CIA YIELDS, DELIVERS DATA TO PIKE PANEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 1, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9
CONFIDENTIAL
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
OCTOBER 1975
1(-). 20
PAGE
GOVERNN'ENT AFFAIRS
1
GENERAL
28
EAST EUROPE
33
WEST EUROPE
34
.EAsT
37
AFRICA
41
EAST ASIA
43
LATIN NIERICA
48
25X1A
Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9
50 Words
geted
y Colby
By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer
Central Intelligence
Agency Director William
E. Colby defused a move to
hold him in contempt of ,
Congress by turning over
a stack of subpoenaed
documents to the House
intelligence committee late
yesterday with only a few
dozen Words deleted.
The secret records were
delivered to Chairman Otis
Pike (D-N.Y.) with a covering
letter declaring that they
were being submitted only
with the understanding that
President Ford would have
the last word on what could
be made public.. ?
Pike accepted custody of
the documents pending a meet-
ing of the full committee
today to decide, whether to
accept the arrangement. Quick
approval is expected. .
"This crisis is over," said
one committee. source. "Now
we can get on with our work."'
? A dispute with Secretary of'
State Henry A. Kissinger overt
access to State, Department
witnesses remains to be set-
tled, but . the committee ap-
parently plans to step up itsf
investigation of U.S. intelli-
gence agencies and keep up
the pressure on Kissinger at
the same time. ;
' CIA special counsel Mitchell
ilogovin handed the sub-
poenaed documents to Pike
and explained to the com-
mittee chairman the reasons
.for the scattered deletions.
They ranged from the names
of secret agents to derogatory
remarks about various per-
sonalities that Pike agree d!
. were unnecessary to the cone;
ruittee's work.
Pike told the. Associated
Press that in his`judgo,
I
Colby was no longer "in c
i
ce:,
A1 jjj 711
mad
tempt of Congress" and that I
only extremely sensitive mai{
terial, covering about 50
words in all, had been deleted.
Pike reportedly was in-
clined to keep pressing for a:
vote of confidence from the'
full House on the committee'si
battle for classified documents
as a matter of principle, but
it appeared unlikely that the
full committee would want toi
keep pushing .that point.
-President Ford cut off the
committee's access to all new
classified information and
demanded the return of 'se-
cret documents the committeel
alreadY had when it insisted
on the right to declassify sen-
sitive information on its own.
Overriding CIA objections.
. the committee disclosed a
; four-word phrase earlier this
,
imonth about Egyptian corn-
tmunications security on the
1 eve of the 1973 Arab-Israeli
war.
i Colby then refused to honor
la fresh committee subpoena
for secret documents bearing
on the Communists' 1963 Tet
offensive in South Vietnam
and maintained that the dis-
pute over who had the right
to make them public would
have to be settled first. Mean-
while, Pike and the committee
kept insisting that the admini-
stration had no right to lay
down any conditions before
;complying with congressional
.subpoenas. .
The dickering led to a meet-
ing between President. Ford
and House leaders last Friday. -
But White House aides follow-
ed up the conciliatory ges-.
ture with a hard-line proposal
not only giving Mr. Ford the?
last word on what to .1-flake
public, but also setting down
new, broadly worded restric-
tions on. what infermation
would be supplied to the com-
mittee even in confidence.
By a vote of 10-3, the com-
mittee decided Monday to re-
ject the "compromise" and
carry the battle to the House
floor with a resolution deplor-
ing the administration's non-
compliance with its subpoenas
and directing Colby to comply
with the Tel subpoena "forth-
with." !
The next step for the corn-I
otittee's resolution would have
1 14110.fi- ii8Vg&alh09ffar08
-0
. The -CIA -letter ' delivered
with the subpoenaed records
'yesterday reportedly made no
mention of any restrictions
? on the types of information
be supplied to the com-
mittee.
As a matter a practice, the
agency will probably con-
tinue to delete the names of
.secret -agents and similar
data from the documents it
supplies. But the - CIA will
have the burden of explaining
the reasons for the deletions
and Pike will be free to in-
sist, for example, on knowing
the identity of a secret agent
in any specific case where it
might be pertinent.
If the committee wants to
make any classified records
orntestimony public, however,
the government agency? in-
volved will be given a chance
to voice its objections at an
executive session. If no agree-
ment is reached, the dispute
will go to the President ' ?
.. Any written certification by
the President that disclosure
would, in his view, be "preju-
dicial . to the national secu-
rity" would bind the com-
mittee and keep the disput-
ed material from being made
public. The committee could
still litigate the issue in the.
courts but that is not 'coositin
maid likely. i
"It's not a great victory for!
US. to be quite blunt abouti1
it," a committee source said.
. At the same time, Pike has
said he has been assured that?
the President himself will re-.
I view any material the com-
mittee insists on making pub-
lic despite the intelligence
community's objections.
While the dispute with ? the
administration over classified
documents appeared virtually'
settled, however, the commit-
tee's battle with Kissinger
stepped up a notch after an
abortive hearing ' yesterday
morning on the 1974 Cyprus
crisis.
It foundered' over what the
State Department's former di-
rector of Cypriot affairs, who
had been called as a witness,
WASHINGTON POST
,
Wedneadav. Oct. I, 1975 ?
Moynihan Rejects
.. CIA Label's Clout
Reuter
UNITED NATIONS,
Sept. 30---U.S. Ambassa-
dor Daniel Patrick Moyni-
han said today that to be
described as a CIA agent
"should not be seen either
to add to or detract from
. the public reputations of
described as explicit orders
not to disclose the recommen-
dations he made improve U S.
Pike accused Kissinger of
blocking the ? committee's in-
vestigations with
"preposterous" restrictions on
witnesses under his caltroi.
The Cyprus expert, Thomas
D. Boyatt, a Foreign Service
officer now awaiting reassign-
ment, said he was told by Law-
rence S. Eagleburger, deputy
under secretary of state for
management, yesterday morn-
ing not to tell the committee
about the recommendations he
made, not even in executive
session. ? -
"I don't think it's the Pres-
ident of the United States
who's causing our clinical-.
tines," Pike told reporters la-
ter. "I've said it before and
I'll say it again, 1 think it's
Secretary Kissinger."
In first enunciating the si-
lence edict to the' committee
last week, Eagleburger cited'
the Red-hunting investigations
of the 40s and 53s as a major
reason for Kissinger's order
prohibiting junior and mid-
dle-grade officials at Siatei
from testifying about policy
recommendations they made
.i.O their superiors.
; Eagleburger sogiseSted that
foreign service officers might
be discouraged from givine
their "candid advice" it they
felt it would not remain -
confidential.
Pike made plain that he feltt
Kissinger was snore interest-I
:ed in protecting himself. The!
New York Democrat dis-i
missed the State Departs;
mends hints of a potential'
resurgence of MeCarnisisea
as "wholly a red herrino."
"I don't think this commit--;
I tee has taken to . exposing'
junior members (of govern-I
merit agencies and depart-1
meats) as evil,' Pike declareci.!
He said the committee's ore-;
liminary work indicates ind
stead that "it is at the upper!
level that things go -wrongn
that messages don't get passedi
'on, that advice is ignored."
those so charged."
He was responding to a
letter circulated last night
by Spanish -Ambassador
Jaime de Pinies who
quoted from a book in
which Mexican President
Luis Echeverria was
linked with the CIA.
laloynitian said tens of
thousands of statesmen
and women have been ac-
cused of CIA ties.
: CIA-RDP77-00432F000100380007-9
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9
NEW YORK TIMM
3 October 1975
SENATE MI Rill
TAX DNA filESE
BY EH, AND CIA,
Revenue Service Was Used
to Harass Groups Seen
as Political Hazards
:By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Sped tt to The 5oYark Times
.WASHINGTON, Oct. 2?The
Central Intelligence Agency and
the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation used the Internal Reve-
nue Service, apparently illegal-
1Y, to harass ;groups that 'they
felt were politically threaten-
ing, according to evillence pre-
sented today at a Senate hear-
ing.
Senator Frank Church, Demo-
crat of Idaho who is chairman
of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, said in an open-
ing statement today, "The com-
mittee has found evidence indi-
lcating that the F.B.I. his widely
!misused the LRS. tax inforrna-
Ilion to disrupt poliEetal activ-
!ists." He said the balk of this
!evidence If;ouid he made public
Iin hearings on counterintelli-
gence. -
; ? Commission Disclosure
- At today's two-and-a-half-
hour session it was disclosed
that the V.8.1. had obtained a
list of contributors from tax re-
turns in a scheme to disrupt
the fund-raising of the Rev.
Martin Luther King jr,'s.South-
ern Christian Leadership Con-
ference.
? The CIA. was disclosed to
have urged the I.R.S. to 'open
an investigation of Ramparts'
magazine in 1967 ha an ;effort
to head off a series of articles
on C.I.A. infiltration of the Na-
tional Student gssociation.
Earlier this year the report
of Vice President Retkefeller's
Commission on the C.I.A. said
the agency had obtained tax
return information illegally.ut
the evidence on the .Ramparts
incident showed that the C.I.A.
wanted to go further and use
the information to harass the
magazine.
The two incidents were the
first time it has been estab-
lised that intelligence agencies
used the I.R.S. for this purpose.
During the Senate Watergate
hearings, it was established
that the Nixon Achniniatration
;sought to use the rakentie serv-
tice
Io punish its political
enemies.
1 In a C.I.A. racanorandum
dated Feb. 2i 196,7, at unidenti-
'he had briefed -Thomas 'Forty,
then assistant to the Commis-
.
Isioner of I.R.S. and Leon Green,
then an assistant to the assist.
ant LIU: commissioner for;
compliance, on the -"current
Status of the Ramparts matter"
and he -sought their "coopera-1
tion." ?
The .memorandurri said:
; "I told' the flier the informa-
tioit and rumors we have heard
!about 'Ramparts' proposed ex-
!poses with particular reference
to the U.S.N.S.A. tUnited States
iNational Student Association]
;and [partial deletion, presum-
ably a designation for C.I.A.]. I
!impressed upon them the direc-
tor's concern and expressed our
certainty that this is an attack
on C.I.A. in particular,' and the!
Administration in general,!
.which is merely using USNSA1
and [deletion] as tools."
The memorandum went on;
to say: "I suggested that the;
corporate tax returns of Ram-
parts, Inc., be examined and!
that any leads to, Possible;
financial supporters be followed I
uP by an examirratiOn of their!
individual tax returns. It is un-!
likely that such an examination!
will develop much worthwhile;
information as to the maga-I
-zinc's source of financial sup-
port, but it is possible that some
!leads will be evident."
The C.I.A. man went on to
;say that the "political sensi-
tivity of the case is SUCIT that
if we are to go further than
this, it will be necessary for
the agency to make a formal
;request for the returns under
la procedure 'set forth in Govern-.
Imentaregulations.
] "If such a request is made,
the commissioner will not be
? in' a position to deny our in-
terest if questioned later by a
member of Congress .or ? other
competent authorit." the mem-
orandum said. "This matter
contains the elements for po-
litical repercussions against the-
internal Revenue Service as
well as this agency and Mr.
?Terry feels that we can make
ino move until he has briefed
the commissioner."
Owners' Tax Return .
In a memorandum dated Feb.
15, the same or another iden-?
tilled C.I.A .official, reported
that he had access to the tax
return information of Edward
Keating, who had reported that
he owned Ramparts. In general
the memorandum indicated that
Mr. Keating's ownership was
routine, but in the following
paragraph it appeared the C.I.A.
was giving I.R.S. advice on how
to proceed in a tax case:
"The statement of owner-
ship, management mid ci?reula-:
tion published in January, 1967,
issue of Ramparts as required
by law and postal regulations
!lists five stockholders, ... This
is not consistent with the solel
ownership of Keating as report-
ed to Revenue as recently as!
fiscal year 1965. We intend tol
check this fact- and so does!
Revenue inasmuch as Keating:
has been claiming 100 per cent
losses on his own tax return."
In May, 1967, the C.I.A. re-
ported in a memorandum that
Washington Post
3 Oct. 1975
Grain Data
Collected
By CIA
By Dan Morgan
WasSangton Post staff Writer
The Central Intelligence
Agency has been collecting
detailed information from
private U.S. companies on
their sales of grain to the
Soviet Union and other
countries, even though the
same data is gathered by the
Department of Agriculture.
The grain export in-
formation ? obtained by the
agency's domestic collections
branch, which often debriefs
businessmen who travel
abroad ? is used to make
assessments of the strategic
balance in grain supplies.
CIA officials have indicated
in the past that they consider
grain supplies to be an im-
portant element of national
security; and possibly a useful
gauge of international
behavior of the Soviet Union, a
major grain importer.
A recent series of detailed CIA
inquiries to grain companies
includes iequests for in-
formation on worldwide
Russian demand for grain,
and estimates of world sales to
the Soviet Union, or East
Europe, including American
grain sales on a weekly basis.
NEW YORK TIMES
28 September 1975
New Effort to Make Public
C.I.A. Budget IsScheduled
Spectal to The New York Times .
WASHINGTON, Sept. 26 ?
Representative Robert N.
Giaimo, a member of both the
House Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee and the ? Select
Committe on Intelligence, will
attempt again next week to
make the budget of the Central
Intelligence Agency Public for
the first time since 1947.
Traditionally the annual cost
of the C.I.A.'S operations are
discuised as part of the Depart-
A Department of Agriculture
spokesman said yesterday
that he had no idea why the
CIA was collecting the in-
formation. In 1973, Congress
-gave the department
responsibility for compiling
weekly reports of all grain
sales abroad. In addition to
those weekly reports, U.S.-
based firms are now required
to inform the department
within 24 hours of any sale
exceeding 100,000 metric tons.
Referring to the duplicate -
commercial export in-
telligence gathering of the
CIA, the chief of one major
-grain company said this
week: "They stay in touch
with us all the time."
Edward W. Cook, chairman of
the board of Cook Industries,
Inc., of Memphis, said in an
interview that he often reports
the same information to both
the CIA and the Agriculture
Department. "They stay in
contact with people who are
doing business with areas in
which they are interested," he
saki. "It could be Brazil, could
be Russia, or it could be !
France." Cook said the CIA I
gets no more information ;
about the sales than the ;
Agriculture Department gets,
adding, "There doesn't seem
to be- much coordination in
Washington." A department
official said recently that it
sometimes seemed that the
CIA's export ' data was
reaching top officials of the
Agriculture Department
before the department's OW11.
CIA officials could not be
reached for comment
yesterday.
ment of Defense's appropria-
tions.
Giaimo, Democrat of
Conneeticet, led an unsuccess-
ful fight to get the Appropria-
tions Committe to publish the
figure Thursday. He said that-
he planned to offer an amend-
ment to the defense appropria-
tions bill to?remove the agency
budget item from the section
where it is disguised as a
defense request. If this amend-
ment is successful. he said he
would offer an amendment to
make the figure public.
For years authoritative intel-
ligence sources have said that
the C.I.A. spends S750-million
to SI-billion a year.
its informants to the I.R.S. Thei
memo said: ?
"If they determine that non-,
bonalide .transactions are in-i
volved, they will infoem me and
will discuss further the investi-
gative procedures to be used,
by I.R.S. in ascertaining wheth-
er or not there are violations of
the internal revenue codes 'in-
!volved."
Sheldon Cohen, Commissioner
Ithe release of tax information
on Ramparts to C.I.A. He said
Ihe had talked to Mr. Ttrry grub
IMr. Green last week and neither
Iof them could recall talking to
!him about the matter.
1 Under Fedei at Law. it is a
mrime for . anyone to make an.
;unauthorized dissemination of
the information frem a Fr.-Real'
;tax return. The current I.R.S.;
!Commissioner. Donald C. Alex-I
!ander, has, ordered an investi-1
eti f LI I r ; o
Ified C.LA.. official renorted that tt.was e.assinp inf !or meal LR-? S. al. ILLS/a? sa.id. on o ) s n A
Approved I-or xelease/604106108': Wk-,IRAFTK-91,144-444y,pliqp38:itgRoas. it was
2 ,revciate. serviee ollicia.ls.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R00010038000-9
II.ANC-2,17,E1 TThIS
23 September 1975
LITY VS NATIONAL SECURITY
'74
SA_Ija PETT
005peciat Cmespondent
ViTAS.FMTON---Jie began by re-
-calling -that when be finally told his
daughter zhat he did for a living,
avhfseh w espior.aeee work, she said,
"But isoft?klat kind of dirty, Daddy?"
He ccll the interview with a kind
of entraterearbra
"IL 2is. Pve had .to dO. things
I'm !rot ,prticularly. proud of. It's
. been a daf6le life, :sometimes unethi-
cal and ilkgal.. Bt I think I've been.
usefel, evil I'm nr.,t envious of any
mate'smer standards."
Ha plater his g"-Isses and dug into
his wallet.. He hoped, he said; he was
not a-'1.7.ocit a be corny. Then, from a
tattil scrap of paper, this big;
peaful-leaking man read ? aloud,
with some emo&ria, the words of
-Nathan Pirla-t
"I wish ttbe useful, and every kind
of service, necessary to the public.
good, brames honorable by being
neiteasa-nry. If the exigencies of my
coo:m.17e thmancl a peculiar service,
its cleamis: perform that service are
'.vas Cc rationale of Dave Phil-
lips' tie the Central Intelligence
Ageneen His (tau-gator had thought
he worked' for the Department of
State_ It it.'"t" been, of course, the ra-
tionale of tile CIA_ the FBI, the mili-
tary ?Inten-gence agencies and, in
fact., si all the heroes and rogues in
? hiAno.?t.:, tytiol served the altar of na-
tional siczeity.
Now, in the wake of Watergate
anti Vietrain, the morality and the
mentality a the huge American in-
teiidgence .apparatans are being ques-
tiontof as sever befrare.
Do the. tiechnionaes of intelligence
in-ea-I:ably compromise ademocracy?
What is tie morality of men who
seek. Fri ted, name ter country, to turn.
men a airther country into traitors.
men -who Ile, steal break and enter.
blazkmail and bug?.' Should Mr. Bond.
at lang lase he housebroken?
How s:emzet should a secret opera-
te?) inafree and open society? At
-what penia, such as in that village in
Vietnam, .b we ritak the destruction
of nerty In the name of its salva-
? tiorff In a world hehich is not a rose
garden, are the qtoestions themselvez
naive and iTkely tee, bring more dam-
age than feety V.-edld correct? ?
e: Fins; does- a nanhon that historically
?'weati ftseh." to the a,-indole of self-de-
_
?totereeimatiast justafto secret plots to
fest: eae the leaden and the lives of
.ethee reeenns? How did honorable,
meta-at:gem men bring themselves'.
- even to &amass assassinations?
0'1 Are we forever locked into the
e the tairieration that a)-
ter-.,hers 'Munich and Pearl.
? iriiessaneer?7..-a there no alternative to
that. view because einot'ner Pearl liar-
lanr timald 'an the iseest?
anyffng gazdNPIPKAYgdeFQ.1"-
An
most anything to in. a cold war and
an. uneasy detente?
It was Pearl Harbor that Harry S.
-Truman had in mind when he asked
Congress to set up the CIA in 1947..
Clark Clifford helped write the legis
tat ion. Before he became secretary of
defense in 1968, Clifford served eight
years on the president's Foreign In-;
telligence Advisory Board, most of:
them as chairman. ? ?
"Basically," he said recently, "an
intelligence operation is an anachro-
nism in a democracy. It is secret. it
sometimes uses questionable means.
The public can't be informed about it
or even told its cost. It is inconsistent
with:democracy, but it remains a ne-
cessity if we are to preserve our form
of government. We can't fly blind ,in-
the world today."
But the CIA .troubles Clifford pro-
foundly, for startling reasons,. and so
.he urges new legislation by which
joint oversight committee of Con-
gress would tether the agency within
new, sharply defined
He is particularly troubled by the
growthi of the "intelligence syn-
drome" over the years of the cold war.
"As the agency went on -growing,"
he said. 'there developed a psycholo-
gy within the CIA: those who were
'experienced in international intel- ?
ligence were uniquely qualified not
only to carry out orders but, to con-
ceive new projects.
"As time went on, they developed a
concept of a higher loyalty, higher
even than that which they owed to
their own director and the President,
a loyalty to country tAich carried
with it the idea that others, only
temporarily in government, would
not be able to understand the great
-
rewards that awaited the country if
they were left alone..
'I know this existed. I'm not guess-
ing. Their thinking was that Pres-
idents and directors come and go
while they were devoting their lives
to this service. So. they found con-
cepts to blunt what the Russians
might be doing in their covert opera-
tions. maybe overlooking the fact
that the Soviets operated from a dic-
tatorship and we, a democracy.
"In my years on the President's ad-
visory board, which had the power of
the President .behind it, I felt we
were given full information in some
areas but not in others. They held
back on us and they held back on the
President. They thought that nonex-
perts really were not qualified to
make decisions in these areas; they
would make them."
Clifford chose not to cite specific
examples. But a former CIA officer,
in his time one of its top men, agreed
with Clifford's picture of the extraor-
dinary elitism by which information
was denied the President of the Unit-
ed States and the mati he appoints to
direct 'he int el nmmee
Releaqen 1/Q8/NE. ; A4pli?
3
?
- utk!.7
ficer said. "They tended to regard
elected officials as transitory. And
they sometimes withheld things from
the director, depending on the direc-
tor. In an internal investigation, the
agency's inspector general also was
sometimes blocked -off from certain'
areas.
'You see, the compartmentalization
was intense and information wasn't
'.alWays restricted only on a need-to--
-know basis. It was, sometimes kept
from those who should know but
might object to a given idea."
By law, the CIA is responsible to
the President and reports directly to
the National Security Council, of
which the President is chairman. The
other members are the Vice Pres-
ident, secretary of state, secretary of
defense, chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the CIA director.
The NSC, too, Clifford says, was at
times kept in the seMidark as a result
of ?agile footwork and a relentless
momentum that would develop with-
in the CIA for a given project.
"Let rhe give you a hypothetical
example," the former secretary of de-.
fense said, "and my guess is there
was a lot of this going on.
"We start with the CIA director
telling the . NSC, 'Here's a little
project we have in mind. We've re-
searched and studied it thoroughly.
It's not very expensive and we want
to go to Point A on it.' - -
"It sounds innocent, and so it is au-
thorized. That's' the last the NSC
hears about it.
'When he gets to Point A, the di-
rector reasons, 'Well, it isn't very far
to Point B and we'll get a much bet-
ter result?At Point B, he feels that
task is incomplete and he goes to C.
At C, he says, 'Well, this has been
helpful but if we're really going to
accomplish our purpose we have to
go to D.'
"Now we're launched on Cod-
knows-what, and D turns out to be a
complete catastrophe. When he is
asked about it later, the director says
he was authorized to do this. What
gets lost is that he was never author,
ized to go beyond Point A."
It is the insistent contention of the.
CIA that it may operate in the dark
but not in a vacuum, that what it
does secretly is simply the invisible
arm cf what the President, .in his
.foreign policy, does publicly.
It is also the implicit contention of
'recent history that elitism in govern-
ment, or what David Halberstam
called "The Best and the Brightest,".
was not confined to the 125 serene,
verdant acres the CIA occupies in the
pines of Langley, Va. From Franklin
D. Roosevelt to Richard
Congress was told less and less by in-
creasingly powerful Presidents. Fath-
er knew best, and Big Brother was
not far behind.
-00432RGQ0,10a3811010789a terrible
war, beginning with the surprise at.
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tack on-Pearf Harbor, which might
,lave been much less of a surprise if
-any arm of government had put
together the separate pieces of infer.
_mation- separate departments had.
In that war, the men who later be-
came the nucleus of the CIA served
:in the Office of Strategic Services..
.They performed with great dash and
"distinction, breaking enemy codes,
,parachuting behind enemy lines,
hatching enemy leaders. It was our:
last declared war, the last one we
didn't debate, and the rules were few.
111 the CIA, as a result of real ac-'
,Complishments and the times, a mys-
que grew up around these former
Warriors, many. of whom came from?
?*the Ivy League, many of whom were
-idealistic liberals. It was our Peace.
:Corps," one said.
The mystique was aided and abet-,
:ted by Joseph Stalin, who seemed in-
:tent on gobbling up Europe and more
:through ubiquitous tentacles. Spies
brought him the secrets of the atomic
bomb. On this side of the world,
there were Joseph McCarthy seeking
to frighten Americans about the
-Communists under their beds and.
- John Foster seeking to make-
anticommunism a moral crusade in
the world.
It was a time when Americans had
only five years' respite between,
?wars, when colonial empires were
collapsing and much of the globe ap-
peared rine for plucking by an ap-
parently monolithic enemy, when
Americans were not questioning
American motives and Presidents
were still trusted; a time when scien-
tists and technicians seemed to hold.
the future in their hands and laymen
were cowct-d by experts.
. "To argue with the CIA," said Torn
Braden, a former member and now a
critic, "was to argue with knowledge."
The late Stewart Alsop, columnist
and former OSS man, sought to ex-
plain how some of the best minds in
the Kennedy administration agreed
to the Bay of Pigs invasion:
"The answer lies somewhere in the:
.mystique of the secret service profes-i
sional vis-a-vis the amateur. Some-
how in such a confrontation, the
amateur tends to put a childish faith,
in the confident assertions of the
professional."
And this from an intelligence offi-
mial, talking to the Washington Post'
about dealing with the Forty Com-
mittee, a supersecret oversight group
within the executive branch:
"They were like a bunch of school-
boys. They would listen and their
eyes would bug out. I always used to
say that I ?Add get $5 million out of
the Forty Committee for a covert
operation faster than I could get
money for a typewriter out of the or-
dinary bureaucracy."
Basic to the ?ndersttanding, of the
intelligence mentality, its practition-
ers say, are several facts of interna-
tional life: the world remains a dan-
gerous place despite detente; the
KGB, the Russian intelligence appa-
ratus. is very good and ubiquitous
and lids the advantage of operating
from a closed society: intelligence, in
any case. cannot be operated within
?Marquess of Queensberry rules,
-
? -CIA Director. Williarn B. Colby:
"If you get to the logical end of de-
tente. then Ve would have estab-.
Iished a relationship with the Soviet
;Union of mutual respect for each oth-
er's strengths, so that our differences
ican be negotiated about rather than
,fought over. This, in turn, should en-.
courage the Soviets to believe that
:they ought to be more open with
their information. But that's not the
:situation now.
."Today the Soviet attaches can go
-to almost any newsstand in this.
countiy, pick up a copy of a technical
aviation or space magazine, and from
it learn a vast amount of detail about
our weapons systems. Unfortunately,
we have to spend hundreds of mil-
bons Of dollars to get comparable in-
formation about the Soviet Union." .
, On another occasion, Colby eon-
trastcd his job with that of 'hiltits--
-sian counterpart, Yuri ,.ViadirnroVich '
Andropov, head of the KGB.
s.."MrAndropof. faces sa :veritable
cornucopia of- easily 'acquired !infor-
mation ! about front- -,pub.
lished and public sources. but of this,:
he must pick. these facts -which -are.
significant and assemble them into an
accurate assessment of America:.
"My task is to search forindiVidual
facts.kept in the utnioit, seerecy! '
elpSed ipoletiessancl with. these facts
trY to Construct whole,!azsessments,
in :somewhat the way 'one extrapo-
lates a ,reproduction of the skeleton
of a brontosaurus from a thigh bone.
of,
clandestinelY: acquired
informatiiin;. brontosaurus could
. in some situations be Very deformed.
indeedinao':.m.es_
Thus eipionage.: -?!
And espionage Dave Phillips
.points otit:is a' crime! In everY'cotiri-
ty of the world. So, 'obviously,, is,
treason. One is fed by the other. Like
Other governments, the government
.!the United, States. sends ? men;
'atircaci ,to spy and encourage treason
and 1,voiild rather; not 'hear of. .:the
:crimes' 'within. the ;criMes?bribery,
theft, blackmail, bugging.'
of if distasteful but vital,'!! says
,
Dave. Phillips, clinging to his Nathan
Bale qUote. It was his daughter?whd
,
keaCtedi,With. dismay when, he told,
her how, be served his.country.
Phil-
lips recently resigned after 25:y,ears
in the CIA to form an association of
:former intelligence officers ' ,ithe.
'.hope Of helping the agency's image.
: "My daughter's reaction shook me.
Alp," he says. Tean remember when,
kids used to romanticize and think
highly.ofintelligence work." ?
ltight and wrong become inopera-
tive, useless Words in espionage, says
Sam" Halperin, who was CIA execu-
Li've: assistant in clandestine services.
He .retired recently after 20 years
with,the:OSS and the -CIA. He is a
short, thin Man who, looks more like,
li:Brooklyn accountant than a James
Bond. . ? ' .
draw the line on torture," ? he
said. "But if I was told to recruit, I'd
.use -all the tricks of the trade?mond.
ey, sex; blackmail, anYthing that
gives ine control ? oVer's people. That's
4 "what getting spies means and every-
thing :else is hyprocrisya! :
s' Rough as espionage is there, seern
-to ! be' ',limits, . practical if notTmora.1
.-ll'In:that-bulture," said Sen. Frank
Church, chairman ?Nil& Senate
lect committee on-Intelligence,-"spies.
don't kill- other. In fad; they`scrupit-.
avoi,d it. NoW,Tin!notAalking
about .douldle agents..But -while they
watch each other careftillY; the KGB
leaves the -CIA-, alone' and the 'CIA
leaves --the KGB alone. -.They ''don't
shoot each other. It-wonld be as bier:-
'ficient as gang warfare." .
a game of :wits, not muScle:
pa'vc,:Phillips:said..','For example; it-
w-Onld be 'easy ,for Us to kill a courier.
Owing/the:Other side's secret doc-
1,1*n.t,s,?b1.4. P-16'si the same to tis';
and pretts0on nobody Would .have
couriers ",
.'Pragmatmcaliy( it. doesn!t make,'
rich' sense,i!!' Sam Halperin
yo're':"a KGB man and youkill mer
yott:then.liaVeto _go. to the time and,
so -
'trouble of learning who my replace-
went is.r
CIA men insist, however, that the
'Russians are not above killing defec-
tors or others who have "turned
..sour arid might carry off secrets
:with them. The KGB, they say, has a
_ special department for carrying out
eliminations known grimly among
American intelligence people as "the
Department of Wet Affairs.' Wet for
blood.
Does the CIA have a similar spe-
cialty?
"I have never heard of anything
-like that practiced by any intel-
ligence system in the Western
World," said a longtime veteran of
American counterintelligence.
- Would he admit it if he had?
"No," the man said.
In the beginning, the CIA was pri-
Inarily intended to coordinate and
..evaluate for the President the infer-
'nation received by the government's
various intelligence arms. The law
establishing it said nothing about
vrhat has come to be known as
"covert operations," the manipulation
of events in Other countries.
But the law did say that the CIA
was to perform "such other film-
bons' as the National Security Courts:
, cil might direct. With that catchall
phrase as its authority, the CIA over
the years has conducted covert oper-
ations around the world with massive
resources of money, men and tricks
neat and dirty. In Western Europe,
Iran, Guatemala, Greece, Cuba, Laos,.
Vietnam and other countries, it has
poured money into elections and en-
gineered or tried to engineer the
overthrow of governments thought
to be inimical.
The general rationale was "they"
do it, we have to; it's them or us. Or
as Colby said in a recent interview,
quoting Vince Lombardi, "Winning
isn't the main thing. It's the only
thing."
"But the question," Sen. Church,
said "is how much like the devil do
we want to be? At one point, do we
become our own worst enemy?"
Church admitted there are no easy
answers. Ha thinks a good argument
could be made for the infusion of CIA
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money into the Rattan elections of
1947, which defeated thE: Communists.
and helped keep a war-wobbly Bu- ?
rope from sliding into Stalin's lap.
Similarly, he thinks a good case
might be made more recently for CIA
-intervention in Portugal ?tapparently
it didn't intervene ,on the grounds
that a Communist or .Rus-sian-backed
minority sought to thwart the demo-
cratic will of the demonstrated ma-
jority.
But there is no, justification in
terms of political marality or Ameri-
can security for the CIA. intervention
in Chile, Church said.
"The Marxist Allende government
was the choice of the "Chilean people,
made in a free and honest ejection.
Furthermore, Chile did not pose any
threat to the United States unless it
was the dagger notated straight at
the heart of the /TT_
"Besides the moral question of our
right to control the alfairs of another
country covertly, there is a practical
question. What is the political cost to
the United States of such ventures,
even when successful!
"Sooner or later, they become ?
- known but the advocates never con-
sider the price we nay for these
things throughout the Third World,
where we are resented and feared
and, in many places; hated fully as
much as the Soviet Union."
- the CIA's general answer to criti-
.Chs,n of its covert operations is that.
they were legally- guthorized and
that the agency, a :ereature of the
President, was carrying out his
? foreign policy. Thus, the question of
CIA morality bee0111eS the morality
of that policy.
And that policy was best summa-
rised, according to one of its critics,
by a statement he atteibuted to Hen-
ry A. Kissinger. The critic is Morton
Halperin, a former ahesoistant to .Kis-
singer on the Nattional Security
Council. He was one of 13 govern-
ment officials whose phones were
tapped by the Nixon administration
in its search for security leaks to the
media.
Halperin said Kissinger once said,
during a meeting of the Forty Com-
mittee, which is an arm of the NSC:
"I don't see why we thhould permit a
country to go Communist due to the
irresponsibility of its own people."
Kissinger has denied making this
statement. - -
CIA Director Colby is fond of point-
ing out that a covert operation pro-
vides a President with "a choice be-
tween sending a diplomatic protest or
sending in the Martens." He is also
given to observe frequently that the
CIA has been a prodnuct of its time
and changes with the times. In May
of this year, he said the CIA now
conducts "very few" covert "political
and paramilitary openations."
"This is the revolt_ of the changed
world . . . but I meet point out that
this changed egorhi seems to be
changing again_ Our country might
again need the cepa:a:ay to provide
some quiet influence or assistance to
friends abroad withant. Artri306fiditeFor
formal diplomatic or military might
of the United States."
* Most covert operations, we are
told, are small and routine. "Mostly,
intelligence work is a lot of little
transactions," said John Bross, a for-
Mer CIA deputy director.
"Generally, its a case of making
friends so you can influence people to
do or not do something," said Dave
Phillips, who was CIA chief of Latin-
American operations. "Like trying to
slow down the flow of hard drugs to
the United States or to have someone
get tough with terrorists kidnaping
our diplomats. And that friend might
be a newspaperman or a government
official or a local Bernard Baruch or
the mistress of the foreign minister.
"A foreign minister, for example, is.
not likely to tell the American am-
bassador that his country is about to
devalue its currency or blast us in
the United Nations. Only intelligence
people can gather this kind of infor-
mation and hope to influence the
events with covert action which
makes it appear indigenoos to the
country and not the desire of the U.S."
Intelligent people tend to view the .
world in terms of unpleasant choices
'and if you question A, they ask back,
would you prefer B. Thus, Sam Hai-
perin has little patience with persons
who say it's all right to spy but im-
moral to interfere with the internal
affairs of other countries: ?
"The essence of espionage is get-
ting spies and a spy, by definition, is
a traitor to his country, and what is
so moral about turning people into
traitors? In my book, it's much more
moral to buy an editorial in a foreign
newspaper or put money into an
election.
- "We interfere in the internal affairs
of other countries all the time by giv-
ing or .withholding something?mili-
tary assistance, the AID. program,
food, loans, whatever. What the hell
is so different about the President de-
ciding we've got to win a foreign
election covertly?
"Teddy Roosevelt didn't need the
CIA to detach the Panama peninsula
from Colombia. Eisenhower ordered
troops into Lebanon, Johnson sent
them to. the Dominican Republic.
Wilson chased Pancho Villa. -All of
This was interference. The Germans
and the Italians interfered in the
Spanish Civil War, the West didn't,
and we got Franco. Maybe we should
have kept Hitler from marchingb into
the Rhineland. That would have
been interference, and what's the dif-
ference whether it is overt or covert?"
- None of the intelligence people apa
proached for this article- saw any-
thing immoral in the Bay of Pigs in-
_ 'simian of Cuba. It was poorly
planned or badly executed but it was
not, in their eyes, morally wrong. Af-
ter all, they said, nobody had elected
Castro and he was talking about ex-
porting Marxist revolution- in -Latin
America and he was inviting 'the
There IS a- kind t of .relentless
momentum implicit in this logic that;
gathering speed, can gallop easily to-.
ward the ultimate in covert .opera-
tions----political assassination. It.
'usually carries with it the; reminder.
that the world might . have been
spared tragedy beyond measure if
somebody had killed Adolf Hitler.
And if Hitler\awhy not Stalin, why
not Castro? After all, . this reasoning
goes, wouldn't it have been better to
kill one man than to have hundreds
die in the Bay of Pigs and later risk
the deaths of Millions in the, missile
crisis?
Church said.. his committee had
"hard evidence of. CIA - involvement"
in assassination plots... Colby said
there had been suggestions to assas
-sinate.r. but they.. :had -been turned.,
.down. . . -
Former CIA men interviewed for,
this story ,denied -knowledge of any.
such plots but they did esay they,
could understand how some persons
might have considered them..
"In any, big crunch"' a man long
counterintelligence said, "there are.
always' people below, the -top level,
who talk about miracle solutions for
problems. But can't. imagine any
CIA director even contemplating as--
saination without going to the-Pres
ident or secretary of state.'n ? -
"Castro represented a real threat,"
another .former CIA officer said; "and
if I'd -been President I would've con--
sidered assassination as an option."
can'imagine," Dave 'Phillips said,.
,"a few people getting 'together and'
saying, 'The Mafia did a remarkable
job for us in, the European ports dur-
ing World War II. Why don't we talk -
to them about knocking Off Castro?' .
? "Butis that involvement? Or if wet
support an indigenous movement to
overthrow.a government, there is no
way we can turn-the taps on or off
and know what the people are going
todo. If the overthrow results in ant
assassinationtis that involvement?"
In any case, Colby said, he is op-'
posed to assassinations because "I
think, they're wrong 'and they fry:,
:quently bring about absolutely una;
controlled and unforeseeable results
?usually worse results than by con-
tinuing to. suffer .the problem you're
facing.'t
Church, whose. committee will at-
tempt to prescribe ,limits for the
American' intelligence community,
says, "No agency of, government can
be licensed to commit murder."
It would seem, then, there finally is
a line beyond which the perceived
needs of national security must note
trespass.
But'.'. . .
"Murder," Church said, "cannot be
permissible when undertaken against
leaders of countries with which we
have peaceful relations or be an in-
strument of ? foreign policy against
small countries whose leaders could
not, possibly threaten us."
Does that exclude the leaders of
large countries who. .
Russians in only 90 miles from Amer- "We're in a field of vagaries where
jean shores and the Russians did it is tomossible to draw clear lines,"
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it, but' there are those who contend;
for .example, that to amid a nuclear
catastrophe a President might have
to take- an action short of war, and.
assassination might become. necessa-
ry...
"But the :President e the United'
,States must never beceeme a glorified',
'Godfather,' with 'hit men' available
to carry out his orders!' -
There is. or there is step.posed to be,-
a double standard in irttelligence by
which the golden rule iis neatly: re-
versed. We do to others what we
don't do to ourselves.. We may spy,
lie, bug, bribe, break and enter, steal'
or blackmail abroad but ilot at home.
This is the law.
? ? "But the problems which have aris-
en in the domestic field cannot be
fully understood and eliminated," said
Erwin. Griswold, a mesalx.sr of the
Rockefeller Corranissiora which in-
vestigated the CIA, "unless they are
viewed against 'the role which the
CIA has undertaken to play outside
the United States. BeCaTf.q.: of the se-
cret nature of its operations, legal
and . moral limitations may not al-
ways be kept in mind. It this situa-
tion, it should not be surprising that ?
personnel, when workinee in the Unit-
ed States, should not always feel that
they are subject to ordinary- re-
straints." ? . -
Thus, the CIA has spired on Ameri-
cans in the United States, maintained
dossiers, intercepted and opened
mail, infiltrated protest .groups and
,engaged in wiretaps and break-ins.
The CIA insists none of this was
"massive" arid says that where it oc-
curred it was necessary' to national ?
security. Its prepenents also remind
;its critics of the unsettling riots in the
'60s and '703. They recall a statement._
LONG ISLAND PRESS
18 Sept. 1975
More. slwrbing
CIA revelations
by FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley:
"Let me remind those who would
criticize the FBI's actions that the
United States Capitol WAS bombed;
that other explosions rocked public
and private offices and buildings;
that rioters led by revolutionary ex-:
tremists laid siege to military, indus-
trial and educational facilities; and:
that killings, maimings and other
atrocities accompanied such acts of
violence from New England 'to Cali-
fornia."
Against this background,- the CIA,
says it sought to determine whether
there' were foreign connections be-
hind the eruptions.
-"Remember," the veteran of coun-
terintelligence said, ? "that the KGB
succeeded in its biggest recruitment
of spies- back in the '30s, when there,
was the Oxford Cambridge group
which . said it wouldn't fight in its
country's wars.
"That was similar to the recent.
wave of protests against the Vietnam
war. It was a time ripe for Soviet re-
cruitment, and many of the protest
leaders traveled abroad."
"Intelligence simply cannot operate
within basic American precepts," said
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, former execu-
tive director of the CIA. "And it is in-c
credibly naive, to be shocked by the
fact that letters were opened. This is
done by every intelligence system in. ,
the world." ? ?
Colby said the CIA no longer opens
mail. He also said the current uproar ,
over its methods has caused damage.?,
He speaks of other friendly intel-
ligence systems abroad growing
wary of dealing with the CIA. Of.
?agents quitting because of a fear of
exposure. Of "people we were -just
about to do business, with changing
n _Central Intelligente Aaency, officials, led by its
. ?
'director, Williarri2Efolby, have .testified about the
'use of deadlY bioll"gical and chemical. poisons in,
:Overseas spying activities. Not only have agents
been supplied with: Such substances to kill them-
selves rather thap' :make damaging confessions to
potential captors,i,but handy gadgets like battery-
powered dart: guri..4-that shoot poisons have also
been stockpiled foi% ,'.offensive use
Thus the inves.U'ga. tion-of CIA activities by a Sen-,
?ate select comrra,..;ee has assumed a James-Bond
!,-,atmosphere .4j,ctional 'spies and their. super
"weapons ? brought to?life. But the CIA hasn't just.
? been involved in realistic theater, it has- also been
-
involved in militay" coups. abroad, and in equally
illegal and dangeous spying. at ?home. Moreover,.
some .CIA officiaLi,have gone so far as to defy an
, order from the President of the United States.
This is-the most Startling and scary testimony
: to emerge from-.the public hearings. To his credit,
their minds." Of American corpora-
tions. now afraid of finding them-
selves . on .the, front 'page as "CIA.
fronts."
"And all that means," he said, "is
that we're not getting the informa-_:
.tion we should be.".
Church said neither he nor his
committee intends to emasculate the
CIA but they are concerned by the
growth of Big Brother government.
"We've come a long way down
that road. It's time to stuff the intel-
ligence genie back in the bottle be-
fore we wake up one morning to find
we have spawned a secret police and
a government which has become the
enemy of the people."
Church admitted that laying down
new specific ground rules for the
American intelligence apparatus in
an unpretty world would be delicate'
nd difficult. "The range of permissi
:ble activity Will' always: have to
:pend on the good sense of .the men
;rnnning our government. The whole
;Solution-cannot:be found.in the Writ-
:ten law no Matter how, carefully itis-
',Written." ? en ? ? ? sse
Which leaves us where?
In the whole search foierules,
its, ? standards. in' a field which has
:few; a:scerie keeps coining to mind -
'from 'a 'Movie, "Buteh Cassidy and
the Sundance Kid." . ? . ? , ?
Cassidy, is talking 'quietly with a
Mutineer hi his gang of cutthroats.
Suddenly ,Cassidy jeska his knee into
the man's groin and the rebel goes
down; surrendering to the knife. at
his Adam's apple. ?, ? . . ?
? moment later, Cassidy is asked
.what they ' talked about. He smiles
and .says,', "Oh, he *wanted to know
the rules in,a knife fight." .? ?
former Presiderit. Nixon ordered such biological
'weapons as a deadly shellfish toxin destroyed. The
CIA disobeyed the order. .
. Mr. Colby also deserves some credit. When he
;learned that the.-;poisons -had not been destroyed
as ordered, he told the Senate investigators. His
predecessors, particularly Richard Helms, left much
to be desired, both-in the-way they:did their job
and in their later recollections. ?-? -
Helms yesterday, for example, said he in-
'tended to obey the presidential directive to destroy
;the poison stockpile, but never issued a written !
,order to have it done. His assertion that the,reten-
lion of the poison supply was "one of the few in-
stanees I know (inn 25 years where an order has
been disobeyed"- must be suspect. We wonder if
it is rather an instance where the truth became
known, to the entharrassment of CIA officials.
The revelation.: of CIA actions, and non-actions, ;
makes more urient than ever the need for better;
oversight of theeapy agency. We believe Mr. Colby
condo the jobevihich must be done, but no director!
no matter ha* competent should be allowed
"to- operate without the full knowledge of the White;
House and Congress. .
6
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NEW YORK TIMES
25 September 1975
ilt S.,SOVIET,CHIM
.REPORTED AIDING
PORTUGAL, ANGOLA
Secret Funneling of Millions
Seen as Part of Struggle
to Control and Influence
C.I.A. LINKED TO EFFORTS
European Socialists Said to
Be Conduit?Russian Total
is Put at $50-Million
. By LESLIE H. GELB
saKial
to aew '14rk Times ?
WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 ?
Millions of dollars are being
poured *covertly into Portugal
and Angola by East and West,
according to four Official
sources in Washington. The
. funneling of the funds is part
.of the continuing struggle for
control of the Mediterranean
and for influence and raw ma-
terials in Central Africa.
United States money for the
,Portuguese Socialist party and
other parties is being funneled
by the Central Intelligence
Agency through West European
-Socialist parties and . labor
. unions, the sources said. The
C.I.A. involvement, the sources
said, amounted to several mil-
lion dollars a month over the
.last -several months. ?
It is also reliably reported
that the Soviet Union and its
East European allies have
poured $50-miilion to Si 00-mil-
lion into Portugal since April,
1974, and hundreds of tons of
military equipment into Angola
since March alone.
,- Chinese in Zaire
The sources also said that
..about 200 Chinese military ad-
visers were operating from
bases in Zaire to help at least'
one of the two liberation fronts;
being supported by Washington.
? Until the spring, most of the.
_Western aid to anti-Communist,
forces in Portugal was being.
*given secretly by the West
? German Social Democratic
.party and. the Belgian Socialist
:party without any American
Involvement.? ?
The sources said that the
fundi earmarked for two anti-
'Soviet liberation fronts in.
-..Angola had been dispersed
,mainty through President Mo-
butu Sese Seta? of Zaire. In
order to maintain good rela-
tions with Mr. Mobutu, the
State Department has oeen
seeking to arrange a refint4P
.-bf hundreds'. of 'millions of doll
'labs in Zaire's short-term debts!
and to increase American aidi
,to Zaire to about $60-million
'this year, from about $20-1
o I
o In Angola and Portugal, the;
!
sources estimated, Soviet aid is!
.far more than American aid
and, at least in the case of
Angola, has included several*
direct shipments of arms.
It is reliably said that the
Soviet Union and, to a lesser
extent, East Oermany and -
others-have transfered the bulk
of the funds going to the Por-
tuguese Communist party
through a bank in Lisbon and
a bank in Zurich.
'Soviet Aid Outlined
The following details were
reliably Supplied on Soviet aid
to its supporters in Angola: -
In March, several Soviet planes
landed in the Congo Republic,
Zaire's neighbor, with. arms and ?
equipment that were -then
shipped to Angola; In April,
about 100 tons of arms were
delivered in souhern Angola by
chartered aircraft; in April, two
Yugoslav vessels unloaded
arms in Luanda, the capital of
Angola; in May and June, four
Soviet merchant ships unloaded ?
vehicles, machine guns, ba-
zookas, rifles and ammunition,
cif Angola, and two East Ger-
man and one Algerian vessel
delivered similar materials.
The Soviet-backed Popular
Movement for the Liberation
of Angola reported is close to
controlling Angola, which is
.scheduled to become independ-
ent Nov. 11. In Portugal, the
anti-Communist situation sta-
bilized somewhat last week
With the installation of a Gov-
ernment including members of
the Socialist party.
The Washington sources said
that C.I.A. operations in both
countries have been approved
by President Ford and are be-
ing carried out, as prescribed
.by law, with the knowledge of
several 'Congressional commit-
tees.
Both sides, first Moscow then
Washington, were filling the
coffers of their supporters in
Portugal at the very time when'
President Ford and the Soviet
party leader, Leonid 1. Brezh-
nev, were signing a pledge in
Helsinki, Finland, not to inter-
fere in the internal affairs of
other European nations.
Kissinger Voices Mann
Secretary of State Kissinger,
speaking to representatives of
African countries last night and
answering Soviet charges of
Western involvement in Portu-
gal, said: "We are most alarmed
at the interference of extracon-
tinental powers Who do not
wish Africa well, and whose
involvement is inconsistent
with the promise of true inde-
pendence."
The C.I.A. cash-funneling op-
erations to Portugal were said
to have revived dormant but
traditional connections between
the 'agency and anti-Communist
West European socialist and
labor movements. And the op-
eration in Angola, the sources
said, led to the reactivation of
Holden Roberto, head of the
, -Wan or An .1N.c211q.11
ve 11
ilaFblaR ot&tr
in 1962 by 'President John F.
Kennedy and the C.I.A. to forge
a link-between the United
Statesand the indigenous
groups who were expected to
drive Portugal from Angola' one
day.
Two of the forces stressed
that -all odds now favored vic-
tory by the Soviet-backed Pop-,
ular Movement in Angola,
less the United States and
China rushed huge transfusions
of aid, which is considered
highly unlikely. -
As described by these sourc-
es, the main purpose for the
covert American effort in An-
gola
-was to underline the Ad-
ministration's support for Pres-
ident Mobutu, the man on
whom Secretary of State Kis-
singer is banking to oppose
MoscoW's interests in Africa
and to further Washington's'
interests in various interna-
tional forums.
The funds going to Portugal
from the United ? States and
Western Europe were said to
be aimed at keeping non-Com-
munist parties intact, in the
streets, and in the business of
competing with the Commu-
nists for the support of military
leaders and soldiers.
? One source said: "The Presi-
dent almost blew the whole
Portugal thing last week in his
interview with The Chicago
Sun-Times. But nobody picked
him up."
This was reference to Mr.
Ford's reply to a question about
the absence of C.I.A. involve-
ment in Portugal. He noted
"our strong stand" along with
NATO allies against a Com-
munist government in Lisbon,
then said: "I don't think the
situation required us to have a
major C.I.A. involvement, which
we have not had."
The source was pointing to
the fact that Mr. Ford was not
denying that the C.I.A. 'had an
involvement.
The sources maintained that
William E. Colby the director
of the agency, had notified
members of six-Congressional
subcommittees several months
ago of the covert operations,
and that no serious objections
were raised. Mr. Colby gave
the notifications after the op-
erations were already under
way, as he is permitted to do
under the law.
Requirement Cited
An amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1974 stipu-
lated that no funds conld be
anent by or o-n behalf of the
CIA for covert operations "un-
less and until the President
;finds that each such operation.
is important to the national
!security of the United Staten
land reports, in a timely fashion,
la description and scope of such
;operation to "the Senate and
!House Appropriation and Armed
Services committees, and to the
;Senate Foreign Relations Corn-
Imittee and the House Committee.
land the House Committee on
'International Relations.
In each case, the full com-
mittee delegated the duty of.
wgitti.U0142to
iions, the members of these 1-
subcommittees are regarded, as!
- conservative.
The sources either di not,
know or would -not state when
the covert operations began.
But two of the sources indicatcd
that the funds going to Portuaall
predated an interview given by ?
Mr. Ford to U.S. News & Worrd .
Report early last month when
he talked of the virtual irnpos-i
sibility of .CIA involvement in;
Lisbon,
Speaking of aid going "qt.tet-;
ly" from Moscow and Western;
Europe to warring factions in
Portugal, he said:
"I think it's very tragic that,
because of the C.I.A. investisa-:
tion and all the limitations'
placed on us in the area of
Covert ? operation, we aren't
able to participate with other
Western European countries."
"The American people
shouldn't handicap themselves
from meeting the challenat', as
we were handicapped in -Sontll
Vietnam and as we are handi-
capped in trying to be a par-
ticipant in Portugal."
- One of the sources said that
Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger
made the decision some time
after they went to Bresi7eis for
a NATO meeting in late May.
It was after consultations 7.-ith
heads ? of state there, the
source Continued, that they saw
Ihow strongly the West Europe-
' an leaders felt about maintain-i
ing. a non-Communist Porznaal.
The source then explained: "We
wanted to show them that we
would stand with them on this
one, and also more money was
needed." ? -
Another source said that the
West Europeans were already
"giving plenty" and wouid
. given more, but "it's just
we can't keep our lianci.3 out
of anything."
? Two of the sources said that
West European trade unions
that they would not identify
were smuggling small arms and
ammunition to the Portu9In?.se
Socialists. The Portuguese -Com-
munists: they said, had been
previously armed by Moscow.
The decision to begin covert-
ly financing these anti-Cemmu-
fist forces marked the latest
step in a long process of re-
versing policy toward post-Sal-
azar Portugal. For almost a year
following the death of Antenna
deOliveira Salazar, the admtn-
istration's policy was to lamer.:
privately but say nothing pub-
licly about the leftward trend
among the Portuguese military
leaders. The theory was that
more harm than Toed would
come of any American involve-
ment.
But the recent decision t'a!
take a strong anti-Communist:
stand in Portugal, inchol'aig
covert financing, was very mnen
in keeping with the history t,f
American policy toward me
countries on the northern rim
of the Mediterranean.
Beginning with the Ccrnmu-
.nist-inspired instabality in
Greece and Turkey after World
War II, and running throezh
the threat of a Communist ro-e
in the ttaiian government in
early nineteen-smties, tb C.I.A.
has been acttve in
3?01147h9the same holds tr:e
itor Africa, particularly beaeo
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Ining with Moscow's attempt' to
gain a foothold in Zaire, which;
was previously the . Belgian
i -
Congo. From the lime Patrice
Di.mtunba was ousted, through
Ithe short career of Mois:-..;;
Tshombe, until General Mobutu'
'come to power, a number ,of
authoritative sources related,
the C.I.A. has maintained I its, largest African station in. Zaire.'
,. At . about the same time, in
the early si7;.:ties. the sources
.said, President Kennedy deter-
mined that Portugal, an Ameri-.,
can ally in NATO, could not
sustain control ovec her Afri-
can colonies indefinitely and ;
that contact most be made
with future revolutionary lead-
ers. 10 1962, on the advice of
the C.I.A. among others, Mr.,
Roberto, the . brother-in-law of
General Mobutu, was selected
as a future leader for Angola.
' Roberto 'Deactivated' '
The sources said .that from,
1962 to about 1969, the C.I.A.;
supplied Mr. Roberto. with
money and arms, but to little
avail. At that point, they said,
he was deactivated and put on
,. M. Roberto was reactivated
BA SUN
2 Octobe.:,'
x-r-1
iLfr Zfr,921
Washington.
On tbe surface, an astounding
tis.g7ea of irresponsibility has
;bstu displayed orr both sides in
the congressional investigation of
the CIA.
? The agency has been disclosed
to b-a. careless of American citi-
zens' right to privacy, the public's
right to know what the public's
employees are doing and to con-
trol those activities. It has been
demonstrated, that the manly
cliche covering high-level admin-
istration---"the buck stops here"
?itself stops when it comes to the
upper reaches of the intelligence
community. .
Among the congressmen, the
disclosure of information provid-
ed on a confidential basis has
,one beyond anything attributa-
ble to mere carelessness.
Members of bath houses have
aggressively pushed into public
view facts that are of surpassing
interest te.the CIA's counterpart
agencies in Moscow and else-
wiicre. They have done this evao
alter being warned that to do so
was to give aid and ..i)rifort to the
po.tentiLl enemy Such favors arc
not prudent even in a period of al-
leged detente.
this spring, accordig to the;
saarces,; at about the time it
became clear that the then
communist-leaning government.
in Portugal ordered its armed
forces in Angola to give active
support to:the Soviet-backed
Popular 'Movement or the lib-
eration of Angola headed by
Agostino Neto.
But the sources said that
C.I.A. operatives and American
diplomats * judged that United
;States support should also be
;thrown behind Jonas Savimbi,
the leader of the National Ur,
non for the Total independence
,of Angola.
It could not be learned
'whether Chines- and American
officials had ever discussed or
ou:?,ht to coordinate their el..'
forts against Mr. Neto. What.
was learned was that American
funds were being used to buy
arms for both Mr. 'Roberto and
Mr. Savimbi, and that the. Chi-
me were providing military ad;
,visors for Mr. Roberto and per-
haps for Mr. Savinmbi as well..
It could not ? be learned
_whether any, C.I.A. operatives.
,E0
wear also: 'acting as military,
s.:i% ;sons. ;
Cabinda a Ney Factor
; At take in Angola, beides
ithe, enlargement ci Soviet in-
fluence, i a region deemed rich
:in copper, industrial diamonds
and Oil. Of particular interest
to the United States and to
President Mobutu, the sources
said, is Cabinda, an oil-rich
area bordering on Zaire end,,
separated from Angola by tho
Congo River. There, the sources
related, the .Gulf 'Oil Corpora-
tion continues to pump- ovei'
100,000 barrels- 'a ditY. The
sources said, that the Admini-
stration believed that Mr. Mo-
butu would like to annex Ca-
binda in the likely event of a
Comintmit tak-over in Angola.
All the sources said, that it
was Zaire,that was.of primary
concern to the Administration.
It is believed that Mr. Kissin-
ger is about to. select Sheldon'
B. Vance a former A.mbassa-;
,dor to Zaire and a close friend'
of Mr. Mobutu, to be Assistant
? Secretary of 'State for African
Affairs. He would replace Na-
thaniel Davis as Assistant Sec-,
i ? ,
iretary. Mr. Davis was in charge!
of Deane R. Hinton, the amhas-i
isador Who was ordered out of!
;Zaire some months ago amid,
charges by President Mobutu,
that the C.I.A. had designs on
the President's life.
; It was Mr. Vance, two of the
;sources said, who this summer
;began to contact Zaire's many
?creditors in the United States
sand' elsewhere to see if the mil-,
;lions in debts that were soon:
Ito come due could be refi-)
Inanced. It could not be learned
1whether Mr. Vance had corn-
Ipieted this task or had suc-
ceeded. ?
In the: meantime, the State
!Department has approached
several Congressmen with a.
'view toward increasing Ameri-
can aid to about $157million.
This year, Zaire was to receive
!about $20-million, but the State
;Department is now aiming for
1$60-million. This would consist
lof $20-million in development
!aid, $20-million in Export-Im-
port Bank loans, and $20-mil-
lion in Food for Peace credit.
Several officials said that so
far, Congressional response had
.been decidedly negative. ?
,v?and Oxe t)yfiront
c?.?4,..,
And yet, when the Congress is
done and erstwhile hawks and
doves have-been alternately out-
raged by what is laid on the rec-
ord, we will understand that this
has been another healthful func-
tioning of our cumbersome sys-
tem. Skim a few of the .outrages
and consider ?
O The Central Intelligence
Agency illegally opened the mail
of leading politicians. including
Richard Nixon, Edward Kennedy
and Hubert Humphrey.
O The agency kept a store of
super-deadly shellfish toxin- after
Nixon ordered that all such mate-
rial he destroyed.
-
O It did indeed get into the
business of assassination of for-.
cign loaders, to what extent and
with what success Still fortunate-
ly not spelled out in public.
? And at nearly every new dis-
closure, we have heard top offi-
cials of the agency allow that they
personally did not ic,mw about
that, or that they"gave orders that
were not carried oat, or that we
used to do that but we doii't any
more? unless of course it still
goes on without the head Man's
concurrence.
It is entirely possible that the
head men involved were telling
the truth when they said they did
not ',mow, and it may even be
standard procedure in the spy
trade for the front man to avert
his eyes carefully while his anony-
mous underlings continue dirty
tricks deemed essential to the na-
tional security. Eventually, how-
ever, he must be called on to ac-
count for everything that was
done by .his agency,. whether he
literally or formally knew about
it or not. The buck cannot be pas-
sed downward.
As for the Senators and con-
gressmen, some of them have in-
tentionally put out data consid-
ered by the agency and by con-
gressional tradition to be secret.
The great flap over the House'
committee's access to further CM
papers, which may and may not
have been solved by the agency's
producing a stack of slightly cen-
sored material., was provoked by
-earlier disclosure of key words
from a classified divurnent.
Robert Ciahrio of Connecticut
is dedicated to making public the
total spending figure for CIA ac-
tivities, a matter long held to be
of high value to the KGB.
The Soviet agency makes ou
side work hard to guess out corn
parable figures hidden in the an,
nual budget from the Kremlin
Without waiting for a vote on Lb
issue, Giaimo said Tuesday the
? CIA funds were covered by a 5
billion-plus line in the Mr Fore
budget. ?
- Irresponsible publicity seek
Ing?
Perhaps. But the drive for pub
licity, which means the drive t
get re-elected, is a fundamental o
life in Washington.
. 0 0
It is required of an intelligen
official that he keep as much o
his work under cover as possible
and it is demanded that the mei
who make the laws and vote th
money try to drag out as manic
supporting data from the agenc!.
as they can.
The tug-of-war between Con
gress and the executive, betwee
secrecy and publicity, is built iotr
the system.
When the- emotion drain
away, the CIA may he marginali
weaker, but the system will me di.
monstrahly stronger. $.7;oinide
Watergate -a precedent.
8
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WASHINGTON POST
26 September 1975
enee
By Murrey 7.?.1arder
Wfuthirtlz.un Post 5nll Writer
- The Ford administration gave unin-
tended credence yesterday to reports
that the United States is supplying
millions of dollars to anti-Communist
forces in Portugal and Angola to offset
larger Convinunist aid_ by refusing to.
eaafirm or deny the accounts.
. "Ws` on of these `danxned if you -do,
damned if you don't' situations," said
one official. describing the administra-
tion's dilemma. ?
Central Intelligence Agency funds
:conveyed to ? Portugal's Socialists
through Western European political
parties and other groups ranged from
about $2 million to nearly $10 million a,
month since June. the Associated'
Peess reported, citing a .State Depart-
ment official source. Last night one
high official scoffed at that range of
figures, but gave no others. ,
. Portugal's Seidalist Party leader, .
Mario Soares, made an official dis-
claimer. 'We have never received aid of
that sort, even less so from the United
Stites," he said, attributing the report
to 'journalistic speculation."
The aid to Poteuears anti-Commu-
nists reaches them circuitously, never-
theless.
ft has been known across Europe for
months that Western European Social-
ist and ?Christion Democratic parties
hare been sending millions of dollars
into Portugal. The purpose was to
counter reportedly kinge amounts of
aid to Portugal's Communist Party
frcra the Soviet Union and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries,.
Outside nations similarly have been
channeling money, plus weapons, to
the competing pro-Communist and ?
anti-Communist liberation farces in
Portugal's huge African colony of An-
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
23SE.FD21.414nli 1975
--Peoo'n
1 .4
-
?Theie has Leen a tot. of fuss in-Wash-
ington latelY'aivrt.t whether Rep. Otis
Pike ED., N. Y.3 has been leaking classi-
- tied material to such undesirables as the
_ Atherican people and the national press.
Just last: week Presideret Ford himself.
;angrily demanded . the return of any
;Classified material in Pile's possession
:as chair' man of the HErzse Select Corn-
. wIttee on Intelligence_ just last week
wrote Foal a latehiPptletithiVlar
S erg
r ff5PTI: arita
gala, due to become independent on
Nov. D. The Soviet Union and China.
have been known to he involved in this
activity, supporting opposing groups.
Until yesterday, the Ford adminis-
tration's position. was that it was stay-
tog out of any entanglement in either
country.
The United States and the Soviet*
Union have cross-warned each .othere
against intervention in Portugal. -
.President Ford publicly, and Secre-
tary of State Henry A. Kissinger pri-
vately, have portrayed the United
States as being blocked from using the
CIA to help anti-Communist parties in
Portugal, because of the furor over
CIA operations elsewhere. Mr. Ford
has described this as a "very tragic".
hini(ation on covert operations.
The Ford administration yesterday,
however. shifted to a "no comment",
position in response to a barrage of
questions initially touched off by a re-
port in The New York Times that the
United States was participating in the
competing flow of aid.
Kissinger acknowledged in a press
conference on Sept. 9 that. the pros-
pects of the anti-Communist forces in
Portugal had suddenly improved.
The United States. Kissinger ,said,
"supports the emergence el' a pluralis-
tic system there reflecting the public's
view" and he said, "we are Working in
the closest harmony on this problem
with our European allies,". ?
d Last week a new overwhelmingly
anti-Communist Portuguese coalition
cabinet was sworn into office, with ma-
Jo.- rocs or the Socialist and Popular
Democratic parties.
White House press secretary Ron
Nessen. State Department spokesman
Robert L. Funseth and a CIA spokes-
man yesterday declined to confirm or
.deny that American money has been-
channeled to Portugal or Angola. -
Administration officials conceded
that by not denying the reports they.
? lent credence to the accounts. What
particularly troubled many U.S. offi-
cials was that their silence tended to
equate the covert American aid sent to
,Portugal and Angola with the amounts.
of Soviet aid.
U.S. sources said that equation is un-
warranted, because, they contended.
the amount of 'Soviet support is much
higher. These American sources said
they were barred from being specific
about U.S. support. .
Sen. Lloyd M. Bentsen D-Tex.) said
in July that on the basis of informa-
tion from the State Department' and
the CIA, Soviet aid to Portugal's Com-
munists reportedly ranged from S2
million to $10 million a month. Kis-
singer said at that time that the infor-
mation he had "makes $10 million
seem high.".
In Angola, there are three contend-
ing liberation movements, one backed
by the Soviet Union, with at least one
of the two opposing groups backed by
China and now the United States as
well.
Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa), chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations sub-
committee on Africa, who visited
Angola last month and talked with
leaders of all three forces, yesterday
said:
"It's. a very bad idea for us to be-
come involved in any way." Clark
said that publicly and privately, "I've
taken a very strong position with high
officials of the State Department"
cautioning that "outside intervention
by the superpowers obviously is only
going to escalate the conflict."
did have a classified document illegally,
:d -he:was more than happy to return
the. thing? It seems that Roderick M..
..[Rodi Hills,-. counsel_ to the. President-
.:and --husband of- Ford's ONLY woman
icabinet. member,- Carla, visited .Pike's
. office last July. Hills?normally one of
-those excessivey tidy, wary -and effi--
cient people who often become lawyers
?accidentally left a red folder on Pike's .
desk. The folder 'contained three pages
stamped "stiper sensitive", two letters
from CIA Director William Colby and
. some -newspaper clippings. Hills, realiz-
ing his goof, asked for the folder; Pike,
realizing the breach of security, refused_
.Until last week: Then Pike wrote in his
letter to Ford that he "detested" in-
formers, would not inform on the person
:involved but would' offer "a hint -with.
?which I suspect the FB( will be able- to -
':track him down. He is the husband of a
-member'of your cabinet." How did word.
tiEw REPUBLIC
20 SEPTEMBER 1975
'Ma zSiiiiif.A3
Literature
ROCKEFELLER AND HIS C.I.A.-SOCIAL-
IST" FAKE LIBERAL AND REAL RIGHT
WING AGENTS in the media (New Republic
through National Review), government,
union misleaderships (-Soares" Woodcock
through "Salazar" Mearty), etc. peddle the
SAME anti-Communist, anti-Soviet LIES.
They offer you the SAME fascist LOOTING
by Chase Manhattan and the World Bank
from New York City to Bangladesh in your
"choice" of "progressive" "moderate", or
"conservative" guise. Have these C.I.A.
lightning rod sham choices diverted your
energy away from the real alternative: NEW
SOLIDARITY, Marxist newspaper of the
U.S. Labor Party (N.C.L.C.). Exposes the
C.I.A. hand behind crises in N.Y.C., Portugal,
India etc. and the C.I.A. crimes that Rocke-
feller and church conceal (C.I.A
direction f - - 1-1?
leak out? about the leak? U. had the agent?provocateur groups e
_entire letter printed in the Congressionai Black S. eptember, etc.) 50 issues S12.00.
ork 0001
Rerte0S4-2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-0043f0164111/08Wica 1`1, 231 IV. 29 St.,
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NEW YORK TIMES
27 September 1975
Europe Socialists Deny Routing
C.I.A. Funds to Party in Lisbon
Speclal to Tate New York /Imes
LONDON, Sept 26?The Gen_ Icial Demociatic party emphati-
eral Secretary of the Socialist I cally denied today any transfer-
International dented today that ring of funds to the Portuguese
Western Etnopean Socialist Socialist party on behalf of
parties were passing on money the C.I.A.
to the Portuguese Socialist par-
ty that was provided by the
American Central Intelligence
Agency.
" "'There has been no such
involvement :whatsoever," the
General Secretary, Hans Tanit-
schek, said. A Washington dis-
patch in The New York Times
yesterday telEarg of such an
involvement, he said, "does
great damage to the cause of
socialism in Portugal and also
in other Western European
countries."
Mr. Janitschsk said that he
was seeking advice about how
to undertake legal action.
against The Times, a paper
that he said he had hitherto
regarded as "one of the finest
in the world." 1
"What I particularly resent,"
he said, "is that The New Yorki
Tunes did not feel it necessary '
to check \Vail me before pub-
lishing this amount." Had that
been done, he went on, he
would have informed the paper
that 'any assistance given the
Portuguese Socialist party byi
sister parties of the Socialist,
International came not from
the C.I.A. but from party mem-
bers, and was "very limited
indeed."
The Times report: did not
mention the Socialist Interna-
tional, but sprite of Western
European Socialist parties and
labor unions.
_ _ A Denial in Stockholm
?
STOCLHOLM, Sept. 26 (Reu-
I ters)--Swederes governing Sp-
NEW YORK TIRES
22 Septerber 1975
_
Hunt Said to Link
Nixon Aide in Plot
To Kill Anderson
-IS-
WASHINGTON. Sept_ 21?E.
Howard Hunt Jr.? who is serv-
ing a jail term in Florida for
his role in the Watergate bur-
glary, has told "associates"
that he was asked about five
years ago by a '".nior" official
in the Nixon White House to
assassinate the. syndicated co-
lumnist Jack Anderson, accord-
ing to a meport today in The
Washington Post.
Neither Mr. Hunt nor his
lawyer, William. A. Snyder,
would comment en the article,
which was displayed across the
top of Page One in The Post.
Mr. Anderson said today that
he did not think it was possible
that anyone in the Nixon White
House would have seriously
suggested his minder.
The Post said that the assas-
sination plan was alive for
"several days" in December,
1971, or January, 1972, and
"Everyone who has visited,
Portugal and seen the Socialist
party at close hand," a Social
1Democratic spokesman. here
/ said, "can testify that the party
'is hardly wallowing in money.
,On the contrary, its economic
situation is very difficult."
The Portuguese Socialist
leader, Mario Soares, is expect-
ed here Monday to attend the
annual congress of the Swedish
party.
U.S. Sources Confirm Aid -
WASHINGTON, Sept. 26 '(AP)
?A State Department official
said today that the Central
Intelligence Agency had been
sending $2-million to $10-mil-
lion a month to the Portuguese
/Socialists, but offered no over-
all total for aid thus fah.
- The official's comment came
as sources in the State Depart-
pent and the 'intelligence com-
munity confirmed that the aid
twas going to Portugal's Social--
;Communist labor unions and.
The sources said aid was -
;sent through a roundabout net-
iwork. involving C.I.A. co.ntacts
Iwithin Western European cound
Itries, such as West Germany's.
/Social Democratic party.
Other conduits for the overt
laid, the sources said, were anti-
Communists labor Unions and
ibusiness organizations that
operated within member na-
tions of the. North Atlantic:
/Treaty Organization.
? "canceled" at the last minute."
The article did not identify
the White House official .or
give the reason for the cancel-
lation.
In hi s book, "An American
Life," Jeb Stuart Magruder, a
former Nixon campaign aide,
wrote that G. Gordon Liddy,
another convicted Watergate
conspirator, had taken him se-
riously when he offhandedly
remarked, "Boy, it'd be nice
to get rid of that guy [Mr.
Anderson ."
Mr. Magruder, who was also
involved in the Watergate
scandal, wrote that his assist-
ant realized that Mr. Liddy
had taken Mr. Magruder's com-
ment literally. Mr. Magruder
?wrote that he had immediately
called Mr. Liddy back to his
office to explain, "Gordon, I.
was just using a figure of
speech about getting rid of
Anderson."
"Well, you better watch
that," answered Mr. Liddy, -ac-
cording to Mr. Magruder's
book. The Post article said that
there was no connection be-
ween the Hunt assassination
an and the Lidde incident.
NEW YORK TIMES
28 September 1275
TGOVERN SEEKING
J,AIISgO1CURB
f? lans Legislation to Extend
? 4? 15-Million' to, Portugal and
Ban Covert Activity
aa By. LESLIE H. GELB
armee epeaua to The New York Tines .
-MT-WASHINGTON; Sept. -27-
7.56nator George S. McGovern
0:itnouneed today that.he would
:.'introduce legislation'to ban'
-further, United States covert
?Intelligence activity in Portugal
and to' give the Government of
.);tortugal $55-million in regulart
keeonomic aid.. e ? ? - ? ?
a? speech prepared for de-
livery to the Senate on Mon-
Oeye the South Dakota Demce
,crat, ? who recently a returned
,from a visit to Portugal, says
that Moscow's secret support
lor Portuguese Communists is
intr., excuse for covert American
taVolvement.? He charges,that
dntral Intelligence Agecy's
`interference "will poison the
politics of that country."
The Senator's proposed ban
is in response to an article in,
The New- York Times on,
Thursday. ? .It 'cited official
sources as -acknowledging that
the United States, through the
C.I.A.'s connections with West
European Socialist parties and .
labor unions, has channeled
several million dollars a month"
since last spring to help non--
Communist parties in Portugal.
Denied by Socialist .
White House and State De-
partment spokesmen would'
neither confirm nor deny this
report yesterday, but the Portu-
guese ? Socialist party leader,
Mario Soares, denied the alle-
'gation.
The report also cited official
sources as saying that the
C.I.A. had been channeling
money and arms to bolstertiwo
national libreatiOn fronts in An-
gola against a third front that
is heavily supph_dd by the So-
viet Uniin. and its .East Euro-
pean allies.-The report also said
that about 200 Chinese military
advisers -were helping one or
perhaps both of the anti-Soviet
fronts.
Interviews with a number of
Senators and Representatives,
:indicated that thereewould
little support for Mr. McGover-
aern's proposed ban. Most of
those interviewed said that be-
cause of information that Mos;
cow's covert aid in Portugal
and Angola predated and ex-
ceeded covert American action,
C.I.A. involvement has been ap-
propriate and justifiable.
A few felt with Mr. McGov-
ern that such aid would damage
non- Communist elements in
Portugal and should be stopped,
and one Senator said that he
would introduce an amendment
10
to ban covert American intelli.
gence activity in Angola.
? Administration officials saidl
that they now expected rnovesi
in Congress to prohibit these!
activities but 'hoped that the..
measures ,could be killed in;
committee or with the argud
ment that no action should be
taken until. the Senate and;
House Select ,Committees on;
Intelligence -make recommen-d
dations early next year.
Panels Had Been Informed, .,
As prescribed by law, Will-
lam E.: Colby, Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, had informed,
members of six Congressional
subcommittees of the opera-
tions in .Portugal and Angola..
, Informed sources said that not
serious objection had been
raised by the legislators.
Mr. McGovern's amendment
to the pending foreign aid bill ?
would 'authorize $20-million for
development projects in. Por-
tugal and $35.anillion to assist -
refugees from Angola over the
$20-million already - in the bill
for this purpose.
In his statement, the Senator
also called for channeling this
aid, as far as possible, through
multilateral international or-
ganizations. "Multilateral aid is
the best way to. meet Portugal's
critical economic needs without.
raising the threat of percep-
tion of interference with Por-
tuguese self - determination,"
the statement reads. - ?
Since last ? _spring, official
sources Said, the C.I.A. has
been providing arms and finan-
cial aid .to Angolan -liberation
groups through President Mo-
butu Sese Seim of Zaire. For
this assistance. the State De-
partment has 'been seeking to
wbrk out aid and financial ar-
rangements to help President'
Mobutu with his mounting fi-
nancial debt.
Soares Criticizes U.S. ,.
sateen to The New 1' r,rk Tants
'LISBON, Sept, 27?The Pora
thguese socialist leader, alirio ?
Soares, criticized the United,
States today when he learnedi
that the State Department had)
refused to confirm or deny a)
. New York Times report that,
millions of dollars had beeni
channeled to his party from!.
Washington through West Eu-i
ropean Socialist parties and la4
bor organizations.
"That's a mean trick of thel
United States government." he!
said, "because we didn't receive/
any Money."
"The Portuguese Socialist
party has always taken great
care not to receive any help
in money from anyone." he said.
"Maybe there 'has' been some
diplomatic support, that sort
of thing, but no money."
Mr. Soares said that there
had been some supplies, such:
as copying machines, from the.
West German Socialists hut'
that he had paid no attentien!
to these details. "As a lawyer,
I must remind you that it is
up to the one who makes the
accusations to give. the proof.
:not the other way around,"
he said.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100-380007-9
WASHINGTON STAR
19 September 1975
By John Fialka
Wa rigtcai Star Staff Writer
For 15 years now Erie H. Bidclle ?
? Jr. has been trying, unsuccessfully,
to come back from the cold.
?
. On the surface, he has every possi-
ble credential one might need to suc-
ceed in Washington. He has excellent
social connections, coining from a fa-.
mous, "main line" family in
'Philadelphia. His academic credenr
tials are impeccable, he prepped at
the Haverford School and graduated
from Harvard.
He is regarded bY his friends and
even some of his enemies as an hon-
est, hard worker. He has demonstrat-
ed experience and skill, at overseeing .
multimillion dollar programs. "He is
the ideal civil servant," states an
evaluation report once done by one of
his supervisors, "with a very high
standard of performance to which he
consistently adheres." ?
Yet, Biddle, at age 6, has seen his
hopes for a meaningful career in the
federal government shattered.
? FOR FIVE YEARS he has been a
"nonperson" at Action, the agency
where he works. He is not invited to
policy meetings. He may not compete
for high-level promotions. Although
he was, until recently, a GS-15, his
work was reviewed by a GS-12. Fre-
quently he has been assigned fo do ?
nothing, and, frequently, his superi-
ors have tried to act as Biddle
does not exist.
Why? Because Eric -Biddle is still
regarded as a "Spook." He succumb-
Wed, along with many of his Ivy ?
League peers in the early 1950s to the
blandishments of government re-
cruiters who promised jobs with the
"most exciting agency in Washing-
ton." It was the heyday a the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and Biddle -
was one of the thousands of bright
'yeing men whit signed on. Although
Biddle resigned in 1960, no one has
-ever let him forget it.
Now the "agency.," as Biddle calls
it, sometimes with respect and some-
times with gentle criticism, is going
through its blackest days, tarred
with attacks from the. press, Con-
gress and even the White House. ?
Many of Biddle's class of "bright
young men" are now getting a taste
of what Biddle has had. He believes
there are hundreds, if not thousands.
who are having great difficulty find-
ing jobs. There have been complaints
of -discrimination against ex-CIA
agents by private employers, but
Biddle's case, now pending in Dis-
trict Court is believed to be the first
one charging that his civil rights are
being violated by the discrimination
of one federal agency against anoth-
er.
? "Because, in the first place it is
" interesting work and they are de-
voted to it It is also hard to get out,
very hard if you're married and have
a family. Now it must be much hard-
er than ever."
IT IS DIFFICULT for him to.con-
yey to a younger generation, a child
of the Sixties, the aura, the feeling
that young, liberal idealists were
charged with in the early Fifties.
"I wanted to serve my country. It
was the-old Rooseveltian concept of
service. That's why I majored in gov-
ernment. The CIA was considered to
be the most exciting place in Wash-
ington. That's why so many of my
peers were recruited, because of the
. aura of mystery and adventure..
"I was asked, for example, when I
was interviewed whether or not I was.
willing to jump ? parachute ? into
the Soviet Union. I didn't know
whether that was a realistic possibilh
ity or not, I had no idea. I sort of,
gulped and said yes."
The State Department, once the
Mecca for blue bloods like Biddle,
had been demolished by the McCar-
thy era. But the CIA was unscathed.
"Because we had passed such a rigid
security screening, we were immune
from suspicion of disloyalty, even
though most of the people I knew
.were .rather liberal in politics. For
example, they were for Adlai Steven-
son in 1952 and skeptical of candidate
Eisenhower's promises to 'roll back'
the Iron Curtain.
He had taken Russian at Harvard.
And, in the spring of 1952. Biddle took
nine months of more intensive Rus-
sian lessons at the Navy's language
school in Anacostia. The competition
for overseas assignments was in-
tense, especially for the Eastern
European sector, and Biddle was
sure that was where he wanted to be.
He wanted action and he got it.
During the next two years he trained,
dispatched and monitored agents,
some of them, he says, for missions
within the Soviet Union. This is the
'art of spy handling, or "agent run-
ning." Biddle, the practitioner,
stayed in the background, operating
from bases in Germany and else-
where. -
HE DESCRIBES IT as a kind of
gentlemanly game. Although there
was considerable thievery and tres-
pass, there was none of the James
Bond hugger-mugger. Poison darts
did net whiz around the arena and
CIA and KGB agents were notscontin-
natty trying to waste each other with
exotic weaponry.
"The two absolute no-nos were that
you did not take away the other guy's
diplomatic pouch and you didn't lull
or even physically harm anybody on
the other side because that went both
6'4)
,
kni-th
During those years, however, he
began to feel symptoms of career
frustration. "I was hired toward the
end of the CIA's big recruiting drive.
They had recruited too many people.
The people in key positions were
. guys not much older than me. I could
'see the promotional possibilities were
going to be very, very slow."
So when Biddle returned to Wash-
? ington in 1955, he was tempted to ac-
cept a fellowship for Russian studies
at Columbia University in New York.
His supervisor, on the very day Bid-
dle mentioned that, came up with an
assignment to Greece.
Eastern Europe might have been
where the action was, but Greece, in
those days, was where much of the
"action" was mounted. "We, I mean
the United States, practically ran
that country in those days. There
were a lot of (CIA) operations there.
Besides, Greece was a decidedly bet-
ter place to live than Germany." Bid-
dle spent much of his free time ex-
ploring ancient monuments.
Another reason Biddle enjoyed
Greece was because he fell in love
with a Greek woman. He wasn't en-
tirely sure he wanted to marry her,
but he decided he would clear the
possibility, anyway, with his superi-
ors. ?
They turned him down flat, even
-though he'd offered to subject the
woman to a complete security check.
CIA intelligence officers were not
permitted to marry foreign nationals,
he was told. That was the beginning of
the end for Biddle's CIA aspirations.
"It was totally unjustified. It was
ridiculous to make a generalization
that all foreigners are automatically
security risks."
IN THE LATE FIFTIES, when
Biddle returned from Greece, he
made it clear to his superiors that he
was leaving the agency as soon as he
could find an acceptable job.
He began spending long weekends
in New York, visting personnel of-
fices on Mondays. At first he found
few takers. "When you leave the
agency, you have this peculiar bur-
den. you can't say what you've done.
The only thing I had to talk about
was my foreign experience and lan-
guages."
Finally, in March 1960, Biddle de-
cided to make a clean break with the
.agency and spend all of his time look-
ing for a job. He resigned and was
given a glowing letter of recommen-
dation from G.M. Stewart, then the
CIA's director of personnel.
For a while Biddle worked for a
drug company in Philadelphia, later
he shifted to a major international
engineering company in San Francis-
co, but he decided that working in the
private sector was, after his experi-
ence, just not that interesting. ?
In November 1963 when John F.
Kennedy was assassinated. Biddle
when was sure he had to "get back into
7-00432 ROM) &GO Cieteig fu I work."
At first he decided that the, way to
Biddle believes tizatAthe ? r Vs.0u$ there was no knowirwie
his former peers arerkT,8EV8r Reier?au ;limos : CIA-RDP7
ne IA.
11
r;
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9
do that was to become active in the
Episcopal Church. In 1964 he started
work at Union Seminary at Columbia
University in New York on a masters
degree in religious studies. To finance
his education, he worked for the Na-
tional Council of Churches.
The following year, however, he
decided that he needed a higher pay-
ing job and returned to Washington,
looking for full-time government
work.
Biddle has always been fussy
about working in Washington. In 1952
the exciting new agency, the magnet
for the idealists, might have been the
CIA, but that era was gone, perhaps
forever. The new magnet was now
the Peace Corps and, of course, that
was where Biddie had to be.
In the late summer of 1905. Biddle
had an interview with one of the
corp's chief "talent scouts" that he
has never forgotten. It was the way
she did it.
He had been in an outer office,
completing his forms, when a lower
echelon official told him that, be-
cause of his CIA background, he
could never be eligible for a position
in the Peace Corps.
"I said I'm not satisfied with that
answer. I want to talk to somebody
higher up." Then he was introduced
to a woman who seemed, at first,
very interested. After running-
through his background, Biddle
added that there was something he
felt she should know.
"Is it intelligence?" she asked,
cheerily.
"Yes," said Biddle. .
"Bye," said the woman, sweetly,
waving at him.
' LATER THAT YEAR, Biddle sign-
ed on as an inspector for the Office of
Equal Opportunity, which was then
in charge of waging President John-
son's War on Poverty. ?
Biddle's work as an inspector for
0E0 often required him to travel to
various communities to see whether.
the antipoverty funds were being
abused. According to several of Bid-
dle's associates, his work was leg-
endary. "He had all sorts of strange
ways to dig up information. The peo-.
pie out in the field were afraid of
him," said one.
The problem was that Biddle didn't
march to any recognizable drummer.
In the late 1960s, during the great
emotional outpouring for inner city
blacks,'Biddle was at work digging
up stories of wholesale diversion of
poverty program funds in the black
community, and was investigating
the financing of such groups as the
Black Panthers.
Later, at a time when there was,
.considerable sympathy for the plight
of the American Indian, there was
Biddle, pointing out that leaders of
the American Indian Movement had
police records and that bands of
armed thugs fought over government
money and positions at various In-
dian reservations, assertions that
later turned out to he true.
By 1970, it became perfectly clear
to many 0.E0 workers that if they
wanted a lengthy career in a govern-
ment agency. 0E0 was not the place
to be. The Nixon administration had
marked the agency for extinction. .
Approved
?
. Biddle then signed on with .a new
agency, the Office of Voluntary Ac-
tion, but not, however, without a few
skirmishes with minor White House
officials who concluded that Biddle
would be "too anti-Communist."
RIDDLE'S NEW BOSS was
Christopher Mould. Mould was im-
pressed with his work, promoted him
to GS-15 and assigned him to a new
task force that was drawing up plans
for a new agency, Action, which
would merge 'the Peace Corps, Vista
and other volunteer groups into one
unit.
It was arranged that Biddle would
go over to Action when the agency
was authorized to begin. It was ar-
ranged, that is, until Mould took it
upon himself to tell Joseph Blatch-
ford, then the head of Action, about
Biddle's CIA background.
Blatchford, Mould has later sworn
in an affidavit supporting Biddle's
case, "concluded that Mr. Biddle
could not remain in any part of Ac-
tion because of the damage his pres-
ence might cause the Peace Corps
overseas."
Mould, who became associate
director for Action, asserts in the
affidavit that, as a result, "Mr. Bid-
dle was persona non grata in Action
and was given little or no work and
was essentially isolated from the day
to day work of the agency."
At the time, however, it was not
clear to anyone just how long Bid-
dle's "nonperson" status would con-
tinue. Biddle, who worried about his
previous rejection by the Peace
Corps, remembers being reassured
by Mould: "Don't worry, you're
going into Action, not into the Peace
Corps."
But Biddle did worry. He worried
enough to ask the CIA why there was
such a taboo about joining the Peace
Corps. He was told, he said, that in
the early daYs of the Peace Corps,
when Sargent Shriver was its direc-
tor, there was a secret agreement
with then-CIA director Allen Dulles
,that, in order to keep Peace Corps
volunteers above all suspicion, the
CIA would never use the corps for a
"cover," and that no ex-CIA agent
could he hired by the Peace Corps
Within five years after resigning
from the CIA.
OFFICIALLY, Biddle was a GS4S
program analyst in the agency's
domestic Policy and Program Devel-
opment section. Unofficially, he was
given few assignments and encour-
aged to find another job. He tried,
sending resumes at first to other
agencies. The Office of Management
and Budget, the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Depart-
ment of. Commerce's East-West
Trade section were among his first
choices.
Later, as his search became more
desperate, the list was broadened to
incude the Departments of Health
Education and Welfare, Agriculture,
and the General Services Adminis-
tration. There were no takers.
"In the old days at CIA," Biddle
reminisced to a reporter, "we used to,
laugh about Agriculture, ? that being
sent there would be like dying or
something. The CIA was the swinging
place to be." ?
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In February 1972, when Howard
Phillips was assigned the task of
demolishing 0E0, he asked Biddle
whether he'd be interested in a
temporary transfer to 0E0 to work
as a program auditor. Biddle, who
was bored and frustrated, accepted.
Unlike any of the former directors
of 0E0, Phillips used all of Biddle's
reports and then some in his all-out
effort to abolish the agency. Biddle
was not pleased by the highly politi-
cal nature of Phillips' attacks and,
when Michael P. Balzano Jr. took
over as the head of Action, Biddle
was back after his old job.
IN THE MEANTIME, however,
'someone had leaked the story of Bid-
dle's, former CIA experience-to the
press. There were several headlines.
about the existence of an "ex-CIA
man in Action," and at least one arti-
cle talked about "former spooks"
serving in 0E0. e
Because Biddle was still officially
an employe of Action, Blatchford felt
it necessary to issue a memo empha-
sizing that the Peace Corps would
always maintain its bar against for-
mer CIA employes. Referring td Bid-
dle as "this individual," Blatchford
noted that he had made considerable
efforts to find Biddle another job.
""Action cannot and would not dis-
charge this man, who has civil serv-
ice rights," said Blatchford.
Under the Balzaho regime, al-
though he had had assurances that
there would be no more discrimina-
tion, it became clear to Biddle one
morning that there was still a prob-
lem.
He had made arrangements to go
to night law classes at George Wash-
ington University, arrangements that
seemed to be satisfactory to his su-
periors at the time.
One Aug. 27, just before law sehool
was to begin, he received a memo-
randum from Marjorie Lynch, who
was then the agency's associate
director for domestic and antipoverty
operations. The agency, she said, had
decided on a "partial decentraliza-
tion," of Biddle's office. The part
that was being decentralized was
Biddle, who was being assigned to
Kansas City.
When Biddle threatened to take up
the matter with the Civil Service
Commission, plans for the -partial
decentralization" were suddenly
dropped.
THEN, LAST SEPTEMBER, Bid-
dle's unit was hit by a reduction in
force. Biddle's GS-15 slot was abol-
ished. Shortly afterward, a friend,
Fred Patrick, then head of Action's
Internal Audit staff, offered Biddle a
CS-14 slot and Biddle accepted, pro-
vided there was an understanding
that he would not be prohibited from
doing anything in the job's descrip-
tion, which mentioned auditing trips
to scrutinize Action's foreign and
domestic operations.
The real test of this came this
spring when Patrick quietly assigned
Biddle to audit Peace Corps activi-
ties in Belize and-Costa Rica. Nobody
objected, so Biddle went. There were
no coups in Central America while he
was there, and no foreign leaders
were seen to be stricken by mysteri-
ous poisons. But when .the trip was
discovered there was an explosion in
' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9
Action..
Patrick, according ton letter he
later sent Biddle, was summoned by
Jorge Cordova, then Action's general_
counsel, and told that the Peace
Corps ban on CIA employes extended
to people auditing the Peace Corps.
Based on meetings with Cordova and
other Action officials. Patrick wrote
Biddle that "the opirrion of the gener-
al counsel will serve as a restriction
prohibiting your future involvement
in Peace Corps work. assignments." ?
Eric Biddle is ori familiar grounds
now. He is fighting a gentlemanly but
desperate battle_ lin December, he
took his case before the Civil Service
Commission, which rejected his argu-
ment that his civil rights have been
violated.
In August he-brought suit in Dis-
trict Court, here, against 13alzano,
Action and the Civil Service Commis-
sion. All:along, his opposition has
been formidable, but gentlem only.
For example, Phillip Bourbon, Ac-
tion's personnel director, asserts that
Biddle's charge of discrimination is
"simply not true." He defends the
agency's latest regulation on the
matter as being necessary to keep
the Peace Corps inviolate.
The regulation MOW prohibits all
former government intelligence offi-
cers. from holding any job in the
Peace Corps or any Action support
facilities ,that deal with the Peace
Corps. Bourbon seid .the regulation
extends to former f,e,telligence agents
from the armed 7orces and might
even bar a former FBI agent, al-
though he said that would have to be
examined on a "case-by-case basis."
Biddle is convinced that the regu-
lation was written expressly for him.:
Bourbon denies it.
? "He (Biddle} is a geed man," said
Bourbon, I don't think anybody's
ever questioned that.' -
WASHINGTON STAR
23 Sep tember 1975
NEW YORK DILY NEWS
21 SEPTE,IBER 1975
'RIGHT ON!'
iA.Ax- .
.es clere to ofi w re ilizicaLian 9
4 i (7.7 0 IT if ? 6 P L .
- . .
The ne:4* Aszariation of Re- 1 Phillips, 52. is the former; ed the convention were touchy ler said. "And I try to do 'my
tired Intelligemze Officers is !chief of Latin American oper-I about djscussineintelligence -part from the library."
going, to stay out of partisan !ations for the Central intelli-'
' operations at all, most, like 1 Lewis Regenstein, 32, the
politics but is trying to do igenee Agency. He said he;
all it can to polish the tar-I"opted for early retirement"; John . Horton, who spent 27 !youngest member, is a con-
nished image of intelligence I in May to promote the group.; years in CIA clandestine -,servationist who works for
operations and. according to ;which he says is a "private i operations in the Far East and the Fund for Animals and re-
its founder, s
man too." !port or guidance from anylLatin America, expressed comicently finished the book, "The
"how we're hu- ;organization receiving no sup-
About WO .ex-spies and :governmental agency." , cern about the future of legiti- !Politics of Extinction." He
?1 mate intelligence gatherings, used to work. out of Bong'
other former members of the I Most of the organization' S.,' ?1; don't think there's any Kong, watching - to see when
intelligence community at-I4.25 members are former CIA !doubt that the exposures and Communist leaders were fall- ,
tended the association's first: agents, although Philipps saidi revelations have hurt our ing out of favor- .
-conventioa this week. which ;an increasing number are for-; work," Horton said. I At the press conference, :
was held -so toe would have ; mer members of military in-; The association's - oldest. Philipps said the organiza-
an irientEty." aecordine- to I telligence or agencies such as; and younrrest membet's also tion was not formed to de-
founder David A. Phillips of i the FBI or the National Se-were present. ; fend the mistakes of some
Bethesda. 1 curity Agency. I Vienna-born Hugo Knopfmae- !people in the intelligence
I
Tha two-day eon ye n I, i on! He said it was a coincidence her, 85. said he fled the Soy- 'community:
closed last night with a press :that the convention was being; iet Union via the Gobi Desert 1 "There have been a lot of
conference sal banquet ati held at the same time (helmn 1920. He joined the CIA in !mistakes. There are bound tol
the Ratmda Inn in Alexandria !House Committee on Entelli-11952 and worked as a research- i he mistakes in any instittil
- and annonticerami of the ap- I genet, was holding hearings on; cc. Ition. We're trying to put I
pointment of IQ-member ;OA excesses. 1 "We have always tried to !things into perspective," ne!
I
board of govern:qrs. I Although some who attend-, find the truth," Knopfmach- ' said.
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13
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9
WASHINGTON ST AR
19 September 1975
Retired Agents Don't Fit the Image
By John Sherwood
ra
Washington Star Staff Writer
' The ghostly Oliphant CIA
sktillmasks with the beady
eyes simply Were not there.
These spooks might have
loolsed the role during their
active role-playing days,
but it's hard to flash a sinis-
ter cover when retired and
attending a mini-spy
convention-reunion at a
local mOtel.
Maybe at the Hilton-Bos-
phorus, but not at the
Ramada Alexandria. Coffee
urns, styrofoam cups and
beehive hairdo t a spook do
not make. These faces were
IBM, Federal Triangle GS.
The two-day convention
was the first of the Associa-
tion of Retired Intelligence
Officers (AR10), who came
in out of the rainy cold yes-
terday to come out publicly
in a kind of evangelical
"Fairness to the CIA" poli-
cy.
Some of the old, -spook
'spark was still crackling,
however, in the cover of
someone who looked like a
bowling lady. The visitor
reached for a paper, and
she stopped him, asking the
THE CHICAM TRIBUNE
28 September 1975
UM 0.il
use -lir 2-
. ?
r.ex-a
?-? . ? ? ?
the-Central Trail-
liginc"A"genCy:: iiust be :changed
sp., that abuses Such as those being
splashed. "across' newspaper front
pages and= television screens do-
not happen /gain, David Atlee Phil-
lips" a former CIA agent told a
Chicago aUdience Friday. '
. . . .
*. Speaking to member of the
Woman's Athletic Club, Phillips
-admitted ,thes intelligence agency
has: rnacle...-"some.-.bad :mistakes"
and did not attempt to ...defend
them'" -
??J'Actions:77.v,,hich .aret.unconstitu-
tional canna; he ? defended," Said
Phillips who,'resigned from the CiA
five months-ago. alto:- 23 years in
such hotespois as. Cuba, Lebanon,
s'
lii
proper authority if it was
okay to hand out the stuff.
IT WAS extremely dif-
ficult for these retired intel-
ligence people, most of
them ex-CIA types, to
admit openly that this was
how they spent most of
their lives.
The paper concerned was
entitled "Periscope," and it
handed out the official
ARIO line:
"It is the belief of ARIO
that neither the Central
Intelligence Agency nor
any other intelligence
organization of our govern-
ment needs defending or
justifying. However, recent
events have made it clear
that a great deal of patient
explaining is called for.
People just do not under-
stand what intelligence is
and how important it is to
their survival. Unfortunate
as it its, they really do be-
lieve the wild-eyed cowboy
tales they read in the press
and get the impression that
intelligence officers are a
lot of maniac-poisoners,
burglars and assassins." ?
The spirit behind this
offensive defense is a
and .the Dominican Republic:e
liE WAS IN Chicago ta start :a
nationwide sPeaking. tour to explain-
the role Of intelligence in American
society. today..SaturciaY he spoke at
a?tefninar sponsored by the Chicago
Council on-Foreigi Relations in
Lake Bluff., ".? :
`.'The successes of the-,CIA were
accomplished in the .'40s; -'50s, and
'60ss.in American foreign Policy; of
tourse, there is always the- Valid
question whether the foreign--policy
was successful," he said.
rt
youthful-looking David
? ex-actor, ex-
playwright, ex-editor of
"The South Pacific Mail,"
and now, ex-CIA intelli-
gence officer.
During a tape-recorded
interview yesterday with
Phillips and a Westing-
house newsman, a suspi-
cious bystander got to the
point where he didn't trust
anyone.
WAS THE GOY with the
tape recorder a plant? Was
the -ashtray bugged? Was
the retired Phillips a newly
hired tool of his alma
mater? Why did that cur-
tain just move? What was
in those _sugar cubes? Why
is my head spinning?
The convention's work-
shops were closed.
Okay, Phillips. What did
The Director (Colby) say
about this move on your
part to blow your cover and
talk? "He said he preferred
that I stayed in the agen-
cy," said Phillips. "But he
didn't object. in fact, he
wished me luck." Of
course, Colby also knew
that it was Phillips' inten-
tion to defend, not to attack.
How do we know the CIA
isn't paying you to do this,
Phillips was asked? "You
don't," he said. "Obviously
I can't prove I'm not under
cover, except that I testi-
fied under oath before the'
Senate Church committee
that I no longer have any
connection with the CIA."
Do you think this conven-
tion is being spied upon by
the CIA? "
"IT WOULD be impossi-
ble" said Phillips. "They
would be crazy to pull off
any domestic, covert
spying at this stage of the
game."
Some 150 attended the
convention (including 31
from Maryland, 53 from
:eatTheri: were zigs and iagi, "some.,
Virginia and 41 from Wash-
ington), assembled .mainly
.f-Phillips 'said. }U.'. heft"; thi-s4endyir:
to develop some kind of
because-1 he ? v?ias. frustrated.- 'and-
? . statement to .be
concerned" at .the lack' of tinder-,pro-CIAanounced tonight.
sianding,.by Americens.of the iole
Phillips, of 8224 Stone
"ofttintelligencee and intelligence ? Drive, Bethesda, said
agents. He-formed the-Association Trait
of Retired Intelligence Officers. to.
educate. the.: public.' ,
.sorne. sp'Ooks . .to.
coine. in out. of the cold and explain
ththr function,'?to.. present:therm.;
s lv es 2 Sz' hU1112.11 og.se'd,he-
? .
he retired early four
months ago to fight for the
CIA cause when it appeared
it needed fighting for.
"I started getting people
together through my
Christmas card list,? he
said, "and went on from
there. Now we are in the
process of establishing
chapters and scheduling
volunteer speakers."
Phillips, who spent most
of 25 CIA years in Latin
America, is now on a pr
CIA lecture tour. He re-
fused to quote his lecture
fee, saying that was a ques-
tion for his agent.
"LET'S SAY this,
though," he added. "My
agent told me I could make
between $5,000 and $10,000 a
year speaking for the CIA,
but could make from $50,000
to $100,000 speaking against
it."
He described himSelf as
"not an assassin, a burglar,
or a purloiner of docu-
ments, but a manager of
spies. Mostly, I attended
meetings. I had managerial
responsibilities. But I can't
go into detail about my
duties."
However, he added, "if
there was even one political
CIA assassination I would
be surprised."
The "tragedy" of the
whole intelligence contro-
versy, he said, is- that an
agency such as the CIA
cannot defend itself by
quoting "the good things it
has done. Because ot its
very nature, it cannot give
out such information."
; JUST BEFORE leaving
for the picnic last night that
rain forced indoors at Stone
Ridge School in Rockville,
the boyish Phillips was
asked once more about any
double-agent status.
"No," he said, quietly.
"I've told you the truth."
But there was one more
question.
During your early years
as a playwright, what was
the name of the one suc-
cessful play you wrote?
"The Snow Job," he said,
trying not to laugh.
WASIITITGTON STAR ? (GREEN LINE)
t7.EPT.Fiar:37R Te 7)75
SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL? . . .
Ear hears that Gordon Liddy had one of
those super-secret CIA laser zap guns
that Congress took a peek at recently.
The weapon has a beam that locks in on a
target and ziopo, what happens next is so
secret even Ear can't hear it. Only five
were made. Liddy told a pal that he once
carried his while toting S40,000 from the
14 White House to a downtown bank. He was
said to be disappointed that no-one held
him up. "It's so simple even a child can
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TIME Mitgazatne
6 Oetc-leoeh 19.75
Those Secret
Letter Openings
In the edlearof the ever-vigilant CIA,
even Richard Nixon nray not have been
above smanicien. When he was cam-
paigning flew 1.1=. presidency in 196S, the
agency secretly opened a letter that he
received Sloan Ray Price, a speechwriter
traveling En .Meecows the contents dealt
nob' with latizon's election prospects.
Idaho's FmankCiturch? chairman of the
.Sertate ferael Ettence! -Committee, dis-
closed last Tale& that the Nixon letter
was one ormattay thousands that were il-
legally phtretageaphed and filed away
.foatn. 1951 ao 1973, when the program
W2S stopped co orders from former CIA
Director i7ATIM Schlesinger, now Secre-
tary of Derfert.=.. Even, after Nixon be-
came Preskleine he apparently was not
are of eat eurloined-letter program
?an indication of how far the CIA had
escaped Emectaieeconuol.
The W?tehlist. The operation was
centered het The US. post office at New
York's Kennedy Airport, where as
many as sEhe cale agents worked in co-
operation with asp U.S. postal officials
to open, sraan and photograph the let-
ters. Anyrame whose name was on a
'"vratth list' heel his mail opened if it
was sent to or came from the Soviet
Union. The trenernittee revealed three
names on be=leetic list Biologist Li-
nos Pauling, The left-leaning Nobel lau-
reate; Labael.ater Victor Reuther; and
John Steiratteckethe fate novelist.
The mairtamany people not on the
list was a1s emlinizede Among them:
Federal Me-setae Chairman Arthur
Burns, Senator Hubert Humphrey, Sen-
ator Edo:a-nil Kemerly, Congresswoman
Bella Abereeege Martin Luther King, his
widow Oocesta and Jay Rockefeller, a
likelyDerreencratic candidate for Gover-
nor of Wesellirdia. Church had a per-
sonal quartel Withthe CIA because it had
opened .a ratter that he wrote to his
anotheretrteaaw he Raise, Idaho, while he
VMS touring Ramie, in 1971. Also rou-
tinely mothhored was mail to or from
Harvard Utaiteraiy and the Ford and
'Rockefeller fratedation se
Nixon'saamsrent unawareness of
the prograue was disclosed ? by Torn Hus-
ton,34, reputed. WITb.Or of the 1970 White
House plan glia proposed illegal break-
ins, wire tteet ?=d? mall intercepts to
.coonteract.iliodactivity. The plan, he
now conced, was largely irrelevant be-
cruise the Crate hadalready adopted many
of those prreeeketsdtlf we had known all
these tools: were being used and were
still not getrialgressits," said Huston, "it
might have .'changed our whole ap-
proach." vainly because of the oppott
sition of an Director J. Edgar Hoover
and Agorae-he General John Mitchell,
the plan veasTejected by Nixon five days
.after he had :ap14.:Wed it. As if nothing
had happened, tir&CIA continued its
mail steering.
Huston still Cetainded these practices
in the conteett terthe tumultuous 1960s.
What had avorriel him .was "revoln-
tionartevionce .the lives and prop-
erty of panole who were being sub-
jected to violence, the 2.0Ct00 bombings
that
occurred ineree year and the 39 no- ?
offi ceradho teese kilted." The White
House was also worried that the vi-
olence mletteet be turtiatly directed or
funded fro..?ea abroad. Ygiaijitlafttl Fr
the opinion of the President's Men,
did not seem to be making a sufficient
effort to establish the connection.
Huston-admitted that his?and the
CIA's?remedies could have become
worse than the disease. "The biggest
mistake I made was that I assumed the
integrity of the intelligence people would
be so great that despite the sweeping na-
ture.of their powers, they would be used
only in the most narrow and restricted
circumstances_ I didn't consider that the
person' using that power would not be
tformer CIA directod Dick Helms but
[convicted Watergate burglar) Howard
Hunt." And, he added, "the danger is
that you move from the kid with the
bomb to the kid with the picket sign to
the kid with the bumper sticker, and so
on down the line. The risk is that you
slip over from a national security pur-
pose to a political purpose. You end up
with these people going into the
Watergate."
Vitally important. Sounding
scarcely different from the most critical
Senators, Huston, now an Indianapolis
lawyer, said, "It seems to me that these
[intelligence] agencies _operate in a
world of their own. They are not ac-
countable to anyone. The problem is
that .you must give these agencies
enough independence to protect our lib-
erties and yet mill hold them account-
able to higher authority."
One of the week's witnesses still
clung to the notion of unaccountability.
James J. Angleton, '57, had been chief
of the CIA's counterintelligence until he
was pressured to retire last year because
of his unyielding cold war stance.. From
1955 to 1973, Angleton was in charge
of the mail program. He told the com-
mittee that the operation was especially
useful because the Soviets did not re-
alize it was going on. Angleton refused
to retract a statement he had made ear-
lier in closed session: "It is inconceivable
that a secret-intelligence arm of the
Government has to comply with all the
overt orders of Government." Certainly
Angleton had not done so. He conced-
ed that it was an error to examine the
mail of Nixon or a person of the stature'
of Church: "But from a counterintelli-
gence point of view," he added, "it was
vitally important to know everything
possible about contacts between U.S. cit-
izens and Communist countries."
Angleton described how helpful the
cast had been in the case of the Weath-
erpeople who blew up a Manhat'tan town
house, where they were making bombs
in 1970. rat files contained little infor-
enation about one of the fugitives, Kathy
'kaolin. The CIA, on the other hand, was
able to supply more than 50 intercepted
letters dealing with Boudin's activitiei.
- The committee then "decided to find
out just how much one surprisingly un-
portant person knew about the letter-
opening pro-am and other activities by
intelligence agencies that harraesed
groups and individuals on the extreme
left and right. The Senators voted unan-
imously to ask Richard. Nixon to tes-
tify. Compounding the former Fresh
d=t's problems, U.S. District Judge
John Lewis Smith ordered Nixon to gide
a sworn deposition in the civil suit filed
against him and other White House of-
ficials by Morton Halperin, a onetime
National Security Council aide whose
phone was tapped for 21 months from
R4fiage126b/10137tfas !CE411143P7 7 -0
15
Not Poison,
Just Some Drugs
It was as hairy and scary as assas-
sination plots come, and the alleged
target was one of the nation's most
prominent muckrakers, Columnist Jack
Anderson. Or' so, at least, reported an-
other top journalist, the Washington
Post's Bob Woodward. Last week he
wrote that Watergate Burglar E. How-
ard Hunt told some of his former CIA as-
sociates "that he was ordered in Decem-
ber 1971, or January 1972, to assassinate
Anderson." Citing "reliable sources,'
Woodward said the order came from "a
senior official in the Nixon White
House." A poison was to be supplied by
a former CIA physician, and it was guar-
anteed to leave no traces. The plan was
eventually dropped, wrote Wocdward,.
for reasons unknown.
The plot, he added, was devised be-
cause Anderson was widely hated in the
Nixon Administration for printing sto-
ries based on national security leaks. Ex-
ample: the disclosure that Nixon secret-
ly favored ? Pakistan in the India-
Pakistan war.
After the Post story ran, the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence
pressed to obtain Hunt's testimony to
get to the bottom of the accusations. The
CIA pledged its cooperation. Anderson
himself expressed shock. He recalled ?
that he had received threats from the
Mafia, but "I just didn't believe anyone
[in the Nixon Administration) would se-
riously suggest murder." ?
' By Hunt's own account, nothing so
serious as murder was ever considered
?but a drugging of Anderson was in-
deed co.ntem pl ated. In an interview with
TIME Correspondent David Beckwith,
Hunt, who is serving a 2- to 8-year sen-
tence at Florida's Eglin Air Force Base
prison camp for his role in the Water-
gate, break-in, gave his version of the
plot. 'According to him, former White
House Counsel Charles Colson suggest-
ed that Anderson might be discredited
if he appeared on his live radio program.
under the influence of a drug that would
cause him to ramble incoherently. With
another Watergate conspirator, G: Gor-
don Liddy, Hunt set up a lunch with a
physician who worked for the CIA.
Wild ideas. Hunt and Liddy ex-
Plored with him methods ocdruseashig a
man to make him ineoherenteThe three
discussed placing on the steering wheel
of the victine'a car a drug that enters
the body directly through the skin, but
that idea was abandoned as too chancy.
Then they considered slipping a pill or
capsule filled with a hallucinogen into
the victim's regular medicine bottles
?but there was no telling, when the pill
would taken. Finally, the three de-
bated .dropping a drug into the victim's
drink at a cocktail party, but since Hunt
knew that Anderson is a teetotaler, the
proposal fell by the wayside. After the
meeting broke up, Hunt decided the
plan would not work.
"It was just another wild idea that
never got beyond the proposal stage,"
said Hunt. "Liddy and I engaged in a
-fact-finding mission, not an operation."
For his part, Colson angrily denied he
had ever heard of such a plan. But How-
ard Hunt, busy last week assisting in the
04A OA
t Qiittsmcamp after Hur-
t?
Vd 16 r. the last word.
Said he: "1 simply followed orders."
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TUE URI REPUBLIC
Et October 1975
The "Company"
Banality of Power
With the recent revelations of myopic US intelligence.
on the outbreak of the October 1973 Middle East war,
congressional investigations of the Central Intelligence
Agency may be on the scent of one of the agency's most
important secrets: its bureaucratic banality. Behind the
imperial manner and machinations, the CIA has always
belonged more to Max Weber than to Ian Fleming,
a hostage to clients, careerism, inertia and root medi-
ocrity.
Understanding the banality,as %veil as the outrages
of the CIA (the two are often synonymous) seems
essential to authentic reform of US national intelli-
gence operations. Bureaucratic influences account for.
some of the more serious and ridiculous mistakes of
what CIA minions call the "Company." Moreover
legislative prohibitions of specific acts such as assassi-
nation may be unavailing in the larger policy sense if
Congress does not confront at the same time underly-
ing organizational motives which may only reappear in
new abuses. ?
The missed signals on the October war were largely
the result of a common bureaucratic phenomenon. Like
the Foreign Service, in whose embassy precincts they
masquerade, CIA stations abroad are heavily depend-
ent on "client" relationships with their counterparts in
best countries. Up to a point, sharing intelligence with
friendly powers is simply maximizing channels of
information. But as so often happens in the Foreign
Service, these relations may tend to obscure the critical,
boundary between US interests and the client's.
The strength and accuracy of the client's views can
affect the standing of the Americans dealing with him,
can influence the rationalizations orus officials abroad
and the scramble for attention and money in-Washing-
ton. The CIA has other problems: the credibility of
shared intelligence in the past; and the sheer laziness
that grows with such dependence. The dangers are
worst when the client is also.qargeted" at the Soviet
Union and thus able to provide information of great
interest to Washington. By several accounts, all this
made CIA report's from the Middle East in the fall of
1973 particularly vulnerable to the flaws and neglect in
Israeli intelligence, whose nearly fatal miscalculations
naere almost identically reflected in US estimates.
Israel is hardly unique in this respect. For many of the
same reasons, US intelligence in the Cyprus crisis was
crippled by reliance on the Greek junta, while officials
wv?re skeptical of less "reliable" contacts among a more
independent Makarios government in Nicosia. If an
international race war broke out tomorrow in South-
ern Africa, CIA intelligence in the region 'would be
similarly blinded by the cozy relations cultivated, over
the years with the Rhodesian and South African
security services, the outgrowth less of overt racism
than of CIA's amoral operational affinity for technically
sophisticated clients who also worry (or at least say
they do) about Russian trade delegations and Chinese
textile engineers. Obviously there is ideology in this
problem. Yet if they probe deeply enough, congression-
al investigators will probably discover the CIA's zeal
often owes .as much to the "professional" seductions of
cliency as to cold ?var passion.
16
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Ideology may be most easily jettisoned at theagency's
higher levels in Washington, where the fate of whole
sections, and the careers in them, can depend on staying
in the action, often regardless of the political niceties_
This constant .bureaucratic search for a rai5en (Vette is
? another. time-honored motive for policy throughout ?
Washington, and the CIA, however bizarre its methods
and purposes, is no exception.-
As a member of Henry Kissinger's National Security ?
Council staff in 1969, I was once invited to a lunch at
CIA headquarters where. a high official discreetly
sounded me out about the receptivity of the Nixon
White House to a little CIA mercenary operation to
save a failing side in a disGht Civil war. There had been
"inklings," as the official put it, that the President
actually disagreed with prevailing State Department
policy. A quiet operation could be mounted, at minimal
cost, of course, to see that the President's "side" got at
least an even break?and Secretary of State Rogers and
his boys need be nonethe wiser.
It was a classic twist, worthy of John Le Carr. The
CIA, we both knew, N'as already supporting the eil;cr
side through the auspices of a friendly intelligence
system; and the people the agency official was now
proposing to help were getting aid from the Chinese
Communists and were opposed by most of our allies.
The whole war lay far beyond any political or military
interest of the US. The unspoken point was that his
colleagues were busily reporting successes and perils to
the director at staff meetings, while this man, graying
heir to a swashbuckling tradition, ran a section that
hadn't toPpled a government in almost a decade. My
impression was that in his condition, he could have
been persuaded to turn his operation on London or
Ottawa; the political stripe of the "target" was of next
to no importance.
The episode illustrated another prosaic bureaucratic
drive in .the CIA, one that the current congressional
inquiry has too frequently ignored. For all its arrogance
and license, the CIA has also been, like other bureaucra-
cies, anxious to cash in on the momentary policy whims
of the White House, and there have been abundant
opportunities in the last 15 years. The official who came
to lunch ready with his mercenaries would have been,
after all, serving "national policy" if he had been given a
presidential go-ahead, which was not impossible.
Similarly the CIA did not embark on its own on a decade
of ruthless meddling in Chilean politics. That interven-
tion proceeded from the paranoia of Presidents Johnson
and Nixon about the impact of left ,wing electoral
successes on the fragile order in Latin America. Thoueh ?
it exploited and often distorted policy for its own
purposes, the CIA did not originate the embroilment in
Laos, the commitment to autocracy in Iran, the
preference for repressive if pro-American regimes
throughout Latin America and Africa, the myth .of
Fascist "stability" in Portugal and Spain.
As Congress and the public recoil from many of the
CIA's past actions, from murder to political mayhem,
they are also seeing a faithful, albeit sordid reflection of
American foreign policy over the last quarter century.
Nor is there any wonder that so many CIA officials,
past and present, are said to be bitter about the current
attacks on the agency while, they argue, responsible
State and Defense Department officials of past
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administrations, men who sanctioned or applauded the
most savage coverts actions, now sit unsummoned and,
uncharged in foundation, law or Wall Street sanctu--:-
aries., It is in this sense too that the CIA must be seen as
one more bureaucracy, part of a larger problem. For
liberal congressional critics of the CIA:this unacknow-
kdg,ecl dimension of th -investigations will demand
much more courage .and wisdom than the burial of a -
discredited cold war zealotry among lesser, largely
anonymous officials_ To blame and. purge the failed
James Bonds will be too easy; to fingertheir numerous
high-ranking Democratic cohorts around Washington
at the time will test Sen. Church and his colleagues
severely_
None of this should diminish or cloud the sinister
quality of the CIA record. No government organization
in American history has operated with such pervasive
contempt for the democratic basis of public policy, nor,
up to this point, with such shocking collusion from the
Congress and the rest of the ? Executive. But the
absurdities -and dangers .:of the past will not be
dispensed with until there is a n awareness that much of
the outrage is simply thenvay of life.in Bicentennial
Washington. The anxious claimant on dwindling
budgets, the victim of clientstAd careerism, the leading
but hardly the. lone participant in government-wide
disdain for CorygressAnd obeisance to presidential
power and secrecy, the CIA has also been a bureaucracy
in search' of a mission, not unlike NASA gambling its
last thrust on the dubious scientifiC virtues of the Space
Shuttle, or the navy 'hustling to extract from Congress-
nuclear aircraft carriers ("You can't strut on the deck of
a submarine," said one observer.)
There will no cloaubt always be a need for a sizable
national intelligence apparatus, in machines if not in
men. But there seems no question either that with
political and techndlogical change, the CIA has lost a
good part of the reason for its bloated bureaucratic
being. And the real stopper to genuine reform is not
some stentorian guard of cold war assassins, but rather
what mires reform all over Washington?that leg,inn of
little people, whose?cloaks are ki i t suits and daggers are
government-purchase cafeteria butter knives, with
suburban mortgages, children in college, and lives
invested seemingly beyond return. When Congress
faces up to the hamane purge demanded by that
problem, it will not only begin to bring intelligence
under better public ,control, but also will chart the way
toward needed reform in other areas of government.
is-tlanta
September 1975
Failing surgery on the bureaucratic heart of the
problem, however, the prospect.seerns inescapable that
the CIA, like its fellow bureaucracies, will improvise
new ways to justify its size and perquisites, to ea-. blish
its worth, whatever the structural, nominal changes
contemplated by the Ford administration.
The possibilities are interesting. In an era where
scarce resource is power and where spreading interna-
tional corporate- control and price manipulations can
topple regimes faster than troops around the presiden-
tial palace, covert action will turn from itingles- to
boardrooms and stock exchanges. it yill no longer be
the minister of defense or the police chief we must own,
but the director of minerals or the economics professor
close to the premier. And there still should be a chance
for some old-fashioned fun:, pipelines to he blown,
refineries to be sabotaged, strikes and demonstrations
to be mobilized. Even assasina lion might be easier to
justify when that oil potentate is trying, as Kissinger
put it, -to strangle the industrial world.?
The catch in all this is that in anachronistic,
overpopulated CIA. finding its outlet in international
economics will expose its own customarily unwitting
public to reprisals in kind. There is no reason to assume
that such a CIA will be more discreet or more successful
than in the past, and there is ample precedent to predict
that its newly powerful adversaries in the developing
world would retaliate with embargoes and their own
price fixing. The 'cost of- CIA adventures then goes
beyond national embarrassment to the pocketbooks of
families in Duluth and. Dallas.
Whatever the plausibility of thi; speculation it is clear
that the world of- the 1970s is far too diffuse in power
and delicate in allegiance to afford the bureaucratic
impulses toward intervention we have learned to
expect from the present incumbents in. the CIA.
The Congress now has the CIA in one of the rane
moments of public censipre and presidential diffidence
in which genuine reform is at last possible. But the
moment is fleeting. The investigation must dig deeper
and wider than Congress has been willing to go thus
far, and. the senators and representatives must be
prepared to -confront not only generally condemned
aberrations, but also equally repulsive products of
business as usual_ The banality of the CIA is a searing
commentary on the whole structure of government _
There will never be a better place?or perhaps another
Lime in this generation?to begin the reconstruction_
e- omoiiett
? Rumors :have hem- flying -I-gently .aa ani it now appears- that the l'homb---
-about a 'bombsheir to be exploded:7; shell". was of a megatonnage, perhaps ?
"anon hy Sen. Frank Church's commit- sufficient to. ruffle the petals of a.
ye investigating Cl?, misdoing. - L. peenie. It seems some minor CIA.
? . ? ? functionary. --- disobeyed .-President
With allegations el domestic spyir.g - Nixon's order and the law by hiding ?
and other illegal CIA activity con-. - small aounts of super-deadly poisons.
--firmed by the Roclefeller Commis- Bad news? but not exactlyexplosive.
on,....with reports of assassination .
-
lots- and deals ';eth Marlmi,:- with- Two lessons may be drawn front
revelations conct,m-=irig experiments ._ this episode: (1) The CIA has stepped
:involving mind-altezing drug., people - out of bounds far too-many-times and
rtaaturaily-..wonderel- what -sort of - needs to be put firmly under ,control
bombshell could top all that. and made answerable for its activity;
? - - - and (2) Bombshells-sometimes turn
Roger Morris
NEW YORK TIMES
20 September 1975
' C.I.A.-Suit Opposed
PROVIDENCE, R. I., Sept. 19i
-(AP)?The federal Government!
has asked United States Dis-
trict Court here to suspend a,
suit dealing with Central Intel-
ligence Agency surveillance of i
mail because it could interfere
with a Justice Department in- ,
vestigation. A statement filed 1,
by Deputy Assistant Attorney!
.General Kevin T. Maroney ar-
gued against continuation di
the suit brought by Prof. Rod-I
Tiev Driver of the University of
Rhode Island. The court has'
issued no deciiiion on the Gov-I
rnment request.
: Some .inform. glare 415_19k101.*For Reiltigakki12:130:1/0?/08., haftsgrarill0432R000100380007-9
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9
THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, Sept. zrs
uise
e
liTTEME A MAN runs for Presi-
Itt dent of the United States, the
effort should yield something lasting,
some lesson or truth in all the cam-
paign speeches and slogans spewed
out over the electorate. When Pat
Paulsen ran for the Democratic presi-
dential nomination in the winter of
1971-72, he gave to the New Hamp-
shire electorate the doctrine that un-
derlies the way this country runs the
Central Intelligence Agency.
He may not have known it, but Pat
Paulsen, serious comedian and funny
politician, provided a reconciliation of.
philosophies that ranks with the work of
Thomas Aquinas. He explained how
it is that a democracy?a government
of, by and for the People?can have,
a secret government agency whose
saes. eest and activities are unknown
to the people who pay for it and in
whose name it ants.
Paulsen had a flair for pointing
out the absurdnm of serious matters
and the seriousness of absurdities,.
allowing and encouraging his listen-
ers to examine the two together with-
out for a moment confusing which
was which. The Paulsen Doctrine came
in a_ stock campaign speech he dead-
panned to audiences of young people
newly enfranchised by the 26th ?
Amendment. It went something like,
this: "I feel. very secure and comfort-
able being an American, because in
America any boy can grow up to be
President. It's not so much that you'd
wont to. It's just knowing that you
could."
It was a good line. Because here
was Paulsen, a most improbable can-
didate, running for President. "Every-
one knew that he didn't stand a,
chance of carrying a New Hampshire
township, let alone the election..
And it was a goad line because Rich-
ard Nixon had grown up to become
President. In rettvspect, it seems an
even better line because we now know
that in the same primary election
campaign in which Paulsen was giving
that speech, Richard Nixon's dirty
tricksters were plotting to put in the
fix so that for four more years only
their boy could be President.
But mostly it was a good line be-
cause that concept?"It's not so much
that you'd want to, it's just knowing
that you could"--Lunderscores a major
irony of our democracy: too much
hinges, upon the necessity that people
not exercise their prerogatives. No-
where in government is this forbear-
ance more evident, and nowhere does
democracy intrude less, than in the
secret activities of the CIA.
Auditing in the Dark
TWIHE VERY EXISTENCE of secret
IL intelligence operations depends
By Edward Roeder
Roeder is a freelance journalist based
upon noncompliance with the consti-
tutional stricture requiring that ". . .
a regular Statement and Account of
the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money shall be published from
time to time."
in Washington.
.tors were unaware of Operation
CHAOS, the CIA's domestic spying op-
eration, until they read about it in the
Rockefeller Commission report. Ac-
cording to that report, CHAOS went
on for six years, employing at its peak
52 people (not counting agent-inform-
ers) and three branch chiefs. Not being
"witting," the auditors didn't inquire
about the program. So they didn't
learn of its excesses. So they didn't
report on them. So it went on.
"Congressional Overslght"
rrHE PAULSEN DOCTRINE also
works in Congress, to keep mem-
bers comfortable Without keeping
them informed. Because information
is compartmentalized, it is possible to
learn a great deal about how the
Agency theoretically works, and to
learn about a number of programs,
without .even getting a hint of the ex-
istence of other programs hidden in
other compartments.
Being a coequal branch, Congress
has the authority to learn whatever it
wants about the CIA. But because
much of the information is so "sensi-
tive," Congress. has set rip elaborate
procedures to restrict the flow of
a"sensitive" information to and around
the Hill. The formal rules and in-
formal procedures provide that only
the legislative and appropriations sub-
committees dealing with defense/
.intelligence matters are informed of
CIA activities, and usually only the
chairman is apprised of the most
sensitive matters. Even when the sub-
committees hold formal closed hear-
ings, on highly sensitive matters, mem-
bers are forbidden from discussing
what they've learned with other mem-
bers. The briefing papers, charts and
even the hearing transcripts are not
kept in congressional safes for easy
access, but are stored out at Langley.
These remain subcommittee property,
and will be brought to the Hill on re-
quest by special couriers who wait
while materials are examined and then
return with the papers to CIA. No
photocopies are kept on the Hill.
This doesn't prevent members from
overseeing the CIA, it just makes it
difficult. The subcommittee chairmen
know they can examine any CIA docu-
ments?at least any they can identify
---at any time. And knowing that they
could . .
The remaining members of Congress
have put themselves in a more ambigu-
ous position. They have passed rules
Virtually all of the highly classified
activities of the' CIA are overseen at
one level or another through the
Paulsen Doctrine. Those responsible
are satisfied knowing that they
could find out what's going on,. so
they don't bother actually to find out.
The people, the Congress, the White
House, the supervisory boards and
committees, the high and mid-levele
officials, the auditors and inspectors,
and the managers don't seem to want
to know any more about the gover-
ment's deep, dark secrets than is
absolutely necessary. But everyone
in a responsible position insists upon
being told that they could find out,
if they had a "need to know."
CIA internal auditors can hardly be
expected to review signed receipts for
bribes to members of a foreign parlia-
Ment. Who would sign their true name
to a receipt for a bribe? Auditors
can't ask foreign politicos to certify
that they .are on the take from the
CIA and to verify which votes they
sold for how much. Suppose the bribes'
go through many intermediaries? Sup-
pose the person being bribed doesn't
even know it is the CIA bribing him?
It's just expected and hoped and cer-
tified that the bribes find their way
into the right pockets.
Of course, if an auditor suspected
that a CIA employee or agent was
skimming off the money budgeted for
bribes, the auditor could make an is-
sue of it and possibly trace the route
of the money by demanding to know
the true names of people who handled
the funds. But in order to gain access
to such information, the auditor would
have to make a good case that he had
dneed to know." That's Catch-22:
- Unless you know something iS wrong,
' you can't get access to information to
prove it. And without access, you
can't find out that something is wrong.
So the auditor takes his satisfaction
from reviewing records made available
to him, certifies that the books he's
been given balance and feels secure
knowing that, if he knew anything
was wrong, he could request authority
to find out more. It's not so much that
he'd want to .
One result of operating under the
Paulsen Doctrine was that CIA audi-
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and accepted customs that- deny th.ena
access to the information they would
need in order to make reasonable
judgments about CIA appropriations
and legislation. A majority doesn't
want to know and doesn't want the
rest of the members to know; But in
theory, at least, the rules could be
changed and the chairmen could be
challenged?if the members wanted
to...
The CIA's secret budget for fiscal
year lg76 has been marked up in the
House. It probably has been more
closely examined than any other CIA
budget in history. And probably less
is known about it, and known by few-
er people on Capitol Hill, than is.
known about any other federal
agency's budget (with the possible ex-
ception of other intelligence agencies).
The CIA. isn't trying to prevent con-
gressional analysis; the last thing the
CIA wants is to appear to be avoiding
congressional scrutiny. No, the CIA
wants Congress to be implicated as
much as possible in the agency's ac-
tivities, and that means Congress must
be at least tacitly aware of the
agency's budget. And the members are
trying to learn what they can, if for no
other reason than to avoid being ac-
cused of what they surely will be ac-
cused of anyway for their past over-
sights: nonfeasance. Every time one
hears the phrase "congressional over-
sight" applied to the CIA, one wonders
whether the term was deliberately
chosen for its ambiguity. .
The difference between Paulsen
enunciating his doctrine for a humor-
ous campaign speech and public (or
secret), officials using it as a philosophy
of governance is that Paulsen knew
that the notion of finding security in
"just knowing that you could" is often
absurd. Paulsen had really tried to pick
up a few convention delegates to ex-
pand his forum. He was spending time,
effort and money, and he was failing.
He knew how absurd it was because:
he had tried.
Nal YORK DAILY NEWS
18 September
1975
Probing the Past
NOW CONGRESS is trying to see
what it can learn about the CIA,
about things members thought all
these years they didn't have to learn
because it was enough to know that
they could. But the fact is that at the
agency and in Congress responsibility
and accountability atrophy when they
are not used.
? Congress has not exercised its re-
' sponsibility to find out what it is pay-
ing?and allowing the CIA to do. Now
Congress finds itself lacking in mem-
bers and staff with insight and talent
to find out. The CM has not been held
accountable for its actions. Now it
finds itself in the awkward position of
not knowing how to go about being
investigated.
Compartmentalized secrecy and a
history of non-oversight by the execu-
tive branch and by Congress have pro-
duced a situation whereby the only
people who know where the bodies are
buried are the members of the burial
parties and the only people who know
who was in the burial parties are the
members of the hit squads. And they
ain't talkin.'
The current hassle and hustle on
Capitol Hill concerns the past: what
has the CIA done? The agency is not
reluctant to be chastized for its past
sins, so long as it is not precluded from
future sins. So the Senate committee
investigating intelligence is grabbing
headlines by picking up on CIA sug-
gestions that it interrogate past and
present CIA officials about failure to
destroy poisons when ordered to do so
by the President?an "aberration," ac-
cording to former CIA director Rich-
ard Helms.
What will coine of all this?a law
requiring that executive branch offi-
cials obey presidential orders? No one
is asking, "What is the CIA doing
now?" or even, "What have they done
to us lately?"
And on the House side, Chairman
Otis Pike's committee is fighting the
wrong battle on the wrong battle-
ground, asserting its right to release
classified information about past in-
telligence failures. The committee will
win, and find that it has won nothing:
the material could have been released
in the committee's final report, when
it would have been too late for the
President to cut off the committee's
access to classified information. Chair,
man Pike's pique is arouse-d by execue
tive branch assertions that the Con-
gress may not unilaterally disclose
classified information, an implicit sug:.
gestion that elected officials in the.
House cannot truly perceive the na-
tional interest because- they are just .
cheap politicians (the executive branch,
currently having no elected officials,.
has no such taint).
A. Mechanism
TO .A DEGREE, Congress Will suck
ceed and fail he finding out what
the CIA has done in the name of the
United States. Except for historians',
it doesn't really matter. But what does
matter is the degree to which Congress
sets- up a mechanism for knowing
what the CIA is doing henceforth?
in every sensitive detail, This mech.:
anism can't be another you-can-if-you-
want-to system that requires congres,
sional initiative before information
flows to the Hill. It must provide that
many members of Congress, not just a
handful of sympathetic chairmen, are
force-fed information about CIA's
activities, so that Congress can be
held accountable for having known of
the CIA's activities.
The fact is. that no . official entity
of government?not the White House,
not the CIA, not the Congress, not -
any of the oversight boards and com-
mittees?is capable of learning with
certainty what went on under the CIA's
aegis during parts of the agency's 27-
year past. In theory, of course, they
-could find out. In theory, of course,
Pat Paulsen could become President.
But to the extent that we rely upon
the Paulsen Doctrine to run the gov-
ernment's most sensitive operations;
we will only in theory have a govern-
ment of, by and for the unwitting ?
People,
--. By SAM ROBERTS ? -
. . .
. .
Councilman Carol Greitzer, 'chairman of-the City Council's Mass Transit.Com-
rt.:Wee, called yesterday for .a full-scale investigation into the "simulated attack" on
the city's subway system by the Central Intelligence Agency.
Ms. Greitzer. a Manhattan
Democrat, urged the city's con-
gressional delegation to ,pursue
an investigation. She also
, promised tu question Transit
Authority ;thief executive officer
John De Moos about the incident
when he testifies before her
?committee tomorrow.
She's Shocked
'I'm shocked to think that the
federal government -not only
turns down New York City for
- aid." she said. "but now it turns
:out that they've actually had- us
' under attack."
'
ing the mid-1E160s in the city's _. ... ..
_.
ducted a "simulated" attack dur- spokesman ? -. politely declined.
"You're talking about operations,
an dtraditionally the agency does
not discuss them," he said. - - -
But city -Air Resources Com-
missioner Ethan Eldon said he
would ask the agency lor all,
germs actually were released, al-
available information on . the
thOugh certain harmless ? gasses incident. Eldon's department
were used to check: how egrms does not monitor air quality in
would be distributed through the the subway . system, and any
miles of underground -tunnels. such testing would require ap-
The -project, developed- by ? the proval of the Transit Authority. -
agency's biological branch, was Daniel - T.- Scannell. former
. The. couneilmans call for an
vast subway system to develop
ways to infect passengers with
deadly germs.
A 1967 staff memo - to the
chief of the CIA's technical serv-
ices division reported that no

to study the vulnerability of the- chief operating officer of the su-
1 i inquiry followed CIA - Director subway system to germ warfare. thority, said he had no recol!--
William Colby's disclosure Tues- Asked yesterday for- further tion of any CIA request to con-
i-J-ty- kbat--tba--ayy---411pkncy---co- .d tad -oliaehar_oeteennfaLA......ductatestaan the_al-WW3X .{):i*taiii.
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.19
TIME, SEPTEMBER 29 19:5 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9
,
Towar
est.n.! e
It was a year ago this month that the first revelations of Cen-
ral Intelligence Agency dabbling in Chilean politics came out.
Since then, more than a quarter-century's worth of skeletons
(not to mention exotic weapons) have tumbled from the agen-
cy's closet Today the CIA is the least secret espionage service in
the world, and its director, William Colby, the most visible and in-
terrogated master spy in recent history. The agency has been in
hot water before, of course. But unlike the uproar that followed
the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, the current controversy threatens
the very existence of the CIA.
The CIA has lost, perhaps forever, the special dispensation
that it was allowed by many Americans and their elected rep-
zesentatives for the first 27 years of its existence. Few people
today accept unquestioningly the notion that clandestine foreign
peratives are a necessary evil. Even fewer would unblinkingly
buy the assurance voiced by former CIA Director Richard Helms:
"The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we, too, are hon-
orable men devoted to her service." Almost daily, newspaper ed-
korials, legislators and some presidential hopefuls characterize
the CIA as a wasteful anachronism at best, an international men-
ace and national disgrace at worst. This month populist Can-
didate Fred Harris drew cheers from an audience of Democrats
in Minneapolis when he proclaimed,
"We've got to dismantle the monster!"
In light of the reports of the commis-
sions headed by former Under Secretary
if State Robert Murphy and Vice Presi-
dent Nelson Rockefeller, released in June,
and of the recommendations that will be
forthcoming (probably next February or
March) from the Senate committee head-
ed by Democrat Frank Church and also
from Democratic Congressman Otis Pike's
House Select Committee, there is no dan-
ger that the agency will escape long-over-
due reforms. The real danger is that all this
intensive scrutiny will lead to ill-conceived
corrective measures that could damage the
CIA. The legitimate and vital functions of
the CIA have already suffered severely
tTIME. Aug. 4). So has morale. "Until this
becomes a truly secret agency again," said a high CIA official
last week, -a lot of our people are not going to be able to do
their jobs- Thus the challenge to Congress is not how to pull
the agency apart but how to put it back together. Few critics
have questioned the CIA's intelligence-gathering activities; they
zero in on the agency's omen activities, which should be de-
fined and controlled but which cannot be abandoned altogether.
Part of the problem has been that the assorted Washington
hearings on the CIA have concentrated too narrowly on specific
horror stories, which have led many Americans to regard the
agency as a bureaucratic Frankenstein's monster that has run
amuck both at home and abroad. This is a simplistic and unfair
impression. Considering the size of the agency (an estimated
20,000 employees operating on a budget that may be as big as
56 billion a year) and the enormous volume of activities it has
been called upon to perform in its 27-year history, the provable in-
stances of malfeasance are comparatively few. Moreover, the
CIA to some extent was a victim of historical circumstance. When
the Chile story broke last year, the military and foreign policy es-
tablishments had met their Viet Nam. The presidency had met
its Watergate. Congress was reasserting itself. The CIA was the ob-
vious next candidate for scrutiny.
In the welter of publicity that followed the Chile revelations,
much of the evidence confirmed that the CIA had indeed from
time to time violated its charter and the constitutional rights of
Americans, not to mention common sense. A number of these vi-
ations can be blamed on the zealotry, villainy or stupidity of
some CIA operatives, especially among the "spooks," or covert-ac-
tion specialists. Many other abuses were, at root, presidential
abuses. For example, the agency's illegal surveillance of the
anti-Viet Nam War movement reflected Lyndon Johnson's ob-
sessive suspicion that Communist infiltrators were behind much
the opposition to his Administration. "I just don't understand
why you can't find out about all that foreign money that is be-
hind those war protesters." Johnson complained to Helms in
1967. The CIA was just one of a number of federal agencies that
Richard Nixon tried to subvert. Although the agency gave some
istance to the plumbers who broke into the office of Daniel
ecess ry CI
Ellsberg's psychiatrist, it later sidestepped White House ploys
aimed at involving it in Watergate. Partly as a result, Nixon re-
placed Helms in 1972.
?
If Presidents have misused and abused the CIA, Congress
has ducked its responsibility to supervise the operations and ac-
tivities of the agency. So far, there has been relatively little ev-
idence proving that the CIA acted without presidential autho-
rization. On the other hand, there is much
to indicate that it bypassed congressional
oversight?largely because Congress did
not want to be bothered, or was embar-
rassed by supervising its activities, partic-
ularly the agency's covert operations.
What then should be done? Gerald
Ford has indicated his determination to su-
pervise the CIA closely. Legally he has to:
Congress last year attached an amendment
to the Foreign Assistance Act requiring that
the President personally "certify" all for-
eign covert actions. A case can be made
that this law should be repealed. The Pres-
ident of the U.S. is now the only head of
state of a major power who is not insulated
from public responsibility for a clandestine
Operation should it be exposed.
To help protect the presidency, and per-
haps to restore a sense of checks and balances in the field of in-
telligence, Congress should establish a joint Senate-House over
sight committee that would replace the four congressional units
that have so inadequately watched over the CIA in the past. In-
deed a similar proposal was made by the Rockefeller commis-
sion in its report to the President. The committee membership
should rotate in order to avoid the past situation, which allowed
the agency to mount covert operations abroad?and counter-
intelligence activities at home?with the passive, usually ex post
facto blessing of a few old reliable friends in the legislature. Pre-
sumably, the agency might also find it more efficient and secure
to report to one committee of Congress rather than four'.
The new committee should be empowered to approve?or
disapprove?in advance any major clandestine activity by the
CIA, like the army of Laotian tribesmen supported by the agen-
cy from 1962 until 1973. The Constitution's provision that Con-
gress alone has the right to make war should extend to small,
secret wars as well as large ones. Covert armed intervention in
the domestic affairs of other countries, apart from being ex-
pensive and often ineffective, has fostered worldwide suspicions
that the U.S. is behind nearly every political upheaval that con-
forms? to American interests. More congressional supervision
might reduce the number of such operations and reduce those sus-
picions?though there is no guarantee of either result. On the
other hand, the CIA probably should be allowed some leeway to
carry out, on its own recognizance, smaller-scale projects, es- x
pecially those in which intelligence gathering and covert oper-
ations overlap.
The CIA must also be able to carry out nonmilitary clan-
destine actions, such as the funding of pro-American political
forces in countries where the Soviets are backing their own can-
didates, as they did in Portugal earlier this year. But these too
should be regularly reviewed with the oversight committee. It
should also be allowed to see a breakdown of the CIA's budget,
arid should be informed about the agency's use of "proprietaries,"
like the defunct airline Air America, cover firms (private com-
panies that allow the agency to use overseas branches as fronts),
and any American individuals or organizations it intends to en-
list in its projects. Closer congressional scrutiny of the CIA, com-
bined with more thoughtful presidential supervision, would pro-
vide a check against the CIA 'S getting involved with organized
crime, as it did in the anti-Castro ventures.
But even stronger congressional scrutiny cannot assure that
the CIA will run properly. There is a basic contradiction be-
tween the secrecy and even deceit required by an organization
like the CIA and the full disclosure and responsibility expected
of a democratic government. It is a contradiction that the U.S.
somehow must live with, since no organizational reform can com-
pletely solve this problem.
Moreover. Congress is a large and sometimes undisciplined
body of individualists. The more widely a secret is known in the
Capitol. the more likely it is to be leaked. Thus both the House
and Senate need to strengthen their existing regulations for pre-
20
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venting breaches of security?perhaps by penalties as severe as
dropping from committees those members who can be proved to
have illegally leaked secrets to the press or the public. One dan-
ger involved in haying more congressional scrutiny of the CIA is
that members of the House and Senate, as well as their staffers,
will become the target of increased espionage by Washington-
based foreign agents.. One Communist secret service is known to
be beefing up its Capitol Hill contacts already in anticipation of
Congress's playing a more active role in U.S. intelligence.
Unfortunately, the facts of international life that always made
the CIA more of a necessity than an evil are still real. Despite
detente and the ending of the cold war, for example, the branch of
Russia's KGB (committee for state security) that is in charge of for-
eign operations has stepped up its clandestine projects around the
world, often using foreign Communist parties as conduits for
money and bases of operation for agents. Western experts report
that the KGB department with responsibility for Japan, India, In-
donesia and the Philippines has increased its budget, apparently
in response to Moscow's belief that the U.S. is still on the defen-
sive in Asia following the collapse of South Viet Nam.
In the current furor over the CIA, genuine reforms under-
taken within the intelligence community have tended to be over-
looked. During his brief tenure as CIA director in 1973. James
, Schlesinger ordered an extensive housecleaning and began
sweeping out the unreconstructed cold-warriors. Colby, a vet-
eran of the covert side himself, has followed through on that pro-
gram and reoriented the agency toward more relevant, "clean-
er" enterprises, such as providing economic and agricultural
intelligence and combatting international terrorism and narcot-
ics smuggling.
While much of the controversy so far has concentrated on co-
vert actions, there have also been shortcomings in the collec-
tion, evaluation and dissemination of information through the
Government. Ray Cline, a former deputy director for intelli-
gence at the CIA and chief of State Department intelligence and
research at the time of the Yom Kippur War, is convinced that
BALTIMORE SUN
28 September 1975
Roe Ele
`?1-7.,;"!-Q ?
;vba..,n",a Senator Frank Church predicted in an in-
terview with Muriel Dobbin of The Sun some time
-ego that the Central Intelligence Agency would be
rereakd 23"a rogue elephant rampaging out of con-
trol," a number of knowledgeable officials respond-
ed that tbe spy agency had never done anything
without presidential approval. Now, after two
weeks of public hearings by the select Senate comit-
Joe studyfr.g intelligence operations, the Church pre-
" diction: lents right on the nose.
? Presant and former high-level CIA officials have
11...iiiifietilte the effect that various agency operations
were carried on illegally and without orders from
als?raority. Indeed, in two cases, the CIA did
_things ergressly forbidden by Presidents. In one
;case it opened mail after President Richard Nixon
-ordered it to, then changed his mind and ordered it
not to. The CIA was already doing that when Mr.
corAdered ordering it to. His order to do it
and hismIL-..,,equent order not to do it were something
of a jatia: to the CIA. As Senator Church, chairman of
the select committee, put it, the President is not the
"commanLer in chief to the CIA, just "a problem."
In anther case President Nixon ordered the
?agencyln destroy some poisons so toxic as to sound
:like science fiction potions rather than something
from the real world. The then director of the CIA,
Richard -Zalm.s, said under oath he relayed the order
.only orally and didn't check up because he "read in
:the newspaper" that the poisons had been destroyed.
if that doesn't make Mr. Helms a perjurer, it makes
. him a sitaErlarly incompetent chief spy. The CIA of-
:fide' dirraly responsible for destroying the poison
:sap he drid.:a't do it b,.:cause he considered the pres-
aidential cater "unwise." That is the hallmark of a
'liareaticraaay out of control.
-1.7ach nwelation creates a new picture of the for-
, mealy haARI11.19Y00cf.1141W9liga%
-cies casually and routinely broken the law by open-
the failure of the agency to predict that war would break out in
the Middle East was due to a lack of coordination between State.
CIA and the National Security Council. "The furor over alleged
cloak-and-dagger misdeeds of the past diverts attention from
the fact that our central intcnieence system is in deep trouble
for an entirely different reason," says Cline. "It hie; not been as ef-
fective as it should be in its crucial central task of coordinating
and evaluating information relating to the national security."
Presidential Candidates Harris and Morris Udall, former De-
fense Secretary Clark Clifford and other CIA critics have rec-
ommended that the CIA should be confined exclusively to in-
telligence gathering. They propose that covert actions, now in
the hands of the CIA's deputy director of operations, should be as-
signed either to the Pentagon or to a new agency. This is not a
good idea. First, intelligence gathering, especially by covert
means, and clandestine foreign operations inevitably overlap and
often involve the same agents. To divide them artificially would
risk duplication, inefficiency and?more serious?the possibility
of intelligence gatherers and clandestine operators bumping into
each other and being discovered. For the Pentagon to oversee co-
vert actions, as Harris suggests, would give the military a license
to initiate paramilitary adventures. That might be a cure worse
than the disease. Since clandestine operations are justifiable chief-
ly as a means of heading off full-scale conflict?what Colby calls
'Ian alternative between diplomatic protest and sending in the
Marines"?they should be kept separate from the Defense
Department.
The best official report to date on the CIA?more thorough
and fair than the Rockefeller study, in the view of impartial in-
telligence experts?was produced by former Under Secretary of
State Murphy's Commission on the Organization of the Gov-
ernment for Conduct of Foreign Policy. The report concluded:
"Covert action cannot be abandoned, but it should be employed
only where clearly essential to vital U.S. purposes and then only
after a careful process of high-level review." The CIA is Still the
most appropriate Government agency to carry out that difficult,
often unpleasant but inevitable mission. Strobe Talbott
ant is Night
ing mail (and breaking into homes and offices, wire-
tapping and planting bugs, combing through income
tax returns, etc.); not only has it ignored presidett-
tial directives. It has also bungled its principal func-
tion of gathering and assessing foreign intelligence.
The House select committee demonstrated that in
1967-8 the CIA totally misjudged or, what may be
worse, deliberately misreported, Communist
strength in Vietnam. In 1973 the agency believed no
war was likely in the Middle East?even as hostili-
ties were about to begin.
The congressional investigations have already
developed facts far beyond anything found by the
Rockefeller Commission, many of whose cautious
recommendations now seem inadequate to the task.
It is easy to understand why many critics want to
disband the agency, but that is too drastic a remedy.
The Ford administration's current attempts to shore
up the CIA during the remainder of the investigation
may he necessary but should not be confused with
real reform. A start toward the basic changes that
are needed could be made now by dusting off one
ROckefeller recommendation that does deal with
one of the underlying problems. It proposed that an
"individual of stature, independence and integrity"
from outside the intelligence community be brought
in to head the CIA. The time has definitely come for
that. If ever an organization needed a tough manag-
er, it is the CIA. Many of its top and middle leaders
developed their ideas of their mission in World War
II and the worst days of the early Cold War, when
anything went. A complete shakeup at the top may
be needed, and possibly extensive reorganization of
the middle levels, too. Only a new director, from
outside the agency, can be expected to do the exten-
sive work that is needed. Even that is likely to be on-
8 :43kbyoupAt.t.tpm Amotgeenr
imty
into the rot.
21
Approved
NEW YORK TIMES
20 September 1975
Dignity
Restored
By Russell Baker
For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9
WASHINGTON STAR
28 September 1975
Crosby S Noyes
The news that Dr. Frankenstein is
-alive and flourishing in Washington
will surprise no one who follows world
politics, and international death plans.
Politicians everywhere commonly view
wience primarily as an instrument for
conveying -death to disagreeable peo-
ples, and if science is at the-service of -
death in Washington, it is not a unique'
alliance of genius and hack. The same
alliance functions around the earth,
and has through the centuries.
The peek. we are now getting. into
Washington's scientific chamber of
iterror is merely a titillating reminder
of the alliance's existence. What makes.
it entertaining, if not particularly
startling, is the small-bore triviality
of the death plans in which the Gov-.
ernment has been dabbling.
Death on the scale deliverable by,
nuclear physics appears such a dull
'mathematical abstraction that it.
scarcely seems like death. The Pen-
tagon does not even talk much about
deaths any more when nuch...ar -
weaponry is discussed. The common,
term is "megadeatha." It takes one mil-
lion deaths to make just one mega-
death.
If one succumbs in a nuclear strike,'
causing eighty rnegadeaths, one's loss ,
to humanity can be measured as one
eightY-millionth of a megadeath, which
makes it seem a thoroughly negligible
event.
In a ,sense, this is the worst of all.
the indignities heaped upon us by.
politics' perversion of science. A per-'
son's death ought to be an event of
some note, 'not a fractional triviality,
so negligible that it would 'bore .a
baseball statistician.
The .scientific corpse-production.
labor now being discussed in Washing-
ton has the virtue of restoring some
meaning to death because .of the
small scale on which these weapons.
were built to operate. As a result; it.
is a refreshing reminder of what the
grandeur of nuclear science has con-,
ditioned us to forget; to wit, that
politics and science between them?
never close down the charnel house..
The CIA.'s .secret stash of cobra
venom and iihelifishi? poison, so suga
gestive of bad spy ne4ic1s, reminds us
that death is officially prepared by
men who act like people in bad spy'
novels. The few deaths these poisons.
could create are ludicrously insignifi-
cant compared to nuclear science's
megadeath, and -for this reason, ? they
suggest real death more pungently than
anything the physics experts have been
able to conjure in our imaginations.
We may assume that similar death
instruments are being created in
laboratories abroad, of course. Primi-
tive politicians were quick . to turn
mineralogy into weapon science.
Surely, Russians and Englishmen have
been no more reluctant than Ameri-
cans to do the same for biology.
The C.I.A.'s electrically-fired poison.,
dart gun, with silencer, presumably
Un pressed with the
. .
You will have to forgive me. It must be
some kind of glandular deficiency. But for
whatever reason, I am simply incapable of
working myself into paroxysms of moral
indignation about the Central Intelligence
- Agency. I am even beginning tq feel sorry
for the poor slobs.
I realize, of course, that all of our prob-
lems in this country today are the result of
"abuse of executive power", with its
"mania for secrecy," and that if only the
"representatives of the people" in Con-
gress were running things, we would be
spared such vexations as the Vietnam War
and Watergate. I also realize that the CIA,
as an untouchable, super-secret branch of
the executive, is an awf ally inviting target
for congressmen who hold that "full disclo."
sure" (of other people's secrets) is a sure-
fire political formula.
I suppose, therefore, that I should find
something pretty ominous in the news that
a CIA laboratory worker failed to carry
out a presidential order from Richard
Nixon in 1970 to destroy existing stocks of
toxins and various kinds of bacteriological
weapons. It was discovered last May that
about 11 grams of shellfish toxin and 8 ?
"milligrams of cobra venem had been
locked away in a CIA storeroom,
But, alas, I can't. For one ,thing, it
seems to me that the presidential order of
Feb:" 14, 1970, applied to military stocks.
For another, it specificaqy exempted
toxins (such as snake venom. or shellfish
toxin) being used for experimental pur-
poses. The order reads:-
"The United States renounces offensive
preparations for and the use of toxins as a
method of warfare.
"The United States will confine its mili-
tary programs for toxins, whether pro-
duced by bacteriological or any other
for creating death in fairly important
individuals,displeasing, to our Govern-..
ment, is the kind of weapon small
boys dream of. A rush job at the toy.
factory might create one of the sur--
prise merchandising successes of the
approaching Christmas shopping sea-
son.
Its charm, of course, is that it- is
designed to cause one single death,
not the boring megadeath of physics.
Here we. have government dispensing
the favor of dignified, individual death,
thus making one's demise an event.
Even the mbre elaborate deathi'pro-
grams which the C.I.A. was preparing
when it made a mock attack on New
York subway riders by pumping harm-
less substances into the underground
would cause deaths only in the thou-
sands if duplicated in Moscow with
real poison gases and germs. If things
came to that, presemably, we and the
Soviets would both be dispensing
megadeaths hither ,and yon on the
landscape; so that .the few thousand
dead in the Moscow subway would,
enjoy deaths of uncommon singularity.
Reading the Dr. Frankenstein stories
.from Washington, one is struck by the
playful spirit of politicians and' sci-
entists engaged in these labors. It is
almost as though they were trying to
get us interested again, by amusing us,
In their varied death programs.
IA flay
biological method or by chemical synthe-
sis, to research for defensive purposes
only, such as to improve techniques of Is
immunization and medical therapy.
"The President has further directed the i
destruction of all existing toxin weapons
and all existing stocks of toxins which are
not required for research programs for
defensive purposes only." ?
Kindly note that this order did nothing to
eliminate huge stocks of lethal chemical
warfare agents ? such as nerve gas ?
which still exist for retaliatory military
purposes. It does nothing about hundreds
of substances quite as deadly as shellfish
toxin or cobra venom. Rattlesnake venom,
for example is extracted daily by a num-
ber of public and private agencies for a
variety of purposes without anybody mak-
ing a fuss about it.
In all, I find nothing very sinister in the
fact that a middle devel CIA scientist
should have locked up his shellfish poison
on the quite understandable theory that it
was valuable for purposes of research
and/or defense. To think otherwise, I sug-
gest, is symptomatic of the paranoia of the
day.
I am equally unimpressed, I'm afraid,
by the revelations of the House irreestiga-
tion that the CIA failed to predict the
Communist Tet offensive in Vietnam in
1968 and the Yom Kippur War in the Mid-
dle East in 1973.
Underestimating the capacity and inten-
tion of the enemy in Vietnam was par for
the course throughout the war in Indochi-
na. In 1973, the Israelis were even more
surprised than we were. When it comes to
the present harassment of the CIA, the
important thing to remember is that
imperfect intelligence is better than none
at all.
Why else would the C.I.A. have
chosen the poisonous hole that is the
New York subway to test mechanisms
for spreading infectious diseases? The
seine ironic humorist's hand is at work
in the C.I.A.'s choice of the Food and
Drug Administration's drinking-water
supply to test techniques for spread-
jrig death through the water cooler.
We detect him again in the use of
5,a3lAloS IIImF1 oiintid atin-
to help create the killer shellfish-
poison, and in the frolicsome frater-
nity-house spirit with which both
C.I.A. and Army Scientists slipped LSD
into the coffee of unsuspecting human
guinea pigs.
It would be idle to fault science for.
its faithful service to politics in the
death industry. American scientists
who serve it can justly point to more
unpleasant states abroad and say,
"They all do it." On the other hand,
it doesn't hurt the rest of us to be
.reminded from ? time to time that sci-
entists are secretly working away at
death with politicians, and that secrecy
favors lunatics.
Ah, here is the latest warning to
? the public from a consortium of con-
cerned scientists. It tells us to beware
of astrology. A false science, says the
bulletin. That kmust mean the Govern-
ment can't find a way to use it for
killing somebody.
22
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9
LOS AIIIIETES. -7DIES
13 September 1975
ANT POiSW. CALLED DEADLIER
rd of a Hdd Toxi s sjited
BY GEORGE ALEXANDER
. Times StienteTt...er
. The last thing in the 7.ror1d that Dr..
:Findlay Russell wants lo find plas-
tered someday on Um door of his
'USC laboratory is az="..p-i reading:
Closed because of the &.'=.ger of mass
poisonings.
Russell, a USC profe-----an,- of neurol-
ogy, physiology and ft-logy, and a
widely recognized expat on toxins,
:is worried that- some 51:ate or local
governmental body mi.F.:5t take a cue
from U.S. Sen, Frank Catrch (D-Ida.)
and pass legislation tharlt would ban?
the sort of medical ,and 7biological re-
search that 111.11,haseIeeen working
on for years.
"Church revealed earFisr this week
;that the Central Intellice Agency
had kept small amounts of paralytic
shellfish poison (PSP)-. aTel cobra yen-
-em for the last five years, despite a
. 1970 presidential order to destroy all
NEW YORK MIES
25 September 1975
The C.I.A. Toxins
Should Be PreS;z1.-ved
To the Editor:
.. Unfortunately, the rerent investiga-
tion of the C.I.A.'s "stockpiling" of
two toxins, has lett to seat-ous miscon-
.ceptions on the part. c.7 the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence,
-headed by Senator Frank Church, and
the news media. ?
*Although we do not ,zondone the
C.I.A.'s apparent intended use of saxi-
toxin (produced naturally by "red-tide"
bacteria and concentrated in shellfish)
and 'cobra toxin, w app':-.aud the fore-
sight of the checnical section
to preserve these in Suable sub-
Stances. It is ridiculous t?i? assert that
the eleven grains (less than one-half
ounce) of saxitoxin and &:e eight milli-
grams (a tiny drop) of cobra 'toxin
could be used as a "mass murder
weapon" in the same sense as the tons
Of nerve agents ?and t..-Tle countless
plague and other germs: that were
stockpiled by the Defense Department
until recently. indeed, most pest ex-
'terminators have much i-..irger cluanti-
-ties of lethal chemicals (e..:;?, parathion,
-the rat and insect poisont chat is only
()0 times less toxic them saxitoxin)
WASHINGTON STAR
21 SEPTE_':43.ER 1975
? stocks of such toxins.
? In making, the announcement;
Church said that the toxins-10.9
grams of PSP -and eight milligrams
(thousandths of a gram) of the snake
? Venom?were ? capable . of .killing
. "many thousands of people." The tox-
ins attack the central nervous system.
While agreeing with the: senator
that the CIA's acquisition of the poi-
sons should be looked into, the USC
expert disagreed with Church's eval-
uation of their public hazards.
? ."Oh, if you injected 200 peOple with
a few micrograms (millionths of a
gram) of these toxins," Russell said, -
"you'd kill a few. But there are more
effective poisons commercially avail-
able, including ant poison."
The' USC professor-physician said
that. if Church was worried about ter-
rorists pouring toxins of this sort into
a city's water supplies to kill large
numbers of people, then the senator's.
on han dthan the C.I.A.'s stockpile."
To destroy this priceless supply of
saxitoxin would be nothing short of
criminal and makes as Much sense as
destroying the heart drug, nitrogly-
'cerine because it is used in explosives
or morphine because it is found in the
opium plant.
Saxitoxin's potential Value to medi-
cal and chemical research cannot be
'overstated and we urge that the Sen-
ate Committee recommend that these
materials be turned over to the re-
'search laboratories of the National
Institutes of Health. Not only does it
seem probable that knowledge about
saxitoxin and its toxic effects will pro-
vide an antidote to "red-tide" (paraly-
tic-shellfish) poisoning, which can be
fatal to -people who eat contaminated
shellfish, but also, as Dr. Murdock
Ritchie of Yale points out,. it will pro-
vide essential knowledge ? about nerVre
action and the diseases of the central
nervous system. .
This supply of saxitoxin must not'
be ? destroyed simply because it was
studied as a possible espionage agent.
(Assoc. Prof.) GORDON W. GRIBi3f.E
Research Assistant
PHILIP D. KuTzENco
Dept. of Chemistry, Dart mouth College
Hanover, N. H., Sept..,18, J975
. ? ? ? -
HUSH, HUSH, DISCONTENTED
CUBANS ET AL . Tim CIA soon won't,
have to open any letters to read nasty
things about itself in print. Ear hears a
lot of folks are getting in their licks in-
books. Victor Reuther, (his letters were -
opened, Earwigs, becatme he was -Union-
mister Walter's brother and UAW for-
eign policy chief) roportedly reveals
some startling stuff on CIA and unions
abroad in his book-to-he.. Then, "Cuban
Terror and the CIA," coming soon from
concern was both dated and remote.
There was a time when a number.
'of nations, particularly Israel, feared
that such biological warfare might be
waged against them. But, said Rus- -
sell, these toxins lose their potency
when mixed in large volumes of wa-
ter and, ,moreoever, they are. not
very effective when- taken orally..
"It's just not very lethal this way," he*
said. .
? "Everybody looked into this-sort of
thing a few years ago," he said, "and
we all pretty much came to the same
conclusion?warfare with these ?tox-
ins was not possible, probable or
practical." .
But if these poisons aren't of much.;
use for . widespread killing, Russell -
said, they are eminently useful in le-
gitimate biological research and med-
ical treatment for certain diseases..
? One of the constituents of. cobra
:venom, isolated and purified, is currently being used by,
physicians-to relieve the pain suffered by some patients,
and to treat certain neurological disorders, hesaid.
Russell himself is deeply involved in biological and med-
ical research of this sort and he maintains a colony of sev-
eral dozen highly poisonous snakes in his. laboratory. He
"milks" them for their venom and he said he, can make 10
times the 8 milligrams now held by the CIA without any
trouble at all.
The shellfish toxin, however?the PSP?is a different -
story. This can be obtained only from clams and mussels.
contaminated with dinoflagellates, the microorganisms
that give rise to the red tide.
?eRussell estimated that it would cost $100,000 of more
harvest enough containinated shellfish to . yield even a ,
small quantity of PSP to satisfy his own USC laboratory's.
research needs. ?
He said that he would prefer that the Senate committee,
disbribute the 10.9 grams to legitimate -researchers like
hithself, but that he doubted if it would be done.
"A key issue here is whether all these stocks were de-
stroyed as they were supposed to be," Russell said of for-
mer President Richard M. 'Nixon's command to destroy
such chemical and biological warfare materials. ?
Russell said that he was most Worried that some state
legislator might try to go the U.S. Senate one step better
and ban all research involving poisonous substances. "We
wouldn't be able-to keep our snakes,' lie said, "and we'd
be-out of business." ,
and Bernard Barker. It's busting with in- SING ALONG WITH BILL COLBY
side stuff. For example: the CIA spent, .-. . :On top of that, the Village Voice says
the past 15 years recruiting and training ?-? that poet Allen Ginsberg's song '-'CIA
thousands of discontented Cubans, with a ...Dope Calypso," which goes on about the
little help from pals in the Marine Corps; - _CIA's role in dope traffic in Southeast
to help fight American battles 'in the Asia, is on the verge of publication. ,.
Congo,' Cambodia and Vietnam. In ex- ..-: -' -
change, they gor the CIA's pronrise .to :
help overthrow Castro. The CIA is wel- I
Harper's Magazhle Prms. was fed by
Watergate burglars Et:Appr,o116adtEer ROMS 200110011/68s:rialitt-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9
23
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NEW YORK T IECS
28 September 1975
The Case of Redford vs. the C.1.
By WILLIAM F. BUICLEY Jr.
"Three Days of-the Con-
dor" has everything, and one
thing too many, wherein alas
lies its chic. But for the ter-
minal protuberance, we
would have an expertly di-
rected, trimly jigsawed, ade-
quately acted spy-suspense
story which catches the view-
er with the opening scene:
What can that mysterious
man in the parked car be ?
about., checking off the
names; re by one, of the
half-dozen people as they:
:saunter into the 'American
Literary Historical Society"
, on Manhattan's East. Side to
begin a day's work? Why,
what he is doing is making
sure there's a full house, be-
cause at lunchtime, he and
his accomplices ace going
'into that staid old building
to shoot them all down in
cold blood, made wider by.
the special ice pellets. used ?
at least, that is one inference
?by specially designed_ car-
nage-machines.
What was Robert Redford
doing while his colleagues
were being mowed down?
He was out for lunch.. Specifi-
cally, out to fetch lunch for
his colleagues, it being his
turn to go to the delfrtessen.
But, in Order to avoid the:
rain, he ignores prescribed
security regulations and
bounds down the staircase
and out the back door; which
is closer to the and
anyway, it is time to estab-
lish him as a man of rather
independent habitra. who
makes the boss of this super-
secret C.I.A. front perpetually
uneasy ("Are you sure you
are quite happy working for
us, Turner?") with that roam-
ing, restless intelligence. (The
'director, Sydney Pollack, is
unwilling to blemish Red-
ford's beautiful face with any?
of the scars -of The Thinker,
but makes the concession of
having him, CYCOIS
'wear glasses. He does not
wear glasses when he makes
love to Faye Dunaway, but
then this is not a moment
when his restless intelligence
is his dominating concern).
Redford's job at the "Amer-
lean Literary Historical So-
ciety" is to apply hies ency-
clopedic-, knowledge and om-
nivorous curiosity to the
scanning of routine material
in search of 'Slirreptitious en-
emy activity_ He has oecently
come on an anornalet A c.er- ?
Wifliant c. Ruchleyk. is au-
thor of the afpcominz, novef,
"Saving Cie Queer." hosed
Oil the adventures or et C.I.A.
agent.
tain bestseller has been
translated only into Dutch '
and Arabic.. So what, you
say? So you would never,
qualify to work for the C.I.A. ?
because Of your restless in-
telligence. Redford has sent
down to Washington,'
through his superior at the-
Manhattan front, the datum,
on which he frames a hunch ,
which is mercifully unexpli-;
toted, and the lunch-hour ?
carnage is the result. Redford ,
had stumbled over an opera- ?
tion of international signifi-
cance, and it is a lucky,
lucky thing that it was his
day to go to the deli and
that he used the back door,
else he'd be stone-cold dead,
along with the boss, the
beautiful Oriental secretary,
and all the others.
On bringing in, the hot dogs
and finding everybody dead;
Redford decides he had better
report the event to Washing-
ton,. but he is good and
scared, and so are you in
his behalf, I'm telling you.
'So when he calls Washing-
ton, and is told by the bigger
boss which alleyway to re-
port to at exactly what hour,
Redford says, No sirree, I'm
not going to report to any
alleyway to meet up with
a perfect stranger. How do
I know I'm not talking to
the chief killer himself? It
is therefore arranged that
the unknown boss will be.
accompanied by an old friend
of Redford's from another
division of C.I.A. Recognizing
his old friend, Redford will
say to himself?and would
_even if he didn't have a rest-
less intelligence?"T-hat's my
-old friend all .right, so the
guy with him must be O.K.".
But what happens is that
as soon as the three men
? get together,- the boss sud-
denly whips out a pistol and
the general shoot-out Red-
ford's friend is killed, the.
boss is fatally wounded, arid
Redford knows he's in real
trouble. So he kidnaps Faye
Dunaway, a perfect. stranger
Of the kind Robert Redford
would come upon, and over
the next couple of hours the
plot proceeds along its an-
fractoous way, and the view-
er has a superb time as assas-
sins come and ge, and gets
a true sci-fi thrill out, of
the display of intelligence
hardware, of which my favor-
ite is a machine that flashes
a map showing the location
of the telephone being used
by the caller. However, Red-
ford's restless intelligence at
some point in his life put
him on to everything any-
body ever knew about tele-
phones, and he manaaes to
cross the lines of halt the
telephone trunks in the city
and sits -comfortably on a?
ganglion that makes a laugh-
ing stock out of the. Central;
Intelligence ? Agency's tele-'
phone-spotting machine. .
By now we all know that
? 'the Mr. Big who ordered the'
killings is very high up in
government. Our govern-
ment. Indeed, by the laws
of compound interest, if the
.movie had endured another
half an hour, one would have
been satisfied only If the
President of t the - United -
States, or perhaps even Ralph
Nader, had proved to he the
energuinen behind
? a 0
Thus.-it goes right to the
smash ending, as unbalanc-
ing as Jimmy Durante's nose.
The viewers would, at that
point, have been left totally
saddled by a traditional
double-agent theme?Mr.. Big
was really working for the.
Soviet Union; or, if that is
not trendy enough for Pol-
lack-Redford, a Chilean colo-
nel. It transpires, however,
that. Mr. Big is a 100 . per
cent American who had to
eliminate all those people at
the "American Literary His-
torical Society" because they
might hak'e become privy to
a contingent operation by
following the lead turned up
by Redford's restless intel-
ligence.
Then, in a dramatic side-
walk confrontation, Mr. Ju-
nior Big explains to Redford
that it is all high patriotirri,
working against a future na-
tional shortage of oil, and
invites Redford to come back
,into the company and accept.
the requirements of orthd-
doxy in the modern world.
But Redford says. taking off.
.his glasses,- No, never! This
very day I have told every-
-thing ? to . . . the camera
slithers up to a marquee
; above the two men who are
. talking and you. see tile logo
of . . . The New York Times.
.The director failed only to
'emblazon under' it, ?"Daniel
Ellsberg Slept Here." Mr. Ju-
? nior Big reacts like the witch
-come into contact with ava-
'ter. He snarls and shrivels
'away, and 'says, half-d.esper-
ately; "Maybe they won't
print ? it!" But Redford has-
by now seeded the audience
with his restless intelligence,
and we all know that The
New York Times , wilt. print
it, and we. shall all be free.
?'r he film's production notes
state: "Over a year ago, Stan-
ley Schneider, Robert Red- ?
ford, Sydney Pollack and
Dino de Laurentiis decided
to create a film that would
reflect the climate of Ameri-
ca in the aftermath of the
Watergate crisis." "The cli-
mate of America" is, a pretty.
. broad term. They really
mean: The climate of Ameri-
ca as seen by I. F, Stone,
Seymour Hersh,. Susan Son-
tag .arid Shirley MacLaine.
One ,recalls Will Rogers, re-
turning from the Soviet
Union where he had seen
a communal bath. "Did you
see all of Russia?" he was
asked. "No," Rogers said,
weighing his answer. "But
I saw all of ports of Russia!"
Redford-Pollack-de Lauren-
tiis have shown us the cli-
mate in all Of parts of Ameri-
ca. It sure is cold out there. VI
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY'S
ADULT EDUCATION
29 September 1975
ETHICS OF ESPIONAGE & THE CIA $20.00
Wed., 7:00-8:00 p.m. Rm. 119. Caldwell
Oct. 1?Nov. 194th & Mich., N.E.
C B
ol. Milton W. . liffington (Reid. Ed.D.. 3M.
In WWII, Col. Buffington served as a military intelligence
officer overseas, following which he joined the CIA in a ..ey
policy planning capacity. He retired from the CIA in 1970.
He will discuss moral and ethical questions in support of
national security, routine sources of intelligence, mission-
impossible techniques, right of privacy, ethics of assassination,
censorship of communications, paramilitary support of the
armed forces, books by es-CIA agents and an overview of the
history of espionage in this and other countries. Col. Buffington
will address himself to these questions with the added exper-
tise of his training as a professional lawyer.
24
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9
' Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9
WASHINGTON STAR
22 September 1975
ExmiC1 A. Argaly3t - ?
Tet fsk,2
? By Norman Kempster
Washington Star Staff Writer
Skepticism about their own conclu-
sions and "petty bureaucratic" re-
strictions ? not deliberate distortion
of the facts ? muted the CIA's warn-
ing of the 190 Communist Tet offen-
sive in Vietnam, according to the
former intelligence analyst who
accurately forecast the attack.
? James V. Ogle said he tried to tell
his version of the story to the House
Intelligence Committee but was re-
buffed. So he provided a copy of his
prepared testimony to The Washing-
ton Star instead.
"We had predicted the Tet offen-
sive," Ogle said. "It was all there, on
paper, in the cables. But we didn't
believe it.
ITIE PREDICTION was based on
captured documents and the
-speeches of North Vietnamese
Communist leaders, Ogle said. The
evidence pointed to an offensive but
there had been similar evidence be-
fore which had proved incorrect.
Later, when the Saigon office
where he worked was riddled with
bullets and spattered with blood,
Ogle said he and a fellow analyst
finally realized just what had hap-
pened.
"'Now we know what they meant,'
Joe (Hovey) said. There were tears
in his eyes. 'They meant what they
said.' "
ALTHOUGH earlier reports had
indicated that a Communist offensive
was planned for sometime between
Jan. 15 and Feb. 15, Ogle said a cable
which would have pinpointed the
start at Jan. 30 was not dispatched to
Washington even though the evi-
dence was available three days be-
fore the attack.
"The cable was never sent for the
petty bureacratic reason that the
translation of the captured document
had not yet been assigned a com-
bined document exploitation number
and so did not pass the tests set up to
avoid double reporting," he said.
Ogle said he decided to speak out
after Samuel A. Adams, also a for-
mer CIA intelligence analyst, told
the House committee- Thursday that
the CIA and the military intentional-
ly underestimated Viet Cong troop
strength for domestic political rea-
sons, resulting in an underestimate
of Communist military capability.
Ogle said he prepared the
testimony after receiving
indications the Pike com-
mittee wanted to hear it.
However, he said he was
riot called as a witness and
was told later by a staff
member that his testimony
tectuld not be required.
IMAMS SAID the intelli-
gence community was
gatity of "corruption" of its
reports. He said the inte.n- sons should be affaseoj ant
tinn was to fool CongrAppas roveAForoRektaisey2laSliiwwp
0
rfl
?
iJ
and the public but that it
ultimately contributed to
U.S. losses in the offensive.
In his testimony, Adams
said a CIA team in Saigon
? Ogle, Hovey and Bobby
Laton ? forecast the offen-
sive but underestimated its
power because of too low
troop estimates.
Sipping black coffee from?.
a yellow mug, Ogle said in
an interview that Adams
charges were "irrelevant"
because the Communists
only used about 67,000
troops in the offensive.
"it was not an intelli-
gence breakdown," Ogle
said. "I realize the conven-
tional wisdom is that it was,
but it was not."
Ogle was bitter at the
failure of the House com-
mittee to listen to his rebut-
tal of Adams.
"I THOUGHT they were
trying to get at the truth,"
he said. "I am now sure
they were trying to make.
political hay. They are
guilty of the same thing
Adams accused the CIA o ,
ignoring some of the facts
for political purposes."
Secretary of Defense
James Schlesinger, who
briefly headed the CIA, said
yesterday the Tet offensive
did represent an intelli-
gence. failure.
But Schlesinger, who ap-
peared on the CBS inter-
view. -program "Face the
Nation," said present con-
gressional investigations of
the CIA already may have
gone too far and damaged
national security. He said it
is appropriate for Congress
to review the agency's ac-
tivities but "we do not want
to throw the baby out ? with
the bathwater."
IN ANOTHER reaction to
Adams' sensational
charges, two members of
the House committee, Reps.
David C. Treen, R-Tenn.,
and Dale Milford, D-Tex.,
demanded that Chairman
Otis Pike, D-N.Y., call as
witnesses 12 individuals
who Adams said had played'
a part in developing phony
troop estimates.
. "Mr. Adams made seri-
ous and personally damag-
ing charges against a num--
her of persons," Treen and
Milford wrote. "In accord-
ance with rule 4.4 of the
rules of our committee we
believe that all such per
witnesses."
"We believe that it is ex-
tremely important that the
committee pursue the alle-
gation that distortion of the
military capacity of the
enemy was the result of
deliberate policy," the law-
makers said. "If the allega-
tion is true, we need to
know who is responsible for
the formulation of the poli-
cy and the means by which
it was carried out.
TREEN, MILFORD and
Rep. Robert McClory, R-
Ill., tried unsuccessfully
Thursday to end the public
testimony of Adams and
take the rest of his state-
ment in a closed committee
meeting. , They were out-
voted 6-3. -
Treen and Milford are
part of the conservative
bloc on the committee
which has been consistently
outvoted by a bipartisan
group of liberals.
Ogle insisted that con-
trary to public -opinion, the
Tet offensive was a defeat
for the Communists be-
cause of the frustration of
their hopes that the South
Vietnamese civilian popu-
lation would join the insur-
rection. But he conceded
that most Americans view
it was a defeat for the
allies.
UNION,. San Diego
OGLE ALSO dinted
Adams claim that the only
reliable U.S. infiltrator who
was able to penetrate 21..e
Viet Cong was killed i the.
Tet uprising. Ogle, who was
in Saigon while Adams was
assigned to the CIA's Lang-
ley, Va., headquarters, said
the man Adams described
had not penetrated the Viet
Cong at all.
He said the man was
really a very skillful "ana-
lyst" who was able to pre-
dict Viet Cong actions on
the basis of information he
obtained from the outside.
Ogle said the CIA did not
rely much on information
supplied by infiltrators
anyway because he said
most of them were "at least
triple agents," who were
usually unreliable.
On one thing, Ogle
agreed with Adams ? the
problem with intelligence in
Vietnam was a failure of
proper analysis, not a lack
of information.
"MERE WAS never a
shortage of intelligence in
Vietnam," Ogle said.
"There. was always tozi
much, too *many low-level
bits and pieces. As in all
intellectual endeavors. if
the bits and pieces didn't fit
the puzzle you were worlicg
on you tended to. ignore
them."
Several members of Cr:a
Pike committee have u
plained that the CIA spends
too much of its time gather-
ing bits of information and
too little trying to mal-le
sense out of the data.
11 Sept. 1975
c!At'ShOtil,d_
Since early this year. the Rockefel-
ler. Commission and ? congressional
? committees have been turning up
instances of abuse and potential law,
violations by the Central Intelligence'.
Agency. It is significant ? that these i
revelations have not .? changed the;
? public's conviction that the Urtited.1
-
States of America needs its CIA.
?
?
A. recent national poU showed that!
an ovenvhelming 80 per cent of .thei
'respondents oppose the idea of aboll
.1Shing the CIA. Further, the weight ofl
opinion is that the agency's problems
can be . solved within its presenti
framework, rather than by restrucl
_turing it entirely. ? -z
Washing the CIA's dirty linen in!
public ? as harmful as this has been
has also demonstrated to Amerd
cans how dangerous it would- be to
our national security if an intelliLl
A-RDPAW4tateft501-i101)W0664t-Were
doinc, its job.
,
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ARGOSY Magazine
September 1975
GEORGE CLIFFORD
? If you _want to know what goes on
. in the briney deep, ask the
They've got the ocean bugged!
allahe cluster of Navy men strained .
El in silence as they listened to the
tei radio transmission. Their sensi-
tive equipment amplified many
strange sounds from under the sea,
but there was one distinctly different,
more unusual and more frightening
than any they had ever heard.
Tapes of the transmission were
played back for other experts and for
high American defense officials. All
sat in horror as they heard what no
one had ever heard before: the ter-
rible pressures of the Atlantic depths
were crushing a submarine. It was like
a fat man stepping on. a light bulb.
"They just sat there," one govern-
ment source told APCOSY, "and they
could hear the bulkheads snapping."
The technology that permitted the.
sounds to be heard had been one of
America's greatest military secrets. It
was this fact, as much as any other,
that the Central Intelligence Agency.
tried to keep secret. When several
news organizations learned of the
CIA's attempt to salvage a Russian
sub from the Pacific floor this sum-
mer, for example, it was CIA Director
William Colby whopersonally.inter-
ceded to keep the cover on the story
for reasons of "national security:"
? Nevertheless, the story did get out
that the Glomar Explorer, a deep-sea
mining ship ostensibly owned by
Howard Hughes, was attempting to
recover a.Soviet sub that was lost 700
miles northwest of Hawaii in 1968.
-How, the public wanted to know, did
the CIA know when and where the
vessel went down?
The secrets contained in the
crushed hull of the Russian Golf class
sub were not as important to the men
in the Pentagon and their cloak-and-
dagger comrades as keeping their own
secret, and the Russians would soon
know if it were publicized that the
U.S. had located the Russian sub.
Now the Russians know, yet the se-
cret is still kept frotri the American
people who paid the bill for one of the
most successful enterprises of the
Cold War: the coastal boundary of
the United States, and of other places
26
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9
held vital to America's defenses, are
guarded by ultra-sensitive listening
devices. The equipment, though im-
proved from time to tim, has been in
these locations for some years.
The shrouds of secrecy around the
project are so thick that we have not
been able to learn precisely when
America first began using the under-
water listening devices, but sources
insist that the first submarine dis-
aster recorded by the equipment in-
volved an American ship. Some say it
was the nuclear sub Scorpion, which
was lost with 99 aboard off the Azores
on May 21, 1968. Other* believe it was
the Thresher, also a nuclear sub,
which disappeared with a crew of 129
at a still undisclosed location in the
Atlantic on April 10, 1963.
The knowledge that it was an
American ship added to the horror Of
the moment when men; safe and
warm at their post, listened to the
sounds of a submarine disaster for the
first time. On huge plotting boards
the Navy keeps track of the move-
ments of all major ships on the
world's oceans. Within minutes after
the listeners heard the bulkheads
break, they were able to determine'
that the doomed submarine was one
of their own.
? There was nothing anyone. could
do to save the crushed vessel. .
The United States and the SoViet
Union have spent untold fortunes for
the ability to detect and?if neces-
sary?destroy each other's sub-
marines. Submarine reseue, however,
remains a virtually unknown art.
Yet even if a rescue ship had been
nearby, it could not have helped. The
listeners knew from the sound of the
splintering steel that everyone aboard
would have been dead in seconds. -
It was not merely the Navy's abile
ity to detect submarine sounds that.
pushed CIA Director Colby to beg for
continued secrecy. Sources pointed
out that the Navy's use of sonar
buoys has been common knowledge
for years. These buoys have a rela-
tively short range and short lifespan.
What was significant about the in-
formation brought to light by the
mission of the Glomar Explorer, they
said, was the proof of America's abil-
ity to pinpoint the location of -a Rus-
sian submarine more than 700 miles
north .of Hawaii in the vast, rolling
Pacific. This, the sources said, repre-
sents a major increase in the range
and accuracy of underwater sound
systems over that of any previously
known to exist.
Ever since the Russians equipped
their long-range subs with nuclear-
tipped missiles, American defense
planners have been using all the tech-
nology at their disposal to keep track
of the underwater attack platforms.
Regularly, American submarines pick
up Russian subs as they leave their
bases in the Atlantic and Pacific, and
follew them on their cruises like gum-
shoes after a philandering husband;..
There is little secrecy involved in the
exercise; the subs can hear each
other. But the information about the
way the Russian subs move, and the
direction of their voyages, is impor-
tant to U.S. officials. (Russians sim-
ilarly monitor American submarine
movements.)
Still more Americans are employed
listening to all radio communications
to and from Russian subs. This not
only gives more information about
submarine locations, but offers the -
cryptologists and computer experts at
the National Security Agency an op-
portunity to crack the Soviet codes.
More information on the activities
of the Russian subs and other ships is
gathered daily by "spy-in-the-sky" .
satellites, which regularly send their
information back to U.S. listening
posts. All of this data is correlated in
Washington, and in times of inter-
national crisis, the National Security
Council and its co-ordinating com-
mittee, the Washington Special Ac-
tion Group, receives maps every day
showing the position and direction of
*the Soviet vessels. These movements
can be a key to Russian policy.
At the time of the war between In-
dia and Pakistan over the indepen-
dence- of Bangladesh in December,
1971, for example, knowledge of the
movements of Russian submarines
and other vessels toward the Indian
Ocean was crucial. It demonstrated
that promises made by top Russians
to Indian officials to prevent?by
force if necessary?a task force from
the U.S. Seventh Fleet from inter-
vening on the side of Pakistan could
be backed up with steel. ?
The ability to pinpoint the location
and direction of Soviet ships was also
crucial following the capture of the
American freighter Mayaguez last
May. Both diplomatic and in-
telligence sources indicated that nei-
ther Russia nor Chills was eager to
block a U.S. mission determined to re-
capture the container vessel.
Coded cables arriving in Washing-
ton under the highest security classi-
fications indicated a number of rea-
sons fee the apparent lack of interest
by the communist powers. The Cam.
' Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDF'77-00432R000100380007-9
bodians had not shown proper grat-
itude to their sponsors in Moscow and
Peking during the first sweet days of
their victory celebration. The capture
of the Mayaguez was thought to he
a foolhardy act. by an inexperienced
government. Most- importantly, it
seemed that the Americans, just
booted out of Southeast Asia, needed
a taste:of an old Asian remedy?the
lace-saver. The recapture of the May-
aguez, or so .the reasoning went
might cool American tempers enoteo-
to prevent a bigger, more arnbitioe- -
adventure. The whole world knew
that an American naval task force
had been ordered into the Gulf of ?
Siam, where the Mayaguez rode
uneasily at anchor under the droning
buzz of American patrol- planes. The
men responsible for co-ordinating the
military alternatives were aware of
the worth in the cables, but were also
on the lookout for cold hard facts.
They knew, of course, that China
lacked significant .air and naval
forces, and separated from Cam-
bodia's coast by more than 1,000 miles
of Laotian and Cambodian terrain,
was incapable of a military response.
Russia, however, was another story.
The Soviet navy had made the...Indian
Ocean its own, with constant patrols
by mcdern, missile-equipped destroy-
ers and cruisers, ever-present sub-
marines lurking beneath the waves,
and a cluster of space satellite sup-
port ships, whose powerful electronic
equipment is also useful for inter-
cepting radio messages from Ameri-
can ships and planes. Russia was not
only capable of stopping an American
essault to free the Mayaguez, but
could have used the incident to
touch-off a nuclear Armageddon.
All of these were factors that had
to be weighed in the State Depart-
ment, the Pentagon and, most of all,
the White House. Nervous .officials
waited for reports to come in from
around the world. The information
arrived quickly, considering its scope
and the vast stretches of the globe to
be covered, but to the men in Wash-
ington, it seemed to trickle like a wa-
ter torture. At last, the positions of
the Red fleet were marked on charts,
and copies were Made for the Na.
27
tional Security Council. It did not
take expert analysis to determine
that the Russians were staying far
from the Cambodian shore. -
If there were to be a response from
Russia, it would be in words, not bul-
lets. The way was clear for the Navy
and Marines to move in and free the
Mayaguez.
This is where the exact location of
enemy submarines in wartime is vital
knowledge to the United States. One
Russian sub, equipped with nuclear
missiles and properly positioned,
could conceivably destroy the key
sections of the megalopolis that
sprawls from Boston to Washington,
or the West Coast population centers.
Now the American undersea listen-
ing network gives the U.S. the awe-
some power to hear the foot-by-foot
progress of Soviet subs as they glide
beneath the surface far off our shores.
With exact knowledge of the sub-
marines' position, chances for a suc-
cessful pre-emptive strike are greatly
increased.
Such a listening system has been
under development for years off the
ccast of Florida. There, sonic devices
have been tested and proven so sensi-
tive they can even detect. the maneu-
vers of small boats smuggling drugs
and other contraband into the U.S.
The stories that finally appeared
about the Glomar Explorer and its
partially successful attempt to raise
the Russian sub also focused atten-
tion on the long-standing and cozy
relationship between .the CIA and
the even more secretive Howard
Hughes. There were many reports of
their interdependent relationship.
Probably the most recent one was
the tax dispute over the ownership of
the Glomar Explorer itself. In June,
Los Angeles County assessor .Philip
Watson told the press that men pur-
porting to be from the CIA had as-
sured him the ship was owned by the
Federal Government?not Howard
Hughes?and that the $300-million
vessel was therefore -exempt from lo
cal taxes. Since the men declined to
produce a letter from the CIA stating
the Government's ownership, Mr.
Watson sent a tee bill to the Summa
Corporation (Mr. Hughes' holding
NEW YORK TIMES
23 September 1975
company) for $7.5 million.
One man who connects Hughes
with the CIA's less publicized deal-
ings is John Meier, who was Hughes'
science advisor in the 1960's. Now in-
volved in complex litigation with the
billionaire recluse, Meier asserted
that Hughes had him place business
consultants in a number of Latin
American countries.
"I helped a bunch Of these people.
get themselves set up," the former
Hughes employee said. "I used my
own contacts to open doors for them.
Then one-of the men I was helping let
it slip that he?and all the others?
were CIA agents. He thought I
knew. I sent word to Hughes that I
wasn't going to help with that project.
anymore.".
Meier was soon off the Hughes pay-
roll, and burdened with legal suits
that only a person of Hughes' wealth
could afford to defend.
Meier insists that the CIA has
continued to side with Hughes in
their dispute. Earlier this year, Meier
.was hospitalized while in London on
business, and sent word that he would
have to postpone a court hearing in
Nevada. Meier asserts that a CIA
agent then came to the hospital and
took copies of his medical records.
"The CIA," Meier said, "is paying
a hell of a price for Hughes' help."
In the meantime, the Glomar Ex-
plorer has returned to California for
modifications and refitting. It was
only partially successful in recovering
the Soviet sub, part of which sank
again as it was being raised, and the
CIA is trying to get permission from
the White House to make another
salvage attempt. According to in-
formed officials, such permission may
never be given.
Maybe olio of the reasons for this is
the great stir that was created in the
newspapers, which made it clear that
we were, after all, investigating a
Russian vessel. There's a good
chance,, however, that the reason
might also be to allow the American
people: to forget the incident?and
possibly cease wondering what the
CIA has going for it. under the sea
waves.fil
. ;
:Ex-C.I.A. Analyst 1
tried' to tell his version of the'lWith bullets and Spattered with',
!
!story to the House Intelligenceiblood, Mr. Ogle said, be and a
i ,
l 1
!Denies Distortion
,Committee but was rebuffedifellow analyst, Joe Hovey, fi:!:
iSo instead he gave The Wash-jnally realized just what. had
1 Of Tet Troop Dat,?IiiIngton Star a copy of testimonylhappened.
" e would have presented. . I "'Now we know V.,hat they'
. 1 . "We had predicted the Tetlmeant,' Joe said. There were .
The WashIngten star - !offensive," Mr. Ogle said. "It 1 tears in his eyes. 'They meant
WASHINGTON, Sept. 2.`"--1was all there, on paper, in the what they said.'"
'Skepticism about their own ;cables. But we didn't believe it." j Although earlier reports had
,condusions and "petty bureau-1 The prediction was based on I indicated that a Communist of-
el-R.:tic" restrictions?not delib-jcaptured documents -and theifensive Was planned for some--'
erate distortion of the facts?Ispeeches of North Vietnameseitime between Jan. 15 and Feb.'
;mated the Central Intelligence!Cornmunist leaders, Mr. Oglej15, Mr. Ogle said, a cablegram.
Agency warning of the 1968isaid. The evidence pointed tojthat would have pinpointed the
Communist Tet offenSive ? inian offensive' but similar evidstart at Jan. 30 was not dis.
a foronidence before had proved in-ipatched to Washington even
?Vietharn. according to'
""--.;correct. I though the evidence was avail-
jr..:c..1igence analyst. I_ Later when the Saigon off icel,a13:e three days before the
AINMOVellbffOlURDlietaseidaeGinted0RotkGIA*RDRIZZE004432R000100380007-9 -,
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LONDON OF=i.
21 Sept. 1975
The price of your petrol will depend on the meet-
ing of OPEC next Wednesday. But are the big
oil companies who buy the oil from OPEC really
battiirig on behalf of the consumers to bring down
the price and break the OPEC cartel? ANTHONY
SAMPSON Is author of a new book on 'The Seven
Sisters' : az so, Shell, Texaco, Gulf, Chevron, Mobil
and P. Here he investigates the curious relation-
ship bettveen the companies and the producers.
NEXT WEDNESDAY in
Vienna? the members of OPEC
will meet once again to setue
the tua-1d peice of oil, while
the coms.untirreg countries will
watch helplessly to await the
size of the bin
It is two years since the
crisis first hroke, which first
doubled, and then doubled
again, the nil price. The first
sense af outrage at the power
of the cartel has given way
slowly to a sense of pained
resignation to the fact that it
will nal break apart, together
with am acceptance?at least
in Britaiii?that perhaps the
price of oil should remain
where OPEC has fixed it.
At the name time the con-
suming countries have been
questioning the role of the
Seven Sisters, the inter-
. nationat oil companies to
whom for the-last four decades
they had virtually delegated
the task of obtaining cheap
and secure oil_
First the consumers and
politicians particularly in
Arnerica?wmee appalled in
1973 to tfiscover that the com-
panies had lost overnight all
their bargaining power to keep
prices down, and were power-
less to prevent the embargo.
Then they wiere further en-
raged IV the vast increases in
the compan3r rofits. After the
crisis, the oil companies have
emerged as the richest of all
corporations- In the annual
list puhlished by the American
business magazine Fortune,
the TCP1 bigges t world com-
panies now imiclude eight oil
companies; led by Exxon (or
Esso) with Shell close behind.
Then a sinister aspect of
this financial power was
revealed in a- succession of
disclosures in Washington
about oil company bribes..
First it emerged that Gulf oil
had paid large bribes in dif-
ferent countries, including $4
million ,since, 1966 to the rul-
ing party in 'Korea. Then
several oil 'companies were
found to have paid bribes to
Italian political parties; Esso
alone had made secret politi-
cal payments totalling $51
million oven eight years in
Italy. These huge bribes,
coming out of the immense
profits, raise sharply the old
question (in both the literal
and general sense) of the
accountabilitY of the oil com-
panies.
But the most serious ques-
tion about the giant com-
panies from the West concerns
their relationship with the
OPEC cartel. Are the com-
panies really representing the
interests of the consumers ?
Or are they in fact serving to
underpin 'the- producers'
cartel ?
It is important in the first
Place to look back at the way
in which OPEC CUIlle about,
From the moment of its foun-
dation in 1960. OPEC was con-
ceived (as one delegate put it)
as a cartel to confront the
cartel.' Without the past his-
tory of connivance of the
companies, who for 30 years
had administered the Middle
East's oil production be-
tween them. OPEC woold
never have happened. Nor
could it have solidified with-
out a single extraordinary
blunder in the New York
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boardroom of Esso.
In July 1960 the Esso direc-
tors agreed --against the
advice of their Middle East
expert, Howard Page ? uni-
laterally to reduce the
'posted 'price for Middle East
oil : a decision which was
swiftly followed by the other
six Sisters (with some pro-
tests from BP). Thus all the
producing Governments found
their revenues from-oil taxes,
which were based on this
posted' price, drastically re-
duced overnight by the actions
of a group of private foreign
companies. It was a certain
recipe for Arab unity, as many
experts had warned; and it
worked. The key producers
clubbed together to form
OPEC, and even the Shah
swallowed his resentment of
Arab radicals, in his anger at
not being consulted, and
joined the new club.
In spite of such mistakes,
throughout the sixties the oil
companies were permitted by
the 'Western Governments, and
particularly by Washington, to
maintain effective control over
international oil policy. Thus,
in the critical October of 1973,
the confrontation with OPEC
was once again left in the
hands of the Seven Sisters
(now joined by a few indepen-
dents), in spite of the fact
that, only two days before, the
Middle East War had broken
out, which transformed the
whole political equation.
Politicians
astonished
The negotiation about the
oil price, not surprisingly,
quickly broke down. The
breakdown marked: the his-
toric turning-point when the
West suddenly lost all its
ability to settle the price of oil,
. producing the precise reversal .
of the situation at the forma-
tion of OPI.':C 13 years earlier.
The OPEC cartel was suddenly
established, to the astonkh-
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ment of consumers and the
incredulity of politicians:
the old cartel of the seven
companies was abruptly re- -
placed by a cartel of 13
nations.
Many experts, including ?
William Simon at the United -
States Treasury and (for a
time at least) Henry Kis-
singer at the State Depart-
' Ment, confidently expected
the OPEC cartel to . dis-
integrate, letting prices once
again tumble down. The im-
- mediate world shortage of oil
was soon over, as the world
recession, itself partly caused
by the oil prices, cut down
consumption everywhere. The
economists and advisers
waited expectantly for the
strains on OPEC to show them-
selves, as each country would
compete to keep up produc-
tion, and thus push down
prices.
? But nothing happened. Con-
sumption went down and
down: :tankers were laid off,
storage tanks were overflow-
ing, freight - rates dropped
lower and lower. There were
eveo hopeful signs of disunity
between the chief members of
OPEC : the Shah of Iran
? talked with increasing rancour
about Sheikh Yemeni, while
the Saudis became incteas-
ingly worried by the Shah's
.imperial ambitions. Yet still
OPEC held together; and the
basic price?with small local
variations?held up. What on
earth had gone wrong?
An important part of the
answer lay in- Saudi Arabia :
. for the Saudis, as far the big-
gest producers, were the key
to the cartel. Like the Texans
in the 1930s, the Saudis real-
ised that they must bear the
chief burden of regulating pro-
duction. And the Saudis had
one huge advantage over the
Texans, as guardians of the
-cartel; they did not particu-
larly- need the money from
extra production. As 'Yamani
explained to. me, talking in
Riyadh last February: Usu-
ally any cartel will break up,
because the stronger members
will not hold up the market
to protect the weaker mem-
bers. But with OPEC, the
strong members do not have
an interest to lower the price
and sell more.'
? et
The 'Saudis as Yamani was
able to show in the following'
months, were quite prepared
to cut back their production,
to make sure that the price
did not come down: in the
first six months of 1973 they
produced an average of only
6.6 million barrels e day,. corn- .
pared with ? 8.1 million the
year before. Other big produ-
cers, Ktiwait, Iran and Libya,
followed suit: in Libya pro-
duction in the same period
went down from 1.9 barrels to
1.2 barrels.
But why were the old
split up so many attempts at
cartels in the past ? Why were
Iran and Saudi Arabia riot
constantly competing for pro-
duction, as they had done
through the sixties, using
every manoeuvre to produce
an extra barrel ? It was not
that none of them needed the
extra money, for even at the
Quadrupled price the Shah
was soon expecting to go back
-into debt: No, the real key to
the continuing cartel was not
the self-restraint of the pro-
ducers;it was the fact that the
oil companies, the familiar
Seven Sisters, were in effect
conducting their rationing
.system for them.
' It- was' the companies, with
their global system of alloca-
tion, . and their control of
world-wide markets, ? who
were making sure that there
would be no glut, who were
holding the. balance between
the rival producers. The Shah
and his oil Minister, Dr Amoy-
zegar, both explained to me
that they had to be grateful
for the companies' role in
running the cartel : With
the Sisters controlling every-
thing,' said the Shah, once
they accepted, everything
.went smoothly.' ' Why try to.
break them up,' said Amotize-
gar, 'when they can do the
work for us ? '
The fact that the giant com-
panies were fully' integrated,'
with their own tankers, re-
fineries and gasoline pumps
throughout the world, made
the maintenance of the OPEC
cartel system infinitely easier.
It was the kind of situation
that the producers of other
commodities, seeking to- form
their, own cartels, might dream
of: in the words of The
Economist (no enemy to the
oil companies) : 'Many poor
primary producers would give
their eye-teeth if big foreign
capitalists, would kindly
..arrange a semi - monopolistic
distribution network for their
products in the. West, down to
tied filling stations.'
What had happened, it
emerged as the evidence
slowly unfolded, was not that
OPEC had usurped the old
cartel of the oil companies,
but that they had simply
joined themselves on to it, and
had manoeuvred the com-
panies into the position of be-
ing their allies and instru-
ments, with no interest in
breaking the OPEC cartel.
In the words of Senator
Church's report in January
1975, at the end of the most
comprehensive set of hearings
on the oil crisis, 'the primary
concern of the established
major oil companies is to
maintain their world market
shares and their favoured posi-
tion of receiving oil from
OPEC nations at .costs slightly
lower than other companies.
To maintain this favoured
members.'
+
Not such
a mystery
-Thus the puzzle of why the
-OPEC cartel did not break was
not really so mysterious : it
, was being underpinned by
seven of the biggest corpora-
tions in the Western world,
who had no commercial inter-
est in destroying it.
In fact this had all been part
of the grand design of OPEC,
and particularly of its most
intelligent delegate, Zaki
Yamani. Back in 1968, in the
.. aftermath of the earlier
Middle East war when Arab
fortunes seemed at their low-
est, Yamani had conceived of
his plan for ' participation,' by
which Arab Governments
would acquire shares in the
oil companies' concessions.
The object was not only to in-
crease the producers' revenues
and give them a stake in their
own resources; it was also, as
. Yemeni carefully explained to
correspondents in March 1969,
to create a bond between the
producing Governments and
the oil companies which
'would be indissoluble, like a
Catholic marriage.'
Yamani knew that outright
nationalisation of concessions
. was a dangerous policy: it
might cut off the producing
country from whole networks
of world markets, as it cut off
? Mussadiq of Iran in 1951.
Instead, participation would
guarantee the co-operation of
the companies, who would be
lured into the agreements by
the promise of cheaper oil
than their lesser competitors.
? 1.7arriani's policy, after some
resistance from the compan-
ies, was triumphantly success-
ful : the seven companies, and
some others, had all been per-
? suaded to enter into mar-
riages by 1973; and though
some producers, like Algeria.
preferred outright nationalisa-
tion. they took care to give
preferential treatment to fay-
pored companies, thus ensur-
ing their support. In the
immediate wake of the 1973
war there were .new demands
for total nationalisation, but in
the subsequent negotiations
the producers took care that
the marriage would not be
damaged to the point of
divorce.
It was the embargo, in fact,
that revealed in a highly-
dramatised form that the oil
companies had already
changed sides, and that they
were most vulnerable to pres-
sures from the producers. As
the Shah put it to me : The
companies were the first to say
"I serve and obey the orders
of the producing countries ".'
The embargo could never have
been effective if there had not
political forces of disunity status, the international corn- been comparatively few com-
betweethen natiops not spgteing
up cartelWarCM MCA Re I eawd
PanliA?Cranifk 31..t 00432R1Y018100880007,9in the key
29
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producing countries of the
Persian Gulf. . As Professor
Stobaugh, an oil -expert from
Harvard, expleined,giyine evi-
dence about Saudi Arabia to -
the Church committee: 'It is
clear that it is easier to have
an embargo when you have
'only four companies to deal
with.
The embargo was really a
forewarning, in the heat of
battle, of the situation which
was to emerge in the following
two years : to put it bluntly,
in the language of the busi-
ness, the companies were
found in bed with the pro-
clucers.
It was an ironic outcome to
the long history of the Seven
Sisters. They had been en-
couraged, sometimes even
pushed, by the Governments
in Washington and London to
go abroad to find cheap oil for
'Western consumers; later they
had been given huge tax bene-
-fits, and special clearance from
anti-trust laws in Washington
on the grounds that their pre-
!settee in the Middle East was
crucial to Western defence
and the future of the free
'world. Yet now, when the real
.crisis broke in 1973, they were
found to have suffered the
fate of so many dubious
,adventurers in the past : they
gone native. When the
Saudis insisted that the
.Aramco partners must cut off
all oil from the United States
Sixth Fleet, they meekly sub-
mitted?at the height of the
international emergency.
We are thus, I believe, faced
with a remarkable neW trans-
formation in the character
of the Seven Sisters. Here
are the biggest corporations in
the world, owned by Ameri-
can or European shareholders,
. and theoretically dedicated to
'safeguard cheap oil and
democracy, which have now
emerged with their principal
loyalties directed towards
foreign powers. The interests
of these powers might become
.diametrically opposed to
those of the 'home' govern-
ments of the oil companies,
which now find themselves
(committed to a cartel to main-
thin expensive oil.
, In- the context of this de-
pendence, it is now much
easier to see why the OPEC
cartel has continued unbroken
for two years; and why
Kissinger and Simon have,
like the Big Bad Wolf, huffed
and puffed but not blown the
house down.
There is nothing con-
sciously conspiratorial about
'the company's support for
OPEC. The oil executives
can, and do, insist- honestly
that they are constantly oper-
ating according to the market,
trying to take oil where it is
cheapest and refusing it
where it is too expensive, as
they have done in Abu Dhabi
and Libya. Like Rockefeller's
executives a hundred years
ago, they can boast that they
are operating the most eco-
nomical and efficient system
imaginable. But they are oper-
ating within a monopoly, and
they will do nothing, beyond
exploiting the local differen-
tials, to offend or break that;
basic cartel. Of course there
are plenty of smaller adven-,
turous companies which would
be glad to buy and sell cut-
price oil wherever they could
find it; but the OPEC coun-
tries can easily enough keep
them under control, provided
they have the use of the
global networks of the Seven
Sisters.
How they
dodge tax
The Seven Sisters have
existed for so long?Exxon
for a century, Shell for 70
years?that they have become
regarded as facts of life, like
nations or mountains. The
need for giant integrated com-
panies has been ? held to be
essential to security of supply;
so that Shell oil . can be
pumped into Shell tankers to
be carried through Shell re-
fineries to Shell filling sta-
tions. But in fact there has
been nothing inevitable or
irreversible about these oil
empires : they have been the
result, more than anything, of
deliberate governmental de-
cisions in past years, .which
have guaranteed tax relief and
diplomatic support overseas,
as part of a deliberate foreign
policy which is now totally
outdated.
The 'integrated companies
developed increasingly into
tax-dodging devices: the tax
concessions led to absurd dis-
tortions in the accounting of
the companies, who arranged
to make most of their profits
out of foreign production,
where they paid minimal
taxes.
But now the whole logic of
the integrated company has
been turned upside down. The
vast machinery for extracting
cheap oil and selling it
through global networks has
been used for the opposite
purpose : to ensure that
expensive oil will always find
markets, and will not be
undercut by cheap oil. The
integrated companies have
become like a heavy blunder-
buss, seized arid turned round
by the opposite side. ?
This new role of the com-
panies, together with their in-
creased profits, and the revela-
tions about bribery, all point
again to the question, are such
huge companies really neces-
sary ? It seems clear that,
without the instruments of the
Seven, OPEC's maintenance of
their cartel would become
much more difficult. If the big
companies pulled out of their
Participation agreements and
long-term contracts, and be-
came more like trading com-
panies in 01 her commodities,
OPEC'S outlets would be much
less assured. And if Western
governments were to take over
directly the task, of buying oil
frOm .OPEC they would pr-
sent a much more effective
counter-group on the con-
sumers' side.
The old argument that huge
companies are essential to sup-
ply the resources for develop-
ment is now much less con-
vincing. It is often the smaller
companies, like Atlantic Rich-
field in Alaska or Occidental
in Libya, who have been most
. adventurous in exploratioq;
and the real strength of the
giants, Esso and Shell, rests
on their control of the markets
more than their record Qf
exploration.
The giant size of the Seven,
and their joint consortia in
the Middle East, were origin-
ally the product of a quite
different historical context.
Thus the Iranian Consortium
(which includes all Seven
Sisters) was encouraged by
the State Department in 1953
as a means to restore the
Iranian economy after the
? disaster of Mussadiq; and
thus the four partners of
Aramco (Esso, Texaco. Socal
and Mobil) were riven toe
concessions and dinlomatic
supnort to keep Saudi Arabia
in the Western camp.
Now the tables are turned.
and the giants have become
much more useful to the pro-
ducers than to the consumers;
meanwhile their size IS se
overwhelming. and so 1;9-
!
accountable, that they ey den
rniis
growing fears a
pe.
untie control of them.
'Time Seven Sisters: The Greqt
Oil Companies and the World
They 1ViaLde,' by Anthony Swap-
son is published by Hodder and
Stoughton tomorrow . eriee
?4.95.
30
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-9
LONDON OBSERVER
28 Sept. 1975
Anatomy of
the oil game
by CHRISTOPHER TUGENDHAT'
THE SEVEN SISTERS by Anthony Sampson
(Hodder and Stoughton ?4.95)
ONE of my most vivid
memories of writing about oil
is of asking a director of
Esso's parent company in
New York what he con-
sidered to be his company's
greatest achievement. ' To
have survived,' he replied,
and he was quite right. In
most industriesu the great
names of the 1920s have
either disappeared, merged,
or been taken over by govern-
ments. One has only to look
at aircraft, cars and coal, to
appreciate how difficult it is
for individual companies to
withstand far-reaching- politi-
cal, economic, and technical
changes.
But in oil the seven sisters
?Exxon (Esso's parent).
Mobil, Standard Oil of Cali-
fornia (Chevron's parent).
Shell. Gulf, Texaco, and BP
?remain among the world's
largest companies trout one
generation to the next. Their
names change from time to
WASHINGTON POST.
30 September 1975
Joseph Kroft
The 0
time, but their vitality con-
tinues unimpaired. This is a
remarkable achievement.
Anthony Sampson sets out ?
to describe how it was done.
Half his book traces the story
from their nineteenth and.
early twentieth century
origins to the formation of
OPEC in 1960, and the final
third deals with the last five.
years during which OPEC has?
assumed responsibility for
setting oil prices, and raised
them to . undreamed - of
heights. He concentrates on
personalities, and confines
himself to those aspects of
the companies' record that
now seem- most newsworthy,
notably the attempts to form
cartels, the acquisition of
concessions, and dealings
with governments.
As one would expect from
his previous books, the result
is highly readable. There
are some marvellous descrip-
tions of individuals and
EC Charade
The price rise set by the foreign oil
cartel last week shows how little this
country has a foreign economic policy.
For the increase comes at a time when
excess supplies should have forced
the cartel of exporting countries
known as OPEC to cut prices.
That OPEC was able to stick to-
gether and then to hike prices at all
is only thanks to help from major
Western oil companies. The big com-
panies favored the foreign cartel large-
ly because they got no contrary sig-
nals from their own governments, not-
ably from the Ford administration in
Washington.
To understand all this it is neces-
sary to have a feel for the strengths
and weaknesses of OPEC. The cartel
is powerful when demand for oil ex-
ceeds supply. It can then set very high
prices which member countries will
gladly adopt and enforce. That. is what
happened in 4.973 and 1974.
An excess of supply over demand,
however, poses vexing problems for
OPEC. In order to hold prices high,
production has to be cut. Deciding
which member countries should ac-
cept which cuts in production?and
therefore in income?has up to now
proved beyond the capacity of OPEC.
Thus Abdul Amir Kubbah, a for-
mer OPEC official, mentions in his
events, and his eve for the
vignette which tells more
than several thousands words
of explanation is as acute as
ever. At times he succeeds
in transmitting a sense of
atmosphere so vividly that
one almost feels he must have
been present at the occasion
he is describing. -
But this approach gives the
impression that the com-
panies are run. like Mogul
and other TV creations, by
small groups of polymaths
constantly taking-. key
decisions, letting across the
world, and carrying all the
details of their business in
their heads. The reality is,
of course. far More complex
and prosaic. The arguments
against considering the his-
tory of a nation ? with refer-
enee-driaV to kings-and battles
are now widely appreciated,
and apply just as much to -
directors and companies.
The directors of the seven
sisters are popularly sup-
posed to be masters of poli-
tics and diplomacy, but that
idea hardly survives this.
book. As the author points
out, most of them have tech-
nical backgrounds, and he
describes the route to the tcip
at Exxon as being through
? the " Texas pipeline "?tin
through the technical univer-:
skies, the refineries, and tanl-
farms.' He suggests that top
oilmen are generally out Of
their depth in politics and
diplomacy. and his account
of some of their activities
bears this out. .
The. US sisters failed
entirely . in their attempt to'
influence Nixon's foreign
policy in favour of the Arabs
before the Yom Kippur War',
and Sampson is very critical
of BP's handling of
events leading up to Abadan.
The mistakes he describes
adds mournfully, "nothing ever came
of it"
Thanks to the recession and a mild
winter, 1975 was a time of oil glut
which put OPEC to the most severe
test in its history. Consumption of
OPEC oil fell from a capacity .of about
40 million barrels a day to an actual
figure of about 25 million barrels per
day.
So if the cartel was to hold, if prices
were to be kept 'steady, the exporting
countries had to withhold from the
market 40 per cent of their productive
capacity. They had to eat?or, as the
term goes, "lock. in"-15 million bar-
rels a day.
The great miracle of 1975 is that
the OPEC countries paiSsed the test.
They sustained prices (at a basic level
of about S10.50 for the marker crude)
all through the year by huge cutbacks
in production.
Moreover, they assigned the cut-
-backs not in a crude, across-the-board
manner, but in a highly sophisticated
way which inflicted least harm on
those countries least able to bear pres-
sure. Thus the biggest producer, Saudi
Arabia, which takes in much more
revenue than it can spend, absorbed
by far the biggest cut. in production,
It locked in nearly 50 per cent of pro-
duction in April and well over 40 per
cent subsequently.
and the misjudgments for
which he holds them respon-
sible are such that many
readers may find it hard to
understand how they have
survived for so long. The
more- recent fiascoes of the
political payments in Italy.
Bolivia, and Korea, revealed .
since this book went to. press,-
must only confirm that im-
pression. Certainly -politics
and diplomacy di) not provide
the explanation of the corn:
panics' longevity.
This lies, unfortunately',-
outside the terms of refer-
ence he has set himself. The
companies have beeu
astonishingly successful at
finding oil under conditions
of every sort in practically
every part of the world; ita
developing new uses for .it
which in turn enabled them.
to expand and diversify, and
in creating a distribution
system that even today most
governments feel unable to
replace. That is why even so
chauvinistic a country
France still relies on them 59
years after la u tic (ling an.
official policy designed to
build up French alternatives,
and why they still handle the
vast hulk of Middle East oil.
Their executives are also for,
midable, highly pi-ofeisiuril
and sometimes ruthless busia
nessmen. who usually manage.
to get the best of their rivals.
However, within his terms
of reference Sampson has pro-
duced an exciting and enjoy-
able book. Anyone wishing fo-
understand how the relation::
Ship between OPEC and the
companies has CVO !vetl over
the last few-years, and what
it means to the consumers,
will find this account
absolutely fascinating. When
it comes to describing a
power struggle Anthony
Sampson has few masters.
with only tiny cuts in production. Thus
the second-biggest producer, Iran,
which consumes almost all of its oil
income in development, cut back its
production by only between 15 and
20 per cent.
Exactly how the cutbacks were ar-
ranged In a way so well caculated to
minimize friction among OPEC mem-
bers is not known. But it is very clear
that the OPEC countries and the inter--
national oil companies were in cello-
sion.
For example, Armco, a conglom-
erate of American companies which
runs the Saudi oil industry, decided .
on the level of Saudi production each
month according to the world market.
But the Aramco decisions were subject
td the control of the Saudi govern-
ment which owns 60 per cent of the
company. In this way Aramco com-
bined with the Saudi government to
make the cartel work.
Conversely, American companies did
not use their power to break the car-
tel. Iran, for example, would have
been highly vulnerable to a threat
by companies to cut back, say, 90 per
cent of their purchases from that coun-
try. Under such a threat the Shah
would have probably been forced to
hook on OPEC that its first resolto Conversely, countries heavily de- break the price and bust the cartel.
11
was in fact 105r Weave 2004/08101k :f4DIANROP77--00i3(2f4010040038010074
tion spoke of the nee(htanapam.
"regulation of productiocir"Thil, e penditures were allowed to get by ? suggested by one major American
31
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? company. But the State Department
discouraged any such counter-cartel
actions by the American companies.
What all this seems to say is that
the Ford administration -- despite
much official huffing and puffing?
actually helped the cartel raise prices.
The OPEC deliberations of last week
? were a kind of charade which made it
? NEW YORK TIMES
28 September 1975
possible fdlr some members?notably
the Saudis?to look pro-American.
-In fact, the cartel stood together
from beginning to end. It will do so
again?and to the great damage of
the Western economies ? until the
United States and other consuming
countries come up with an interna-
tional energy policy. While there are
? some signs of progress noW, I am
reminded that the Saudi oil minister, ,
Zaki Yamani, once asked me: "Does
the United States really have an oil
policy?"
1975 Field Enterprises. Inc.
U.S. IS SAID TO LAG Assessment ? A Calculus of (C+E+M) (S 4W).. PP stands Canada, China,- Japan, West
Strategic Drift," published this for perceived power, C for the Germany and France.
ni r week. . "critical mass" of population As for military strength, Mr.
sTRAE(pt, i Mr. Cline, a former high of- plus terr:aory. E for econarnic Cline estimates the United
" Fic;a1 in the Central Intelligence capability, M for military capa- States and the Soviet Union to
Agency and director of intel,
ligence in the State Department,
Ex-tntellieYence Aide Finds
_. has been critical of Secretary
. Soviet Purpose Stronger of State Kissinger and has
deplored the. impact' of recent Equal on the Basics - . ? ranks the United States slightly
.
investigations of the intel- Applying this . part . of the ahead of the Soviet Union, with,
-- By DAVID BINDER - ligence community. 'Chira North Vietnam, Taiwan,!
Specuti to-a-be :Nv:: Y4.:1-??. Times The formula devised by mr. .orinula -.,.i.r. Cline finds that ' "
.WASHINGTON, Sept. n _ Cline, now an executive at the the So?7,et Union, the Uniaal North Korea, Pakistan and.
Britain following. !
Genrgetosvn University Center States and China have roughly'
The Soviet UniOn has twice the It is in the area of strategy;
for Strategic and Internat;orial equal coefficients of population and will that Mr. Cline finds,
?."strategic purpose *and will ' to '?' ' ?
.. .StudieS- .states that political and territory followed by' the United States seriously'
S for strategic purpose be .equal in strategic weapons,
and W for will to pursue trailed at a great distance by
Britain, France and China. But
national strategy. in total military capability he
C
pursue national strategy" ot power is a combination of more,india,
the United States, according to or less measurable quantities:, ? Indonesia, Japan and
lagging. He rates the Soviet
Union at a coefficient of 1.5 and
Ray S. Cline, a retired Amer-'nepulat:on and territory, and? . the United States at 0.7.*.He
ican intelligence official who military capability, multiplied, In terms Of economic capa- also finds the Soviet bloc, in-
has devised a mathematical-by coefficients of strategicibility, the formula finds the eluding Cuba, to have coeffi-I
formula to support his thesis, purpose and the will:to pursu0.1nited States leading the Soviet dents of 1.0 or better. He rates!
His formula provides a basisinational strategy. Union by about 12 per cent; West Germany, the Netherlands,
fo..r his book, "World 'Power, The formula ? states: PP-trailed at some distance by Canada', Mexico and Israel Muchl
higher than the United States
in this field.
The American Problem
In his description the Ameri-
can problem is this: "At pres-
ent, the power of the United
States is declining, not because
it has become a weak nation,
but because it is strategically
muddled and because the num-
ber of its reliable allies is de-I
.clininga
As remedy he proposes "to
? reconstitute a pattern of key
!alliances?a kind of latter-day
:Athenian League." He-speaks of
this- as an ."oceans alliance"
? that. would link the United
.States to a core group in which
..he includes Canada, Britain,
West Germany, France, Italy?
the Netherlands, Israel, Japan,:
ITaiwan. Australia and New
Zealand.
The core of 12 would be
augmented, according to -the
formula, by a group comprising
Mexico, Spain, Iran, Turkey,
,Egypt, Saudi Arabia, India,
iPakistani. Indonesia, Singapore,
!south' liorea, Brazil, Nigeria
land South Africa.
The book was published as
a paperback by the Center for
,Strategic and International
Studies and in hardcover by
iWestview Press, Inc., Boulder,
!Colo.
LONDON TIMES
18 September 1975
-Less Red
The new edition of the Encyclo-
paedia Britannica, published
last year, is to have all 15 of its
articles on the 1.5 Soviet repub-
lics revised. It is being done
after readers complained of a
pro-Soviet slant in the articles
?hardly surprising, since they
were written by Soviet scholars
provided through Novosti, an.
official Soviet press agency. In
the previous edition the articles
on the republics were written
by non-Soviet experts.
Professor Ronald 1\ilisiunas of
Willians College, writing in the
Slavic Review, complains that
the articles are written from a
distinctly Soviet standpoint and
do not conform to Western
standards of objective fact. In
none of them is it stated, for
instance, that the Communist i
Party s the only political
organization permitted. .
Warren Preece, editor of the
new edition, said: "We are
changing that. We are making
it perfectly clear in the 'articles
that some version of the Com-
munist Party is running things,
that there is a single party."
? None of the articles reports
that: the 15 Republics are con-
trolled from Moscow. "I con-
cede the possibility of prejudice
by omission", said Preece.
? 32
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NEW YORK TIMES
14 September. 1975
PAIT ?HEW
MILTON OaAMER
The Drk Side of
tural D?nte
Le poliftcs of detels a wondrous thing? ?
unlng us, as it (km; to believe that the earth
is flat?a no less wondrous are the cultural
elicies shat have followed in its wake with a
promptittatise that can be effected nowadays
csly by catnunissars operating on large budgets
under government fiat_ The astronauts keep their rendezvous
in space, the.Bolshoi mnorms the operas of Prokofiev at .
? Lincoln CenMa,. and the Metropnlitan Museum of Art
? dispatches its prized Old Masters to Moscow. God's in his
heaven, you odght say, and all's right with the world! Right?
? Of comae there are isolate cranks, like. Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn, who, refusing all 'invitations to amnesia, insist
on drawing oztain lesnons from. experience, but there is no
shortage of Iltatal prartflits eager to discredit them. Between,
say, The New Republifs recent attack on Mr. Solzhenitsyn's
warnings and the statement by iosonnid I. Brezhnev that .
"the Comm.anist party of the Saatiet Union and our
Government iatiteve. itnecessaty to support and develop all
kinds of cootna?ation which setae to facilitate the
strengthening of muttael undersimding and mutual respect
among the peoples," there is a perfect unanimity of
sentiment. Werie could ask for anything more? Certainly not
the Corrimut party off the Soi%at Union.
Breah-rav's.,.,tattement is quoted from the Letter
that appears as a prefane to thetteandsome catalogue of the
exhibition callat "Master Paintings from The Hermitage and
The State Russian Museum, Leningrad". opening this week
at M. Ithoeciter & Co. Mr. Brezhnev's passion for the
t masterworks cl.tv'esteern painting has heretofore been a
well-kept sea--..t. so far as one tza tell, but that is the
wonderful tirheg about the politics of d?nte: it brings out
all sorts of tenenspecteat tastes in art, science and the
humanities. l, not nat....thaps in the humanities, where the
requisite octhtsion of sztemory has a certain inhibiting
effect, but w-tont- does matter? lot is what counts, eoes ?
? it not? For an exchange ,of Rembrandts, we can be expected
to forgive soene of the seamier artdnaa. of Soviet culture. After
all, we are ant being naked to stao.d in line to leak at
them. Out of ght,. as the saying goes, out of mind.
So the ?Cmortach ty,orchased by Nicholas 1, the Tiepolo
purchased-by Catherine II and Lhea.. great Picassos and
Matisses aCC5-fred by felaose Jewisth bourgeois merchants,
Sergei Shchrki.o. and Ivan Moozar, in the bad old days
before the Faetatiutiorn are comirg to New York, and
.marvelous plettre.s than are. In Itta.shinntori, where these
"Master Paireihas" ware shown tatt the National Gallery, they
drew a large and apprenotative and the experience is
likely to be .ranteated in New \tad:. And after New York, the
show travels to Detrota, Los Angees and Houston, where
.lines of eageataietvers :ran likewtte be expected.
In addition to the. :n0 glorionn paintings by Western
masters--Caaareentgio, tt,toussin, Vetaz.quez and Cezarine are
among the cat_taz at...hates represented?the show also includes
13 works by Inatatian painters of 'inite pre-Revolutionary era.
These cannot *.r_ expecoarl to cart the same spell, but they are
not without interest. Flow delightfoL for example, to see
Lon Bakstts 5i7;5 portrait of Seratti Diaghilev:Only
Efterwards, e:taps, are we ovemorne by sober thoughts
about the fate tatese a.51:-.111(1US esthetes would have suffered -
if, Like. so inane others., they had tad the misfortune to live
long enough ;..tetheir ntent_iive land re experience the tender
mercies of Stattans ctaraIpolicies
There is, *Ey the way, no representation in this
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exhibition at anything Produced by a Soviet painter since
the victory of the proletariat?as they say in the U.S.S.R.?
altered the conditions of artistic culture. Lest this omission
be mistaken for undue modesty on the part of Mr. Brezhnev's ?
government?a body not usually inclined to minimize the
achievements pf Soviet culture?it is well to be reminded of t -
the reasons for this conspicuous lacuna in a show designed
to reflect glory on the Soviet state. ?
?? ? The work of the Soviet avant-garde, which flourished '
In the early years of the Revolution, is still under a rigorous
ban in the Soviet Union, and in the period since Lenin
first introduced the policies that led to the complete
destruction of the avant-garde?some 50 years ago now?
Soviet culture, so far as the visual arts are concerned, has
-become for the most part a dead culture, tethered to the
dictates of the Politburo. Its death is the direct result of the ?
kind of murder and coercion o.ne finds spelled out in
stomach-curdling detail in Mr. Solzhenitsyn's "Gulag
Archipelago"?not a book Much recommended by tender- ?
hearted partisans of d?nte, but not exactly irrelevant,
either, to that "mutual respect among the peoples" we are '
being asked to bear in mind while our eyes feast upon
the handiwork of Poussin and Picasso.
There are, to be sure, those intrepid "unofficial" artists
in the Soviet Union who persist in trying to keep alive the ?
idea of a free and independent artistic life, but their work ?
Gould scarcely be expected to receive the imprimatur of Mr..:
Brezhnev's cultural ministry. So there was little choice,
really, in what to send on this mission of "mutual
understanding." The selection of masterpieces might vary?
there is plenty to pick from in The Hermitage certainly?
but it had, perforce, to he confined to paintings that found
their way into Russian collections before the blieht of
'Revolution had its profound effect. Amid the undeniable
pleasures of the "Master Paintings" exhibition, we might,
then, give a moment's thought to what this signifies about
.the fate of Soviet culture.
.? We are, apparently, to have a great many more of these
detente exhibitions. Dr. Armand Hammer, whose "fruitful
initiative" Mr. Brezhnev gratefully acknowledges in his
catalogue statement, shows no sign of slackening his
- activities- in this realm, and neither does Thomas P. F.
Hoving, the director of the Met, who sounds positively
euphoric these days in speaking about his dealings with
Soviet officialdom. It must be a relief, I suppose, for Mr.
Hoving to negotiate?commissar to commissar, so to speak
? ?with Soviet ministers after his recent experience with
. curators on his own staff.
At the opening Of the show of master paintings from the
Met in Moscow this summer, Mr. Roving was reported to
have said of these Soviet officials: ''There are the best people
we at the Metropolitan have ever dealt with outside our own
country." What comparisons, do you suppose, he could have
had in mind? Perhaps those French officials who refused to
suffer in silence when he unilaterally reduced the size of
the recent "French Painting" show? Whatever he meant,
this is the sem of thing we can now expect to be commonplace
in the rhetoric surrounding d?nte exhibitions. The language
of diplomacy ha; never been famous for its moral rigor,
and Messrs. Hoving and Hammer are not the men to challenge
custom in this regard.
What we can expect, too, is that nothing in these
exchanges will be allowed to cause the Soviet Union the
least trace of ideological inconvenience. This means, among
much else, that the art in which the Western mind has: made -
its deepest avowal of feeling in this. century will not be
accorded the Slightest sign of acknowledgement. The
principles of detente require us to act is if we too belonged
to a dead culture.
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WAS/UNION STAR
25 September 1975
Turkey,
Snce
(re
nica
By Ralph Joseph
Specikol to the Was son Star
- TEHERAN, Iran ? Since
the comgressional suspen-
sion of American arms aid
to Turkey and the subse-
quent takeover of the U.S.
bases in Anatolia? a notice-
able softening or Ankara's
'attitude toward the Soviet
Union has taken place.
There are even some in-
dications that Ankara may
be ready to negotiate a
treaty- for friendship and
nonaggression with Mos-
cow.
The suggestion was first
made to Turkey by the
Soviet Union in April 1972,
when President Nikolai
.Podgorm, made :,a state
visit to Ankara. The Turks
turned down the idea then.
When Podgorny flew back
to Moscow, all he had to
show fed- his effort was a
joint declaration between
the two- countries to develop .
bilateral ties on a .basis of
peace,. friendship and good
neighborly relations.
NEW YORK TIMES,
TURKISH officials then
pointed out that Turkey's
membership of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion made it inconsistent to
sign a treaty of friendship
and nonaggression with the
Soviet Union, but that a
joint declaration along the
lines of one signed between
Russia and France the
previous year would be bet-
ter.
The Russians left it at
that for the time being. A
year after Podgorny's visit,
feelers were again put out
by the Kremlin, but once
again nothing came of it.
Moscow has not since re-
newed its efforts. This time
the feelers appear to be
coming from the Turkish
side. Last month, Turkish
President Fahri Koruturk
took advantage of a tour of ;
some Black Sea provinces;
to make pointedly friendly'
references to "our northern
neighbor, the Soviet
Union."
Reporters covering the
tour were quick to point out
that Koruturk's remarks
were made soon after
references by him to the
strained relations between
the United States and Tur-
key.
?
THE ISTANBUL daily
Milliyet a few days later
commented in an editorial
that it was not common-
place for a Turkish presi-
dent to stress the signifi-
cance of Turkish-Soviet
friendship and to praise
Russia: Nor, it said, was it
common for a Turkish
minister of state to say that
Turkey could buy arms
from the USSR, and could
coor..serate with it in estab-
lishing a war industry. The
minister had indeed just
made such comments.
The paper also said that a
"deeire to sign a nonag-
gression pact with the Sovi-
et Union had emerged and
was spreading" among
Turkish politicians.
It is probably too early
for 'Moscow to have shown
any response, but the
expectation is that when it
comes, 'the response will be
positive. In July the Krem-
lin extended a large new
credit to Ankara, said to be
worth about $700 million.
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 19 75 (The exact figure has
he reign in
illisaO?raem
By William Safire
WASHINGTON, Oct. 1?America's
ihterest. in Franco's reign in Spain
falls mainly on the planes?that is,
the air and !naval bases we have been
renting, whcze leases are now being
renegotiated.
The world7s interest in. Spain these
days centers .on the execution of five
terrorists, including two Basque sepa-
ratists, convic.ted by a military court
of murdering policemen in the course
of bank holdups. General Franco evi-
dently decidsti that one way to dis?
courage cop-killing was to put a handful
of cop-killers in front of a firing squad.
The world little notes nor long re-
members the stern rnea..,-mres used be-
hind the Ircm Curtain to "repress"
killers of przblic ? officials. No voices
are raised in. the Linite.d Nations to
demand an accounting of the death
,pain
march ordered by Cambodian Com-
munists. No ambassadorS are with-
drawn to protest the absolute termina?
tion of press freedom in Saigon.
But General Franco is a Fascist, not
a Communist, dictator, and an \aging
?one at that. That's why his stern re-
sponse to the murders of a score of
policemen so far this year, including
three*yesterday, met this international
?
reaction:
*Fifteen ambassadors from Euro-
pean countries, including the entire
ESSAY
Common market, were recalled from
Madrid or kept home.
o Mexican President Luis Echeverria,
with no relations to break off, found
a way to express his rage by cutting
off postai communications with Spain.
o The Vatican, hardly a leftist re-
doubt but conscious of the need to
34
apparently not -yet been
established). This loan offer
reportedly came from the
Russians when a Turkish
delegation was in Moscow
? earlier in the year seeking
a much smaller credit. The
Turks were surprised by
the Russian response but
gratefully accepted.
THE RUSSIAN offer ap-
peared to be a respone to
the U.S. Congress which
had had cut off about $200
million in military and eco-
nomic aid to Turkey for fis-
cal 1975 in February.
ALL THE WHILE the
Soviets have been wooing
the Turks, their stand on
Cyprus has been softening.
Before Podgorny's visit in
1972, the Kremlin's friend-
ship gestures through eco-
nomic aid seemed to be
consistently ruined by a
hard line on Cyprus.
?
It's pro-Makarios stand
invariably angered the
Turks, and Moscow even
called for Turkish troops to
leave the island, though
both Greek and Turkish
troops were stationed there,
along with British forces,
under the tripartite agree-
ment between Turkey,
Greece and Britain.
At the time of Podgorny's
visit Moscow merely called
for a solution of the Cyprus
issue by direct negotiations
between the Turkish and
Greek Cypriots.
establish-a footing with the people
who will come after Franco, expressed
its displeasure after the Spanish Gov-
ernment would not heed the Pope's ?
plea for clemency.
What can we learn from this? And -
what should our own reaction be? ?
The first lesson is that solemn dec-
larations not to interfere in the "inter-
nal affairs" of sovereign nations are
hogwash. Almost every nation feels
free to meddle and to moralize, re-
strained only by threat of military or
economic retaliation.
Lesson number two is that leftist
leaders are much better at meddling
in rightist nations' affairs than vice
versa. Sweden's Prime Minister is now
contributing money to Spanish opposi-
tion groups; he would cry havoc if the
Shah of Iran or somebody were to
help finance anti-Socialist activities in
Sweden.
? Our first reaction should be to rec-
ognize the right of any nation to int-,
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? etoSe a death sentence on Murderers a
police or prison guards. We may dis-
agree on capital punishment but the
? penalty is not beyond the pale of
civilized national behavior.
?ext, we should set aside the temp-
tation to bedeck murderers with the
verbal garland of "guerrilla" or "com-
mando" or even "revolutionary." A
person who kills another human being
in a bank holdup, whether in t,he name
of Basque separatism or Synabionese
. Liberation, is a murderer. (Radicals
change terrorist to "guerrilla" in the
same way liberals soften "involuntary"
to "court-ordered" and conservatives
harden 'involuntary" to "forced.")
Does this mean the Government of
the United States should continue to
say nothing, to hold 'that terrorism in
Spain?and the repression it desires
and has triggered?is "an internal
matter" off-limits to comment, and to
keep our eye on the hall of the mill'
WASHINGTON POST
30 September 1975
?
tary 'basis? ' ? n - ? ??? t??'' ? ? a ?
? Absolutely not. Fianco's transfer of
the terrorists' trials from civil courts
to military courts was wrong, and we
should say so. The principle of sum-
mary execution, without the right of
appeal, is abhorrent to our idea of
justice, and we should make our opin-
ion known. Only when a state provides
an individual with a fair trial can it
claim the right to put the guilty to
death.
Secretary Kissinger would say that's
all-Well and good, but to speak up
would jeopardize delicate negotiations.
Not necessarily so: A statement of our
beliefs, including a unique emphasis
on the tragedy visited on the families
of the dead policemen, could-be fash-
ioned- in a way that would not be
unwelcome in Spain.
An honest and reasonable statement
by the U.S., especially at a delicate
, moment, is important for our own self-
'respect as well as our image abroad.
This is sneered at as moral poatiring
by the power pragmatists on the:
seventh floor a State, but unless they
make some obeisance to international
morality, they will be faced with the
practical problem of a grand agree-
ment and no Congressional approval.
America is against terrorism and
? against mindless overreactions to ter-
rorism. Saying so now requires some
courage, some diplomatic finesse, and
may cost Us a few million dollars on
our air base leases. Standing for some-
thing in the world is worth both the
trouble and the mopey. .?
We could become the only nation
in the world consistent in applying a
measure of moral pressure on dic-
tatorships of -both left and right. If
Mr. Kissinger persists in looking the
other way, he will discover, as the
embattled General Franco has, how
foolish it is to -put all your Basques
, in one exit
Executio ns in Spain
THE WORLD UPROAR over the execution of five
convicted terrorists in Spain is entirely the result of
a characteristic political decision by Generalissimo
Francisco Franco. By responding to agpeals to commute
those death sentences, he could have ridden out the .
European left's storm. But he apparently calculated that
a stern display of executive will was required to stabi-
lize Spain in this the terminal stage of his rule. Thus did
he assure that a far wider spectrum of opinion in Spain,
in Europe and elsewhere would join the outcry and
that the object of protest would spread from the ?xectt-
lions to the whole fact and manner of Spanish fascism.
The five, convicted by military courts under a new law
denying- appeal, had chosen violence as a political meth-
od to provoke state repressions and hasten the disinte-
gration of the old order. General France's harsh over-
reaction plays directly into their hands.
- At 82 General Franco cannot last forever, and at his
death the archaic Spanish political system is bound to
start catching up with the forces that have been helping
modernize the country's economy and its foreign out-
look in recent years. In this sense, the terror which has
been so prominent in Spain-12 police officers have
been killed this year; the prime minister was assassi-?
nated in 1973?is not aimed so much at ending his rule
as establishing a position to participate in the political
changes sure to come. With that in-mind, one can only
express astonishment at some of ,the protests that have
rolled in. Sweden's Prime Minister Olof Palme, for
instance, so fervent in denunciation of American inter-
CHM STIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 September 1975
Difficult negotiations for the renewal of
America's bases deal with General Franco
are now in their eteeenth month. Here is a
backward look at some of the quirks and
crises that have characterized 22 years of
military collaboration between the United
States and authoritarian Spain.
Madrid
In 1959 a member of the House Armed
Forces Committee visiting American military
installations in Europe got a rude jolt when he
came to Spain.
vention in Vietnam-, now proposes his own- intervention;
he intends to donate. $46,000 to Spanish opposition
groups with a view to ending the rule of "satanic mur-
derers." Mexican President Luis Echeverria, who as
interior minister a few years ago commanded the
police accused of killing more than NO unarmed demon-
stratingtstudents, at once cut off postal and communica-
tions ties with Spain and demanded its expulsion from
the United Nations. The moral selectivity of the inter-
national left can be a wondrous thing to behold.
As for the United States, President' Ford yesterday
had his press secretary make a statement evoking all
the compassion for human life and all the feeling for
justice that you would expect from a government that
is currently negotiating a renewal of Jhe American
bases agreement with Madrid. Secretary of State Kis-
singer, well known for believing that a gnat power
cannot afford to bend to public breezes, is due to meet
again with the Spanish foreign minister today to con-
tinue the negotiations. Mr. Kissinger should quickly
get himself a cold. Nothing new or surprising about
the Franco regime has been revealed by its latest harsh
-response to its tormentors. No new factor has arisen,
in our view, to alter the strategic grounds on which the
bases agreement has been made. in due course, the
negotiations should go forward. But it is an affront to
too many Americans, and to too many good Spaniards,
for the United States to be doing business as usual
With Generalissimo Franco at the very moment when
the smell of blood is in the air.
U.S.: the strain in Spain
By Richard Mourrer
to discover that the defense agreements
signed in 1953 prohibit the flying of the Stars
and Stripes over the American-built bases
here manned by 10,500 U.S. airmen and
sailors.
- "I urge you, Mr. President," Congressman
Kowalski cabled Dwight Eisenhower in Wash-
ington, "as Commander-in-Chief of our great
nation, to initiate steps to restore to our
righting men in Spain the right and privilege
Frank Ko A
e214*.twedifettecR4mie z
as was one on other American-manned
- see
But nothing happened, and the prohibition
remains. Never in the 17 years since the bases
became operational has the American flee
been permitted to fly over them, not even
alongside the colors of the host nation as is
done in other countries where the . U.S.
maintains a military establishment. Not even
on Independence Day, wryly dubbed by some
Americans here as."the Furtive Fourth." Nor
was the Stars and Stripes flown at half-mast in
Fr ?ImMZfillitrIleftegiltSbdig2FtedelifV806117e9a) Eisenhower's Passing
Congre=nan
35
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military bases around the world.
Spanish pride and sensitivity about anything
that might seem to infringe on their country's
sovereignty is not the only reason for the
American flag ban. Gibraltar is another. The
strategic Rock on Spain's south coast was
wrested from Spain by the British 271 years
ago and the Union Jack has fluttered over it
ever since. For many Spaniards this is an
affront that makes them extremely touchy
about any foreign military presence on their
soil, with or without their consent. ? ? .
From the start. of the Spanish-American
association the Americans have leaned over
backward to avoid jarring Spanish susceptibi-
lities ? and those of Franco's authoritarian
regime. Strict censorship rule.s were drawn
up by U.S. officials for the American Forces
Radio at Torrejon Air Base. The basic aim was
to avoid broadcasting news items about Spain
that the Spanish authorities had censored out
Of their own broadcasts.
A "sensitivity briefing guide" was compiled
by the U.S. military which said, among other
things:
"References to dictatorship should he
avoided. Be especially wary of comparisons
between dictatorship and freedom." On one
occasion Torrejon radio slipped up and was
reprimanded for having broadcast a thriller
set in a fictitious Spanish-speaking country in
which the word "dictatorship" cropped up,
EIN YORK TINES
1 October 1975
MUCH TORTURili J
"illiES (ATP')
The American military's self-cemaorsh,
led, on occasion, to elaberate contortions to
avoid connecting some event with Spain. In
1967 the former premier of the Congo (new
Zaire) living in exile in Spain was kidnapped
and flown to Algeria, where he passed on in
captivity. Torrejon radio reported: "Tshombe
had been living in exile and the country he had
been living in may consider the kidnapping a
breach of its sovereignty."
Since then the Franco regime's control of.
Spain's information media has eased and the
Americans' self-censorship has followed suit.
But by and large Torrejon continues to steer
well clear of Spanish political news.
The American bases complex in Spain took
two years to negotiate and five years to build.
Total cost: $395.6 million. When the job was
done $30 million ?worth of construction equip-
ment was given to Spain.
Most of the installations have gradually
? been handed over to the Spanish so that today
the American military presence in Spain is
concentrated at Rota and Torrejon. In 1'54
Rota was expanded to serve as a base for U.S.
nuclear submarines. The air base at Moron
was put on caretaker status in 1970. Zaragoza
was also closed down. but later partially
reactivated so that United States Air Force
planes stationed in northern Europe, deprived
of a fair-weather gunnery range in Libya,
could use Spanish facilities as a substitute.
lids, ethnic origin or
Mr. Jones and Mr. Wisser in-
tettviewed 15 torture victims?a
"comparatively high number, in
' L./ View of the prevailing fear of
reprisals in the Basque region,"
said Amnesty International?
and. 30 witnesses to the torture
of others. Additional testimony
ilvas taken from lawyers whose
clients asserted they had been
tortured in jail.
: The investigation was carried
out ?during the. last days of a
three-month "state of excep-
tion"?imposed after the killing
if four policemen by the
Basque separatist organization
.--that suspended certain civil
-rights in the Basque provinces
of "Vizcaya and GuipUzcoa.
. The report did not name any
of those who said they had
been tortured or had witnessed
torture: It declared that every
'victim who gave testimony for
.the Amnesty International re-
port had been subjected to at
least one daily session of in-
terrogation and torture, and
some to as many as five a day.'
Interrogation sessions lasted
,from half an hour to six hours,
according to Amnesty interna-
tional and one victim asserted
that he had been tortured 30
times in 21 (lays of imprison-
ment.
Aged 17 to 72
?
Amnesty international Tells
of 'Findings in Spain
Special to The Nci.is 'Vole Times
, LONDON, Sept. 30?Basque
prisoners have been tortured
"on a massive scale," an Am-
nesty International report said
today.
The report said that a two-
man mission that visited Spain
in July received "personal and
direct evidence" of the torture
of ? 45 Basques and "credible
and, convincing evidence" that
torture was used systematically
against at least 250 detainees.
The 24-page report said that
Basque prisoners were severely
beaten, burned with cigarettes,
nearly drowned, prevented from
sleeping and subjected to psy-
chological stress through mock
executions, sexual threats and
-threats to relatives.
The evidence was compiled
by- Thomas Jones, a lawyer
from Washington, D.C., and
Bu'rkhard V.7iser, a West Gar-
man professor of philoaophy.
AMnesty International is a Lon-
don-based organ iZa don that
cat,npaigns for the aelease of
persons detained because of
their political or religious be-
? The ages of the 45 victims
whose cases were covered by
first-ha nd evidence ranged
from 17 to 72 years, but many
Throughout 22 years of a military partner-
ship Spanish-American relations have gener-
ally been good, but on two occasions things got
rather strained. The first, crisis was in 1965
when a 3-52 armed with four H-born5s crashed.
on the south coast of Spain. The unexploded.'
bombs were recovered, one of them from the
sea. But thereafter Spain banned U.S. planes
armed with nuclear weapons from flying over
Spanish territory.
Another crisis developed during the Mideast
war of 1973. The pro-Arab government of
General Franco announced that the bases in
Spain would not be permitted to be Used "in
any way, directly Or indirectly," in operations
related to the Middle East conflict. But U.S.
Air Force tankers based at Torrejon never-
theless took off and refueled planes bound for
Israel somewhere over the Mediterranean.
The United States has furnished $3.2 billion
in economic and military aid to Spain as the
price for using the bases here. Now General.
Franco is asking for a lot more: $1.5 billion in
? sophisticated military equipment over the
next five years.
The price is high because Franco has been
unable to get from the United States what he
really wants: a full-fledged military alliance,
which would require the approval of the U.S.
Senate.
Mr. Mowrer is the Monitor's special
correspondent in Spain.
were in their 20's.
- The women torture victims,
of' whom there were 11 inter-
Viewed, 'were so sadistically
beaten and humiliated that it.
was not easy for them to come
forward," the report said.
"They :told of sexual.' threats,
Including sterilization, of being
made to walk naked in the
police station."
. Several of the men spoke -of
having a pistol put to their
'heads and the trigger pulled
on a blank cartridge. One matt
broke his leg while trying to
escape and was tortured by
having the broken limb twisted.
? The report said that Spa's.
three -main police forces?the
regular armed police, the para-
military civil guard and the
special security police--collab-
orated.. in the torture of the
Basques. "The torture and oth-
er acts of official intimidation,"
the report said, "were aimed
not only at dismembering the
separatist organization but at
Undermining its support and
at discouraging aspirations to
BaSque autonomy.
? Amnesty International ap-
pealed to the Spanish Govern-
ment, to investigate the report's
findings. It asserted that tor-
ture of political detainees was
not confined to the three
month's of the state of excep-
tion or to the Basque region.
? .
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NEW YORK TIMES .
27 September 1975
Some in Cairo Now Feel
taae. ?
ment that deliveries - of Per-I
ishings could not begin before
the early nineteen - eighties,
K struck Egyptians as Ominous,
issinger Misled 'Them
Irather than reassuring: It was!
!:
seen as a sign that the United
States and Israel both remained
convinced that a state of war
would still exist 10 years from
now.
"Thas makes a mockery of
Kissinger's step - by - step ap-
proach," an Egyptian said. ?
More Spending on Arms
The issue goes to the heart
of the considerations that have
led Egypt to accept Mr. Kissin-
ger's step-by-step diplomacy.
It is taken for granted here
that Egypt, the most powerful
Arab nation, must always
match Israel's. armaments. If
jsrael is slated to receive Per-
shing missiles the Egyptian
Government will try to get
comparable weapons somew
here.
1
As a result, it wilt be impos?i
-sible for President Sadat tol
reduce military expenditures
and shift resources to civilian
reconstruction and rehabilita
tion, Egyptian officials say.
They add that it was precisely
the hope of being able to turn
to civilian tasks that led Pres-
ident Sadat to accept American
mediation and American offers
of economic and technological
assistance.
The feeling here is that the
burden on the United States
to prove its friendship for
Egypt is greater than ever.
Mr. March in a bitter Mood.
recalted the summer of 1956
.when Secretary. of State John
?
? By HENRY TANNER
ea'.1 Speetall to The. New York Times
..c.AIRO, Sept. 26?Some lead-
:ingiEgyptiart officials have be-
gun to express great bitterness
.ciwer the attitudes taken by
thee United States and Israel;
since the conclusion threei
weeks ago of the Sinai disen-
gagement agreement.
Some of these men are said
to feel that Secretary of. State
Kissinger misled the Egyptian
tegbtiators by rmt telling them
'Verhad promised that Washing-
steniwould sympathetically con-
sider supplying the Israel's with
Pershing missiles.
The Pershing,s, with their
rkrite of about 44) miles; would
,piltr the Aawan dam as well
aseCairo within firing distance
of the Israelis. They have be-
cw_e -a pyschologicaI and poli-
tical symbol here.
Assurances Unconvincing
Egyptian officials knew that
large quantities of powerful
and advanced American wea-
pons would st conclusion
of the agreement. But the Per-
shings, in the view of these
NEVI YORK TIMES
2 Oct. 1975
officials, constitute a dramat c
move for . quality of American
.weapons for Israel. American
assurances that they will not
be equipped with nuclear war-
heads are unconvincing here.
Arab critics of President An-
wain el-Sadat of Egypt take
it.a,sa confirmation of their
belief that the United States,
never be "evenhanded'? in
the-Middie East and that Mr.
Sadat's move to associate hini,
self:. with WashingtonWas
wrong-.
-eyed Marei the Speaker
the National Assembly ,and one
of O'iraSadat's closest intimates,
suggested in a conversation the
other day that the only possible
way the United States could
correct ':the damage done to
Egyptian eArnericare ? relations
would be to provide Egypt with
similarly powerful American
weapons as well as with much
greater and more visible finely;
cial and technological assis-
tance than is now contemplat-
ed.
Even the Pentagon's' state-
DISP.111E FLARES
ON MIDEAST LEAKS.
Some U.S. Aides Say Secret
Documents Were Modified
to Trace Disclosure
'I3yLESLIEILGELB
Spedal toTtrNzrs Tock limes
WASHINGTON- Oct. 1?High
Administration eilcials said to-
day that the Stat.le Department,
before giving congress secret
documents about United States
assurances to Israel, had made
stylistic changes to be able
to trace future Leaks to the
press.
The officials saki the do-
cuments; as published by vari-
ous newspapers two weeks ago.
had a nuraherrng system and
a style that ware unique to
.the copies that lad been con-
fidentially orovialed to Congres-
sional committees. Therefore
the leak must lave been on
Capitol Hill, tie'; contended.
The charge was promptly de-.
tiled by Jack Anderson, the
columnist, who first obtained
the documents..
from Capitol Rill," he said in!
a telephone interview. "They
came from the State Depart-
Intent Is In Dispute
Two officials said that, before
the documents were transmit-
ted to Congress, they were r-e
typed to change the numbering
of various sections and to make
stylistic changes. The purpose
was to be able to trace leaks,
they said.
"The documents that Ander-
son obtained could only have
come from the Hill because
that was the only place the
documents existed in that
form," one of the officials said.
When asked about this today,
a high State Department offi-
cial acknowledged that the do-
cuments, as leaked, were
unique to Congress, but be in-
sisted that thealterations were
inadvertent and no effort had
been made to trap Congress.
He said that because of a
clerical error, one sentence had
been omitted from one. do-
cument titled "Mernorandumof
Agreement Between Israel and
the United states." He said
a secretary, in typing the do-
cument, had left out one point-
of agreement and tins, in Wen,
led to the renumbering of the
. "The documents did not cone sections.
'Foster Dulles Withdrew his 'of-
fer of American help in building
the .Amsayan dam, and opened
the way for the Russians to
do so, starting a 15-year period
of Egyptian dependence on
Moscow.
Israeli attitudes since conclu-
sione, of the., agreement have
..alSo., tt ern eS.a. here.
5-'Foreign Minister Ismail Fah-
my, one of the chief negotia-
tors, said in a conversation,
that Egypt had regarded the
agreement as a test of Ameri-
can and Israeli intentions and
that the result had been nega-
tive on bath counts.
I The stationing of American
ltechnicians in Sinai, he said,
!could have become' the begin,
ning -of --a, new. _approach be.
Israel , .and- the' 'Arabs to the"
I issue ? of their mutual security
;because it gave them an alter-
native to an arms race.
Instead, he charged, Israel
has gone ahead with her past
policies as if nc.thina had
, changed. Her shopping list, in-
!eluding the request for Per-
!shines, showed she still had
,an insatiable appetite for arms,
he said. ?
Second, he charged, the -IS:
raeli Government ch .reM, . the
days after the conclusion of
The agreenientto,annourice that
it would build a new kibbutz
Ion Egyptian territory in Sinai
I just south of Gaza.
This, he added? showed that
!Israel had no intention cf relin-
quishing the territory she occu-
pied in 1967 even though both
:sides are ?riedged to regard the
!new agreement as a step to-
ward a full settlement.
Several Papers Altered
lie said the missing point
was subsequently provided to
Congress. But the other Admi-
nistration officials insisted that
changes had been made in more
than one document.
A Senate aide said the do-
- curnents published by Mr. An-
derson could not have been
unique to Congress since the
State Department typed these
documents in the first place
and must have retained copies.
"They could have leaked their
own doctored version," he ad-
ded.
Senator Dick Clark, an Iowa
Democrat on the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, commented:
"If it is true that the do-
cuments were intentionally al-
tered. I can't imagine that it
will do too much to iestore
a coopeative spirit between the
two branches. -
"It will oniy exagerbate the
present situation because it re-
veals distrust."
who denied that the alterations
had been intentional said it
had never been the practice
of Secretary of State Kissinger
to play this kind of game with
Congress.
A former Under Secretary
State, George W. Ball, saia
of State, George W. Balt, said
Democratic administrations
had never coded documents
sent to Congress.
"I can't recall any time we
ever did this and I doubt we
did," he said. "And I had two
presidents who were concerned
about leaks. Our problem was
leaks within the Administra-
tion, not on Capitol Hill."
The documents in question
are the memorandum of agree-
ment ibetween the United States
and Israel, assurances from the
United 6tates Government to
Israel, assurances from the
United 6tates Government to
Faypt, and a memorandum of
agreement between the United
(Oates and Israel on the Geneva
. peace conference.
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NEW YORK .TIMES
26 September 1975
JORDANIANS SEM
B't MISSILE AFFAIR
Ofticials,ComplainAboutU.S.
Treatment in Deal for
Hawk Batteries
. By TERENCE SMITH
Specbi. to The New Yee, Times
AMMAN. Jordan, Sept.. 25 ?
The compromise worked out
last week to break the crisis
? over Jordan's desire to purchase
14 batteries of Hawk antiair-
craft missiles illustrates the
problems that arise from the
United States policy of trying
to influence both sides in the
Arab-Israeli dispute and the
delicacy of Jordan's position
in trying to appean to her Arab
neighbors as more than a client
of the United States.
The 5350-million Jordanian
purchase from the United States.
seemed gayety imperiled last
Thursday when the Jordanian
Government angrily denounced
the restrictions on the deploy-
inent and use of the missiles
imposed by the Ford Adminis-
tration at the demand et pro-
Israel force.s in Congress. A
'formal Amman Government
statement attacked the condi-
tions of the sale' As "unique
and abusive of Jordan's national
- pride."
But just 24 hours later the
State Department announced in
Washington that the "misunder-
standing" had been cleared up
? and the deal would go through.
This ISO-degree switch, the
sources said, came about as the
result of a face-saving formula
under which it was agreed that
the actual purchase contract
would not include the restric-
tions on the use of the missiles
demanded by the pro-Israel ele-
ments but that King Hussein's
Government Would Make simi-
lar pledges separately and
privately: .
Promises Already Made.
The pledges include promises
King Hussein had already made
in a letter to leading Congress-
men in which he explained that
the missiles would be used in
fixed installations to protect the?
capital, array camps in nearby
Zerka and air bases and airports
in the heart of the country. ?
Under the, agreed formula
Jordan will he able to contend
to her citizens and fellow Arab
states that there are no strings:
attached to the sale agreement.
whiie the United States will
'still receive the assurances it
? sought.
This formula was apparently
harnmered out in hurried.
,meeting last Thursday night
between United States Ambas-
sador to Amman, Thomas R.
Pickering, and Jordan's Pre-
mier, Zaid al-Rifi, although the
United States Embassy here de-
clined to confirm this or dis-
cuss the incident. ?
Jordan's threat throughout
the summer - long controversy
over the Hawk sale was that
if the United States refused to
meet her air defense needs, she
would turn to the Soviet Union.
It' now seems clear that the
deal will go through . and that
this will not happen, but re-
liable Jordanian sources said
today that the Government
would probably seek supple-
mentary air-defense systems
from European suppliers.
It Strained Relations
In any event, the "tempest
over the Hawks," as one Jor-
danian official put it today, has
left the Government here smart-'
Mg over what is regarded as
a humiliating and, unnecessary
episode. An element of strain
has been injected into the tra-
ditionally friendly Jordanian-
American relations - and left
King Hussein and his top advis-
ers with deep doubts about the
value of Administration com-
mitments that must run the
gantlet of the pro-Israel forces
in Congress before final ap-
proval can be reached.
"We were stung by this ex-
perience," Jordan's Information
Minister, Salah. Abu Zeid, said
lit an interview in his Amman,
office today.
? "What, after all, do 14 Hawk
'batteries really amount ? to?"
He continued, adding: "They are
the bare minimum we need to
protect our capital and air-
ports. And they are nothing
compared with what yew pro-
vide Israel with in arms every
year." -
From the Jordanian point of
view, it was, deeply insulting
to have an agreement reached.
in principle in late 1974 blocked
as a result of the efforts of the
pro-Israel lobby in Congress.
The Original Request
The Jordanians originally
asked for 24 batteries of Hawks
When they first raised the pos-
sibility of buying them two and
a half years ago, reliable
sources reported here. The
number 14 was reached by a
Defense Department team that
came to Jordan early this year
to study both her requirements
and her ability to absorb the
complicated systems.
When the Administration
proposed this to Congress this
summer, however, it created
an uproar. Numerous Senators
and Representatives protested
on the ground that the sale
would equip Jordan to enter a
future war against 'Israel with
relative security against the
Israeli ? Air Force.
The Jordanians denied that
this was their purpose and
pointed out. that Jordan was
the only country in the region,
Israel included, that lacked a
modern air-defense system.
NEW YORK TIMES
28 September 1975
ARABS WARN U.S.
ON AID TO ISRAEL
Groups at U.N. Says Arms
Will Endanger Mideast
By PAUL HOFMANN
Spedal to The New York Times
UNITED NATIONS, N.Y.,
Sept. 27?The Arab League
; warned the United States today
that moves to supply Israel
with large quantities of ad-
vanced weapons, including mis-
siles, were endangering peace
in the Middle East.
"The Arab states are follow-
ing this situation with grave
concern," said a statement
made public today. "This sup-
ply of further, offensive arms
NEW YORK TIMES
29 September 1975
$adatSays Experts
From U.S. Helped
Israel in '73 War
.! CAIRO, Sept. 28 (UPI)?Pres-
ident Anwar el-Sadat said to-
day that American technicians
had helped Israel in the 1973
War.
He said that he had accepted
-the cease-fire ending the Octo-
ber war with Israel when the
United States sent technicians
a7nd new weapons into battle
against Egypt and the "Soviet
Union was on my back." Mr.
Sadat spoke at a meeting of
parliament and the Arab So-
cialist Union, the country's sole
nolitical party, to observe the
fifth anniversary of the death
of President Game! Abdel Nas-
ser.
When I accepted the cease-
WASHINGTON POST
19 September 1975
India Scores
Criticism
By Ford
? Vs= 'News Dispatches
NEW DELHI, Sept. 18?The
Indian government sharply
criticized President Ford to-
day, saying that he has no
business commenting on In-
dia's internal, affairs or crit-
icizing Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi's takeover of emer-
gency powers.
"It is amazing that the Pres-
ident of the United States has
chosen to comment on the in-
ternal affairs of a friendly
country without due apprecia-
tion of the issues involved," a
Foreign Ministry spokesman
by the United States to Israel
will lead 'to condolidation of
Israel's continued occupation
of Arab territories and her con-
tinued denial of the nationa.
rights of the Palestinian.
people." , ?
The statement added that
the new American weapons
would "encourage Israel
ward a new aggression, as well:
as maintaining her expan7;
sionist policies?'
The warning for Washingtoni
was unanimously adopted at:
day of . foreign ministers and
other officials of the 20 coun-i
tries of the Arab League. The:
group has permanent observere
status at the United Nations.:
Representatives of the Pales-:
tine. Liberation Organization,1
the guerrilia movement thati
ilso has permanent observeri
status at the world oreaniza-i
tion's headquarters, parcipat-i
ed in the session. .1
fire on Oct. 22, 1973?and I'
Want our brothers in the Syrian
Ba'ath party to hear this?I was
facing both the Americans and
the Jews," Mr. Sadat said. ?
'Entered the Battle'
a, "America with its strength
And its new weapons that had
never 'before left the United
States," he said "They brought
the weapons and experts and
entered the battle in the days
of the breakthrough." This was
a reference to the Israeli move
cross the ? Suez Canal.
"Just as America and Israel
were in front of me, the Soviet
-Onion was on my back." the
President said. "The air bridge'
which brought in weapons was;
bringing weapons that should;
have been delivered in..1969."
Mr. Sadat said that the Rus-I
sians had flooded Syria with!
weapons after his. decision to
atespel Soviet advisers ,frorai
Egypt in July, 1972.
said in* a prepared statement
approved by the government..
The rebuke, the strongesti
aimed at the United States
since the emergency was pro-
claimed June 26, was directed
at Mr. Ford's remarks in an in-
terview Sunday ?with three re-
porters.
It marks a sharp shift in
gradually warming U.S.-Indian
relations, with the United
States planning to resume de-
velopment aid to India?cut
off since the 1971 IndiaTaki-;
stan war----and Mrs. Gandhi at- i
tending a small dinner party;
at the U.S.. embassy in New
Delhi.
In his interview, President
Ford said that Mrs. Gandhi's
recent actions represent
very sad development, and I
hope that in time there could -
be a restoration of the demo
-
38
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eratie protesses as we know
them in the United States."
He also indicated that he is
unlikely to visit India this
year, as scheduled. "We have a
very full slate between now
and January he said.
The Indian statement ac-
cused the Pri&ident of over-
stepping diplomatic p?ropriety,
and added that India :Iliad re-
WASHINGTON POST
21 September 1975
Jac k Aildi,Yrson
frained -from. Making. Similar
comments about America.
"There are many aspects of
the internal politics of the
United States on which it is
possible to comment, includ-
ing the situation of civil liber-
ties and the extra-ordinary
powers exercised by the exec-
utive in certain circum-
stances,". the statement said.
tee..
eace Price:
The closer Congress scrutinizes Sec-
retary of State Henry Kissinger's Mid-
dle East. peace pact, the louder the
grumbling growa, particularly over the
price tag and those 200 American
"technician's."
As it turns out, from secret State De-
partment briefings of senior lawmak-
ers, the American taxpayers will be
asked to provide well over $15 billion
in aid to Eept and Israel during the
next five years.
And the -200 U.S. peacekeepers, ac-
cording to intelligence sources, will
likely include "retired" CIA agents, an
invitation to eenti7oversy no matter
how good a job they do in the Sinai
buffer zone.-
Before the agreement can be put
into effect, of anurse, the lawmakers
must approve the stationing of techni-
cians between fate two hostile camps.
And a half dozen committees or more
will get a crack at one phase or an-
other of the firs-year $15- billion aid
package.
But this has nat made Congress. any
more corafortahle with the interim
agreement. Seine of the legislators we
queried in the mist few days were wor-
ried that there is still more "fine
print" or "oral understandings" to
come.
For example, last week we revealed
that President Toed and his wizardly
Secretaey of State., have virtually prom-
ised the lasaelts spanking new F-16
fighters and Pershing missiles. The
missiles can reach targets 460 miles
away and can easily be- equipped with
nuclear warheads.
Other portions of the secret accords
have been priventely- disclosed to a few
chairmen and ranteing members of
cnmmittees in betea the House and Sen-
ate, but younger members have been
kept in the dart both by the adminis-
tration and their own chairmen.
Sonic lawmakers have even stopped
US in the hails el Congress and fumed,
"How eerie you find out about these
thir as before vie do?"
WASHINGTON POST
28 Septemer 1975
e
"But the accepted. "-norms-
and curtesies of internation-
al relations do not permit of-
official comments from out-
side."
All actions taken under the
state of emergency have been
taken within the Indian consth
tution, the statement said,
noting: "Every society takes
measures to protect its stabil-'
In this wavering economy: every mil-
lion in foreign aid counts, and Kis-
singer and his public relations men
have been citing the figure of $2.3 bil-
lion in economic and military aid for
'Israel and 400 million as the outer
limit for Egypt. ?
But at an executive session of the
House International Relations Commit-
tee, members were told that these fig-
ures are bound to rise in coming years.
By putting together these projections,
congressmen quickly came up with a.
five-year figure of welt over $15 Wi-
liam
The priee of one. portion of the. Is-
raeli aid package is bound to soar.
About $400 million of the money prom-
ised to Israel is in compensation' for ?
the oil they will lose next year by sur-
rendering the Abu Rudeis oil fields -
back to Egypt.
Such payments will continue for all
five years. Since the price. of crude is
going nowhere but up, the American
contribution for Israel's lost ellis cer-
tain to follow suit.
In addition; Ford and-Kissinger have
given the Israelis an ironclad, written
guarantee that they will be supplied ?
with oil until at least September 1980.
According to the secret accords, Is-
rael is expected to "make its own inde-
dependent arrangements for oil . . ."
However, if they are unsuccessful for
any reason, the documents state, "the
United States government will
promptly make oil available..?'
In the event of an oil embargo, the
Secret agreements imply, Israel would
be supplied with oil from American
stockpiles. Kissinger further vowed, if
necessary "to help Israel secure the
isecessary means of transnort."
Another aspect of the Sinai pact that
has created some furrowed brows on
- Capitol Hill is the proposal to provide
American technicians.
Those "technicians," top-level intelli-
gence sources confided to my associ-
ate Joe Spear, will have very close ties
1:47;:? artid.1 T t 4.1 gr-tvr t-rr
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- T-7-7 13 -iiii Ai 0
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Vc.../-li -I. tt L.d.i.iLiti,.. n.kLi i'vii-,kli.ii.li I '
blockinn the new Israeli-
i Egyptian accord on Capitol
' Hill.
11,
it.
'-'? m
C, trp1-111-.,:fil . Diploacy often turns on
ot,64.3m0000Qa
ity and ideals, India no less
than the United States."
The emergency began with
the arrest of reajor non-Com-
munist opposition leaders, sus-
pension of most civil liberties
and the imposition of press
censorship, including the ex-
pulsion of several foreign
journalists.
to the Central Intelligence Agency. In-
deed, say our sources, many of them
will probably be regular CIA employ-
ees who will be "retired" shortly be-
fore they report for their desert duty.
The idea of placing American techni-
cains in "early warning" stations was
first suggested by Egyptian President -
Anwar Sadat at a meeting with Presi-
dent Ford in Salzburg, Austria.
Concerned that Congress would see
the technicians as an echo of Vietnam
in the early 1960s, Ford and Kissinger
originally balked at the proposal. Sa-
dat was eventually persuaded to settle
for United Nations personnel.
'Israel, however, adamantly insisted
on an American presence. No Ameri-
cans, no peace agreement, they de-
dared. Kissinger, faced with the awful
prospect of once ?again limping back to
Washington in defeat, went along.
Some key congressmen, however, are
convinced that Kissinger is secretly de-
lighted with the proposal to put Amer-
icans in the Sinai. It forces Congress
to put the stamp of approval on his
peace pact and thus absolves him of
full responsibility if it flops.
In fact, say some of the experts we
have consulted, the American teelmi-
cianseare not needed. Ostensibly, they
will be there to give impartial warning
of menacing maneuvers by either side.
Both the Egyptians and the Israelis,
however, will be provided with sophis-
ticated American electronic equipment
to establish warning stations of their
own.
From their perch atop a 2.500sfoot
prominence known as Umm Hashiba,
the Israeli radars will be able to "see"
-aircraft taking off in Cairo. The Egyp-
tians will have a comparable facility,
enabling them to monitor Israeli's
huge Sinai air force base at Bir Gif-
gafa.
The American presence, therefore,
will be largely symbolic. In more ways
than one, it may prove to be one of the
most costly symbols the American
public has ever purchased.
01975. putted Feature Svuiate.
By Murrey Marder
WasSIrkgSon Post Staff Writer
A bizzarre controversy
I over putting an official
t stamp of authenticity on se-
-ieset documents that have al-
ready been disclosed is
r-4
Fte 10644" diA"
aal
tration critics charge.
U.S. officials concede that
this appears to be a hair-
splitting conflict. In fact,
they maintain, it is pro-
foundly significant in diplo-
matic terms, and unless
soon resolved it can wreck
the agreement laboriously
negotiated by Secretary of
State Henry A. Kissinger
and du to liegkn taking ef-
fite accord,
39 ludicrous lengths, adminis- which, the administration
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hoped to have cleared
through Congress by now, is
still stuck in committees.
Unlike the other secrecy
disputes between Congress
and the administration, the
central documents in this
controversy have been pub-
lished in the press. The ad-
ministration insists, how-
ever, that they must not be
published as official records
by the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee or the
House International Rela-
tions Committee.
To do so, administration
officials maintain, will de-
stroy "diplomatic confiden-
tiality" and "the protection
of the diplomatic process."
in an attempt to compro-
mise, t h e administration
submitted to the committees
a summary- of the secret
documents.
The Senate committee
spurned the summary as to-
tally inadequate. The State,
Department has offered to
give the committees a fuller
anti franker summary. Even
this, critics protest, will
make Congress look foolish,
putting into its public re-
ports lesddhan has appeared
in the press.
Some senators have pro-
posed reprinting in the com-
mittee report the texts of
four documents published in
The New York Times, The
Washington Post, and repu-
bished in ether newspapers,
whether the administration
likes it or not.
Another suggestion in the
Senate committee was to
print the secret texts
"without quotation marks,"
making them appear to be
paraphrases or summaries.
"We didn't leak these doe-
umentsa'? said one State
State Department official.
"They .(the Congress) are
not going to engage .the ad-
ministration in a squeeez
One high-ranking official
said adamantly: "This goes
to the heart of the confiden-
tility of the diplomatic
process ... We do not in-
tend to publicize (the texts)
of confidential agreements
It is one thing for docu-
ments to appear, based on a
leak, in the press and there-
fore continue to be unoffi-
cial. It is something far dif-
ferent for us to sanctier
'these documents as official."
To comound the problem,
administration leaders do
not want to specify officially
exactly what the distinction
is in this case between offi-
cial and unofficial disclo-
sure. That, they say, would
? only. produce the conse-
quences they deem so dam-
aging.
? "It should be obviouse_
what kind of repercussions ?
there would be," said one-
source, especially on the
position of Egyptian Presi-
dent Anwar Sadat, "who has
steadfastly denied that there
are any secret agreements."
? When Egypt and ? Israel
initialed thre?formal, public
text of them few accord on
Sept. 1, Sadat's Arab oppo-
nents charged he had sold
out to Israel and the Unied
States at the expense of
other Arab ? nations, ?
? Press disclosure of secret
American pledges to Israel
has exposed Sadat to more
stinging attacks, especially
over the U.S. promise to
give favorable consideration
to supplyig Israel with 460- ? ;
mile-range Pershing mis-
silos, which could . reach
many Arab caital.s., ?
Any supply of the
Persh-
lags ds years off, and many
U.S. of privately be-
lieve' they never will be
given to Israel, but that has
not prevented a furor over
the disclosure..
Many U.S. officials out-
side the negotiations regard
the promise concerning the ?
Pershings as a major blun-
der. But the real blunder
Kissinger's associates argue, I
was unauthorized disclosure
of the issue at a sensitive I
moment. a
Adminitration officials
have been surprised by the
way the controversy has es-
calated. The immediate is-
sue before Congress, and
the only issue that Congress -
is being asked to act -upon,
they emphasize, is uthoriz-
ing up to 200 American civil-
ians to be stationed at elec-
tronic early-warning stations
between Israeli and Egyp-
tian forces .in the Sinai de-
sert.
"At the beginning," a sen-
ior associate of Kissinger
said acidly, "everybody was
rooting to get the agree-
ment. Now that we got the
two others to agree. We are
in the position of frustrating
it ourselves."
Before Kissinger even
completed the negotiations
at the end of August, how-
ever, demands were raised
for "full disclosure" of all
American commitments stir-
? rounding it.
"Kissinger later said there
was "an unprecedented ef-
fort to. put before the Con-
gress any American under-
taking, to either of the par-
ties."
He also said, on Sept. 9,
that there were consulta-
tions With the Senate and
House committees to make
?sure that "their definition of
what constitutes an under-
taking does not differ from
curs."
"There is, however," said
Kissinger, "an area of diplo-
macy that no country has
ever made public and that
does not involve undertak-
ings, commitments of the
United States." The State
Department, he said, was
letting Congress see
"documents that have never
been made available to con-
gressional committees be-
fore," and will work with
the . committees on "an
agreed method of publica-
tion" that "will be the ful-
lest disclosure of a diplo-
matic record that has ever
been made."
All Kissinger's pledges,
State Department officials
say, have been kept.
Nevertheless, Sen. Frank
Church (D-Idaho) and many
other committee members,
especially in the Senate, in-
sist that the central issue is
still public disclosure of se-
cret commitments. "I think
we've had it to the teeth
with secrets," Church said
last week.
In a letter to .Kissinger
last week, Church protested
that, "Obligations toward
foreign governments are not
properly regarded as state
secrets,"
. Two senators, Floyd K.
Haskell (D-Colo.) and Mark.
?:rient was being withheld
from it. ?
To many members of Con-
. ?
:gress, there was little that
was "voluntary" about this
process at all; -except timing.
? Under 1972 legislation,
stimulated by alarm that the
executive branch was by-
passing treaty requirements
on a wholesale 'basis, and ?
committing the United
States to overseas involve- ?
-meat through executive
agreements;Congress passed
what is known as the Case
Act, named for Sen. Clifford? ?
P. Case (R-N.J.).
? This law requires the -
-President to transmit to
Congress "any international
agreement" ? within 60 days
'after it has entered into
.force, other than a treaty,
which has to be submitted
in advance. However?this
legislation does specify that
the information will be sent.
to the Senate and House for-
eign affairs committees "un-
der an appropriate injunc-
tion of secrecy to he re-
moved only upon due notice '
from the President."
The State -Department's
legal adviser, Monroe Leigh,
in a letter to the House com-
mittee, has acknowledged
that two secret memoranda
between the United States
and Israel (among the four
leaked to the press) do
amount to "international
agreements."
One member of the Sen-
ate committee, Sen. Dick
Clark (D-Iowa) maintains
that beyond being an execu-
tive agreement, one of the
documents virtually amounts
to a treaty of alliance and
should be submitted to the
'Senate in that form. ?
It refers to "the long-
standing U.S. commitment
to the survival and security
of Israel" and calls for con-
sultations On assisting Israel
if there are "particularly
grave threats to Israel's se-
curity or sovereignty by a
world power."
Administration officials
contend that this only re-
peats what has been said by
"five U.S. administrations"
in support of Israel. ?
In that event, critics
counter, why is the adminis-
tration so alarmed about the
disclosure of the document?
Again, U.S. officials con-
tend, it is to avoid formally
acknowledging what they
say are, in many cases, only
"expressions of intent"
which "leave our options
open" as long as they are
kept confidential, without
the public label of official
documents.
0. Hatfield (H-Ore.), yester-
day urged the Senate For-
- eign Relations Committee to -
? keep up the pressure on the
?'administration, delaying ac-
tion on the 200 American ?
" technicians "until the ad-
- ministration discloses all
agreements."
An aggrieved high official
said on Friday, "This is be-
ing put in terms of a secrecy.
issue, which it is not."
? "We agree fully," he said,
that nothing "should be hid-
den from the Congress or
the public that involves
American undertakings." He
e said, "We proceeded in a
most extraordinary process
?we voluntarily submitted
documents on a classified
basis" with "nMmoranda
that are not linked to the
proposals" for assign-
ing American technicians.
"We don't have any inten-
tion," he said, "of submit-
ting these pieces of paper
for approval of the Con-
gress." Instead, he said, they
were only submitted on a
agreement" with 60 days aft-
-confidential basis to assure.
Congress that nothing perti-
40
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LOS ATIGELES TIMES
21 September 1975
Should
BY CHARLES C. DIGGS JR.
Despite the increasing strategic im- ?
portance of the African ccintinent,
this Administration continues to ac-
Cord low priority to .that part of the
world.
U.S. policy, which traditionally has
been the by-product of America's re-
lations with its NATO allies and its
Soviet adversaries, has not kept pace
Rep. Charks Diggs (D-Mich.), a
member of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, chaired subcommittee -
hearings on Africa. He has visited
Africa frequently.
with new international realities..
Three principal developments have
drastically altered the power rela-
tionships of the international commu-
nity:
--The end of empire in Africa and
Asia, resulting in three times as
many developing countries as indus-
trialized European powers:
?The". nuclear stalemate, which
made war between the United States
and the Soviet Union unthinkable,
reversed the direction of the cold
INZ7 and opened up an era of 'detente
which included the rehabilitation of
the Peoples Republic of China;
?The destruction of the post- .
World War II economic order accom-
plished in international monetary af-
fairs by President Nixon's New Eco-
nomic Policy of August, 1971, and
the two subsequent dollar devalua-
tions, as well as the consolidation of
an effective oil producer cartel that ,
coold manipulate the supply and
price of oil.
These events have profound impli-
cations for U.S. policy toward Africa.
In the past, America attenuated its
support for liberation of the African
continent in order to mollify its Eu-
ropean allies whose good graces were
required to bolster Western defense
against the Soviet Union. Detente has
made the continuation of such
unnecessary. During the late '50s
and early '60s, African, Asian and
Latin American countries were
viewed as areas of East-West eompe-
Howeeer, it became apparent
with the Soviet backdown on uni-
? lateral arms supplies to the former
Cm:ego in 1960 and 1961 and Krusha
chev'e retreat during the Cuban mis-
sile crisis in 1963 that the Kremlin
woo; not willing to risk military con-
frontation with the United States
over Havana or Kinshasa.
frica olicy
As it became clear that the Ameri-
cans and Russians had some common
political and economic interests that
transcended ideological differences,
the source of potential world conflict
was transformed from that of East-
West competition to one of North-
South confrontation over internation-
al economic disparities between'. rich
and poor nations. The need for eco-
nomic security and an assured supply
of raw materials is more urgent in
the aftermath of the Vietnam war.
The flagrant waste of American ?re- -
sources in that conflict seriously
weakened the United States' econom-
ic and political position in the world.
Hence, the greatest threat to U.S.
'security today is economic and not
military. The United States will have
to reduce its traditionally Eurocen-
tric bias and seek a direct accommo-
dation with Africa and the. other
developing countries who are the
principal suppliers of our raw materi-
als.
There are several economicreasOns?
why U.S. interests dictate an im- ?
provement in its relations toward .
Africa. Trade bet weerrAfrica ,and the
United States nearly tripled between
1.960 and 1970, and reached $4.3 bil-
lion in 1973. (Total U.S. foreign trade
for 1973 was approximately $140 bil-
lion). The African continent has de-
posits of all of the world's 53 most
important minerals including 96% of?
the world's diamonds, 60% , of the
gold, 42% of the cobalt, 34% of the
bauxite and 17% of the copper.
Moreover, Africa supplies 54% of
U.S. manganese requirements and
the Malagasay Republic -provides
22% of our graphite.
In addition, Africa's energy re-
sources are diverse and plentiful.
Nigeria, the world's sixth largest pro-
ducer of crude oil, is the second lar-
gest supplier of petroleum to the.
United States after Saudi Arabia. Al-
geria, Libya, Sudan, Angola and Ga-
bon have substantial oil resources
and the full extent of Africa's oil and
natural gas reserves is as yet un-
known. Furthermore, Africa holds
23% of free world uranium. There is
a vast, largely untapped potential for
investment in the majority ruled
states of Africa.
In order to improve its relations
with Africa, the United States will
have to demonstrate greater respon-
siveness to African concerns for ra-
pid economic development, end its
support of minority rule in Southern
Rhodesia and South Africa and ac-
cord Africa the consideration and sta-
? tus its position in the global commu-
nity merits.
Paradoxically, while our NATO al-
lies, especially Britain, France and
Portugal, have admoniShed us to go
slow on pressures for ending colonial
?rule in Southern Africa, they have -
made an end run and concluded mu-
tually beneficial economic agree-
ments with African states?such as
the recent Common Market accord
with 46 African, Carribbean and Pa-
cific states signed at Lome, Togo,
early this year. They also have taken
steps to decrease their support of
South Africa. France has announced
a modification of its arms sales to ?
South Africa. Britain has abrogated
the Simonstown agreement wit the
Pretoria government, thereby ending
special ties to a base once considered
vital to the security of the Cape
route. Even Portugal has approved
the independence of its former terri-
tories, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique
.and Angola.. Nevertheless, after Por-
tugal had conceded the inevitability
of independence, the United States
was the only country to veto Guinea-
Bissau's admission to the World.,
Health Organization.
The United States must begin to
reassess its treatment and perception
of African states and their leaders.
Contrary to popular notions about
political instability, about 11 African
states have the same chief of state
today as at the time of independence. ,
For such countries as Tanzania, Se-
negal, Cameroon and the Ivory Coast,
this involves 15 years of continuity.
Few if any Arican countries have'
been as politically unstable as the
Fourth French Republic, Italy or the ,
post-Caetano government in Ports:
gal. Indeed, in those countries that
have experienced civil war such as
Nigeria, Burundi, Sudan, Zaire and
now, Angola, internal strife grew
largely out of hostilities resulting -
from differential treatment of ethnic- ?
groups during the colonial period
and have been exacerbated by overt -
or covert intervention from abroad..
America would do well to recognize
that political instability in Africa re-
sults primarily from competition over
scarce resources and not an endemic
inability of African leaders to rule.
African states recently demonstrat-
ed that they share common interests
with the United States when they ef-
fectively blocked an Arab-led move
to obtain the Organization of African
Unity's support for the expulsion of.
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Israel from the United Nations. ?
On the -ele of the seventh United.
Nations special session and the 30th
' session of IM?.1.1.N. General Assemb-
? ly, the President and the secretary of
? .? state have an opportunity to begin
mending fames in Africa. ,
Specifically the United States.
should:
- ?Take concrete steps to stabilize
earnings at reamnable levels for
African and other developing coun-
try's raw triderials.
. ?Provide more foreign assistance
on better terms to African states.
Africa contzens 16 of the 25 least
developed alid 21 of the 33 countries
most i_zeriously affected by the quad-
? rupling of le prizes. Nevertheless,
this year the .A.dnainistration has re-
WASHINGTON POST
27 September 1975
quested only $256.4 million in eco-
nomic aid to Africa in contrast to the
$488.4 million allocated in 1972.
---Take the lead in creating an in-
ternational consortium to finance a
long-range comprehensive develop-
ment program for the Salielian coun-
tries and for the other African states
seriously affected by the drought.'
?Make a substantial contribution
to food production in Africa and oth-
er developing countries and maintain
contributions to a world food re-
serves program.
?Work for the repeal of the Byrd
Amendment which allows the United
States to buy Rhodesian chrome.
If the United Statcannot support
majority rule in Southern Africa, it
should stop supporting minority rule.
I
Toward a oenstave ana
It has been publicly admitted ?by
Secretary. of State Kissinger that the
U.S. does nothave a coherent African
policy. But it is rants hyperbole to con-
elude, as . did Michael R. - Codel- in
The Washington Post on September 9,
that as long as, the State Department --
remains preoccupied with Middle East-
ern Affairs, decisions on our African
policy 'will aintinute? to come out of
Mnshasa and .Kampaila, and not out of
Washington."
Mr. Codel obviously holds -no brief
'for the policies of Presidents Mobutu
Of Zaire and Idi Amin of Uganda," but.
there is- no evidence that these two
men, have been able to influence-our
non-policies. in Africa. For. :many
months now there has -been 'no U.S.
Ambassador in Kampala. One may
ject to President Amin's actions and
pronouncements, but the question- is
whether the Witdidra.wal of U.S. repre-
?sentation from Kampala is the ? wise
Way to deal with !aim. Has:the -State
?Department nat. yet learned that its
most successfiii ambassadors in Afriea.
have been men who knew how toeoma
bine the role at ambassador with that
of instructor in international_ affairs?
For many an African chief of state, the
activities in Washington' are viewed as
bizarre-at is African behavior to many
Americans. The skillful -U.S. ambassa-
dor insakfrica -ms.Ust. function as inter-
preter to both-lxii -countrymen and to.
the people to whom be iS--accredited.
Failure to do se spellt?titsaster.'.;:- ?
s Many-U.S. diplomats now; admit that
the Davis- appaintractit as Asaistants
Secretary of SWO:lor African Affairs .
was a mistake. Although allegedlyt
good diplomat. lack e African expert-,'
ence is--a serious handicap for anyone
.responsible for our Africa policy. Any
Foreign Service.htficer who goes tra.Af-
rica quickly teallies that the .*hole
history of We,tern activities in Afrir.a
Influences hisiber work 'in not so-sub'
C
?
Relaxation of the arms embargo
against South Africa and encourage-
ment of trade and investment there
and in Namibia should cease. U.S.
private investment in Nigeria now ri-
vals that in South Africa and U.S.
policy should reflect this reality.
The United States is the last major
Western country to seek an improve-
ment in its 'economic and political re-
lations with Africa.
This country should use the ingen-
uity it has demonstrated in its China
and Middle East policy to capitalize.
on the reservoir of African good will
toward America. We must reassess
African policy in light of the new in-
ternational reality of global interde-
pendence and the end of bipolarity.
. POli6y
_
the. Secretary.shimselfs:
. been more' sensitive to' African ?pin;
ions and- attitudes,: he would haVe rec-
ognized the liabilities ? facing ':a.nyone:
even remotely associated with out *Chi-
:
leap policy.:Multiplybi 20:our current
concern over the power of the CIA.and
one Will understand. the. fear aroused
by this agency in the.Third World.:
Your guest columnist laments What
he considers to be ,'the disproportion-
ate' influence of' the Black Congres-:.
sional Caucus" given "our_policy vac-
uum." Itis, however,' a fact that this
group, Which is petentiallY a.useful in-
strument for helping America develop
a coherent African policy, is only now.
being recognized by the administra-
tion. Dr. Kissinger must certainly be
sgiven a "C" for effort in being the first
Secretary of State to give an audience
to: this body.. Had the Black Caucus:-
? been as influential as Other non-'
elected interest groups monitoring
U.S. ,foreign policy, they, and not the
African leaders, would have automati-
.cally :challenged the Davis: appoint-
ment:las detrimental to our relations
? with Africa. However, once the. Aid-
- cans .had 'challenged Davis' n.onsina- 7
tion, the Secretary had to. support him.-
? No, strong state cart 'tolerate other
states publicly criticizing whom it se-
, lects-to conduct its policies.'; ?,
The -Secretary. will eventually -Jewett',
that the- time-is not Yet -ripe when" the.
U.S.' can elaborate a common policy to--
:wards all mankind, Ambassador Carter, ,
. should therefore 'not be pilloried for; .
meshing, a worldwide policy--- against:.
?
the reality of-Africa. The mark of a ?
brilliant .diplomat is to protect, the
lives of-hiS fellow citizens. It is a mark:
of failure if he sacrifices them, to. poll.-
cies, which; in the:nature..Ofathings, are
*fated to change.-
Those of us,- who :have?avatched
evolution of Dr. Kissinger's attitude
? ' wards. Africa ? since the, beginning . Of-
, the .--Nixon administration have- been:
--appalled by, its arrogance and naivete .
"s masquerading; as-. "toughness" ? arid.?
-. "realism?' .Nixthi's Nigerian CivilsWar
? -pOitcy was.:a disaster, our. Portuguese
?. policy unrealistic, ? our Sahelian
drought policy miserly, and our South;
,Afilcart policy shortsighted..Equally la
inentable has been the- callous atti?
tudes of the State Department and the, .
White House towards black. Foreign:"
Service officers. These all too few per-'1.
sons have been so unnecessarily
iated that one Wenders whether there,
is.- as caltulated . attempt, to. challengtir::
both their devotion to',- their careers,'
and their country. Coming. as a sequel,:
to .Ambassador Carter's mistreatment -
, is the news that another., brilliant offi:
cer,- Di: Samtiel Adams, Director .of.:
sas USALD's African Bureau; - is being
relieved:of hiS' Position just when his
approaCh is beginning, to bear- fruits_
One hopes that President Ford will
. soon ask his Secretary of *State to -des s
velar a sensitive and worthwhile
? can policy.
It is unfortunate that Davis is-now:?a
. victim of ?America's _hesitation to :des
velop a viable policy towards Africa.' It
is also. unfortunate that Ambassador
Hinton did not have the experience to
s surmount the difficulties that. he faced
In Zaire. But is it true that. Ambassa-
- a dor 111.. Aav6rly'Carter was a victim n of
' II?obUtu's -pique at; the puolicity given
tne Popular ,Ilevolutionary -Party? Or
dict he-7as a skillful- diplomat who suc-
:tes-sfully facilitated the. release of the
?ic?otiPrtmatologists, run. afoul -of Kis-
- isInger's rigid policy toward hostages?
, sa? P.
Franz Boas Professor of Anthrorasletv...?
eblumbia Un'v,rslcv? ?
Chs,Irman.er the 13oard nf the African- .?
American Scholars Council.-
. ruow at the Center for Advanced Study ?.;
in the Behavorial SciencAs, 1915-76:.*
Former U.S. Ambassador to Uover Volt.a.?
Stanford, Calif.
1,t2
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003800079
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
16 September 1975
r IAN WARD on-the Corninnn4st, inngle-of-South.East-Ashr-
CfOUTH-EAST Asia's militant , o1 e
13 Communist movements have 1? ill Thailand, be tne
had their shortcomings, btit
failing to signal their ultimate
objectives has neve'r been one. -
t ?
In th
South Vietnam e V ifa
Viet Cong X min() to fall
? -
?? ?
all along wanted victory through
armed struggle. Broadcasts, docu-
ments, speeches and other propa-
ganda stated the fact ad nauseant /
; for almost two decades,
-Likewise in Cambodia the
Khmer Rouge, long before the
Government of Prince Norodom
Sihanouk was. toppled, exhorted its
'followers to pursue the glorious
revolutionary war to its logical
conclusion. A similar pattern was
always evident among Pathet Lao
in the landlocked kingdom of Laos.
That Washington seriously
thought she might deflect the
Communist tide by agreeing to the
1972 coalition Government in Laos
followed by the January 1973
Paris. Peace document for South
Vietnam is testament. to the in- ?.
credible naivety of liberal Ameri-
cans who ultimately decided their
country's policy on Indo-China.
The two-Fact coalition in Vien- ?
tiane plus the stated objective of ?
a - government of national recon-
ciliation for South Vietnam
merely provided the Communists .
with text-book conditions for vic-
tories. throughout Indo-China.
Yet despite the events of the
past six months there still persists
a wealth of world-wide public
opinion?particularly in the United
States and Europe?ready to be-
lieve that the Communists drive, -
having wrapped up Indo-China and
SOfilehrne content with the 'results,
will now subside.
Following in the footsteps of
their successful neighbouring com-
rades the Communist party of .
Thailand awl the Communist party
of Malaya have very different
views. In clandestine broadcasts
both movements have gone to great
lengths to underline the import-
ance- of armed struggle ? and the
need to gain power through it. ?
in 'Thailiend., now sharing fron-
tiers with Communist nations to
the north and east, and considered.
by some-observers to be the next-
in-line domino, the political mood
is of extreme apprehension.
-Local political leaders, seeking
to defuse public alarm over the
possibility of the country's fall to
Communism. emphasise the stabil--
ising factor of the kingdom's:
unquestionakty respected mon- '
? archy. They also seek solace 'in the'
. fact that Thai history demonstrates
-- a nation with an uncanny 'ability ,
to accommodate others.
r But still the rapid fence-Mend- -
! fng ? with Peking following the fall
of Indo-China hod all the overtones
of a panic move. Aceempanying
this came an almillitimenteldicblipppkei
that :MST's establishment of diplo- ?
matic ties with the Chinese, by
counter-balancing Russian influ-,
ence in Hanoi, would somehow allay-
the disruptive forces suddenly tear-
log at the nation's vitals. .
The realists have set about stif-
fening and expanding harder
patrols? troops' along the Cam-
bodian frontier and fast river craft
along the meandering Mekong to
the north and north-east. Security
officials n-aw recognised that border ?
patrol police, must be better armed.?
Aiilitary commanders have step- ?
ped up their anti-insurgency war-
fare with notable successes in
certain areas. But overall, obser-
vers are concerned by the incon- .
sistant co-ordination, motivation
and morale of the Thai Army.
Last month's bombing of the
national memorial in . Kuala
Lumpur together with the grenade ?
attack on the capital's police
barracks eight days later came
after the Communists promised to
increase urban guerrilla warfare?
throughout Malaysia.
As with the assassination .of the
nation's police chief last year and .
the gunning down since of several
Special Branch detectives the cul-?
tatty activity 'w.thin the two terri?-?,..
tories in the months ahead.
? The. first of these is that Hanoi,
? so involved with setting her house
.Jo order, will not have time for ,.
? further adventures , among her
neighbours. Taken a: step further,
this envisages a breathing-space Of
from five to 10 years during which.
time Hanoi and her satellites can ,
be wooed into peaceful regional co;
operation. ? ? ?
The second is that the- Sino-
'Soviet split will so divide and corn-
...plicate the Communist world as to -
make effective support of regional
wars of " national liberation ? vir- ?
? tually impossible. Finally, it is .
claimed that as both Thailand and
Malaysia have demonstrated an
_ adequate capability of containing .
Communist activities to this paint
'there is every reason to -believe
they will continue to do so.
* The. ? ability of Thailand and
Malaysia to cope with the expected ?
increase in .Communist terrorism,
say anti-insurgency experts, can
einly_be assessed in the light of two
? varying but dominating factors. -
? These are: the degree of politi-
.
pnts of these .latest Communist
incidents remain at large.
Malaysian officials, highly sensi-
tive on matters involving internal
security, claim that foreign obser-
vers place too much emphasis on
the nation's military and police
shortcomings and not enough on
the Government's economic efforts
for the benefit of the population
at large. But the fact remains that
one %vett directed psychological
action by the Communists can
negate months of well planned
economic administration.
It is in this context that valid
criticism is being levelled at the
effectiveness of Malaysia's Special
Branch, which has suffered badly
over 'recent years.
Contrasting .with their ? " all-is-
well " facade, Kuala Lumpur
leaders recently announced the
formation of a country-wide
vigilante organisation to guard
against crime and Communist sub-
version.
The Communist party of Thai-
land is divided into three -largely
?
Rejected theories autonomous military regions locat-
ed in the north, north-east and
Anti-insurgency experts in both southern sectors of the kingdom.
Thailand and Malaysia overwhelm- Top of the Communist Thailand
ingly -reject the three most popular hierarchy is thought to be art ethnic
theories?ife md against the. l'k "
Thai named Charoen "?tintigam,
eta-4 26049DBYtY8 --OlistilkftIlb7,74100432E1011/440arla03a9C47-9ecre t a mot: en.
cal stability achieved respectively
by Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur:
and the speed at which Hanoi ?
of the region's two primary revo-
lutionary sources ? is prepared
to push the action. The. two influ-
ences will naturally be inter-related
and should not be undermined by
the fact that Peking, the other
centre for revolutionary inspira-
tion, will probably emerge ideologi-
cally at variance with Hanoi.
Some political circles have spec-
ulated that as Hanoi has so far
failed to expand her involvement
among the Thai Communists since
her Indo-China victories, then per-
haps her attentions are focused
elsewhere. Against this the experts
contend that they would not have
expected the North Vietnamese to
gear up for a fully active role
within this time-frame.
Latest Western intelligence
appreciations of both Thai and
Malaysian Communist movements
show esse,ntially unspectacular; but
nonetheless broadening iniraatruc- -
tures over the past decade.
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eraL 'Mire is no Permanent central
- co-ordinating committed as such;
but on occasions that the leaders
do meet the venue is usually some-
where in southern Laos:
Current estimates place full-time
insurgents in Thailand's northern
, sector, comprising mainly Men
soldiers led by Sino-Thais, at
'around 3,650. In the north-east
, where ethnic Lai-Thias plus an
- assortment of tribesmen are led by
Sino-Thais the statistics show some
3,650 insurgents. In the south. ap-
proximate/y 1,300 ethnic Thai
guerrillas, with a smattering of
WASHINGTON POST
30 September 1975
Moslems,' are ?iiT1ed by Sind- 1:
Thais. ? ? .
On the other hand the Commun,
ist party of Malaya,' which split
into three rival factions in 1970,
concentrate its primary military .
effort in the northern regions along
the Thai-Malaysia border. The
three factions comprise the ald
Communist party of Malaya, still
led by Chin Peng, the CommuniSt
party a Malaya (Marxist-Leninist)
and the Cominunist party of
Malaya (CPM revolutionary
Malaysian intelligence - statistiqs.
eaths hi. Cambodia
Laid to U,S Policy
By Dan Morgan
Wtslthlgton Yost Stafi Write:
At least 15,(E0 Cambodians
died of starvation or malnutri-
tion-related diseases in terri-
tory .held by the United
States-backed government in
Phnom Penh in the last four
months of war, according to a
private study released yester-
day.
It attributed the deaths to
an American policy that fa-
vored effOots to sustain the
Phnom Penh government mili-
tarily over food relief for refu-
gees who poured into the be-
leaguered capital before it fell
to Communist attackers April
37.
The 67-page study issued by
the Indochina Resource Cen-
ter, a nonprofit oroomization
that often has criticized ad-
ministration poikies in South-
east Asia, also challenged offi-
WASHINGTON STAR
28 September 1975
dal assertions that the mass
evacuation of the capital or-
dered by the Communist vie-
tors. was. an "atrocity" with a !
potential for causing wide
spread famine.
"A study of the available
ev-
Idence shows that the evacua-
tion was ordered in responsel
to certain urgent and funda-
mental needs cf the Cambo-
dian population and that it
was carried out only after
careful planning for provision
of food, water, rest and medi-
cal care, it said.
American rice shipments to
the capital in the final days of
the war fell far short of re-
quirements, and food was di-
verted from the neediest, it as-
sorted. .
State Department officials,'
who said they would have to
? show combined guerrilla strengths
of the three operations ? to be
2,047 which breaks down on
national grounds . to -give 875.
Malaysians, 1,170. Thais and two
Japanese. .
Despite official claims of success-
ful joint border operations between
the. Thais and Malaysians the fact
remains that border co-operation
so far as effective anti-insurgency
measures are concerned; is lamen-
table. And while this state of affairs
exists Thai and Malaysian units
will continue to be beaten bv the
terrorists at every, encounter. ?
study the document before
comment on details, took issue.
with most of its main conclu-
sions.
While conceding that rice
played a major role in the?out-
. come of the war, they placed
much of the blame for the
starvation And misery ort the
:Communists, who blocked rice
ishipments to the capital in
the final stages.
; The report's authors. Gareth
i Porter and G. Q. Hildebrand,
: said they relied on data sup-
lied by private relief agen-
cies and clinics for their 'esti-
mates of starvation in the.cap-
.
ital.
Dr. Gay Alexander. medical
director for Catholic Relief
Services in 1974 and 1975, de,
dared shortly before the col-
lapse that "hundreds are dy-
ing of malnutrition every
day." At the Catholic Relief
Services children's clinic. 20 to
25 per cent of the children ad-
mitted died there because
;their conditions already were ,
so poor, the report. says.
"13ut these deaths were only !
ithe smallest tip of the iceberg I
r ? 4, 0 ?
NissnigerS 6.atrocity of _major proportion? s,
dci.) "Er 7etrAdtt
te--3
otake
121. 11
h -
?It,
44. *IL 4.-NI
r1
111.C, tk.....kai
By Robert W. Edgar
It has been months since the last Ameri-
cans left Cambodia. Soon after the cold
? lapse of the Lon Nol regime, the American
public began to receive reports that the
new Khmer Rouge government was exact-
ing severe retribution upon the civilian
population through the forced evacuation
of urban areas.
Based on my analysis of conversations
with persons who have had experience
with Cambodia, press reports and data
provided by the State Department, it is my
opinion that the evidence readily supports
an alternate analysis. That evidence would
seem to indicate that, rather than being a
vindictive or rigidly ideological program
of retribution, the forced evacuation of
iof death by starvation and as-
sociated illness." it adds.
State Department officials
said yesterday that in per cent
of the canital's requirements I
were met by an American rice;
airlift in the final weeks, and
the rest was covered by rice I
brought in from the govern-
ment-held rice-producing prov-i
ince of Battambang. ,
The officals said malnutri-
tion had increased and resis-
tance to disease had lowered
in the final months but the ;
number of deaths couldn't be
determined.
. I
In August, the State Depart-
ment reported there was a ?
!'growing shortage of food in
Cambodia," whose main new
rice crop will not be harvested.
before November.
The report, called "The Pol-
itics of Food: Starvation and
'Agricultural Revolution in
1Cambodia," asserts the State
Department ignored evidence
of an "agricultural revolution"
in the countryside that has
made possible some planting
of a second, irrigated rice
,crop during the dry season.
Phnom Penh can be seen as a march away
from starvation, away from urban epidem-
ic and away from death in an overbur-
dened city.
1 make no claims to having all the rele-
vant rtirrnation, though I do believe that
I sought and received information from a
wide and responsible selection of sources.
Nor do I speak in defense of the Khmer
Rouge regime. I am merely saying that the
evidence I have studied supports a differ-
ent view of events in Cambodia than the
one widely reported to the American pub-
lic.
? Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in a
news conference on May 12, said that
Cambodia was carrying out "an atrocity of
tth
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major proportions:" Sm.-41 after that,
columnist Jack Anderson ran a story
-decrying the Cambiadian "atrocity,''
characterizing the evatsuatien of the urban
population as a "death march." He quoted
from a "White House docurnent" which
predicted hundreds of thousands would die
from hunger, disease,, and erahaustion as a
result of the Khmer Rouge azaion.
t Assistant Secretary of state Philip
Habib held a briefing for rneenbers of Con-
? gress in June during with Lee alleged that
? there was a bloodbath in progress- in
'Cambodia. Habib said the famed evactia-
,tion was ?likely to result in death for up to a
million people. In a folliziwup telephone in-
quiry which my office made., an official at
the State Department added that broad-
? casts of Radio Phnom Penh indicated that
the evacuation was apolitical measure de-
signed to purge corrupt7estern influ-
ences.
The assumptions umferlying this "death
march" analysis are two-fold: that the
urban population would starve to death if
cast into the. countryside, and that they
would survive if allowed to remain in the
cities. The evidence l have seen does not
support either assamptinn.
In the final months of the war, Phnom
Penh was a besieged, blockaded city. Sup-
plied with food and fuel through a despera-
tion airlift, the capital was totally depend-
ent upon American aid. For the final years
of the war, enalnutritien was widespread,
and in the last weeks sitar:ration settled
over the city. Although enough rice was
being flown in by the United States to have
fed the entire population, much of the food
was earmarked for the Lon Nol military
machine..
Water, power, sanitation, and food sup-
plies were disastrously overburdened by
the refugee influx from the countryside. -
The Departthent of State 'timates that
the population of Phnern Penh grew from
600,000 in InS9 to 2,000,660 by 1975, an in-
crease of 333 per cent in Firge more than
five years.
. Rep. Robert W. Edgar, a first-term
Democrat, represents a cliS tect just out-
side Philadelphia.
The spreading starvation among this
population was described in a study by the
State Department's Inspector General of
Foreign Assistance in February, which
documented an alarming drcp in the aver-
age body weight for a sample group of two-
year-olds. The statistics, aceparding to the
report. "confirm the =Weisel medical im-
pression given us be- these involved in
Cambodian health and nutrition that chil-
dren are starving to death."
The situation in Phzeam Penh just prior
to the fall, when the United States life-line
was still open, was cnearly desperate.
French dotenars. at Calinette aespitall warn-
NEW YORK TILTe.,S
19 September 1975
P11,01 FOR SM13,1
!.CALLED RED AGETI,
Bombed-I-idea Palace in Last
Days?Trained in U.S.
ed of a rising incidence of cholera and the
threat of plague, there was a shortage of
safe drinking water, garbage collection
had ceased, and sanitation services had
broken down. -
What then could be expected to happen
to the city once the massive airlift ceased?
In response to my written inquiry, the
State Department stated that "there is no
question that there would have been urban-
starvation without the U.S. airlift and U.S.
airdrops to isolated enclaves."
If the situation in Phnom Penh just prior
to the fall was desperate, the situation just
after the fall was clearly more desperate.
Reportedly, the main water purification
plant had been seriously damaged on the
last day of the war. Power facilities were
largely inoperative. The Khmer Rouge had
practically no fuel for vehicles. One can
discard the notion that Phnom Penh was in
any way capable of sustaining a large
population when the Khmer Rouge took
control.
These facts alone provide a compelling
alternative to the prevailing analysis:
Under the circumstances, it seems evacua-
tion was the only thing they could do. .
The .other side of the question involved
the manner in which the Khmer Rouge
carried out the evacuation. One of the
more persistent allegations is that the
Khmer Rouge forced the evacuation of the
sick and wounded from hospitals. There
are some indications that patients from
these hospitals were evacuated from the
city to Khmer Rouge clinics in the country-
side. Other reports indicate that it was
Khmer Rouge policy to replace foreign
doctors with Khmer personnel and to clear
out the wards only temporarily to clean
them and then put them back into opera-
tion.
I do not know for sure what happened to
the hospitals after the Khmer Rouge took
Phnom Perth, but one can get a sense of
what these hospitals were like before the
war's end from this eyewitness account
from two Newsweek reporters:
. "In the Khmer Sovietique hospital, more
than 1,300 patients struggled for survival
last week. Doctors, nurses, medical corps-
men, drugs and plasma -were scarce;
-malaria, tuberculosis and dysentery were
rampant."
In February 1975, the Inspector General
of Foreign Assistance reported:
"The facilities were not only overcrowd-
ed, for the most part they were crude and
unsanitary. . . Death frequently resulted
from infection arid lack of proper care,
medication was not being administered to
patients suffering severed limbs or gross
traumatic abdominal wounds . .
These, then, were the hospitals which
the Khmer Rouge have been condemned
South Vietnamese Air Force
pilot who unexpectedly bombed
the presidential palace in Sai-
gon last April was the son of
a Vietcong official and had
been a secret Communist agent
for years, according to a Com-
munist newspaper that has be-
come available here.
At the time it was widely
v.-"ZWIRSro difiRfegefe0g? p01Y00Y0
stet rrestuent guyen
Thieu because his wife and
HONG KONG, Sept. 18--The
for evacuating.
The evacuation was not as aimless
panic. Most press reports indicate that the
population was directed to specific areas
for resettlement. As stated earlier, many
of the "urban population" were in fact ?
refugees from rural areas who had vil-
lages and fields to return to. The remain-
der, apparently, are being used in the cut- /
tivation of the next rice crop.
The State Department said that "there
were very few instances reported of
Khmer Rouge authorities providing food
for the evacuees." However, a Time maga- -
eine report stated that refugees interview-
ed had been provided a ration of one tin of
rice per day by the Khmer Rouge on the
evacuation route.
Although the State Department denies
any knowledge of food surpluses being
accumulated by the Khmer Route in an-
ticipation of evacuation, William Goodfel-
low, an associate with the Institute for
International Policy who left Cambodia ir
April, believes there was a sizable surplus -
in the rural areas. In a New York Times
article in July, Goodfellow says that: -
"Since Congress forced a halt to the U.S.
bombing, farmers in the "liberated" areas
have had almost two years to rebuild irri-
gation canals and dikes which enabled
them to harvest a large dry season rice
crop this spring . . . Starvation was al-
ready a reality in the urban centers, while
in the countryside there was a sizable food
surplus."
Despite my request to the State Depart-
ment for transcripts of any refugee inter-
views which tended to support the original
State Department analysis of massive
starvation as a result of the evacuatt
the urban areas, no transcripts were pre-
tided.
Perhaps most significant is the fact that
when pressed for an "on-the-record"
projection of the loss of life likely to occur.
the State Department offered a drastically
scaled-down estimate: "While these are of
course many unknown variables such as
the availability of vegetables and other
secondary food sources, on the basis cf
current information we believe that ma:is--
thousands face the threat of starvation."
"Many thousands" facing a "threat" of
starvation represents a significant chanee
from the hundreds of thousands who sue-
posedly would in fact die.
Because little information has leaked
out of Cambodia since May, it is impossi-
ble to provide a definitive analysis of the
internal situation. Whatever toll the marca
itself may have imposed is not clear. But
clearly the evidence available to me sup-
ports the analysis that the evacuation of
the urban areas was a march away from
starvation. ..
baby were left behind when Da Vietnam?The Struggle, givesi
Nang was abandoned to' ad- a rare glimpse into the work-
ings of the Vietcong's secret
apparatus.
. 'Lot of Comedy to Act'
According to the paper, whichl
is described as the central or-1
gan of the' South Vietnamesel
National Liberation Front. the
pilot had had, "a lot of comedy
pap,",,caeRiallv durina twoi
re! IFYvnagP9Alkk?114VIMAt the Uniterit
1 -
the Communist paper, South! States for training.
vancing Communist troops
without a fight.
President Thicu escaped un-
harmed in the attack involving
an American-made F-5E jet
fighter, but the incident added
to the sense of panic in Saigon
that eventually helped destroy
45
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_ Several months before' the
actual raid, the article said, he
had received secret orders "to
take advantage of any oppor-
tunity to bomb Thieu's Inde-
pendence Palace and then fly
to the liberated zone." Several
times after he informed his
contact that he would carry
out the attack, his unit was
moved too far from the Saigon
area.
The pilots name was Dinh
Thanh Trung, the article said,
NEW YORE TINTS
25 September 1975
KOREAN VIETNAM. .
IS HELD POSSIBLE
Seoul's Policies. Invite It.
Oppositien Leader Says
^ :
By DAVID- BINDER
Special toThe Nvrt TIrnes
WASHINGTON, Sept. 24
The South Korean opposition
leader, Kim Dee Jung, believes
his .Country wtil stiffer "the fate
a another Vietnam" unless the
present Semi Government is
eharig,ed, he wrote in a docu-
ment released here today.
Mr. Kim, eiho faces senteric-
hag in South Korea Friday on
chaeges, made this ob-
servation in a memorandum pn
the. security situation in East
Asia. that he gave to Repre-
sentative Stephen J. Solarz,
Dernocra-t of New Yerk, in Seoul
last month.
"'don't bdieve that our pres-
ent.situation is the same as the
Vietnamese situation," he
wrote. "But if we don't change
the suppreasive and corrupted
rule early, we can't avoid the
fate of another Vietnam." ?
Outlining is Vietriam-Korea
analogy, Mr. Kim wrote:
"1 believe most people in this
country are ecomirig skeptical
about figh-Lieg against Com-
munism under the present dic-
tatorial rule, disappointed with
the big gaptitetween the haves
and the haveenots and angry
with the ,e'.'etent of corruption
and ? the heearious- life of the.
privileged cless. 'Their loyalties;
to the natica are eroding day.
by day."
'1 don't see that there is an
iminent threzt of an all-out
attack from the North at pres-
ent," Mr. Kin' sugested that,
Kim Il Sung, the North Koerani
leade.r, ?"will take a leson from;
Indochina and riot repeat hs
failure in the Korean war, that:.
of all-out attack." 1-le con-1,
'He will try to organize guer-
rillas to infilttate ainong a peo-
ple dissestisfied with suppres-
Sinn, poverty and corruption in
the South.
"He will urge :that guerrilla
activities in the South are,1
staged with ts the South with!,
no obvious connection with thel
North. This is the precedent!
of North Vietnam when it cam- i
?triunieed South Vietnam."
As for the prospects of dia.,
and after his father, a district
party secretary, was killed in.
1963 in a Government attack
in the Mekong Delta, he adopt-
ed the alias of Nguyen Thanh
Trung. The alteration was made
by "a close comrade" of his
father's who also arranged to
doctor their life stories.
Examined For A Year
Six years after the death of
Mr. Trung's father, the article
related, a Communist agent,
identified only as "graying
Comrade K," told him to enlist
in the South Vietnamese Air
Force. At the time he was a
science student at Saigon Uni-
versity.
Mr. Trung's background and
qualifications were examined
for a year, the article said, and
after that he was accepted
. The article reported that on
the mroning of the attack Mr.
Thing was not scheduled to
fly but volunteered at the last
minute to fill in for another
pilot who usually came to
work late because his home
was -in Saigon and the squad-
Tuesdoy, September 23, 1975 The Washington Star
Indochina shock still
rocks Asian ances
ron was based in Bien Hai, 40
minutes drive away.
Most of the bombs missed
the palace, the article con-
ceded, but said it was because
the pilot "wanted to avoid the
servants' quarters."
; After the fall of Saigon oni
April 30, .Mr. Trung was re-
united with his mother. She;
had nevre been told that he!
Was working for the Com-
munists. , -
I
Crosby S. Noyes
Ever since the disaster in
Indochina, the tone of the
administration has been
resolutely upbeat. Despite
what happened in Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia, we are
told, the United States will
continue to "fulfill its cam-
mitments" in the rest of
Asia. The Mayaguez inci-
dent ? somewhat patheti-
cally ? was supposed to
provide conclusive proof of
continuing American re-
solve.
This has been backed up
by a certain amount or
tough talk? especially con-
cerning Korea, which seem-
ed for some time the most
likely next victim of mili-
tary aggression. Top offi-
cials of the administration
from President Ford on
down have vowed to keep
American troops on the
ground in South Korea,
where they would automati-
cally be involved in any at-
tack from the North. Secre-
tary of Defense James
Schlesinger refused to rule
out the use of nuclear weap-
ons if they became neces-
sary for the defense of the
peninsula.
But what, in 'practical
terms, does all this mean?
How much confidence can
Asian leaders place in such
"commitments" by an
American administration at
this point? In the light of
Indochina, ? how much
weight does the word of an
American secretary of de-
fense carry ? or, for that
logue between North and South,
Korea, Mr. Kim wrote:
"As long as there exists such
a Government as we now have
which lacks the confidence of
the people in the South, the
North Korean Communists Will
never respond to calls for dia-,
logue. -
matter, the word of an
American president?
The answer, in brief, is:
damned little. Today, in as-
sessing the reliability of
American assurances, for-
eign leaders must weigh the
mood of Congress and the
people along with the
promises of administration
officials. The result often is
depressing. There may be
some parts of the world ?
Europe and the Middle
East, for instance ? where
the United States still is
considered to be a reliable
ally. But the Asian conti-
nent is not one of them.
Ask the Thais how they
feel about American reli-
ability. We have duly rati-
fied commitments to Thai-
land under the terms of the
SEATO treaty. The Thais
were once among our
staunchest allies in South-
east Asia. But as far back
as the proclamation of the
Nixon doctrine in 1969, the
shrewdest of the Thai lead-
ers saw what was coming.
With the departure of the
fast American troops from
Thailand next year, Thai-
land will indeed be on its
own And since Thailand
does not have enough mili-
tary power to stand up to
North Vietnam, it isn't hard
to predict what its basic
alignment will be.
As a practical matter,
American "commitments"
in Asia are now mostly off-
shore. In addition to the Ko-
rean peninsula, they in-
"The Communists. believe
they May communize the South
easily if the present conditions
eon ti nue."
Representative Solarz said he
had met privately for 9.0 min-
utes on Aug. 11 with Mr. Kim,
who gave him the memorandum
when. they parted. 46
clude Japan, Taiwan and
the Philippines, with all of
which we have defense
treaties.
But even in these coun-
tries, confidence in the
American performance is
being badly eroded. Pres-
sure for the withdrawal of
American forces from South
Korea is growing. Detente
between Washington and
Peking has the gravest
implications for the Nation-
alist Chinese regime on Tai-
wan. Familiar complaints
are heard that we are sup-
porting repressive dic-
tatorial regimes in Seoul
and Manila.
There remains Japan.
Domination of Japan by
powers unfriendly to the
United States would be a
strategic blow comparable
to the loss of Western Eu-
rope, but it could happen.
At this time, Japan has
three options: continued
total reliance on the United
States for security, rearma-
ment on a massive scale or,
in case of a serious threat
from one of the great
Communist powers, im-
mediate surrender As
things are going, the final
option is by no means incon-
ceivable.
No recriminations, of
course, but the need for a
hard look at what is hap-
pening in Asia can't be
avoided. So far, we haven't
begun to. measure the dam-
age of our defeat in Viet-
nam ? either to the Asians,
or to ourselves.
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007k9
?WetJM; THE WASHINGTON POST
By Ilturey Marder j demands to be returned, and I
?
3t Stay Witr I the United States cannot hold I
Wasti=tom Fere
ithem "against their will." ? -1
Presidult Ford:' has agreed I If South Vietnam refuses to:
:to permit about- 1,600 refugees , accept the people on the ship,i
.-to try to return to South Viet-Ithere could be a stormy propa-
.nam fmen Guam, on a- ship leeanda battle between the Viet, ,
they will sail themselves. namese. Communists. and the
.. There is? no certainty,- howT i United States, over who is re-
ever, that Communist, atithori-, sponaible for the . impasse.'
tics in Saigon will allow. hem:That possibility has troubled
to lend. -.. many American officials for
This is a "Inman dilemma." !months.
said Julia. V. Taft, ?Viettiainl President Ford made the de-
task force director, In an-lcision Monday night, with the
nouncing the long-debated de-Iconeurrence of the National
cision yaerday. - ? !Security Council, Taft said,. to
About 128,00 refugees have meet the "adamant desire" of
been resettled by the United, the refugees to sail back to
States, site said, but the 1,600 'Saigon.
or more wanting to go back to "This cannot be a 'Flying
'South Vietnam have reached I Dutchman' situation," said one
"violent proportions", in tlaeirj U.S. official, referring to the
WASHINGTON STAR
21 September 1975
legendary ship condemned to
sail the seas forever. "We will
receive them back at Guam" if
they cannot land in South Vi-i
nam, he said.
Most of the refugees in-
volved never intended to leave
South Vietnam. They thought
they would be landed at an-
other port in that country
when they lett in confusion as
South. Vietnam fell under
'Communist control last April.
They are confident they will
be allowed to land, on the ba-
sis of radio broadcasts and re-
ports reaching them from
North and South Vietnam,. al-
though there is no official as-
surance of that. ?
The United States has
agreed to recondition a ship
that brought many of them to
Crosby S. Noyes
The contagion is taking h
as Asia assesses the results
The reason why all of the countries of
Asia are drastically revising their policies
in the wake Of the American disaster in
Indochina is quite simple: .
The leaders of Asia --.- unlike some in
this country ? have never bought the no-
tion that the.defeat of American policy in
Indochina was in some way preordained,
the result of mistakes .and misconceptions
dating back to the early post-war period.
On the contrary, they have seen it as an
almost entirely self-inflicted defeat, a. pro-
gressive loss of will on the part of the
American people and its leadership, and,
finally. a total repudiation of its commit-
ment to prevent the military conquest of
South Vietnam:
Sure, plenty of mistakes were made. The
sophisticated military theories of "meas-
ured responsee" counter-insurgency,
'!search and destroy" and all the rest of it,
were all singularly inappropriate to the
problem that confronted us. Tragic politi-
cal mistakes were made in the frantic
search for local leadership in Vietnam that
would be acceptable to liberal American
critics of the war.
? But the leaders of Asia have never
.doubted that the dramatic collapse of
South Vietnam was simply an extension of
? a collapse in the United States. So far as
they are corn-erred, it started with the
proclamation of the Nixon doctrine in 1%9
which sent sheekowaves of anxiety through
all of non-ccerenetraist Asia. It progressed
through the .ftsastrous Paris agreements
of 1973. the destruction of Richard Nixon's
presidency in the Watergate affair to ,the
ultimate repeariatien by Congress of com-
mitments under the Par-is agreements to
support and a-an:rola, the government in Sai-
gon.
The Asian governments have hada num-
ber of months to assess the results. In
Southeast Asia, they have watched the
emergence of a new Vietnam, possessing
formidable military power and still unde-
fined ambitions. The leaders in Hanoi may
take their time in consolidating their victo-
riesc But there is no doubt whatever that.
the Y intend to extend their hegemony. over
Laos and Cambodia. And there is no rea-
son to believe that they will not use some
of their huge stocks of surplus captured
military equipment to support the insur-
gencies they have backed for 20 years in
Thailand and Malaysia, and wherever else
the opportunity arises. .
In the bigger picture, China and the
Soviet Union are moving briskly to fill the
vacuum left by the-American retreat from
the Asian mainland, and rivalry between
the two communist giants promises to keep
the pot boiling for years to come. For the
moment, China appears to have the upper
hand in picking up the marbles. But the
final outcome of that competition ? espe-
cially which of the two great powers domi-
nates in Hanoi is far from decided.
No need to talk of dominoes. The term
was never more than a crude visualization
of the contagion that was certain to follow
an American defeat in Indochina. The pub-
lic statements today of Asian leaders from
South Korea to Singapore leave no doubt
that the contagion is taking hold. One way
or another, all of them are saying the same
thing: Without the Americans, we have no
choice except to make the best deal we can
with those with the power .and the will to
take over. .
4
:Guam. the 437-foot vessel Viet- ?
nam Thuong Tin, a 6.275-ton
cargo ship. It will take about
two to three weeks to equipl
the ship for -the two-week voy-
age from Guam to Vietnam,(
officials said. It WU carry'
provisions- for a round trip. I
"We are not 'sending them!
back,' " Taft said. "We are all
lowing them to repossess the!
ship they brought."
The number of potential ren
turnees has fluctuated. Now,I
in addition to 1.541 on Guam,
who want to return home, Taft
, said, there are 47 Vietnamese
in camps in the United States!
who want to join them, plus!
about 50 persons so far who
have been resettled and
ichanges their minds. ?
Taft said "tensions have
!peaked in the last few weeks;
I on Guam with a series of out-
bursts and demonstrations."
Four U.S. marshals v. ere hos-
.pitalized in an Aug. 31 'riot.
The decision en letting them ,
sail, U.S. officials said, came
after the United Nations High!
Commissioner, Prince Sadrud-i
din_ Aga Kahn, failed' to get?
"any concrete word" from
Communist authorities in Ha;
noi during a trip to North Vi-,
-etriain last iveek. ?
, According to Sadraddin's:
deputy, the North Vietnamese,
authorities reiterated their ?
"policy of receiving those
.etnamese desirous of return-,
,ing to their homeland," and,
said: "Such return will take!
iplace as soon as possible after:
Ithe individual applications for
;return have been examined."
Taft said those applications;
I were turned over to Commu- I
!fist authorities in July.
Other sources said the Ford'
administration concluded that!
the prince "struck out" for
any refugee return in the near !
I future, and that the United?
States would be in an impossi:
ble situation if it delayed any
longer. .
The U.S. veto of U. N. mem-
bership for both North and
South Vietnam, unless,
South Korea also is allowed.
to enter the United Nations.,,
clearly "has complicated this
problem." one U.S. source ac-
- knowledged.
in addition,. Secretary of
State Henry A. Kissineer is
reported- to have put 'South -
Vietnam and Cambodia on the
list of nations where Ameri-
can passports are invalid with- ;
out specific approval, against:
the recommendations of sub-
ordinates in the Bureau of
East Asian and Pacific Af-:
fairs.
The formal notice of that .
action, published in the Fed-
eral Register, cited -severe ,
hostility" of those govern-
ments toward the United
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47
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WASHINGTON POST
29 September 1975
e ss ring ary, C
mai
Jeers Greet U.S. Aide's Explanation of Panama Mks
. ADoe.a.1 tante Washington Post
7 BALBOA, Panama Canal
Zone?"It's kind .of like
?watching a hawk in a 'cage
-with a canary," an Ameri-s
.can resident of the Canal:
'Zone observed one night
. last week after a raucous -
gathering in Sthe Balboa:
.JETigh - School auditorium. ?
in this case, the canary
yttati an official of the U.S.
embassy in Panama, and the
_hawks, hundreds of them,
were irate fellow citizens
who frequently jeered at his
explanations of the U.S.
'policyto negotiate a new
vanal treaty with Panama.
U.S. officials are striving,
through statements and pub-
lic appearances, to calm the
fears of many Zonians about.
their future under a new
treaty. Their efforts have
hien met with skepticism,
and recently, with. open hos-
tility..
The United States and
Panama have agreed in
'principle to replace the
otaen-ended 1903 treaty with
another of fixed duration
that would lead eventually
to full Panamanian jurisdic-
tion over the 61-year-old At-
-lantic-Pacific waterway and
the surrounding, 550-square-
mile Canal Zone.
Neautiators still must re-
solve major differences,
however, and both govern-
Monts face public relations
tasks of assuring their re-
teneetive peoples that vital
.interests are not being sold
Among the more difficult
to persuade are the Ameri- ?
',can Zonians. There are es-
, timated to be 39.200 of them. ?
Many are second or third
generation Zonians. There
are about 9,800 civilian em-
ployees and dependents at-
? tached to canal agencies, ?
: 950 other civilians and 20,500
? military -related people in-
:.chiding 10,177" in uniform.
, It is not difficult to un-
- derstand why many are un-.:
, easy. Driven-a; through Bat-
? boa, the Zone's main resi.-
? den flat and commercial area,
? one can see a slice of Mai
;town America transplanted
? to foreign soil but to a :meat
:d?ree insulated from the
culture. cittorits and laws
Of the host coutur.y. '
ii is a company town. The
. Panama Canal Co.. a U.S.
.government agency, oper-
ates the canal. Overseeing
more than HMO ship pas-
sages a year, and runs virtu-
ally everything that affects
the lives of the Zonians. It
operates police and fire de-
partments, post office, thea-
ters, stores, schools, hous-
ing, a hospital, a leprosar-
ium and a 50-mile railroad
across the isthmus.
? The contrast to adjacent
alums of Panama City is evi-
dent to Zonians .and Pana-
manians alike, although the
capital of the country has
its affluent areas, too.
fel admit we have mani-
cured lawns, but that's bet-
ter than having weeds," says
Frank A. Baldwin, the Pan-
ama Canal information offi-
cer, who was born in the
Zone. "Some American news-
papers refer to manicured
lawns as if it were a sin."
. What seems to worry the
Zonians most is the prospect
of Panama taking jurisdic-
tion over all of these sena
ices. There is also concern
over job security, wage
level's and .personal safety
when the Zone disappears
as a separate .entity and be-
comes a part of Panama.
And there is a widespread
attitude that the U.S.-built
canal is "ours." ?
Maj. Gen. Harold R. Par-
fitt. the Canal Zone gover-
nor, says the mood of Zon-
tans is "great apprehension
. . . because nobody reaily
knows the details on what
the impact will be on their
lifestyle or on their employ-
ment."
- There were some clues
when Panamanian negotia-
tors revealed certain points
of agreement last weekend.
although U.S. officials have
stated that even these "con-
ceptual" agreements are
subject to change in a final
treaty package. The Pana-
manians said it had been
agreed that the Zone will
disappear three years after
the treaty takes effect, that
Panama's National Guard
will replace the -U.S. police
force, and the Panamanian
laws, courts. fire-fighting
and postal services will func-
tion exclusively. Panaman-
ians arc to move increasing-
ly into canal administrative
Among. points of disagree-
ment listed by the Pana-
manians was said to be a
U.S. proposal "to maintain
the privileges of the Zonians
and exclude them from Pan-
amanian jurisdiction." Pan-
ama rejected this and pro-
poses that the Zonians' pres-
ence "diminish gradually,
maintaining certain guaran-
tees in their jobs but with-
out detriment to Pana-
manian jurisdiction." ?
Ambassador-at-Large Ells-
worth Bunker, the chief U.S.
treaty negotiator, met in pri-
vate last week with leaders
of the Zone's labor unions
and civic councils. Gov. Par-
fitt said that Bunker did not
reveal specifics of the ne-
gotiations, citing a need for
confidentiality, and there-
fore did not allay the appre-
hension,
"We still, know about as
little as we knew three
years age, said Douglas C.
Schmidt, president of the
Pacific Civic Council, which
has 6,200 constituents in the
zone. "Mr. Bunker continues
to claim that our best in-
terest is being kept at heart.
But what that best interest
is, he fails to say." ,
Bunker recently designat-
ed 'John Blacken, the em-
bassy's counselor for politi-
cal affairs, as his liaison
with the Zone. Blacken has.
appeared seven times before
various Zone organizations.
Last week he addressed a
general Zone audience for
the first time.
About 600 Zonians crowd-
ed into the high school audi-
torium to hear him. Others
were turned away for lack
of space. It was at the same
school where students' in-
sistence on running up the
American flag angered Pan-
amanians and touched off
riots in 1964 in which 24 per-
sons died. Today the U.S.
and Panamanian flags fly
on adjacent flagpoles at the
school and other civilian in-
stallations.
-Blacken argued that the
Canal Zone is "Panamanian
territory under U.S. jurisdic-
tion," that a new treaty
would serve the interests of
both countries, and that fail-
ure to compromise in the
treaty talks would create a
situation in which "SOrlie
form of confrontation would.
be probable." The warning
48
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about a Confrontation has
also been Used before a
skeptical U.S. Congress .and
public by Secretary of State
? Henry - Kissinger, Assistant
Secretary ? William .Rogers
and Bunker.
. Many of Blacken's listen-
ers were unimpressed, as
well as frustrated by the
deck of details to support'.
.Blackents assertion . that.
"your ?interest will be pro-
tected' in 'any new treaty
submitted to the Congress
of the United States.
Hoots and jeers greeted
his remarks that the Pana-
manian government is "re-
sponsive to its citizenry!! ,
and will be able to carry out:
public services efficiently:.
"I live in Panama, and my
garbage' is picked up seven
days a week," he said. Howls
drowned him out.
"Basically, we are guests
in somebody else's terri-
tory." Blacken said at an-
other point in the question-
and-answer period. -There
were shouts of no, no."
"You champion Panama's'
aspirations and not mine."
said one man in the audi-
ence. He was roundly ap-
plauded.
An American soldier who
had been arrested in Pan-
ama while bird - watching
said, 'If we cannot. defend
American rights now, how
the devil are they going to
be defended in the future?"
Iie, too, was applauded.
No one spoke out in favor
of a new treaty during the,
meeting. But some people
apologized to Blacken after-
ward for hostile remarks -
made by others, and the .;
next day he 'received tele-:,1
phone calla of support.
The fellow who saw the
evening in terms of a hawk
pouncing on a canary told
a reporter outside: "My
views are that the alterna-
tives to a treaty are far less
desirable for the individuals
in the Canal 'Zone, as well
as the 'U.S. government. So
therefore 1 think that a
treaty is the best solution
to the problem down here."
Thursday, Blacken will
speak to another general
Zone audience on the Atlan-
tic side of the isthmus. Ho
? says that now he has a bet-
ter grasp of what the Zon-
ians' concerns are and he
hopes to do a more convinc-
ing job.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380007-8
NEW YORK TIMES
21 September 1975
-Chilean Junta Resisting (Critics
t
? - By JONATHAN. HANDEL!. :.t
saree to ykoNeVt York Times
e SANTIAGO, Chile, Sept. 16?
..
. two years after the bloody coup.
that toppled the Marxist coa:i-i
'lien government of President!
Salvador Allende Gossens, thel
military_ junta that governs!
Chile, has developed a siege
mentality against critics of its
harsh economic recovery. pro-I
i
1gram and of its continuing Vig,i.
lations of human rights.. [
Unemployment is at its high-i
.s
est in at least four decades aal
industrial production has
dropped sharply this year. ,
,?But the: junta has vowed to.
continue an austerity -program
aimed almost exclusively at
dampening the perennial ?rise in
inflation and diminishing the
'slate's role in the economy. . (
Arbitrary arrests and ne I
'ports of torture have declined,.
in recent months, apparently!.
because of the military's con?-I
fidence that the threat of sub-i
,version has eased. On the other!
1 hand; such practices have vir-
tually been institutionalized,
land the secret gralice apparatus!
remains :pervatrive. There arel
I still about 5,00 political pris-
oners, according to the Govern-i
ment -? 1
The junta also denies any
knowledge of the fate of morel
than 1,000 people who -Were de-I
tamed after the 1973 co-up.!Lawyers and clergymen susd
pect that many of these miss-1
sing prisoners have died in de-
. i
tention carhps and torture cen-
ters.
' Government Cites Polls ?
The human-rights controversy
has stiffened the attitude of
'Chile's main creditor a, particu-
larly in Western Europe,
and-
has forced the jrmta to renego-
[time the 'country's huge for--,
reign debzl.
In Washington. the House of
iRepresentatives has passed a
.bill prohibiting economic aid to
countiles that systematically
violate human rights, and the
Senate is et-pa:led to add its
approval later this month. etle.
though United States economic,
aid to Chile now amounts to
only about 825-aaillion a year.
a complete cutoff could further
discourage private loans and
investment. In the last two
years, less than S2-million in
new foreign private investment
has actually flowed into this
country.
"Chile will net. permit any
foreign power to use temporary
difficulties we are facing to
interfere with our. sovereignty,
even if such attempts are made
under the guiiie of friendship,"
said President Aueusto Pinochet
in a speech last week celebrat-
ing the junta's second AtiOretv
nary. ?
"The immense majority of
our compatriots accept and sup-
port restrictions," General Rum-
chet went on, "because they
understand that they are the
necessary price for tranquility,,
order and social peace that
have made us an island within
a world invaded by violence,
terrorism and :generalized dis-
order."
The Government has publi-
dzed recent Gallup Polls indi.H
eating that it still enjoys the
backing of tide majority. Skep-
tics, hOwever, question the
value oil any public-opinion
sounding in a society such as
this ,in which fear of repression
ts widespread among old sup-
porters of Dr. Allende, who lost
his life in the September, 1973,
toup, and other politically dis-
aanting groups.
According to the Govern-
ment, about one out of every
250 Chileans has undergone at
least temporary detention sine
the coup; church sources be-
lieve the figure is closer to
one out of 100.
Marxist political groups have
been banned; other political
parties remain in a, state of in-
definite suspension. Leftist pub-
lications are prohibited and
other journals are under Gov-
ernment control through self-
censorship.
Junta's Support Slipping
There are no elections at any
level in society. Purges have
sedeot Marxists from public ad-
ministration, university and la-
bor posts. Trade unions exist,
but are forbidden to strike:
they have no dear concept of
what their role is supposed to
be.
The Roman, Catholic church,.
which Counts 90 per :cent of
the people among its faithful,
has spoken out several times
against violations of human
rights. and. the growing plight
of the poorest Chileans. ?But it
has no stomach for an open
confrontation with the junta
that would risk political divi-
sions in the clergy.
Last week the Catholic bish-
oo gave the junta a boost by
asserting that the military coup
saved the country "from a
Marxist dictatorship that
seamed inevitable and would
have been irreversible." Though
the church hierarchy decried
the excesses of the junta, it
treielemned Marxists for their
l'atheism" and political "oppor-
tunism."
Despite the effectiveness of
the political repression, in re-
c=t. months a slow deteriora-
titre of enthusiasm for the junta
has become apparent among
suite of its supporters.
Eduardo Rios, president of
the Maritime Workers Union,
is considered the leading labor
lezder in the country. After the
coup. he went abroad to defend
the junta at international labor
conferences, but recently he re-
fused to do so again.
? are concerned over the
growing distance between the
Government and labor, because
a Et rtRittaletiSeP2101rt/0800
uner repercussions on workers,
because of labor reforms With- 6 ed with th 50
centc mpar w e per
out the advice or participation cent public deficit. of the last
of workers," Mr. Rios said sev- year of the Allende Govern-
eral weeks ago. "There is no !ment.
dialogue with the Government."The military rulers assert
Mr. Rios's opinions appear to. that the balance-of-payments
be shared by most non-Marxist deficit will be a manageable
labor leaders. $300-million. There is guarded
The military inherited a cha- optimism that the price spiral
otic economy from the Allendej is slowing because the inflation
Government. Inflation had I index for ? August was 8.9 per
reached an annual rate of about cent, down from 9.3 per cent
700 per gent; investment had! in July and 19.8 per cent in
evaporated; industrial and June.
agrarian production had de- . Soaring Jobless Rate
dined sharply; there were wide- Otherwise, the effects of the
spread shortages of all goods shock treatment have been dev-
and a rampant black market; astating. Unemployment has
climbed to 20 per cent, leaving
700,000 people jobless in a
work force of 3.5 million.
There was a 20 per cent de-
cline in 'industrial output dur-
ing the first six months of 1975,
compared-with the same period
of 1974. Construction and auto-
mobile production have fallen
by 'more than a third. Accord-
ing to Government officials, the
gross national product this year
may well be ten per cent less
than that of 1974.
An economic survey prepared
by the center-left Christian
But inflation still ran at more Democrats, the largest political
than 370 per cent?the highest party, estimated that real in-
rate in the world?and unem- come would fall about 10 per
ployment rose above 10 per cent with respect to 1974, by
cent as the bloated job rolls of 18 per-cent compared with 1973
the Allende era were cut down, and by a full 40 per cent from
With inflation running at 1970. For the Chilean working
similar levels this year, and class, the statistics represent a
with the added danger of a return to poverty levels not
billion-dollar balance-of-pay- seen here in more than a gen-
Inuits deficit, the Government eration.
put into effect a "shock treat- The Government has begun
ment" in May. ? an emergency work program
The guiding, light of the jun-. that provides jobs to the un-
ta's economic policy has been employed for 90-day periods at
Milton Friedman, a conserve-
a monthly salary of about 830
tive economist from the Uni-
versity of Chicago who visited There are 100,0
00 openings but
Santiago shortly before the they cover only about one out
"shock treatment" j5rograrr of seven jobless workers. The
took effect. The "Chicaer low income falls far short of
Boys," as the junta's economi-
the minimum monthly food re-
advisers like to call themselves quirements of a family of five.,
The junta has also- been
slashed public spending, re-
sharply attacked by some econ-
stricted bank credits and
slowed the printing of money. .omists and businessmen for
The only public expenditure Putting the wealth into fewer
that has escaped the scissors
hands. Before inflation is over-
come the critics say, a drop in
has been the military budget, '
sales and a wave of bankrupt-
a taboo topic for public discus- cies will enable a privileged fear
sion. Officially, defense spend- to buy businesses at 'bargain
.ing is 23 per cent of the Gov- prices.
T
emment budget, compared with he privileged minority today
20 per cent during the last year are people who own finance
companies.- The banks, still un-
of the Allende era. But critics der state control, are restricting
assert that a gond deal more, u
'ceedit but the finance comma-
,
military spending is hidden in I flies are extending it at exorbi-
the Finance Ministry's budget.. ; tact rates.
The idea behind the "shock' Since they are far more flexi-
treatment" was to hit inflation bin than the-banks, the finance
by cutting demand. Real income companies also attract money'
would decline and force produc- from investors too scared by
foreign debts had mushroomed
to several billion dollars and
foreign exchange reserves were
down to $3-million.
Moreover, copper?exports of
which provide 85 per cent of
Chile's foreign-exchange earn-
ings?has been selling at de-
pressed prices in the world
market for most of the junta's
two years in power. This was
also a problem for the Allende
Government.
During the junta's first year,
there were production increases
in most sectors of the economy.
en and distributers to sell their infiaticn to put their money
goods more cheaply. Price con-
trols were discarded as ineffec-
tive, artificial mechanisms that
would only hide inflation and
eventually lead to a return to
the black market days. ,to a bank or finance company
The junta and its supporters to easily obtain 5 per cent in
hard currency a month without
already contend that there are
some optimistic sighs that the .doing anything?" The question
treatment is working. The pub- ?wras put by Orlando Saenz, a
lie deficit or gap between Gov- 'former economic adviser to the
outory9 one of its most
into industries.
"Who is going to invest
money in any industrial, com-
mercial, farming or mining ac-
tivity if he knows he can aCe
CA.'S
119
IllaVg37711111)
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The rise of unemployment,
the decline in production and
the concentration of wealth in
fewer hands has led some econ-
omists and businessmen public-
ly to suggest alternatives.
"Right now, the biggest
threat is bankruptcy, not infla-
tion," said one of the largest
automobile distributors. "The
Government is seriously 'under-
estimating how difficult it is
to start up production once it
stops dead." He suggested that
the Government act immedi-
ately to stimulate production.
Party Suggests Controls
The Christian Democratic
party, arguing that most Chil-
ean businessmen have had an
"inflationary mentality" for
years, suggested that some form
of price controls be imposed on
a list of key products.
The program also called for
the Government to fix interest
rates to prevent usurious credit
dealings. To alleviate unemploy-
ment, the party suggested art
immediate ? increase in public
spending, especially on projects
that employ large numbers of
workers.
The most controversial aspect
of the plan was the suggestion
that no economic program
could be successful without for-
eign investment and aid and
.that such funds would not be
iforthcoming until the political
iimage of the ceuntry changed..
The clear implication was that
money from abroad would not
arrive while President Pinochet
remained in power. .
, There have been some hints
of dissent at high military lev-
els over the economic recovery
program. General Gustavo
Leigh, the only :junta member
with any real power beside
General Pinochet, conceded pub-
licly last month that the "so-
cial eost" of the economic pro-
gram had exceeded expecta-
tions. General Leigh is said to
have had an angry confronta-
tion recently with the Finance
Minister, Mr. Cauas, over un-
employment.
In his anniversary speech
General Pinochet gave no hint
that there would be a let-up in
the relentless austerity program
for several more months. "To
try to avoid this social cost
would. mean fooling the people
and permitting them to live
with false illusions," he as-
?serted.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
26 September 1975
Time to cool it on Panama
The attack on the United States Embassy in
Panama City by a group of 600 or more rock-
throwing youths is an indication of the
potential explosiveness of the Panama Canal
issue. The incident, moreover, was the most
serious since the 1964 anti-U.S. riots in
Panama which killed 23 persons, injured -
dozens more, and led to a break in relations
between the-two nations.
It is bound to make more difficult the task of
Panamanian and United States negotiators
drafting a new treaty to govern control and
operation of the Panama Canal. Those talks,
which several months ago were said to be
moving smoothly, are now apparently
'snagged.
Complicating the issue is growing congres-
sional opposition to any new treaty and to any
change in the present U.S. control of the
canal. Added to this was a statement over last
weekend by Panamanian negotiators com-
plaining that the two governments are far
,apart on a number of basic issues.
Washington was right in protesting the
Panamanian statement which, at best, was ill-
timed. Indeed, there is some speculation that
the rock-throwing demonstration was sparked
by? the Panamanian statement. Taken ? to-
NEW YORK TIMES
25 September 1975
Panama Apologizes
For Youths' Attack
On U. S Embassy
Srorla! to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Sept. 24?
The Panamanian Government
has apologized to the United
States for an incident ,21ester-
day in which dernonstratora
broke about 100 windows in
the American Embassy in
Panama City, the State De-
partment reported today.
The oceanside building was
attacked by 600 to 800 rock-
throwing youths, according to
gether, the statement and the attack on the
embassy add new problems to the talks.
Panama has rightly apologized to the U.S. for
the embassy incident, which involved "in-
adequate protection" by the Panamanian
National Guard as the U.S. noted.
What is needed now is a cooling-off period ?
involving perhaps a new meeting between the
chief negotiators, Ambassador Ellsworth
Bunker for the U.S. and Foreign Minister Juan
Antonio Tack for Panama, to get the talks
back on track. Then, too, the Ford adminis-
tration should encourage Congress to hold off
its attacks on a new treaty until it. knows just
what a proposed treaty will include. Many of
the congressional statements of late have been
far off target ? commenting on the treaty as if
it were already written.
- ? And for its part, Panama needs to restrain
both its negotiators from commenting on the
talks in progress and its impressionable youth
from violent acts. It ought to be self-evident to
Panama that incidents such as the intemper-
ate weekend statement and the melee at the
U.S. Embassy only stir up the congressional
opposition which could lead to eventual Senate
' rejection of a proposed treaty once it is ready.
Robert L. Funseth, the depart-
ment spokesman.
They shouted anti-American
slogans and demands that the
'United States pull out its
troops from bases in the
Canal Zone.
Embassy officials reported
that the demonstrators also de-
nounced Brig. Gen. Omar Tor-
rtios Herrera for "complicity"
in attempting to negotiatte a.
new Panama Canal treaty with
the United States.
No Americans 'were injured
In the attack. -Several Pana-
manian ational guardsmen were
assaulted however when they
sought to disperse the demon-
strators, the embassy officials
said.
Yesterday afternoon Ambas-
sador William J. Jorden sent
NEW YORK TIMES
23 September 1975
authorized bv;
U.S. Warns Panama
Not to Air Details
Of Talks on Canal
The warning,
Ellsworth Bunker, the chief
United States negotiator in the
Panama Canal treaty talks,.
which began in June, 1974, was
issued in response to publica-
tion Saturday of a Panamanian'
Government statement on the!
status of the negotiations.
The Panamanian statement,1
made on the orders of Brig.'
Gen. Omar Torrijos Hen-era,
had said that talks on the fu-
ture of the canal had beers
stalled by United States insist-
?
ence on its right to continuel
defending the waterway in-1
def initely,
sfecinteesaxeavelemees
WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 ?
The United States warned Pana-
ma today that public airing of
purported negotiating positions
on a new Panama Canal treaty
could "hinder the balancing of
mutual interest that makes any
such treaty possible."
a note to the Panamanian v
Foreign Ministry "protesting
the inadequate protection if-,
forded the embassy by the Na-
tional Guard," Mr. Funseth re-
ported.
Later yesterday Presidenz
Demetrio B. Lakas called Mr.
Jorden to apologize and this
morning the Foreign Ministry
sent a formal written. apology.
The incident was the most.
serious in Panama since 1964
when anti-American riots
caused 23 deaths, officials here
said.
Meanwhile; the House voted
203 to 197 this afternoon to
stand by and earlier resolution
that the Administration should
not negotiate "the surrender
or relinquishment of any Unit-
ed States rights in the Panama
Canal zone."
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