bush submitted the statement in
response to written questions from
lawyers for the Socialist Workers
Party, which has filed a $37 million
damage suit against the FBI, CIA
and other government agencies
charging violation of the rights of
party mcinbers. ?
A CIA spokesman said that the
agency had never rejected the use of
surreptitious entry as a technique for
gathering information abroad. But he
refused to say whether the CIA still
conducted burglaries against Ameri-
can citizens overseas.
Herbert Jordan, a New York attor-
THE CLEVELAND _PRESS
25 June 1976
ney representing the Socialst 'Work
ers, said the party would argue th
CIA-sponsored break-ins were illeg I
if they were directed against Ame
cans.
The case apparently will be t e
first in which a court is asked to
cide the legality of such overseas a
tivities of U.S. intelligence agencies.
"It is our position that surreptitious
entries and warrantless surveillance
of American citizens violates the
Constitution regardless of whether it
is done in the United States or,
abroad," Jordan said.
No date has been set for oral ar-
guments in the case, which is being
heard in U.S. District Court in New
York.
In written interrogatories, lawyers
of the party asked the CIA if the So-
cialist Workers or members of its
youth affiliate, the Young Socialist
Alliance, had been targets of burgla-
ries, wiretaps or bugs during the last
13 years. The lawyers also demanded-
lAbost here,
ks !--15d on
? By JULIAN KRAWCHECK
George W. Bush, director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, today
said again that he is
willing to testify be-
fore congressional
probers on. "sensi-
tive information"
but insisted anew
that adequate safe-
guards be erected
against leaks to the
news media.
? In remarks prepared for delivery
before the City Club Forum, Bush?
pledged that the CIA would not em-
ploy full-time journalists for intelli-
gence purposes but said he reserved
the right to make use of data volun-
tarily furnished by newsmen.
He indicated that all ground rules
on these and other CIA procedures
are subject to variances based on
special conditions involving national
security.
Bush's -emarks were In response
to criticism of the CIA from various
sources for alleged non-cooperation
with congressional probers and for
the reputed use of journalists based
In foreign countries for espionage
purposes.
. fall details and doctiments from the agendy's files.
Bush responded with a detailed affidvait that was clas-
sified "top secret" by the CIA. The paper was turned over
to the U.S. attorney's office in New York under conciions
that make it available to the judge but not to the Socialiy:
Workers or to the public. ?
A three-page summary, couched in general terms, was
'.made
"Information . . . was aquired and a result of seven:
L.surreptitious entries that were made into premises abroad
as to which certain of the named plaintiffs. . . had regu-
lar access or may have had proprietary interest," Bush
said in the public affidavit:
? The intentionally .vague language apparently coven
break-ins at apartments, hotel rooms and offices.
The Socialist Workers Party is a tiny left-wing organ',
zation that was the target of FBI burglaries as part of the.
FBI's since-discontinued COINTELPRO (couunterintel-
!ligencd program) effort. Although the party's rhetoric is
;often inflammatory, its members have never been con-
victed of political violence.
! Bush's affidavit referred only to burglaries, tugging an? d
wiretapping against members and officers of the party
' and its youth affiliate. But in a 29-page brief filed along
,with the affidavit, the government implied that similar
,techniques were used against other targets.
. "It is apparent that disclosure of the documents (provid-
? ing the details demanded by the party) would reveal CIA
sources and methods," U.S. attorney Robert B. Fiske Jr.
said in the accompanying brief.
In court papers filed Friday, the Socialist Workers
!urged the court to reject the CIA's secrecy plea and make
4niblic the documents and Bush's detailed response to the
questions.
? In addition to pressing the case in court, the party sent
copies of Bush's affidavit to the Senate's new permanent
iCommittee on Intelligence headed by Sen. Daniel K. In-
ouye (D-Hawaii). The party urged the committee, created
,-!earlier this year as. a successor to the temporary commit-
'tee headed by Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.), to investigate
Ithe extent of CIA burglaries.
:.., The Church committee disclosed earlier that the CIA
and the National Security Agency had intercepted tele-
phone, cable and telex communications of Americans
when at least one party to the communication was locat-
ed in a foreign country.
- The committee did not specifically refer to overseas
1
T burglaries by the CIA. ,
,
Te siid he had appeared 28 times
before congressional committees
and subcommittees, and pledged his
readiness to testify further "with
proper regards for safeguards
against leaks of sensitive
information."
Bush welcomed the creation of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, headed by Sen. Daniel Inouye,
of Hawaii, as a sort of clearinghouse
for giving CIA data to Congress. ?
However, he said he would continue
to cooperate with the six other Sen-
ate committees interested in the
intelligence field.
"There has been no problem on
the CIA's furnishing of sensitive data
to the appropriate committees,"
Bush said.. "The,only problem has
been with regard to leaks of infor-
mation the comrnittees agreed
should be withheld for security
reasons."
He conceded the difficulty of seal-
ing the lips of all those privy to testi-
mony before various committees but
insisted that every possible safe-
guard be erected and policed.
At today's Forum special
recognition' was given to 17 mem-
bers who joined the club 50 or more
years ago. Five of these; H.F.
Schneider, Arthur J. Iteinthal, Rob-
ert L Snajdr, Suggs Garber and A.H..
Zychick, have maintained member-
ship continuously during that time." -
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THE MART DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio)
.26 June 1976
its anger
crresszonal ie
0
By Douglas Y, Petirs
CIA Director George W. Bush yesterday
blamed congressional committees with CIA
oversight privileges for the "unprecedented
number of leaks in the last year."
Bush told the City Club Forum,?"Leaks can
hurt American intelligence activities far into
the future. The United States must have an
intelligence agency second to none."
He said a consolidation of congressional
investigations would minimize leaks and the
CIA is willing to cooperate with Congress in the
future. '
"I personally appeared 28 times before
congressional committees since becoming direc-
tor.The CIA has disclosed its budget in minute
detail to several congressional committees."
Bush is opposed to the publication of any
part of the CIA budget because "subsequent
comparisons of the total figure changes" could
reveal new intelligence activities.
Bush said covert activities, which formerly.
accounted for about 50% of the CIA budget,
have been reduced to 2%. ? ? ?-,
"I believe no president should be' denied
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
28 JUNE 1976
CIA NOT ACTIVE IN
THIS "BOOKS ABROAD"
EDITORS, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY:
We were amused to find in Publishers
Weekly for May 17 a headline, "Senate
Group Finds CIA Now Active Only in
Books Abroad." Our quarterly review
of contemporary world literature does
in fact have several thousand readers
and over 800 contributors scattered
? across the globe, and while most of
these individuals doubtless possess the
artist's and intellectual's usual irasci-
bility toward matters political, their
activity as far as our journal is con-
cerned is limited to short comments of
a primarily literary-critical nature. As
for our modest staff?well, we're eyeing
each other suspiciously now but have
not as yet uncovered any conneaions
; more nefarious than the MLA.
WILLIAM RIGGAN
Assistant Editor
Books Abroad
Norman, Okla.
CIA AGAIN: QUIS
CUSTOD1E7 I PSOS CU STOD ES?
EDITORS, PUDLISFIERs WEEKLY;
Upon reading the report (PW,May 17)
on Senator Church's committee investi-
gating the CIA's "book publishing pro-
gmm" abroad, one reacts with amaze-
ment to the "Question: Did you take.
Some soil of steps to make sure that
things that were published in English..
were kept away from American read-
covert capabilities," Bush said.
Bush conceded the CIA has used news
correspondents as agents in' the past, but. said,
"as SO0R as possible" existing relationships with
journalists will be ended and no more: newsmen
would be employed as agents. ?
However, Bush defended the practice of ac-
cepting information from news correspondents
"who voluntarily contact the agency for the
purpose of exchanging information with no
expectation of monetary
Declining to reveal the names of any jour-
nalists who have worked. for the CIA; Bush said,
"I hope that members of a profession willing to
go to jail rather than reveal their sources will
understand this."
Despite. recent attacks on the CIA, Bush. -
said Morale is high-and enrollment has increas-
ed. He said he believes time will restore the
public's confidence in the CIA.
He admonished the audience not to believe
all disclosures about CIA activities merely be-
cause they are printed.
"We have been accused," he-said, "of steal-
ing relics from Noah's Ark."
EDITOR & PUBLISHER
17 July 1976
CIA says it will not
hire news people
In a meeting .at Central Intelligence
.; Agency headquarters at McLean.- Va.
(June 24). CIA director George Bush and
; three of his assistants told representa-
tives of the National News Council no
newsman affiliated in any way with an
; American news Organization would be.
hired for any purpose by the agency.
. Clarifying Bush's February II policy
statenient on CIA employment of jour-
nalists. the CIA representatives said the
agency would. in the future. no longer
employ news executives, stringers for
American news organizations, foreign
'nationals _working as newsmen for
American news oiganintions and free
;lance writers w ho could be interpreted in
any manner as being journalists. Any af-
' (Plate now fallirre into Cu-se ..ategories.
- they added. has been or wOuld be fermi.-
'tutted as a CA employe.
The CIA. they also affirmed, will not
use news organization "cover" for its
employes ?cover." in this ease. refer-
ers?" Indeed, who will protect us from
the Senate protectors as they go about
protecting us from the CIA protectors?
ALVIN SKIPSNA
Librarian
Skidmore College
Saratoga Springs, N.Y.
ring to the controversial issue of press ?
credentials.. as discussed in tf;e U.S. Sen-
ate's recent Select . Committee on Intel-
ligence ?Acti.iIies report.. (I-4P, May 8) -
Bush. who attended . only part of the ? ?
meeting. declared. as he has in the past. -
.that he would not release the names of
any journalists who have been employed ?
.by the CIA.
Ir reference to requests for such
names from 'various news organizations,..
he said, "We're not goine to do any
inore..We can't doany more."
In addition. the . CIA representatives
refused to specify wIrich foreign informa-
tion services might be presently affiliated
with the intelli,zenee organization.
Minimizing the "domestic fallout" from
stories placed by the CIA in foreign pub-
lications, they indicated that this practice
would continue. ?
The meeting. attended by News.Coon-
cil member William Rusher, publisher of
the iVationc.1 _Krt ;ea.. and Ned Schrmr-
man. NNC assodate ?director. was the
result of a NIzi; 3 letter from the Council
to MAI requesting clarification of his
February Ii policy statement.
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NEW REPUBLIC
JULY 1916
?The Ascendant Pentagon
?
Freezing Out the CIA
by Tad Szulc
The Pentagon is emerging as the principal force in the
management of US foreign intelligence, gradually
displacing the Central Intelligence Agency from its
traditional preeminent position, as a result of the.
implementation of President Ford's plan to reorganize
the intelligence community. This little-noticed power
shift may, in the opinion of numerous specialists, have
an adverse effect?on the quality of US intelligence.
Under Ford's reorganization, based on the Presiden-
tial Executive Order of 'February 18, the Director of the
CIA (currently George Bush) remains in name the chief
intelligence adviser to the President. The law provides
that the CIA director act simultaneously. as Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI), heading the entire civilian
and military intelligence community. In practice,
however, there are growing indications that Bush, as
DCI, is being forced to share his authority with the
Pentagon's top intelligence official, the new Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Robert Ellsworth.
In part this is so because Ford, wishing to centralize
the control of intelligence in the President's office and
the National Security Council after all the abuses of the
past, has effectively diminished the DCI's influence in
the allocation of resources to the various arms of the
intelligence community. It is the power of the purse
that counts in operational policy-making, and the
Pentagon?running the huge National Security Agen-
cy (NSA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
among other. military intelligence operations?holds
the lion's share of the total multibillion-dollar in-
telligent.e budget.
*The other reason is that the Defense Department,
interpreting in its own way the presidential Executive
Order, has recently streamlined, expanded and
strengthened. its intelligence apparatus in a way that
many intelligence community officials see as an "end
run" by the military, designed ultimately to lessen the
CIA's position in policy-making and its impact on the
elaboration of fundamental intelligence estimates. New
lines of authority were drawn in a manner likely to
reduce the DCI7s direct control oversuch agencies as
the NSA and the DIA. The Pentagon's internal
intelligence reorganization was completed on July 6,
when a new organizational chart was circulated
internally; there was no publicity about it.
In the developing controversy over Ford's ?
reorganization plan?and, especially, the Pentagon's
role in it?at stake is whether civilian control of the US
intelligence process, as represented by the CIA, can be
maintained or supplanted in practice by the military
viewpoint. The picture is still quite blurred; the new
system is not yet fully understood in the intelligence
community, and it is too ea rly to offer final conclusions.
Aside from the CIA's monumental wrongdoing in
the past --Sin covert operations abroad and illegal
domestic intelligence activities-the agency has a.
superior track record to the military in analyzing and
interpreting foreign intelligence. 1/5 foreign policy
decisions are often based on intelligence assessments.
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Ti
-
0 take two major recent examples, the CIA was
basically right and the military agencies wrong in the
1969 controversy over the timing of Soviet MIRVing of
its ? missiles; likewise. the CIA estimates during the
Vietnam war, both about conditions in South Vietnam .
and the impact of US bombings of North Vietnam, were
more realistic than the DIA's gung-ho judgments.
Unfortunately neither Johnson nor Nixon listened to
' the CIA. During the preparations for ? the 1970
Cambodian invasion, the CIA was hardly consulted
(though Richard Helms, then CIA director, made an
'ambiguous presentation at the crucial National Securi-
ty Council meeting) and the intelligence community as
a whole was not asked to prepare a National In-
telligence Estimate on the subject. Instead, Nixon and ?
, lenry Kissinger depended entirely on the opinions of
f. he DIA, the loint Chiefs of Staff, and the US command
n Saigon.
The present concern is that the Pentagon's ascenden-
cy in the intelligence process may tend to further shut
out the CIA's analytical voice and tocompliCate, rather
than improve, the method of allocating money for
intelligence.
Ironically. Ford started out intending to reinforce the
DCI's position, which had become considerably eroded
when Allen W. Dulles left the agency in 1962. He was
the last strong CIA Director. On the one hand, the
growth of intelligence technology,- such as the use of
"spy-in-the-sky" satellites for observation over the
Soviet Union, China and elsewhere, inevitably threw
more resOurces?and influence?to*the'Pentagon and
its specialized agencies like the NSA and the National
Reconnaissance Office. (NRO) although the CIA
retained an intelligence coordinating role. At the same
time the DCI's working relationshipt. vith the rest of the
intelligence community was rather . ill-defined
although, theoretically, he headed . it. Personality
problems aggravated things. (Helms, for example, had
virtually no access to Nixon in the last years) What
existed, then, was a collection of intelligence fiefdoms,
all autonomous in such matters as drawing up their
secret budgets for congressional authorization. For the
most part,. Congress did not know what it was
approving because requested intelligence funds were
concealed in other budgetary line items. As a power
vacuum developed in the intelligence community, .
? Henry Kissinger moved in 1970 to become the de facto
bass of US intelligence.
- ? Nixon tried in 1971 to strengthen the Do ilirt.0;:j1
on executive order issued on November 5 (i!
drafted by Janle; R. (.-.;chlesirigeri.vho toter became CIA
director and. Defen,:e Sekretary). This order vested in
the DCI the power to?present a consolidated budget for
the whole intelligence community. Reviewing th.--
CIA's history this .year, the Senate littelli,;ence
Committee applauded this move On Ott-grounds that a
strong DCI was essential for the ?immunity's work.
lowever, Helms, when he held the job of Dct, f?i4.,1 to
carry out his mandate. The Intelligence Community,
already in disarray because of the emerging scandat,-...
20
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has been drifting ever since.
Ford's executive order last February abandoned the
1971 concept to divide the budget-making responsibili-
ty among Bush as DCI. Ellsworth as the Pentagon's
delegate, and William Hyland, the deputy to the White
House Assistant for National Security 11ffair4.13ush:
was described as the top "manager- of this new group
known as the Commi...t.tee on Foreign Intelligence, but
because Ford did not want an,. -intelligence "czar,"
Ellsworth and Hyland can appeal Bush's decisions
directly to the President.
Besides its resource allocation- responsibility, this
three-man panel actsas the steering committee for the
intelligence community. replacing the former United
States Intelligence Board, which was headed by the DCI
and on -which all the agencies were _represented.
Despite the language in Ford's Executive Order, many
intelligence officials see Bursh assimplyrrinnts.inierpare::-
with the Pentagon's Ellsworth sharing equally in the ,
committee's responsibilities. This is one aspect of the
Pentagon's upgraded role in the management of
intelligence.
Below the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, a
larger body was set up undet Bush for operational
:coordination. This is the National Foreign Intelligence
:Board on which all the intelligence agencies ?are
? . represented. But it lacks the policy powers of the old US
Intelligence Board.
i Bush, of course, is helped by his easy access to Ford,
; but the next pa may not. have the same relationship
with the next President, and this is where the new
system may be damaging to the CIA and advantageous
to the military now. that anew institutional structure
has been built. The Pentagon also has direct access to
. the President through the Secretary of Defense,
personally-and through his membership in the National
Security Council. The DCI is nota statutory NSC
!Member.
The Pentagon began restructuring' itself for its new
intelligence role last May when Defense Secretary
.1 Rumsfeld issued new directives. Accordingly,
Ellsworth *was named to the post of a second Deputy
Secretary of Defense (William Clements is the other
ideputy)-with intelligence as his principal responsibility. -
; This changed the command Structure in the military
I intelligence community. Until then, Pentagon in-
telligence was coordinated on a daily basis by the
I Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, a lower
?1 post than - Ellsworth's current deputyship. Formerly,
NSA and DIA directors *reported directly to the
I Defense Secretary although the DIA also responded to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Rumsfeld and Ellsworth have
I devised new lines of authority;
In expanding the military intelligence system,
Ellsworth, as the Pentagon's top intelligence manager,
created the new, post of Director of Defense In-
telligence to be held concurrently by the Assistant
. Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (this spot has not
yet been permanently filled). The Director of the DIA
(Gen. Samuel C. Wilson) now reports to Rumsfeld
through Ellsworth and through the new Director of
Defense Intelligence (Thomas-K. Lat timer is the acting
director in his capacity as Acting Assistant Secretary.
For Intelligence). Also created was the Defense
Intelligence Board headed by Ellsworth. The board has
three specialized subordinate bodies.
? More significantly, the Director of the huge National ?
'Security Agency henceforth reports to. Rumsfeld
through Ellsworth ? and the new Director of Defense
Intelligence rather than directly. So does the Director
of .Air Force Special Programs, which runs the spy
-satellite operations. The Defense Intelligence Agency
has been .streamlined ? and apparently enjoys less ?
autonomy. ? .
The Pentagon takes the position that the reorganiza-
tion, .which has proceeded virtually unnoticed since
May, serves the purpose of centralizing and, therefore,
.improving the quality of the Def.ense Department's
intelligence output. In a sense, that's true. Ellsworth's
elevation and the creation of the post of Director of
.Defense Intelligence, however, are also having ? the
effect of isolating military intelligence agencies from
George. Bush's direct control in his DCI capacity,
according to many intelligence officials. In the crucial
case of the NSA, for exa.mple, Bush has to deal with it
on policy matters through Ellsworth, his colleague on
the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, and through
- the Director of. Defense Intelligence. On operational ?
mat ters,.Bush can deal with the NSA through the CIA's
.. Intelligence Community Staff which is headed by Vice .
Adm. Daniel Murphy. But the DCI no longerhasdirect
policy -access to NSA's Director Geo. Lew Allen. In
- Other Words, a series of filters have been established
- between Bush and the military agencies. .
A senior intelligence official, who believes that the
new Pentagon system is more rational and efficient,
- recognizes nevertheless that it poses a serious threat to
.civilian management of the intelligence community.
? "Basically, it will depend on the people involved to see
what .the reorganization does. to the intelligence?
community," he says.
. Bush is believed to be satisfied with the existing state
of affairs, but that's because he and Ellsworth enjoy an
. excellent working relationship: As another intelligence ?
official remarks. "today it works' because Bush and
Ellsworth are reasonable people. But things could get.
- Out of hand if there's someone else in Ellsworth's place.
. There are built-in problems in this whole new spAem?
= ? and .all this . mayN, ./ el I play to the advantage of the-
. military who've alway's wanted to dominate in-
telligence."
- The contradictions in the Ford reorganization plan
. ? include the fact that the DCI--Bush--has been spared
the responsibility for running the CIA on a day-to-day
basis because of the appointment of a new CIA Deputy
?
Director, 'E. Henry Knoche, who enjoys unprecedented
...authority. The idea was that the DCI should have the
. freedom to run the overall intelligence 'community.
Yet, at the same time, he has been weakened in the
central area, the budgetary power held by the
Commit tee on Foreign Intelligence.
? In addition to Knoche, ? a veteran of 23 years in
-? intelligence analysis (this is the first time that neither of
? the CIA's two top jobs are filled by officials from the
,clandestine services), Bush has named anew high-level
? team of men highly regarded in the 'profession. The
new Deputy Director for Operations (clandestine ?
? services) is. William Wells. The Deputy Director *for
Intelligence is Sayre Stevens, a specialist in science and
technology. So, the- CIA appears to be improving .
_professionally; the agency's big problem in the future,
- however, is the rise of the Pentagon as the increasingly'
.powerful voice in US intelligence. ?
21
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NEW HORIZON
NIGERIA'S SOCIALIST MONTHLY
MAY-JUNE 1976
was adopted. The intelligence services
of the two countries maintain close
co-operation both in South Africa and
in the rest of the African continent.
. The United States has. stationed
several control posts in Ghana. James
Dudley Haase, who held this post in
- Kampala in 1972, and.Jarrel -Rich.ard-
son, the leader of the CIA network in
Pretoria in 1974, head the operations
in Accra.
'In Nigeria the CIA had a network of
. agents even before .the secessionist
move. The reasoh for the particular
interest. in Nigeria is her specific posi-
tion on the continent. Nigeria is a more
developed African state politically and
1 intellectually. It has the. strongest army
ii Africa. There are two CIA networks
in the Country: in Lagos which up to
July last year was led by David Zim-
merman of the political affairs depart-
'
merit of the American Embassy aral in
I Kaduna in the north, led by Richard
Pities in the consulate.
Two big groups of CIA agents work
in Kenya and Zaire. This is becatie
of the gececonomic location of them:
countries. As for Zaire, the United
States has been in control since the early
- 1960s. ..
The French-speaking countries in
Africa do not appeal to the CIA as the
above-mentioned countries, though
African influence is considerably stong
. in Ivory Coast and Senegal. In most
African countries America and French
intelligence services often compete with
each other, whereas in Angola they_are
cooperating closely.
- CIA operations in Africa ? do not
ditTer eery much from these in other
-countries. The methods used in Africa
are identical to those in other countries:
the extension of contacts in the diplo-
matic services and mass media particu-
larly among numerous American spe-
?cialists working within the framework
of . the programme of cooperation in
Africa. Cooperation and technical aid
are often a cover for CIA agents. The
main goal of the CIA operation is to
infiltrate governments. In many coun-
tries efforts towards this goal have been
'successful. For instance, William Mos-
by, Jr.; the head of the CIA network in
' Bangui, the Central-African Republic,
receives copies of all the minutes of the
? cabinet Meetings presided by Jean
Bedel Bokassa. _
The CIA mounts extensive operations
to discredit, students and technicians
who studied in the Soviet Union or
other socialist countries, who are placed
under constant control and police
surveillance. Lastly, African students
in the United States are an ideal target
for the CIA.
The CIA establishes contacts with
them so as to try to make them work
for the agency in their own countries.
For sonic time now control over CIA
operations in Africa has been exercised
in Paris. CIA agents who work in
Africa regularly pass through Paris in
transit to and from Washington. -
"Liberation- then published a lit of
CIA agents who hold posts of respon-
sibility in Africa:
Algeria: Edward Katie, head of the
THE CIA NETWORK IN AFRICA
Culled from the Magazine Liberation .
April 2, 1976, Paris.
Since 1969 the implementation of the
Nixon-Kissinger doctrine of rappro-
chement between irte United States
and the South African white minority
regime has greatly damaged America's
prestige in Africa. American influence
in Africa has further diminished after
the. %.var in Angola which is why the
American intelligence services are mobi-
lised to remedy the situation and
.strengthen American standing in Africa
once again.
American influence which Was 'very .
strong, for instance, in Haile Selassie's
Ethiopia, has noticeably declined after'
the coming to power of the military.
The change in the political scene in
Ethiopia compelled the United States
to move around the greater part of its
intelligence institutions formerly sta-
tioned in Ethiopia. Till recently the ?
. backbone of the CIA network in Africa
had been concentrated in Addis Ababa,
which happens to he the headquarters
of the Organisation of African Unity.
?regular procedure for American
agents operating in Africa was to work
for some time in Addis Ababa after
which they . are assigned to other
African countries.
Addis Ababa had been used as the
?base- of CIA's Telecommunications.
I etwork in Africa which has now been
moved to Liberia, considered a more
reliable, country politically.,
The centralised telecommiiiiication
centre in Liberia has been 'reinforced.
It is in this centre that all inforinatiUn
obtained by associates and agents of
the CIA in Africa is collected, processed
and then sent over to CIA headquarters
in Langley Virgina Seventy-four ex-
perts are in charge of the operation.
With the exception of the 'Maghreb
.countries which ? gravitate rather to-
wards the mediterranean, CIA agents
Ire concentrated in big numbers- also
. in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Zaire.
In view of the special relations between
Pretoria and Washington South Africa
has been upgraded to a privileged posi-
tion after the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine
22
network of political affairs, telecom-
niunications: -.Richard, Ilaythorn -and
Terrence Rods;
Burundi: David Harper, head of
'political affairs and economic ? ques-
tions, Richard Green and Joseph
Pearce telecommunications.
Cameroun: JegQ Corridon, .1.1;nd of
.political affairs and economic ques-
tions, Michael Berg.er, an associate in
political affairs and economic qt.estions,
C.ierdd Branson and David Levandovs-
kie, telecommunications.
1 he Central-Africau Republic:.
Wil-
lian Mosby Jr., head of political affairs:.
Ivory Coast: Martin Bergin, head of
political affairs, and Gordon Hcpman.
3p associate in political affairs. Pressly
East and Andrew Turko Jr.. telecom-
munications; ?1
Dahomey: Montgomery Rogers.
head of the consulate office, and Robert
Dafilide, telecommunications,
Ethiopia: Eugene Jeffers Jr., head of
political- affairs, Mathew Monczewski,
an associate in political affairs, Sheldon
Benz, Roy Bigler, Felix Maladoskie,
Carl ? Moss, Raymond Strahm and
,Kenneth Walters all in telecommunica-
tions.
Ghana: Jerre! Richardson, James
Dudley Haase and William Stanley in
political affairs, Clyde Brown, Earl
lson and Paul Pena in telecommunica-
tions.
Guinea (Conakry) Dwight Burgess,
head of consulate office with Charles
Chowning and Anthony Malesic in ?
telecommunications,.
Kenya: William Clair of political
affairs, Frank Durfey ire administrative
services with James Mcgilvray and ?
David G.rottenthaler, in telecommuni-
cations.
Liberia: Edward Carrol of political
affairs and seventy-four men in tele-
communications.
Mali: Terrence Kauffers and Gerald
Lindsay in telecommunications.
Jauritius: Vasia Gmirk in, head of
? the consulate office.
Morocco: Gohn Beam former head
of Oh. network in Burundi, Lyle Dinner
-
in Tangier, and Ronald Gagnt, Gilbert
Giles, Michael Grandy and Edward
Urquhart in telecommunications,
Nigeria: David Zimmermana, head,
Richard Pines, an associate based in
Kaduna with Alfred Capelli and Charles -
Jones in telecommunications.
Somalia: David Hunt, bead of
economic questions with Peter Kerstra,
Jr., Frederic Sharbrough and Gerald
Zapoli in telecommunicatioos.
Sudan: Ralph Brown, and William
M CC; utcheon
Tanzania: Sheldon Seltzer, telecom-
munications,
Chad: Philip Ringdald, head of poli-
tical affairs and economic questions,
South Africa: see Liberation, Janu-
ary 30, 1976,
Zaire: Samuel Martin, Peter Hanson,
Nancy Buss, Mrs. Vickie Vigier, Stuart
iv/framer); Jeffrey Panitt, Robert Bene-
detti and' Bruce Brett, all political
affairs, with Peter Comar, Mart in
McFarlane, William Harrier, Richard
Harrison, David Markey, and others
in telecommunications.
Tea-ae,
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GENIEIVAIL
WASHINGTON POST
18 JUL 1976
o ? ?
By Bruce Howard
SOON a diplomatic plague will be visited on Rosslyn,
Virginia. Dozens of Boeing 707's will crash into the
tropical-rain forests along the Potomac, their holds ex-
ploded by terrorist bombs. Top secret diplomatic
pouches will disappear, bodies will be identified,
be notified.
The hypothetical disasters are part of a new training
program at the Foreign Service Institute in Rosslyn to
prepare foreign service officers for terrorism abroad.
Starting Oct. 1, junior foreign service officers will be
assigned for several weeks at a time to the "Consulate-
General of Rosslyn," there to attempt to cope with the
town's never-ending'destruction..
" in the past three years State has spent more than $100
?million to protect its personnel abroad from terror. But
the dramatic rise in security expenditures ? from $14.6
? iniilion.in 1972 to more than $40 million this year ? has
. been matched by an increase in terror attacks. In 1969
there were four major attacks against U.S. embassies
and/or their employees; last year there were 19.
? U.S. ambassadors have been killed in Guatemala (1968),
. _Sudan (1973), Cyprus (1974) and Lebanon (1976); kidnaped
and released in Brazil (1969) and Haiti (1973). Terrorists
have attacked American embassies and employees in
; more than 30 countries? above and beyond war zones
such as Indochina.
!_ Although most of the incidents occurred in relatively:
unstable countries in South and Central America, Africa
and Asia, attacks have also taken place in Japan, France,
Italy, Spain, New Zealand and other relatively stable na-
tions.
On the average, according to department. studies, an
International terrorist involved in one of the kidnaping ;
? Incidents of the past eight years had an 80 per cent
chance of escaping death or imprisonment:If captured,?,.
most terrorists quickly obtained freedom, - either, ;
through prisoner swaps or light sentencing. The average
"sentence for the few who were brought to trial was 18
months.
"In a word," says Robert Feerey, special assistant to
the secretary of state and coordinator for combating ter-
rorism, "outside the hijacking area, our efforts to make.
terrorism unprofitable for the terrorists have made little
headway?'
The Real Target
? 11-1 ERRORISM is aimed at the people watching, notat
1 the actual victims," Brian Jenkins of the Rand Cor-
poration has written. "Terrorism is theater."
The audience is world-wide, but those in a specialized
part of it, the foreign service officers, suffer the addi-
tional pressure of knowing they are potential victims.
For .nost of them, psychological adaptation to terror-
ism has only begun. Until recentaears, the diplomat in a
foreign country was sacrosanct ? he came under a
white flag.
One of the first American diplomats kidnaped by the
"new" terrorists was C. Burke Elbrick, U.S. ambassador
to Brazil, seized in Rio de Janeiro in 1969."! remember it
seemed outrageous at the time," Elbriek said in an inter-
Howard, a Harmed Law School student, is working
this summer on the notional staff of The Post.
err i rism
view. "There had been incidents before, but we in the
department had thought they were flukes.
"I said to my captors, 'You guys changed the rules.'
And they said, 'Yes, we have. But the government is our
enemy and you are part of the government."
Much of the new anxiety in the for-
eign service has surfaced in the form of
resentment against the State Depart-
ment itself. "Terrorism has hurt morale
In the service," one officer said. "But
not as much as the department's poli-
' cies on terrorism".
?
? State's Hard Line
23
i ONE OF of the department's most
controversial policies is its refusal
to negotiate for the release of kidnaped
*reign service officers.
Secretary Kissinger defends the poi-
Icy as a long-term deterrent ? while to-
day's hostage may be sacrificed, the
' thinking is, tomorrow's terrorist will
,e?
. see that America won't be black-
Mailed; yielding only encourages more
terror.
But some staffers question whether
..terrorists really are deterred, especially
:when some host countries and/or hos-
,tage families go on to meet terrorists'
?.,demands. an 1973, the wife of a kid-
. naped U.S. consul general in Mexico
raised $80,000 to ransom her husband
:after State refused to yield.)
The critics argue that the depait-,
'ment should. comply with most de-
mands, especially those involving mon-
'eery ransoms, and make efforts to re-
cover the money and capture the kid-
napers after the hostage is released.
'This policy, placing top priority on the
safety of the immediate hostage, is
:usually advised by police and the FBI
jli domestic kidnapings.
Foreign service personnel stress that
the policy, whether it works in an Indi-
vidual case or not, is inhumane and de-
-Moralizing. "It's hard to see people you "
' know just written off," said Margaret
Dean, a newly enrolled foreign service
officer and the wife of an officer.
"It makes you feel like a pawn," she
added. "We make morbid jokes about
It, . but It's horrible to know that the
people behind you aren't worried about
wetting you out. That Kissinger isn't
concerned about you. The attitude we
hive is, Kissinger doesn't know our
nathes; he cares about the world view."
E.ven Fearey noted In a speech de-
fending the policy that it sounds "some-
what cold and unfeeling."
Some officers rationalize the depart-
ment's policy by saying that the threat
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of, death by terrorism is part of the job,
a hazard that officers have to accept,
much like the military.
. But a former soldier who has studied
terrorism challenged the military com-
? parison. "Soldiers may get killed in
combat, but they don't get written off,"
he said. "When a soldier gets trapped,
the military makes every effort to get
him out, even if it means risking
greater resources, such as flying in a
helicopter. And they do it because it's
the only way to maintain organiza-
tional loyalty. You can't expect a man
to go out there knowing that, if he gets
In a jam, he will be abandoned."
Fatal Test ?
rp HE FIRST firm enunciation of the
no negotiations, no concessions
policy came in 1973 when two popular
, foreign service officers, Cleo Noel, am-
bassador to Sudan, and his deputy,
George C. Moore, were held hostage by
Arab terrorists in the Saudi ambassa-
dor's residence in Khartoum along with
three other diplomats ? from Belgium,
Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
Sudanese officials were in contact
with the terrorists when President
Nixon made a tough no-compromise
statement. A few hours later the two
Americans and the Belgian were.mur-
dered. The Saudi and Jordanian diplo-
mats Were released unharmed when
the.terrorists surrendered.
Afterwards, one of the terrorists was
quoted as saying, . "We had no choice
btit to execute the three hostages . . .
after. the categorical U.S. rejection of
our demand was confirmed by Nixon's
state'- ant." .
The incident is often cited bitterly by
foieign service personnel. William
Broderick, acting director of the For-
eign. Service Institute, said it was "an
? outrage for Nixon to go public with
that statement."
? The controversy has a variety of com-
plexities. "Publicly we say we will not
negotiate and even some of our own
.people think that's that," said one offi-
cer who was himself a kidnap victim.
"But privately the practice is more flex-
ible or, at least, more confused."
In the Sudanese incident, for exam-
ple, a high level official, William Ma-
comber, now ambassador to Turkey,
Was en route to the Sudan when Nixon
made his public statement.
"Since then," one official said, "the
department's policy has been a patch-
work of hard-line rhetoric, more flexi-
ble practice, and confusion."
? In 1973 the department commis--
sioned the Rand Corporation to pre-
pare a series of reports on terrorism.
Rand's report on hostages stated: "The
present [department] policy is an accre-
tion of public statements and preced-
ents established in previous hostage in-
cidents which are themselves some-
times contradictory."
The officer who had been a hostage
commented: "The really delicate nego-
tiation ? and most of the confusion ?
surrounds what we tell the host govern-
ment we want them to do. Publicly we
say 'no deals,' and then privately we
tell the host government that we're
holding it responsible for the well-
being of our diplomat. This can lead to
chaos."
The official cited the 1973 kidnaping
of Terrance Leonhardy, U.S. consul
general in Guadalajara, Mexico.
"There the kidnapers wanted money,
and the Mexicans asked us if we
wanted them to pay," the officer said.
"Publicly we were saying we would
make no deals. Our embassy got con-
fused and was about to tell the Mexi-
cans we didn't want a deal made when
they got an urgent message from the
department saying, 'Shut up, don't say
anything.' The Mexicans got so con-
fused they almost blew it."
Finally, the Mexicans allowed Leon-
thardy's wife to pay the ransom and, ap-
parently, provided her with the money,
the officer said.
"Much of our public policy," One offi-
cer said, "is written after an event,
when we're trying to explain to the
American people what went wrong."
He pointed to the 1975 kidnaping and
murder of John Egan, U.S. consular
agent in the Argentine city of Cordova.
The account of the incident in a de-
partment "public information" docu-
ment says, "The kidnapers demanded
the release of four imprisoned com-
rades. The Argentine government ref-
used to negotiate. Egan was murdered
48 hours later."
But department. officials now con-
firm reports ? which appeared in the
media at the time ? that the terrorists
actually demanded only that the Ar-
gentine government produce the pris-
oners on TV to demonstrate that they
had not been tortured or killed:
A bitter department source said,
"The Argentines refused because their
embalming fluid wasn't good enough to
show the prisoners on TV, not because
they were hard line."
"The next week, the same terrorist
group kidnaped an Argentine judge,
and demanded the release of a com-
rade who happened to be still alive. The
government made the deal, and the pri-
soners were swapped."
The Aftermath
rr HERE IS angry debate, too, over
the department's treatment or
hostages after their release. One Rand
study reported that hostages returning
to the department may be stigmatized.
Their careers suffer through no fault
of their own, according to the report,
and they and their families sometimes
develop severe psychological problems.
"The top officials deny the stigma
phenomenom," one department expert
said, "but then they talk about the 'con-
tagion of the kidnapee.' It's very similar
to the social pariah feelings focused on
24
the rape victim." ?
The Rand report said, "Many former
hostages complained that they were
treated like 'social pariahs, as if they
were lepers.' These are their own
words. Initially, we thought that this
might be a reflection of some kind of
oversensitivity but, in talking to col-
leagues of former hostages and.to other
officials concerned with the incidents,
we heard comments such as. 'We had to
get him out. He would have destroyed
morale." ,
"There's no question that the inci-
dent harms the career of the victim,
even though it's not his fault," Elbrick
said. "There's a feeling In the depart-
ment that they don't like to go with a
loser, that somehow you're accident-
prone."
Sean Holly was kidnaped in Guate-
mala in 1970 while serving as U.S. labor
attache there. He now works in Foggy.
Bottom. "As far as treatment by the de-
partment is concerned," he said, "I'd
have been better off shot. At least then
my wife would have gotten a pension
or. maybe a job."
"But because I survived they treated
me like a damn nuisance, a living re-
minder to the rest of the department.
They gave me a Superior Honor medal,
which you get for typing fast, and said,
'Forget it.' They even sent me a bill for
.$189 because I left Guatemala before
they thought I did and I had gotten
paid for a few extra days.
"That's why there's no more real loy-
alty to the department."
Department spokesmen deny the
stigma charge. "I know .one [former
hostage] who is doing a lot better than I
am," an official said.
Former hostages also charge that the
department has yet to address squarely
the psychological traumas that affect
terrorist victims and their families.
They pointed to these symptoms ? psy-
chosomatic illness, so-called "anniver-
sary reactions" involving ulcer and
anxiety attacks on the exact anniver-
sary of the kidnaping, guilt complexes.
for surviving and for being an "embat -
rassment" to the service, severe prob-
lems within the family. A department
spokesman insisted that specially
trained psychiatrists are made availa-
ble to the kidnap victims and their fam-
ilies.
Broderick remembers the pressures
on his family during a 1964 coup at-
tempt in Bolivia. The most anguishing
moment, he said, was "when terrorists
gained control of the radio station and
our children heard them urging the
people to kill the Americans."
Diplomats are concerned about a
new development ? the separate kid-
na pings in Mexico last month of an
American businessman's 8-year-old
daughter and the Belgian ambassador's
16-year-old daughter. One expert said
that, except for the Middle East, these
were the first terror incidents ever di-
rected at foreign children.
"We're praying," he added, "they
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were isolated, non-political events be?
if terrorists start going after
school buses with American children,
you couldn't calculate the impact. Of fi-
? cers will take risks, but not those risks."
Except in the most hazardous situa-
tions, the foreign service expects the
Individual family to decide whether to
leave a difficult ' foreign post. "It is
heart-rending to see a woman break
down in tears in My office asking me
how she can decide between exposing
-her children to terrorists or depriving
them of a father," said Joan Wilson, the
coordinator of the department's work-
shop for foreign service families.
The department discourages officers
from asking for transfer or refusing to
go to hazardous countries. "The unwrit-
ten rule .is three 'no's," said one offi-
cer's wife. "After each 'no' you get a -
worse offer, and after the third 'no'
? you're out."
One method used to maintain morale
in high-risk posts is to grant "differenti-
als," or percentage salary increases,
after a terrorist incident. The diff?
erential is also used to compensate for
service in disease-ridden or otherwise
unattractive countries.
Even the differential has been
, viewed cynically. "After our ambassa-
dor got shot," said one 'officer, "we got
a 10 per cent differential. Then a year
later the troupe from the department
came back to readjust the percentage.
It was clear that the message was, `No-
body's been killed for a while, so you'll
lose the differential.' Just before they
decided, though, one of our attaches
got kidnaped and we went up to 15 per
cent." ,
Oddly, the increasing hazards of the
diplomatic job have not stemmed the
recent rush of applicants. Interest in
foreign policy, sparked by the Vietnam
war and the tight job market, has
pushed the number of applications to
the foreign service from 6;700 in 1969 to
more than 20,000 this year. -
But the applicants and new officers
are often poorly informed about the
terrorist risks to the low and middle-
level service personnel. For the news
media focus on the incidents involving
ambassadors and largely ignore the
others, while the service itself delays
most terrorism briefings until the off i-.
cer accepts an assignment and reaches ?
his post.
"We don't get into it too much," said ?
Joan Wilson of the Foreign Service In-
stitute, which trains the new officers,
"because there's a danger of paranoia."
Another officer noted that FSI's
"Consulate General of Rosslyn" will in-
clude hypothetical violence against
American citizens, but not against
members of the foreign service. For
those who do accept the high risk posts,
the general attitude is "It can't happen
to me."
"It's the classic defense mechanism
? denial," a terrorism expert said.
"People say, It won't happen to me,
and if it does, there's nothing I can do
about it."
"It's impossible to even think about
it," said Claude Ross, former ambassa-
dor to Haiti and Tunisia. "If you
thought about it, you wouldn't be able
to get your job done."
Help Shortage
Tr1 HE UNITED STATES has had lit-
tle success in efforts fo get other
nations to cooperate in the fight
against international terror. Some
countries, particularly in the Arab East
and Africa, provide asylum, weapons
and operating funds to terror grotip-s.
Some even provide pensions. At the
1972 U.N. General Assembly the Ameri-
can delegation proposed a convention
which would have obliged signatgry:?...
states to prosecute or extradite-iiiternai
tional terrorists; only six other coun-
tries supported the treaty. The next
year the U.N. did adopt an anti-terror
convention, but it bad no enforcement
provisions and it has ot vitt beeniati-r
. lied by enough countries to become op-
. erative.
The American Foreign Service Asso-
ciation, representing some 9,000 diplo-
, matte .employees, contends that the
United States itself, for diplomatic rea-
sons, has not done enough to bring ter-
rorists to justice. The association points
to the aftermath. of the killing of
Rodger P. Davies, U.S. ambassador to
Cyprus, during a Greek Cypriot demon-
stration outside the embassy in Nicosia
In August, 1974.
Last January, during preparation of
the House intelligence committee re-
' port, word leaked that U.S. intelligence
? officials had learned the identity of
Davies' killers within an hour after the
shooting and later confirmed the infor-
mation through ABC News film taken
at the scene Although the killers were
serving in the Greek Cypriot govern-
ment security forces, angry State De-
partment employees charged, the ad-
ministration did nothing beyond filing
a quiet imotet with the Nicosia-authori-
ties.
The recent Israeli raid into Uganda
to rescue hijacked hostages was, ob- ?
viously, the talk of the foreign service.
AFSA's Harry Blaney said: ?
"None of us really feel that the
United States can afford to use force
like the Israelis, if only because we are
a great power. We play a different dip-
lomatic role in the world and we have
more to lose.
"But at the same time; our role gives
us more leverage in areas like eco-
nomic aid. The lesson was ? the Isra-
elis fight courageously to save their
people. We have to ask, 'Why does the
United States do so little?"
Foreign service officers realize that
dramatic rescue operations, particu-
larly when they involve not one
hundred hijacked passengers under
guard in an international airport but a
single diplomat hidden away, in some
obscure apartment, may be impracti-
cal. AFSA is pressing for modest re-
' forms:
? An increase in protection for-
middle and low-level officers overseas.
"There's a lot of resentment out
there about the ambassadors in their
armor-plated cars," one specialist said.
"In Argentina, where the ambassador
sleeps in an explosion-proof bedroom
with walls lined with steel and plays
tennis guarded by a Marine who
"changes sides of the court when ne
does, most embassy personnel travel
the city stieets unprotected."
? A reduction of staffs in high-risk
areas to a bare minimum.
The embassy staff in Beirut, one offi-
cer noted, was increased from 42 to 53
shortly before the recent assassinations
there. The U.S. Information Service
continued to operate a printing press in
the city for months after two of its em-
ployees were kidnaped.
? An increased use of American mili-
tary personnel, rather than local police,
to provide protection.
State has always preferred local pol-
ice because of the obvious complica-
tions in a clash between U.S. marines
- and local demonstrators. But there is a
growing feeling within the service that
in many sensitive situations local police .
cannot be relied upon.
There are also some foreign service
officers who argue that an increase in
the assigned number of guards,
whether local or American, will
weaken their effectiveness is diplo-
mats. "How," one officer asked,"can
you meet with groups outside the gov-
ernment with guards and local police
following you around? The damage will
really show in the future, when the out
groups get in."
Foreign service people charge that
there is a high-level failure of imagina-
tion or will to search for formulas prov-
iding for their safety. At the same time,
they recognize that the total isolation
of the diplomatic community in secure
bastions would spell victory for terror-
ism.
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5 July 1976
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isarm the terrorists
On . the? theory that to be
forewarned is to be better pre-
pared,, the CIA has made pub-
lic a siii-d37-5y-Thill?df its re-
search analysts, David Mil-
bank of the Office cirPolitical
.12,f...search, on the subject of
terrorism.
Milbank's findings are most
-disquieting. They will . not
comfort .those persons who
WOtird like ? to believe that the
bombings, kidnapings; hijack-
ings and other terrorist acts
are an outgrowth of special
problems in specific countries
and that they will subside as
those problems are reduced.
To the contrary, Milbank
THE ECONOMIST JULY 10, 1976
Nuclear arms
found that there is "good rea-
son to believe that at least a
few foreign terrorist groups
are planning to step-up.their ?
attacks on Americn targets -
abroad in the near.. future.".;
Also,. "it seems likely that,
Washington will, be targeted
.by terrorist demands some.;
it/hat more frequentl:A, in the
future." A "no concessions"
policy will not- alter that pre-*
diction, he adds.
Seepage
Perhaps- his 'most alarming
conclusion is ,that 'sooner or
later some terrorist group is
bound to take the plunge' into
Using weapons of mass - de'
TheUnited States, which claims it is
anxious to curb the spread of nuclear
weaponry around the world, is about to
supply nine tons of uranium to India
and a big nuclear reactor to Spain. Its
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
voted 3-1 for both decisions against the
unprecedentedly open dissent of a
senior Rand corporation physicist, Mr
Victor Gilinsky.
Neither India nor Spain has accepted
the 1968 non-proliferation treaty, with
its obligatory safe,guards. India has
already used its reactor-produced pluto-
nium to carry out a nuclear explosion,
and its refusal to give adequate as-
surances about its future intentions has
led the Canadians (but not the Ameri-
WASHINGTON POST
19 JUL 1976
struction. Nuclear weapons are
not difficult to obtain. he_
warns, but' "a more pressing'
threat would seem to lie in the
field of chemical, biological;
and radiological weapons."
Like most such studies, this
one is long on problems and
short on specific solutions. Ob-
viously, however, the Milbank
study calls for better security
that now exists at nuclear and
military installations. No. real
'solution to the exotic weapon
_problem will be found. howev-
er,-.until the nations that pro.
-duce them finally realize that
,whatever advantages are-at7:
tached to them cannot possibly;
outweigh the risks.
cans) to decide that they will not supply
it with any ,more nuclear material.
Spain has retained the right to use non-
American fuel in its new reactor (which
will annually produce enough pluto-
nium for more than 30 bombs), and can
thus use it to build up a stockpile 'Of
plutonium over which the Americans
will have no control. .Mr Gilinsky, it
seems, has a point. Or two..
On the sale.to Spain. his most pointed
point was the revelation that Spain had
r.ot even been asked whether it would
agree to fuel the reactor Only with
American material. On the sale to India,
he did get -.11d' other NRC members to
say that it "would be desirable" to find
out if ?India would let the Americans
buy the plutonium which its Tarapur
reactor will produce from. the American
fuel. But the answer to.such an inquiry
seems to be available already, and it
Aid la
710st
By Don Oberdorfer
Stiashin2toit Post Stair Wr!ter
U.S. engineering assist-
ance, .training and Possibly a
crucial U.S. chemical ingre-
dient contributed to India's.
1974 atomic explosion, ac-
cording to data filed for an
on public hear-
ing this week on future U.S.-
India nueleeir cooperation.
Government. documents
obtained under a freedom of
information action by law-
yers in the ease show that
the United States received
clear signs met- many years
of 1 ndia's growing capability
and interest in exploding a
nuclear device, but did little
to stop it.
The newly released docu-
looks pretty negative. Ten. days before
the NRC vote on July 2nd, India's news
agency had confirmed reports that a
reprocessing plant was already being
built at Tarapur to extract plutonium
from used reactor fuel.
,
Not that the British are in a position
to act holier-than-thou to the Americans.
Under the deal which the British and
French are now jointly making with
Japan. 4,000 tons of used _fuel ,from
Japan's reactors are to be reproceSsed in
Britain (at the new site near Windscale)
and France. Good, in that it is better to
use plutonium separation -plants- in'
countries w.hich already possess the
bomb than to build them in states which
would be close to getting the bomb if
they possessed these plants. Less good.
in that the plutonium extracted from the
Japanese used fuel is to be Sent back to
Japan.
ments and other sources re-
veal-that late in 1970, more
than 'three years before the
epochal atomic blast under
the Rajasthan desert, India
rebuffed .a written U.S.
warning against the use of
American-supplied "heavy
water" (deuterium) in Manu-
facturing a nuclear explo-
sive device. Despite earlier
statements to the contrary,
there .are growing indica-
lions that this ingredient
was used in making the ma-
terials for the Indian blast.
The May 18, 1974, explo-
sion brought India into the
"nuclear club" and set off
powerful shock waves in the
capitals of other underdevel-
oped nations. The Indian ex-
plosion is blamed for a con-
certed drive by Pakistan to
obtain the means for nu-
clear explosions and, to a
lesser degicc. for similar
drives in Brazil and Iran.
The history of U.S. in-
volvement is of major im-.
portance to a Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission hearing
scheduled for Tuesday on
whether to continue ship-
ping enriched uranium fuel.
for India's atomic. program.
Canada has permanently cut
off nuclear supplies to India
because Canadian equip-
ment and technology were
used in the 1974 explosion,
but the United 'States con-
-tinues to sell India nuclear
fuel.
?
The controversy marks.
the first time that U.S. ex-
port of nuclear materials
has been publicly contested .
and the first time that a
public hearing has been
held on such an issue. The
outcome is expected to have
serious repercussions here
and overseas.
The Natural Resource
Defense Council, Sierra
26
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? Club and Union of Con-
cerncd Scientists are seek-
ing to hlock the sale of more
uranium to riSclia -under
present conditions. They
? said-fe a brief submitted for
the-hearing- that in the most
critical areas of spalicy to-
'-.ward India "United- States
? action (and inaction) disas-
trously ',sets' the stage for
further weapons prelifera-,
tion."
? Join/leg the opposition
groups in writtesk s state-
? merits have been a nuniber
of well-known former offi-
? cials, including former Un-
der Secretary of State.
George W. Ball, former Am-
bassador to the United Na-
tions Charles W. Yost and
former presidential science
adviser George B. Kistia-
kosvek'S'S
The State Departrtent in
a written response, said fail-
ure to approve the fuel ship-
? ments would cause "severe
economic and sodal dam-
age" to 80 million Indians in
areas dependent on nuclear
power and would be "a ma-
jor setback in our relations
with India."
? . . The ' , department main-
tattled that the United
..States is committed to. con-
tinue the sale of enriched
uranium under longstanding
contractual agreements, and
? that U.S.-Indian arrange- ?
ments preclude its use for
atomic bombs.
Ta produce its 1974 explof
!don, India used a Canadian- ?
. supplied research reactor
known as CIRUS to make ir-
radiated atc mic fuel. Then 1
this material was treated by
an Indian-built "reprocess. I
lug plant" to make weapons.
grade .plutonium. Though
there was no indication of
this at the time of the ex-
plosion, the new evidence
indicates that the United
States played a role in both
processes.
In 1956 the U. S. Atomic?
Energy Commission agreed
lb sell 21 tons of "heavy
Water" to India for use in ?
the Canadian-supplied re-
search reactor, which re-
quires this rare and expen- ?
sive substance for its opera- I*
tion. The contract provided 1
.that the "heavy water" .
could be used only for
"research into and the use.
of atomic energy for peace-
ful purposes."
Recently disclosed 'files in-
dicate that some AEC corn-
niissioners were concerned
about this matter as early as
Oct? 8, 1956, when "problems
with respect to the safe-
guard provisions" on the In-
dian "heavy water" were
raised at an AEC meeting.
A memorandum says that
this was the first time for ?
the commissioners to dis-
cuss "safeguards"?which
induce strict measurement
and inspection requirements
?in connection with a sale
of "heavy water" abroad.
The staff was instructed to
work on a "safeguards" pol-
icy which was applied to fu-
ture sales, but this action
was considered too late to
affect the deal that had just
been made. -
From 1939-61 India con-
structed a "heavy water"
manufacturing plant using
Italian, French and West
German equipment, with
the aid of two American
firms, Vitro Corp. and Na-
tional Research Corp, At
that time, U.S. companies
were authorized to provide
many types of nuclear engi-
neering services, including
those connected with "heavy
water" plants, without spe-
cial government permission.
Later they had to get special
permission, which would be
difficult for a company
wanting to assist a country
without nuclear weapons to
obtain today.
In the late 1950s.India
also began building a
"reprocessing" facility capa-
ble of making weapons.
grade material from fuel
rods that had been sub-
jected to radiation in a nu-.
clear reactor. An American
official familiar with .the
matter said the United
States was "well aware" of
the Indian plan to build the
facility and offered "some
training assistance to Indian
nationals" and help in using
information on reprocessing
, that had been declassified
by the U.S. government
At the time, reprocessing
facilities?which _also have
civilian uses--were not seen
by the United States as a
major bomb proliferation
problem.
AEC correspondence indi-
cates that the LT.S. firm of
Vitro International, a subsid-
iary of Vitro Corp., partici-
pated in the design of this
plutonium reprocessing
evidently without any
requirement for special U.S.
permission. But when the
AEC asked Vitro about the
facility during the final
stages of construction in
January, 1963, India directed
the firm to say nothing.
The United States was '
told that any information
to come directly from In-'
about the plant would have
dian atomic authorities, but
AEC files do not show any
follow-up. "Apparently there
was no follow-up because
the AEC wasn't that inter-
ested." said Jerry Helfrick,
director of international
program implementation of
the Energy Research and
Development Administra-
tion, successor to some AEC
functions.
An AEC memorandum of
Sept. 21, 1966, said U.S.
agencies agreed to sponsor
and finance training for In-
dian officials at the AEC
production works at Han-
ford, Wash., in "plutonium
27
recycle." Weapons-grade ma-
terial as well as reusable
fuel can be made ia such a
process.
Hanford records show
that at least two Indian sci-
entists studied there in the
late 1960s or early 1970s. Ac-
cording to an AEC compila-
tion, 939 Indians were
trained in various skills in
AEC facilities from 1949 to
the time of the 1974 explo-
sion.
The Chinese explosion of
a nuclear device in October,
1964, sharply increased In-
dian anxiety and interest in
bomb manufacture. Nearly
100 members of the Indian
parliament signed a petition
urging nuclear weapons de-
velopment, and Ti.S. agen-
cies received many press re-
ports?and no doubt diplo-
matic and intelligence re-
ports?of the growing In-
dian interest and capabili-
ties.
In January. 1970, by far
the largest U.S. atomic proj-
ect in India?the Tarapur
nuclear power station?was
dedicated by Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi. Late that
summer, Gandhi and her
atomic energy chairman be-
gan speaking publicly of
their interest in under-
ground nuclear explosions
"for peaceful purposes."
Seriously concerned U.S.
officials secretly notified In-
dia in writing in November,
1970, that a nuclear explo-
sion?no matter how it was
labeled?did not qualify in
U.S. eyes as a "peaceful pur-
pose" under the agreements
to supply "heavy water" and
other materials.
Although the United
States had promoted the
idea of "peaceful nuclear ex-
plosions" in earlier times,
officials realized by 1970
that an Indian blast of any
description would be consid-
ered a military threat by
neighbors and might spur
worldwide atomic bomb pro-
liferation.
India rejected the U.S. in-
terpretation and a similar
approach by Canada, declar-
ing itself free to use nuclear
energy for any ;purpose
that it considered peace-
ful. An AEC memorandum
of January, 1971, reported
that Indian atomic research
chief Homi Sethna?who
eventually had charge of the
Indian ? explosion?was
"disturbed" over the 11.S.
approach and insistent that
India was far away from a
"dean" explosive capability.
"They [India] asserted a
position which made us wor-
ried," said a participant in
Washington discussions of
the time. "But they had not
actually violated anything
and so we didn't take any
action."
In May, 1971, Prof. Lin-
coln Bloomfield of the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology passed along to
Washington the diselosure
by Svinivasa Khrishnas-
warnl, joint secretary of the
Indian Defense Ministry,
that Gandhi would be mak-
ing the decision "in the next
few months" on whether to
proceed with an atomic
bomb.
The U.S. embassy In New.
Delhi estimated in April,
1973, that India probably
would not be in a position to
make an atomic bomb until
1976 or later. But in May,
1973, a Malaysian official, in
a letter to the AEC, re-
ported that the Indian at-
omic research chairman had
spoken of India's "own nu-
clear explosive, which ? has
been painfully accumulated
over the years."
No report has been made
public showing any U.S. at
tempt to dissuade India in
the months preceding the
May, 1974 underground
blast.
Immediately following the
explosion, the United States
expressed displeasure, though
in mild terms considering
the worldwide alarm. For a -
short time the- United States
held up regularly scheduled
shipments of enriched- ura-
nium fuel for the Tarapur
reactor in an effort to ob-
tain explicit Indian assur-
ances that it would not be
used for any sort of nuclear
device. When India refused,
the United States agreed to
a much vaguer statement in
an exchange of letters and
resumed fuel shipments.
Shortly after the 1974
blast the AEC said there
was "no reason to believe"
that U.S.-supplied material
was involved. Secretary of
State 'Henry A. Kissinger
subsequently said India's ex-
plosion did not violate U.S.
supply agreements and thus
"we had no specific lever-
age on which to bring our
objections to bear."
Kissinger's "no violation"
statement was . evidently
based on a July, 1974, letter
from Indian Ambassador T.
N. Kaul saying that "100 per
cent Indian material" had?
been used in the-atomic ex- ,
plosion. However, American
officials now concede that -
Kaul's words did not rule
out the possibility the U.S.-
supplied "heavy water" in
the Canadian reactor was ut-
ilized to make "Indian mate-
rial for the blast.
Sen. Abraham A. Ribicoff
(D-Conn.), who publicly.
raised the, U.S. "heavy
water" issue' -last month,
said, "There now are strong
and disturbing indications
that India did use it to pro-
duce plutonium for its nu-
clear explosion in 1974 and
is still using it for its nu-
clear explosion program."
At the heart of the discus-
sion of the past is the ques-
tion of current American
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policy.
Those who intervened in
the NRC case say they see
no reason why the United
States should withhold for-
eign aid from India?as it
currently does?but con-
WASHINGTON or
if
? ss ;1742
L.)
tinue sales of potentially
dangerous nuclear fuel.
They also maintain that
"business-as-usual" U.S. nu-
clear sales ..are a clear en-
couragement to other na-
tions contemplating atomic
weapons programs.
1,7. 19:5
' .
Those on the opposite side
maintain that the practical-
effect of a US. cutoff might
he to send India to the So-
viet Union (the only other
worldwide supplier) for thefl
necessary enriched uranium.
They also say the United
States can exercise greater
influence on India and other
potential atomic weapons
nations by a continuing role
as a nuclear supplier.
the ,J)arrnb-Peddling,
HAT IS SO rase as a day in. June? An American
- public ofilcial Who professes to think that the
spread of nuclear weapons would be a good thing.
And yet, if we may mix our authors a little, everyone
talks about the danger of nuclear proliferation, but
nobody does anything about it. That last formulation
may be a little harsh, but it is manifestly true that
both Congress and the executive branch?never
mind their noble professions?seem incapable at this
point of designing and acting on any coherent policy
to curb the spread Of a nuclear weapons potential to
countries all aroUnd the world. Yes, at U.S. initiative
the siipplier-nations of peaceThl nuclear technology
have organized themselves into a group and drawn
up some guidelines and standards intended to dimin-
ish the dangers that flow from their exports. And,
yes, the bills being introduced in Congress-to curb _
the outward flow of weapons material have begun to
take on the aspect of a good confetti-fling. But none
" of this begins to come to grips with the choices and
problems facing this country in respect to-our prolif-
eration policy at the moment.
Let us name the parts. It is a well known fact that
nuclear suppliers in other nations, principally the
French and Germans, have been entering into nego-
tiations and deals with non-nuclear countries for the ?
export of technology and plant that have a very high
bomb-making potential?and that the United States,
by contrast, has been much more cautious over the
yeers in both supplying and safeguarding nuclear .
materials it sends abroad. It is not so .well-known,
however, that this country has some 30 agreements
with other countries concerning our provision of
peaceful nuclear technology and that many of these
have failed to keep step with changing circumstance
and expanded knowledge. The point is that what
seemed safe and airtight, say, 20 years ago when
some of these deals were made, no longer can be said
to be sufficient.
Can we renegotiate these deals upward, so .to
speak, tightening their terms and Sharpening their
'precautions? That is where a second big problem e
comes in: Neither formally and officially on paper,
nofinformally and unofficially in the practical world
of real-life Washington, does the government have ei-
ther the focus or instrumentality or (evidently) the
will to produce a plausible and consistent policy. The
Department of State has some of the action; so does
the Arms Control Agency; so do the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission, the Office of Management and
Budget, ERDA and the Congress. Thus when these
things are argued out, a multiplicity of competing in-
stitutional interests is likely to -come into play, along
with a certain heavy fatalism. Your average country
desk at the Department of State can understandably
almost always find a diplomatic reason why it would
be harmful to our relations with country X to put..
new limits on the materials we are sending; the long-
term prospect of country X's bomb-making potential
hardly seems worth exacerbating the current crisis
28
or snarl we are otherwise experiencing with its lead-
ers. And besides, what would be the point of tighten-
ing the rules on this reactor or that when we don't
have complete control over its other reactors? And,,
anyway, if we deny them what they want, isn't it pos-
sible that they will shop elsewhere and that we will
lose whatever limited control we might have had if
we closed the deal? And, when yOu get right down to
it. isn't it already too late to halt the inevitable devel-
? opment around the world of nuclear arsenals?
To hear these arguments repeatedly -stated you
could get the idea that the United States has as little
leverage in these matters as it apparently has policy.
But that is not the case. We remain the preferred sup-
plier of technology and the best-stocked supplier of
fuel (although to maintain the latter position much
more is- going to have to be done to increase this
country's capacity to produce enricheds uranium).
What is needed is some focus and decision and mus-
cle at the top. It is even conceivably possible that a
policy review and examination would lead to the con-
. elusion that we might as well toss in the towel on our
fitful antiproliteration efforts. But if that is not going
to be the case, then a whole lot of tough questions are .
_ going to have to be addressed: If we cannot prevent
the spread of these weapons, can we not at least re-
ta.rd or better control that spread? Is it possible or
even credible for this country to complain about
French and german sales of enriching and reprocess-
ing equipment if we ourselves do not act to make our
own contracts more consistent with such a position?
And if we are to pull ourselves together on this ques-
tion, will not our very doing so require that we also
consider ways to meet the legitimate concerns of cli-
ent countries that: 1) we will be a reliable producer of
? the materials they need for their nuclear energy
? plants and 2) by depriving them of a nuclear weapons
capability we are not diminishing their security.
Other commitments, in other words, might have to
accompany such a policy.
If you want an example of how the thing is work-
ing now in the absence of a coherent, consistent gov-
ernment point of view, you need only consider the di-
lemma of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which
must license nuclear exports, but which has no au-
thority to impose conditions on the importing coun-
tries. themselves. That must be done by other agen-
cies of. the executive branch. At the moment the
question before the NRC is whether it should grant
approval for new fuel supplies for two American-
built reactors at Tarapur in India?yes, India, ex-
ploder of that famous "peaceful" bomb in 1974, which
we now know was made with the help of heavy water
supplied by the United States for other (peaceful)
purposes. Given that record, it would seem undenia-
ble that the United States is not just entitled, but ac-
tually obliged to impose some very strict conditions
on what may and may not be done with any further
fuel we supply. Yet since the only practical way to dos
this is to deny the Indians permission to .extract plu-
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? tonium from that fuel, the actual imposition of prop,.
? er terms lies outside the NRC's jurisdiction.
? The NRC, however, can impose terms on the U.S.
government by refusing to approve the Indian li-
cense until the appropriate executive branch agen-
cies have imposed the required terms on India. There
seems to be anything but a disposition to do so in cer-
tain important reaches of the State Department. In-
deed, the State Department's July 8 submission to the
? NRC on the question reads as if it had been written in
? New Delhi. But we think the NRC can and must hang
? tough until it has been given the proper assurances
, by the people in charge at State and in the White
Howe that the Indians will be denied the opportunity
to reprocess any fuel that is licensed and that this
condition has been made a part of our arrangement
, with them.
THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JUNE 25, 1976
The point is simple: If the United States does not
act in the Indian case to ensure that our nuclear ex-
ports will not be misused or contribute even indi-
rectly to enlarging the Indians' nuclear arsenal, then
the game will more or less be over. What credibility
will we possibly have in urging the French to aban-
don their plan to sell dangerous reprocessing equip-
ment to the Pakistanis? What authority will we bring
to our efforts to negotiate strict safeguards on the. nu-
clear reactors we have offered to provide to coun-
tries in the Middle East? What license in the future
will we ever be able to question or curb?at least with
a straight face? We can only hope the NRC will insist
on the proper commitment from the administration
before it releases this fuel?and that the rest-of gov-
ernment will get off the dime and start thinking
about and acting on its obligations in this dangerous
and supremely important field.,
By Richard Burt
L9ND0II?F0rd-ACImin1st1'ati0n0ffi-
Cjils, led. by Henry . A. . Xissinger,
have reiterated their 'belief that the
strategic arms limitation talks . must
continue to serve as the foundation
for a less antagonistic superpower
relationship. For more than a year,
Leonid I. Brezhnev and his colleagues
have Voiced a similar view. After
signing the United States-Soviet agree-
ment on peaceful nuclear tests re-
cently in Moscow, Mr. Brezhnev
stressed that the Soviet Union' was
' doing "all that it could do" to achieve
an accord limiting strategic weapon's.
Why, then, have negotiators failed
to iron out the details of a new ?
strategic-aims agreement 'that were'.
outlined at the 1974 summit talks at
Vladivostok? '
The popular answer is that the
Steam has gone out of superpower
atente and that the growth of Soviet
military power, coupled with the
.United States Presidential primaries',
has made President Ford reticent to
enter into a new strategic arms accord.
These -are plausible explanations, but
they tend to obscure what is. prabably
? a more important 'obstacle to. arms
c.h.htr9I in. the longer term?a grawing
class Of United States, Soviet and
:European weapons that these tiego-
-tiations are not currently suited to.
control nor organized to accommodate.
. :these weapons constitute a ."gray
?area" of. military technology: systems
that by 'virtue of their range, deploy-
ment or national Ownership are not
riow, _covered by the strategic- arms
talks but possess the capability, in
theory, to deliver nuclear warheads
on the superpowers or their allies.
The most celebrated category of gray-
area systems is the fleet of United
States fighter4bombers deployed in
Western Europe. While these aircraft
- are assigned tactical strike missions,
some possess the range and payload ,
to deliver nuclear weapons on the
Soviet homeland. Accordingly, Moscow
_ . . .
Richard Burt is assistant to the director
of the International Institute for Strate-
gic Studies,. ,
:
has argued that they should be limited
by an accord, an argument that the
United States rejects.
Another gray area includes the
hundreds of Soviet medium-range
bombers and missiles targeted on
Western Europe. Because these weap-
ons cannot be used against the United
States, they have been left out of
strategic-arms deliberations, but .they
pose a continuing danger to United
?States allies, and their use could trig-
ger a United States, Soviet nuclear
exchange.
Western European nuclear forces
comprise a third, gray area. As a
bilateral dialogue, the strategic-arms
? discussions do not attempt to con-
strain the nuclear capabilities of other
countries, but from the Soviet perspec-
tive, British and French forces (and
China's) must be. added to the United
States nuclear threat.
As the gray area grows in military
significance, superpowerr-arms control
becomes immeasurably more difficult;
Despite Soviet concern over United
States aircraft in Europe, they re-
mained outside of the 1972 strategic-
arms agreement, a precedent that was
continued in the search for a second
accord at Vladivostok. But ne,gotia.
tions since 1974 have bogged down
over a new group of gray-area weap-
ons, the Soviet bomber designated the
Backfire by the West and the United
States long-range cruise missile.
In the case of the Backfire, United
States negotiators have refused to ac-
cept the notion that it Is not intended
for use against the United States. The
cruise missile raises even more dif-
ficult problems, because it is to be
built in strategic and shorter-range
29
tactical versions. "While it might theo-
retically be possible to distinguish be-
tween them, in practice this conld
prove. impossible. - -
Whether the deadlock over cruise
missiles and the Backfire will be finally
resolved remains to he seen: But even
if it is, the gray-area problem is likely
to grow 'worse. The' Backfire is only
part of a more wide-scale Soviet effort
to, upgrade medium-range nuclear
forces for use against Europe.:As these
? forces expand,' their exclusion frOni
East-West arms control will be seen
? as a growing anomaly.
? Diagnosing the 'gray-area Problem;
however, is far easier thiri:devisineik
solution. One- suestion is- that these
systems be relegated to the ether
.major East West antis control
forum?
the Atlantic - alliance-WariaW::::Pact
talks over troop, reductions in Central
Europe. Unfortunately,' most of the
gray-area weapons are deployed out-
Side of. this region. ? -
A more imaginative idea is the con;
vening- of a, "third" arms-control con-
ference? that would deal specifically
with the nuclear systems that continue
to elude coverage in the strategic arms
limitation talks. Another passible solu-'
tion would be to incorporate those
talks and the talks on the reduction of
forces into a single forum, where a
larger number of participants would
focus on a wider array of weapons. ,
Whether either of these two ap-
proaches is workable is 'unclear, but
both: should be examined. What is
clear is that the implications of the
gray area are ominous?not only for
the future of arms control, but East-
West relations in general,
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LONDON TIMES
5 July 1976
TWO HUNDRED YEARS ON
Those with a taste for. the
. romantic in politics. will no doubt
regret that the United States did
not celebrate its bicentennial
when President Kennedy Was
proclaiming his countrymen's
readiness to " pay any price, bear
any burden, meet any hardship,
support any friend, oppose any
. foe, in order. to secure the sur-
vival and success of liberty ".
That was the apogee of American
idealism and of their perception
of their power. Much has
changed since then. The price
of global responsibility has be-
come higher and there is no
longer the old confidence that
American involvement guaran-
tees either the survival or suc-
cess of liberty. At home the
United States has been rent by
assassination, racial conflict and
corruption. The dominant mood
of the moment is of anti-Wash-
ington sentiment, which repre-
sents the disillusionment of the
American people with both their
institutions and their political
processes.
But it is when things are going
badly that one can best assess
the enduring strength of a nation.
One should never underestimate
either .the speed with which atti-
tudes- can change in the United
States or the differing facets of
American life. It was only a few
years before Kennedy was cap-
turing the imagination with his
? rhetoric that the country was
going through the era of McCar-
thyism.
There were.two factors of par-
ticular interest throughout the
years of American travail. The
first was that there' were many
Americans who were as dis-
gusted .as anybody by. the activi-
ties of their own Government.
Whatever politicians and offi-
cials may have been doing, the
voice of pretest was never stilled.
That is the first test of the poli-
tical. health of a country. It is
the evident dissatisfaction of
Americans with sordid gov-
ernment that offers the best hope
of political renewal now. Mr
Jimmy Carter's meteoric rise can
largely be attributed to his per-
ception of this yearning for
decency in high places. That is
the context within which Ameri-
can politicians of all parties are
now having to operate, even if
they are not all likely to undergo
a spiritual Conversion overnight.
? - The second factor was that,
bitterly though the United States
was criticized by international
opinion for its role in Vietnam,
the worst fear of many countries
was that in-reaction there might
be a new phase bf American
isolationism. The point was
never reached where the :with-
drawal of America from an active
part in internati,onal. affairs.
'would have been regarded as a
blessing.. American authority
and moral standing were sadly
diminished, but nobody else was
able or .willing to take on the
task of creative international
leadership. That is 'still the.
American role today. But it does
not follow that with an appro-
priate pause for breath the
'United States will shortly be able
to resume the position it held in
Kennedy's day.
The world, as well as the
United States, has changed since
then. Power has become more
fragmented. Neither the Nato nor
? the Warsaw Pact countries are
such cohesive groupings as they
were. China has become more
active in . international affairs.
With ,the greater importance of
commodity prices in international
economics the third world has
acquired a potential bargaining
strength it did not possess before.
Less tangibly,. but no less signi.-
ficantly, there has. been a change
in the international atmosphere
which imposes restraints on
whoever may wield power,
whether economic or military.
This means that American
power can be exercised effec-
tively only with the approval of
other countries, which depends
in turn partly upon the United
States being a source of creative
ideas and partly upon that spark
that touches the imagination.
That is needed now abroad as
well as at home because the
active involvement of the United
States is as necessary as it ever
was. Most obviously, it is essen-
tial to preserving the military
balance with the Soviet Union,
without which the whole inter-
national order would be trans-
formed. Secondly, while one of
the' most constructive acts of
statesmanship in the past thirty
years has been the positive
American encouragement to the
establishment of the EEC, inter-
national economic and political
stability *still requires active
cooperation across the Atlantic.
Then the chances of achieving a
better understanding with the
primary producers would be
much -poorer without vigorous
American participation in ? the
search for a solution. As the
United States celebrates its bi-
centennial it should know that
other countries are looking. not
just to its romantic past but also
to the role of international
leadership it still has to. play.
The context of that leadership
has changed, but without it the
world would be a yet more-dan-
gerous and uncertain place. .
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Thursday, July 15, 1976
Gtia iiloney
The United States has sent the
frigate Beery tel Mombasa. Kenya,
to help Jomo Kenyatta face down
Uganda's Idi Amin in a spat deriv-
ing from the Israeli raid on Ugan-
da's Entebbe Airport. The U.S.S.
Beary's "courtesy call" is a classic
example of gunboat diplomacy, and
we think it's fine. In fact, when we
contrast such old-fashioned inter-
ventions with modern innovations
like the current Security Council
debate on the Entebbe incident, we
have to admit the moral superiority
of the 19th Century methods.
As Ambassador Scranton re-
minded the UN. international law
clearly allows for states to use lim-
ited force to rescue their own citi-
zens from mortal danger on foreign
soil. Precedents are numerous. If
there is a country where this inter-
vention is justified, it must be
Uganda. The one hijacking hostage
entirely in Ugandan hands, Mrs.
Dora Bloch, apparently has been
dragged from her hospital bed and
murdered, Kenyan nationals in
Uganda have been .slaughtered and
now, Idi Amin is threatening the
safety of 500 British residents be-
cause of the British role in the Secu-
rity Council debate. Through all
this, UN Secretary-General Wald-
heim seems mainly concerned
about Uganda's "sovereignty."
The U.S. is taking entirely appro-
priate steps to support our friends
in Kenya. The question is why Brit-
ain, which in the 19th Century was
willing to defend British citizens
anywhere in the world, new feels so
powerless to protect its own peo-
ple.
30
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Monday, July 19, 1976
The Washington Star
By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Scar StAft Writer
There were sunny smiles, polished
politeness and lots of luscious Fin-
nish strawberries last summer in
Helsinki. Everybody seemed to
agree that peace, friendship hnd
greater contact between nations was
a good idea.
And so the leaders of 32 European
nations, plus the United States,
Canada and the Vatican, signed the
Final Act of the Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe. It
talked about "promoting better rela-
tions among themselves and ensur-
ing conditions in which their people
can live in true and lasting peace." .
It sounded fine, but the agreement
had been hammered out in contro-
versy between East and West. For
every soaring hope expressed in Hel-
sinki of a new era of international
understanding, there were Western
warnings of pitfalls ahead in turning
the agreement into a working blue-
print for cooperation and a Commu-
nist qualification to the written
terms.
Now, a year later, the Helsinki
agreement is still controversial.
? IT IS NOT JUST the expectable
? argument about whether it is proving
to be a half-full bottle, containing
some progress in East-West rela-
tions, or a half-empty one notable
? mainly for its unfulfilled provisions.
The very delineation of the bottle is .
in dispute between a Western under-
standing of it as a simple, straight-
sided thing and a Communist at?
?
' tempt to define it as decidedly curv-
ed.
? Two years of tough negotiations,
? basically pitting the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization nations against
the Moscow-led Warsaw Pact, pro-
duced a very qualified and yet out-
? wardly encouraging document.
The Soviets wanted a European
statement that would have the effect
of ratifying the borders it grabbed
during World War II and might
create an illusion of peaceful har?
mony which would lull the Western
defense effort. Using the leverage of
Moscow's eagerness, the West was
able to insist on humanitarian provi-
sions despite marked Soviet reluc-
tance to accept some of them.
Some families separated by the
Communist minefields that run down
central Europe have been reunited
since the agreement was signed. A
few more Western newspapers are
available under the counters of tour-
ist' hotels in Eastern Europe, if not
yet accessible to local people. Visa
rules have eased a bit for journalists.
And, under the heading of
"confidence-building measures,"
SES Cr ir07
advance notifications have been
given of some military maneuvers.
But there has not been very much
more, and even the limited number
of family reunifications is of doubtful
attribution to the Helsinki agree-
ment. Some provisions of the Final
Act have been unilaterally redefined
by Communist leaders from straight
Western interpretations to curved
conformity with their usual desire to
isolate their people from foreign
influences. Some other provisions
have been virtually ignored.
THIS HAS RILED. many in the
West who have paid attention to hu-
manitarian problems in Communist
countries. One is a cultured lady.
from New Jersey with a social con-
science and a seat in the House of
Representatives, Millicent H. Fen-
wick, a Republican.
Largely as a result of her initia-
tive, and the help of Sen. Clifford P.
Case, R-N.J., and many other inter-
ested members of Congress, a
commission of 12 members of Con-
gress and three representatives of
the administration has been voted
into existence "to monitor the acts of
the. Helsinki signatories . . . with
31.
_
_
particular regard to the
provisions relating to coop- -
eration in humanitarian
fields." It has not yet start-
ed work.
The Kremlin has been
mightily angered by this
American attempt to check
up on what it does. And
signs point to Henry A.
Kissinger's State Depart-
ment not being too happy,
either, with what it appar-
ently sees as congressional
interference with its man-
agement of Soviet affairs.
The Soviet Union began
in 1151, in the chilliest part
of the Cold War, to seek a
European security confer-
:ence. Waxing and waning
over the years. the idea be-
came a massive propagan-
da ploy intended as a sub-
stitute for a World War II
peace conference and a way
of promoting "Europe for
the Europeans" -- meaning
"Yankee go home," an
.unpopular idea with mili-
tarily vulnerable West
Europeans.
Only when the principles
of American participation
,and of humanitarian provi-
:sions were generally ac-
cepted did negotiations
*begin. The tough talks fell
under three subject head-
ings. which negotiators
'called "baskets'' of ideas.
BASKET ONE COVERS
security and "confidence.
building measures" like
giving warnings of large-
scale military maneuvers
close to borders and invit-
ing observers. Soldiers
from neighboring countries
have watched maneuvers
near both ends of the Soviet
Union's European border.
The Warsaw Pact did not
accept a U.S. invitation to
maneuvers in West Germa-
ny, however.
No significant progress
has been made toward
disarmament, which was
advocated in Basket One.
But in general the first sec-
tion, which contains sweep-
ing statements on peace
?and similar lofty senti-
ments, has not been a prob-
lem so far.
Basket Two covers
"cooperation in the field of
economics, of science and
technology, and of the envi-
ronment." There has been
movement in these fields in
the past year, but it is hard
to single out of on-going
trends toward European
coordination of this type
' any specific action at-
tributable to the Final Act.
No problem here, either, if
also no verifiable claims of
success.
It is in "cooperation in
humanitarian and other
fields," Basket Three, that
the trouble has arisen.
Soviet bloc nations never
wanted the third basket.
They wanted to restrict dis-
cussion to relations between
governments on security
and scientific-economic
matters that could be easily
centre!!..:(1 from Communist
party central committee
secretariats. It was only
because the West would not
play ball on those terms
that the Soviets agreed to
negotiate on the freer
movement of people and
ideas.
In accepting such negoti-
ations, General-Secretary
Leonid I. Brezhnev of the
Soviet Communist Party
added the significant quali-
fication that humanitarian
provisions must respect
"the sovereignty, laws, and
customs of each country"
? and serve "the mutual en-
richment of peoples, in-
crease the trust betwen
them and promote the ideas
of peace, freedom and
good-neighborliness."
WHAT THAT CLEARLY
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meant was that Warsaw
Pact nations were reserv-
ing the right to interpret for
themselves whether any-
thing they signed was ap-
plicable to their rigid
systems of controlling
information and the move-
ment of people.
In the negotiations the
West managed t6 defeat
most Communist attempts
to insert qualifying phrases
to dilute the value of Basket
Three. NATO. countries
were supported on most key
issues by neutral nations,
who rejected loaded
Communist definitions of
human rights.
So the Final Act was
signed by Brezhnev, Presi-
dent Ford and other leaders
last Aug. 1 in Helsinki's
magnificent Finlandia Hall.
But addressing the confer-
ence on the hot summer day
before, Brezhnev reiterated
his qualifications just as if ?
his negotiators had never
given up their points in
trade for border ratification
and the lulling illusion of
peace in Europe.
Since the signing, this
Soviet attitude has been re-
peatedly demonstrated by
an insistence that it is an
interference in Soviet bloc
internal affairs for the West
to push for easier contact
, among people or a more
Iliberal exchange of ideas
and information. What
, democracies consider the
I free flow of information
would mean opening
Communist doors to "anti-
Soviet, subversive propa-
ganda, materials preaching
violence or stirring up na;.
? tional and racial strife, and
pornography," one Soviet
commentator said.
?-41* Helsinki signatories
"make it their aim to facili-
tate freer movement and
contacts, individually and
collectively, whether pri-,
vately or officially, among
persons, institutions and or-
ganizations of participating
states." But when some
Soviet dissidents began to
quote this to authorities in
Moscow, they quickly found
. all sorts of limiting reasons
being offered ? or they
were simply silenced.
THE COMBINATION of
foreign pressure to open up
their ?zloors a crack to the
fresh air of non-Communist
macts and of internal of-
forts to cir,,! the Final Act
against Soviet officials
soured Moscow's attitude
toward the agreement.
Within a tew months'
Moscow had become defen-
sive about it. There began a
campaign, which still con-
tinues, to claim that the
Soviet bloc has adhered to it
faithfully but the West has
not.
? For instance, the control-
led Communist press pub-
lished all 30,000 Words ot the.
Final Act but Western gov-
ernments were allegedly
afraid to let their people
read its terms. ?The fact
that the document is no
more tedious and boring
than the usual stuff in
Communist newspapers,
but no commercial paper in
the West would be able to
sell it, was blithely ignored.
Brezhnev continued this
campaign last month in his
speech ?to the East Berlin
meeting of European
Communist parties. He
contended that the Soviet
Union is willing to ex-
change ideas but the West
is not. ,"In ? Britain and
France," he said, "they
publish six-seven times less
books by Soviet authors
than we in the Soviet Union
publish works by English
and French writers," and
the West shows only a a
small fraction as many
Soviet movies as Western
movies are shown in his
country.
? Aside from the unread-
ability of Soviet books ?
neither Tolstoy nor Solz-
henitsyn qualify, only "so-
cialist realism" ? and the
boredom of officially ap-
proved movies, there is a
larger principle involved.
The Final Act clearly opens
the way to unofficial ex-
changes of the kind of
things people want. The
Soviet Union makes the
revisionist argument that
exchanges should be under
governmental auspices,
meaning that they can be
controlled in accordance
with Communist ideology.
This is. actually an exten-
sion of what has been hap-
pening for many years. By
exploiting the free enter-
prise system in the West,
the -Soviets have been able
to distribute books and
other materials carrying
their message, but Western
material is severely re-
stricted if not entirely
banned in the East.
Brezhnev went on in his
June 29 speech to deny that
Communist countries are
closed societies. "We are
open to everything truthful
and honest," he said. It's all
a matter of definitions, and
signatures on the Final Act
have not changed the defi-
nitions used by Soviet bloc
leaders.
The defensive Soviet atti-
tude on application of the
Helsinki agreement has
taken the form of "tryii.g to
divert attention from the
real issues," according to
one U.S. official v ho has
followed th subject closely.
"They use the
issue to try to cover up t seir
refosal to let people choose
for themselves."
On one aspect, the Sovi-
ets have moved from the
defense to an offensive. It is
radio broadcasting. The
Final Act notes "the expan-
sion in the dissemination of
information broadcast by
radio, and express(es) the
hope for the continuation of
this process." But foreign
broadcasts break the
Communist monopoly on
what people are allowed to
know.
BREZHNEV CHARGED
that the two American-fi-
nanced stations in West
Germany broadcasting to
the Soviet bloc, Radio
Liberty and Radio Free Eu-
rope, "poison the interna-
tional atmosphere and
(are) a direct challenge to
the spirit and letter of the
Helsinki accords." The
West considers wording of ,
the Final Act to say the
opposite.
The section on freer
movement and contacts
also mentions facilitating
"the solution of humanitar-
ian problems," particularly
reuniting divided families.
This has attracted the par-
ticular attention of people
like Rep. Fenwick.
"There isn't any govern-
ment department charged
with looking out for human
rights," she said in an
interview. "No one's telling
us what's happening on
Basket Three." A govern-
mental commission was
needed to bring together
information from federal
government branches and
from private agencies here
and in Europe.
? Fenwick said it is neces-
sary to focus public atten-
tion on humanitarian prob-
lems in the Soviet bloc in
order to get any action.
"The only thing that gets
somebody out" is publicity,
she said, although with
some smaller East Euro-
pean countries quiet pres-
sure is sometimes preferra-
ble. ?
She added that a second
purpose of the commission
is to help members of Con-
gress judge how well
Communist countries are
living up to their Helsinki
commitments so that this
can be used to judge wheth-
er they deserve to be voted
"most favored nation"
privileges intrade.
Some officials see a third
reason as preparing a
record for the conference
scheduled to be heleby the
35 signatory nations to re-
view the way the Final Act
has worked out after two
years. The act says prepa-
rations for the review will
begin in Belgrade next
June 15, with the confer-
ence to be held by the end of
1977. Considering the dif-
ferences so far over the
shape of the bottle as well
as its contents, some ob-
servers are skeptical that
the preparations will ever
be completed.
SOVIET SENSITIVITY
about the way the Helsinki
agreement is working out
was shown by a protest
from Ambassador Anatoly
F. Dobrynin.
Bypassing Kissinger,
with whom he virtually
always deals, Dobrynin told
the assistant secretary of
state for European affairs,
Arthur A. Hartman, that
the new commission was an
illegal American assump-
tion of the right to interpret
the Final Act arbitrarily
and unilaterally. Hartman
rejected this. ?
But, while defending the
commission against the
Soviets, the State Depart-
ment has appeared from
Capitol Hill to be displeased
with it. One muttering has
been that maybe a joint
congressional-executive
group is unconstitutional.
Hill experts deny this, since
the commission is purely
investigative rather than
operational.
The man named by
House Speaker Carl Albert
as commission chairman,
Dante B. Fasdell, D-Fla.,
wants to get it to work by
the end of July. So far the
Departments of State, De-
fense and Commerce have
not designated the mem-
bers which the law requires
them to provide, however.
Hartman will probably be
named to represent State,
since Fascell wants people
of assistant secretary rank
from the three executive
departments. Kissinger's;
record of defending the
Helsinki agreement against
critics of detente makes it a
delicate job for a State De-
partment representative to-
have the-job of giving the
commission information on
Soviet failures to abide by
the Final Act.
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THE WASHINGTON POST rueukr,Jun 29,7976
Joseph Kraft
Setting the Stage for a Communist Split
Simultaneous summit meetings?one
of European Communist Party bosses
In East Berlin, the other grouping lead-
ers of the advanced industrial coun-
. tries in Puerto Rico?show how, far the
world has moved past the cold war con-
frontation of yore.
Inner weaknesses, not confrontation,
determined the agenda of both confer-
ences. But while the Communists are
clearly in bad trouble, the United
States and its allies can mend their own
problems and?with a little more flexi-
bility?foster a second major split in
the Communist world.
1
"It makes sense for the governments of North
America, Western Europe and Japan to show a
.more flexible attitude toward local communism
to drop barriers and open dialogues."
Italian Communists in the elections last some special help for Italy, the United
week rammed the point home. The States and its allies ought to he able to
Russians decided to call off the debate achieve sustained non-inflationary
and proceed to an immediate confer- prosperity for several years to come.
ence in East Berlin. According to the But in their preoccupation with their
Italian Communists whom I saw in own problems, the advanced industrial
The Russians began talking up the Rome last week, it will offer precious countries are missing an opportunity. It
meeting now under way in East Berlin little satisfaction to the Russians. is the opportunity to end the knee-jerk
three or four years ago in tones of am- The document issuing from the East hostility to local Communist parties in
bition run riot. According to Moscow . Berlin conference will not condemn Western Europe and Japan.
the meeting was to condemn the the Chinese, nor acknowledge Soviet These parties are now showing stead-
Chinese Communists as heretics. It was supremacy with the formula "pro- ily growing opposition to dictation
also to accept the principle of letarian internationalism." It will reas- from Moscow. They have acquired, es-
"proletarian internationalism"?a code- sert the principle that the party of ev- pecially with the U.S. and Russia nego-
word for loyalty to Russia. ?
ery country is entitled to find its own tiating under the aegis of detente, a
But virtually all the other Commun- national way to socialism. What the kind of legitimacy. They cannot be
1st parties of Europe resisted these So- Russians get is an acknowledgement fobbed off much longer by the old Red-
viet aims. The Yugoslays and Rumani- " that all the Communist parties are menace argument that they are mere
ans, having already divorced them- heading toward the same goal?a fig- tools of Moscow. Moreover, some of
selves from Moscow, outspokenly op- leaf for diplomatic defeat. them at least can play a constructive
posed condemnation of Peking and ac- As to Puerto Rico, the advanced role in fighting inflation by holding the
ceptance of Soviet supremacy. The Ital- countries talked about their No. .1 prob- line on wages.
Jana and less independent west Euro- lem?economics or, more precisely, So it makes sense for the govern-
peen parties followed suit more cau- maintaining prosperity without setting ments of North America, Western Eu-
tiously. Except for East Germany, the off another inflationary wave. No ma- rope and Japan to show a more flexible
' other East European countries used the jos decisions have been taken?in large attitude toward local communism?to
occasion to wriggle a little further out - part because the US., Japan and West drop barriers and 'open dialogues. The
from under the Russian thumb. ? Germany all face early elections. Communists will thus have some new.
As the debate wore on at meeting But there was widespread agreement incentives to cooperate, and pull fur-
after meeting, it became an obvious. that a general recovery from last year's ther from Moscow. As they take their
loser for the Russians. Not only did recession is now under way. Equally distances from Russia, the stage is set
they make no headway themselves. But that measures should be taken to hold for the next logical blow to Moscow's
the Italian Communists, in particular, down inflation?among them limits on pretensions to world leadership?the
deliberately stood up to the Russians government spending, on wage rises, , development of a Euro-communism
.the better to win support at home. and on barriers to the free exchange of split off, like Communist China, from
The stunning gains achieved by the goods including fiddling with currency
the Soviet Union.
gnarlr5 burl Sun., July 18, 1976 rates. With a little give and take and c 1978. Field Enterprises. Inc.
Drug Agency Failing to Curb Traffic
It said that "although DEA has presented sta-
tistics to demonstrate considerable numbers of
arrests of violators and seizures of illicit drugs,
the ability of higher-echelon dealers and finan-
ciers to ring illicit drugs into the United States
has not been effective] deterred."
The subcommittee said the agency had con-
centrated too much on pursuing low-level drug
dealers and addicts and not enough on con-
spiracy cases targeted against high-level nar-
cotics traffickers.
It also complained of a lack of cooperation in
exchanging inforthation between the agency
and the U.S. Customs Service, which is respon-
sible for protecting the nation's borders and
7 ports of entry against smugglers.
Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), acting chairman of
the subcommittee, said in a statement accom-
panying the report that the agency and the
Customs Service had "declared war on each
other?not on the big-time, international nar-
.cotics smugglers and dealers."
The drueb agency was established in the De-
partment of Justice on July 1, 1973, under an
executive order of President Richard M. Nixon
consolidating the enforcement functions of a
number of agencies.
WASHINGTON reorganization in-
tended to strengthen federal efforts to combat
illicit drug traffic has failed, Senate investiga-
tors said Saturday.
? In the'three years since the Drug Enforce-
snent Administration was established, the na-
tion's illicit drug traffic has increased, a report
.of dte permanent investigations subcommittee,
a -unit of the Senate Government Operations
Committee, said.
"The number of drug addicts continues to in-
..crease at a rapid rate, brown heroin from Mexi-
? to continues to come into this country in mas-
sive amounts, and drug abuse continues to
spread into rural and suburban areas," it said.
In comments on the report. Peter Bensinger,
DEA administrator, said that although the
agency welcomed and needed the interest of
the committee, "the findings of this report,
simply put, arc dated." . ?
"They may represent the committee findings
on past DEA operations. but do not portray
DEA's mission or strategies in July, 1976." he
said in a statement.
The subcommittee's report was based on an
investigation and hearings conducted last year.
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THE ECONOMIST JULY 3 1978
etwelm 9n Erezhnev s toes
%dr
The Polish workers who ripped up the railway line
outside Warsaw on June 25th to stop their government
putting up the price of food may have given the signal for
a change of western policy towards the Soviet empire. It
is no longer necessary to assume that any change for the
better in Russia's dependencies in eastern Europe can be
brought ?about only through the approval of Mr-
Brezhnev; maybe it can be done despite Mr Brezhnev.
On the same day as Polish strikers were vetoing their
?
government's price policy, Mr Henry Kissinger was
saying in London that the Americans "recognise no
spheres of influence and no pretensions to hegemony" in
eastern Europe. That is not quite how his assistant Mr
Helmut Sonnenfeldt put it last December: Mr
Sonnenfeldt said that the smaller east European
countries ought to become more independent of Russia,
but then he ruffled the hawks' feathers by adding "within
the-context of a strong Soviet geopolitical influence.'
Mr Kissinger has deleted that complaisant phrase. What
is the connection between the Soviet Union's
relationship with the governments of eastern Europe
and the problems those governments face in dealing with
their own peoples? It is that, for the past 10 years, the
west has acted as if the key to change in eastern Europe
lay exclusively in Moscow: as if nothing could be done to
improve the lot of Poles and Czechoslovaks and the rest
without the blessing of the Soviet government. For three
reasons, it is time to ask whether that western policy is
still the right one.
The policy that ran into the stops
First, the policy of concentrating on Moscow has
achieved just about as much as it was ever likely to
achieve, which was not very much. Back in the late 1960s
it made sense to think that the road to change in eastern
Europe would have to rim through Mr Brezhnev's
office. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968
appeared to confirm the. lesson of the Soviet
interventions in East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in
1956: nothing could happen in Russia's dominions, it
then seemed, that Russia did not like. And indeed, in
Russia itself, the west's decision to focus its efforts on
influencing Russian policy did produce some modest
benefits. It was western pressure that helped to get exit
permits for quite a lot of Soviet Jews, and some other
dissidents as well; it is the scrutiny of the western media
that has kept some of the other dissidents who remain in
Russia out of prison. This willingness by Mr Brezhnev to
let a few hornets go on buzzing has spread into the more
liberal .east European countries, such as Poland and
Hungary. But in what matters most to Mr
Brezhnev----the preservation by communist
governments of all the rest of their apparatus of political
and economic control?the Soviet Union's leader has
made it quite plain that there will be no change if he can
help it. ? ?
Second, however, it has begun to look as if he may not
be able *.o help it, at. least as much as he originally
thought. The long delayed conference of all Europe's
communist parties which was eventually held in East
Berlin this week confirms that Mr Brezhnev's power to
give orders to other communists is much more limited
than it used to be. The slogan of "proletarian
internationalism"?meaning do as Moscow tells
you?made no appearance at the conference; and Mr
Brezhnev was obliged to listen to Rumanian and
Spanish communists telling him that each communist
party should do what it thinks is in its own best interests.
In the short run, this may not do much for the east
Europeans who have Soviet divisions squatting on their
territory. But in the longer run the sight of Italian and
Spanish communists insisting on going their own
way?and, which is the heart of the matter, winning
public support by doing so?is unlikely to go unnoticed
by the governments in Warsaw and Budapest, and even
in Prague and East Berlin. - - - -
Third, therefore, it is important to note this past
week's evidence that eastern Europe is by no means the
docile and quiescent place the Russians have spent the
past few years trying to make it seem. The Economist
had better make it clear that, on the econOrnics of the
issue which blew up in Poland last week, we think the
Polish government was right and its worker-opponents
wrong. Food prices in Poland have been kept artificially
static, partly by holding down the real incomes of
farmers while the real wages of industrial workers have
risen quite fast, but mainly by subsidies which now take
up almost 8% of the national income. These are
nonsenses, and will have to be stopped some time. But
the real point of the Poles' protests on June 25th. is a
lesson for the communist world's politicians, not its
economists.
The Polish explosion shows that even in the most
economically successful of all the communist
states?Poland claims that its real gross national
product has been going up on average by over 10% a
year in the past four years?a large .number of industrial
workers still feel disgruntled enough to resort to violence
rather than accept a modest, temporary and
economically"rational check in the improvement of their
living standards. It also shows that they can make their
protest stick: the people, when they feel strongly enough,
have a veto on the party's will. But it can hardly have
escaped the attention of the Polish government, and of
the other east European. governments, that a system
which jerks between the party's yea and the urban
population's nay is a peculiar way to run a country. The
isolation of Poland's communist party from the public
opinion it claims to represent has not been cured by Mr
Gierek's perfectly genuine attempt in recent years to
meet more people, and explain his policies better, than
most other communist leaders do.
The moral of the Polish affair is a radical one. le
communist parties are not to keep on losing contact with
public opinion, they will have to change the way they
-organise
themselves; which means introducing the
principle of pluralism; which means abandoning Lenin's
idea of a monolithic and all-powerful party, which is the
basis oft he way all communist parties except (perhaps) a
few west European ones now organise themselves.,
What the west can do
Al] this suggests that there is more possibility of change
in the smaller east European countries than there is in
the ironclad rigidity of the Soviet Union itself; and that
the western democracies should look to these countries,
rather than to Russia, as the focus of their eastern policy.
Can the west do anything to help a gradual and
controlled liberalisation of eastern Europe? Yes. For
instance:
* It can make it clear to these countries that they have
rather more scope for runging their affairs in ways Mr
Brezhnev may not enjoy than some of them perhaps
realise. Hungary runs a looser (and therefore more
efficient) economic planning system than Russia does.
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Poland 'allows its rriiddle crasi a bit more freedom of
sixech and travel, and has a decollectivised peasantry.
Rumania runs a markedly non-Brezhnev-type foreign
policy. If an east European country tried to combine,
say, two of these measures of independence, it is unlikely
that the Russia of the second half.of the 1970s would
intervene to prevent it by force?because such
behaviour would cost Russia dear in its hopes of western
economic assistance, and in its already fragile influence
over the communists of western Europe.
? The west could shape its credit policy, including
helping to finance the movement of western technology
into parts of the communist world, so that more of its
economic help goes to those east European countries
which show most signs of liberalising themselves. This
year's West German deal with Poland gave the Poles a
large, cheap loan in return for their release of more
ethnic Germans who want to go and live in Germany. It
would make even better sense for future help to be
steered towards countries that seem to be loosening the
Leninist system?because such countries' economies are
likely to work more efficiently. . . ,
* The EEC might-offer to include more east European
WASHINGTON POST
15 JUL 1976
countries in its system of generalised preferences. So far
only Rumania enjoys this advantage, because only
Rumania has decided to, brush aside Russian
disapproval; but others might risk it later. And helping
'eastern Europe is another argument for reforming the
EEC's common agricultural policy; if the CAP were
changed to put less reliance on the common price system
which helps rich farmers and poor alike, and more on
direct subsidies for the poorer ones, there might be room
for the east Europeans to sell more of their (very good)
farm produce to west Europeans.
None of this, it should be clear, is within a mile of the
"rollback" policy that John Foster Dulles talked about
in 'the early 1950s. It would not re-establish a pre-
communist system in eastern Europe. Its aim would be
to encourage those communist parties in the region
which see the advantage of trying to move in the
direction in which Mr Berlinguer's Italian Communists
claim to be pointing. The west's reply to "proletarian
internationalism" is self-determination; and it should
help the people of eastern Europe who wart to try to
struggle out from under Mr Brezhnev's toes.
Defending the Penkovsky Papers' Authenticity
Some weeks ago Stephen Rosenfeld
? stated in an article that the Church
committee had proved the Penkovsky
? 'Papers to have been fabricated or falsi-
fied by the CIA. This has since been as.?
as fact in your editorial columns.
May I, as one much involved in the orig-
inal controversy on the subject, point
out that this is not so?
The Church committee merely said,
"the book was prepared by witting
? Agency assets who drew on actual case
?materials." It said this in passing in a I
section of its report criticizing the CIA '
on the different matter?and one far
less grave than falsification?of con-
cealing the source of the material from
the publisher. lit is surely far from
- being a principle of American journal-
ism that the rather perfunctory con-
cealment of a source should be thought
? to invalidate a document.) The commit-
tee's phrase as it stands could perhaps
at a pinch be construed to mean for--
gezy. But if it had meant to charge the
CIA with this serious crime, it would
NEW YORK TIMES
Z 6 JUN 1976
r --
IA Soviet Scientist
Is Critical of Ford
On Human Rights
Special to Thlk New York Thee
MOSCOW, June 25 ? The
highest-ranking Soviet scientist
to apply for emigration accusedl
President Ford today of indif-
ference to \ iolations of human:
rights in the Soviet Union and!
elsewhere.
In an open letter to the Presi-
dent, Veniamin G. Levich, a
physical chemist and corre-
sponding member of the Acade-
my. of Sciences, stressed that
he was not making an appeal
for help in his case but a more
general call for a reassessment',
1 of, American policy.
4
We want a President whol
is for ddterte," he said in an 1
certainly have made it a major point in
the indictment and would have as-
serted it flatly and unambiguously. The
natural interpretation of the sentence.
is that those sections of Col. Penkov-
sky's reports which were not of intelli-
gence interest -fwere edited and ar-
ranged by a friendly intermediary. The
book as it appeared in fact contained a
good deal of commentary quite explic-
itly written not by Penkovsky but by
the editor. This has never been at issue
and Is not relevant to the present
charges.
Mr. Rosenfeld cited Victor Zorza as
having, at the time, thrown doubt on
the authenticity.of the book on internal
textual grounds. True, but his objec-
tions were almost unanimously re-
jected by students as eccentric and
without. substance. We are now told,
solely on the basis of the Church com-
mittee's remark, that the inauthentic-
ity is established. Mr. Rosenfeld found
It possible to quote with approval a So-
viet description of the papers as a .
interview; "but who will not
forget the humanitarian prob-
lems."
In his letter, Mr. Levich
asked: "Why have those who
have been waiting for long ago-
nizing years in this country for
their legitimate rights to be im-
plemented never sensed any
moral support either from you,
Mr. President, or from any one
of your Administration?"
Noting Administration con-
tentions that "one should trust
in the efficiency of quiet diplo-'
inacy," especially on the ques-i
tion of Jewish emigration, Mr.
Levich declared:
"No one sensible can deny 1
that there is certainly plenty of'
'scope for this sort of diploma-
cy. In this case, however, the
voice of quiet diplomacy was
so quiet that hardly anyone
could hear it."
After a surge in the number
of Jews permitted to leave for
"coarse fraud, a mixture of provocative
invention and anti-Soviet slander." And
he specified as false the accounts of
"high-livers" and "first-strikers" among
. the Soviet elite. (The papers do not, as
he implied, say that this was universal.)
All evidence, including public evi-
dence, shows that both these rather dif-
ferent types are indeed not uncommon
in Soviet political and military circles.
It will be plain that the Church coin-
' mittee provided no new information at
all?and its very absence tends to con-
. firm the official story. There is, in fact,..
no evidence whatever that the papers _
were in any sense faked, or that the
material attributed to Col. Penkovsky
was in any way fabricated. Proof posi-
tive of their authenticity is a matter for
the CIA. The agency has been accused
of procuring a falsification. I hope it
will now settle the question once and
for all.
Washington
Israel, a flow that reached an
estimated 35,000 people in
1973, the number dropped last
year to 11,700, according to of-
ficial statistics.
The drop occurred after Mos-
cow had rejected an arrange-
ment linking favorable United
States regulations for trade
with the Soviet Union to
progress on the relaxation of
Soviet restrictions on emigra-
tion. The linkage, known as the
Jackson amendment after its
author, Senator Henry M. Jack-
son. Democrat of Washington,
was opposed by both the Nixon
and Ford Administrations as
counterproductive.
Mr. Levich said he could not
be sure how far the Soviet Gov-
ernment would yield to Ameri-
can pressure on human rights.
But he said that emigration, or
as he put it, "one of the funda-
mental human freedoms, the
free choice of country of resi-
'ROBERT CONQUEST
ldence," could be caialyst for
!broader liberalization within
Soviet political and social life.
"If those who want to emi-
grate can do so freely, that has
a great significance for those
who stay behind," he said in
?an interview with Western cor-
respondents. "Each state with
free emigration must address
itself to its internal problems,
and this promotes the liberal-
ization of the whole socie:y."
35'
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DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
25 June 1976
Ital 9S?st ay
f execution- -
SUPPOSE that a condemned
man who is told, on the morn- ROBERT MOSS on a oniniums
ing he was to be hanged, that
he has been granted a stay of
execution feels a certain sense of threat that will not go 'away
relief. But this is the only kind
of satisfaction that can be derived
from the results of Italy's elec-
tions.
This might seem a curious way
to sum up the outcome of elec-
tions in which the Italian voters
did not do either of the two things
that had most been feared. 'They
did not give more votes to the
Communists than to .Christian,
Democrats, and they did not give
an overall majority to thz Left.
So the entry of the Communists
into -the --Government is -not yet -
inevitable. But it is very much
in doubt whether Italy is govern-
able without them._
The Communists have gained a
considerable ? moral victory,
increasing their vote in the polls
for the Lower House by over 7
per cent. They are confident, dis-
ciplined, and ready to bide their
time?especially since they want
to avoid shouldering any of the
blame for the country's economic
? crisis and have built up a formid-
able power base through the
regional governments they control.
A t further reason why Signor.
Berlinguer is in no great hurry
is that he knows that the arrival
of, the Communists in power
(eircept as part of a coalition
including Christian Democrats) is
the one thing that might finally
bring the confused and fractious
anti-Marxist forces together and.
produce a vigorous public reaction.
In contrast, the democratic
parties- are :left floundering -with- ?
out any. apparent sense of direc-
tion. Fear of the Communist
danger did move a third "of the
people who ? voted for' the, Neo-
Fascist MST -in 1972' to switch
. their votes to the Christian Demo- ,
crats--Lbut they were only, just
enough to make Up for the Chris-
tian Democrat voters who defected
to'the Left. .
'The smaller parties of the- Centre'
that might, united, have supplied a ?.
viable alternative or voters. who
are fed up with the corruption and
.
economic incompetence of the
, Christian Democrat establishment ,
were virtually wiped 'off the slate.
So the creation of a new Govern-
ment depends on a renewed court-
ship between those aged divorcees,
the Christian Democrats and the
Socialists. The Socialists swore
blind during the elections that they
es-
would not go hack into government
without the Communists. But if
the Christian Democrats offer them
rich enough rewards ? including
?.the .Presidency of the 1Republic-7,
they will no doubt remember that
promises are only promises.
1,V,Iiich could, lead only to, another '
rudderless Government. after an
interlude of rudderless non-govern-
merit. . Given .the near-total dis-
I array of the non-Marxist forces,
sorrier state,:
than the pound and major strikes
looming, it is hardly surprising that
many people who are far from
being Marxists have turned wist-
fully towards the Communists.
Maybe they can govern, the argu-
ment:goes.----Anyway, It would-force=
the Lather lot to get rid of the
crooks and tired old Men so a
decent anti-Communist Govern- .
ment could emerge later.
This- -is, g :seductive argument,
:
,but it must be resisted?and also?
publicly resisted by Italy's friends?
abroad?not just because a Com;.,
munist is a.COmtnunist is a Corn-:..
munist. (and not Jost a soCial. ree
' .forrner" or a liberal in a hurry) but..
? 'because Italy is 'too crucial' to the"
precarious strategic balance in the
Mediterranean for the West to
tolerate a Chilean-style " experi;
cra ne? ?Whet hmer
Signor Berlinguer is What he says ;
he Italian tommunists,;
succeeded in convincing a.;-:
surprising number of People that
their entry into government would--:-
not jeopardise the country's rela,
tions with Nato,. the EEC or the.
Western bankers. and !this- helped,
them in the elections. :. ?
The Italian Communists were.
compared in the Guardian the
other day to the British Labour
? party. Now, I would hot dispute
for a moment that there are a:
? fair number of people ?in the.;
Labour party who would not feet:
at all ill-at-ease in: Signor Berlin-
guer's party, so long as they could ;
learn to eat pasta iinstead of ,
- potatoes. But the; point is that
Signor Berlinguer's party is a
Marxist-Leninist party in which .1
each member7is , subjected to that
'system of ?" democratic centralism " ?
Which is about as ,far away from
, genuine democracy as you can get. :
For instance the editors of L'Unitci-
censor Signor Berlinguer's .own
. speeches when he says something
overly revisionist in order to woo ?
the middle-class voter. In an
interview -viithiCorrierd ?della Sera
shortly before the elections he
. expressed qualified?enthusiasm for
Nato: from a Marxist-Leninist
viewpoint there''was no tontradic-
', tion involved in publishing some-
;thing in a national paper and then
?suppressing.it in the party organ.
By talking that way. to Corriere, he
was making another tactical move
towards the peaceful 'assumption
of ?power; the editors of I.' U ni t a
were-reassuring the party faithful
that If the Communists do come to
power, they will behave exactly as
they in-the-past. ? ?
Nato at risk .
-WhatifOi'
Berlinguer and his friends, it
remains irrefutable that their
entry into government would put
_ at risk Nato's entire southern. flank.
This is why it is "ll "
now than it was before June 20 for
Western -leaders -to itiake it clear
.that an Italian Government that in-
cluded Communists would,. 'be
viewed rather ..differen.tly.-?than a
Government that did not Dr
7:KiSsingerlv_asilvidelymritifisect.lor:
his pre-election talk about how a
Communist victory in Italy would
be "unacceptable." It may well
be that it is not much good talking.,
this way unless you are clear about
what sanctions the West would
apply if suelictettring---actualiy came
about. But-71.:-:-helieve that, on
!balance, it ,wais' better to have
'" Spoken he 'did rather than to.
3 -have, kept. silent for, worse still, to
have; madecomplacent or sympa-
;:theile,noisei a la Olcif Palme or
."c'
?.e?d?
- ?
'The , overnment main-
.a 'silenge that was punctua---
4ed only bya remarkable leak. On
June ..15 the prosCommunist paper
Paese" Sera 'published a lengthy--
article based on a summary of an
off-the-record briefing that Mr
Crosland had .given to diplomatic.,
7-corresporidents. Mr Crosland was
quoted ? as saying that the Italian
Communist party had evolved in
, a European direction" and that he
, did not consider that its entry into
government would pose a serious
threat to Nato. -
Mr Winston 'Churchill, MP, has
now tabled a question to Mr
Crosland. But whether or not the
Crosland quotations were accurate, .
there is no doubt that the resound- ?
ing silence of the British Govern- :
ment was interpreted by Berlin-
guer as a blessing. ,
The same thing must not happen
again. It should be made clear
that not all would be sweetness
and light between Italy and Nato
(or between Italy and the Western
bankers) if the Communists gain
power.
I am not calling for the ostra-
cism of Italy in such an event, still
less for a total break with Nato.
I am calling, instead, for a system
of " incentives arid penalties "?to
use the now somewhat tarnished
phrase I hat was initially applied
by Dr Kissinger to the manage-
ment of d?nte with the Russians.
36
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Under such a system, the aid
and credits that are currently
going to bolster the sagging Italian
economy would he granted (if
granted at all) only if the Italian
Government respected certain
clearly defined conditions, with
full guarantees for the free Press
and the security of the Nato bases
rating high on the list. Communist
or pro-Communist officials would
be ruthlessly kept out of Nato
counsels. Despite its status as one
gngthg ritutt
of the four permanent members
of Nato's Nuclear Planning Group,
Italy would have to be excluded
from many sensitive discussions.
Bu i such a system of controls
could not remove the strategic
dangers that the 'new situation
would present. America's nuclear
stockpile and naval and air bases
would ?be in jeopardy, as would
Nato's system of air surveillance
and communications. Israel's vul-
nerability would ?be increased in
Mon., July 12, 1976
the event of a new Middle East
war.
These are sufficient reasons for
Western leaders to sound a note
'of warning to the Italian public.
Such warnings sometimes backfire.
But it is better tO risk that than
to tolerate a situation in which the
?Communists have succeeded in
reasturing at least a part of the
Italian electorate that Italy's rela-
tionships with the ?West wOuld
remain fundamentally unchanged
if they took office.
Berufsverbot Gone Berserk
? Vireit 'Germany is concerned about protecting its
? flowering, but still shallow-rooted, democratic insti-
tutions that grew out of the shambles of World
War U. But it seems to have overreacted in the ap-
plication of a policy popularly known as "berufs:
? verbot"?a ban on performing a job or following
one's profession. ?
? ? The:policy is designed to prevent extremists of
the right and left from joining the civil service of
federal_ -and state agencies?a device to protect
democracy from those who would destroy it.
But-some see in it the specter of totalitarian con-
formity, and former Chancellor Willy. Brandt, a
champion of German democracy, is having second
thoughts about it. Brandt's government, in 1972,
urged?vigorous application of the policy as part of a
postwar program to prevent a resurgence of totali-
tariani,sni.
Critics, say the policy is invoked against leftists
and Communists while leaving rightists and former
Nazis untouched.
Berufsverbot is determined through' a security
check, -which supporters say is little different from
that vi other West European countries, on whether
a civil service applicant's a supporter or opponent
of democracy. Such applicants, like those in other-.
parts of-Western Europe, are also required to take
a loyalty oath?a requirement that predates beruf-
6verbot.
? . 'Theii are conflicting claims on the impact of the.
?policy. One anti-berufsverbot group says that 750,-"
GOO persons have been investigated, and that 1,200
of them have been turned down because of their ?
political views or past activities, such as taking part
in antiwar demonstrations. ? .
; But Wore there is a rush to judgment over such
'Statistics, it is important to bear in mind the peculi-
arities of West Germany.
:Besides having the fragility of a young democra-.
icy; the 'ftation is especially vulnerable to antidemo-
cratic forces. It is continuously under assault from
-the Communist north and east by spies and subver-
sive groups.
There., are an estimated 15,000 espionage agents
at work against the government at any one time,
an affliction that is far worse than that affecting
THE ECONOMIST
17 July 1976
Norway
The little hut
FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT
Kithenes
A pale yellow wooden summerhouse is
up for sale outside Kirkenes, 150 miles
north of the Arctic circle. It is just
like thousands of others in northern
Norway, although it commands a tine
view to the east and overlooks a tirst dotted with occasional watchtowers
37
other Western governments.
These agents have infiltrated the highest reaches
of government, and even the inner sanctums of
Bonn's security services. Brandt resigned the chan- ?
cellorship in 1974 because of thefl discovery of an
East German spy among his aides. ?
Because of the postwar split of Germany into east
and west portions, most of the spies are East Ger-
mans who enjoy a unique advantage in undermin-
ing democratic institutions. They share a common
language and cultural tradition with West Germans
that enables them to infiltrate such institutions
with relative ease.
Then there is the determined antidemocratic
movement among non- and anti-Communists like
the notorious Baader-Meinhof gang, which has as- ?
saulted West Germany with bombings, kidnapings
and assassinations. ?
From the west and south of the nation there are
suspicion and jealousy, which do little to fertilize
West German democracy.
The suspicion is based on history. The jealousy is
based on West Germany's emergence as a world
power that has brought unprecedented freedom
and prosperity to its people. Through self-discipline
and hard work, the nation has made the most of
Marshall Plan dollars in achieving a largely suc-
cessful mix of social democracy and enlightened
capitalism.
As such, West Germany stands as an affront to
the totalitarian right and left. Antidemocratic
forces cannot point to West Germany, as they
might to Italy, and say the days of enlightened free
enterprise are doomed. Thus, to provide credibility:
to their claims, such forces must attack West Ger-
many with special vigor. This is no doubt a factor
in the opposition to berufsverbot.
There is also no doubt that there have been
abuses in the policy, just as there have been abuses
by the FBI and CIA in attempting to protect the in-
stitutions of this country. ?
Like the United States, West Germany must do -
all in its power to eliminate?through democratic
means?those abuses, and if need be abandon or
amend its berufsverbot policy to conform with its
postwar ideals.
rate salmon river. Yet the government
has decided to buy it and destroy it,
because it stands just l0 yards from the
border line with the Soviet Union. The
Norwegians fear that the house might
be taken over by the CIA or at least by
somebody with unfriendly intentions
towards the Russians. They do not want
any awkward incidents.
The border is marked by two rows of
striped posts and a wire fence to stop
reindeer straying across. The skyline is
raised above the forest, but no troops
-? are in sight. Relations between the
Norwegian and 'Russian border com-
missioners. have never been better. The
two men meeLlt--fegularly to'share .a
vodka and sort out 'routine problems.
In-.between meetings', they are linked
by a "hot line"; said to be the world's
second because it was installed after the
Washington-Moscow link. The tele-
phone at the Norwegian end. is an
ancient crank-handle model, but is
painted bright red.
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The Kirkenes locals still remember
that northern Norway was one of the
few regions of Europe which the
Russians liberated during the second
world war and then withdrew from.
Here at any rate, it seems, detente is
alive and well.
Yet the nominal border line is
deceptive. The border where the Soviet
Union actually begins lies several miles
away, beyond the Pasvik river and
shrouded by pine trees. It is marked by
a high barbed-wire fence .and is
patrolled by border guards. Their
efficiency is simply measured: no
refugees have succeeded in escaping into
Norway in recent years. Behind the line,
the Russians keep a tight check on all
movement in the area, so that most
would-be escapers cannot get anywhere
near the frontier.
The military importance of this Arctic
area is greater than it seems. In the
Kola peninsula Russia maintains a large
part of its strategic nuclear capacity:
Its population has increased from
360,000 in 194Q to lm today. Murmansk
and the adjacent ports are the only
Soviet ones with direct and ite-free
NEW YORK TIMES
9. July 1976
S. NATO FORCE
CALLED 'UNREADY'
G.A.O.ReportonGermanUnit
Cites Personnel Shortages,
Equipment Problems
By JOHN W. FINNEY
SPeal to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, July -8?A
General Accounting Office in-
vestigation has established that
the readiness of United States
Army armored units in Western
Europe is "woefully deficient,"
Senator Hubert H.. Humphrey
said today. .
The Minnesota Democrat
made the statement in making
public a digest of a classified
report by the G.A.O. on the
readiness of frontline armored
units stationed in West Ger-
many.
The G.A.O., the investigative
arm of Congress, found that
the units suffered personnel
shortages, ammunition supply
problems and deficiencies in
their equipment. Despite these
, shortcomings, the report said,
the units "continued to report
that they were substantially
ready with minor deficiences."
Part of the problem, the
digest of the import suggested,
is that army standards for com-
puting and reporting on readi-
ness "have been relaxed to the
point where units could almost
always be reported as combat-
ready."
Not Fully Manned
The office, which undertook'
its investigation at the request
of Senator Humphrey, found
that because of serious person-
access to the Atlantic, and some 180
submarines are based there. There are
also, in round figures, 110,000 military
and civilian personnel stationed there
(i-ncl uding two army d ivisions and a naval
infantry brigade), 200 combat ships.
200 naval patrol aircraft and 300
fighter-bombers.
See no evil
The naval and military build-up in
the Kola peninsula is still going on, and
the defence ministers of Scandinavian
countries ?have been voicing under-
standable anxiety about it. The three
Norwegian observers who were recently
allowed to attend a Soviet exercise
north of Leningrad under the terms of
the Helsinki agreement did not see
much, and Nato experts do not expect
the agreement to make any practical
difference. Indeed, General Sir John
Sharp, the British commander-in-chief
of Nato's northern forces, recently
claimed that the build-up in the Kola
peninsula represented. "the most im-
portant strategic threat to the western
alliance at present". This is one reason
why.. Nato ? chiefs have been pressing
net shortages, particularly
among skilled enlisted men, not
all of the armored vehicles were
fully manned.
-Without giving specific fig-
ures, the digest said that many
of the vehicles were not com-
bat-ready, largely because of
problems with their radio equip-
ment.
Among the ammunition prob-
lems cited in the report were
lack of adequate storage areas,
insufficient information on
serviceable ammunition, inade-
quate access roads to stock-
piles, not enough tools to 'cut
the banding around ammunition
,boxes and a lack .of conveyors
to expedite loading.
' In one instance, Senator
Humphrey said, drawing from
the classified portion of the re-
port, a unit of the First Ar-
mored Division did not have a
set of keys to the ammunition
bunkers and would have to
travel about an hour to obtain
one.
'Serious Mismanagement'
"There is, in my judgment,"
Senator Humphrey said, "seri-
ous mismanagement and ineffi-
ciency in our European forces
and in the program that is sup-
posed to assure the combat-
readiness of those forces.
"It should be emphasized that
these problems are the result
of management inadequacies
within the- army. They have not
been caused by inadequate sup-
port from Congress or the tax-
payer,"
The Defense Department had
no immediate comment on
Senator Humphrey's statement.
In the past, however, army offi-
cials have emphasized that the
readiness of the forces had suf-
fered because of Congressional
cuts in the defense budget, par-
ticularly in the operations and
maintenance accounts.
At the same time, army lead-
ers have emphasized that the
combat-readiness, which a few,
years ago was acknowledged to
be low, has been improving as;
Norway and Denmark to increase their -
defence budgets.
Nato has asked the Norwegians for a
4rA', annual growth in real defence
spending. Norway is unlikely to agree to
such a big rise, despite its new oil
wealth, but a defence commission set up
by the government is likely to recom-
mend some rise when it reports later
this year.- -
Nato is also trying to improve its
ability to resist a Soviet invasion of
Norway. It is thinking about preparina
a stockpile of equipment, including
tanks and trucks, for use by other
Nato troops, like the., British and
Canadians, if troops had to be airlifted
in a hurry. .At present, however, the
Norwegians will not allow any foreign
troops or nuclear weapons to be bas-ed
in Norway. They fear that the Russians
would see this as a Cuba-like threat.
This is the dilemma for. Norway: it
wants to improve its defences, but also
to avoid doing anything which the
Russians could interpret as a provo-
cation. That is why a yellow summer-
house on the border will shortly be only
a pile of firewood.
the divisions in Europe,
stripped of their skilled person-
nel for the Vietnam War, were
rebuilt.
The G.A.O. said that many
of the problems cietd in its re-
port were recognized by the
United States Army command
in Europe, which it said was
moving "actively and positive..
moving "actively and positive-
ly" to eliminate the deficien-
cies.
Indirectly, the readiness of
the four and a half army
divis-
ions stationed in West Germany
bears on the military balance
between the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and War-
saw Pact forces on the Central
European front.. Despite some
increase in the size of the War-
saw Pact forces, it remains the
judgment of Pentagon officials
that a satisfactory balance now
exists, with the NATO forces
providing an effective deterrent
to a Soviet attack.
NEW YORK TIMES
16 July 1976
RED BID TO SUBVERT
ALLIED TROOPS SEEN
LONDON, July 15 (1.1111)7
Communist and other extreme
left-wing -groups are stepping
up efforts to subvert allied
forces in Europe, with Amer-
ican soldiers "a particularly
tempting target," the Foreign
Affairs Research Institute said
today.
? An institute study said sub-
versive, campaigns against
United States servicemen in
Europe were directed in large
part against blacks and Puerto
Ricans. -
? "The threat to the loyalty of
armed forces in Western Eu-
rope must be taken serioasly,"
lit said, describing American
forces in the Western alliance
38
as "a particularly tempOrig
target for the professional agi-
tator."
According to the study.
"Servicemen and women who
are away from theit home en-
virorunent and carrying out a
deterrent role with its attend-
ant dangers of boredom -cam
become disaffected relatively
easily. This applies particularly
to ethnic minority groups such
as blacks and Puerto Ricans."
The study for the privuelyt,
financed body was written by!
Anthony Burton, described as
a lecturer and writer, who
served 16 years in the British
Army.
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NY4431}?"
eami
ait
? WASHINGTON POST
2 1 JUL 1976
their links, both Israel and
Israel Apparent y to Syria that they are deter-
the Maronites have signaled
mined to help one another
to resist any attempt to es-
Aiding teirut
light? tablish Syrian hegemony
over Lebanon.
? In the Lebanese war's iM-
? tial stages, Christian leaders
By Joseph Fitchett procured a range of weapo-
'Special to The Washington Post nry, mostly automatic arms,
BEIRUT?Lebanon. Mar-
onite Christian forces, dis-
playing new military muscle,
are apparently receiving di-
rect but 'covert military aid
from Israel.
Evidence in the field, -
calculated indiscretions by
Christian politicians, the
street mood on the Christian
S id e and unattributable
statements by Western
diplomats in Arab capitals
all tend to confirm it.
An ambassador who is
closely involved called it an
"objective concurrence of
Interests" among the Leba-
? nese Christians, Syria and
Israel. The United States
has not lodged any com-
plaints to anyone about the
practical steps by the three
in furtherance of their mu-
? tuality of interest, -U.S. offi-
cials confirm privately.
A key factor lathe recent
strengthening of Christian
forces is the supplies of
new, heavier materiel pour-
ing into their arsenals.
The main Christian port,
Jounieh, was closed last
week for days, and Palestin-
ian intelligence reports say
that during that period, two
large shiploads of heavy-ap-
pearing armored Vehicles
were landed. This weaponry-
is expected to appear in a
new drive in which the
Christian militias attempt
to follow up their recent vic-
tories and expand the zone
under their control to in-
clude the hills above Beirut.
New equipment is only
part of the explanation of
bolitered? Christian bold-
ness. Equally important is
the:- manifest confidence of
Christian commanders that
mm-e materiel can be ob.
tained promptly and in
quantity. This has convinced
military observers that
Christian arms procurers,
wile initially had to shop
arohnd from arms dealers
all over the world, now can
obtain their supplies di- ,
rectly from the military in-
ventories of a government
thatitself has good delivery
facilities to the Christian en-
clave.
Christian commanders say
their forces now have all the
weaponry which their troops
can absorb ? a marked
change from the earlier
phases of the 15-month-old
war.
Christian fighters brand-
ish. their weapons, claiming
that the NATO-style assault
rifles come from Israel and
pointing to the serial num-
bers and insignia scraped
off the gun and leather
sling. On conquered build-
ings, Christians scrawl a
Star of David as readily as a
Cedar tree, the symbol of
Lebanon.
Part of this reaction is
natural defiance of an Arab
enemy, perceived as the Pal-
estinians. Part reflects the
Maronite Christians' desire,
as a minority people, to
view themselves as
"Israelis"?Western-minded,
capable achievers beating
back a numerically superior
Moslem tide. It also reflects
a common sense conviction
among the Christian rank-.,
and-file that Israel is provid-
ing help on the theory that
my enemy's enemy is my.
friend.
At a. - deeper ? level, the -
Christian mood stems from
nervousness about relying
on the regime of Syrian
strongman, President _Hafez
Assad. While -the .Chfistians
. believe they fit.- Assad's
strategy of weakening the
Palestinians to facilitate an
Arab-Israeli settlement, they
realize that a coup or an as-
sassin's bullet could change
. Syrian policy. ?
In that- .case, they. see Is-
rael as. the only potential
savior?a Jewish state which
would be happy to have a
Maronite Christian partner
as an allied island in a Mos-
lem Arab sea.
While recent Maronite
military successes have de-
pened heavily on ? Syrian
support, many Maronite
leaders expect Syria eventu-
ally to tip the balance in the
other direction, once the
Palestinians have been hum-
bled. Such divide-and-con-
quer tactics were used to
rule this region by the cola-
. French. , By tightening
?
from a wide variety of
sources from dealers in
Western Europe to the hard
currency-hungry state agen-
cies of Czecholovakia and
Bulgaria.
Then, Israeli-supplied
arms, suitably untraceable,
were also reaching the Leba-
nese Christians via Cyprus.
Turkish radio has charged
that the EOKA-B Greek Cy-
priot underground, which'
sympathizes with Lebanese
Christians fighting Moslems,
was also useful in this con-
nection.
This system was costly,
Unreliable and rarely able to
furnish heavy arms of the
kind the Christian forces
needed after war escalated
last spring, when the regu-
lar army dissolved and took
various sides with stolen
tanks and artillery.
When the. Maronites were
combing the arms markets
last year, Israeli agents
were able to provide valua-
ble help. Israel is known to
'have strong contacts in par-
allel arms markets because
of the Jewish state's concern
to have alternate arms
sources in case weapons de-
liveries from an ally were -to
be halted, as France did in
.1968.
The,' Israeli government
apparently decided to go
over to direct assistance to-
the Chritians this spring.
The results began to show
in June.
Commercial skippers in
the eastern Mediterranean
report dense traffic at night
off the Christian-controlled
coast. The information in
the region's. ports is that the
traffic is coming from Israel
to Jounieh.
The Christian-held coast
teems now with barges of
the type that could unload
armored ears from a tramp
steamer in international
water and carry them to the
small jetties, recently built
in tiny coves.
By getting weapons di-
rectly from Israel. the Mar-
unite forces enjoy may ad-
vantages over their previous
method of shopping around.
Heavier weapons are in-
volved, deliveries are fast-
er. resupply is more reli-
able and there is a degree of
standardization,
39
The Palestinians so far
have been unable to identify
positively the Christians'
equipment or its source
since nothing significant has
been captured. It is de- ?
ployed on fronts where the-
Palestinians are relatively
weak and unlikely to cap-
ture it
? But the Israelis hove large
stocks of Soviet-made weap-
ons captured from Egypt
and Syria in two Middle
East wars. These could be?
used, as "sanitized" arms,
for an operation of this
kind. Israel helped previous
minority revolts such as
those of Iraq's Kurds and
Sudan's southerners which
challenged the hegemony of
Arab nationalism repre-
sented today by the Pales-
tinian guerrilas.
The "Israeli connection"
is widely said to be former
Lebanese President Camille
Chamoun, leader of the sec-
ond largest Christian mili-
tia. A hawk in the Maronite
camp, Chamoun, whose own
house was looted by Pales-
tinians, has said publically
that he will never lay down
arms until the Palestinians
are eliminated as a military
threat in Lebanon.
Repeatedly there have
been public allusions. from
Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat and others, to recent
? arms deals between Cha-
moun and the Israelis.
Another hawkish Chris-
tian leader,. Charbel Cassis,
a monk, visits Israel regu-
larly to perform pastoral
a duties for Maronite Arab
Christian monks there.
Recent Western visitors to
Israel report aowidespread
general assumption and ac-
ceptance there that Israel is
supplying military aid to
Lebanon's 1?.ilaronite light-
er. . . ,
This support is implictly
j'ustified in Israeli propa-
ganda, heard here on Israeli
overseas broadcasts, which
argues that Israel is the
only government ready to
help Lebanon's Christian
minority, who have been
abandoned, this argument
runs, by Western govern-
ments intimidated by thier
humiliations . in Southeast
Asia and by the growing
power of oil-rich Moslem
States.
? Maronite Christian politi-
cians share the tacit assump-
tion behind this Israeli anal-
ysis that Arab oil power will
peak within the decade and
then states -with str ong
W ester n connections.....4 ike
Israel has already and like a
Maronite-dominated Leba-
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.non would seek avidly?will
come back loto their own.
The timing of the Israeli-
Lebanese Christian effort to
step up their covert coopera-
tion stemmed apparently' -
from several considerations.
Militarily. '? Lebanese
Christians were being roiled
back last spring. making
*them psychelogicaliy ready
to take help from the de% ii
himi.ielf." as one spe.;.esman
Put it.
The Christians' alliance
with Syria against. the PLO
WASHINGTON POST
-
gave Israel an extra incen-
tive and' also insured that
Arab ? regimes implicitly
against the PLO would be
?less likely to hublicize and
criticize the Christians' new
Early in the Lebanese
war, the Lebanese Christi-,
.ans received substantial fi-
nancial help from conserva-
tive Arab states including
Saudi Arabia. Payments or-
dered by Saudi intermediar-
ies totalling more than $2:00
million. were reported ear-
7T
741-731" gg-
C al le
_a.
lier by American bankers
here familiar with the trans-
actions.
But Saudi Arabian help
apparently ceased early this
year, shortly after newspa-
per photographs circulated
in the Arab world showing
cross-wearing Christian
fighters mistreating and hu-
miliating ? Moslems in Kar-
antina. a Moslem slum here
razed by the Christians.
The ready willingness of
American and European dip-
lomats here and elsewhere
d
at s Eeoi
? By Thomas W..Lipnman
wasinaztoa ra:t ForeIgn Sezvice
CAIRO?A Marxist mem-
ber of the original group Of
offices who helped Gamal
Abdel Nasser overthrow the
Egyptian monarchy in 1932
has retuined to ? political
? prominence as the leader of
? *a new . leftist organization
that 'opposes many of the
policies of the current gov-
ernment.
He is Khaled Mohieddin,
55, a former .cavalry officer
who was recently selected ,to
-head the National Prog-
ressive Unionists, one of
three political groupings
. whose creation was author-
ized in Marey by President
. Anwar Sadat.-
? In his new role he exerts
? ? little if any direct influence
on the course of Egyptian
affairs, but_ he -hopes to
change that by leading his
- group to a strong showing
against government ? candi-
dates in this fall's parlia-
mentary elections.
The Peoples Assembly,
thoroughly dominated by
supporters of Sadat, "will
move left this year," Mohi-
eddin predicted in an inter-
View. The Egyptian people.
he said, are disillusioned
with the results of Sadat's
economic open-door policy,
which has benefited only
the "parasite classes and
land speculators" and will
show their feelings in .their
votes this October. _
That .kind of talk is unu-
sual in contemporary Egypt,
but, it could become more
common as the country
moves into the new political
phase opened by Sadat
when he authorized the cre-
ation of the new political
groupings.'
Egypt abolished political
parties after the revolution
and the new groups are not
'officially classified as par-
ties. During the national de-
bate that preceded their es-
tablishment, many Egyp-
tians who remember the
misdeeds of the old prerevo-
lutionary parties warned
that a return to the party
? system could be a disservice.
to the country.
Sadat, who has been grad-
ually liberalizing the politi-
cal climate, decided instead
to authorize the creation of
three - "forums" or
"platforms" within the Arab
Socialist Union, ? the coun-
try's, sole legal political
? body since it Was created by
Nasser. ?
Beneath their cumber-
some official ? names, the
three. forums are commonly .
referred to as right, center
and 'left, and the full weight
of the pro-Sadat political es-
tablishment has come down
heavily in the center group.
-Its leader is Sadat's Prime
Minister, Mamdoult Salem,
and its secretary general is
Mahmoud Abu 1Vafia, Sa-
dat's brother-in-law.
The government - con-
trolled press supports the
center and Mohieddin is reg-
ularly criticized on front
pages. The sheikhs of Mos-
ques all over ?Egypt are re-
portedly urging the faithful
in their Friday sermons not
to join the leftist forum.
Under the circumstances,
Mohieddin said, the creation
? of. the forums is hardly true
democracy but "it's a start.
It's not bad. I have the right
to come down into the street
and present my program,
which I didn't have before.
?And after. the elections, we
will be, a. political party,
whether they call it that or
not. We will make our views
known and we will have our
supporters in the assembly."
He said his group has no
hope of winning a majority
of the 35a seats--outsidean-
alysts say 10 per cent would
be too high a goal?but that
he is aiming less for short-
run political gains than for
long-term changes in atti-
tude among. the Egyptian
people.
Mohieddin._ and Sadat
were both members of the
"Free Officers" who joined
Nasser in ousting King- Far-
ouk, but they had a political
falling out shortly afterward
'and have usually been at
odds since then..
Mohieddin has retained
his membership in the cen-
tral committee of the Arab
Socialist Union, however,
which made him eligible for
selection' to head the leftist
forum. It is taken for
granted that Sadat person-
ally approved this choice.
One theory is that Sadat
consented because Mohied-
din, despite his devout ad-
herence to Islam, is known
throughout Egypt as a Com-.
munist, which makes it im-.
possible for him to win any
widespread political sup-
port.
? "Ours is a leftist program
but not a 'Marxist program,"
Mohieddin said. "We have
30,000 members and we are
aiming ? for 100,000. About
600 of them are Marxists, a
very small percentage."
. He said 70 per. cent were
Nasserites, whom he defined
as those who "believe that
the laws of 1961 were the
proper starting point for
Egypt."
Those were the laws on
40
in the Middle East to eon-
firm the Israeli connection
has aroused some suspicion
that the prominent Israeli
role might actually be a
cover for assistance from
American and European
countries.
CIA sources here have
confirmed that the agency
assisted a Christian militia
with a program of stockpil-
ing light arms in the 1950s
as part of the agency's use
of minorities to stop any
Communist advance,
land reform, nationalization,
and confiscation of private.
fortunes that set the course
of Egypt's state socialist
economy under President
Nasser. Sadat, who has been
encouraging the inflow of
foreign capital, reopened
foreign banks and lifted
many restrictions on luxury
imports, has changed the ec-
onomic atmosphere .here in
ways that Mohieddin and his
allies do not like.
?This is now a. society
where you .can't find beans
or lentils in the shops but
you can find. Gruyere .
cheese. The people are as:
tonished. They were against -
the old policy and thought
they were going to cat bet- -
ter when the American
money flowed in, but now
they see it's not happening,"
he .said.
On foreign policy, the left-
ist forum ' emphasizes
Egypt's ties to the socialist
countries.
Mohieddin's was one of
the very few voices in Egypt
raised to protest Sadat's ab-
rogation of the friendship'
treaty with the Soviet Un-
ion. After that, the country's
biggest newspaper printed a.
series Of letters td the editor'
and man-in-the-street inter-
views telling him he was out
of tune with the Egyptian
majority. ,
Mohieddin said he knows
exactly how far he is permit-
ted to go in espousing leftist
positions and opposing the
government, although he
did net say, how far that
was.
"We have to work within
the system," he said. "There
are points beyond which we
cannot go. They can finish
us off any time. But what
would be the results of
that?"
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"A3iii;Oved ror tkelaiie-26O (Otta i'CIA-RoP77-o0432RboOtoo39o0641
*11:,SIONVTON-e3ee igovititteilort and the United States.
noW-faite eactpvcrit thmtighaettO0Ott in a .checkered belt -
that 41014 Ilevrn :i 'ss C.ntr4 Atiia, froniSomnafiato -Eta.;
opiet?:0easela, Kere., Zaire aortArliela... It is ..the position Of
;vierto..A41::::xua%,itiou that it ***it intended . nor willed
!this :sieration, officialt talk as If theIlideati Sterne now
shaa ore 'choicetei nutintairfite ? '
*ugh erne shipments finite East and West are rising
MIllifliArgArt officiaic. acknowledge
lY
, , tomteetiouts dtplornatic effmts are uoderway through the
Organization foo African 'Unity or with the Soviet Union to
tellsoussiestral= and oonsequenceater, -
IV.014,43f eitiati places IZIudillope.ra-tfie prospect of
fahnt-negutial#ns., Their tommentaji interviews are laden
with etortien and' a sense of drift:- But they Ascribed more
OUrposefahms itaissket moVesenthe area - . ?
State DO:Partantint adAbn discussion
oe
- within the Administratiotot"Whentiver one of , these etated-t
-.asks for taiyaid, the WIM/3313 1 argument is 'We've got a
eeli mibtionShip with that State, its neighbors me being armed by.
Russia, they're asking for help and we can't turn. them
'deem."' - ? - -
None.of tie arida; interae:Oted ths concerned about
risk of a direct Soviet-American confrontation or even a war
'between African statea The tevabling factor is that continu-
ing teriskes in the erea would divert resources from eci:a. ?
-iteenic testatoptoeut to military hardware and continue to
stoison Zo-dotp.L.rderican relations?es did Angola. .
Y,` Russin Susi poured hundreds of zailliOns of dollarIn -arms
Into Samaria, ll'eetiula mid 'Angollit-Thefaid"AdininistrationoS
has been znaldag up for lost time by trying to fill with '
' :natio sipals the interval before -Its new arms. arrive ha
Kenya, Ethiopia, and Zaire. In the last few days, the Penta-
gon dispatched a -frigate and petrel aircraft to Kenya, ?,-
, ? ?
The Vredi"Wity. Factor
.eivhsit happens," - one Administration official: asked, -9f
after this symbolic show of Americen supoort, Uganda were:
. to attack Kenya? What would we do then? Not miticheAndo
then what would happen to our credibility?' ' ?
? ? "Credibility," the Amexican -watchword in Vietnam and
: Angola, Is creeping into the Administration's vocabulary on .
Central Africa. The officials. traced the Cancan about cred-
- ibility hack to early 1975 as the Angolan Civil war began to.
.
? buildt; tottarel a victory for the Soviet-backed forces.-
- At that time, t.lte Administration's 'iirrmediate focus was
on Zaire.. Ftseident Mobutu SgA14. Sake. of Zaire, trying tO
goveorti aotiztorel-rich underdeveloped =entry and helpful to
the Attlmi istmtinel in North-South economic riegistiatiOnsr;
.-was of pert:huger hateresetoSeeretari. of State SerrY A;
Kissingeee ? , - t ?
? Zaire is liandlucked end Its primary river and rail routes to
:the sea rim through Angola. Mr. Xobutit feared that a Come
munist-enntiolled government in Luanda would cut' those
links. Re has also faced Internal security problems. ? .?-???";
' ftussia, according to Administration intelligence, delivered -
NEW YORK TIDIES
.19 !July 1976
POOR NA7101173 FEAK0e4wsubb'vements."-
s-
$200...1310011 in ems to Angola in the last two years.: To
coinitritt this, Ad:hints" tration 'arms transfers to Zaire rose
front *tent Si mdlikto in 1976 in$19 million in 1976, and
there aretelsortoOf a $SO relifi3Ott isiwit sale for 1977. Frence
recently sold Zaire 15 ?Mirage let figliters. Belgium also sells
mens to Zaire.
'As the Angolan situation .qttieted down, itlesdnistratian
-attention cantered on Kenya. Somalia and Uganda.- There! is
,4bad blood between the Kenyan President. ecitno Kentrattat
: and the Ugandan leader, Idi Amin Vida. ".
A.rnerican arms sales to Kenya went frorn zero in 1971 to
-. shoot 57 million in 3976 to a ozopesed $74 million deal for a
citizen F-SE jet fighters in 1977. Administration. officials also
said that Britain was about to conclude a major arms trans-
action with Kenya. A resolution of disapproval is expected
to be introduced in Congress to the proposed sale to Kenya, .
not so much to prevent the sale as to compel the Administra-
tion to present a longterm policy'
The siteation. in Ethiopia is more confused, complex and
volatile'African experts and high policymakers alike seem
to believe actual sear is both likely and pessible between
Ethiopia and Somalia. - ? ?
The military Government of Ethiopia is fighting rebels in
Eritrea and faces the prospect of war with Somalia over the
French territory of the Afars and the Issas:- The French will:
leave this last of their African colonies in about a 'Year. Its
, port city of Djibouti is the main trade outlet for Ethiopia, but
its people are overwhelmingly Somali. . -
According to Administration officials, Ethiopia , has bee
trying .to establish its socialist credentials and a 'new, rela-
tionship with Moscow. In meat months, State' Department ,
.officials eaidaidoscovreejected Ethiopian requests for arms,
but -tiro/ Moscow,andEthiepla have concluded an eeetionsic
s Ethiopia continues to make la.rge as panes fromthe
.United States. Since last October, official estimates ' put thetotal at $100 million, including more than a dozen F-5E's:.
:United States economic add to the states in-the region has
kept; steady at about $70 =linen Per year. significantly mere
, than Soviet economic el& But aid is mirthless important to
the development of the African estatesthan the madam Ittr7
being negotiated in-North-South meetings such as those on
the stabilization of export earnings.
1. ;This belt of states does not constitute an entity. The sitta.
,?c lion there is complicated blithe presence of Cuban railitr.V
n!'? advisers and because Libya provides arms and money to left-
wing Moslem friends and opposes-American interests. Fur-
ther complications arise from the internal instabliity
camtnee. such tas Sudan andthad whore coups and veep
.. attempts frequently are threatened. ? ?
' - Arms requests from all of the African states are expected
to docrease. Adrninistnation officials are not eager to -sell.
Silt for the time being, they see no alternative to the evolve
jng American role as supporter-of the regimes in Kenya,.
Zaire and Ethiopia and as maintainer of the regional balances
of militia', power.
YrIbas,21.1911XIIII7011.?
? ? 1...ealle if: Gelb is a diiiiiinaticeiarrespondent for The New.
. _
York Mies. ?
: 's E' Thti rent: of- thifear' is "the
NYAERE SAYS use to which America great
et. ? - pt:iweris efterr-puttand the e
President A
us - 'Xy,q,r,r# tent to which, American prin
let TallZ0)04:14 Pjligf4 fOlt.v e ,,have. :been flouted 'in. the
t w
.est Issuetif Timeinagatose as hiterea'Arnett-
oeyirig that the nations can poweet", the black African
of the world "fear America and leader said. ?
We straggle against America. . Mr. elk/Y.0'61"i .comments
even while We admire the great here 'Made m' a "Message to
principles of Alliatina: And her Aentitictie"iiiihatiagatinies,CMO
twit" issua . It as .oni of a! the plea . that it is Fighting -
Series of 'statements bat. World cPrnmunisra," ?"
leaders heing published to mark lie alsci said that the 'United
the United States Bicentennial. States was offering "direct and
Mr: Nyeiere, a socialist who indirect" support to the "rac-
-is. generally regarded 118 a mod- lot alla colonialist" forces o
elate said that in its -1.5 years Southern Africa.
of independence Tanzania ?had -Mr. Nyeiere unsuccessfully
?seen American military and eco- attempted to Mediate an agree.
,nouric power "time aed again inent between the white so-
lacingst anfi black laatiorailist
, freedom Used to fight freed forceio itittocosis; 41
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-AljP7140-43R000100390.005-6. ,
-
TI-E CI-PSTIAN SCENE MONITOR
Wednesday, July 21, 1076
Communist campaign against
By Russell Brines
* The show trial Of 12 foreign soldiers cap-
tured during Angola's civil war has set off a
worldwide campaign by communists and their
"revolutionary" supporters to build the word,
"Mercenary" into a knee-jerk anti-Western
symbol, like "iiiiperialisni" and -racism:*
? Their immediate purpose ds to biock the fur- r
ther. use of mercenaries or foreign volunteers
? in Africa's upcoming wars. This would give ,
.?.Moscow .and: its Cuban allies the .sOle con-
cession for: foreign meddling in troubled south-
ern Africa. ?
? The Luanda trial of three American and nine
British soldiers of fortune was staged for the
. explicit .purpose of condemning the United ,
States for financing the noncommunist merce- ?
naries who showed up in the Angolan civil war..
? "The Americans -(mercenaries). they are
nothing. . said the Angolan prosecutor, .
Manuel Rui Alves 1VIonteiro. "We are not out to :
get them, only the people who sent them in."
? *. President Agostirtho Neto added that the
United States is an "international recruiter of -
mercenaries and agents of subversion. . ."
Angolans made no attempt to prove these
charges. Instead, they Merely tried to hammer
them into the world's psyche, as part of the
continual *conditioning by the multibillion dollar
communist propaganda apparatus. Years of
manipulating "imperialism" and -racism"
have made it virtually impossible for Washing-
ton or any other Western capital to send troops
* in .support of any threatened country outSid-eruf-
.;: Europe and a few other spots, however worthy
the cause. If the same opprobrium can be at-*
tached to mercenaries ? or' "Mercenary prosti-
".:tutes," -as the Luanda prosecutor called them
the Western capacity. to help a threatened
friend, particularly di Africa; will be blocked. ?
The Angolan civil war was not a 'struggle
for freedom, but a- ruthless and ? successful
communist effort to -steal the anti-Portuguese
:revolution which already had been' won by An-.
golan factions supported by the majority of the
people. The Soviet-backed Movement for the
.Liberation of Angola (MPLA) won power and
established the present government when a Cu- .
6an expeditionary force of perhaps 0,000 men
defeated noncommunist rivals with tanks and .
other modern arms. .
Cuban, forces remain in Africa, despite pious ,
propaganda gestures' toward withdrawal, be-
cause their modern arms and fighting morale
be vital if -Moscow sets off the race war
against Rhodesia and South Africa that it is
? working overtime to detonate.' The Cubans al-
Western mercenaries
ready put-gun such black nations .as Zaire
which cornmtinist propagandists virtually have
called their enemies. Moscow has established
thecapacity and credibility to flood 'the region
with arms.
In fact, the Soviets and their allies have- cre-
. ated the strongest strategic position in the his-
tory of 'liberation wars" to Win a region by hi-
jacking revolution. The last link in this trap is
to prevent the infusion of trained Western' .
fighting technicians capable of Matching the: -
Cubans' military sophistication. They are:to be
condemned as "mercenaries," whether they -
fight for money or idealism.
To set off this campaign. the Angolans .
mounted a non-case 'against their 12 hapless
foreign captives: They had no charges that
would have stood up under any realistic defini-
tion of international law. So they staged a sad
bit of Gilbert and Sullivan in Leninist dress. ?
The American, Daniel Gearhart, was given the
death sentence, for example, for allegedly ad-
vertising his military prowess in a magazine.
He claimed he had not fired a shot during his
four days in Angola, and the point was not dis-
Puted--
Instead of ridiculing or condemning this per-
fect example of "socialist justice." as the An-
golan8 term it, the -noncommunist world ac-
cepted it with general indifference. Therefore.
it endorsed -the fact that the real ----crime" of
the mercenaries was in fighting or preparing
to fight against communist. usurpation of the
Angolan revolution. -
The Organization Of African Unity con-,
sequently was emboldened to begin a drive to
formally label all foreign mercenaries as crim-
inals and to treat them accordingly. In the
United States, .the National Conference of
Black.Lawyers (NCBL) has initiated a cam-
paign to use American neutrality laws to pre::
* vent any possible infusion of American experts
into African battlefields, and has struck a re--
sponse in Congress. The NCBL was repro-,
sented at the Luanda "trial" and was also rep-
resented at a special Moscow-Cuban-Angolan
propaganda conference on. Africa held last'
February in Havana..
Such is the process by which the word "mer-
cenary" is being singled out for criticism:
Mr. Brines is a free-lance writer on for- 7
elan affairs.
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It41, 1976
- _
Navy
Seane o
-lii llailEa
? By Bernard Wideman
s Special to The Watihing:ou Pz.$:
MANILA. July 20?Presi-
dent Ferdinand E. Marcos'
martial law government ap-
parently has used the recent
? reports of four Filipino fish-
ermen's deaths by U.S. Navy
''bombs to stir up sentiment
? against the United. States
during the current negotia-
tions on U.S.: bases here.
?Although 'Philippine offi-
cials have exonerated the
,U.S. Navy of responsibility
.? ?
'in the incident, the govern-
ment-controlled press has gi-
ven little coverage to the of-
? lidial findings.
? By contrast, the original
reports of the deaths re-
ceived headlines and
,prompted harsh anti-Ameri-
a.'an commentary in the
press.
For example, a columnist
the Daily Express, wrote:
? "First they killed four and
Wbtinded two. As if that
were not enough, they killed
two more. These U.S. Navy
NEW YORK TIMES
16 July 1976
M.I.T. Help for Taiwanese
Halted After U.S. Objection
CAMBRIDGE, Mass., July 14
(AP)?Massachusetts Institute
of Technology said today that
it had cut off a training pro-
gram for engineers from Tai-
wan because of State Depart-
merit objections.
Informed sources said the
Government feared the Taiwan
technicians could use technolo-
gy gained at M.I.T. to build mis-
siles to attack China.
The S917,000 program, paid
for by the National Taiwan Uni-
versity, began in January 1975
to teach 15 engineers to design
and produce aircraft-navigation
systems. The program ended
last month, six months early.
air exercises are too realis-
tic for our purposes. They're
posing the most telling argu-
ment againA having foreign
bases in this country. We
can't afford visitors who use
us for target practice with
live shells."
- The original story distrib-
uted by the government's
Philippine News Agency on
July 8 said four Filipino
fishermen were killed June
1?J by a bomb dropped by- a
U.S. Navy plane. ?
. -The press here also gave
prominent display to a re-
port a few days later of an
alleged incident June 14 in
which two fishermen were
-machine gunned and ser-
iously. wounded by U.S. Navy
planes.
; - The government-con-
,trolled press campaign must
--be viewed in light of the
base negotiations, in which
Marcos is not trying to get
rid of the bases but to ob-
tain more control over them
and more money.
- [Marcos told reporters to .7
,hat he hoped the nego-
tiations. would be completed
by December "notwithstand-
ing the fact that the United
States faces an election
sear," UPI reported.] ?
A week ago, the constabu;
- Lary commander of Zarn-
bales Province, where the
-'Subic Bay U.S. Naval Base
located',--cpmpleted an
? LONDON.TIMES
17 July. 1976
estigatiorr ?"f the bombing'
incident and cleared the
U.S. Navy of blame.
?.1. government. report, by
Lt. Col. Ernesto Venturina,
. said four men from a village
90 minutes by boat from the
bombing range had been
killed by a bomb but that
the explosion had happened
when the four tried to tow
an unexploded dud from the
- restricted target area.
Venturina's report said
that the U.S. forces had
complied with all required
procedures before conduct-
ing the live ammunition
?
bombing exercise and that
Philippine authorities had
warned villagers to stay
clear of the area.
Collecting munitions frag-
ments from U.S. exercises,
however, is a pmfitable cot-,
tage industry for the inhab-
itants of a half dozen nearby
? villages, including Pundakit.
'where the four victims
'lived.
' :."Some of 'them when they
learn of a scheduled bom-
bing exercfge go to the area
and watch for duds and
race against one another to
recover dud bombs," Ventu.
.rina's report said. '
? A bomb with explosive
_charge and primer intact
can bring up to $666.
A; On a recent visit to San
'Miguel, the village of the
two men allegedly wounded
on June 14, most villagers
said they knew of no one
who had been injured, but
rater two men said they had
been shot by a U.S. Navy
plane. Both were recovering
:from wounds.
The attending physician
at the hospital where the
two were treated said the
bullets, which caused leg
'fend arm woulds, were small
caliber, unlike those fired
from aircraft, and had been
fired from close range.
-The medical findings in
the case of the two men, al- "
though known to the mili-
tary, have not been released
.to,the press.
? ' The day the report exon-
eating the U.S. Navy in the'
bomb deaths was released,:
:Philippines Foreign Minis-
ten Carlos P. Romulo sent a
note to the U.S. embassy' re- ,
questing that the United ;
States stop all bombing ;
.?lorthwith" pending "more .
. effective measures of
safety."
The U.S. Navy, in the
;midst of the sensitive base
negotiations. has suspended .
' live ammunition exercisei,
, and stepped up its own in- .
vestigation, which is not yet
coinpleted. In an apparent'
7 good will move, it has of-
:fered to compensate thc0
involved . and
treating the two wounded
men in the U.S. Navy dis-
pensary.
Police called in over leak of)
secret papers in Australia
Canberra. July 16.?Mr Mal-
colm Fraser, the Australian
Prime Minister, has called in
police to find out how 15 secret
government documents have
been leaked to the press since
be assumed office in December.
These have, included defence
reports, foreign affairs docu-
ments, and papers from Mr
Fraser's Department as well as
from the Departments of Busi-
ness and Consumer Affairs and
Employment.
The latest leak, a letter to
the Prime Minister from Mr
Tony Street,. Employment Min-
ister, occurred shortly after a
43
secret transcript Of .port ?Of ?Mr.
Fraser's talks ? in Peking with,
Mr Hua Kuo-Feug, 'the
Chinese PrInie Minister,, fell
into. foreigd.,.:correspondenti'.
hands. . .
Mr William'. Macmalion,:
former .Liberai Prime Minister;
today called 'for an Official
Secrets Act in Australia to pre-
vent politically motivated civil,
servants giving material to the
press. At present, civil servants
who reveal government secrets
can be ? dealt with under' the
Public Services Act - The.
Crimes Act .can be invoked' in
some cases.?Reuter.
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THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JULY 16, 1976
Jamaica's Emergency Rule Cuts Political
By RALPH BLUMENTHAL
Special to The New York Times
KINGSTON, Jamaica?Strin-
gent emergency rule by the
leftist Government here has
kept the peace between violent
political factions for a month
now, but disorders still threaten
this Caribbean island 90 miles
south of Cuba.
The Government of Prime
Minister Michael Manley has
charged that Jamaica is being
"destabilized" by foreign and
domestic conspirators. The op-
position Labor Party counters
that the Government is using
its sweeping police powers to
intimidate critics as national
elections approach.
The turmoil is mining the
once flourishing tourist indus-
try and is aggravating the
already high 25 per cent un-
employment rate. Businessmen,
fearful of an anticapitalist
trend, have been smuggling out
their assets, draining Jamaica
of its monetary reserves.
1,000 Are in Custody
? According to official figures,
about 1,000 Jamaicans have.
been taken into custody with-
out charges since the Manley
Government had the Governor
General invoke the emergency
on June 19 for 30 days.
Most detainees were released
after several days of question-
ing in a former British military
camp in central Kingston. But
more than 200 have been held
on verious charges and at any
given moment more than 50
remain under detention.
To the relief of many Jamai-
cans, the emergency rule has
sharply reduced the political
shootings and firebombings
that have focused on Kingston
slum-dwellers and plunged the
island into the worst crisia of
its 14 years of independence
from Britain.
Serious Crimes Down
Serious crimes ? murders,
rapes, robberies? which were
running as high as 160 a week
before the emergency were
down to 54 after several weeks,
according to security officials.
once before, under a Labor
Party government, from Oct. 3
to Nov. 2, 1966. It applied,
however, only to a particular
region around Kingston where
partisan violence had erupted.
Manley Explains Measures
According to Prime Minister
Manley, the state of emergency
,was precipitated by information
that ?fr 'a new wave of violence
lwas planned" to coincide with
Carifesta, the festival set to
start here later this month.
"We became aware of a
specific development that could
only be described as strange in
the extreme," he said, alluding
to a report that an informant
was prepared to denounce a
Government agency for alleged-
ly distributing guns, presumably
from Cuba. ,
Then, Mr. Manley said, the
man retracted his allegations
and said he had been forced
into trying to embarrass the
Government.
Smokescreen Is Charged
But the opposition calls this
a smokescreen.
"From the day we saw what
happened in India we said this
is going to happen here," con-
tended Edward Seaga, Labor
Party leader.
-Mr. Seaga, a financial con-
sultant of Lebanese ancestry
and finance minister in the
?Labor Party Government before
1972, maintained that his party
had been gaining support. Mr.
Manley, to frustrate this, di-
rected the emergency powers
"to set the stage for immediate
manipulated bogus elections,"
Mr. Seaga said. ?
From the beginning, more
members of the Labor Party
than the People's National
Party were ? picked up for
detention.
While maintaining that only
security considerations and not
politics were the grounds for
detention, the Prime Minister
in effect acknowledged the im-
balance when he told Parlia-
ment that "both as a matter of
evidence and common sense"
the governing party was not
planning to overthrow itself.
But the crackdown has pro- Hysteria Is Charged
yoked a. counterreaction from
The 51-year-old Prime Minis-
the Labor Party, which has ter, son of a former Prime
charged Mr. Manley with using Minister and leading Jamaican
the emergency to advance the patriot, Norman Washington
prospects of his People's Na- Manley, in turn charged his
tional Party, whose five-year
mandate expires by next
March.
conservative opposition with
embracing violence in despair
of winning power constitu-
The emergency, which has tonally and seeking "to spread
curtailed civil libertiesand a wave of hysteria throughout
banned utterances and printed the country based on the oft-
articles "likely to be prej- repeated allegation that the
udicial to the public safety," Government was Communist."
came in response to what Prime
Minister Manley described as a
bizarre plot to smear the Gov-
ernment and provoke a new economic involvement but also
wave of violence.
An emergency was invoked
Mr. Manley calls his Govern-
meet "democratic socialist."
He has said he favors state
private enterprise and democ-
racy.
The elections will take place
as required in, coining months,
Mr. Manley said.
Mr. Manley and his ministers
have also suggested that the
? Central Intelligence Agency has
a hand in the "destabilization"
of Jamaica.
The allegations have been
protested by the American am-
bassador, Sumner Gerard, who
has transmitted to Mr. Manley
assurances from Secretary of
State Henry A. Kissinger and
William E. Colby, then Director
of Central Intelligence, that no
United States clandestine opera-
tions are under way or con-
templated in Jamaica. .
Approached by C.I.A.
Jamaican Government of-
ficials have retorted that Such
assurances were also given
Chile while the C.I.A. was
undermining the late President
Salvador Allende Gossens.
Investigation and interviews
here this month produced no
substantiation for the charge of
United States-sponsored ac-
tivities, although' the C.I.A. is
understood to maintain what is
called an "acknowledged pres-
ence"? here, as in many coun-
tries overseas, to collect in-
telligence.
For example, one longtime
American businessman recalled
an occasion about a -year and
a half ago when he was ap-
proached by a C.I.A. man for
help in obtaining the plans for
a newly built extension to the
Chinese Embassy.
The American passed the
request on to an architect he
knew. The architect checked
Into it, turned the information
over to the American who, in
turn, reported back to the
C.I.A. man: "The room is 30 by
80 feet. They eat on one side.
Then they play Ping Pong on
the other side."
Close Ties With Cuba '
At the same time, there does
not appear to be any significant
intrusion by the Cubans with
whom Mr. Manley, an advocate
of third world solidarity, has
been building a closer relation-
ship. .
Western diplomats who have
been watching the situation
closely say that while the grow-
ing exchanges are bringing
Violence
over more Cubans, Havana
seems to be taking a cautious
approach toward any entangle-
ment in Jamaica.
In fact, apart from the tragic
violence that has claimed so
many dead and injured, there is
a kind of opera-bouffe quality
to events on this island of blue
mountains, white beaches and
throbbing reggae music. .
Some nights ago, for example,
a few sleepy lovers were linger-
ing under the palms around the
Sheraton Kingston pool when
a soldier in battle gear stepped
out of the shadows. He was
followed by several other sol-
diers and suddenly the garden'
was aswarm with soldiers
carrying rifles and submachine
guns.
As 50 soldiers ringed the
hotel and about 25 covered the
garden, 15 burst into the Jun-
kanoo LoUnge to seize a
suspected gunman nicknamed
"Slcully," who was talking with
two women. He went quietly.
But two days later, released, he
showed up back in the bar.
Dollar Drain Serious ,
One of Jamaica's gravest
problems cannot be resolved by
police action. It is the dollar
drain. Although the outflow has
been impossible to gauge
accurately, the Minister of
Mining put the amount of re-
cently illegally exported cur-
rency at more than $225 million,
a huge loss for a nation the
size of Connecticut with a $1
billion annual budget.
Jamaica recently. borrowed
$90 million from Trinidad and
Tobago, Barbados and Guyana,
but this is expected to see the
nation through only to October.
Bauxite production, the is-
land's leading money earner, is
running at 70 percent of last
year's output, which earned the
Government $170 million. Tour-
ism, which brought in $135
million in foreign exchange last
year, will, from all indications,
suffer a disastrous blow when
the winter season arrives.
As an indication of what
tourist promoters are up
against, the Tourism and In-
dustry Minister, P. J. Patterson,
recently sought 'to assure pros-
pective visitors that any tourists
caught in curfews or cordons
"would be treated with courtesy
and understanding by the se-
curity forces."
44
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