THE TRIAL OF THE C. I . A

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 12, 1976
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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NO. 17
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
GENERAL
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17 SEPTlt11BER 1976
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Not all its covert actions have succeeded, but the
agency did manage to outfox Congressional investigators.
2V WaVE90lT M1-RMOTM
There have been enough revelations about the Central Intelligence
Agency over the past two years to keep diplomats, prosecutors, reporters and
philosophers busy for entire careers. Three separate investigations not only
stretched the imagination with show-biz material about cobra venom and
deadly skindiving suits but twisted the lens on the American self-image in
foreign affairs. The investigations rewrote history-the history, for example,
of the relationship between the United States and the Castro Government
in Cuba. They showed that the C.I.A., in some 900 foreign interventions
over the past two decades, has run secret wars around the globe and has
clandestinely dominated foreign governments so thoroughly as to make
them virtual client states. In contrast to Watergate, the C.I.A. investiga-
tions proved that abuses of power have not been limited to one particular
Administration or one political party. They also established facts that few
people were prepared to believe-such as that distinguished gentlemen
from the C.I.A. hatched assassination plots with Mafia gangsters.
With all these surprises percolating, the most interesting surprise has
been largely ignored. And that is how the C.I.A. investigations ceased. The
topic faded away so quickly as to make the whole episode look like a fad.
Unlike the F.B.I. issue, which has moved to the prosecutors' offices and
stayed on the front page, the vaunted trial of the C.I.A. has already become
a memory. And the agency itself has survived the scandals with its covert
operations intact, if not strengthened.
The collapse of the C.I.A. investigations has been due largely to in-
eptitude, poor judgment and lack of will on the part of the Congressional
committees. But the agency also played a role. Its strategy was flawless.
"Those guys really knew what they were doing," says a staff member of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence chaired by Frank Church. "I
think they defended themselves just like any other agency would, except
they're better. They had a whole office set up to deal with us, and I some-
times had the feeling that they ran operations against us like they run them
against foreign governments. It was like the C.I.A.' station for the Congress
instead of for Greece or Vietnam." The story of how they came out ahead of
their investigators says a great deal about both the Congress and the agency,
and about the problem of reconciling the demands of the superspy with the
democracy he is supposed to protect.
In the spring -of 1975, the Church committee had been spinning its,
wheels for several months without much success. Charged with the task of
investigating more than a dozen intelligence
agencies, any one of which' was an enormous
challenge, the Senators became cnsnarled in
debate over how to proceed. The agencies
were stalling, hoping to deflect attention else-
where. 't'hen the committee got a break.
Approl*A FlwslR se i- $JJQ8 ~~Cl4 RDP77-00432R000100390001-4
Taylor Branch is th,e Wcwhingeon columnist
Pike.
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under Vice President Rockefeller that January, , to inquire into charges of
illegal domestic spying by the C.I.A., announced that it had received
evidence of, C.I.A. involvement in attempts to kill foreign leaders. The news
created an instant sensation. Rockefeller said his commission, which was
completing its work, had neither the time nor the mandate to pursue
the matter, and he turned the evidence over to President Ford, who quickly
passed it along to the Church committee. Suddenly, the Senators found
themselves with a large batch of classified documents and with responsi-
bility for the hottest issue since Watergate.
For five months last year, the Church committee focused its energy
on assassinations. Other investigations lapsed. Staff members were pulled
from other projects. While it is no mean feat in the Senate to obtain sus-
tained, personal effort from Senators on any single subject, the members of
the Church committee went to C.I.A. briefings day after day to be intro-
duced to the agency's arcane methods. In November 1975, the committee
published an interim report on this one aspect, and Senators and staff alike
were proud of it. As an exploration of the Machiavellian underside of
American foreign policy, it was, in fact, a tour de force. Yet it failed to
build public support for investigating or controlling the C.I.A.
Press and TV coverage was intense but shortlived, focusing on certain
salacious details: the gangster plots, the titillating reports of. an affair
between President Kennedy and the mistress of one of the gangsters, and
terest was down. Assassina-
tions proved peripheral to the
main business of C.I.A. covert
action, and the investigation
of that unknown realm had
scarcely begun. With in-
vestigations of the other intel-
ligence agencies, including the
F.B.I., still ahead of them, five
crucial months had been lost
-along with much of the
committee's momentum. The
Senate's February 1976 dead-
line for the completion of all
work loomed large. And
Church wanted to wrap up
his investigative chores in.
order to begin his own Presi-
dential campaign.
The Church committee had
gambled heavily on the assas-
sination report. And lost.
a few exotic spy plans worthy of a television serial. In this last category, ecnrdinrr to Mitchell
with a chemical that would make his beard fall out and thereby destroy his,'
s ecial counsel-dur-
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tations that had grown up.
The committee did not claim to have found a "smoking gun," in the from the agency's point of view
form of a kill order ringing down from the Oval Office, through the C.I.A. was covert action-secret in-
chain of command and out to some mysterious trigger man in a foreign terventi6ns abroad by means
capital. Quite the contrary. Where the American efforts to kill were most of propaganda, bribes, manip-
direct and persistent-in the case of Castro-they were unsuccessful. And ulation of foreign agents and,
where the foreign leaders were actually killed-Lumumba in the Congo, Tru- in some cases, paramilitary
jillo in the Dominican Republic, Diem in South Vietnam, Schneider in Chile force - as distinct from gath-
there was no hard proof that C.I.A. operatives actually took part.in the ering and analyzing intelli-
murders. In some cases, the agency seemed to withdraw at the last moment. genre. The promotion system
In other cases, "someone else got there first. Of the Diem assassination the for C.I.A. case officers has
committee could only say that the C.I.A. had sanctioned and encouraged a been built around operations,
coup against his Government when there was a reasonable chance the plot- and C.I.A. leadership has been
drawn from the operators-
ters would kill him. But no direct orders to assassinate. Everything was a Allen Dulles, Richard Helms,
little blurred. Even the most direct written
communications, as in the Lurnumba case, William Colby-instead of in-
were couched in opaque C.I.A. language:-- telligence analysts. Veteran
"Hunting good here when lights right." agency operatives often say
Smoking guns are considered thoroughly that without covert action the
unprofessional in clandestine operations, C.I.A. would be nothing but
where secrecy is paramount and it is a mark a collection of sophisticated
of skill to channel existing forces subtly. The professors with mounds of in-
assassination report, on the other hand, was' telligence, and the agency it-
publicly judged by self would be only a more spe-
Dominican strongman, how cialized version of the State
standards built for palpable Department.
and exotic murders. Because the agency provided assur- The C.I.A. approached the
no foreign leaders were, ances of support to those who Congressional investigations
killed outright by American: plotted against him, how
initiative, planning and ex- C.I.A. officials smuggled with one central objective: to.
ecution, the C.I.A. benefited weapons into the country and protect the means and prac-
from a general impression exchanged cryptic messages lice of covert action. It was
in line with this strategy that
that it came out of the - on the likelihood of a success-
assassination inquiry with ful assassination. In keep'ng Colby and Rogovin gave
ground on the marginal issue
clean hands. This impression with its courtroom definition of assassination, cooperating
is false. of assassination, however, -the with the Church- committee,
committee exonerated the turning over more informa-
of many thousands agency of Trujillo's murder on
of people have died as a result the ground that the weapons tion than the committee could
of secret C.I.A. digest, helping the committee
paramilitary it smuggled in were probably use itself u Then, when the
interventions in countries P-
ranging from Laos to Cuba to not the ones used in the kill-
ranging report was com-
the Congo. (The Church com- ing. pleted, Rogovin became tough,
mittee obtained some casualty "By the time we finished about information to be grant-
figures but did not publish the assassination report," re ed for the `remainder of the
them at the agency's request.) calls the leader of one of the investigation - especially in
And, in the case of selected committee's task forces, "we . regard to covert action. The
killings detailed in the report, had lost three things-the committee was floundering;
the fine between involvement public's attention, much of Rogovin pressed his advan-
and actual murder is often our own energy and will tage. "We agreed with the
shadowy. For example, the power, and our leadership. committee that they could
Church committee reported Quite candidly, we had lost have access to information for
extensively on the maneuver- Frank Church," The Senator, six case studies in covert ac-
ing that preceded ti~~ L
nsatinn of Rafael "1 ninon n
can policy turned against the vailing atmosphere. Public in-
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of secrecy oaths that they
would not even. let the names
of the other five countries
leak." The case study he chose
was Chile-a selection favora-
ble to the agency, since a lot
of material on the C.I.A.'s in-
tervention in Chile had al-
ready leaked to the press:
"It was a bad deal," says
F.A.O. Schwarz, the commit-
. tee's chief counsel. Many of
the principal staff members
opposed the settlement. What
little they had learned about
covert action in the course of
the assassination investiga-
tion had made them realize its
was one of the hardest but
also one of the most important
issues to deal with. "That i$
why we went so heavily into
Mongoose in the assassina-
tion report," Schwarz ex-
plains.
Operation Mongoose was a
covert action designed to
weaken and destroy the Cas-
tro regime through an orches-
trated program of economic
sabotage, commando raids
.and paramilitary harassment.
It was the heart of the agen-
cy's effort to overthrow Cas-
tro; simultaneous' assassina-
tion attempts complemented
Mongoose rather than vice
versa. Although the campaign
failed, it was kept so secret
that the American public was
left with a fundamentally dis-
torted view'of United States-
Cuba relations for more than
a decade.
Before the committee's re-
port, it was generally accepted
that the Kennedy Administra-
tion ceased hostilities against
Castro after the Bay of Pigs,
until forced to act defensively
by the unprovoked introduc-
tion of Russian missiles on
Cuban soil. The Church com-
mittee revealed that not only
were there repeated attempts
on Castro's life before and
after the missile crisis but
covert Mongoose raids were
being intensified throughout
the period. The assassination
report quotes the minutes of
high-level meetings, less than
two weeks before the missile
crisis, at which Attorney
General Robert Kennedy
spurred the C.I.A. on to hit
Castro harder.
The assassination report,
outside sources generally
agree, was the high point of
the committee's investigation.
After that, the staff divided
into two groups, one known
informally as "the lawyers"-.
a group of attorneys drawn
together largely by Schwarz
-and the other as "the
professors," who were gener-
aly foreigaa - policy experts
with academic routs or Capi-
tol Hill exl e,^:c re:. Under
task - force leader William
Bader, the "professors" be-
came responsible for the C.I.A.
investigation, while .the "law-
yers" went off after the
F.B.I. Frictions developed be-
tween the two groups, the
Bader group tending to criti-
cize the lawyers as too
prosecutorial and "Watergate-
minded," and the Schwarz
team hinting that the Bader
group was too soft in its
handling of the C.I.A.'s pros..
In any event, discouraged by
the covert-action compromise,
the "professors" never recov-
ered the initiative.
n the House, the Select
Committee on Intelli-
gence chaired by Otis
Pike-the counterpart
of the' Church committee-
pursued an arduous and in-
dependent course. Created
only after a long internecine
squabble over its leadership,
its mandate weakened by con-
tinuing- feuds in the House,
the committee struggled
through the summer of 1975
to breathe life into itself-
seeking, on one occasion, to
justify its existence- by leak-
ing the sensational but un-
verified story that Nixon aide
Alexander Butterfield had
been a C.I.A. "plant" in thel
White House. The story was
refuted, leaving the committee
with less credibility than ever.
By fall, the traditional jealousy
between the House and the
'Senate had flared up behind
the scenes, and Mitchell Ro-
govin, negotiating with both
committees, was finding them
competitive. "Church," says
Rogovin, "held his `,toxin hear-
ings' because he was afraid
Pike would do it if he didn't."
By December, the House and
.Senate committees were set on
opposite courses. Pike wanted
to impale the C.I.A. for its
abuses. Church wanted to
show that a Senate committee
could handle national secrets
responsibly. The Ford Admini-
stration played the commit-
tees against each other. When
Pike demanded information
and denounced "delaying tac-
tics," Administration spokes-
men would point to the ex-
emplary behavior of the Church
committee and appeal for a,
more cooperative spirit. When
the Church committee cooper-
aced, the Administration tended
to see it as a sign of weakness
and feel freer to hold back
on information. Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger and
C.I.A. director William E.
Colby simply boycotted all
the covert-action hearings,
and the conunittee accepted
the rebuff instead of subpoe-
naing them.
"The object of the exercise,"
says a Church committee staff
we were not Pike. We were
not going to move the Con-
gress or the public by more
expose. What was going to
'carry us was the kind of edi-
torial we finally got in The
Washington Post: `An Intelli-
gent Approach to Intelli-
gence."' The committee evi-
denced an increasing aware-
ness of its public image, of
its ability to keep secrets.
avoid leaks and work in some
semblance of public harmony
. with the C.I.A. Many on the
committee staff endorsed this
approach as the path toward
"establishing a relationship"
that would serve the Congres-
sional committee that was to
be set up to exercise over-
sight-supervision of the in-
telligence agencies. Some of
these investigators have, in
fact, moved on to jobs with
the oversight committee, now
in business. Their attitude was
infectious: Even today, many
former Church committee
staff members are more reti-
cent in discussing C.I.A. mat-
ters than C.I.A. officials them-
selves.
n Dec. 24, a band of
unknown terrorists
assassinated Rich-
ard Welch, the C.I.A.
chief of station in Greece.
Welch had been identified as
a C.I.A. official by a small
anti-C.I.A. magazine, and a
.furor immediately arose over
whether the revelation had
anything to do with his death.
The Senators on the Church
committee received a flood of
letters denouncing its work on
the grounds that exposure of
C.I.A. secrets is an invitation
to the killing of C.I.A. offi-
cials.
Sources on both sides of the
C.I.A. investigation now agree
that neither the magazine nor
the Church committee is
likely to have caused Welch's
death. He was a relatively
well-known figure in Athens,
certainly to the kind of organ-
ized political groups likely to
have killed him. These proba-
bilities were overwhelmed,
however, by the emotional
power of the tragedy, and the
C.I.A. encouraged the idea
that C.I.A. critics might have
contributed indirectly to the
murder. Rogovin would only
tell the. Church committee
that its own investigations
were not "directly" responsi-
ble. Colby lashed out in public'
at those who revealed C.I.A.
secrets as being more sinister
than the secrets themselves.
Ford made public statements
to th,,e effect that inquiries
into C.I.A. methods were
unpatriotic.
No single event (lid more toa
turn 1 uh!it: opiY ion at `Hirst
the investigatae its than the
Welch affair. As 1975 ended,
the press was shying away
from ,the C.I.A.,issue, and ?huy-
tility toward the inquiry was
building up-in Congress itself.
As to the C.I.A.'s private
thoughts on whether naming
senior officials makes them
more vulnerable to "the other
side," a move that escaped
public attention may provide
some insight: Welch was re-
placed in Athens by a man
who had been identified as a
C.I.A. official. by Greek news-
papers and an American
-magazine.
On Jan. 29, 1976, Represent-
ative John Young, Democrat
of Texas, offered a motion on
the House floor to suppress
the final report of the Pike
committee. The ensuing de-
bate was not distinguished.
Some speakers argued that
the report-which they admit-
ted they had not read --
would endanger national se-
curity and align the House
with the murderers of Richard
Welch. Others, like Wayne
Hays, argued for suppression
on the grounds that the report
would be boring: "I suspect
that when this report
comes out it is going to be
the biggest nonevent since
Brigitte Bardot, after 40 years
and four husbands and nurrer--
ous lovers, held a press con-
ference to armounce that she
was no longer a virgin."
Views like these prevailed,
and the House, by a vote of
246 to 124, ordered its own
report to be locked away in
the clerk's safe.
The document did not re-
main suppressed very long. it
was leaked to CBS co.rres-
?pondent Daniel Schorr, who in
turn leaked it to The Vilage
Voice through a series of inter-
mediaries. When The Voice
published the report in two
special supplements under ban-
ner headlines, it became the
most spectacular leak of the
C.I.A. investigations.
Pike developed two themat-
ic criticisms of the C.I.A.
First, he amassed evidence of
repeated intelligence failures,
showing how the agency had
failed to anticipate such major
world events as the 1968 Tct
offensive in Vietnam, the Rus-
sian invasion of Czechoslova-
kia the same year, and the
1973 Yom Kippur war in the
Middle East. Citing various
bureaucratic entanglements
and preoccupations as the
cause of poor performance,
Pike took the agency to task
for bunging the one function
- gath ering intrellir e:nce -
ageinst which tl,:ere is no am
diyle dissent. Pike':. secot,ci
line of craicisrri was more
subsi.antive: Un attackcd Cu"-
C r't? as 'iii"s't b;r revs iia~t; a fe et
xue.nl; I
don't
think we'
.
ve got a conflict on this one, Toni..
SNYD.ER: What if Jimmy Carter is elected in November?
What happens to your job?
DIRECTOR BUSH: I serve at the pleasure of the President.
And I would not make it difficult for a new President to get rid
18
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of me. And I'll tell you why. I don't believe the agency or the
Director of CIA, Director of Central Intelligence or the head of
CIA should be partisan. But I do believe strongly -that-whoever
heads the intelligence community, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, must have the confidence of the President. He can't serve
intelligence well if he doesn't. And the President is ill-served
if he can't have confidence in what the Director is telling him.
And so there is a certain compatibility separate and
apart from politics that is in the national interest. And so-what
happens, I don't know. And I really think it's far less important
than whether this community stays strong, the intelligence community.
And so I would say "Mr. President, any time you want to get a new
man in here, please proceed so to do." And I don't think that is.
making partisan a nonpartisan job. It's simply my conception. of hoI4
government ought to operate.
SNYDER: I don't have historicity in my head as to
what happens when a President of a different party comes into
office. Do you remember what happened....
SNYDER: Yes. When Johnson came in, or when Johnson
left and Nixon came in.
DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, Dulles -- Dulles was eventually
replaced by Kennedy. There was a little period of time. I mean
President Kennedy replaced....
SNYDER: Replaced Allen Dulles.
DIRECTOR BUSH: ...Allen Dulles. I can't -- I'll be
honest; I haven't looked back.
SNYDER: Who was in when --- does anybody in the room
know when Johnson and Nixon....
DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, Dick Helms.
SNYDER: Well., he remained.
DIRECTOR BUSH: But I don't remember. I thought you
were talking about turnovers. I.can't....
SNYDER: No, I'm just wondering. The minute Kennedy
took office from a Republican, Eisenhower, did you fire the CIA
Director? .-
DIRECTOR BUSH No, no.
SNYDER: I don't think so.
DIRECTOR BUSH: No, no, no, no.
SNYDER: And.when Nixon took it from the Democrat, Mr.
Johnson, did he fire the CIA Director?
DIRECTOR BUSH: No. But in fairness....
SNYDER: And I'm not trying to dictate....
DIRECTOR BUSH: No', but in fairness, Tom, there has
never been a Director who has had as active a political past as
I have. And so just as I understood the debate on my nomination
before the Senate, I would understand a review of. my position, if-
for no other reason than because I had been actively involved on the
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other side of the political spectrum, .you know, should your
hypothesis work out.
But again I come back, not trying to sound holier thin
thou, lbut that's inconsequential. What really is essential is
now. It's working well. The Director Aof'Central Intelligence''
is given access to a Pros e
_ _
n
strong foreign intelligence community. 1t:And Jthat's what's-essen--
U
tial
whoever I
P
,
s
resident.. And my future, my getting a job
really is .coincide
t
l:
n
a
SNYDER: We will continue after these announcements:
I hope y o u ' l l crag r.
d
ne
SNYDER: You mentioned that you feel it's proper that
11 Carter, the Democratic nominee, be briefed on certain.iitems.
Who decides how much he will be told?
DIRECTOI BUSH: Well, in the final analysis, the President.
The President's instructions to me, as head of the'intelligence com-
munity, is the determining factor. But the President took a very
broad view. He said I think that it's most important that the
that Governor Carter be given intelligence briefings. But then
I worked out, as the designee of the President, with Governor Carter
the parameters of the briefings. And we decided that they should
'be'on intelligence, that they should stay away,from policy and that -
they should stay away from sources and methods, which is a certain
code for the things I am to protect under the law. Governor Carter
recognized that he didn't need to know at this juncture the sources
and methods of the intelligence. And so our briefings-have consisted
of-finished intelligence. I,'ve attended 'the. two briefings on'intel-
ligence, and fortunately fore him with me went some of our very top
experts in the areas that he'was interested in. And we're not
holding back. The President has made clear to me he wants Governor
Carter fully briefed, and this is what we're doing. And the bene-
ficiary is the United States of America.
SNYDER: Now in the briefings -- and if you can't say,
you will just say "I can't say." I,understand because I'm a neo-
phyte and I don't want to get into areas of great sensitivity.
But do you brief. the opposition candidate on methodology, per-
sonnel, location, or do you brief him on things that are happening
currently incountries,where we operate intelligence installations?-
DIRECTOR BUSH: It's` the latter. We don't go into metho-
dology. Sources and methods of intelligence we don't go into.
SNYDER: Like in country "X," Mr. "A" is doing such and
such to make sure that political .Ir. "B" will not advance. That
kind of thing?
DIRECTOR BUSH: No. We don'.t go into the source or
method'. What we go into is here's the way one conceives the
strength of the Soviet Union, for example, where it's up against
NATO, you know' Or, here's what we think that might happen in
China after Chairman Mao passes on.. Or, here's a current Intel--
1'igen'ce briefing. Here's the status of what might be goin-o
in some area, maybe the Middle'East or Africa, or wherevergitnis.
SNYDER: I understand.
DI:RIsCTUP, BUs11: We stay out of policy. We give him
intelligence. We respond to questions. And I hope its working
2n
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to-his satisfaction. The people at th.e CIA, the professionals
with whom I work, feel that the briefings have gone reasonably
well.
SNYDER: Will there be more before the election?
DIRECTOR BUSH: That. depends on what Governor Carter
feels he requires.
SNYDER: I see. Now what....
DIRECTOR BUSH: The President has authorized me to give
him what he needs in terms of intelligence briefings.
SNYDER: Has he asked for anything you wouldn't tell him?
DIRECTOR BUSH: Now, Tom, you're getting into....
SNYDER: I understand.
DIRECTOR BUSH: No, I don't think so. I don't think
he has. No. And I don't think we had any differences with the
`Governor.
SNYDER: What arrangement is there, though, and I'm cer-
tain there must be some, between the President and Governor Carter
in terms of using information supplied by yourself and your associates
as. campaign issue or campaign speechmaking source?
DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I don't -- I don't --- if there is
some arrangement that they've discussed, something between them of
that nature -- certainly I've not been any intermediary on that kind
.of an arrangement. I don't expect that kind of an arrangement exists.
I think that any recipient of highly classified intelligence in the
position of Governor and certainly the President recognizes he's
dealing with sensitive information. And I don't expect there will
be an abuse of this information.
But should that have been discussed, it hasn't been dis-
cussed with me, nor should it be. That would be an arrangement, a
policy kind of a thing that would be worked out elsewhere. But I
don't believe there's such an arrangement.
u now are at . dDing
.goo yo this kind
SNYDER: But you really are
ood
I'
g
.
m out of time. But
you really are good at this,, and you should do it more often' It
would help you, and it would help -your company.-..
..Thank you for being here this morning.
DIRECTOR BUSH: Thank you,-Tom.
PIIILAD;sLPi{IA INd~UIRhTj
6
16 SEp i P!Tll>il 197
Quotable: A matter of choice
"I don't lie; I just choose -what f say."
Former CIA director William ('o11 )y. spooking to students
at the University of Pennsyivania Tuesday night
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WASHINGTON POST
1 6 SEP 1976
A
charges of bank robbery, and who
wound up, in an ironic turn of the
story, working briefly for the Interna-
tional Rescue Committee of which
'?Cherne was chairman of the board.
. Early last year Casey persuaded the
1los Angeles Times to send him and
,two st.aff reporters to Hong Kong at a
reported cost of $15,000 for a prom-
ised rendezvous with Hearst. The
newspaper subsequently described the
episode as a hoax. Casey, acknowl-
edged that,the Hearst trip "bummed
out."
Casey's career also encompassed a
tiine-month period as director of spe-
:cial projects for Boys Town, the Ne-
-braska community started by Father,
Flanigan, from which he was fired in
a dispute with the administration over.
the alleged theft of 3l files for *an
MGM television production. (`.'One of
my jobs," he said, "was to get them
publicity.")
When Cherne found out who had
turned up with his notebook, lie noti-
fied the intelligence staff and was
advised "to play it down and not make
it appear to,be important." The initial
judgment was that the loss was not
of great security significance.
Cherne maintains that he first
learned that Casey was employed in
the Los Angeles office of the Inter-
national Rescue Committee as a con-
sultant during an Aug. 22, 1975,'phone
conversation with him. "i said, 'I
don't think terribly much about you'
association with IRC and when I de-
cide finally, I'll ask. for your. resigna-
tion.'
The green notebook was returned
on Aug. 2G, 1975, and Cherne turned
it over to. the intelligence, staff. Three
weeks later he called Casey and asked
for h:s resignation. "He submitted
cheerfully, always cheerfully," Cherne
reminisced.
On Sept.. -2 Casey sent a Mailgram
to the p_csiding judge in the Heist
case, Oliver J. Carter, in the name of
the IBC.
"We, p.?ayfully request that Patricia
Hearst be admitted to bail." the tele-
grams read. "Picasv consider that
Patty Hearst was directly and Indi-
rectly i esponsible rror the, safe cvacua-
timr of :m:97 men, women and childr::n
W tit ;,;t reg:tl;I i'' ,)to!- own safety dur-
ing th4 last. week of \pril, 1975, at
Srti ai Smith Vietnam."
'I?nc lclegrani was inmmedi'ately re-
purtiate:l by the IBC, on Chernc's in.
st; uctinns.
In i'elr nary of this year ChM-11e
was appointed to the Intelligence
Oversight Board by -President. Ford
and also named chairman of the For-
eign hutciligence Advisory Board, of
which lie was a member at. the time of
his European trip. Ills' offices here
arc in Iito Executive Office Building,.
and lie cnnuturtes from New Y rr?k an
avcrarie of twice a week.
11) Itlto-ch, a rcnoricr for the tiara M.
e n Evening '. Tribune, Robed t)ielrich,
,.all"d Cherne: e:,platninz; that Casey
had showed him the contents of the
notebook.
e
By Laurence Stern
Wasnlnufo i Post Staff Writer
Leo Cherne, one of President Ford's
chief intelligence advisers, . is a cen-
tral' figure in a 'justice Department
national security investigation that i>i
being described by federal officials as
"the green book affair."
The green book is a government
note pad in. which a staff aide to
Cherne recorded briefings with diplo-
matic and intelligence officers during
a trip to Europe in March, 1975.
Cherne is chairman of the Presi-
dent's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board and a member of the newly
:formed three-member Intelligence
Oversight Board.
The notebook, officially described
.as having contained "classified infor-
mation. . injurious to. the national
security of the United States," disap-
peared immediately after Cherne and
his aide, Cmdr. Lionel H. Olmer, re-
turned from the European trip.
Here the plot thickens. Olmer. an
intelligence officer during his entire
"19-year naval career, says he, has no
idea how the little green notebook got
out of his possession. He ? is described
by associates as an extremely meticu-
lous professional experienced in the
'.handling of classified material.
'Within several hours after his ar-
rival at his Rockville,: ] Id.. home, he
called _ Wheaton. Byers, executive see-
retary-of the Foreign ,Intelligence Ad-
visory. Board and advised him of the
notebook's disappearance' 'he' said yes-
terday.. An investigation was con?
ducted and the notebook was. pre-
sumed lost when the aircraft cabin
was cleaned.
The mystery was solved-to' the
greater consternation of :Cherne and.
Olmer-on July 24, 1975, when the in-
telligence adviser received a tele-
phone call from Michael James Casey
of Los Angeles.
"He said, 'I have your notebook,' "
Cherne recounted yesterday in de-
scribing what he called a "14-month
ordeal."
It was during this and subsequent
telephone conversations that Cherne
learned that Casey had served two
years at Soleclad prison near Sall
Francisco., Casey. further , explained
that he had recovered the notebook'
from sympathizers of Patricia Hearst,
who was then at }are.
Casey contended that the finders of
the notebook had hoped that. 'it "might
be exchanged for considerations in
their behalf and I -told him that 1
wouldn't do it: even if I could,"
Cherne said.
Casey, in a tctepiioitb interview
from Omaha. wh re lie was acquitted
yesterday of a "felonious entry"
rhargo, insisted: "1 was-not. trying to
burn Chcrnc. I 101(1 him how I got the
hook and the interest of the people
who had found it."
Casey is a '32-year-old Californian
who prides Itiniseif on his work in rc-
setllenr'ni. I)[ Vietnamese refugeca,
who srtught. io appear as a witness in
behalf of ilearst at her trial on
The notebook, according to in-
*nrmeci sntuces, contained notes on
briefings with embassy and Central
Intelligence Agency officials about a
number of issues, including reactions
to news stories about the CIA. the im-
pact of the massive flow of petrodol-
lars 'ram the West. to the Arab states,
as well as '.'unprecedented unemploy-
mert aa.rl. catastrophic inflation" in
European countries.
There was an-early refe?eo^ce-in. the
notebook, both Cherne and Casey. ac-
knowledge, to New York Times re-
porter Terry Robards. Casey located
Rnhards in New York, he said, and it
was the Times reporter who specu-
lated that the initials "L.C." in the
notebook must have referred to
Cherne. This, said Casey, is: how he
concluded that the notebook belonged
to Cherne.
Dietrich wrote a story in the Trib-
une last April 14 charging that he had
tried tq alert the FBI to his discovery
of docun,ents "containing the names
of 100 or more ;CIA agents" and
that the details "were in the hands
of an ex- convict with ties to the Ameri-
can underground."
Dietrich also charged he had been
intimidated by myst-rious phone calls
and an armed visitor who "asked
about Cherne and about copies of Ca-
sey'i papers in this reporter's posses
sion."
Dietrich's story raised more ques-
tions at the time than it answered.
Word of the report also leaked to New
Times magazine and was the subject
of a column by its West Coast editor,
Robert Scheer.
Cherne said that reports were being
circulated that the oot-cbook had been
;found "in a 'Paris whorehouse-an
outrageous ii'. .. ' visited no whnrc-
houses in any European city or else-
where."
In the course of these events the se-
curity priority of the notebook was
substantially upgraded by the CIA's
Office of Security, and a Justice De-
partment investigation was launched
to determine how it was lost and who
found it. The CIA declined comment
on the inquiry and t.lt.e Justice Depart-
ment only confirmed that an investi-
gation was under way.
Cherne said he initiated the request
for an investigation of the entire epi-
sode. In the course of yesterday's in-
terview his desk was covered with
documents that. detailed the develop-
ments in the extraordinary case.
One of the curiosities is that Olmer,
who took the notes in, "cryptic short-
hand," was never asked to hell) de-
code them by'CIA security officials.
He is still baffled at the disappear-
ance. "haven when I went to the men's
room dvrin- the trip I took the note-
book out of my attache case and car-
ried it with Inc." he said.
Cherne, who lamented that: lie had
sucnessrully stopued smoking for sev-
. era] ye?n's, had three packs of ciga-
c1t.ee no hip d':sk yesterday, which tic
shared u itli a reporter. , .
22
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WASHINGTON POST
1 5 p 1976'
F : Inquiry ?~ .
On Leftist
Party Halted
Long Probe Finds
Wrongdoing by
Socialist Workers
done` routinely. It's 'no' coincidence
that they picked the one organization
that has been laying bare all the FBI's
abuses and illegalities. We think they
did It in hopes that we would end our
lawsuit and put a stop to the revela-
tions about what the FBI has done."
:Perkus said the SWP plans to con-
tinue prosecuting its suit. She' added
that the SWP will ask Judge Griesa to
issue a permanent injunction barring
any further FBI activity against the
SWP and to order the bureau to turn
over immediately the names of all-
present and past informers infiltrated
into the party.
:'The SWP, whose national member-
ship is believed not to exceed 2,000,
has its ideological roots in Trotsky-
ism, a revisionist Marxist ideology
based on the theory that permanent,
worldwide revolution is needed to
maintain economic systems beneficial
to the working classes.
The party has insisted for years
that it has no connection with the
Communist Party or movement and
does not advocate violence as a means
of, overthrowing the U. S. capitalist
system. . '
'In its suit, which originally asked
damages of $37 million, the SWP
charged that its pursuit of legitimate'
political activities had been seriously
undermined by an FBI "dirty tricks"
campaign. The FBI activities included
the use of paid informers, wiretap-
ping, interception and opening of mail
and burglaries of SWP offices and the
homes of its members, the party al-
leged.
Also named as defendants in the
suit ;were other federal agencies, in-
cluding the Central Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency
and the Internal Revenue Service.
The suit Is still a long way from res-
By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer
The Justice Department reveal-
ed yesterday that it has ordered
the FBI to halt its 38-year investi-
gation of the . Socialist Workers.
Party-a small left-wing political
.group whose counterattack helped
to plunge the FBI into crisis. '
The bureau had been pursuing the
SWP since 1938 without producing
any evidence of wrongdoing by the
party or its members.
The FBI's activities caused the SWP
In 1973 to file what has become a $40
million lawsuit against the bureau and
other federal law enforcement agenc-
ies, charging them with illegal harass-
ment and intimidation.
As a result of evidence uncovered
by the lawsuit, the Justice Department
has been conducting a seven-month
Investigation into allegations that the
FBI carried out widespread illegal
burglaries against suspected "extrem-
ists" during the past five years.
Justice Department spokesmen con-
firmed that the FBI had been ordered
to stop investigating the SWP after it
was learned yesterday that, the depart-
rnent had sent letters to the SWP and
to Judge Thomas P. Griesa, who is
hearing the suit in U.S. District Court
in New York, notifying them of the
action.
The spokesmen said Attorney Gen-
eral Edward H. Levi had issued the
-order following a "systematic review"
.of how recently issued guidelines cov-
ering domestic security investigations
apply to the SWP and its youth' affili-
ate, the Young Socialist Alliance.
The spokesmen insisted that Levi's
decision came in the course of review-
ing the cases of all political groups
under investigation by the FBI and
had no connection with the still pend-
ing lawsuit. '
Levi's guidelines stipulate that' the
FBI can investigate an organization or
individual only if it has evidence that
they have been engaged in some spe-
cific Illegal act.. The guidelines bar the
FBI from maintaining surveillance of
a group solely for the purposes of
gathering intelligence or because it
suspects that the members might do
something illegal.
FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley
also released a statement last night,
saying that the bureau had partici-
pated with Levi in the review. Kelley
added. "1Ve;agree it is now nece:;sar;y
to discontinue such investigations."
In New York, Cathy Perkus. 'a
olution. But it already has triggered a'
number-of sensational disclosures that
include:
? An unprecedented admission by
an FBI agent, George P. Baxtrum Jr.,
that, prior to 1965, he participated in
at least 50 burglaries of SWP offices
in New York at the direction of his su-
periors.
. ? ? Use ,by another FBI agent, Joseph
Furrer, of his Fifth Amendment
rights against self-incrimination -
the first known instance 'of an FBI of=
ficial taking the Fifth - when ques-
BALTIMORE SUN
11-Sept. 1976
Ex-chief Colby
defends CIA's_
worth to nation
tioned about his knowledge. of ' bur-'
glaries against the SWP.
Disclosure that an FBI informer,
Timothy J. Redfearn, committed three
burglaries against the SWP - the
most recent in July - and turned doc-
uments taken in these break-ins over
to the bureau's Denver field office.
? A charge by a Portland, Oreg.,'
man, Alan I-L._Selling, that the FBI
had paid him to join the SWP and act
as an informer against the party. Sell-
ing also contended that he was 'in-
duced by FBI officials to commit an
illegal burglary, but he said that was
directed against an organization not
connected with the SWP.
? Revelation that the bureau, over
the years, had used approximately 1,-
600 persons as informers against the
SWP and still retains 66 informers
posing as members of the party.
The lawsuit also has had repercus-
.'sions that go far beyond the FBI's in=
volvement with the SWP. Earlier this
year, Judge Griesa ordered the bu=
reau to search the files in all its of.-
.fices and turn over to the SWP all
documents relating to the party.
The resulting documents search
turned up a previously secret file in
the New York field office indicating
that the FBI had committed burglar-
ies in the course of domestic security
investigations during 1972 and 1973.
Previously, the bureau had said it
ceased such so-called .'black bag jobs"
in 1966. -
. This information prompted thr Jus-
tice Department to launch an investi-
gation. that has spread across the
;country .to a number of cities. It has
resulted in the empaneling of a fed-
'eral grand ?ury ;" cew York to.probe
the break-ins there -and consider
'whether the FBI officials involved
should be Indicted on. criminal
charges.
Sources familiar with this investiga-
tion said yesterday that the grand
jury should complete the first phase
of its inquiry b), the end of.this week
or early next week.
In this initiai phase, the sources
added, Justice Department lawyers
have concentrated on presenting to
the grand.jury testimony or informa-
tion from FBI agents who, during 1972
and 1973, were assigned to the New
York field office's squad investigating
the radical Weather Underground.
gal case'initlated by the Socialist Worker's'
party over government spying on domes-
tic dissidents and insisted, in the face of a
hostile questioner, "The CIA does not train
people to torture."
Mr. Colby, under whose direction the
intelligence community made public
many of its past controversial activities,
by DAVID ZIELENZIGER insisted that under new presidential direc-
Speaking dispassionately and almost as tives and with adeouate congressional
if he had never been fired as director of oversight previous abuses will not have a
the Central Intelligence Agency 10 months chance to be repeated.
ago, William E. Colby last night defended "It may be again necessary for the CIA
the intelligence community's ability to to assist decent local people suffering un-
cope with threats to national security in. der a racist despot," Mr. Colby said, "but
the future. from our mistakes in Vietnam we have
While he spent most of his 35-minute. learned that we don't use military assist-
lecture at Towson State University de- ance to solve a political problem."
scribing the rationale for intelligence op- "One doesn't discuss disbanding the ar-
erations, Mr. Colby also admitted "we did my or the police because of mistakes that
but now we were made in handling a case," asserted
do things wrong in the past
,
l
n woman for the Political Rif:trts have corrected them." the 56-year-old attorney, "and that same
)efe
I~efcnsc t~ und, %%hich is financing the
SWIG suit, s: id: Approved For Rpjj r - f-004 !,~ QQt9~eth epee."
...If .. t__1. t r, he r t a e- ~0 s trf3ed the lecture..
YF1, ,AVit 4 I4-I,I:Y V" ?IIA~ 411.J YY 111
23
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WASHINGTON POST
1 2 SEP 1976
Alton-Frye
ssu z
curiosity in
Cuba, implying that, had his request been granted,
t
d
An inquisitive American learns many things on a
visit to Cuba. One of the most surprising is that high
officials in Havana seem genuinely hopeful that the
investigation of the Kennedy assassination will be re-
opened. They are convinced that there was a Cuban
-factor in the murder.
- Conversations with senior officials of the Cuban
government, including Deputy Prime Minister Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez, make clear that they have followed
closely the disclosures by the Senate Intelligence
Committee casting doubt upon the Warren Commis-
sion investigation: The Cubans are well aware that the
doubts center on the failure of the CIA and the FBI to
inform the Warren Commission of the several plots
mounted by the CIA to kill Fidel Castro. Knowledge
of these plots appears to have been withheld even
from the FBI and CIA officials who were responsible
for investigating the President's murder and for sup-
porting the work of the Warren Commission. As a re-
sult, there was no special effort to explore the possi-
ble involvement of either the Cuban government or.
Cuban exiles in the assassination. Evidence developed
by the Senate committee makes both hypotheses plau-
sible-and a new inquiry imperative. -
The situation is murkier and more perplexing than
ever. Those who are resistant to conspiracy theories
and who have been prepared-ever: eager -to be-
Iieve that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone can no
longer rely on the Warren Commission report as an
The writer is a senior fellow of the Council on For-
eign Relations.
adequate prop for their predilections. The commis-
sion did not know that on Nov. 22, 1963, at about the
very. hour Oswald struck in Dallas, an agent of the
Central Intelligence Agency was meeting with a rank-
ing Cuban official (code-named AMLASH and re-
cently identified as Rolando Cubela) to plan the mur-
der of Castro. Simultaneously, in Cuba. a French re-
porter, Jean Daniel,,was spending the day with Cas-
tro, conveying to the Cuban leader views expressed
by President edy in a brief interview at the
White House-on, Oct. V:, persuading Castro that Ken-
nedy wanted to explore ways to normalize relations.
Thus, at,the. moment. the President was killed, U.S.
policy toward Cuba appeared to be moving not only
on two tracks but in opposite directions, and rtwvo-
ment on'dithertrack could have provoked violent re-
sponse by one or another Cuban faction.
,perceptions inside the Cuban government re-
sponded to both tendencies, in U.S. policy. There is
good reason to suspect that the AMLASH operation
involved a double agent, or at least a singularly inept
one. Castro almost certainly knew of it. The CIA even-
tually concluded that the AMLASH activity was "inse-
cure" and terminated it. Among other discoveries,
within two days of the assassination it was known (but
not., to the Warren Commission) that AMLASII had
been in contact. with Soviet personnel in Mexico City,
where Oswald had gone in September 1963 to visit.
both the ('uhan and Soviet consulates. WW'bether these
facts are significar.t or merely coincidental, one can-
not 'tell. In retrospect, Cuban authorities note with
some relief that Oswald was denied permission to visit
a
the finger of suspicion would surely have pointe
Havana.
Perhaps more suggestive of a direct leak from AM-
LASH to Castro was the sequence of events on Sept. 7,
1983, when the CIA re-established contact with the Cu-
ban conspirator for the first time since the preceding
year. Late that evening, Prime Minister Castro called
in Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker for an un-
expected interview. Only three Western reporters
were based in Havana at the time and their contact
with Castro was quite limited. Evidently, the Cuban
leader had a message he wished to get on the record
through Harker. He charged that the United States
was aiding terrorist plots in Cuba and warned U.S.
leaders that "if they are aiding terrorist plans to elimi-
nate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe."
This threat of reprisals seems less inflammatory
and more understandable now that we know what
Castro knew at the time, namely, that the United
States was in fact'stepping up its covert operations
against Cuba during the summer and fall of 1963. Yet
it seems an exception to the main lines of Cuban pol-
icy as it was then evolving.
For months afer the missile crisis of 1962, Castro
had been displeased with the Soviets, and there are
signs that he' was interested in an opening to Wash-
ington. On Sept. 5, the Cubans quietly proposed talks
with the Americans at the United Nations, and Ken-
nedy soon responded with interest. Also, in early Sep-
tember the Time magazine bureau chief in Buenos
Aires, Gavin Scott, travelling on a Canadian passport,,
spent two weeks in, Cuba. Although key U.S. officials
have no recollection of consulting with Scott on that
occasion, the Cubans recall his questions and com-
ments as hinting of American interest in a possible ac-.
commodation, much as they were later to interpret.
the discussions between Jean Daniel and Castro.
Then and now.the Cubans' attitude toward Ken-
nedy has been a compound of political antipathy and-
personal admiration. While critical of Kennedy's role
in various counter-revolutionary efforts, Castro and,
his associates voice a warm, almost affectionate re-
gard for the President's courage and realism. They
profess to have seen his death as a grave setback to
more hopeful relations between the two countries.
The John Kennedy of 1963 was not, in their judgment,
the same man who was inaugurated in 1961, but a
more mature, poised and forward-looking leader with,
whom they could have done business.
With this frame of reference, Cuban officials specu-
late that the real origin of the assassination lies in an-
ti-Castro circles, with which Oswald also was in touch.
They emphasize that assassination is incompatible
with their own revolutionary doctrine and that they
never contemplated it even against Batista, the pre-
vious Cuban ruler. And they volunteer the suspicion
that the recent murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny
Rosselli, the Mafia figures who consorted with the
CIA to kill Castro, surely have some connection with
Cuban exile politics and the Kennedy murder.
Castro has said publicly that he has no proof "count-,
er-revolutionary elements" planned the assassination,
but that is clearly the consensus in Havana. Further
investigation may still be inconclusive, but, far from,
seeing it as an impediment to Cuban-American rela-
lions, the Castro regime welcomes such an inquiry.
Their curiosity seems greater titan their complicity.
U. ,?,, woP'LD i?',',.PORT
One. result of widespread attacks on
the Central Intelligence Agency: Co-
vert operations by the Agency, insiders
say, now account for only 2 per cent of
the CIA's work.
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avana
The JFK ass
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100390001-4
WSEPO1976 AR
By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer
The Ford administration has be-
come concerned about the extensive
Soviet program for civil defense and
the lack of any comparable effort to
protect the American people in case
of intercontinental nuclear war.
The first comprehensive official
study of the large Soviet civil defense
program to be made in many years
is now under way at the CIA and
elsewhere around town. A National
Security Study Memorandum is
being coordinated at the Pentagon
examining U.S. civil defense needs.
The NSSM,, pulling together differ-
ent agencies views in order to arrive
at a top-level recommendation to the
President, is due to be completed by
Sept. 30. It will provide the basis for
a presidential decision whether to fit
an expansion of civil defense work
into the 1978 fiscal year budget.
But so far the interagency materi-
. al focused on CIA work has not pro-
duced a clear picture of the Soviet
program. There is disagreement on
whether the preparations to protect
the Soviet people from nuclear war
by shelters or evacuation to the
countryside which are described in
Russian manuals are being carried
out.
THE SOVIET PROGRAM and U.S.
needs are connected. by apprehen-
sions of some American military
analysts that an imbalance in civil
defense programs would make this
country vulnerable. In a crisis situa-
tion, the Kremlin could threaten the
American people with destruction
while sheltering its own people, thus
reducing the U.S. ability to negotiate
from equal strength, these analysts
warn.
But this contention that the mutual
deterrence "balance of terror" has
been eroded is questioned by other
analysts on two grounds.
One is that a protected population
could not long survive if its cities
were destroyed and its air-and crops
poisoned by fallout, so that protection
from nuclear explosions might be
meaningless in the medium or long
term. The other involves whether the
Soviet Union really can, or on the
basis of present intentions will be-
come able to, protect its people from
nuclear attack.
U.S. policy during the 1950s was to
try to protect cities against bomber
attack, and the advent of interconti-
nental missiles led to the backyard
air raid shelter boom in the early
1960s. But by the middle '60s official
doctrine switched under Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara to an
TION the findings of people like
Goure on which such warnings are
based. A recent study by John M.
Collins of the Library of Congress's
Congressional Research Service said
Soviet plans "are impressive on
paper (but) how practical they would
be in practice is problematical." Col-
lins thought "no U.S. authority as yet
has satisfactorily answered hard
questions" about the Soviet program.
One senior administration official
handling arms control negotiations
says U. S. Embassy personnel in the
Soviet Union and travelers have fail-
ed to see the kind of evidence that
would be expectable if the paper pro-
gram really existed as workable civil
defense protection. A government
expert on Soviet affairs reports a
widespread suspicion that little more
has been done than earmark re-
sources.
The main realization which had de-
veloped in the administration by last
spring as a result of publicity like the
House hearings was that not enough
was known about Soviet civil defense
efforts. The CIA had not taken a seri-
ous'look at the subject for more than
five years - since before the post-
ABM treaty program expansion that
Goure detected.
SO A MULTIAGENCY STUDY
was commissioned. It should have
been finished two months ago. In-
-stead, each draft report had pro-
duced new doubts about the reliabil-
ity of available material.
"The basic problem is that we just
haven't been putting enough re-
sources on this," an informed
observer commented. "It should be
possible for the U.S. intelligence
community to determine whether.
Soviet shelters and evacuation plans
and all that really do exist, but the
subject hasn't been getting enough
attention so rar."
The National Security Study
Memorandum was ordered by the
White House after the study of Soviet
efforts had begun. It is being coordi-
nated in the office of Donald R. Cot-
ter, an assistant to Secretary of De-
fense Donald Rumsfeld for atomic
energy affairs.
An administration official said the
NSSM was the result of accumulat-
ing concern about the U.S. civil
defense posture rather than any
specific alarm over what the Soviets
might be doing.
But even if a gap is found and a
threatening imbalance discerned, the
chances of organizing an effective
civil defense program in this country
in anything less than an alt.-out, war
situation are considered small by
some informed officials. Therefore,
the realistic options open to Cotter's
study team stop somewhere short of
the kind of ... ...,r
.,. ...hi
h S
i
1:?
a
c
ov
et
.
QJ.lMlll t/,1 VFI 41,Ci4 {.IL openly expressed. But the Soviet Un-
)ireeze blew in from the sea. Oleander state-building has displaced the search ion has provided him with a first-class
and jasmine were in bloom. for unity of.-the 1950s and 1960s, secu- modern arsenal of -more than 2,000
Could this be the center of world larism in.public life has made'sweep tanks, Migs, surface-to-air missiles,
terrorism of .which President Gerald ing gains, and most Arab leaders have and even the dreaded SCUD-a.
.Ford spoke the other week? The So= ground-to-ground missile with a range
i viet. Union's new Middle Eastern come to believe that the Arab-Israeli of 190 miles.
springboard? The fief of the "madman ? conflict should be-settled by political The Soviet Union may see Libya
,of Tripoli," as President Anwar Sadat negotiation.,. only as a sort of supply dump, where
now describes: the young Libyan Some argue that the moral and ma-
~? weapons may. be stored for future ruse,
leader? . . ?terial, support that . Qaddafi gives to
f. There were two high points of the his cherished causes around the world a11 n intermediary to arm the
festivities: a midnight tea party given is no more than
proverbial Bedouin Progressive side. Soviet arms have ,'by Prime Minister Abdul Salam Jal- hospitality run riot. It is said that found their way via Libya to Lebanon,
and they may also be reaching the
loud in the gardens of the former someone with the right ideological Polisario in the Western Sahara.
royal palace, and Col. Qaddafi's own coloring has only to seek his help to For Qaddafi, however, the mere
fiappearance at the anniversary parade, be directed to the jihad (holy war) . presence of his vast armory provides
where he was mobbed by an adoring fund, a sort of vast petty-cash box un- clout. The truth is that the achieve-
crowd. ~ der religious control. merits that are realistically on to
The two men could be brothers. , Libya's population is little' more him are not Sadat's overthrow, nor a
They share an unaffected manner, a than. 2 million and the country is far great blow struck for .distant Moslems
plain-speaking candor that has be- from the heartlands of the Middle or frustrated Palestinians, -but rather
come the hallmark of the Libyan revo- East, but Qaddafi's ideas, underpin- the extension of Libya's influence in
lution. It is striking how little they ned by an annual oil revenue of the-central Mediterranean.
are encumbered by protocol, pomp, or around $8 billion, have made him the . He has Malta in his pocket, and has
even security. precautions. main pole of opposition to Secretary guarantee( His trouble-making reputation of State Henry Kissinger's Pax Amer- :plaiinedwiitl cits se after lratiallin 1979. Brit's
is ten
abroad has perhaps blinded outsiders lea.
to what. Qaddaft has achieved at couraging Sicilian separatists and is
home. In seven years, and at a cost of Qaddafi-is out to destroy, by every meddling in Corsica, Crete and Cy-?
possible means, the American-spon- ? prus. He has patched up his
$20 billion, he has created one of the sorrel peace with Tunis and stayed friends with At.
world's most lavish welfare states, 1 Ptroces;;, which he be-
world's d schools and une tI 1ieves is a betrayal of Arab and Pales. geria. Libya is already a Mccliterra-
scatte the land and begun to turn t1111,11111 interests. Sadat's Egypt, the mean power, if not yet decisively an
linchpin of Kissinger's' step-by-step, di- - ,? Arab one. ., 1 ,
WASHINGTON POST
;) SEP 1976
Y 11 Till 91 6Y b
c
axa 1":! 4rI
By H. D. S. G'recnway
wnfllnuton Post i orcJOU survlce
TEHRAN, Iran Sept. 2-SAVAK is worried about
its image.
+,. ~c?u u11 t.L \ anct t'131 roiled Into
I Ft LL one, .uid as such it
tl enjoys a 1iarful rel?u,t:itian as an
36
Europeans, uniformed Soviet top with Qaddafi's political messianism.
-brass, a special envoy of Fidel Castro, He thinks he is a man of destiny, the
~
I a. i". i astve 01101 all-powerful ec rct police that ;rules
by tortu 1 re and. ter; ur, rend eru'hes all dissent.
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 Approved For a eR T a0
The weekly Economist of London haq estimated
the number of political prisoners languishing in
SAVAK jails at 20,000 to 40,000: Other estimates
have put. the number as high as 100,000.
SAVAK officials grant interviews relatively infre-
quently. But its deputy director, Parviz Sabeti, is
Worried about all the bad press his organization has
been receiving and, in a recent interview, said it is.
unfair.
"These torture charges are pure fabrication. and
not at all true," Sabeti said. SAVAK should, get
credit from the Western press for fighting comn3ti-
nism, he contended, but instead "they are sticking it
to us. . ,
"In 'all Iran there are only 3,200 political prison-
ers. We don't have enough jails to house 100,000
prisoners," Sabeti said at SAVAK headquarters, oil
the eastern edge of Tehran.
"Put.. this in. your newspaper," Sabeti said:
"Article 131 of the criminal code states that any
government official caught torturing anybody will
get six years in prison," he said.
Sabeti castigated the FBI for not keeping closer
watch on Iranian exile and student groups in Amer-
THE BALTIMORE SUN
3 Septeinber 1976
New Delhi (AP)-The
Indi- an Parliament voted yesterday
to invesiigaiie one of Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi's most
outspoken critics-Subraman-
Ian Swarm, aright-wing, oppo-
sition leader and . a former
member of the Harvard Uni-
versity econornics faculty.
The vote came amid accusa-
tions from Mrs. Gandhi's ruling
Congress party and pro-Mos-
cow Communists that the Unit-
ed States Central Intelligence
Agency is aiding the 36-year-
,old Mr. Swamy.
Political sources said the on-
`precedented investigation could
cost Mr. Swamy his seat in the
upper house even though he has
four years remaining in his
term.
According to the govern-
ment, 'fr. S?,vamy fled to the.
West in January after evading
arrest during the 14 months
since the government pro-
claimed a national emergency
"Ind detained many opposition
leaders.
He returned briefly to India
early this month to sign the at-
tendance roster in Parliament
I to keep his membership active,
but then escaped abroad again,
opposition sources said. .
Ora Mehta,..the minister of
home affairs, accused Mr. Swa-
my of carrying out "anti-Indian
propaganda calculated to bring
,lea. The CIA, he said,, was "no help at all."
SAVAK has been "quite successful" in rounding
up terrorists in the past, Sabeti said. He expressed
confidence that the persons responsible for the mur-
der of three American civilian technicians in Teh-
ran last Saturday would eventually be caught.
SAVAK believes the group responsible for the
killings is the M11ujahidden E Khalq which began?as
curious mixture of Marxism and Moslem con-
servatisin. The number of active 'terrorists at large
in Iran may not exceed 100, Sabeti said.
The Americans were involved in "Project IBEX,"
a secret electronic intelligence gathering system {
which the U.S. firm of Rockwell International is in-
stalling for the Iranian government.
Sabeti said althougli there had been anti-state ac-
tivity in the past, political assassinations by killers
trained abroad and supplied with the latest 'Soviet
weapons was a comparatively new phenonienori for
Iran. . , i
Before 19711, Iran had not felt it necessary to exec-
ute people for anti-state activities, he said. But the
new wave of terrorisei has "caused its to get a bit
rougher," he said, and now terrorists frequently are
ent v s pro e
a
le 7 m- I
the Parliament,' its reenrbers, position have every right to say
ii
the government and the nation in and out of this house what we
as a whole into disrepute and want," said Vishwanatha Men-
contempt." ' on, a Marxist Communist mem-
In a reference to an earlier b r. "Ile {Mr. Swarnyl must he
warrant for Mr. Swainy's ar- allowed to say what he wants.
rest, Mr. lehta said the econo- We need not spare the ruiiog
mist was guilty of "evasion of party." .
law and fleeing from justice Yogendra Sharma of the
and legal processes, flouting pro-Moscow Communists de-
lawful orders and generally be- nounced Mr. Swamy for having
having in a manner unworthy of said, according to an interview
a member of this house." published in the 'Toronto Star
Mr. Swamy: has reportedly in Fabruary, that the.Commu-
traveled in the United States nists in India might try to as-
and Canada since leaving India, sassinate Dirs. Gandhi. . .
often addressing rneet.ings and "We Communists will save
giving press interviews to de- the prune minister at the cost
nounce Mrs. Gandhi's eitergen- of our lives," Mr. Sharma said.
cy rule. "It is the fascist elements in the
Mr.. Swamy taught econom- country who wart to kill de-
tcs at Harvard from 196' to mocracy, playing into the hands
1969 and was a visiting profes- of the CIA, while putting all the
son of economics there in 1911 blame on the Communists."
and 197;1 be:ore being elected ? Haresh De.o Malviya. a
to the Indian upper llnus': in member of the Congress party,
q accused the CIA of helping Mr.
With dr. Swamy s own col- Swamy operate abroad.....
leagues in the right-wing Jana
Singh party absent from the ? "I see the invisible hard of
chamber because of a continu- the CIA." he said. "It is the poll-
info boycott by the non,-Corn- cy of the CIA to destabilize gov-
munist opocsition, a leader of errments not in their favor, and
the Marxist Communist party -'their hostility to India is' well
was the only person to oppose known. -
the government's motion to "I dcfiniteiv feel Mr. Sub-
start the investigation, ramanian Swami is an agent of
"When the democratic sys- the CIA who has infiltrated into
tern is being broken down by this house. We should e spell
the ruling party, we in the op- him, the earlier the better." ..
37
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Taaesdoy, September 7, 1976 The Washington Star
One of the storied traits of tyrants is that, no
matter how impregnable they might seem to be,
they never feel safe. Is this one of the explana-
tions for Indira Gandhi's current bid to bury In-
dian democracy under further layers of parlia-
mentary and constitutional assent to her one-
woman rule?
Otherwise, the Gandhi government's demand
for substantial new powers would seem to be un-
necessary. Under the "emergency" authority
she already claims to have, Mrs. Gandhi over
the last 14 months has proven herself completely
capable of jailing thousands of opponents, in
cluding three dozen legislators, imposing a
sweeping censorship that suppresses news even
of parliamentary debate and cowing a once
proudly independent judiciary. With her major
critics locked up, resistance to her dictatorial
course has been pathetically weak, and the
world's most populous democracy lies dormant.
And since Mrs. Gandhi's. Congress party enjoys
commanding parliamentary control, there is no
question about the government getting whatever
legislative backing it wants -- including support
for changing the constitution.
It is by the constitutional amendment route
that Mrs. Gandhi seeks new legal embellish-
'ment of her bosshood as prime minister. Powers
of the judiciary to review legislation and en-
force civil liberties would be curtailed. Parlia-
ment would be permitted to ban "anti-national
activities and associations." And the prime
minister, acting through the figurehead presi-
dent, could simply order further changes in the
THE WASHINGTON POST
Friday, Sept. 17. 1976
aC k An de .gon and jeq Whitten
sa
constitution without even the need for a parlia-
mentary rubber stamp.
Some members of the parliamentary opposi-
tion still at large were scathing in their
denunciations of the Gandhi regime's constitu-
tional proposals. "All the pillars of
parliamentary democracy are being converted
into pliant tools of an all-powerful executive,"
said H.M. Patel. "The main thrust of the bill is
to establish a totalitarian rule of one-party
dictatorship," said a Marxist member. Mr.
Patel and his supporters walked out in a boycott
of the parliamentary proceeding to avoid giving
"a semblance of constitutional legitimacy to the
move to throttle, democracy and impose authori-
tarian rule."
The parliamentary give-and-take seems to
have a democratic ring until you realize that
only foreigners like us can read about it, and
even our correspondents are hampered. Censor-
ship prevents the Italian people from learning
the substance of the criticism voiced against the
Gandhi program. The opposition also accuses
the government of going back on a promise to
permit public debate of the changes.
As for editorial critiques of the constitutional
plan by India's once-lively press, we regret to
report virtually nothing along that line. The
nearest an editorialist came to questioning the
proposals was with reference to the plan for
executive amendment of the constitution. An
editorial in Tile Statesman called this "ex traor?.
dinary indeed." That may be the most pregnant
"indeed" ever written.
S,. file s
In blunt, blistering language, Saudi 'i't Saudi oil minister was con-
Arabian officials have accused the, vinced that the United States was de.
United States of building up the shah- liberately bolstering the shah's mili-
of Iran for an armed invasion of Ara- tary power and that "Iran's extraordi-
bian oil fields. - nary military buildup' was quite
The respected Saudi oil minister, clearly aimed at occupying the Arab
Ahmed Zaki Yamani, warned that the states across the gulf, the emirates,
shah was "highly unstable mentally." Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and even Saudi
If the U.S. authorities failed to recog- Arabia itself."
nize this, added Yamani, they must be The Saudis had become persuaded,
losing their "powers of observation." Akins noted, that "in the next Arab-Is-
The Saudis confided their fears last raeli war, Israel ... would be encour-
year to James E. Akins, then the U. S. aged to occupy Tobuk in northern
ambassador, who relayed the message Saudi Arabia, and Iran would be told
to Washington in startling secret let- to occupy the Arabian littoral."
ters and memos. If such a situation developed, Ya-
One "nienioranduni for the file" mani warned Akins: "Iraq would be in-
dated Aug. 1x1, 1975, describes the ex- volved immediately and so would be
plosive conversation with Yamani. 'l'he the Soviet Union. But if Iran should
oil minister, according to the secret succeed in occupying part of the Ara-
memo, said "the conclusion the Saudis bia-a coast, it would find only smoking
were reaching was that we had an rttins, and the Western oil consumers
agreement with Iran to let it take over would face caatastrophe."
the entire Arabian littoral of the Per- Akins responded, according to Ills
scan Gulf." secret memo, that "such a plan would
Yamaani believed the United States be sheer ni adness." Yamaaai agreed
"head urged the siaaail to naalce peace that Altins "was quite bat tadd-
with Iraq," Akins added, "so frail, ed: "We think you may have- gone
would have a freer hand ita, the lower mad."
Gulf."
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NEW YORK TIMES
17 SEP 1976
Challenge to the Shuttle
Kissinger's Tested Style of Negotiating Faces
Minister Vorster. But in the interim, thel
A Very Different Range of Problems in Africa riots and killings have occurred South
Africa, and they have made it difficult)
B JOHN DARNTON for African Presidents to explain howl
By they can countenance conversations with
Special to The New York Times a man their own newspapers decry as
DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzania, Sept. 16 Secretary said, referring-'to both whites 1 a butcher of black children.
So far, Secretary of State Henry A. Kis- and blacks, is "the reluctance of anybody Mr. Kissinger is new to Africa, and
singer's mission to bring peace to south- to admit that negotiations are possible i some would say he has yet to acquire
ern Africa has shown only the delicacy, before they know that negotiations will; the necessary feel for the politics and
complexity and immensity of the job in- succeed." special sensibilities. Days before his arri-
vplved.- His point, as far as black Africa is con- vat here, he caused a flap because press
Ti. Following his talks with cerned, is not quite valid. The African reports said that he had been "invited"
President Julius K. Nyererc leaders could retort that long before Mr. instead of "welcomed"-a distinction
Kissinger entered the scene, at the Victo- promptly corrected by the image-con-
News yesterday,. two dramatically
n,Analysis contrasting news conferences ria Falls conference last year, they tried 1 scions Tanzanians.
were held. In one, President negotiating for majority rule with the! Three Conflicts Involved
Nyerere, sitting on the back Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian D. Smith,
The African presidents say they fear
porch of his state house, passionately ex- using Prime Minister John Vorster of I that the United States Is acting out of
plained his mixed feelings toward the South Africa as an intermediary. The fact I self-interest, to contain Soviet influence,
American intiative and said, in effect, that the venture failed-because Mr. rather than out of a sincere commitment
that he was less hopeful than ever. .Vorster was reluctant to apply sufficient to the concept of majority rule. If this!
In the other, Mr. Kissinger, braced be- pressure on Mr. Smith, according to the is the case, they say, then America will
hinds lectern at the Kilimanjaro Hotel, Africans-has left a sense of pessimism drift into an alliance with South Africa,
suggested that President Nyerere's re- and even betrayal. which claims to be fighting communism,
marks were the kind of thing that accom- The repuations of moderates, such as if the negotiations fail.
panics negotiations and sought to portray President Kenneth D. Kanda of Zambia, But there is also a strong moral tone
himself as nothing more than a conduit suffered in the growing nationalist fervor to' their position. They say they want
for relaying views between black-ruled of Organization of African Community someone on their side because it is right,
and white-ruled"countries, gatherings, and they have changed from and not because of fear of another super-
But the fact remains that so far. the doves to hawks. power. The level of idealism clashes
Kissinger trip has drawn a good deal of In the Middle East, Mr. Kissinger somewhat with Mr. Kissinger's brand of
suspicion and doube from black Africa, worked for a peace settlement -after the realpolitik.
some obviously for appearance sake but fighting had stopped. In southern Africa,; In the Middle East, the Secretary of
much of it real. the fighting is continuing and, indeed, State could identify the conflict and the
Those who traveled with Mr. Kissinger growing' parties involved. In southern Africa, there
during his Middle East negotiations note; There is a constituency among the is not one conflict but three-over Rhode-
that gloom is a perfect curtain-raiser for: blacks that says the fighting should go sia, over South-West Africa and potential-
his style of diplomacy. With it, even a on. It steins from the conviction that the' ly, over South Africa. In the case of Rhode-
relatively, minor advance-in this case, military advantage has swung to the) sia, the nationalist factions are so snlin
an agreement for a constitutional confer- blacks and that negotiations undertaken' tered,that it would he impossible to know
once on South-West Africa embracing all later, when territory is actually won, are whom to invite to the conference table.
sides-takes on the appearance of a mira bound to be more advantageous. That White the nationalist leader are totally
cle and can generate momentum. conviction is running especially strong dependent upon the "front line" African
Some Call Gloom justified. now that the rainy season, which will residents to wage their struggle, the
' presidents
But those who have followed events las, shift is the about tactical to begin in n Rh abegin ai Rodsia. T the sta. To - plisten to their opinions. And
each of the presidents-except Joshua
in Africa feel the gloom justified and negotiate, some feel, wauld be 'seen as Nkomo, the moderate who engaged in
point out the vast differences between a sign of weakness.
ths ago- is;
the Middle East and southern Africa in There is also an element of pride and) talks with Mr. Smith Kissinger.
terms of issues, multiplicity of factions l a sentiment for winning the war. Of all sispicious about Mr. Kissingand personalities, the African nations that have won inde- Most suspicious of all is Robert Mugabe,
Mr. Kissinger has said privately thatI pendence, only two, Algeria and Guinea- the Rhodesian who is emeri ing as er-
President Nyerere, whom he greatly re- Bissau, can honestly say they have dc- most popular politician sprang the guel'
t rillas. Slgnifica:ntly, Mr. Mugabe has
spects, is not "another Sadat." The impli- tested colonial forces on the batt,efield. ,
cation is that unlike the Egyptian Presi- The slogan of the Zimbabwe Peonle'si voiced reservations about a key provision
dent, whom Mr. Kissinger has praised for Arnry, the nsair: fighting force of the Rho-~ to fire Kissinger plan, financial a bl an-
I ices for whites in Rhodesia undor a bl;aek
courage in negotiating with, the Israelis tie: tan blacks, is We are our own hbera- government. " who will 'pay blacks fort
despite Arab criticism, there is no African tors." all their years of being exploded by the
leader willing to run the risk of appearing Mr. Kissinger has stressed that during awhites? Ire said in being interview here last!
moderate on the question of "liberation." his visits in April, every African head ?. ,, .
WASHINGTON POST
~FP
pent." Tass, the Soviet news agency, said. Soviet Union, Gaj.on5s Bo>! In Paris, president. Omar 13c,nl;o of Gahon dis
go Blast i
t? . I missed h.issinger's weekend talks with South Afri-
U.S. Role in La'in' African .'1'Cll"ioli can Prince Minister John Vorstet as "nonsense, a
1"l onr Nr?u:Ilisputcltrs Was 10. of tilde."
The Scwird. Union yeslcrr.la,v accused U.S, Secrr orster will not ch'tnge Ills policy. He is it racist
tart' of State }teary A. eiday"er of using shuttle through and through. Sine no kind Of di,tlo ue can
sneered a:i,h South .fruit, we will take in amts
negOt.iations tletween black and white African lead' and do as we raid in :~n,,ola," i;open said yesterday
acs to prop Ill) r;last, governments mid protest Amer- when hr arrived In the French capital for a .ho:,t.
icon iiitr?.sti'ii ttl5,
"The ostentation,,; of he Private bait.
tUS.A. Brill rs said ho wilt 1110('t French I'residt nl. V,l!rry
is. nothilli; else Irtlt, fe;tr of a chain ,eart.iorl which
riscurtt r!?7afailtg before flying t6 Mf-.Xico Saturday
was sini-ted by thr? crillnpse of l'ortuglit'se ctrl'ni;ll
riri~, l,l,l m anti has noi~' Spread to other tsartss of tale t?c,llli? fo l. an visit,
is
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WASHINGTON POST
!' S . a 1;l 75
sin
By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer
Deep distrust of Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger's African shuttle
diplomacy was expressed yesterday by
black representatives of the Rhode.
sian and Namibian (Southwest Africa)
liberation movements.
A conference of African specialists,
held in the Senate Caucus Room,, re-
verberated with suspicion that the ul-
terior motive of Kissinger and the
Ford administration is to protect
white interests and American invest-
nientsin southern Africa.
Kissinger's attempt to launch new
negotiations for peaceful settlement
of the guerrilla warfare in Rhodesia
and Namibia was assailed as out-of-
date, ill-advised, a serious subversion
of African aspirations and even a
strategy of racism.
Warfare alone, even if protracted
warfare, is the only solution now for
Rhodesia, liberation spokesmen said.
The criticisms graphically illustrate
the obstacles confronting Kissinger's
new round of African diplomacy,
which the State Department is ex-
pected to confirm officially today.
Kissinger is planning a press con-
ference Saturday to explain his new
venture, scheduled to be launched
Monday and starting in black Africa.
Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa), a co-spon-
sor with Rep. Charles C. Diggs Jr. (D-
Mich.) of the African panel discussion
yesterday, told the group at a luncheon
in the Senate Office Building that "I
think the chances are one in 25, or
one in 30," that Kissinger's diplomatic
mission will succeed.
"But I think it is worth making the
effort," Clark said.
However, while concentrating on
the racial struggle in Rhodesia and
Namibia, Clark said, "I hope we never
forget that the most repressive regime
in southern Africa is the regime in
South Africa."
The Senate Foreign Relations Sub-
committee on Africa, which Clark
heads, is conducting intensive hear-
ings on South Africa. In South Africa,
Clark said, "total U.S. investment is
estimated at greater than $1.7 billion,"
representing "40 per cent of the total
U.S. investment in Africa."
Several hundred spectators at-
tended the Caucus Room discussion,
which was sponsored by the Fund for
New Priorities in America :rd the
Women's Division of the United Meth-
octist Church.
To the disappointinent: of some of
the white specialists on Africa, the lib-
eration Spokesrnen for Rhodesia re-
fused to consider any alternative to
expanding guerrilla war.
Callistus Ndlovu, representing the
relatively more moderate wing of the
Zimbabwe (Rhodesian) African Na-
tional Council, led by Joshua Nkomo,
who tried to negotiate with Rhodesian
Prime Minister Ian D. Smith, said:
"We do not see how the talks can be
resumed ... We therefore believe that
any attempt to resume these talks is
bound to fail."
Eddison Zvobgo, a representative of
the more militant wing of the Rhode-
sian liberation movement, led by
Bishop Abel Muzorewa, said , that
"every time the U.S. raises the ques-
tion of negotiations" it is because a
liberation struggle is "about to tri-
umph" somewhere in the world.
"The conference stage is over,"
Zvobgo said. "Negotiations are being
carried out where they belong-on the
battlefield. We should resist any Kis-
singer seduction."
.One white panelist, Alex Boraine,
from Harvard University's Center for
International Affairs, a former mem-
ber of the South African Parliament
for the Progressive Reform Party,
asked the liberation spokesmen if
they saw no course "complementary
to the armed struggle." He asked if
there is no way to reduce "the length
of the struggle" in Rhodesia, and the
casualties.
Only "by politicizing our people,"
and "by rallying as many interna-
tional forces as possible," replied El-
ton Razemba, another member of the
Bishop Muzorewa faction of the Afri-
can National Council. "Destruction
will be there," be said. "What is war
about? Zimbabwe will be a better soci-
ety" in the end.
Zvobgo, his colleague, interjected:
"The only way of shortening the
[Rhodesian] war or limiting the num-
ber of people killed or injured is to
get the war over as quickly as possi-
ble. It is a kind of 'quick kill' theory,
to put it bluntly."
The Rhodesian liberation spokes-
men insisted that what is going on in
Rhodesia in the conflict between
about 270,000 whites and about 6 mil-
lion blacks is not a racial. war. "We
are not' just fighting to replace a
white government with black faces,"
Ndlovu said. "1Ve are fighting to bring
about fundamental change."
American-Eritish plans to organize
an international guarantee fund of up.
to $1.5 hill ion to $2 billion to compen-
sate Rhodesia's white settlers for
their property and other assets, said
Ndlovu, represents "guarantees of
4D
privilege" which the blacks will nee
tolerate.
This idea "is predicated on the no-
tion that it is impossible for blacks
and whites to live together peace-
fully," he said, and Zvobgo charged,
"This really is racism."
However, Nigeria's. ambassador to
the United Nations, Leslie O. Harri-
man, while criticizing much of Kis-
singer's strategy, said, "I believe that
the option of buying off the whites is
realistic."
Harriman said afterward, "We have
done it in our own country [Nigeria]
for independence." But he also said
that, basically, "the military struggle
is the only option left" for Rhodesian
independence.
Kissinger's diplomacy for Namibia
equally "is bound to fail," said O.T.
Emvula, deputy chief of the South
West Africa People's Organization
(SWAPO) mission to the United Na-
tions.
He labeled Kissinger's approach to
Namibia "a serious subversion" of
commitments made by the United Na-
tions for the independence of that ter-
ritory.
Kissinger, Emvula said, "i'deliberate-
ly complicates" matters by meeting
with Prime Minister. John Vorster of
South Africa, which rules Namibia
under a mandate that the United Na-
tions has ruled is illegal.
If there "will he a negotiation," said
Emvula, expressing a more moderate
position than his Rhodesian col-
leagues, "only South Africa and
SWAPO shall he the parties."
However, SWAPO, he said, will not
enter any talks with South Africa un-
til South Africa withdraws its military
forces from Namibia and releases all
political prisoners.
Panelist Boraine said, "I think Vor-
ster will do a great deal to get Nami-
bia ... off his back."
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'Log fntgefe5 Tiine
Cornmunst Forces c3row i hail
Flabby Government Bureaucracy Fails to Contain ,Insurgents
"Intelligence -in the east has not, tie right now.
Times Stall Writer vcw, wv CU uL aLc, au, 1 V U ' IL
Marshal Siddhi Savetsila, secretary theory. This is the Communist Party
13ANGKO'K-Por eight years the general of the National Security of Thailand at work;' a Western dip.
government of Thailand has entrust- Council. "We have good hindsight on lomat said.
ed its campaign against Communist what has happened, but we know Still, the outside help is available
insurgents to a semi-clandestine, nothing about what is about to hap- now. There are three fairly well de-
a
k
b
nown
s
ureaucracy
rank-heavy
ISOC-the Internal Security Opera-
tions Command.
And while ISOC grew progressive-
ly flabbier, the insurgency grew ing the fragile period of democracy weather road extended through Laos
from a serious nuisance into a hard since 1973, the rulers in Bangkok in- to Pak Beng, just across the northern
jungle army of about 9,000 guerrillas.
In the estimate of an American ex-
pert, the Communist organization be-
came "a quality product, well-
trained, well-armed and largely self-
sufficient." It has, the expert said,
perhaps 85,000 active .workers within
the country's political woodwork.
Given the intrigues of the Thai mil-
itaty structure--where some C00
generals and admirals vie for power
and its rewards-it would be unfair
to blame Communist growth entirely
on ISOC's failure.
The government's regular armed',
forces are made up of more than
200,000 men, plus a paramilitary de-
- fense corps of. 49,000 and a border
police force of 14,000. Their effect-
tiveness is a matter of debate.
Gen. Saiyud Kerdphol, the ISOC
commander, warned "+ recently: "My
estimate is that we have about three
years to put' our ; hotiso. ii1 order. If
not, the combination''of internal and
,external pressures will make .the fu-
? Lure of this country:;very uncertain
the test will come sooner.
lie. expects that within the: next
two dry seasons---a span of about 18
months-the insurgency will grow to
niobile warfare and battalion-sized
attacks against the ill-organized Thai
military and government structure.
M
"They have the troops to do it now," he said. "They could overrun
, any military or police, post in the
countryside if they wanted to.!'
The old-school politicians and gen-
erals who run things in Bangkok are
debating what to do. There are belat-
ed plans to reorganize the army, buy-,
more planes and enlarge "pacifica-
tion" programs in the countryside.
But sources with first-hand know!-
edge of the Thai counterguerrilla
program say that despite decades of
experience. the government fre-
quently lacks the most basic knowl
edge of Communist activity.
pen or what the insurgents are going fined supply routes through Laos
to do the next day, But the Commu- from Vietnam, organized and
nists know our movements." manned by North Vietnamese. The
For years of military rule, and dur- Chinese send supplies on an ally
directly have supported the domino Thai bor ler.
theory by contending that the Com- The level of this aid is indicated by
munist Party of Thailand was almost the light traffic on the Chinese road.
totally dependent on outside help.. In one recent month, an official ado
Aging Prime Minister Seni Pramoj, mined only t:;o Chinese trucks
ill-suited to control the traditional
turbulence of Thai politics, has tried came dow, n Yvith material for the ir.-
s
.
to play it both ways. Until June he suge"
Th
T
contended that foreign aid was mak-
ing the insurgency more serious than
ever. Last month he admitted before
the parliament that he had little
proof of direct aid from Peking, Han-
oi or Moscow for Thailand's Commu-
nists.
Then he basked in the "diplomatic
victory" when Foreign Minister Pi-
chai Rattakul returned from Hanoi,
where the two countries agreed to
exchange ambassadors, and reported
a pledge from North Vietnamese Pre-
hai army has done little to
e
seriously disturb the Communists in
their growing "liberated zones."
While the generals make pro-
nouncements and schedule "suppres-
sion" drives, the actual strategy has
been one of "containment," The Com-
munist bases are largely centered
around tribal peoples in' Jungles- and
mountains, but there are relatively
few government soldiers in a position
to bar the insurgents from moving
into more populated-and. ethnic
mien Pharr Van llong not to inter- Government offensives are rare.
fere in Thailand's domestic affairs. The only major battle of the year
(The Chinese had made a similar : came about by accident. It started
pledge earlier). June 11 when the jet pilot son of a
But Seni knows better. The flow of Maj. Gen. Yuthasorn Kaysornsuk
aid from Hanoi and Peking is a fact ' crashed his F-5 in the rugged moun-,
of life along the border. tains of Petchabun province, about
More important is the dismal fact 300 miles north of Bangkok and mid- I
way between the insu rgent areas in
that. during the decade of heavy the north and the northeast.
American involvement in Vietnam, An immediate operation was
while the Thais largely wasted $1.7 . launched to find the plane. A para-
billion in aid, the Communists were troop unit was put in, got into a hea-
building a force needing little outside vy battle, and called for reinforce-
help. di cited the ment.s. For the next two weeks major
diplomatic source fighting raged in the district, com-
government.s record recently in the - plete with Jet strikes. At' least 200
distant southern provinces, which are_ Communist troops, and probably
the least important of three major in- more, were killed,
surgency areas. In little-noted Although. government -casualties
clashes, insurgents there have cap- also were heavy, the few "activist"
tared more than 300 weapons in, six , generals in Bangkok were elated
months.
The government is planning a $600 ;over the battle. A lot of intelligence
million military budget this year. A 5v'theas insur picked gent up and forces there were being were bad signs.
-?
Western expert figured abstractly I'
that the insurgents could fight for. +ly disrupted. addition, this was a?
roughly 130 yeas on that. amount. It jital area where the shadowy Cen-
t apes only 75 cents a day to feed and 4tral~Committee of the Communist
clothe a Communist soldier and keep I arty of Thailand had been meeting;
him in the field. In time, the Insur- ,*crcntll.
" was.
gents doubtlessly will need more ant- In vcr the fennel end,
and the tile. missing operation e
was
munition and guns, but they nt ed lit. Xac4.
ca,lled off despite the cliirn of the.'
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commanding general that "we'uiill
never stop fighting."
"They never would have started in
the first place if a general's son had
not been lost," said one disgusted
headquarters official in Bangkok.
This attitude gradually has permit-
ted the, insurgents to enlarge, their
areas.
Gen. Pralong Veerapriya only this
month stirred a public storm by say-
ing that perhaps 10,7-o of the popula-
tion was under the sympathetic sway
of the Communists. Western experts
consider this -a high estimate, but ev-
eryone admits that the Communists
now control large base areas with
plenty of manpower for recruitment.
They long since. have matured from.
an organization dominated at the top
by Chinese or Sino-Thai leaders, with
the foot soldiers recruited from tribal
"buffalo boys." land.
? .,
Since 1952-when the first batch Two of the regional commanders_ ward the same goal for' years. They
of 20 trainees was sent to southern Song Nopakun in the north and are following good Maoist principles
China-about 2,500 military and pa. Udom Sisuwan in the northeast--are in preparing to encircle the cities
litical cadre have been sent to China; from the countryside, an. d that con-
old Bolshevik Sinn 'Thais who attend- ~,
North Vietnam-and camps in Laos ed the Party's congress three decades times to be thWestern eir strat p y,? fecls that
(often supervised by Chinese), ac- ago. The third, in the south, is Prasit, the Thaiepar y- will alter the strategy
cording to intelligence sources. Thiansiri, an ethnic Thai believed to; somewhat to take advantage of the
An efficient command structure be much younger. The Central Com- political weaknesses In Bangkok.
has been built, now based around 15 mittee is now believed to number"
" "What they are after here is a col-
provincial" areas where the local about a dozen men, several of whom lapse from within,"'
ithin, " he said. "Those:
commander corresponds roughly to a are ethnic Thais, and the first.: guerrillas are not going to come
regimental or.divisional commander, among-equals is said to be Charoelr' marching into Bangkok like the
with attached political officers. Wanngam, also an ethnic Thai, who' North Vietnamese marched into Sai-
Unlike the Vietnamese Communists is in his 50s and was trained in Hanoi gon. The way they figure it, they
who had a proclivity toward putting ? and possibly China. won't have to."
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Tuesday, Sept. 14, 1976
To, a
11
By RnfiPRT L. BAATLEY
PEKING-=The doors to the Great Hall
of the People stood open, and after 15 min-
utes waiting in the pleasant autumn sun.
the force of the air conditioning struck the
face like a cold breeze. It was a fitting sen-
sation as one came into the presence of the
remains of Mao Tse-tung, one of the most
historic figures of our century.
James Schlesinger, formerly U.S. Sec? was sontethtng of a syrrabolic substitute, for
retary of Defense and now in Peking as a clearly the invitation was intended as a
guest of the Chinese government, led the great honor for Mr. Schlesinger. Now the
party of 12 Americans into the antechant- rest of the trip has suddenly been rein-
her where they signed official registers, stated as well, an intriguing commentary
and into the receiving line of nine of the oil the post-Mao regime and Chinese pr'lori-
top officials of the People's Republic of ties in foreign policy.
China --headed by Premier Hua Kuo-feng, An ` xcel)tional Regard'
and Politburo standing committee mem- Obviously the Chinese government has
bers Wang Hung-wen and Chang Ch'un-
ch'iao. what one of its spokesmen calls "excep?
Slowly walking 30 steps beyond the re- tional regard" for Mr. Schlesinger, who
since his di
Secretary
ceiving line, the party spread into a re- by President t Fo Ford rdl has ass been fit t Defense
the Johns
b
Johns
spectful line before the glass coffin holding Hopkins University Washington Center of
the remains. Motion pictures were taken Foreign Policy Research. During the
under shining light, and the party passed
mourning period, when, Peking's museums
alongside the bier, three feet front the late werc officially closed, he and his party
chairman. Mao's face was somehow More ~ were escorted to the Great Wail, the Ming
square, more gray, and more wrinkled tong:; and the fantastic, Summer Palace,
than one would expect from photographs. Members of his party were told that the
But eyes closed and expressi.nl peaceful, it original Invitation for the visit came at the
radiated Ik sett se of serenity and power. personal direction of Mao, and that the
The procession passed behind one row dying chairman knew Mr. Schlesinger was
of wreaths as the next group of foreign via- in Peking.
itors cable through the receiving dine, then
h
'
rip
e trots` ss tat iitraty was from the first
down the steps past a separate lbte of blue
tl'' P
and green clad Chinese worker:n, and fi- uperl,u u it e:rr accorded a for.
oigo visitor. Mr. 1k-hlestrtger and those of
pally hack to Its procession of autos, Twin-
lair, party who have trutycd tiu '; Sea n
ty-five iitintitca after the party hat left its
hold, the :"rlt?nt'u alai dif;nltied cer