KISSINGER CIA GROUP DIDN'T MEET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 31, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

25X1A
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003800057.1
CONFIDENTIAL
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
31 OCTOBER 1975
NO. 22
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
GENERAL
WEST EUROPE
NEAR EAST
AFRICA
EAST ASIA
LATIN AMERICA
PAGE
1
29
39
41
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Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose or within 60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001-00380005-1
Washington Post
31 OCT 1975
Kissinger
CM Group
Didn't Meet
By George Lardner.Jr.
Washington Post Stet! Writer
Nearly 40 covert Central
-.Intelligence . Agency
. operations were approved
between 1972 and 1974 without
a Single meeting of the Special
While House group that was
-ostensibly in charge of them,
it was disclosed yesterday.
Testifying before the House
intelligence committee, a
' recently retired State.
Department intelligence
' expert said the National
Security Council's so-called
Forty Committee did not have
a single formal session bet?;.
? ween April. of 1972 and
December of 1974.
The witness, James R.
Gardner, who served for nine
years as the State Depart-
ment's liaison officer with the
Forty Committee, said the
- committee's chairman, Henry
A. Kissinger, apparently
? preferred to approve or at
times _reject the secret
:operations after "telephone
votes,'" without face-to-face
:'meetings at which their
?-merits could be debated and
: discussed.
?: "Sometimes he felt he just
didn't have the time for it and
anyway, he knew what he
wanted to be done," Gardner
added later to reporters. He
likened the Forty Committee
under Kissinger to "Lincoln's
Cabinet" ? with Kissinger's
'vote being the only one that
s counts.
' Covert operations, which
_Gardner said used to be far
.more numerous than their re-
cent 20-per-year average,have
ranged all, the way from the
1961 Bay of Pigs invasion to
paying off politicians in Chile
and raising a sunken Soviet
submarine from the Pacific
Ocean floor.
The Forty Committee,
which has existed under ?
various names since the mid-
' 50s, has also been in charge of
certain secret intelligence-
gathering activities such as U-
2 spy flights. Kissinger is
chairman by virtue of his post
as special assistant to the
President for national
security affairs, a job he
;retained after his appointment
in i973 as Secretary of State. ?'
" Other members are CIA
Director William E. Colby,
Deputy Secretary of Defense
William P. Clements Jr., Gen.
George S. Brown, chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air
Under Secretary of State .for
The Washington Star Thu.rdcy&io13;:?0, 197S
Crosby S. Noyes
Reverse Me
in furor over intelligence
artnyism i0Offlo
These are hard times for
the intelligence community.
To judge from the expres-
sions of horror and shock
from our liberal legislators,
we are back in the era of
an intelligence-gathering
which held that "gentlemen
don't read other people's
mail."
Of course,-it's perfectly
O.K. for private citizens to
steal secret government
documents and deliver
them by the crateful to
sympathetic newspapers.
But let the government be
accused of reading the mail
or listening to the phone
calls of a few people sus-
pected of being security
risks or involved in the
international drug traffic,
and the foundations of our
fundamental civil liberties
are held to be in deadly peril.
It is very fashionable
these days to be against any
intelligence-gathering ac-
tivity. It is even fashionable
to be against national se-
curity. Everything of this
sort is automatically relat-
ed to the excesses of the
Nixon administration in,the
Watergate affair.
? We are well on the way to
a kind of reverse McCarthy-
ism in which the most ele-
mentary activities of the
various security agencies
are denounced as deep-dyed
plots against individual
freedom.
Political Affairs Joseph J.
Sisco.
Gardner, an officer of the
State Department's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research
who became liaison officer for
secret CIA operations in 1966.
said that the approximately 40
covert operations authorized
between 1972 and 1974 were all
subject to "telephone votes"
by Forty Committee mem-
bers, but that except for
KiSsinger, committee
members were often not given
detailed explanations ? of why
the programs had been ap-
proved
The official records of the
Forty Committee, Gardner
added, also became far less
In this I suspect there is a
large element of hypocrisy
and political miscalcUla-
tion. Americans may de-
plore the need for govern-
ment snooping on the
activities of their fellow-
citizens. But most would
also recognize the legitima-
cy of mail interception and
phone taps in cases involv-
ing national security, kid-
naping or organized crime.
It is hard to contend ? as
some liberals do ? that se-
curity of communications is
a constitutional-right guar-
anteed to all citizens.
From its inception, the
telephone has been the most
insecure means of private
communication., Almost
everyone over the age of 30
has lived in a community of
party lines where every
conversation was assumed
to be monitored and in
which the telephone opera-
tor was always the best-in-
formed gal in town. In
every foreign country, the
tapping of resident foreign-
ers is automatically expect-
ed.
A few years ago, I
remember calling Lyndon
Johnson's presidential as-
sistant McGeorge Bundy at
the White House with an
indiscreet question, "Sure-
ly," said Bundy, "You can't
expect an answer to that ?
especially over the tele-
phone."
Much the same goes for
Although each department
and agency represented on the
Forty Committee submits
the sanctity of the mails as
an inviolable constitutional
right of every American
citizen. Many of those now
leading the protest against
the intelligence services
spent plenty of disagreeable
hours, as officers in the
American Army in World
War II, reading the letters
of their own enlisted men ?
a duty made the more dis-
tasteful by the presumption
that officers' mail was
uncensored.
True, we are not in a
state of war today. But the
principle that the privacy of
communication is subordi-
nate to the requirements of
national security ? and
presumably also the war
against organized crime in
this country ? would not be
seriously disputed by a
great majority of American
citizens.
The conflict between the
rigIrts of the individual and
the rights of society, repre-
sented by a democratically
elected government, is not
exactly new. What is essen-
tial today is that these dif-
fering ? and not always
easily compatible ? rights
be redefined in a way which
will protect honest citizens
(by legal rather than politi-
cal definition) without com-
promising the right of the
state to defend itself:
It is one of the more ur-
gent tasks ' of the post-
Watergate period.
'memos detailing its views on Christian Science Monitor
each proposed secret
operation, Gardner said he
had no way of telling how
Carefully those views have
been considered in recent
years. By the time he retired,
he said, the official minutes of
the Forty Committee were
"merely the statement of a
decision" and plainly
"inadequate."
Kissinger is to testify before
the committee today. Both
Gardner and William Watts, a
former staff secretary for the
National Security Council, . handle intrigue than a politician who has made
detailed under Kissinger than told the committee yesterdays it all the way to Washington?
they had been in 1966. Also he that they felt Kissinger's I am appalled at the situation.
told the Pike committee, the many roles have often Seal Beach, Calif. Joanne Sales
number of covert operations inhibited serious con-
qfiCO f
. as '-lauen steauily, pp7gorle his32R.000100380005-1
1
l't6flefltdftijeu2011/6n8iffimen8ttiPietillIgltnarlYo
even "radically," since 1966. own.
2, October 1975
Readers write
In regard to your editorial concerning the
CIA's spy files I should like to agree and add
my response. Due to the bleatings of some of
our legislators it looks like it may be no time
until we have many vacant posts among the
undercover operatives attempting to guard
our national security. Perhaps it would be
practical to ask those parties determined to
disclose every facet of this program to fill
those vacancies. After all who's more able to
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1
E IIIET?17 YORK TIMES, SATURDAY OCTOBER 18, 1975
U. S. Intelligence System: How Well Does it Do
Ey JOHN M. CREWDSON
SottO al to The New Ytfrit Times
WASHINGTON, Oct. 17?As
the House Select Committee on
Irtelligence closes its doors to
prepare the next phase of its
investigation, it leaves behind
what many see as a troubling
answer to the
question of how
News well American in-
Analysis telligence performs
its principal task?
predicting events
of international significance in
time to allow the makers
of foreign policy to prepare
or react.
The conclusion that seems to
emerge from public hearings
over the last month is that the
half-dozen or so Federal agen-
des charged with gathering
and evaluating foreign intelli-
gence do not provide a reliable
early-warning system where
such things as wars, invasions
and political upheavals are con-
cerned.
Representative Otis G. Pike,
the Suffolk County Democrat
who heads the 13-member se-
lect committee, found the evi-
dence so disturbing that he
recently went so far as to ques-
tion this country's ability to
detect in advance a threat to its
own shores.
? Form Crisea. Studied
"If an attack were to be
launched on America in the
very near future," Mr. Pike
declared, "it is my belief that
America would not imow that
the attack were about to be
launched."
The Central Intelligence
Agency disputed that assertion,
but so far no one has seriously
challenged Mr. Pike's assess-
ment that, in return for an in-
telligence budget that approach-
es $7-billion, the country does
not seem to be getting its
money's worth.
In the public hearings, the
committee chose to concentrate
on four international crises in
which the United States had a
military or diplomatic interest,
and by which it was to some
extent caught off guard?the
1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam,
the 1973 war in the Middle,
East, the military coup in Por-
tugal and the invasion of
Cyprus by Turkey.
Despite delays in obtaining
documentary evidence, occa-
sioned by dispute with Presi-
dent Ford r the committee's
!handling of secret materials,
the panel was able to estab-
lish that in each of the four
.instances warnings of what
:was to happen failed to reach
:the top.
Deliberate Effort Seen
The committeehis also under-
stood to have received docu-
ments showing failures of intel-
ligence in advance of other
events, including the 1968 in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia by the
Soviet Union and its allies and]
the detonation of a nuclear de-
vice by India, but those mate-1
rials are still secret.
The reasons for the intelli-
gence failures are varied and
complex. In some instances,
raw intelligence collected was
incomplete or simply in error.
In others, good intelligence was
misinterpreted by analysts.
In the case of the 1968 Tet
offensive; the committee heard
assertions that American lead-
ers, in deference to precon-
ceived policies and for fear of:
inflaming antiwar sentiment at
home, had ignored 'indications
that the Communists' forces
might be twice as large as the
official estimates.
Samuel A. Adams, a former
C.I.A. analyst who specialized
in studying the Vietcong, re-
counted his contention that this
? country's "astonishment" at the
scope of the Tet offensive had
resulted from a deliberate ef-
fort within the intelligence
community "to portray the
Vietcong as weaker than they
actually were."
Mr. Adams quoted from pre-
viously secret cablegrams be-
tween Saigon and Washington
that resulted in the unan-
nounced dropping of two cate-
gories of Vietcong forces from
le official strength estimate
to keep it at its previous level
of 299,000.
Mr. Adams's charges of
corruption were not repeated
by witnesses who testified on
NEW YORK TIMES
17 October 1975
Human Experimentation
A pending Senate bill to broaden the responsibilities
of the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research offers
a. simple but promising approach to a difficult and-Often
painful problem. ?
? The commission was established by Congress last
? year to take a two-year look at the practices, ethics and1
values involved in using human beings as research
- subjects. Formed after exposure of the infamous
Iabama. syphilis experiments, the commission was em-
powered to propose regulations for such experimen-
tation to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.
Under the law, the Secretary is required, if he chooses
-not to promulgate the proposed regulation, to give his
reasons in writing.
e The new bill would enlarge the commission's' juris-
diction to include experimentation ' conducted by the
Approved For Release 2001/08/08:
Cyprus, Portugal and the Mid-
dle East. But their accounts of
failure to clearly see or cor-
rectly interpret key signala
were equally dismaying to
most of the committee mem-
bers.
One subsequent assessment
obtained by the committee said
"there was an intelligence
failure in the weeks preceding
the outbreak of war in the Mid-
dle East" in October, 1973.
? Analysts Are Blamed
The fault, it said, lay not
with the collectors of intelli-
gence, who passed on "plenti-
ful, ominous and often accu-
rate" indications that the
threat of war was serious, but
rather with the analysts who
were assuring officials that
"neither side appears to be bent
on initiating hostilities."
Some of the best intelligence,
the committee was told, was
picked up by the National
Security Agency, which moni-
tors the military communica-
tions of other countries.
But some of this intelligence
could not be passed on to the
Watch Committee, set up to
keep an eye out for trouble
spots, because its members
were not clear to receive such
sensitive material.
Ray Cline, the State Depart-
ment's director of research and
intelligence at the time of the'
1973 war, testified that he had
concluded hours before the
fighting began that hostilities
probably were imminent and he
had asked that the message be
passed to Secretary of State
Kissinger. Mr. Cline said he
learned later that Mr. Kissin-
ger never got the message be-
cause his secretariat "did not
want to trouble him at that
late hour."
Three intelligence officials told
the committee that their agen-
cies?the C.I.A, the State De-
partment and the Defense In-
telligence Agency?had been
surprised by last year's over-
throw of the Portuguese Gov-
ernment by leftist military
leaders.
According to William G. Hy-
land, the current State Depart-
ment intelligence chief, no
specific warning was provided
Its lob
by intelligence agencies despite
indications in the months be-
fore.
Another witness, Keith Clark,
an intelligence officer for West-
ern Europe, said the intelligence
community had failed to com-
pile information about the dis-
sident military officers who led
the coup in Portugal.
According to evidence and
testimony assembled by the
House committee, C.I.A. anal-
ysts studying the Cyprus situ:-
ation in July, 1974, tempered
their previous warnings that
the Government of Archbishop
Makarios, the President of Cy-
prus, was endangered by the
military regime in Greece.
That reversal, according to
a second post-mortem report
made available to the commit-
tee, occurred a few days before
President Makarios was un-
seated and was founded on a
single C.I.A. report from Athens
suggesting that the Government
there "had now decided not to
move against Makarios, at least
for the time being."
Ability to Foresee
The Cyprus post-mortem re-
Port comments on an "inabil-
ity to foresee critical events in
the face of mounting evidence
to the contrary."
"Ultimately," the report con-
tinues, "intelligence will be
judged in the context of its
.ability to provide the consumer
with premonitory assessments.
The ability of the community
to provide its consumers with
the news after a crisis has
erupted is widely recognized."
The House committee drew;
no conclusions about what fac-
tors might account for the in-
telligence failures, but the C.I.A.
officers who wrote the Cyprus
post-mortem report offered one,
possible explanation.
Among analysts, they said,
there exists "the perhaps sub-
conscious conviction and hope
that ultimately reason and ra-
tionality will prevail, 'that ap-
parently irrational moves will
not be made by essentially
rational men."
military services, the C.I.A. and the Veterans' Adminis-
tration. It would also make the body permanent and'
add a number of officials including the director of
Central Intelligence and the Secretaries of Defense and
H.E.W. The revelations over recent months of the
irresponsible manner in which the C.I.A. and -the Army
experimented on people and the tragic results of some
of ,those experiments constitute a powerful argument
for introducing accountability into the process of secret
experimentation.
The legislation is imperiled by jurisdictional objections
of the armed services and veterans' affairs committees
on both sides of Capitol Hill. Such territorial 'imperatives
should not be allowed to impede this legislation. The
protesting committees have never bestirred themselves
sufficiently to insure that these efforts to increase
human knowledge are carried out with a decent regard
for health and the lives of the people involved. The
commission as strengthened ?by the new bill, would
afford far greater assurance of responsibility in future
experimentation than is e'er likely to come from the
established committees. ?
CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1
C.
TheWAington Star
Ftil
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Weezmity, ()deter 22, ?,975.
Service C
By Norman Kempster
Washington Star Staff Writer
A close and friendly relationship
*with the CIA has become virtually "a
prerequisite for promotion" to top
posts in the State Department, a
middle-level Foreign Service officer
has told the House Intelligence Com-
mittee staff.
"You aren't going to have an
ambassador anywhere in the world
unless he has a record of working
closely with the CIA," the officer
said in a telephone interview after an
hour-long unannounced talk with a
committee lawyer.
The olicer, who declined to be
identified by name, said the exten-
sive use of embassy posts to provide
"official cover" for overseas CIA
operatives produces a cooperative
? relationship between the agency and
State Department management both
in Washington and 'abroad.
? STATE DEPARTMENT personnel
officers must be aware of undercover
:CIA agents assigned to embassies,
he said.
And Foreign Service officers who
buck the CIA just don't get pro-
moted, he said.
The officer said he had urged the
Committee to continue its efforts to
question junior and middle-level
State Department officials as part of
its investigation of the effectiveness
of the nation's intelligence efforts.
Secretary of State Henry A. Kiss-
inger has refused to permit employes
below the assistant secretary level to
answer the committee's questions on
matters of policy.
THE PANEL VOTED yesterday to
avoid an immediate showdown with
Kissinger on the issue. The secretary
was summoned to appear either Oct.
30 or Oct. 31 to defend his policy in
:person at a public hearing.
BALTIMORE SUN
22 Oct. 1975
CIA probes linked
to aide's execution
Boston (AP1?An official of
an unspecified Middle Eastern
country was executed for
supplying information to the
Central Intelligence Agency
after the official's identify was
determined through testimony
in congressional probes of the
CIA, the Boston Globe said yes-
terday.
The newspaper quoted a
congressional source as saying
the execution took place recent-
ly.
The Globe said its report
was based on at least a score of
interviews with intelligence
sources inside and outside the
CIA.
The committee decided to
call Kissinger as a witness
after rejecting, 8-5, a
proposal to launch con-
tempt of Congress proceed-
ings against him.
The- middle-level officer
who was interviewed by the
committee staff said the
lawmakers should insist on
talking to working-level
officers because they would
be more willing than their
superiors to discuss CIA
"penetration and manipu-
lation" of the State Depart-
ment.
THE CIA'S PENCHANT
for secrecy makes it dif-
ficult to trace the agency's
influence. In many cases,
he said, records do not
exist.
For instance, he said, as
an acting counsel in South
Africa in the 1950s, he was
told to show a potential in-
formant a fake letter plant-
ed in the consulate's safe.
After the informant left, he
said, he was told to destroy
the document.
"There are no records of
much of what they do," he
said. "They burn the
records "
OTIS PIKE, D-N.Y.,
chairman of the House
Intelligence Committee,
and four other Democrats
wanted to start action
against Kissinger for refus-
ing to comply with the com-
mittee's subpoena for a
rs
memo that criticizes U.S.
handling of last year's
Cyprus crisis. But an im-
promptu coalition of four
Democrats and four Repub-
licans decided to make one
nitre try at a compromise.
"It was my opinion that
we should proceed against
Dr. Kissinger as we would
against an ordinary mor-
tal," Pike said sardonical-
ly.
It was understood that
State Department officials
were working on possible
compromise proposals to
assuage the committee
without violating Kissing-
er's rule barring junior and
middle-level employes
from discussing policy
matters.
Pike objects to the order,
which he said prohibits the
committee from finding out
the full details of the effec-
tiveness of the CIA and
other intelligence agencies.
But he may be willing to
compromise after he has a
chance to confront Kissing-
er face-to-face.
THE COMMITTEE has
subpoenaed a memo writ-
ten by Thomas Boyatt, who
was the department's top
Cyprus expert at the time of
the coup that ousted Arch-
bishop IVIakarios from the
presidency of the island na-
tion. Boyatt has confirmed
that -the memo was sharply
criticial of U.S. policy? but
he has declined to discuss
POST?DISPATCH, St. Louis
25 Sept. 1975
? A CIA Pretense
1. At a press briefing ?in' St. Louis birector
William E. Colby of the'Central Intelligence
Agency indicated that by such appearances he
is trying to repair the damage to his agency
done by adverSe"publicitY stemming from
congressional investigations. If success de-
pended only on a cool and urbane manner, Mr.
Colby accomplished his purpose here.
But the press has an obligation to look
behind the friendly smile and the smooth
answer. At one point Mr. Colby was asked to
comment on testimony before the House
intelligence committee by Samuel A. Adams,
former principal CIA analyst of Viet Cong
troop strength, to the effect that the agency;
yielding to military and political pressure, had
underrated the adversary's strength just be-
fore the 1963 Tet offensive. Mr. Colby replied
that-there had simply been a disagreement
between Mr. Adams and others in the agency
over categories of Viet Cone; forces and that
there was no deception or chaoging of figures.
- This answer just does not square wi:h the difference of opinion beloeeen Mr. Adams and
Approvedvi*Mentilfitethk0108/4140MIAQROPTIZ-00432ROMMO(88000EMby is not helping the
3 House testimony and in a. detailed article in CIA's image.
? kanao
the specifics.
Kissinger has refused to
give the committee the
memo because it was sent
through a special "dissent
channel" intended to per-
mit middle-level officials to
object to policy without
being publicly identified
with their suggestions.
The secretary contends
his objective is to protect
Foreign Service officers
from the sort of public con-
demnation they received
during the era of the late
Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy.
But Pike argued that
Congress is so weak "com-
pared with the executive
branch" that it can cause
little trouble. He said gov-
ernment employes have far
more to fear from their own
departments than from
Congress.
? "GOOD, HONEST MEN
who state their views are
-punished within the: bu-
reaucracy -while those that
are gagged or go along,
keeping silent, are pro-
moted in the bureaucracy," ?
Pike said. "To me, this is a
far greater danger to our
country than a charge of
neo-McCarthyism."
Pike was the only mem-
ber of the committee who
would discuss the issue with
reporters following the ses-
sion. The committee's rules
make the chairman the
official spokesman.
the May issue of Harper's ma zinc. He ;
reported that in 1966 he had found that the
Pentagon was using an estimate 6f Viet Cong
guerrilla strength (103,573) that had been
thought up by the South Vietnamese and that .
had remained unchanged for two years. After
studying reports from the field, Mr. Adams ;
estimated as early as 1966 that total Viet Cong
troop strength was 600,000 rather than the
270,000 figure used by the American command. I
? Yet despite strenuous protests byg.Mr.
Adams, the only CIA analyst on this assign-
ment, the agency, under orders from Director
Richard Helms, accepted the American com-
mand's figure of 270,000 as late as 1968.
The deceptive figure, put out in response to
pressure from Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker
and Gen. Creighton Abrams, was only changed
after-the disastrous Tet offensive, which cost
heavy U.S. casualties, made clear
that the military estimates had been wrong.
By pretending that the only issue here was a
Approved
liEti YORK TIMES
22 Oct. 1975
C.I.A. 'MAIL COVER'
NIT Al 2.7 MILLION
215,820 of Letters Opened
?During a 20-Year Program,
Senate Panel Is Told
By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
? . Special to The New York Times
? WASHINGTON, Oct. 21?The
Central Intelligence Agency
opened more than 215,000
pieces of mail in a New York
operation that many senior
agency officials knew to be
illegal, it was disclosed today
at a Senate committee hearing.
? Testimony and documents in
traduced before the Senate Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence
sketched a program of intru-
sion ' upon the United States!
mails fa rmore extensive than
was inaicated in the Rockefel-
ler Commission report on the
intelligence community last
June or in previous Congres-
sional testimony.
1. Figures made available to
the committee by 'the C.I.A.
!showed that it photographed.
;the exterior of 2,705,726 pieces
:of mail to and from the Soviet
Union in its New York pro-
-gram between 1953 and 1973:
This, testimony established,
%vas' one in every 13 pieces of
mail to and from the ? Soviet
Union. The agency opened
215,820 individual letters.
Similar operations were
conducted' on the West Coast,
in Hawaii and in New Orleans,
but all were of shorter dura-
tion. No figures were given
for these operations.
Two C.I.A. internal investiga-
tions of the New York mail,
project, one in 1960 and the
other in 1969, found the opera-
tion of little intelligence value,:
,the men who conducted the:
reviews testified.
? Gordon Stewart, Inspector
General of the C.I.A. in 1969,1
said that his office was "quite,
surprised to find such an en-
deavor going on" and that,
'after an internal investigation,
:he recommended that the
,project be turned over to the
Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, which was receiving a
large portion of the intelligence
information.
Mr. Stewart and John Glen-
non, and Thomas Abernathy,
-former staff members in the
Inspector General's Office, said
they believed the project was
illegal. Moreover, Mr. Glennon
testified, "obviously everyone
involved in it at the C.I.A]
realized it was illegal."
gi As early as 1962, the C.I.A.
!became concerned that the mail
opening might inadvertently be
gnade public and it devised cov-
er stories for those involved,
according to agency documents.
For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1
ND' YORK TIMES
23 Oct. 1975
Hthns Says Search
Of Mail Was Illega
"As an example of additional
safeguards to the project," one
memorandum said, "high-level
police contacts with the New
York City Police Department
are enjoyed, which would pre-
!elude any uncontrolled inquiry
in the event police action was
;indicated."
A committee source said
,there was no evidence that
the New York police knew
'about the illegal mail opening.
The 20-year project appeared
:to pick up speed in the late
'nineteen-fifties and again in
.the early nineteen-seventies.
?During these periods, figures
indicated, the C.I.A. was exam-
,ining peak numbers of mail
items, and between 1970 and
1972 averaged about 2 million
a year.
According to C.I.A. memo-
'randums, the project was origi-
nally proposed to postal offi-
cials as one in which the C.I.A.
would'only photograph the out-
side of envelopes?in effect,
a "mail cover." New York was
selected because that was
where mail to the Soviet Union
was funneled.
Subsequently, by the mid-
nineteen-fifties, large numbers
of letters were being opened,
but it was unclear whether
postal officials or Attorneys
General were fully informed.
According to testimony,
members of the C.I.A.'s Office.
of Security chose mail at ran-
dom from the traffic between
the United States and the So-
viet Union, as well as looking
for letters of certain persons.
More than 25 million letters
'were, routed to the Soviet
Union during the period.
There was no direct testimo-
ny on how the mail was
opened, but intelligence sources
said that the C.I.A. at first
used a steam system, but later
developed an oven, that
"baked" the letters open. After
the mail was opened, the con-
tents were photographed and
the letters were resealed and
sent on their way.
It was unclear whether the
C.I.A. obtained approval over
the years from Postmasters Ge-
neral or Attorneys General.
One memorandum made pub-
lic today indicated that Richard
M. Helms, former Director of
Central ? Intelligence, had
briefed Edward Day, Postmast-
er General in 1961, and that
Mr. Day permitted the project
to continue but "he did not
want to be informed in any
greater detail on the handling."
According to the Rockefeller
Commission report. Mr. Helms
briefed Attorney General John
N. Mitchell and Postmaster
General Winton Blount in 1971,
and they fully "concurred."
In its report, the Rockefeller
Commission said at one point
that "some 8,700 items were
opened and the contents ana-
lyzed"; at another point, it said
the project had "expanded by
1959 to include the opening
of over 13,000 letters a year."
But at no point did the commis-
sion make public the total num-
bers of letters involved.
Testimony before other Con-
gressional committees and the
select committee had estab-
lished earlier that the mail pro-
gram intruded upon the mail
of',-- Senators, Representatives
By LINDA CHARLTON
special to The ls;evi York Times
WASHINGTON, Oct. 22 ?
'Richard Helms, Director of
Central Intelligence from 1966
to 1973; testified today that he
!knew then that the agency's
mail-opening program was il-
legal. But he said he assumed
that Allen W. Dulles, the intel-
ligence agency's director who
started the operation in 1953,
had "made his legal peace with
it."
Mr. Helms, the only witness
this afternoon before the Senate
Select Committe on Intelli-
gence, also conceded that , a
1970 report to President Nixon
that he and others had signed,
and that stated that the mail-
opening - operation . had been
discontinued? was untrue.
But he added that there had
been "no intention to mislead"
the . President., He explained
that he- had believed- that the
statement had referred ?toy a
similar operation of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation,
which had. been discontinued.
It was disclosed during testi-
mony yesterday that the agen-
cy had opened more than 215,-
000 pieces of mail in' New York
from 1953 to 1973 and had
photographed the exterior of
2,705,726 pieces of mail to and
and other bublic -officials, in-I
eluding Senator Frank, Church,I
Democrat of Idaho. Mr. Churche
Is chairman of the Senate selecti
committee. .
Suspension of Intercepts
WASHINGTON, Oct. 21 (UPI)
? The State Dertment ap-
parently asked the C.I.A. to
suspend interception of mail
to and from China in connec-
tion with President Nixon's vi-
sit in 1972, a-Senate investiga-
tor indicated today.
Questioning C.I.A. witnesses
during a hearing of the Senate
intelligence committee, Senator
Walter Huddleston, Democrat
of Kentucky, asked whether
the witnesses knew about a
stop order on aalL ihtercerts
involving "an Asiatic country"
in connection with the visit
"of an eiecutive of this country
to that country."
THe witnesses said they were
unaware of it, but it was clear
from previous diclosures that
Senator Huddleston referred to
a C.I.A. operation in San Fran-
cisco that sporadically inter-
cepted amil to and from Com-
munist nations in the Far East
between 1969 and 1973.
Senator Huddelston, glancing
at documents, said the suspen-
sion request was made by the
Secretary of State?who, in
1972, was Willeam P. Rogers.,
Secretary of State Kissingere
then Presidential assistant fort
national security affairs, made
the first secret trip to Peking
in July, 1971, to arrange for
Mr. Nixon's visit, which took
place in February, 1972.
4
from the Soviet Union.
Difference in Testimony
Replying to questions about
whether the agency had obtain-
ed approval of its program
from Postmaster-General, Mr.
Helms was occasionally at vani-I
ame.with two of the three wit-I
nesses this morning; all former
Postmasters General.
They were J. Edward Day,
Postmaster General trom 1961
to 1963, and Winton M.
Blount, who held that position
from 1969 ?to 1971.
The third was John A.
Gronouski, who headed the
Post Office Department from
1963 to 1965; he said flatly
and angrily that he knew noth-
ing- of the program and would
have opposed it if he had. This
was confirmed both by Mr.,
Helms and -by an internal
C.I.A. memorandum.
Mr. Day, however, said that
shortly after he took office in
1961, Mr. Helms, Mr.: Dulles
(who died in 1969) and Kermit
Roosevelt, then a C.I.A. offi-
cial, visited him, saying they
wanted to tell -him "something
very secret." Mr. pay recalled
that his reply was: "Do I have
to know about it?" And was
told he did not. He added that
he was "sure that I wasn't told
anything about opening mail."
Told of Secret 'Project'
Mr. Blount said be was told
about a secret "project" in
which the Post Office Depart-
ment was cooperating .with the
C.I.A., but not specifically the
opening of mail. He asked if
he should seek legal advice
from the general counsel, he
said, and was told that the mat-
ter of legality had been dis-
cussed- with the then Attorney
General, John W. Mitchell.
He did know, he said, that
the mail of "avowed enemies
of this country" was being "in-
terrupted"?that is, taken out
of the "main stream." and the
front and back of the enevel,
apes photocopied.
The committee issued a
subpoena today for Mr. Mitch-
ell's appearance Friday, but his
attorney, William G. Hundley,
is expected to argue tomorrow
to have the subpoena with-
drawn on the ground that Mr.
Mtichell's appearance might
prejudice a pending appeal of
his conviction in the Watergate
cover-up case.
Mr. Helms, in his testimony,
said he believed that "we told
him f.Mr. Day] the truth about'
the project," but that he' could
not be sure. A. C.I.A.. memo-
randum referring to, the brief-
ing with Day says merely that
the .officials "withheld no rele-
vant details."
As for Mr. Blount. Mr. Helms
said that he recollected taking
with him to the Blount briefing
"a couple of pieces of what
we got out of the program"?
typewritten . copies of material
't'hat would indicate that we
had been reading the corre-
spondence between certain in-
dividuals in the United States
and the Soviet Union."
He appeared anxious to avoid
contradicting Mr. Blount's testi-
mony, and said that perhaps
he had not been "specific
enough" about the program.
Mr. Helms said that Arthur
E. Summerfield, Postmaster
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'Cenzral frori:1953 to .1961, has
been told only that the agency
wanted to photograph enve-
lopes, and that other Postmas-
ters General during this period
were not informed at all about
the operation.
? 'No Written Record'
He said that he could not
recall if Mr. Dulles had told
?)resident Eisenhower or even
Mr. Dulles's brother, Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles,
about the program, nor whether
President Kennedy had been in-
formed. He said that he might
have. told President Johnson
during a discussion of C.I.A.
matters in 1967, adding: "I -have
:ter written record of what I
told Johnson."
TSimilarly, , he said he did not
recall telling President Nixon.
tater, talking to reporters in
the. corrido outside the hearing
thorn, he explained why he had
no?record about what he might
have told these Presidents:
"You've got to protect the
President from the dirty stuff.",
..:.!There's got to, be a break,"
he said. '"The President can't
survive [if he is ;tied to this
tort :of. activity]. But, some-
boars got to take the heat. So.
let old Helms take it, and I'm
taking it. You can't ask' the
President to sign off on illegal
activity."
As for his assumption ?that
'Mr.. Dulles bad resolved the
legal question about the mail-
opening, Mr. Helms said in his
testimony that the former Di-
rector of Central Intelligence
was "a much respected figure"
and "it would not have oc-
curred to me to fault Min on a.
Matter of law." ?
? 'He.?said that he could not.
recall "ever having discussed"
the. operation with any of the
Congressional C.I.A. oversight
committees. ?
NEW YORK TIMES
18 October 1975
Ex-C.I.A. Agent Loses Suit
Over Raid on His Arsenal'
PHILADELPHIA, Oct. 17 (AP) '
?Federal Judge Leon J. Hig-
genbotham dismissed a lawsuit
'yesterday brought by a former
agent of the Central Intelligence'
Agency, George E. Fassnacht,
against two police officers who
raided his weapons arsenal in
1971, because the two-year
statute of limitations had ex-
pired.
Policemen raided Mr. Fass-
nacht's borne in the Fox Chase
section June 20, 1971, and con-
fiscated an arsenal of guns,
explosives and ammunition
from his basement, the suit
said. The weapons were Sup-
pressed as evidence Oct. 27,
1972, because the police had
no search warrant.
Mr. Fassnacht, a 42-year-old
former city ballistics expert,
was acquitted in December,
1973, of charges of illegal pos-
session of an arsenal of ex-
tiosives and dangerous weap-
Vas. ,
5Approved
By. Norman Kempster and Orr Kelly
From News Services
Three former postmasters general
today told a Senate committee they
never knew the CIA was opening
mail. Two of them conceded they
really did not want to know anyway
and the third said he couldn't find
out.
J. Edward Day, who headed the.'
Post Office from the beginning of the
Kennedy administration in January
1960 'until Aug. 9. 1963, said he was
told the CIA was engaged in a secret
project involving the mails but he
said he shut off the conversation be-
cause he did not want to know about
it.
Winton M. Blount, head of the de-
partment during the first two years
of the Nixon administration, said he
was told that mail was being re-
moved from the Post Office, given to
the CIA and returned the next day.
But he said, "I don't know what
was being done with it." He said he
never asked if it was being opened.
In contrast, John A. Gronouski,
,Day's successor, said he was never
told the CIA was opening mail al-
though he tried repeatedly to find out
about any cases in which mail was
delayed or diverted.
"I THINK IT is incredible that a
person at a top position in govern-
ment could have something like this
going on in his organization and not
know about it," Gronouski said. "It
wasn't that I didn't try to know about
it."
' A CIA memo dated April 23, 1965,
indicated Gronouski was not told
about the project because a Senate
subcommittee was investigating
privacy at that time and CIA officials
decided that the postmaster general
should not be put in a position where
he could reveal the project to the
committee.
The CIA has confirmed that for
about 20 years, from 1953 through
1973, it opened mail between the
United States and Communist coun-
tries. Of the seven postmasters
general who served during that peri-
od, the CIA has said that three were
informed and four were not. Day and
Blount are the only two still living
whom the CIA has said were briefed
on the project.
FORMER CIA DIRECTOR Rich-
ard Helms has testified that he per-
sonally was involved in briefing both
Day and Blount. He has said under
oath that he told both of them mail
was being opened.
A CIA memo placed in the com-
mittee record said Helms personally
showed "a few selected examples" of
the product of the mail opening
operation to Blount.
The June 3, 1971 memo said: "Mr.
For Ritiligil2MbtlegeePrfatr 7t)i
0
the operation's product, including an
item relating to Eldridge Cleaver
which attracted the PMG's special
interest."
Blount testified that althoubh
Cleaver's name was mentioned dur-
ing the meeting' he can recall no evi-
dence to show that the mail of the
black revolutionary was being
opened.
Both Blount and Day told the com-
mittee that they believed the CIA
was protecting the national interest
and should not be impeded.
"I THOUGHT THEN and I think
now that the CIA has certain powers
that put them in a different class
from other people . .The CIA is
something different and very spe-
cial," Day said.
Sen. Walter F", Mondale. D-Minn.,
responded, "We are both lawyers. I
don't recall seeing that in the Consti-
tution."
Blount said he supported any CIA
project as long as it was legal. He
said he assumed the mail opening
was legal because Helms told him
that then Atty. Gen. John N. Mitchell
had been informed.
The..CIA has since conceded the
operation was illegal.
"My understanding was that mail
would be removed to the mail stream
and given to the CIA and returned to
the mail stream the next day,"
Blount said.
"After being read?" Mondale
asked.
"I didn't know what was being
done with it," Blount said.
"Didn't you ask?" Mondale said.
"I don't recall," Blount answered.
The CIA memo said Helms briefed
Mitchell the day before he saw
Blount and that Mitchell "fully con-
curred in the value of the operation
and had no 'hangups' concerning it."
Helms is scheduled to testify and is
sure to be asked why he had person-
ally supported the operation ? code-
named HTLINGUAL ? even though
other officials of the CIA had long
felt it was clearly illegal and of dubi-
ous value as a source of intelligence.
Between 1953 and 1973, when the
operation was stopped, the commit-
tee was told, a CIA office in New
York filmed the envelopes of 2,705,-
726 letters and opened 215,820 of
them. The largest single recipient of
information from the intercepted
mail ? 57,846 items ? was the FBI.
Howard Osborn, former director of
security for the agency, told the'
committee his office was responsible
for running the New York operation,
but he said he did it for another CIA
division.
"it was their Cadillac. They built it,
they drove it. My job was to maintain
it, to change the oil," he explained,
and then added, a few minutes later:-
04NR0018i11001341038084 ve!"' good..
e product was worthless.'
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'TheWashingtonStai. NEW YORK TIMES,
? -October 23, 1975 ?
Mail Spies
Stopped
By Fear
By Norman Kempster
Washington Star Staff Writer
William Cotter, the for-
mer chief postal inspector
cast by the Rockefeller
Commission in the role of
hero for stopping the CIA's
mail opening program,
says he acted only out of.
fear that the cover had al-
ready blown off the opera-
tion.
Cotter told the Senate
Intelligence Committee he
became concerned that the
project had been discovered
after he received a letter
from the Federation of
American Scientists asking
if the Post Office permits
other agencies of govern-
ment to open first-class
mail.
The question fit perfectly
the 20-year operation in
which postal employes
turned their heads while the
CIA rifled mail sacks look-
ing for suspicious letters.
"It appeared to me that
the project was known,"
Cotter said. He noted that
the federation's member-
ship included one former
CIA official and a number
of scientists with high se-
curity clearances.
? THE AUTHOR of the let-
ter that worried Cotter,
Jeremy J. Stone, director of
the federation, said in a
telephone interview that his
question was just a shot in
the dark. He said he was
asking a number of agen-
cies questions about priva-
cy. '
Cotter ultimatly wrote a
flat denial of any mail
opening in a letter to Stone.
He admitted to the sena-
tors: "I knew it was false."
But motivated by the let-
ter from Stone, Cotter said
he urged CIA Director
Richard Helms to termi-
nate the project. CIA docu-
ments indicate that Helms
briefed Atty. Gen. John N.
Mitchell and Postmaster
General Winton Blount on
the project and decided to
continue it when the two
Nixon Cabinet members
expressed no objections.
After Mitchell and Blount
left the government, Cotter
said he renewed his request
that the project be termi-
nated. CIA Director Wil-
liam E. Colby scrapped the
operation shortly after he
_succeeded Helms in 1973. .
SATURDA:Y, OCTOBER
25, 1975
Mitchell Denies He Knew of Mail Opening
By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York ThateS
WASHINGTON, Oct. 24-7,
Former Attorney General John
N. Mitchell told a Senate com-
mittee under oath today that
officials of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and Federal
Bureau of Investigation had
never told him that the agen-
cies were secretly opening mail.
His testimony before the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Intel-
ligence appeared to conflict
with a statement made Wednes-
day by Richard Helms, former
director of the C.I.A., who
COTTER, WHO became
chief postal inspector in
1969, knew about the mail
opening because of an 18-
year career with the CIA.
The CIA said earlier this
week that 215,000 pieces of
mail were opened in New
York, the largest of four
mail interceptions. Only
mail between the United
States and Communist
countries was intercepted.
The committee likened
to testimony for about five
hours yesterday in an effort
to determine who knew
about the mail opening ef-
fort and who authorized it.
The results were often con-
tradictory.
Helms, making his 19th
trip to Washington since he
was named ambassador to
Iran in 1973, testified that
he briefed both Mitchell and
Blount on the mail opening
program, showing them
samples of material obtain-
ed from reading the letters.
Blount testified earlier in
the day that, although
Helms had discussed a se-
cret CIA project that in-
volved diverting mail, he
was never told the letters
were being opened.
MITCHELL, whom the
committee hopes to ques-
tion in a public sesssion
tomorrow, has told the
.panel in executive sesssion
that he remembers the
Helms briefing, but he
thought it referred to
examination of the outside
of envelopes without open-
ing them. Examining the
outside of envelopes is
legal; opening them is a
violation of the law.
- Helms said he showed
Blount typewritten copies of '
intercepted letters. He said
he can't remember if he
told Blount that letters were
being opened, but he said
he assumed that Blount
would know there was no
other way to copy the con-
tents.
"Perhaps I wasn't specif-
ic enough." Helms- said.
testified that he advised Mr.
Mitchell of the mail-opening
project in June, 1970.
Mr. Helms said he had told
the Attorney General about a
"mail cover" and acknowledged
that "in those times I'm not
sure the Attorney General
knew the difference" between
"mail cover" and actual mail
opening.
A mail cover, Mr. Mitchell
testified, meant to him that
security agencies photographed
the exteriors of the envelopes
to obtain the names of the ad-
dressors and addressees. Mr.
Helms, however, said on Wed-
nesday that he presumed from
the context of the conversation
that Mr. Mitchell knew the
C.I.A. was opening mail.
The committee chairman,
Frank Church, Democrat of
Idaho, told reporters that while'
there was an obvious conflicti
in Mr. Mitchell's and Mr.'
Helms's testimony, he was not
prepared to accuse either man
of lying.
? "there is no basis on which
I could make such a charge
in view of the possibility they
might just have misunderstood
each other," Mr. Church said.
The committee also made
public today documents that
indicated that Nicholas de B.
Katzenbach, Attorney General
under President Johnson, may
have known that the F.B.I.
was opening mail. Committee
sources said that Mr. Katzen-
bach would be asked to testify
publicly on the matter.
In a memorandum written
on ,,March 2, 1965, ?J. Edgar
Hoover, then director of the
F.B.I., said that Mr. Katzenbach
had talked to Senator Edward
V. Long, Democrat of Missouri,
about keeping information on.
mail openings out of hearings'
Mr: Long was then conducting
in the Senate.
The Attorney General, ac-
cording to the memo. said that
Bernard Fensterwald, thea,
counsel of Mr. Long's commit-
tee, "had some possible wit-
nesses who are former bureau
agents and if they were asked
if mail was opened, they would
take the Fifth Amendment."
"The Attorney General stated
that before they are called, he
would like to know .Nho they
are and whether they were ever
involved in any program touch-
ing on national security and, if
not, it is their own business.
but if they were, he would want
to know," Mr. Hoover's memo-
randum said.
. In a telephone interview late
today, Mr. Katzenbach said he
had "never heard" that either
the C.I.A or the F.B.I. was open-
ing the mail and he suspected
he had not been told because
the "process is illegal." He said
he had believed the intrusion
upon the mail system was only
to conduct a "mail cover,'
which he said was legal in both
criminal and national security
cases.
Mr. Katzenbach said that had
he known mail was being
opened he would have ordered
it halted. He said that he had
already told the Senate com-
mittee, under oath, in executive
session that he did not know
about F.B.I. mail openings.
The committee in its hearings
has established that both the
C.I.A. and the F.B.I. conducted
illegal mail-opening projects
over long periods of time.
Testimony by C.I.A. officials
and C.I.A. documents have indi-
and C.I.A. documents have
indicated ? that agency officials
throughout the years knew the
process was illegal. Moreover,
one C.I.A. document showed,
they had serious doubt that in
peacetime even the President
had the power to authorize the
activity.
F.B.I. officials testified today
that the bureau tended over a
26-year period to ignore the
question of whether the open-
ings were illegal. The question
was discussed only once, in
1951, three former officials said.
The F.B.I. conducted mail-
'opening projects in eight cities
apparently without the approval
of any Attorney General and
without a warrant from a court.
The F.B.I. legally opens mail
in certain criminal cases after
obtaining a court order.
No figures for the amount of
mail the F.B.I. opened were
given.
F.B.I. officials testified today
that J. Edgar Hoover, while
director of the bureau, halted
the mail-opening project in
1966. W. Raymond Wannall,
now chief of intelligence at
the bureau, speculated that Mr.
Hoover may have discontinued
the top secret project because
he had "a regard, for the cli-
mate of the times." He implied
that Mr. Hoover might have
come to the conclusion that the
political climate would not
justify the illegal operation.
Project Lasted Till '73
The C.I.A. did .not stop its
mail opening until 1973. Mr.
Helms testified on Wednesday
that the only Attorney General
he ever briefed about mail open-
ings was Mr. Mitchell, in the
session that Mr. Mitchell now
disputes.
Mr. Mitchell said that in
June, 1970. he did have a 22.
minute meeting with Mr. Helms
on a subject he declined to re-
veal for national security rea-
sons. He has told the committee
about it in executive session.
Congressional sources indicated
that Mr. Helms had been brief-
ing Mr. Mitchell on aspects of
electronic eavesdropping used
by the National Security Agen-
cy in tracking antiwar radicals.
During this session, Mr.
Mitchell said, Mr. Helms re-
ferred to mail cover as an aside
to the main purpose of the
meeting.
Mr. Helms said Wednesday
that after he talked to Mr.
Mitchell he had met with
Winton M. Blount, then Post-
master General, and told him;
6
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that Mr. Mitchell had "no
problem" with the project. He
said he showed Mr. Blount
some "samples" of what the
C.I.A. was gleaning from open-
ing mail. -
Mr. Mitchell had sought to
avoid testifying before the corn-
Inittee in public session because
his appeal of his Watergate
conviction is still pending. He
.was convicted of perjury.i
conspiracy and "obstruction ofl
justice in the Watergatel
cover-up. _
NEW YORK TIMES
30 Oct. 1975
RSA. CHIEF TELLS
OF BROAD SCOPE
OF SURVEILLANCE
By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Spedal to The New York Times
- WASHINGTON, Oct. 29?The
National Security Agency
secretly scanned international
telephone and cable traffic to
"intercept the messages of 1,680
'American citizens and groups
and of 5,925 foreign nationals
or organizations, its director
testified today. ?
The director, Lieut. Gen. Lew
Allen 'Jr., told the Senate Se-
lect. Committee on Intelligence
that the seven-year program in
behalf of six government agen-
- ties, was halted in 1973. He
said that N.S.A. had not ,ob-
tained court orders to authorize
the eleCtronic surveillance and
had not received the specific
approval of either Presidents
Johnson or Nixon or of any
Attorney General.
? This was the ?first time a
director of the security agency
had described one of. its opera-
tions in public session. Under
questioning, General Alien
agreed that his public testi-
niony might be in technical vi-
;OlatiOn of laws against ? dis-
closure of communications in-
telligence data.
His description disclosed that
the surveillance was far more ,
vast than hinted at in press
accounts or in the report of the
Rockefeller commission on the
C.I.A.
General Allen ?said the Na-
tional Security Agency had sup-
plied intelligence on Americans t
to the Federal Bureau of In-1
vestigation, Central Intelligencel
Agency, the old Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs,
the Secret Service and two De-.
fense Department components,:
Department of the Army and,
Defense Intelligence Agency.
Senator Frank Church, chair-
man of the committee, de-
scribed the so-called "Watch-i litical information along with
list" operation as one of tAP
ri3tmilikflorfileketts6a2001i08/08
-
itspectS' of N.S.A,' s Activities1
that he regarded as "unlawful"
and apparent violations of con-
stitutional provriptions against
invasion of privacy.
The Idaho Democrat urged
that the committee make pub-
lic a report on the other aspect,
described as "Operation Sham-
rock," which Congressional
sources later said was N.S.A.'s
Arrangement with cable com-
panies to obtain international
traffic. ?.
i Senator John G. Tower, A
!Texas Republican and commit-
tee vice chairman, opposed dis-
closure of Operation Shamrock,
:as he had opposed the public
hearings held today.
"I do believe the 'people's
right to know should be sub-
ordinated to the people's right
do be secure," he said.
, Senator Tower and Senator
Barry Goldwater, Republican of
Arizona, argued strongly that
such disclosure would "adverse-
ly affect Mir intelligence-gather-
ing capability," as Senator!
Tower put it.
At a closed midafternoon
meeting, the committee agreed,
apparently without a vote, to
submit the report on Operation
Shamrock to General Allen for
his comment on whether it en-
dangered sources and methods
of intelligence, before voting
on whether to make it public.
Even without the details of
Shamrock, the scope of Gener-
al Allen's testimony was un-
expected. He said that as early
as the first years of the nine-
teen-sixties, N.S.A. had occa-
sionally looked at communica-
tions of Americans traveling to.
Cuba.
N.S.A. is part of the Defense
'Department and is charged with
coordinating electronic intelli-
gence gathering and with de-
oielOping and break,ing codes.
On Oct. 21, 1967, testimony
and documents disclosed, the
ADepartment of the Army form-
',ally asked N.S.A. to help in
,determining whether foreign
;governments were supporting
.domestic disturbances.
The following June, after
'Senator Robert F. Kennedy's
.assassination, the Secret Ser-
:vice submitted a list of persons
,,and groups that its officials be-
lieved posed a threat to persons
it was protecting. It also, Gen-
leral Allen testified, submitted
; the names of the persons being
'protected.
In the view of informed
.Congressional staff members,
Ist.his apparently permitted the
- service to receive the over-
'seas communications of candi-
'dates for President, which it
protects, as well as the corn-
'munications of the President
himself, moreover. the N.S.A.'s
computerized system, in addi-
tion to selecting Shreating
material, presumably would
have selected innocuous over-
seas messages about campaign
activity.
A spokesman for the Secret
'Service declined to comment
on whether it had received po-
sinatitin attempts.
In 1969, theN.S.A. formalized
its surveillance on domestic se-
curity threats under an "Oper-
ation Minaret." Internal docu-
ments 7eleased today warned
'officials of the agency riot to
disclose to other agencies that
it was even collecting the in-
formation. General Allen said
he believed this concern was
to Insure that the information
was not used in criminal prose-
cutions where its source would
have to be made public to the
courts.
The data accumulated ? re-
ports averaged two a day at
one point, he said?were hand-
carried to the agencies and
marked "!): ckground use only."
At the licietit of the various
programs, Ile said, N.S.A. was
scanning for information on,
some 800 Americans at any one
time.
This included monitoring to
discover narcotics traffickers,
conducted from 1970 until 1973,
as well as the programs aimed
at political dissidents.
In 1971eVice Adm. Noel Gay-
ler, General Allen's predecessor
at N.S.A.,. - briefed John N.-
Mitche'l, then the An erney,
General, and his deputy, Rich-{
ard G. Kleindienst, on the pro-
gram. General Allen said that
the group had agreed upon
"procedures" and that this had
implied some consent by the
group. He said the agency, how-
ever, had found no written au-
thorization from Attorneys
General for the activity.
General Allen also said that
the members of the United
States Intelligence Board, made
up of the intelligence agencies,
knew of the intrusions because
of the fact that the agencies
individually submitted names
for the "watchlist."
He said the National Security
Agency had not conducted sur-
veillances on domestic United
'States communications and that
all its intrusions had involved
communications in which at
least one "terminal" was in a
foreign country.
Benson Buffham, deputy di-
rector of N.S.A., testified that
no consideration had been giv-
en to the legality of the pro-
gram at any point. After a se-
ries of questions on legal as-
pects, Senator Walter F. Mon-
dale, Democrat of Minnesota,
said "what worries me" is that
:N.S.A. officials still view the
'activity as legal.'
- Mr. i'vto...:dale said that among
the merrsage3 :hT:-.; A.. had inter-
cepted waa a ieque3t tc a
"peace-LI" antiwar activist to a
foreign singer to participate in
a concert to fund the antiwar
movement or to make per-
sonal contribution. The mes-
sage was so innocuous, Mr.
Mondale said, it "raises the
very 'serious question about
how to contain snooping."
He said the effect of the
snooping "discourages political
dissent in this-country."
General Allen said that the
security agency had rejected
some names for the watchlist,
mainly from the F.B.I. and De-
partment of Justice, as inap-
propriate to its intelligence-
gathering function mainly he-
cause they appeared to be tar-
gets of law enforcement.
General Allen testified that
N.S.A.'s, intelligence had helped
the F.B.I. avert a major terror-
ist plot in one city and had con-
tributed to halting the smug-
gling of several major ship-
ments of narcotics. He declined
to specify the inci2ents. In-
formed law enforcement sources
said that the terrorist plot was
presumably one involving Pal-
estinian terrorists in a plan
aime dat American Jews.
Concern about the legality of
the operations emerged in 1273,
at the height of criticism of
Watergate matters, and shortly
after General Allen became
head of N.S.A. First he, testi-
fied, the C.I.A. pulled out of the
narcotics surveillance project
on the ground that it appeared
to violate the C.I.A.'s charter
forbidding a domestic police
role. Though N.S.A. has no such.
charter, General Gaylor said, it
followed suit.
On Oct. 1, 1973, he said, then
Attorney General Elliot L. Rich-
ardson ordered N.S.A. sto. sup-
plying the' F.B.I. and the Secret
Service with material.
"Until I am able more care-
fully to assess the effect of
Supreme Court decisions con-
cerning electronic surveillance
upon your current practice of
disseminating to the F.B.I. and
Secret Service information ae-
quired by yo through electronic
devices pursuant to requests
from the F.B.I. and Secret Serv-
ice," Mr. Richardson wrote, "it
is requested that you immedi-
ately curtail- the furn.er dis-
semination of .such information
to these agencies."
LOS ANGELES T17.S
19 OCTOE3EFt 1975
ray A le.' ? :te s. eeeti ;N.;
tiyi Lep - ?
f.;:rWhil.g.the CIA needs a' tighter rein
Ani.' :its activities and budget; thoses.
i.seeking. to ;cripple its activities
abroad should 'remember that Rus-
:sia's equivalent of our CIA is working.
.,.,4u.11-tirrie through numerous agents in':
four country and elsewhere. Further'
,,anore... the present, action some'
'members' Of . Congress is to' give our
adversaris whatever of -our 'secrets
, they cannot otherwise learn... ?
? :?? . ARTHUR N. YOTTNO-.
: CIA-RDP77-00462.R00010038000reinont'
?
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1
NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 29, :975
White House Pushes Effort to Keep Intelligence,
By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Oct. 28?The
Ford Administration is increas-
ing pressure to keep the hear-
ings of the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence behind
closed doors, the . committee's
chairman said today.
The chairman, Senator Frank
Church, Democrat- of Idaho,
said "pressures are mouHting
on a broadening front" that
indicated the intelligence com-
munity and the Ford Adminis-
tration were "more and more
opposed to public hearings on
anything!" The senator made
his comments after a two-hour
closed briefing on covert activi-
ty by the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Intelligence community offi-
cials have said on several occa-
sions that they are against dis-
closure of details of present
and past covert operations.
"Just how do you have a
public hearing on a covert oper-
ation without endangering indi-
viduals?" one official asked.
THE WASHINGTON POST
4It
. .
The dispute now centers on;
the issue of whether the com-
mittee can hol a public session
on the C.I.A.'s operations 1n1
Chile. Mr. Church and other)
members of his committee havel
said they believe a portion ofi
th discussions can be held MI
public without compromising;
national security. Moreover,i
they point out, much of the;
activity has already been re-i
ported in the press.
Leaks Are Charged
Senator Gary Hart, Democrat'
of Colorado, charged in a;
speech today that the Ford;
Administration and the intel-i
ligence community "were de-
liberately leaking secret infor-I
mad= about abuses under in-
vestigation by the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence."
He cited a ?dozen news ar-
ticles that had the effect, he
said, of pre-empting the com-
mittee hearings and putting Ad-
!ministration explanations in a
:favorable light. ? He said the
cmmittee had made a major
effort to remain "leak proof.", ,
There is no rcord that the]
Wednesday, Oct. 29, 1975
oh? ,
er 7
Fregs.ure
G Easy
By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer
plans to publish a com-
prehensive report on its
months-long assassination
inquiry.
The Idaho Democrat said he
saw no reason to keep the
Chile inquirysecret either, but
the committee will first at-
tempt to find out "how
strongly the administration is
prepared to resist" a public
airing.
Colby and William Nelson,
the CIA's deputy director of
covert operations, testified in
closed session yesterday
about the spy agency's work in
Chile from 1964, when it spent
some $3 million to oppose the.
presidential candidacy of
Marxist Salvador Allende,
until 1973 when Allende was
overthrown in a military coup.
Two former ambassadors to
Chile, Ralph Dungan, who
served from 1964 to 1967, and
Nathaniel Davis, from 1971 to
1973, appeared before the
committee yesterday af-?
'ternoon. George Kennan,
former ambassador to
Moscow and author of the s6-
called "containment policy,"
also testified about the value
of covert operations
generally,.
The Senate intelligence
committee has been running
into mounting pressures front,
the administration to suppress
the results of its in-
vestigations, Chairman Frank
Church (D-Idaho) charged
yesterday. ?
? Central Intelligence Agency
Director William E. Colby
urged the committee at a
*closed meeting yesterday
morning not to hold any public
hearings on covert CIA
operations in Chile.
Church also told reporters
at a mid-day briefing that the
administration still opposes
open hearings on improper
activities of the National
Security,Agency and that the
White House recently objected
to release of even a printed
report on the CIA's in-
volvement in foreign
'assassination plots.
"The pressures are
. mounting on a broadening
front," Church said.
But in spite of the com-
plaints, he added, the com-
mittee will go ahead today
with a public .hearing. on the
supersecret NSA. Church said
the Senate panel also has no
intention of abandoning its
Administration has publicly
charged the Senate committee.
with leaks, but William E. Col-
by, Director of Central Intel-
ligence, has said that disclo-
sures concommitant with the
entire Congressional investiga-
tion the intelligence community!
had undermined the agencies':
effectiveness.
Senator Church said that af-
ter today's meeting Mr. Colby!
would seek guidance from the
White House on whether he
would be permitted to testify'
before a public session. Mr.-
Church also made public a let,,
ter from Philip W. Buchen,
counsel to President Ford, it
was the "general view of thei
executive branch" that if the;
committee issued an "Official",
report on plots to assassinate
; foreign leaders, it might da-
mage United States foreign re-
lations. .
Senator John G. Tower, Re-
:publican of Texas, 'who is vice
[chairman of, the committee,
I said he was also opposed to
!public hearings on covert acti-
ivities. .
. Church said he felt
disclosure "of the whole story
fon Chile) is in the best in-
terests of everyone" since it
would give the CIA a chance to
explain itself publicly. He said
the episodes were all past
'history and would "not entail
any threat to national
'security." .
But he said no decision was
reached because "it was not
Clear if Mr, Colby and others
" would be prohibited from
testifying" in public. ?
Turning to the committee's.
nearly complete assassination-
report, Church recalled how
President Ford himself had
encouraged a congressional
investigation of CIA-
sponsored plots after the
Rockefeller commission had
been unable to complete its
own inquiry.
"I can't imagine how now it
could even be suggested that
this report not be made,
public:: Church said.
He said the objection had
been voiced in a letter to the
committee from White House
counsel Philip Buchen.
The Oct. 9 note, made public
later in the day, appeared to'
? be largely a complaint for the
record. In it, Buchen said the
"general view of the executive
branch is that any report on
political assassination
allegations issued by the
select committee as an official
government document may
seriously prejudice our
national security through'
damage to the foreign
relations of the U.S. and to the
position of the U.S. in the.
world community."
8
Inquiry Secret
Meanwhile, antiwar and reli-
gious organizations filed a
8500,000 suit against the C.I.A.,
.the National Security Agency
and four major cable communi-
cation 'companies. The suit,
filed in Washington's District
Court, charged that the Govern-
ment agencies had deprived
some 8,200 persons of their
constitutional rights.
The plaintiffs sought $50,000
in damages for each of the
8,200 perso as. well as $100
for each hour they were sub-1
iected to illegal electronic cave-
- sdropping. The suit is based
on disclosures in a Rockefeller1
commission report of a domes-
tic surveillance operation in
'which files were prepared on
antiwar a radical leaders and
in which th::: N.S.A. conducted
cable and overseas telephone
'monitoring on some 1,000 per-
'sons.
The suit was filed by the
American Civil Liberties Union
as a class action in behalf
of those affected by the pro-
gram.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
SEPTEMBER29, 1975
THE HOUR OF THE BLUE
FOX. Hugh C. McDonald. Pyramid,
$1.75
This long, walloping good espionage
thriller has many ports of call, an ex-
pertly devised plot and enough energetic
spies to keep readers happily settled in
for the run?that is, if they ignore the au-
thor's obvious and overbearing political
biases. The CIA, opposing d?nte, has
lied to the president and aligned itself
with an international organization of re-
actionaries called the Blue Fox to infil-
trate a Russian experimental germ war-
fare facility in the Aral Sea. At stake is
the antidote to a virile microbe the Rus-
sians have successfully tested in three
U.S. reservoirs. With super-security safe-
guards easily penetrated on all sides, the
action races around Hungary, Austria,
Russia, San Francisco, Washington and
New York. [November]
Buchen added, however,
that the White House realized
the committee "intends to
exercise its own judgment"
and therefore would assign
three officials, from the State
Department, CIA and Pen-.
tagon, to read over the draft
report for any language that
might cause "specific security
problems."
.
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1
NEW YORK TIMES Washington Post
22 Oct. 1975 29 Oct. 1975
INQUIRY !S VOTED 1502 MUlion
FOR HARRINGTON Rs. k'clight
in
- U.S. Spying
Ly RICHARD L. MADDEN
Special to The Neer York Times
WASHINGTON Oct. 21?The
House Ethics Committee voted
..t .to 2 today to investigate
formally charges that Repre-
sentative Michael J. Harrington
violated House rules by disciss-
ing with unauthorized persons
secret testimony on the Central
Intelligence Agency's political
activities in Chile.
? - If no inquiry is made, it
would be the first time that
the eight-year-old panel, which
is.nfficially known at the Com-
mittee on Standards of Official
Conduct, has formally investi-
gated a complaint against a
*yew:her of the House.
approving an inquiry,
will begin with a public
hearing Nov. 3, the committee's
vote appeared to assure that
whatever action it recommends
,will reach the full House for
final action.
Committee members said the
panel could recommend that
'no disciplinary action be taken
against Mr. Harringtcn, a Mas-
sachusetts Democrat, or that
be be censured or even expelled
from the House. ?
The last disciplinary action
by the House against one of
its members was the exclusion
of' the late Representative
Adam Clayton Powell Jr., De-
mocrat of Manhattan, in 1967
for alleged misuse of funds
and> for being in contempt of
courtk in New York.
Could Stir Fight
''The I-Parrington case could
provoke a divisive fight within
the intelligence operations are
- already being investigated by
House and Senate committees.
.Mr. Harrington has acknow-
ledged that he discussed with
other members of Congress and
a reporter for The Washington
Post the substance of secret
testimony on the C.I.A.'s efforts
in 1973 to undermine the
government of Salvador Al..
lende Gossens, Chile:s late
President.
The testimony had been given
by William E. Colby, the Direce
tor of Central Intelligence, to
the House Armed Services
Committee, and an account of
It apperaared in The New York
Times in September, 1974.
t Representative Harrington,
summoned before an Armed
Services subcommittee two
-weeks later, denied having been
the source for The Times article
but 'conceded he had? sought
to bring the C.I.A. involvement
to light.
Representative Robin L
liteeed Jr.. Republican of Ten-
nee who is a member of
tho Armed Services Committee,
rift! a complaint with the
Macs Committee charging that
Mee Harrington had violated
Keeese rules.
retr. Harrington countered by
Mug complaiits. against 17
members of the ArmeAfteetpf
Caseunittee charging that they
. -
By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer
A lawsuit was filed in.
federal court here yesterday
charging the National
Security Agency and the
Central Intelligence Agency
with conducting a massive,
illegal spying campaign on
antiwar activists in the late
1960s and early 1970s and
seeking $500 million in
damages.
The suit was filed by the
,The
Civil Liberties
Union on behalf of 8,200 in-
dividuals and groups on whom
the CIA and NSA reporttedly
maintained files, opened mail
and intercepted messages and
telephone calls.
.The suit is based largely on
information growing out of the
Rockefeller ? commission's
report in June on the U CIA's
domestic surveillance ac-
veelated Kouse rules hy voting
beet June 16 to deny him access
tee the panel's classified testi-
rainy. The Ethics Committee
is not yet acted on these
arenpiaints.
Mr. Karrington told reporters
eterday that he was disappointed
Lat not surprised by the Ethics
Committee's action to investi-
gate Mr. Beard's complaint.
He said he hoped that the
rearings would focus not on
the narrow of whether Kouse
rules may have been violated
but on the broader question
of what he described as "the
use of the C.I.A. and govern-
ment secrecy in general to
short - circuit the democratic
process and cover up illegal
activity."
He said his actions had
been "responsible and proper
under the circumstances," and
added:
"The implication of the Beard
comrlaint and those behind it
is that the rules of the House
And the classification process
itself can prevent the rtporting
of a crime. I don't accept that,
and Neither do the American
people."
?? 3 on Other Panel
? He also noted that three of
the seven votes in the Ethics
committee to investigate Mr.
Beard's complaint had been
Cast by Representatives who
were also members of the
Armed Services Committee?
Melvin Price, Democrat of Min-
bis, F. Edward Hebert, Demo-
crat of Louisiana, and Floyd
Srence, Republican of South
Carolina.
The other four votes for the
inquiry were cast by Represen-
tatives John J. Flynt Jr., Demo-
crat of Georgia who is chair-
man of the committee; Olin
E. Teagut, Democrat of Texas;
James H. Qnillen. Republican
FforRek1tite 261011/0/Offd
Hutchinson, Repuencan of
Michigan.
deities. The report confirmed
the existence of a program
known as "Operation Chaos."
The groups and individuals
listed as plaintiffs in
yesterday's suit reportedly
were watched as a part of that
program.
Named as defendants are
past directors and other top-
ranking officials of both
government spying agencies,
as well as four international
communications networks
which supposedly aided in the
illegal interception of
messages being sent overseas
by the plaintiffs.
The suit claims the plaintiffs
became the topics of "watch
files" ce ''subject files" in the
CIA because of their op-
position to the war in
Indochina in the late 1960s.
The CIA then supplied a
`.`watch list" to the NSA so the
NSA could intercept in-
ternational messages and
telephone calls placed by
persons on the list, the suit
continued.
t According to the
Rockefeller commission
report, the CIA began
if Operation Chaos" to gather
frlormation 'on* the "foreign
contacts" of American
eitizens here who were
protesting the Vietearn war.
As a part of that program,
More than 40 undercover
agents reportedly infiltrated
plomestic antiwar -
organizations.
f The program also included
illegal opening of first-class
mail with the contents copied
and placed in Chaos files, the
Suit alleged. Reportedly
aiding NSA in the interception-
overseas messages were.
Western Union,Telegraph Co.,.
RCA Global Communications,.
Inc., American Cable and
Radio Corp., and ITT World'
Communications, ? Inc., ac-
ording to the suit. The four,
'coMPanies were named as,
I:defendants. ?
NSA turned over to the CIA
more than 1,100 pages .of
'summarized conversations
that had been illegally
.overheard, the suit claimed.
The suit seeks $50,000 in
punitive.damages for each?
'plaintiff, as well as $100 a day
'for the duration of any illegal
interceptions of wire or oral
'ommunications.
Wednesday, October 22, 1975 The Washington Star
Oliphant's seen \
aiding the KGB
I am dismayed by the vileness of
recent Oliphant cartoons, especial-
ly, but not limited to, those concern-
ing the CIA. Is he incapable of a
humorous or positive or construc-
tive portrayal of people, organiza-
tions and events?
, Years past, I had extensive ex-
perience and involvement in
propaganda activities. The most
effective media instrument was the
cartoon, since most people indulge
visually and absorb the message,
but rarely read written propagan-
da. The KGB could never approach
Oliphant's destructive cartoons,
and they receive it for free; that is,
the cartoons serve the KGB's objec-
tives.
Ed McGettigan
CIA-R9PP-1604131214000100380005-1
THARimpe0gRogwag,2pfkii9AiozaatsiimeR-C)9f1532R000100380005-1
The Mail Cover Story
When, Richard Helms became di-
rector,. of the Central Intelligence
Agency, in 1966, he knew that the
agency's mail cover program was
.would be unless, as Mr.
Helms now says he assumed to be
the case,, some form of legality had
been :arranged by Allen Dulles, the
director when the program was
started in 1953.
That may. have been a logical
assumption, but the trouble was that
Mr. Helms, did not bother to check
its validity with Mr. Dulles?"it would
not have occurred to me to fault him
on a matter of law." Nor, apparently,
did Mr. Helms check his assumption
with _anyone else who might have
knov4n he just let the mail cover pro-
gram' go forward.
That testimony and the rest of what
the Senate Intelligence Committee has
been, hearing about C.I.A. mail covers
provide a sort of catalogue of the evils
that allowed the agency to go its own
way " fOr so long, to violate the law
and its own charter with impunity, to
become a sort of government within
the Government.' .
Mr. .Helms' "assumption," for ex-
ample,, not only emphasizes the fact
that .the C.I.A. was scarcely account-
able ,to anyone, and that its power to
operate in secrecy was, in fact, the
power to do virtually anything it
wanted to do. It also suggests the
arrogant, expansive and dangerous
habits of mind officials can develop
when they can act in secret and with-
out accounting for such acts.
Mr. 'Helms further testified that
when he signed a statement in 1970
informing Richard Nixon that the mail
cover program had been ended, he
had no intent to mislead Mr. Nixon?
although the C.I.A. mail cover pro-
gram -was continued until 1973. The
1970 report, he said, ?had referred to
an F.B.J; mail cover program.
Of 'all the devices of high-handed
government, none is more insidious
than this?the statement that is bound
to mislead although it was "not in-
tended" to mislead, that does not tell
the truth although it does not tech-
,
By Torn Wicker
nically tell a lie, that distorts or con-
ceals or obscures facts while appearing
to be a straightforward response. The
C.I.A. may not have originated the
technique, but its officials became
master practitioners.
The Helms testimony left the im-
pression that at whatever political
level?if any?the mail cover program
might have been authorized in 1953
or afterward, it was not by a Presi-
dent. He thought he recalled mention-
ing the program to President Johnson,
more than a decade after its incep-
tion, although he could not\ be sure.
But he could not remember if Presi-
IN THE NATION
'No President has
a right to be
insulated from the
knowledge that his
own subordinates
are deliberately
breaking the law.'
dents Eisenhower or Kennedy had been
told about it by his predecessors, and
he did not remember telling Mr. Nixon
himself.
"You've got to protect the President
from the dirty stuff," Mr. Helms told
reporters after testifying. It could as
easily be said that a man-in his posi-
tion, or Allen Dulles before him, had
to keep the President from finding
out what was going on, so that the
illegal "dirty, stuff" .could, proceed.
And even if the motive Was to "prd-
NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, OCTOBER
18, 1975
American Intelligence:
'A Page of Shame'
To the Editor:
Samuel A. Adams' effort to throw
some light on corruption in the intelli-
gence process before and after the
1968 Tet offensive reflects a personal
integrity which, unfortunately, has
been increasingly under fire within the
C.I.A. and other precincts of the in-
telligence community in recent years.
As a C.I.A. analyst working on the
Vietcong in Saigon and in the Pentagon
from 1965 to 1970, I can confirm the
entire thrust of Sam's charges. My
only regret is that I did not have Sam's
courage and foresight in saving
relevant documents to prove the case.
Some of Sam's critics attempt to
represent him as an egomaniac on a
crusade. Others portray the questions
he raises as "arcane side issues"
(R. W. Komer's Sept. 29 letter). These
,positions reflect either an appalling
ignorance of the nature of a people's
war or a self-serving but transparent
effort at self-defense by the time-
worn tactic of "plausible denial."
The truth is that working-level
analysts in the C.I.A. continually were
diverted from following out leads on
Vietcong strength; that ,they were as-
signed to other areas of work when
they attempted to do so; that they
were ignored or suppressed, as Sam
was, when they persisted, and that
these efforts at distortion and sup-
pression of the facts were common
knowledge and were openly discussed
at the working level. There was room
for only one convenient "truth" in
official estimates, as Sam has proved
beyond any dispute. The choice was
to compromise one's integrity or to
resign, and too many chose the former.
If the issues were fully studied, if
special task .forces were appointed to
study them and if the results were
circulated in the intelligence corn-
10
tect" Presidents, why should ,they be
protected? The highest duty of any
President is to take care that the laws
be faithfully executed, and no Presi-
dent has a right to be insulated from
the knowledge that his own sub-
ordinates are deliberately breaking the
law. To whom should they justify do-
ing so, if they can, except to the
President?
Mr. Helms said he never discussed
the mail cover program with any of
the Congressional oversight commit-
tees to whom he supposedly reported.
That can only mean that they didn't
ask him anything, and he volunteered
nothing, about such important inva-
sions of the privacy and constitutional
? rights of Americans, and such viola-
tions of the laws of the very Govern-
ment the C.I.A. theoretically protects.
So much for the supposed efficacy of
Congressional oversight, and the will-
ingness of the agency to cooperate
with the overseers.
' Arthur Summerfield, Postmaster-
General in the early years of the pro-
gram was misled as to its extent,
according to the Helms testimony, and
his immediate successors were not
informed of it at all?an early example
of C.I.A. deception of its own Gov-
ernment and subversion of official in-
stitutions and processes.
? That neither Mr. Helms nor a later
Postmaster-General, Winton M. Blount,
could agree on exactly what the latter
was told about mail covers suggests
how ad hoc and inadequate were the
sketchy procedures later followed to.
inform the postal department of the
perversions of law being practiced in
its own house.
And when Mr. Helms and other
C.I.A. officials tried to tell Postmaster-
General J. Edward bay "something
very secret" (about the mail covers)
in 1961, Mr. Day protested that he did
not want to know, so that he could
not be blamed for any possible leaks.
Thus, he exemplified that' abdication
of personal responsibility by Govern-
ment officials that did so much to
permit the vast growth of secret, un-
lawful and imperial power in America..
munity as they became available, let
the C.I.A.'s offices of Current Intelli-
gence and National Estimates produce
the published results for Congress. Let
the Director of Central Intelligence
release to Congress the detailed rec-
ords and documents of the National
Security Council's Watch Committee
to prove that the matter was pursued
vigorously and professionally. The
facts will speak for themselves.
The record is clear. It Speaks of
misfeasance, nonfeasance and mal-
feasance, of outright dishonesty and
professional cowardice. It reflects an
intelligence community captured by an
aginc, bureaucricy which too often
placed institutional self-interest or per-
sonal advancement before the national
interest.
It is a page of shame in the history
of American intelligence, and it de-
serves to be aired as fully as possible
beforc the public. JOHN T. Mooat,
Selinsgrove, Pa., Oct. 10, 1975
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BOSTON GLOBE
22 OCTOBER 1975
-11
o
TAT 671, Etc
It
Beecher. The Cl?.,he's
diPlontatic corresp,?Ident? in!iewed
more than o score of prcscur and for-
mer intelligence officigs to examine
the in:tlications of recent exposes. In
a ihrec-part series he discusses the
impact on lorrign intelligence-gather-
ing, adjustinents made to ride out the
storm and future prospects ,for US ?
intelligence capability.
,
By William Beecher -.
Globe Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON Within recent
months, British and West. German
intelligence services; which long had
freely exchanged thie most sensitive
information with their American
counterparts, have become chary of
providing such data.
During the same period, a num-
ber of major LIS corporations, which
have provided cover abroad for
Central Intelligence Agency opera-
tives or insights on little-known eco-
nomic and political trends overseas,
also have become reluctant to cocas-
orate as before. .
?
And large numbers of foreign
agents and contacts, always worried
that an indiscretion could jeopardize
.their jobs or* their lives, have be-
come increasingly nervous about
passing on documents or even ru-
mors.
Well-placed sources in or other-.
wise familiar with the American in
telligence community report - that
such developments are a direct re-
sult of congressional libarings and
newspaper exposes of Certain ques-
tionable activities on the part of the
CIA and other intelligence agencies.
Comments one top CIA official:
"It would be overstating the situa-
tion, to say our sources abroad have
dried up. But 'there's no doubt we're
hurting. People who used to give us
whole reports now are giving us
only summaries. People. who used to
give us .summaties. are 'only giving
us one or two facts. Other's who used
to pass along an oceasional nugget at
diplomatic party, are now
not :willing to shake, hancis
or even smile."
? The reasons for this
? sudden skittishness: fear
that information o: turned
.over to CIA. could coneeiV-
fably ,he provided ? to
Capitol Hill and thence ei-
ther released wholesal Or
-leakixf daniagtN
roved
0
"'i (r"'"111.1
N 6 tl
some cases?deacily, con-,
sequences..
Indeed, a C:ongree.sional
hsource -says certain, com-
mittees have been advised
that following a recent
Congressional revelation a
Middle East country put
two and two together and
executed one of its offi-
cials believed to have been
supplying 'reformation to
CIA. The source declined
.to be more specific.
F. But while conceding at
least temporary damage to
iforeign intelligence g,ath-
eging, several intelligence
'experts interviewed by
The Globe. over recent
;weeks stressed that expo-
esure of excesses and ille-
e,oilities by American Intel- i
:ligence was .direly needed
order to force reforms
;chi' the system.
Clark Clifford Is one
l'suen person. Having
.lielried draft the 1947. leg-
islation which created the
..CIA and having served for
',seven .: years,' first as a
;member and later as
hcnairman oto the Yresi-
. dent's Foreign Intelligence
-.Advisory BoardOhe 13 par-
ticularly well qualified to
assess the situation. ,He
:says: ? ' " ? o
"In the main, our intei'L
ligence operation has
set ved this country well,
1ircugh very troubled
times, for nearly 33 years.
Now the time has come to
?
? "Some of these engage-d-
in intelligence deplore the
investigation that's ? been
gcing on. Tney take the
position that there's some-
thing . unpatriotic and
naive and unsophisticated
.aboot the whole thing.- I
disagree. If we find that
-.under our democratic sys-
Item we have created art
operation which has gross-
ly offended im.portant ten-
lets 'adhere to, then it
'otteht to be changed. The
iuost important job goy-
41- fro c-zt
0, CA),
it
C"`"'1,7 ,(7N
Both critics and defend-
ers of the CIA and its sis-
ter agencies agree, howev-
er, that never before has
.the nation had greater
need for clear, insightful
iroelligence military,
political and economic de-
ve-erenents in the f3oelet
Union and throughout
,much of the world.
If detente with Russia is
to continue, for example,
it is vital that both sides
have confidence they
know to what extent
agreements between them
are being honored. And if
detente should collapse,
with a reversion to cold
war attitudes, detailed
knowledge of Soviet capa-
bilities and probable in-
tentions would obviously
be of very 'great Impor-
tance.
The spotlight of recent
revelations has focused on
three 'broad categories of
activity.
? On covert programs in
places such as Chile and
Laos, many observers feel
it is unfair to pillory the
CIA for operationa autho-
rized and minutely hell-.
rected from tha White
House.
. On domestic operation,
which are. -precluded by
CIA's charter, such as
penetrating and spying on
antiwar movements, even
insiders concede the 'igen- ?
cy should have strenuous-
ly .resisted such assign-
profit from lessons learned merits. ?
and to overhaul this some- . On small - seals covert
times free-wheeling ma- and clandestine opera.'
chine. ? tions, ? informed sources .
ernment has is to correct running amok and eu
Foriksfealk92EH51/08/08 : CIA-Plaa-QW1i3gRiOW1
claim there has been a
Ft-7cl rurner ce.st:3
ey..ceedin3 authorized
:actions. 'Very little has
surfaced publicly on this.
There was, however, the
care of a middle level CIA
official who took it upon
himself to disobey an
order .to destroy some
'deadly toxins developed
for use in poisible assassi-
nations.
But of more than a tcore
of epecialiees interviewed,
none felt the "rogue ele-
phant" concept of the CIA
11 fled.
Ray S. Cline, who spent
about 20 years in top ana-
lytical and operational ag-
sig-renents with CIA and
four. years as director of
the State Department's
Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, believes that
while the intelligence
structure requires. re.;
?.
.vainping, an overdrawn
picture of abuse of power
has seriously damaged the
'ability of CIA to perform
necessary work.
. One of the major im-
pacts of the bad publicity
has been on the raoeala of
.intelligence personnel, pri-
marily 1st CIA, but also in
other agencies. ?
? Notes one s?eitior
cfll-
ciol: "People in the overt.
aids of CIA and TER
(State Department intelli-
' ? gence) are. _:beginniri.g to
r.fa-el a little. ashamed- to
have been professional
in intelligence .over the
Years. ? When you tell
someone you're in intelli--
pence, 'there's? a definite
danger that you'll become.
an outcast, both inside and
outside government." ?
Wives of CIA men report
'suddenly scornful. treat-
Merit in social function's
and even " by ..long-time
neighbors.
7 About 2500 reportedly
have resigned from the
CIA over the last three
years' and many are .en-
countering 'difficulty ? in
getting good jobs. "In they
past, firms have been anx-
ious to snap up our expe-
rienced men," says one of-
ficial. "Now they don't
want to touch them with a
10-foot pole."
' William E. Colby. direc-
tor of Central Intelligence,
has said publicly there is
no difficulty, getting re-
cruits 'for the CIA. But
others report the iluality
of the new men generally
is mit up to the level of
the halcyon days .pf the
ef agency.
000.05?Sleurces report that the
National SPctiritv A isp.nev
Approved
?c.NA) is wont ied that its
worldwide electronic
eavesdropping could be
crippled for fear that -it
wiil unwittingly pick up
and transcribe f or eign -
telephone conversations
? that. include US citizens, a
matter that the Congress
? is very much upset -about.
Sen. *Frank Church,
Democrat from Idaho who
is chairman of the Senate
committee ? investigating
the intelligence. communi-
ty, has warned that the
technology of exotic
eavesdropping has become
so pervasive and awesomei
that Americans may soOrn
be left with "no place to
hide."? ? ? ? . ?- ,
But a senior intelligence
official frets that while it
would be important to
learn what plan's a Euro-
pean firm has to build pe-
troleum pipelines in Rus-
sia and China- over the
next several years, the,
? NSA is nervous abouti
going after telephone- in-
tercepts of, that company
for fear some . American
may suddenly be heard in
one of the conversations..
? Attorney General Ed-
ward H. Levi repqrtedly is
k ta01.12..
Beecher; 'The
Globe's diplomatic corre-
sPondent, interviewed more
than a score of present and
former intelligence officials
to examine the implications
of recent exposes. , In a
thrce-part. series he dis-
cusses the impact on for-
eign .intelligence-gathering,
adjustments made to ride
out the storm and future
prospects for. US intelli-
gence capability.
(Second of a three-
part series)'
Be Wiliam Beecher
Globe Washington Bureau
,.. WASHINGTON ? In
order to convince British
intelligence it. can hand
over top-secret documents
;without fear of their be-
coming public, the United
States; now treats such
material as "on loan." .
:By that semantic sleight
Of hand, such files would
not be considered ? the
"property" of the United
States and therefore
would not be subject to
For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010038
trying to work out a sys-
tem to safeguard Ameri-
cans from unwarranted
intrusions of their privacy
While permitting NSA. to
conduct electronic surveil-.
' However temporary this
? development may turn out
to be, for the time being
there appears to be a sig-
nificant net reduction in
so-called "humint," or
lance that ii regarded as human intelligence. "The
finest spy satellites in the
world arc* great at count-
ing missiles, but not- too
good at providing .clues as
to intentions; internal po-
litical shifts, economic
plans," says one expert.
"For that we must. depend
on people." ? .
being in the national in-
terest.
?Congressional sources
say at after the Russians
installed 'several facilities
In the United States to in-
tercept telephone conver-
sations beamed by micro-.
wave, 'they learned how
valuable a n intelligence
instrument that was and.
proceeded to bury many of
their key telephone lines
in Moscow:.. ?
Officials report that
some foreign governments
that used to pass secrets
eagerly to the CIA,. on the.
premise that a twe-way
exchange would be mutu-
ally beneficial, now are
giving information instead
to US military attaches
abroad. Apparently they
feel the ntilitary system is
less likely to leak. But
these officials say this
switch is on a small scale
and is not making up for a
lot of material the United
States used to get routine-
ly.' .
The negative climate
within the .United States
has cooled the. coopera-
tiveness of American firms
,to the point where many
are not willing to cooper-
ate as before overseas.
Also, in a recent CIA so-
licitation of bids; on' a..
speoky piece of equip-
ment, there were no tak-
ers. The CIA says this is
the first time in its history
this has happened. The of-
ficial ? who disclosed this
was not willing to say.
what the equipment was..
Perhaps as damaging as
anything else of : disclo-
sures from the Pentagon
Papers to those more re-
cently in the view of sev-
eral officials, has been kbe?
BOSTON GLOBE
23 OCTOBER 1 915
'It
II
-FLLi
THE TROUBLED CIA 2
subeoena by Congress or
the ceurts.-
Also, while the Ford
Administration ? wanted
very' much to mount a
major covert effort in sup-
Port of political moderates
in Portugal, because of
widespread criticism over
a similar effort in Chile no
action was taken ? until
very late in the game.
What finally was done
was not only very late, but
very little. Contrary to
published reports *pecu-
lating about tens of mil-
lions of dollars. of covert
aid, the total effort to
date, according to unim-
peachable sources, has
been just over $1 million.
These two incidents are
in one sense closely re-
lated. For they represent
ways the United States is
trying to adjust, in the af-
termath of months of rev-
elations about the CIA on
Capital' .Hill ?and:: in the
press, try the new Yeality of
nervous allies and a criti-
' cal Congress.
For, whatever reforms
may eventually be decided
upon to restore confidence
.in American intelligence,
the United States cannot
call "time" to minister to a
key injured player.
The US-British intelli-
gence connection has been
very close since the days of
World War II when the
OSS (Office of Strategic
Services), the predecessor
of CIA, was established in
part . because of Britain's
desire to ? have a single
agency with which it
cciuld share information
and coordinate clandestine
operations to mutual ad-
vantage... .
?
The relationship ? flow-
ered as Cl.e. grew from a
hand of a few hundred ex-
OSS hands in le47 to a
15,000-man establishment,
with access to information
from the most sophisticat-
ed apy satellites and
other intelligence-gather-
0005-1
insight Soviet analysts
have goLten into the inner
workings both of American
intelligence and or the de-
cision-makeng process it-
self. ?
"Take the Pentagon Pa-
pees." said one Defer:se of-
ficial. "What the Soviets
learned was not so much a
few detailed recommenda-
tions about Vietnaxn, but
rather that . the. Joint
Chie Is of Staff recom-
mended to the. President a
series of steps they felt he
must. take toewin the wane:
It was an interdependent!
package deal ? with time ?
being of the eieence.
."Other memos showedl
the President agonizing ;
endlessly - over seven '-
months and then picking.
out a few actions to try.
This gave the-Soviets an
imPortant insight into the.
non.decision-making in -a
democracy.. It cou3d tempt
them to: act quichly in a
crisis, _confident that be-
'fbre ii reazt'on is decided'
.14pons..... ? in Washington.
they'll -have achleie
7: ac-brazI? " ?
ing equipment . In the
:world. ? -
' But .the British, of late,
have ? become ? quite
alarmed. at the trend in
the United States to shine
a public spotlight into
siime of the more shadowy
cupboards of American in-
telligence. In Britain that
Could not occur because .of
the Official Secrets Act. ?
They were particularly
concerned that their secret
reports and analyses might
be pried out of the files
of the CIA by sub-
poena from a congression-
aI4cornrnittee or by court
suit under the newly
strengthened Freedom of
Information Act. Highly
sensitive sources and
methods might he compro-
mised: And so they held
back a lot, and passed cer-
tain information with so
many restrictions as to
make the information dif-
ficult to disseminate to an-
alysts, according to quali-
fied US sources.
Thus .American officials
came u.p with theitnagina-
12
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tive legalism of treating
British intelligence - as
property, not owned but
merely on loan to the
?United States.
But officials concede
this has not totally ? over-
come British apprehension
ens: the earlier, close rela-
tionship has not been fully
restored.
?
In the case of Portugal,
-officiala say that Secretary
of State Henry A. Kissin-
ger was particularly wor-
ried that unless Lisbon's
drift toward including
Communists in top gov-
ernment posts could be re-
versed, it might well give
an aura of respectability to
coalition governments
with reeente?-zt members
that might be repeated in
Italy and elections in
Western Europe.
? If euch a trend devel-
oped, he felt, the very ex-
istence of the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization
would be jeopardized. For
NATO, ? art alliance de-
signed to stand against So-
viet political and military
pressure, could not tune-
tion without exchanging
great quantities of .classi-
fied facts and plans. And
with Communists sitting
in its inner councils, such
information ? could not be
kept from Moscow, in his
view.
Knowledgeable sources
say William E. Colby, CIA
director, in spring and
early summer stoutly re-
sisted pressures to mount
a covert.- political-action
program in. Portugal, ar-
guing that word would get
out and Congress and the
Press would have a fit
over interference in the
internal affairs of another
nation, similar to the reac-
tion to revelations of CIA
activities in. Chile.
As late as July, a num-
ber of other officials were
backing Colby in the ar-
gument that American
handsewere tied in Portu-
gal be... the hostile atmo-
sphere in Congress. In-
stead, they insisted the
United States would have
to sit back and depend on
a number of West Euro-
pean Socialist parties, led
by those in West Germany
and Sweden, to help their
counterparts in Portugal.
Meanwhile, while no
one knew the hard num-
cracy that . the Soviet
Union was spending. about
$50 mirion in Portugal.
In early. August, Presi-
dent Ford complained in
an interview with U.S.
News et: World Report of
the vitual ittmos.sibilttes of
CIA involvement in Por-
tugal bee:et:se of the nega-
tive climate on Capitol
Hill. But a month later, itzt
an interview with the. Chi-
cago Sue-tiltnes, the Pres-
ident :stinted of some in-
volvement when he de-
clared: "I dOn't think the
situation" (in Portugal) re-
quired us to have a major
CIA involvement, which
we have not had."
.Sources say that be-
tween those two state-
ments by Ford, the Ad-
ministration discussed the
danger ef trendain Portu-
gal with some key con-
gressional., committees arid.
a small-Scale CIA effort
was approved and
launched.
Observers in and out of
the intelligence conarnuni-
ty believe the CIA has
been given a bum rap over
covert action in places like
Chile and Laos. Aa in the
case of Portugal, they
point out, the decision to
go in and the nature steel
scope of the effort, were
decided upon by the Presi-
dent and supervised by his
"advisers.
Ray . Cline, who
capped a 20-year 'career
with CIA by servin'a.,? from
1962 to 1966, as iti deputy
director for. intelligence
and subsequently headed
the State Department's irO-
telli eence blanch from
1969 to 1973, raid in en
- interview that the - Laos
enparatiert started as a
standard etandeettne intel-
ligence mission to gather
information on .. North
? Vietnamese -military
movements- along the lia
Chi Minh Trail.
? But a series of White
House decisions; starting
in the ? Kennedy ?Adminis-
tration, turned the effort
from that of a small num-
ber of Meo tribesmen col-
lecting tactical intelligence
Into a covert, undeclared
war, run in the field by a
succession of American
ambassadors in Vientiene.
.A senior congressional
source agrees. Both Nort
Vietnam and the -United
its pas ticipation in mili-
tary activity in Laos. In
the? case of the United
States, he says; it might
have been forced by the
Laotian government to
pull out if it admitted its
role Publicly, thereby in-
creasing the ? jeopardy to
-American and Vietnamese
'troops in South Vietnam.
"It grew to a $20 million ,
to $30 million a year .ope'r-
ation, funded out of: the
Defense Department's
budget," the congressional
source said. "But it was
not an assignment the CIA.
particularly relished, and
it certainly cannot be
blamed in that instance
for running amok."
In the case of Chile,
Cline says, "Kissinger
pushed .the CIA in, pre-
sumably on ? behalf. of
Nixon." The operation, he
said, was run from. the
White House.
? But he and others do
blame the CIA for knuck-
ling under to pressures
from Presidents Johnson
and Nixon to infiltraye and
report on the activities of
antiwar groups lit the
Uriited,States.
Clina makes this dis-
tinction: if CIA had pene-
trated domestic groups in
order to provide a cover to
send agents abroad on
clandestine missions, that
'would have been permissi-
ble,. in his view. But CIA
provided extensive reports
to the White House- and
.the..F14 on the. plans and
activitieseof such domestic
groups, and that clearly
was improper.
"I can - only . blame
Helms for not digging in
his heels harder," Cline
says, referring to Richard
Zitelms, who at the time
'ambassador- to Iran. Many
voters voiced. the same
sentiment, saying that
. Helms found it difficult to
'headed CIA and now is
others voiced the same
say no to the White House,
-but suggesting that he saw
that the agency "dragged
. its heels" -and did the-
least possible in questiona-
,-
ble operations. . -
. .
A number of specialists.
believe recent revelations
may be useful in opening
the way to needed reform
of the intelligence commu-
nity, but they argue that
the focus on covert opera-
intelligence activity, is.
missing the forest for the
trees.
,
? In their -tier; the two
most import2.M.
are: I) a paucity of consir,-
tently well thought-outs,
well articulated and time-
ly intelligence analysis,
and 2) .a penchant for
oversecrecy over the last
six years which Withholds
from top intelligence ana-
lysts information, for in-
stance, on negotiations
with the Soviet Union and
the People's Republic- of
China. Such information
would enable the analysts
to hatter know what to
look for in studying the
roams cf data culled from
recennaissance satellites,
agent reports and transla-
tions cf Soviet and Chi-
nese broadcasts and news-
papers. .
Says one Official of the
poor .qeality, overall, of
analysis from CIA and
DIA (Defense Intelligence
Agency): "They know the
single stones of the mo-
saic. They know- the color
and shape and' size of
many of them. But they
can't put the mosaic to-
gether consistently."
To improve the quality
of analysis requires the
recruitment of better ana-
lysts, provision of well
thought-out programs of
specialized advanced edu-
catiOn ? and training, and
incentives to got out on -a
limb an.d warn of impend-
ing crises when facts and
intuition warrant, the ex-
perts agree. . ?
s ?
But they feel the pre-
sent climate makes it es-
pecially difficult .to recruit
many of the kind of young
people necessary for an
upgrading effort t_
On .the matter of over-
-secrecy,: Clint. recently
told the Pike a-mmittee on
intelligence: "In all . my
years in the State Depart-
ment as ? chief of. intelli-
gence, I never saw any re-
cord of any of .the many
conversations between
White House officials and
senior Soviet officials. If
these had been available
for systematic study by
Soviet experts, some of the
rather naive steps taken in
Presidential-level negotia-,
tions with the Soviet.
Union might have been
avoided "
reports were
cireeu.-
rcRiamttoeftsA113010(18/04171Alit;ittv-oraseittvoi 0 ?AN 0 -
bers,
?
?
lacing through the burea -PP whi neit er admitted ril wo percen o entagon - sources
.13
Approved For Release 2001/08/08
.iythe decision to invade
Cambodia in 1970 was so
citnely held by the Nixon
Administration that even
the then DIA director, Lt.
.Con. Donald Bennett, was
f.e. the dark. According to
'!1?:?e eccount, on the morn-
THE BOSTON. GLOBE
24 October 1975
ing of the invasion Ben-
nett was asked lions the
Russians and Chinese were
reacting?
?
"If you'd hare -told me a
few days ago. I would
have gotten some special
assets into place to be able
: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1
to give you a decent an-
swer," he is reported to
have snapped. ? ?
The point, of course, is
that if a handful of top of-
ficials are so worrhid
about the possibility of
Officials fear reform, admit ifs- riteeded
William Beecher interviewed ',tore
than a score of present and former
intelligence officials to exantine the
implications of recent exposes. In a
three-part series he discusses the
impac; on foreign intelligence-gather-
ing, adjustments made .to ride out the
? storm and. future prospects for U.S.
i4itelliL7enci capability.
By William Beecher
.Globe Diplomatic Correspondent
V Anlilen_in. N ? The senior
intelligence official official was trying to
sum up his frustration and concern
over sensation-packed Congressional
hearings and newspaper exposes on
the excesses of the intelligence com-
munity.
. .
"The whole thing reminds me of
the last scene of Oedipus Rex," he
said. "The king, having seen some
wickedness and learned some bitter
truths', walked to center stage and
tore his own eyes out.
"If the current process continues;
we're in danger of ending up with a
blind government, trying to cope
with foreign affairs and military
policy in a very cruel, tough world."
This sort of arpprehension,
though not. so dramatically ,over-
stated, was voiced in a series of in-
?terviews by a number of men, par-
ticillariy those who currently lead
the iritelligenee establishment.
But they and others . generally
agreed that out of the present trau-
ma should come a 'Thoroughgoing
analysis of what America wants and
needs in. the way of an intelligence
system, and reforms alined at
achieving a better balance between
ends and means.
While experts in and out of gov-
ernment have a variety of views on
.what is needed, there are some com-
mon strands in many of their pro-
posed solutions.
The common elements
? include:
1) A new look at intelli-
gence priorities, with
greater emphasis on de-
veloping sophisticated eco-
nomic intelligence and
somewhat less on military
fntelligence, especially if
funds,are cut back, as ex-
pected.
2)- A fundamental
change in the present ar-
14
THE TROUBLED CIA -3
rangemertt in which the
director of the intelligence
community also heads one
of -its components, the
CIA. Most would separate
the two functions and. up-
grade the former.
3) Creation 'of a new
loint Congressional over-
tight committee, patterned
on the Joint Committee on
Atomic _Energy, to scruti-
nize operations and con-
sult with the Executive
Department on long range
policies and on proposed
covert activities.
4) Some would take
covert missions away from
the CIA and establish a
separate small agency,
more closely, . supervised,
for such activity. Others
ivould leave the function at
the CIA, but cut way back
on such operations, per-
mitting political interfer-
ence in other countries
only When a compelling
case of American national
interest could be made.
Clark Clifford, Wash-
ington lawyer, adviser to a
succession of presidents,
and former Secretary of
Defense, has been in-
volved in shaping Ameri-
can intelligence since he
helped draft the 1947 law
which established the CIA...
He was White House Coun-
sel at the time.
President Truman, he re-
President Truman, he re-
calls, wanted such an or-
ganization because of his
conviction . that the bu-
reaucracy failed to fore-
cast Pearl Harbor not be-
cause there weren't solid
signs and reports pointing
in that direction, but be-
cause no one central office
was collating and evaluat-
ing them.
Following the Bay of
Pigs fiasco in 1961, Clif-
ford says, he was asked by
President Kennedy to be-
come a member of a new
group, the Foreign Intelli-
gence Advisory Board, to
leaks ?that they don't even
confide in the heads of
State and Defense Depart-
ment intelligence, this se-
verely constrains the abili-
ty of the intelligence corn-
muhity to serve the policy
mkirg precesr egeetively,
improve US performance
in this field._
"I made a tragic mis-
take," Kennedy told him
at the time; "The reason
did was because my advice
was wrong. My advice was
wrong because it .was
baSed- oh erroneous facts.
And. the 'erroneous. facts
were due to faulty intelli-
gence. If we improve sub-
stantially our intelligence,
then my adVice will, be
better and I will, hopeful-
ly, not make another mis-
take of this magnitude." .
. Clifford served for
seven years on The ?board,
first as a-. member and
later as. chairman. :From-
this background, he has a-
number of suggestions to
improve the current Intel,
ligence set up.
He urges a new law
'which would take from
the e National Security
Council the primary re-
sponsibility for making
policy for the intelligence_
Community and vest it, in-
stead, in a specialist at-the
White House.. Any pro-
posed covort actions, for
example, would have to be
cleared by him.
He would consult, regu-
larly and closely, with a
new ? special oversight
committee with a small
number of senior members
from, both houses of Con-
gress.
"This man would keep
the President fully in-
formed of all important
developments in intelli-
gence; if he needed a
Presidential decision, he
would get ? it, quickly,"
Clifford says. -
He feels true oversight
has not been performed in
Congress for years. And
he believes that the secre-
taries of State and Defense
are much too busy running
their departments to give
more than cursory atten-
tion to overseeing the in-
telligence community.
Clifford says that at the
Present time the director
of Central Intelligence
will come before the Na-
tional Security Council,
sketch out a problem and
make a recommendation
for perhaps a covert action
/program.
?
? "The pushed, harried
men at that meeting will
say: 'It sounds O.K., pi
tahead.' CIA will thus have
a charter to go from point
A to point B. But in the
field it will appear to the
operators the events ? are
pushing' them to Point C,
then to D and E. And then
the roof falls in. In point
of fact, they were only au-
? thorized a limited opera-
tion from A to B."
Clifford feels that with
a small, new agency set up
to handle only covert pro-
grams, it would have to
clear each and every stop
directly with the new in-
telligence czar. And he, in
turn, would consult, as
necessary, with the Presi-
dent and the special Con-
gressional group.
He feels that very few
covert programs would be
authorized under this ap-
proach, and that the effort
in Chile would not have
passed the test as being
vital to US national inter-
ests.
. This raises a philosoph-
ical question as to what
sorts of activities the Unit-
ed States should in fact
get involved in.
A senior intelligence of-
ficial complains that under
present circumstances the
Soviet ? KGB could move
into Bangledesh, build up
the local Communist
party, buy off some key
people in the military, the
government and the press,
launch a black propaganda
Cainpaign to mislead the
populace on the true ac-
tivities of the Uniteo
?
States and others ? aL.
without fear of any coun-
- ter-effort by the- United
States.
"We - would say:
?A5prOVed-FOTRe1e-ate-2001/08/00 CIX-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1: ?
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shouldn't ire counter it?
Buy back some people?
We need funds. But it
wouldn't be authorized for
le.ar of the activity leaking
cnt; SO we'd drift along
=tea' the. situation became
so deenerate that we'd
areve ne choice but to act.
By then it, would lee too
Tate to do anything effec-
tive." .
. :This reflects a coricern
among a number of ective
cfficialre but Clifford,
Emong . others, would
event.: . the United States
should steer clear of such
marginal situations. That
is the kind': of question that
doubtless Would :be 'debat-
ed thoroughly.if aenewein-.
telligence struc-
ture is propoied either by.
the White House or -Con-
gress.
A top- Congressional
source says he would be
apprehensive about creat-
.ing a new intelligence czar
? on the President's . staff
because such ? advisers at
present may not be called
before Congressional com-
mittees. He would prefer
having a Director of Cen-
tral intelligence, confirm-
ed by Congress, with over-
nil responsibility for guid-
ing' all the intelligence
agencies, and a different
man running the CIA.
Currently both jobs are
handled by one man, Wil-
liam E. Colby.
The Congressional
source favors a new select
committee of the Congress,
NEW YORK TIMES
25 Oct. 1975
Former Intelligence Officer
Sues for C.I.A. Files on Him
but would limit it to over-
all review of policy, with
the Armed Services and
Military Appropriations
? committees of both Houses
centinuing to pass on the
funding requests of differ-
ent Lntelligence agencies,
mostly hidden in the-De-
fense budget. The new
committee, however,
would also be available for
consultation on special,
sensitive projects, such as
proposed convert actions..
An official with eite-n-
sive experience both in
CIA and military intelli-
gence points out that 80
percent of all intelligence
resource's are under the
control of the Defense De-
partment. One result, he
? says, has been that the
vast bulk of resources are
targeted on' learning how
many SS-19 missiles the
Russians have deployed
and how many mecha-
nized divisions the Chinese
have, but precious little on
developing economic intel-
ligence about plans of oil
producing nations, for ex-
ample. ?
Other experienced intel-
ligence officials, civilian
and military, agree. One of
them says: "Economic in-
formation 13 booming, in-
creasingly important to
:the viability of this coun-
try. We should be gearing
up to a major capability
here.. There ought to be
some way we could obtain
information from some of
our major corporations,
WASHINGTON. Oct. 24 (UPI)
'?A former intelligence officer,
John Marks, has tiled a free-
dom of information suit against
the Central Intelligence Agency
seeking all files or other docu-
ments the agency has compiled
on him, the Center for National
Security Studies announced..
The suit, filed this week for
Mr. Marks by ? the American
Civil Liberties Union, seeks "all
files, dossiers, communications,
computer printouts or other
documents", the agency holals
on the former State Depart-
ment liaison official with the
intelligence agency. -
? Mr. Marks is co-author with
Victor Marchetti of the contro-
versial book "The C.I.A. and
the Cult of Intelligence," which,
with court approval the agency
partially censored. He is :now
an associate at the center.
without creating conflicts
of interest or raising._ sto-
ries about infiltration of
US business by the CIA.
"For example," he con-
tinues, "Occidental Petro-
leum knows more about
what's going on in Libya
than anyone in the US
government. We ought to
be able to go to them and
_solicit information, prom-
ising it won't go to ? com-
petitors or anyone ,else.
But Occidental doesn't
want to be associated with
CIA. Everyone is afraid to
get involved .in internal
collector, of information.
But we should be gearing
up more to ,understanding
what's going to happen to
oil, copper and other- com-
modities. We know so
much about strategic mis-
siles, but very little about
economic intelligence. It's
a question of priorities."
?
When will the priorities
be addressed, the issues
brought to ahead?
?
A savvy Capitol Hill
source says he thinks the
issue will be kept gave
through the election year.
"There are some 'members
who would rather .have
the issue than the solu-
tion.".
But the Church com-
mittee in the Senate and
the Pike committee in the
House should wrala up
their investigations and
render reports and recom-
mendations within the next
few months.
Christian Science Monitor
22 October 1975
' Presicicnt *ford is known
to be unwillteg to let the
matter rest with the re-
port by the intelligence
commission head?til 11,:r
President Rockefeller. A
team of White House ofil-
dials is beginning to ac-
tively dig into the situa-
ation; que.Stioning officials
at each of the intelligence
agencies with an eye ton
major Presidential initi-
ative. ?
. Clifford, for one, thinks
it would be a mistake to
think the community can
be brought into line mere-
ly by increasing the clout
of the Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board as recom-
mended by the Rockefeller
Commission. The mem-
bers of that board are
much too busy in their own
professions' to provide
proper continuous over-
view, he feels.
One of the key officials
in the community would
Welcome the issue being
aired in the Presidential
campaign, so long as it is
done conscientiously and
'constructively. "When the
campaigs is over, the new
President will have a
mandate to reform the,
system. The dust can set-
tle, and we can stop' testi-
fying ,and get back to our
work sof gathering and in-
terpreting the facts so
necessary to effective pol-
icy-making."
'Leave our spies alone'
Commentary by Howard K. Smith on
? , ABC News.
Chairman Pike [recently] praised our spies
who gather information, but he said the CIA
goes wrong among those who receive and
interpret the information, and act on it.
I don't know if he knew it, but scholars of
the subject say he was stating the tradition of
the dark game the world over.
Espionage is eminently successful in all
nations. There aren't many secrets that can't
be found. But intelligence ? interpreting and
acting on them ? are flawed most every-
where.
Because all the books on it are now open,
World War II is an encyclopedia of cases.
Hitler's planned attacks on the Netherlands
and on Russia were known to the date in the
victims' capitals, but they wouldn't believe it. ?
Hitler had our detailed plans for D-Day, but
we were smart enough to get a lot of phony ?
plans to him too, so he never believed the real
ones., ..;.? : , .? -; ?
?? . ??, ? .
Books on 'cases since are not open. But we
know that from Russia putting missiles in
Cuba to the Yom Kippur war in the Sinai, we
had. all the facts . we needed, but anis- -
interpreted them. ". ? s. " "
. Since CIA reform is now in order, the..
distinction is important: Leave our spies -
alone. I am inclined to think the President ?
right in denying Congress information that'
would hint .at their identities, locations, or
methods. : ? . .? ? a ea a a? -
? Go to* work on' the' superstructure of in- -
telligence and dirty tricks. That's Where the
.trouble lies and changes are needed..
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New Statesman
17 octo4ppemed For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001h0q8K9A4
ion ta ISL garbage invariably con-
Julian Barnes
Under the CIA Cloak
M.1:1Z1390, 411110NaliSONIMErtlffir
Ac-cording to Walter Mondale, the Demo-
cratic Senator from Minnesota, the present
proceedings of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities are 'more import-
ant than the Watergate hearings - possibly
the most important hearings in the history
of our country'. There have certainly been
enough sensational revelations about illegal
techniques and vicious hardware (dart-guns
and shellfish poison) to disturb the glazed
approval with which the American public
traditionally regards the CIA and the FBI.
The Committee itself is aiming somewhat
deeper: at how the intelligence agencies are
and can be made accountable to the Presi-
dent and to Congress. Such a scrutiny is cer-
tainly overdue, since congressional super-
vision has long been weakly complaisant,
and presidents have been more interested in
hearing about results than methods. In addi-
tion, presidential attitudes to the FBI were
long conditioned by the secret files which
J. Edgar Hoover built up on important
public figures. Kennedy, asked why he re-
appointed Hoover, replied: 'You don't fire
God'; while Johnson, a rich source of
coarse wit, commented: 'It's better to have
him inside the 'tent pissing out than out-
side the tent pissing in.'
The Senate Committee is not a very
wieldy institution, either for intensive cross-
examination (each of the ten Senators has
ten minutes with a witness), or for a serious
exchange of ideas (three of the ten minutes
are usually taken up with a harangue,
sometimes patriotic, sometimes moral,
sometimes folksy, sometimes, hideously, all
three). Moreover, there are side-issues which
often take over from the investigation. With
election year coming up, and gavel-to-gavel
television coverage available, the Senators
are on good form: the younger DemOcrats
are in feisty mood, throw moral fits towards
the camera, and call for Nixon to be sub-
poenaed; the Republicans soft-pedal the
past, and take it out on the bureaucrat serv-
ed up -as the day's victim. The chairman,
Frank Church, neat and broad-jawed in the
Kennedy mould, with a matching electric-
guitar voice, is bucking discreetly for the
Democratic nomination; and his recitation
of the Presidential Oath (without notes),
ostensibly to emphasise Richard Nixon's
dereliction of duty, has an added resonance
to it. Despite all this calculated theatricality,
however, the plot-line remains vividly clear.
The present hearings, part of the con-
tinuing backwash from Watergate, develop-
ed from the discovery of what was known
as the 'Huston plan'. Named after a Nixon
White House aide, this was a strategy de-
signed in 1970 to counteract campus
violence and the anti-war protest move-
ment; it involved black-bag jobs (as break-
ins are called in the sanitised vocabulary of
intelligence work), mail-opening pro-
grammes, and the vigorous harassment of
. political activists. It also proposed domestic
spying by the CIA, in direct violation of
the agency's charter. President Islisoa gave
official approval to the Huston plan on 23
July 1970; but five days later, after pres-
sure from Hoover and Attorney-General
John Mitchell, he revoked his approval.
Both decisions were completely hollow: the
first, since most of the illegal techniques
suggested in the Huston plan had already
been in use by the FBI and CIA for
decades; the second, since both agencies
went ahead and behaved as if the plan had
been approved.
It was a classic example of executive im-
potence. The CIA, for example, immedi-
ately began to expand the mail-opening
programme which it had run on suspected
dissidents since 1952 (its varied victims had
included Senator Edward Kennedy, John
Steinbeck, Martin Luther King, Richard
Nixon himself, and, ironically, Frank
Church). Meanwhile the FBI, which had
had great difficulty in infiltrating student
movements, had sought, and been refused,
permission to recruit agents under the age
of 21; it nevertheless went straight ahead
with the proposal, and its teenaged inform-
ants enabled thciusands of extra files to be
opened on suspected dissidents. These files,
illegally compiled, are presumably still held.
Truly, as Frank Church put it, the intelli-
gence agencies had begun to operate as
'independent fiefdoms', keeping the Presi-
dent ignorant of everything which, in their
judgment, he did not need to know.
The reasons for acting unconstitutionally
and illegally are easily explained: such
methods are less trouble, they bring results,
and anyway the other side is already using
them. One of the few witnesses to approach
candour on the subject was James Angleton,
the former chief of CIA counter-intelli-
gence. A gaunt, rather stylised patrician
who cultivates orchids in his spare time,
Angleton was reputedly the man who put
the finger on Philby, and was forced into
retirement last year because of his opposi-
tion to d?nte. In an unguarded piece of
testimony which he subsequently described
as 'imprudent' but did not withdraw, he
pronounced it 'inconceivable that a secret
intelligence arm of the government has to
comply with all the overt orders of the
government'. It was a belief which followed
ill on the assurance voiced earlier by ex-
CIA Director. Richard Helms: 'The nation
must to a degree take it on faith that we,
too, are honourable men devoted to her
service.'
When Angleton was asked to evaluate
the usefulness of the CIA's illegal activi-
ties, he cited the case of Kathy Boudin, a
member of a group of Weathermen who
blew up the Manhattan house in which
they were making bombs in 1970. The FBI's
investigations produced virtually nothing on
her; but the CIA's mail coverage pro-
gramme turned up some 50 letters which
related to her activities.
Almost by arrangement it seemed, the
next witness, Charles Brennan, a former
assistant director of the FBI, emphasised
the frustrations and failures of sticking to
the law. A? chubby, nervous apparatchik,
suspiciously eager to please, Brennan out-
lined an FBI plan devised when informa-
tion on foreign spies working in the United
States was at a low ebb. This was a scheme
of `trash coverage', and involved the bureau
systematically sifting through the dustbins
of suspected communist agents. The revela-
16
tamed nothing but garbage drew the loudest
laughter of the hearings; but even this
seemed to underline the stance which the
intelligence services were taking before the
committee. Either we stick to the letter of
the law, they appeared to imply, in which
case we remain empty-handed and ridicul-
ous; or we use dubious methods, and get
results.
It is, of course, an illusory dilemma, since
there are two more possibilities: legal com-
petence, and illegal incompetence. Indeed,
the latter may well turn out to characterise
the recent activities of the CIA, since a
concurrent House investigation under Con-
gressman Otis Pike into the agency's actual
efficiency has already revealed startling
failures over the ret offensive and the Yom
Kippur war. Even with an efficient intelli-
gence service, however, the Executive must
be able to control it. The Senate Committee
returns restlessly to this question, with little
enough help, not surprisingly, from its
witnesses. Asked how he thought the
agencies could be made to act within the
law, Angleton brazenly suggested that the
law should be adapted to the needs of the
agencies; indeed, he even claimed (and in
this was supported by Brennan) that if the
agencies had gone astray it was partly
through lack of guidelines from Congress.
Disingenuous as this argument is, it con-
tains some truth. Tougher congressional
supervision is part of the answer (at the
moment, for example, oversight of the CIA
is split between ?four congressional units);
choosing a president (and, through him, an
attorney-general) of firm moral character
is clearly another part. As far as the
agencies themselves are concerned, it does
appear that they are now less eager to en-
gage in illegal activities: the FBI's black-
bag jobs (of which, for example, there were
238 against 14 specific 'domestic subversive
targets' between 1942 and 1968) were dis-
continued on Hoover's orders in 1968; and
the CIA ended its mail coverage in 1973
Of course this still leaves activities like the
tapping of international phone calls (about
which Senator Church has promised revela?
tions), and the use of the Revenue Service
to harass dissidents.
But however much the structure of ac
countability is tightened up, and howeve
much agency operatives appear to change
their spots, it remains extremely difficul
if not impossible, to ensure the account
ability of intelligence agencies whose pa
terns of thought and modes of operatin.,
demand stealth, concealment and deceit
Perhaps the most bizarre and disturbing dis
covery made by the Church committee s
far, and the one which is most indicativ
of the thought processes of those under in
vestigation, has been that of the existenc
of the FBI's `Do Not File' file. This was
system whereby the black-bag jobs which
were done were recorded separately, an
kept out of the regular bureau files. FE
officials were thus able to submit affidavits
and to swear in court, that their files con
tamed no reference whatever to the break-i
that was being investigated. 'It's really th
perfect cover-up,' declared Senator Richa
Schweiker. 'It would be technically telli
the truth, yet it would be a total deception.
Or, as Senator Howard H. Baker fro
Mississippi, in his folksier way, put it:
frightening.'
-
Washington
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380008-1
Th U.S . 2ittar
?
V./ASH NG.TON
A PRIVATE WEEKLY REPORT AND FORECAST FROM U. S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT
2300 N Street N ? Washin5lon. DC 23037
Tel.: :[phone]j3 ? C:11)!ci Adrirsss.
VOFEPO-
October 10, 1975
.Quiet steps are being taken to reshape the Central Intelligence Agency..
One objective: To free the agency from "excessive" Pentagon pressures.
Another, to lessen the influence the State Department wields over the CIA.
And, at'the same time, a drive is on to find more spies who are willing to do
the tedious undercover work that a successful intelligence operation requies.
Little of this story has been told. Here is a bachgrounder for you:
The Pentagon comes in for some severe criticism by CIA's civilian brass.
In particular, scare-tactic lobbying by the military to boost CIA's budget --
the old routine of whispering to Congress that "Soviet subs are off the coast"
at times when Congress just happens-to be considering appropriations requests
from the Defense Department and the CIA. The growing view: No need for that.
. Moreover, some CIA professionals resent what they regard as interference
by the State Department -- "tailoring" CIA information to foreign-policy goals.
(The charge that CIA figures on Viet Gong troop strength in the Tet offensive
were doctored to match an Administration line is offered as an illustration.)
? . To correct the alleged abuses, the agency is doing some intense lobbying,
asking Congress to amend the 1947 law which set up the CIA in the first place.
Specifically, CIA seeks exclusion of military men from its two top posts.
It's also asking Congress to block any Secretary of State from serving as head
of the National Security Council, a position that Henry Kissinger holds today.
CIA morale? Low. Investigations and adverse publicity haven't helped.
Nor has this: The agency has became infected with. Washington bureaucracy-itis.
Too many empire-builders, some offices overstaffed, some methods cry for change.
Vietnam proved, for example, that the British Government could gather as many
facts with 12 undercover agents as we could with 700 people in the same area.
Then there's the problem of spies who don't want to stay out in the. cold.
The CIA can hireplenty of people who like to work in the open, bat we're told
there's a shortage of men and women willing to go overseas and underground
to pose- as merchants, taxicab drivers and such while serving as CIA operatives. ?
-These Missions can mean danger, hardship, facelessness sometimes for years.
If you know anyone interested in working for CIA, suggest that they write
CIA Personnel Director, Washington,- D.C. 20505. Or telephone [phone].
NEW YORK
27 OCTOBER 1975
146
The Company Minds Its Manners
The CIA is quietly launching a public-relations campaign
to convince the establishment that its existence is worth
preserving. So, the Harvard Business Club of Washington
was recently invited over to CIA headquarters in Langley,
Virginia, for cocktails and a little hard sell from Director
William Colby. Equipped with charts and slides, Colby
!
detailed the structure of the organization, discoursed on the necessity for some secret operations, and discussed the
CIA's involvement in the six-day Arab-Israeli war. One of
the agery's Middle East problems, said Colby, was that
intelligence agents in the area had not anticipated an Arab
attack. A more fundamental flaw in their operations, Colby
explained, was that the agency had not "programed enough
irrationality" into the Arab- Israeli situation. He promised
that every effort wouAlifirol9dtltParRilea's re120.04406108
Meanwhile, over on Capitol Hill, the word is that Colby's
courtship of the establishment may be a little "irrational"
itself. A number of congressmen are saying that both the
Church and Pike committees investigating U.S. intelligence
activities have mishandled their hearings, and as a result,
the CIA may get off the hook entirely. One embittered lib-
eral congressman explained it this way: "Frank Church's
Senate committee.lvent off into the clouds, playing to the
press gallery with sensationarstuff about poison dart guns
and shellfish toxin. It lost sight of the real purpose of the
inquiry?not only what the CIA does, but why it does it.
...-Over in the House, Otis Pike is on an ego trip fighting
the White House on a side issue of subpoena power, and
it's caused a lot of dissension within the committee." The
expected outcome: as the investigations drag on and on.
Congress will lose interest in the whole subject and will
161AaREkR F3ROONMIRD MUSS WOO CIA. .
alit)," in the future. ?
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FOREIGN SaRVICE JOURNAL
October 1975
The nation must, to a degree, take it on faith that we, too, are
honorable men devoted to her service.--:Richard M. Helms
try^
yiqt?
t?
tinvesil adau_
THOMAS A. DONOVAN
1'1
IT SEEMS likely, when the Senate's.
investigation of the Central In-
telligence Agency .is finally behind
us, that new and stronger barriers
to Agency involvement in domestic
affairs will have been erected. It is
much less likely that any substan-
tial:changes will have been imposed
on the Agency's activities over-
seas. Too many Senators have ex-
plained that the investigation is not
? a threat to the Agency's continuing
ability to carry out its "basic mis-
sion" focl us to expect from the
Congress any real change in CIA's
mandate for clandestine in-
telligence collection beyond our
borders.
This is a pity, for there is need
for a careful Look at this "basic
Mission." We should ask: Should
we not, while retaining within the
agency's sphere of operations all of
its present open intelligence-
collection activities, put an end to
its present excessive preoccupation
with the collection of information
by the traditional methods of es- ,
pionage?
We would still have our observa-
tion satellites overhead. We would
still tisten to (and if we are clever
enough, even read) other people's
radio traffic. We would continue,
as in the past, to learn what we
could from knowledgeable defec-
tors and other walk-in document
deliverers, such as Oleg Pen-
kovsky. We would still take normal
counter-intelligence precautions.
Moreover, we would still have in
an -above-board way, our batteries
of intelligence analysts making
their customarily careful analyses.
We have been told by CIA
spokesmen that the. overwhelming
bulk of the information worked
over by agency analysts emanates
from more or less open sources,
and only a tiny percentage conies
from the packets of traditional spy
Thomas A.-Donovan. FSO-retired. seri?ed
at Prague. ilk IhtKitc. Fi.ankfort. Warsaw,
Berlin, Khorramshahr and in the Depart-
ment hefine his ,Virement vi the late 60s.
Reprinted uldi permission _limn Com-
monweal Publishing Co., Inc.. 232 Madison
Are.. New l'grk, ew York 10016.
work: -
As for agency officers at CIA
stations in embassies and ,consu-
lates through the world, we could
keep them on the. job, going to
cocktail parties and-circulating as
conventional diplorriats do. The
unconventional but sophisticated
political reporting talents of agency.
personnel 'abroad already largely
focused on and concerned with
open available information, are an.
asset that would not be diminished
by depriving them of their authori-
zation to act.,.fcr a feW-hours each
week, like -"characters in a spy
novel. All in all, then, an abrupt
end to the shabby expedients now
indulged in by our collectors of (or
rather, lookers for) clandestine
political intelligence would be a
-long way indeed from total in-
telligence disarmament.
Certainly the record does not
suggest that Russia's immense
vestment of men and money in
clandestine intelligence collection
has been all that useful. The,
Soviets have been taken by sur-
prise quite as often as. perhaps of-
tener than their Western rivals.
They did not expect that Nkrumah
would be overthrown in Ghana or
that Sukarno would fall in In-
donesia. They did not foresee that
the United States would take pic-
tures of the missiles in Cuba. or
react to them as it did. They have
been as often surprised by startling
developments in East Europe as
the rest. of us. Yet in all of these
Ce'ri*rifries the Soviets have long
possessed large clandestine intel-
ligence-collection programs, and in
some of them they have even con-
trolled the local intelligence ap-
paratuses.
Is it, then, worth?'vhile for us as a
nation to have on the .payroll at
Langley a set of specialized civil
servants to collect information for
us by burglary, bribery and
blackmail? For this is what we are
really talking abOut in our sanitized
language about the Agency's
"basic mission" to collect clandes-
tine intelligence..
My own experience, as an in-
formation collector and intelligence
processor of sorts in the Foreign
Service and the State Department,
18
is that we could get along nicely
without blackmail, bribery and
burglary. No one who has not gone
abroad on a diplomatic assignment
.can appreciate how much our rep?i
resentatives overseas are handi-
capped by the reasonable suspicion
that they have been sent to bribe or
blackmail their way into possession
of the classified internal trivia of
another country's bureaucratic
machinery of government. Cer-
tainly, in my own tours of duty in
Eastern Europe I have appreciated
the legitimate anxiety of casual
foreign acquaintances as .to
whether I was other than I seemed
to be. Was I. under diplomatic
cover, Someone whose organiza-
tional imperatives made it routine
for him to be ready to ruin the lives
of his foreign contacts?in the
presumed "national interest" of
the United States, but in practice
mostly to win points for himself in
his home organization?
have firsthand knowledge of
one such Agency effort. The victim
was a young member of the
Ciec'noslovak Mission in West
Berlin who had the misfortune to
meet, and subsequently to be prop-
ositioned by, a free-lance An-ill-l-
ean journalist whose acquaintance
he made at a dinner in my home in
West Berlin.
My role in the matter seemed
harmless. . I inferred correctly
enough that the journalist whom I
was asked (by an agency employee
in the US Mission) to invite to my
house was not, in fact, a legitimate
American correspondent. I had
never heard of the news agency
listed on his &ailing card. Though I
knew,' thei'efoie,' that I was being
used by the Agendy to help bring
these two men together (this is why
I took up the agency man on his
offer to pick up the tab on the cost
of the dinner)--I rather simple-
mindedly supposed that this was an
inconsequential favor on my part.
The Czech would be too wily to
bite, I assumed, and if I 'didn't
make the meeting possible some-
one else would.
Several years later in Washing-
ton, a professor friend from MIT
just back from a trip to Prague, told
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me he had met somebody 1 knew.
My ,young Czech diplomat had
been assigned to escort him about
Prague. Why was he no longer in
the diplomatic service?, the profes-
sor had asked. The young Czech
had candidly replied that he had
accepted an invitation to dinner at
an American diplomat's house in
West Berlin and there he met an
American correspondent- who
made him an offer to work for the
American. intelligence service. He
turned down the offer and informed
his superiors. But they, in the way
of intelligence organizations?and
maybe this was what the agency
had had in mind all along?called
him home and cashiered him. After
all, if the Americans could have
had reason to suppose he might be
a weak link in Czechoslovak secur-
ity, then better to play it safe and
put him on the shelf in Prague.
An unimportant enough affair in
the end, no doubt. Diplomats have
to live with such hazards. But now
it is no longer just the diplomats
who come under a cloud from this
sort of thing. Whole professions
have been tainted by reasonable
doubts as to:their bona fides. Can
one wondeF, from the above in-
stance, that stispicious security
services in even the backwaters of
the world now feel they cannot. af-
ARGUS, St. Louis
2 October 1975
From The
Publisher's Desk-
ford to be indifferent to ,the com-
ings and goings of US newsmen?
The Senate inveMigators should
ask, at long last, whether the na-
tional interest is really servedby
having this unWorthy and ulti-
mately useless activity continue-to
he tarried on by tare& civil ser-
vants of the United States govern-
ment. The Senators must go be-
yond a limited effort to satisfy
themselves that the clandestine
arm of the agency henceforth oper-
ates more clearly within the agen-
cy's charter. They must redraw the
agency's "basic mission" to ex-
clude the kind of reliance on
blackmail, bribery and burglary
that has become such a characteris-
tic feature ? of clandestine in-
telligence collection. No amount of
fussing with the agency's operating
instructions?no new ordinances
specifying, -? say, what kinds of
newspapermen may or may not be
used in what kind of operations?
nothing of this kind will set things
right.
The Senators have, anyway, a
unique opportunity to seek An an-
swer to the question of whether our
own record over the last 25 years
shows clearly land decisively that
slavish imitation - of the Soviet
KGB has promoted our real na-
tional interests in any significant
way.
Image Making.
Eugene N. Mitchell, M.D.
It would seem that in what is commonly considered
the post Watergate era that Americans are in for an
onslaught of redefinitions and new image making.
Currently the media in most cities are about
investigating government and its agencies. In a way,
this is good in that many have needed a close perusal
for sometime now. . ,
Abuses by physicians and other professionals are also
popular topics, and most agree that certain types of
exposes, while necessary, if not watched carefully can
cause more harm 'than. good. Witness the ever
increasing malpractice costs which, many- feel will
seriously damage the practice of medicine in this
ountry.
Right now, alleged CIA and FBI abuses are the
popular fodder for newspaper's powerful
cannon, and sensational headlines concerning these
co-called threats to our democracy are as common as
raindrop's. ?
That mistakes have been made is all to obvious, but
if we're not careful the effectiveness of these badly
They might try to balance the:
Agency's inflated and thus far tm- I
documented claims to occasional)
modest successes against its all too t
painful failures.. The committee
should satisfy itself, for example,
as to whether .the Agency has
needed its license to practice
blackmail, bribery and burglary
beyond our borders in its much
vaunted performance in gaining
possession of the text of
Khrushchev's secret speech of
1956 on the crimes of Stalin. In
fact, several copies of the speech
were simply passed to US officials
abroad by foreign Communists
who were anxious to get it into
general circulation quickly and who
were indifferent to the fact that a
decision would be taken in Wash-
ington to treat the windfall as a
coup of CIA's clandestine in-
telligence collectors.
At any rate, my own exposure?
in a Foreign Service career of 25 .
years?to a representative cross- :
section of the Top Secret output of
the collectors of clandestine politi-
cal intelligence convinced me that
the game of authorized blackmail,
bribery:, and burglary has been
as .little abroad as at home.
Thei'Sehators will conclude as
much, 1 suspect, if they try to see
for themselves-
needed agencies will also be ,seriously hampered..
-This is not to say that the CIA, FBI, doctors, lawyers
and politicians should not have checks and balances,
but to totally tarnish their images or ignore their
individual and collectiite good would be a horrendous
mistake.
All nations have a spy service and as CIA Director
Colby pointed out recently in a St. Louis visit, this very
delicate balance of power must be maintained to
preserve peace. It would be nice if nations did not have
to spy on other nations but it's naive to suspect this will
ever be.
Certain types of abuses simply can't be accepted
especially if they infringe upon our individual rights.
Would we, however prefer to allow groups like the
SLA, the Weathermen: or Ku Klux Klan run rampant
and unchecked?
Remember the violence prior to J. Edgar Hoover's
getting tough on the Klan. And don't forget that groups
that advocate overthrotVing our form of government are
also a threat.
. It's obvious when all facts are considered, that the
difference between totalitarianism and the effective
safeguarding of American freedom is a thin line.
The one area of concern that is -intolerable is the
allowing of politics to influence, our powerful national
agencies thrust. This, obviously, is_difficult to control,
and in the end, after all the investigations are over, the
main control will probably still be the integrity of the
people involved.
Laws, can be legislated, but honesty, and integrity
can't. _ , _
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POST, New York
17 Oct? 1975
ax Lerner
14t _was still a blunder.
Have othe.,_Cong,ressonal corruoittees
be-come sensation-mongers, as is often
charged? My answer is that the po-
litical theater was inevitable. The
_
strength- of Congressional investiga-
..,ar'''''''...-fv.r."71 WILL INTELLIGENCE SURVIVE? tions,- as witness the Ervin committee
on Watergate, is that they are free of
? ?
WASHaNGT.ON. ?
It was part of the new "openness"
of the CTA that a professor-columnist
was invited to give a talk in an after-
noon lecture series in the new dome-
shaped auditorium. His theme being
"Where Is America Gong?" he talked
(among other -things) about open and
covert societies, and about using social
intelligence in intelligence operations.
The policy of inviting some ideas
from the outside into the sacred pre-
cincts of the CIA predates the big
public flap abOttf.'thea.gency. It was
sta-rted when ? James-- Schlesinger was
briefly director and has been contin-
ued under William Colby. - ?
Some might scorn such auspices for
an arena of open discussion, but oth-
ers have seen it as a change to infil-
trate the hitherto rigid domain with
oppositional ideas. In any event the
CIA leadership publicly aired its con-
viction that its sinners are not beyond
salvation.. ....-
44.'.'
My own view of the recent revela-
tionS about the CIA' and its related
agencies Is that it is never pleasant to
watch a can of worms being opened,
but that it is better to have the worst
revealed than to continue the) conceal-
ment. _-
When director Colby ordered a set
of intern al ,investigations into ,the
agency's past several years ago, he
must have had a strong hunch about
what would -be discovered. Understand-
ably he wishes that the cleansing proc-
ess had stopped there. But no* one could
have stopped it. Once the self-assess-.
anent had begun it was bound to-spread.
The 'Virginia Gazette
? ? -- ?
Williamsburg, Va.
October 17, 1975
Page 4
Colby's regret?if he hasany?is that
he briefed only the- chairmen of the
two Congressional oversight commit-
tees or, the results -of the inner dig-
ging. He should have- briefed the whole
of the leadership of both houses, and
arranged for 'an early'and orderly Con-
gressional investigaton. By. not doing
so, he let. the whole investigation game
become a free-for-all.: SeymoUr Hersh
of the New York Tithed got hold of a
good part of the story, 'and then hell
inevitably broke loose, :1 -, 1- ?
-The Rockefeller commission worked
hard, -but from its beginning it was
bound to- be- tagged as -an- establish-
ment inquiry. It did an honest, earnest
job but the conclusions . 7Vould ,have
lacked credibility, if they were not con-
firmed by the independent work of the
two Congressional committees.:
Where -the aockefeller group made
Its mistake was in deciding to separate
the assassination material' from the
rest of its report. The whole- thing was
all of a piece in its methods and. in its
moral roots, and should.. have been
-treated as a. piece. -? 1.: ?
The story one gets fir Washington
Is that President Ford was responsible
for .lopping off the assassination ma-
terial. He felt it was bad enough for
foreign "nations' to learn that their
heads of 'government had been assas-
sination targets, but if they had to
know everything it was better for them
to learn it from Congressional hearings
and leakages than from a presidential
commission which had been given the'
President's brief and *hose report
would get the President's approval.
One can understand Ford's feeling, but
Headlines-
It was unfortunate that Vice Presiden. E-ROckefeller
took the occasion Of the launching of the-,USS Dwight D.
Eisenhower last. Saturday to' make some :gratuitous and
misleading remarks-about news coverage.of the CIA._
Warning that U.S1 security is thrfeatened by a build-up
of Soviet .naval forces and their existing intelligence
system, Rockefeller said, "The Soviets-have, developed
the most 'comprehensive intelligence complex the world
'has ever known,- while we run the risk of destroying our
Own intelligence system with headlines.'.',
This is analogous to the remarks of former President
1Slixon and his aides that "wallowing in Watergate" would
..aestroy the- presidency. Watergate destroyed Nixon but
revitalized our trust in the presidency. -?
7'. Vice President Rockefeller did not tell the Newport
'News crowd that he was a member of the U.S. Foreign
:intelligence Advisory Board during the same time that
?many alleged. CIA wrongdoings were permitted to occur,
--executive' in'nibitions.---.--.
Their weaknesses are that Congress-
men have to play to the gallery of their
constituencies, or. else they wouldn't be
what they are. Curiously, none, of the
Ervin committee :members who were
touted for the presidency at the time
have come through as real candidat.
How about the question of legisla-
tion? The best bet would he to strength-
en the internal investigative controls
within the CIA by giving the inspector'
general stronger powers- to roam-
through the 'agency. As for the Na-
tional .Security Agency, its scanning of-
global communications should get spe-
cific assent from the Attorney General.
The Congressional controls of the
whole intelligenee setup should be in
,the hands of' a joint Congressional
. committee of both houses, as is troe
of the Joint Committee on Atomic En-
ergy. But its members should be taken
from the highest levels, and include the
Congressional leaders of both parties.
In that way there will be a. maximum,
of intelligent control of intelligence.
- -There remains the question of
whether the Congressional investiga-1
tions have hurt the intelligence opera-
tion., Temporarily they have, by putting
the agency in a bad -light, but the in-
telligence community will survive. .The
valid functions of the operation will
have to be separated from the abuses ?
that have distorted them.
What the world will in time see, 2$
It did with Watergate, is that 'a democ-
racy can clean its house without de-.
stroying the vital things that have to
go on within it.. - ? j
;during 1969-1974: This board theoretically held super-
:xisory authority , over the CIA and- other .intelligence
:groups. ?
. Rock efeller.,also-seemed to forget that it was his own
.:Commission on CIA .Activities. Within :the=Uniteci States
::that just last June cOnfirmed the accuracy.of many news-
about CIA- misdeeds.. in fact-, -the- Rockefeller
'Commission went beyond the news media, in several in-
'stances such as the discovery of Operation CHAOS, the
'domestic intelligence project_
7- We have previously- maintained that an. official in-
r'vestigation is warranted into possiblerConne.cdons bet-
:ween alleged CIA assassination plots and the agency's
;Sprawling training base here- at Camp Peary. While it
:'would be diplomatically damaging to expose the identities
.:Of any targets, it would be helpful to know the sordid'
"history of how these plots developed..Only in this way can
7-iwe learn froth our mistakes and hopefully punish any
::.perpetrators.. This,country has benefited far more. from
?:such exposure-to the-public eye than,,ite.bas from corn-
'::parable cover-ups, as we so paintutiv -learned during
::i1Natergate.
20
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NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1975
AdministrationSaidtoMap
'Battlei 'aril' on Intelligence
, By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
-'Special to Tito New York Times
?
WASHINGTON, Oct. 18? in the preparation of Mr.:
The Ford Administration will Ford's program for halting in-
stanchly resist a Congressional telligence agency abuses. He
effort to bar the United States and his advisers, senior sources
Government from undertaking said, passed want to avoid legislation
covert intelligence operations =,
emotional present atmosphere"
mlent's prerogative to order
such operations, interviews with
high Administration sources
that would permanently crimp
the Government's ability to
maintain national security.
disclosed. The Ford program, still far
from finished, includes efforts
This decision is one of sev- to "civilianize" intelligence and
era' reached recently as the
Ford 'Administration and the
leaders' of the intelligence
agencies drew up what one key
official called the "order of
battle" for an expected con-
frontation with Congress on
control of the intelligence com-
munity.
Administration sources said
they fully expected, and many
approved of, stronger Congres-
sional oversight of intelligence
gathering activities. But these
sources agreed that President
Ford would resist an attempt
to bar the Government from
engaging in covert foreign
operations or an effort to re-
quire him to get prior approval
from Congress before such an
operation might be started. The plan now under study
Indeed, one top official was by Mr. Ford, drawn partly from
even chary of proposals that a recommendation of the corn-
the President should "consult" mission on the C.I.A. headed by
Vice President Rockefeller.
would require that a proposal
for Covert activity be sent to
the board and the board would
give the President its recom-
mendation on the 'plan. He
would still have the final de-
cision and his power is un-
marred, most sources agreed.
? The board would be given an
'increased staff to permit it to
examine the justification for
agency proposals more fully.
New appointments would also
be made to give the board what
one official called, "more Ford
character." All current mem-
bers of the board were ap-
pointed before Mr. Ford took
office and seven of the 10
members were appointed by
,President Nixon.
"It's Mr. Kissinger's board,"
said one source, explaining that
the appointments since 1969
had been recommended or ap-
proved by Secretary of State
arrange ways the agencies, can
"police themselves," sources
said.
The keystone will be a rein-
forced President's Foreign In-
telligence Advisory Board,
which would have the power
to "look at" proposals for cov-
ert activity. It would also, an-
other source said, be a plate
where complaints of abuse
within the intelligence commu-
nity could be carried.
The board was created to be
a place Presidents could obtain
independent advice on intelli-
gence matters. But, in fact, over
the years its role has been min-
imal in the President's decision-
making on covert activities.
with Congress on covert opera-
tions before they are launched.
"The problem with that is
consultation implies approval
which is a violation of the doc-
trine of separation of powers
and, we've been fighting this on
separate fronts all along," he
said.
The move within the Admin-
istration to solidify its positions
on intelligence matters seemed
to coincide with a sense of
growing fatigue and irritation
with the Congressional com-
mittees and media disclosures
on intelligence. "People are
tired and tempers are flaring,"
one key sonrce said.
? A senior official said that he
find the President belieVed that
the two Congressional commit-
tees did not need to "disclose
everything in order to .get leg-
islation" and suggested that
the Congressional investigators
may have passed from gather- Kissinger.
ing evidence to prepare legis-
lation to "mere curiosity." The White House, sources
"I think they ought to get said, has rejected an early plan
on with it," said another offi-
that would have placed the
cial. "Get the legislative pro-
hoard's chairman over the in-
posals together and stop all the telligence agencies in what one
dramatics." He criticized partic-
called a "czarlike" role. The
ularly the upcoming hearings, post was offered to former See-
of the Senate Select Comrlittee retary of the Treasury George
on Intelligence, which will ex-
P. Shultz, who is a member of
amine mail openings this week,
the board, but he declined it.
M
"We've been over and over and Mr. Shultz is employed by the
over that." he said. Bechtel Corporation and is
The Senate has already re-
serving the Administration in
-ceiged -testimony on how the several special capacities.
Central Intelligence Agencyl There is also no immediate
opened mail and the subject Plan to replace William E. Col-
has been examined by several by, Director of Central Intelli-
other Congressional commit- gence or Clarence E. Kelley, Di-
tees. - !rector of the Federal Bureau of
The pressure Of
ace
pears .have been one ffethe sbalfteffl/&,4?R Y-MOinMAPAUS
Cotipp,ThinglItgot6g.tiitin. Acme pp_ h,hhint a
a list of potential directors for
21
FEAT YORK Tr1ES
20 October 1975
11S1 PEFLD7E AIDE
JLA
FACES NEVI DELAY
? . By GEORGE VOLSKY
Special to The New York TImes
MIAMI, Oct. 19?The confir-
mation of a Cuban-American'
appointed last August as direc-
tor of the Cuban Refugee Pro-
gram faces a new delay follow-
ing lengthy background investi-
gations by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and other
agencies.
A spokesman for F. David
Mathews, the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare,
who is responsible for the Cu-
ban program, said Friday that
an-F.B.I. report en the appoin-
tee?Ricardo Nunez, would be
sent to the Civil Service Com-
mission this week.
"It's out of our hands," the
spokesman said, adding that
a 'decision might not be made:
until December. Other Federal
officials said they could not
recall a "super-grade" appoint-
ment for which confirmation
by the commission had taken
sO long.
Mr. Nunez, a wealthy Miami
builder, was a top executive
'of Gramco, a bankrupt invest-
ment fund based in the Baha-
mas that was owned by Robert
Vesco, the financier who
fled to the Caribbean after he
was indicted on Federal char-
ges of fraud and conspiracy.
Between 1959 and 1968. when
he joined Gramco, Mr. Nunez
Was an employe of the Voice
of America. During most of
that time, he has said, he was
also an undercover operative
of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
His new $36,000 jab, although'
subject to the confirmation by
the Civil Service Commission,
is a political appointment. It
also requires a top security
clearance.
The refugee program he has
the C.I.A.., but found no one
with the qualities he felt the
job called for who would _ac-
cept the post.
Mr. Colby has already in-
creased the size of the C.I.A.'s
inspector general's office and
the inspector general is to be
given new lines of command
that will make it possible for.
him to report to the advisory
board, they said.
Several officials were anx-
ious about the concept that a
director of the C.I.A. could
complain to Congress, about
Presidential orders or that
Congress would be "ombuds-
man" over the agencies.
"I'm a little worried that
oversight should not impair
good' working management,"
said one senior official. He im-
plied that making Congress a
"court of appeals" for thei
bureaucracy weakened disci-
pline.
? Administration sources ap-
peared to believe that how the
!Senate select committee hen-
Idled the hearings on the Na-
tional Security Agency might
#1,eAt;'nf gbeialoopsibility
hfilFeis4 H0801.11
tionat security matters.
beili named to head spends
about S90-million a year. Its
farmer director?like his prede-
cessors. an expert social work-
er?died in March, awl Case
W. Weinberger, then the
H.E.W. Secretary, named Mr.
Nunez to the pest fillve months
later.
Before the appointment was
Made known, some experts ad-
vocated that the Position be
abolished for the sake of econo-
my_ They argued that since
virtually no new Cuban re-
fugees were coming to the
United States, the program'
should be phased out and its
functions absorbed by other
agencies.
! 'The app ointment of Mr. Nu-
nez provoked strong criticism;
particularly among Cubans who
are Republicans and Americans!
who have y had business deal-
ings with him here.
In Washington, Lilian C-iber-
ga, a Cuban Adviser to the
Republican National Commit-
tee, s called Mr. Nunez, himself
a Republican, "totally unquali-
fied." She said that she had,
written to resident Ford urg-
ing that Mr. Nunez be asked
to resign to "spare the Admi-
nistration an embarrassment."
In Miami, Rafael Villaverde,
Republican who heads a so-
ilaP agency for the aged.
termed the process through
which Mr. Nunez was appoint-
ad'."our new Atergate."
Supporters of Mr. Nuzez have
isted, however, that his
aide-ranging business and civic
aetivities have qualified him
4r the job.
In late .August, after The
.tl'eW York Times learned that
Nuzez was a defendant
a dozen of civil lawsuits
.ere, the F.B.I. reopened its
inquiry into his 'background.
According to court records
in Dade and Broward Counties,
about 30.companies:and indivi-
odutis and several law firms
are suing Mr. Nunez and N.
B. S. Development Company,
his land and contracting con-
cern, alleging nonpayment of
,more than $300,000 in bills
two other cases, the builder
and his company ave been
ordered to pay a number of
plaintiffs.
While not legally bankrupt,
N. B. S. has no known assets.
Mr. Nunez, who lives in Coral
Gables, in a lavish home report-
ed to be worth $500,000, was
a modest wage earner in, 1968,
when he left Miami to iive
in Nassau. Four years later,
following the bankruptcy of
Gramco. he returned here a
multimillionaire, according to
former associates.
One associate said that part
of Mr. Nunez's job at Gramco
had been to coordinate sales
in Latin America. He added:
"We all knew that it was
illegal in every Latin country
to sell Gramco bonds. At one
time, our entire team of 10
salesmen in Peru was arrested,
and it cost us a huge bribe
to get them out of jail. After
that our Latin operation went
completely underground, with
fictitious names, coded messa-
ges and all that C.I.A. stuff.",
When Gramco collapsed,
thousands of Latin investors
were reported to have lost
more than $50-million. Some,
of them are said to have ex-
380g?st to American diplomats
'dismay over Mr. Nunez's
;appointment.
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PITTIADELPHIA NOJJIREH
17 OCTOBER 1975
'
__ - the:1 liberal reporters
vFEe- :::eked off the CIA controversy
inta 'last year are- now ready to settle
.for the prosezution:and jailing of, one
Or tY.-3. CIA agents?the higher,rank-
log.- the.- better?forr.violations 'of law
uneovered in the?cOurse of their hot-.
.eyed investigations I hope profound-
,y that. no- such thing happens..
?
,.; Tin whole flap over the alleged mis-
eecds. -of the: CIA has: been-a phony-
fron;._ t,he start?a painfully obvious
attempt on the, part of the Washing.
ton press corps to maintain the rma:
mentcrn generated by Watergate and.
.roll over, yet another pet liberal :tar-
get- before the juggernaut slowed'
-.7r5ra SeYinour Hersh's original
story in the New York Times on Dec.
1974-,- to Sem-Frank E'nurch's most
recent pirouettes, on the Sunday TV
talk show, the entire affair has had
the unmistakable flavor of a."happen-
frig": , one of those . pseudo-eventS
Staged-to aniaze and edify the ground-
lings in the tedious gaps 'between real
- -The 'test of the phoniness of the
Ii'hole thing is the. disproportion
tween the efforts exerted between the
cooperating media and politicians
the -amoant of authentic concern
generated irr the public at large.
T-leaven.knows_the effort has-'been.
? -
.monumental: acre_s '.'of.. 'newsprint,'
oceans of, ink, .hundreds of hours of
prime time, a reveiarion a day for 300
days, a Presidential commission and
three separate congressional investi-
gations,?,-...: A ?
? Yet...just;hovii -concerned are the.
'misconduct'
people -over.- the -:aileged
of . the CIA? Have you.
heard a single,- really tense. argument'
on. the..subjeCt? -..Watergate caused'
plenty of :them?and Vietnam- too;
and .so.plid.the campus riots-and vari-
ous aspects of the civil' rights contro-
VerV: ?????? ; :.? `;.- ?
. .
..?:?But if anybody outside' the original'
elique:bas ever raised his voice in
anger, one way 'or the other; on the
subject; of-the CIA, it. has eluded me'.
The reason for the public's indiffer-
.ence .is not far to seek. Most. Ameri-i?
cans. know:yery -well :.that... this, i5,4.?
dirty 'and. are: entirely. in.' ac-
? . ? ? .
"cOrd.with. the-idea* that it is necessary
? to have some- tough types on our side.
?. 'And ? if .Senator Church,. poking -
around in .the .files, comes unexpect
edly. Upon evidence that the Kennedy
brothers -spent a lot of time trying to
kill.-Castro,-- daresay that the domi-.,
nape. emotion Of a good many Amer--
tans :on the subject. is a. keen regret
? that they.didn't succeed.
. . .
To:be sure, it is the unwritten law'
in such situations. that the did prin-
ciple of "respondeat superior" doesn't
.apply:?.?We all remember that . dry.
voice on: the-, self-destructing tape .in
WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Oetober21.1975.
turate
?By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer
The Central Intelligence
Agency built up such an un-
dercover bureaucracy
overseas that for a time it had
almost as many employees
abroad as the State Depart-,
ment's Foreign Service, ac-
cording to informed sources.
Shortly after the advent of
the Kennedy administration,
sources said, the CIA had 3,700
employees operating under
diplomatic or other official
U.S. titles overseas while the
State Department had 3,900
bona fide employees working
abroad..
The CIA officials were
known in U.S. "government
circles as "CAS"?Controlled
American Sources. Their
proportions in U.S. embassies?
abroad were sometimes
startling.
Some 15 years ago. One
source said, for example. 16
out of 20 people in the political
section of the embassy in
Vienna really belonged to the
CIA.
En recent years, another
source said, the CIA con-
tingent abroad- has been.
drastically reduced, partly
because of the 1961 Bay of Pigs
--? ? ? - : ?
. ?: ?
?Inipossible" warning. 'Jim
that if his .actions- unluckily came to
'light;. "the Secretary- will of course
'deny all -knowledge of them."
? Fair enough but it certainly
that if Jim's illegal acts were
-:exposed by .EsPine- nosey reporter, it
would be the bounden duty of our own-
:Depart-tent. of Justice to prosecute
.? Jim and sendlhim up the river. ??
There is-such a thing as "prosecu-:
? torial discretion": ?the right of the
? prosecutor ? to decide, in the light .of
all ',..ciretirnStances ? ;of ? the
wheelie:- or not to seek an indictment,
.?Just, at the moment that discretion
is being exercised generously in favor
:of. thousands. of draft-dodgers and de:-
,.serters, many of whom have recently
?
compounded' their original. crime by
failing to keep the promises (of alter-.
native service) they made. to avoid
'prosecution in the first place:
How much more 'deserving are, the
men in the CIA'who may have yiolat-:.
:ed lesser lawS'in the interests of this
? WielT.the:full knowledge and?
? the private behest, of the. Presi-;
::7denta- they sei-wd!' ?:
To prosecute-such men now, for no:
!letter; reason ? than ".to.- reassure
moUr-Hersh that he hasn't been wast-;
,-ing,Our time and. his own, would be a.
"deadlier'blow at the CIA' than any he
? and his -cronies have managed to. land'
a. far .greater crime than anyi
- ,
at tip. dc-Or of the
. .. ?
Em ssies In
fiasco, but also because of the
growing clout of the multi-
billion-dollar National
Security Agency, whose
technological eyes and ears'
are considered more reliable.
-You'd be surprised at how
few people the CIA has
; overseas these days," - this
source said. Although the
figure can sometimes jump
dramatically with the in-
ception of new covert
operations, this source said
the current total was "less
than half" of the 3.700 officials:
reported on the CIA's secret
roster in mid-1961.
Shortly alter the CIA was
established in 1947, a special
study group headed by then
deputy CIA director Allen
Dulles warned in a still secret
report against using State
Department cover as an
answer to all its problems.
The report, sources said.,
indicated that the CIA even
then had been making what
the State Department con-
sidered excessive demands
for official slots. The study
group reportedly recom-
mended that the C IA develop,
more "outside cover" for its,
personnel overseas, ,such as
that which cquld be provided
by private business.
The CIA, however, steadily
increased its requisitioning of
official government positions,
sources said, because it was
easier, quicker, provided
more security and offered
more perquisites for its
personnel.
By 1961 as a consequence,
according to sources, the spy
agency had some 1,500 people
abroad under State Depart-
ment cover and another 2.200
under other official U.S.
covers, such as Defense
Department civilian per-
sonnel.
In some U.S. missions so-
called "CAS" personnel
outnumbered the regular
State Department com-
plements. At the embassy in
Chile, for instance, 11 of 13
officials in the political section
in 1961 were from the CIA.
Almost half of the political
officers in American em-
bassies throughout the world
were under cover for the CIA.
The result, sources said,
was often a seriousen-
croachment on State
Department policymaking. In
some countries; CIA station
chiefs were able to command
more influence than the
ambassadors and at times
22
pursued different policies. At
the Paris embassy, where the
CIA occupied the top floor and
in 1961 had more than 125
people, the spy agency even
took over much of the overt
political reporting on French
politics normally done by the
"State Department.
Although there are repor-.
tedly far fewer CIA officials
operating abroad today, there
are indications that the
agency still relies heavily on
official U.S. cover for the
overseas personnel that it
does have.
At the CIA's inception 28
years ago, according to one
knowledgeable source, the use
of State Department cover
was supposed to be "strictly
limited and temporary."
But in an affidavit this
month that was prompted by a
freedom-of-information
lawsuit in U.S. District Court
here, officials of the National
Security Council claimed that
disclosure of initial 1948 plans
for coordinating secret'
operations with other U.S.,
agencies could, even today,
"prompt attacks on our
diplomatic personnel overseas
as. being spies and covert'
operators." 1
AP-P--rO-ved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-004321000100380005-1
ee.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1
-5or;: ? .
?
BY THOMAS PEPPER
BALTIMORE SUN
19 OCTOBER 1975
? it; ; ?
esie0 Washington.
kleel' the leaves change color on the.
treeee and time begins to run out on the
tV:Congressional committes investigat-
ing United States intelligence activities,
it ;is :;becoming increasingly apparent
if:Tar-normal standards of government
tetgfiirmance are not going to bring
gre,,itand meaningful change to the in-.
telligence community.
.-
...If-past precedent is any guide, it will
t6,1;e-an extraordinary and concerted ef-
fort.--:on the part of the White House,
Congress, and the intelligence agencies
themselves?to do anything more than,
repeat the usual Washington cycle of
disclosure, alarm, and inertia. .
..'.:"Indeed, without such an effort?of a
edit-More systematic, for example, than
thefeurrent attempts to change regulato-
ry policy?one could hazard a guess that
the. various intelligence agencies would
rfde, :rent their current troubles, and be
badt?:in business, roughly as before, by
Mid4977. .
te- -Between now and then, a certain
ainOunt of day-to-day difficulty is inevit-
ahleit Senate ? and House investigating
cOnernittees will continue to demand an-
., ,
ewers to a host of questions, although the
coMmittees will soon have to halt their
inquiries and put together their reports;
bath face deadlines of early next year.
President Ford has indicated that he
will-be instituting reorganization proce-
dutese-presumably to check past abus-
esebutealso to head off too much Con-
gressional intervention later next year,
when legislative changes arising out of
the two investigative reports will be
ready for passage. Meanwhile, the intel-
likence agencies themselves can be ex-
pected to do a certain amount of inter-
nal?house-cleaning.
- Thus, by spring various reorganiza-
tion plans are likely to be in the works.
And with an election campaign under-
way, the country can expect?and de-
serves?more debate than normal about
the power and quality of its intelligence
services.
.. There will be charges and counter-
charges, and bitter disagreements over
who is protecting the nation more effec-
tively: defenders of a relatively unfet-
tered intelligence agencies, or critics of
allegedly too powerful intelligence serv-
ices. Then, no matter who wins the pres-
idency?but particularly if a Democrat
wins, and brings with him a wholesale
change in executive branch appoint-
ments?some further reAreanization is
likely in early 1977. rprovea i-or
23
But what happens after that? Will the
dust settle once again? What form will
reorganization take?
The answers to these questions would
seem to depend, in the end, on the intel-
ligence agencies themselves. A strength-
ened system of oversight, though it is
now the most obvious and most likely re-
sult of the current congressional investi-
gations, is not enough.
The intelligence gathering process, if
it is to work, must operate under condi-
tions of greater secrecy than any other
part of a democratic government. Un-
like grand juries, or regulatory agencies
and other quasi-judicial bodies that op-
erate with a certain amount of secrecy,
intelligence agencies collect much of
their information without the knowledge
of the people who first produce that in-
formation.
Any sharing of how this is done, even
within an agency, is considered a risk
perhaps greater than the original risk of
seeking the information. The risk is evert
greater when an intelligence agency en-
gages in so-called "covert action,"
meaning an attempt not simply to col-
lect information, but to change the
courseOf events in a way that masks the
cause of the change.
Any oversight process, particularly'
'one that might involve public disclosure,
increases the risk to intelligence opera-
tions. Correspondingly, any requirement
-for a secret oversight process weakens
the independence of the oversight body.
In extreme situations, something has to
give?either the effectiveness of the in-
telligence operations, or the ef fective-?
ness of oversight. With mutual trust,
there would be room for give-and-take;
the. agencies could give up some of their
secrecy, and the monitoring bodies could
give up some of their need to know, tak-
ing the rest on faith. I.?
But that very trust is the missing in-
gredient at the moment_ The succession
of super-discreet ?congreesionai etibeoin-
mittees that took care of intelligence
oversight up till?now tilted heavily in the
direction of intelligence activities. In
practice, there was less oversight than
this year's revelations would seem to
have warranted.
Now the atmosphere is different. Be-
ginning with the Watergate revelations
of 1973, and continuing into this year
with the two congressional investiga-
tions and one by an executive branch
commission headed by Vice President
Rockefeller, public perceptions of the in-
telligence agencies have changed consi-
derably. As a group, they stand accused
of two severe failings:
First, in their efforts to collect infor-
mation, the agencies admittedly broke
.;
Agency aimed at letters to and from
Communist nations, and an electronic
eavesdropping program run by the Na-
tional Security Agency on all interna-
tional teiephone, telegraph, and telex
traffic. Also, the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation has admitted that it conduct-
ed illegal burglaries against U.S. citi-
zens.
In addition, the agencies often failed
?again, by their own admission?to
meet standards of quality they them-
selves had set for gathering accurate in-
formation; standards they had told the
rest of us to expect. Key examples here
are the estimates by both the CIA and
the Defense Intelligence Agency of the
likelihood for unlikelihood) of a Middle
East war in the fall of 1%7. As late as
one hour after the Egyptiam;Syrian at-'
tack had begun, these estimates were
-still telling the President that no general
offensive was in the works.
Thus, judging by revelations so far,
the major tasks ahead are:
1. On the input side, to curb abuses of
the law.
2. On the output side, to force the sys-
tem to produce higher quality, intelli-
gence.
? Some would go still further and say
that U.S.. intelligence agencies should
not engage in "covert action." _
Any new congressional oversight
body that might emerge from this year's
investigations is bound to. have these
matters very much in mind, and to shift
away somewhat from the old system of,
giving the intelligence agencies the ben-
efit of the doubt'
Just how far the balance will shift re-
mains to be seen, however. A Democrat-
ic administration could probably count ,
on greater latitude from a congressional
committeehdominated by Democrats
man the present Republican administra-
tion could. -
Furthermore, any new Congressional
panel?say one patterned after the rela-
tively successful Joint Committee on At-
omic Energy?Would eventually en-
counter the same obstacles that haunted
its subcommittee predecessors. This
conflict between secrecy and oversight
would -also apply to any new White
House monitoring group that Mr_ Ford
might establish._ '
9
7" "77 ;:
?- '
The. burden of change, then, is likely'
to fall mainly on the agencies them-.
selves. Each has a separate history, and
a separate set of problems. But they.
alone possess the necessary information
to accomplish the two key tasks.
Within the CIA, for example, there is
a definite feeling of satisfaction about
changes the agency introduced on its
..
various laws and violated constitutional own in the period just before the con-
rights of privacy. The primary examples gressional investigations begareeTheee
both.= 'Lb- the problem of
Relett14662NIMina"3114ilita"7-???NattWPIlfeuni-olf faulty Intel-
gram run by the Central intelligence
?
Approved For Releamds0SM/kNrW.TRP77=0042ERWRIQ weimoNnop
ligence estimates of -the sort published
just before the Middle East ware ..
But again, if past precedent is any
guide, further improvement will be
needed. The next major phase in CIA
history?following an inevitable period
of caution during the current investiga-
tions?will depend on how its next gen-
eration of executive-3 is selected.---------. ?
:
The group that entered intelligence -
work in World War II?when such work
was an honor and a privilege?is now
eerving out its last few years. Because
the CIA was founded in large measure
by these same people (and their like-
minded, already-retired eiders), the
agency has never really had a transfer
of power from one generation to anoth-
er.
This-is why the nature of any reorg-
anization that takes place over the next.:
18 months is so important. If all the dis-
closures of the past two years lead only
to a purge of a few top officials, and to
the institution of a new but still politi-
eized White House monitoring group and
new but customary congressional over-
sight, ? the intelligence agencies could
.easily- revert to their old: habits?and
.understandably so.. -
" ?
Are, pepper reports ? on congressional
activities from The Sun's Washington
. Bureau. ??
THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
111, October 1975
Surver.33 Agencies
.SpentI63 fdr Cop. 's
Washington, Oct. 13 (UPI) ?
The first inventory ever conduct-
ed of federal government police
actitivites showed today that the
government spent $2.6 billion
last:year?to employ 169,$25 ner--'
sons for police, investigative and
intelligence-gathering activitieS
in 33 agencies.
The figures covered the fiscal
year that ended June 30 and
amounted to more than 0.8% of
federal spending. ;
The survey was, conducted by
the General Accounting Office,
an arm of Congress, and did not
cover the Central Intelligence
Agency, the National Security
Agency, of the Defense-Depart-:
ment's - intelligence-gathering
branches. No _ did the _survey._1
show how much' Is spent sepa-
rately to contract for guards.
The survey showed that the
Capitol emploed 1,028 guards
-
more than two for every
member of Congress ? at a cost
of $12.2 million.
The -survey raises -questions
about "the sheer number of gov?-
erriment units having some form
Of law-enforcement responsibil-
ity" as well as raising the possi-
bility of duplication of efforts,
according to Sen. Charles H.
Percy AR-I11) w'no_requested the
data.'- -
Percy said, for example, that
23 departments and- agencies
have 35 separate guard forces,
with four alone in the Treasury
Department. Percy questioned
u4hy the Capitol, the Library of
Congress and the Supreme Court
each requires separate police
forces totaling .1,214 officers to
protect, a four-block area ,that
also is patroled- by the District
of Columbia police..? ..?,
24
4 ?
By Benjamin Welles
? and even advertise in leading news-
papers, including the New York Times.
whose revelations of "massive, illegal"
activities last December led to in-
vestigations both by Vice-President Nelson
A. Rockefeller's commission and by Senate.
and House committees. ?
Applicants were once interviewed on
Campus, but anti-Vietnam war feeling ran
so high in student circles in the late '60s
and early '70s that the bulk of the inter-
viewing process was quietly shifted to
nearby federal office buildings.
Applicants now must fill out a 17-page,
personal-history form and if accepted must
wait up to six months for the intense
screening process. Most of those accepted
then undergo a year's training (with
certain exceptions such as engineers,
?e*. Washington
e For the last 10 months the CIA has been
e battered by more bad publicity than in all
28 previous years since its creation in 1947.
Has this hurt recruiting? , ?-e ?
. - No, say agency officials -- though they
' concede that the school year has only just
begun and that recruiting trends may. not
_ be clear until January.
The CIA says-it hires "less than 500",
' young men and women officers a year
(apart from clerical staff) of the 4,000 or so
. who apply. assize and budget are officially
secret, but a good guess would be 15,000
people and $600 million. ?
Who, then, are the college and graduate
students and the young men and women
already in jobs who want to join the CIA?
"There's been a Marked change down'
? the ye,ars," explained. ?enior.official. "In scientists, etc.).
the '50s they came mostly, from the Eastern Not all the CIA's work is "spying." Of
Seaboard and they were products of prep' the agency's four component directorates,
one ? Operations (formerly Plans)
trains and directs agents who collect
clandestine intelligence overseas. Tradi-
tionally the so-called clandestine services
have had the lion's share of personnel (33
percent) and of funds (50 percent). But
since Vietnam and the post-Watergate
outcry about assassination plots and "de-
stabilizing" hostile foreign governments
much of its activities have been cut back.
Of the other ? three directorates, In-.
telligence analyzes the huge bulk of in-
coming information ranging from pub-
lished manuals on Soviet bee culture to
secret-agent reports.. The work of the
Science and Technology directorate and of
the Support (administrative) directorate
are self-evident.
Virtually all new recruits have a PhD or
at least an MA degree; only 5 percent hold
only BA degrees, say the recruiters. As
an equal-opportunity employer the CIA
also has been seeking qualified women,
blacks, plus Americans of Oriental and
Hispanic origins. According to one official,
"We've been delighted to find that we can
hire from minorities without lowering our
strict standards." Starting salaries ?
depending on skills ? range from $10,000 to
$20,000. _ _
schools and Ivy League colleges. Now they
!come from all over the country." ?
In the tOs when the cold war reduced
.U.S.-U.S.S.1 . relations to black and white
: many, recruits came from military
?backgrounds. Duty came before self-ques-
'tioning; patriotism before doubt. Now,
since Vietnam and the Watergate scandal,
:the CIA's recruits are more "intellectually
,challenging," says one agency official.
"They ask tough questions: 'What do we
*, why. do we do it?' They probe, they
challenge us. We realize they face stiff peer
pressures. So when they do decide to join ?7
they've weighed it -and thought it out.
They're committed."
Each year top CIA officials at headquar-
ters near Washington list the special skills
:e--engineers, chemists; economic geogra-
,
jphers, area specialists, linguists among
others that they will need Over the
coming year and in what numbers. The
lists go out in autumn and spring to
regional recruiting offices: Los Angeles;
Portland, Oregon; Austin, Texas; Denver;
Chicago; New York; and Philadelphia.
'Headquarters here handles recruiting for
The South. ,
, CIA recruiters from the regional offides
contact area university-placement offices
WALL STREET JOURNAL
17 OCTOBER 1975
WasIfington Wire
. CIA CLEANUP promises to fall short ot
;fundamental change.
.Ford will order limited revisions soon.
;He will make the (MA inspector general.
more autonomous. supposedly with power to I
:halt dirty deeds. The White House plans to'
give more authority to the Foreign Intelli-1
g6nce Advisory Board. install a new chair-
man. Its legislative proposals may seek to
bar assassinations. Skeptics claim the
changes would be largely cosmetic., ? '
Congress will probably create *a, joint
committee to oversee the agency. It will
likely tighten legal language governing CIA
operations, without banning all covert ac-
tion. Some Capitol aides wonder if Senate in-
vestigating chairman Church is more inter-
ested in running for President than in re-
forming the CIA. The House inquiry is far
fvom reaching any conclusions..
Morale sags, meantime, among CIA ,
hands. They ?nuke reports increasingly ,
bland in efforts to avoid troubie: Some
employes count the days till retirement.
? .1
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NElf YORK TIM ES
26 Oct. 1975
DRIVE FOR BLACKS I
PRESSED BY RI,A,
College Placement Officers
Impressed by Parley on
Minority Employment
Ey JOSEPH LELYVELD
Speclat to The New Yorks Tants
WASHINGTON, Oct. 25?
There were cocktails and an
ample buffet, featuring South-
ern fried chicken, in the execu-
tive dining room of the Central
Intelligence Agency list night
fo a group of college place-
ment officers As it happened,
most of the guests were blacks.
They had been invited into
the sanctum on the seventh
floor of the agency's McClean,
Va., headquarters at the end
of a two-day conference on
"minority employment" de-
signed to drive home the idea
that the C.I.A. is an equal op-
portunity employer.
William E. Colby, the agen-
cy's director, whose offices
open on to the dining room
through doors that have one-
way locks, was on hand with
other top officials for this rare
display of C.I.A. hospitality.
The guests were clearly im-
pressed.
Dr. Joseph M. Wright, direce
tor of student affairs at the
University of Michigan in Dear-
born, said the very idea of
coming to the conference had
made him uneasy. Before this
week the only C.I.A. man he
had ever met was James W.
McCord Jr., the convicted
Watergate burglar, who had
spoken on his campus.
He would have been unlikely
to mention the C.I.A. to a stu-
dent job seeker, Dr. Wright
said, because of his own doubts
about its activities and anxiety
about "how he might react
to my suggestion." Now, he
said, he is not only convinced
that the agency is a "necessary
evil" but that it ought to have
more blacks.
Drive on for Two Years .
Long stereotyped as a bastion
of the WASP Eastern establish-
ment, the C.I.A. has been ac-
tively recruiting black profes-
sionals for two years now. It
obviously did not have many
blacks when the effort began,
for only 1.5 per cent of its
professional staff idc now black.
(Of its total staff, including
clerical workers, 6.4 er cent
is black.) ?
? The agency divulge k only
percentages, not absolute num-
bers. According to the book
by Victor Marchetti and John
D. Marks, "The C.I.A. and the
Cult of Intelligence," a 1967
-survey turned up fewer than
20 blacks on a nonclerical staff '
of 12,000. That works out to
.0016 per cent.
Yesterday, in one of the con- I
ference's final sessions, the
placement officers pressed
F.W.M. Janney, the agency's
personnel director, to say how
many blacks were interviewed
in recent years and how many
were employed. When Mr. Jan-
ney would not give the num-
bers, suspicions were voice
by the guests that the agency
was more interested in image-
building than black recruit-
ment.
These were answered by Mr.
Colby, who followed Mr. Jan-
ney to the rostrum. But, at
the last session of the after-
noon, Helen Kimball of the
University of Kansas wanted
to know "how much aware-
ness" the C.I.A. had of the
economic and social barriers
the average black had to cross
to become a college graduate.
Her question raised the ques-
tion of preferential hiring.
It was answered by Dr. Ed-
ward Proctor, deputy director
of for intelligence, who said
the agency would consider the
obstacles an individual had to
overcome but would not estab-
lish special standards for
blacks as a group."I'm looking
for performance," he said.
Orening Not Essential
The one exception the C.I.A.
would make, he said, was that
it would hire a black who was
"really first-rate in virtually
any academic field that is per-
tinent to our work" even if
it had no immediate openfng
for him.
Moments later, Merritt Nor-
veil, an assistant dean at the
University of Wisconsin, said
that blacks were not looking
for preference. "The Russians
don't care if I'm blue, yellow,
or red," he said to a burst
of arplause.
According to C.I.A. personnel
officials, the agency recruits
about 1,100 new employes a
year. Of these, only 2 to 3
per cent are taken into the
elite career trainee program
t at prepares future intelligence
oeratives. In all, there are
about 400 professional open-
ings a year, mostly for econom-
ists, linguists, scientists and
others with special sLills.
The recruiting is done from
10 regional offices across the
country, which are said to be
in contact with 400 campuses.
Until the antiwar protests of
the late nineteen-sixties, the
-recruiters went on to the cam-
puses to condnct their inter-
views, the way corporate talent
scouts do.
Later they retreated to well-
secured Federal buildings, bnt
now, gradually, it is said, the
climate is easing and the C.I.A.
is cautiously starting to send
its recruiters back to the cam-
puses.
In the last year, offcials
say, the recruitment prospects
for the agency have improved
markedly, despite the revela-
tions of the C.I.A.'s illegal
domestic spying activities and
the well-publicized investiga-
tions these engendered. In fact,
it is said, the publicity has
helped, not hart.
BALTIMORE SUN
30 Oct. 1975
Garry Wills
FtI Motto
Is to Save
Its Face
The revelation that the
FBI destroyed a letter from
Lee Harvey Oswald does not
tell us anything new about the
FBI?its highest imperative
has always been "Don't em-
barrass the bureau."
What is more important,
the letter tells us nothing new
about Osivald's assassination
of President John F. Kennedy.
We are often told that new
revelations make it desirable
to reopen the Kennedy investi-
gation. Most of these new rev-
elations are repetitions of old
stuff, like the fact that Jack
Ruby was a mob groupie.
But the letter of Oswald
was a new bit of information,
and it just tends to confirm
the Warren report. Oswald
wrote the letter because he
was mad at an FBI agent for
checking up on his wife, Mari-
na, a routine the bureau fol-
lows with immigrants from
the Soviet Union.
If Oswald had been work-
ing for the FBI, as many con-
spiratorialists have argued, he
would not write the agent a
letter telling him to stay away
?he would have talked to his
"contact." In fact, he would
probably have expected, and
not resented, the agent's call
on Marina.
Then why did the FBI de-
stroy the letter? Because it
regularly tells lies to make it-
self look like its TV image.
Even without knowledge of
the letter, some people find
that the FBI had been remiss
in not watching Oswald more
closely. With the letter, things
might have looked worse. So
the FBI denied such prior
knowledge of Oswald in his
threatening mood.
The letter gives us a
glimpse of the reality that ex-
ists behind conspiratorial
theorizing. The theorists be-
lieve that all people in power
make up a clique of bad guys,
whose interests are similar
when not the same. They do
not recognize that the bad
guys spend a lot of their time
fighting each other.
The FBI swept much of the
evidence in the Kennedy and
Oswald killings off to its
vaunted laboratories in Wash- -t
ington. When the state prose-
cutors needed rot';. of the ev-
idence for the Ruby trial, they
almost had to Lackrnail toe
FBI to get it.
The conspiratorial scena-
rios depend very largely on
meet-meshings between local
police, the FBI, the Central
Intelligence Agency and the
Justice Department. But local
police often resent the FBI
?especially Texas police,
who still think of themselves
as Rangers. The CIA and FBI
have a long history of mutual
distrust and bureaucratic non-
co-operation. That is one rea-
son J. Edgar Hoover shot
down the Huston plan?he did
not like to work with others,
and especially with the CIA.
In World War II, Hoover
quickly expanded his anti-
crime work to the hunt for do-
mestic spies and saboteurs,
and then expanded that hunt
to foreign cities where he had
FBI offices. So thoroughly did
he take over the busy anti-es-
pionage activities throughout
South America that William
Donovan, when he founded the
Office of Strategic Services,-
could not move in on Hoover's
territory.
Gen. Douglas MacArthur
kept Donovan's boys out of the
South Pacific, too; so the OSS
had to settle for Europe and
Africa.
After the war, Hoover
tried to supplant the OSS in
Europe while retaining his
sovereignty over South Amer-
ica. But with the founding of
the CIA, he had to relinquish
even South America to' the
President's new army of
spies. He did this with a nota-
ble lack of grace, and the bit-
terness engendered then was
kept alive, like most of Hoo-
ver's resentments, through the
rest of his career. As recently
as 1971 he was again expand-
ing overseas FBI offices,
against the active resistance
of the CIA.
So those people who imag-
ined Hoover's one-man band
co-operating in a conspiracy
to kill the President are mis-
judging the actors in the plot.
The FBI has always tended to
be timorous with any people
but the very helpless?fright-
ened of embarrassing the bu-
reau, and better at destroying
letters than at pulling off co-
operative ventures of high
risk.
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Jack Anderson
'An Attack on America
The Central Intelligence Agency's
harassed director, William Colby, has
written us a letter that deserves attention.
"The successful conduct of both in-
telligence and journalism," he contends,
"depends upon the ability to protect sour-
ces. We are deprived of intelligence today,
which tve might have had but for sen-
sational exposures of our activities, not our
abuses.
"The solution to the dilemma of how to
conduct intelligence activities in our free
society is to give our intelligence
organizations clear guidelines and effec-
tive supervision ? but through represen-
tatives of our people, not through the
powerful spotlight of total exposure."
We agree that total exposure, like total
secrecy, could be hazardous to our national
health. But the greater danger, we believe,
Is too much secrecy.
For-too long, the CIA has operated in a.
subterranean world of half light, a world of
grotesque shadows and shapes. In this
murky environment, the CIA plotted mur-
ders, conducted burglaries and buggings,
blackmailed diplomats, tailed _newsmen,
'spied on dissidents and engaged in dirty
trickery. Often, the victims *ere not
enemy agents but loyal Amerianans.
We believe the press let the sunshine into
this shadowy world just in time. Otherwise,
a subterranean creature might have
developed, which would have become a
menace to the freedoms it was created to
protect.
The language of the Constitution ?
'justice, tranquility, welfare, liberty?was
intended to protect the people from the
government. The language of the CIA ?
secrecy: surveillance, covert operation ?
would protect the government from the
people.
Colby acknowledges "that the CIA must
allow more light on its activities to regain
the trust of the people. I believe we have
been doing exactly that," he contends,
"over the past two years
Certainly, Colby has been more open and
candid than any of his predecessors. But he
has also a sought. to create it cozy
. relationship between the CIA structure and
the press apparatus. What he really wants
are reporters who will act as explainers
and apologists for the CIA. They would
become lap dogs rather than watchaogs.
The need for the press to occupy an ad-
versary role was clear to America's
founding fathers. That is why they made
freedom of the press the first guarantee of
the Bill of Rights. Without press freedom,
they knew, the other freedoms would fall.
Colby claims we misrepresented. his
views on Senate Bill No. 1, a 750-page
monstrosity disguised as a codification of
existing law, which would strangle in the
crib the system of free inquiry we have
today.
"You say that 1-want 'to make it a crime
for newsmen to publish classified infor-
mation.' This is not so. The legislation I
have recommended," Colby claims,
"would apply only to those who gain
authorized access to classified intelligence
information."
He also states that his proposal "would
require that any prosecution for un-
authorized disclosure be subject to prior
judicial review to ensure that classifica-
tion of the information is not arbitrary or
capricious."
Behind almost every important revela-
tion of government wrongdoing in our time
has been three ingredients: (1) the honest
public employee who reveals the hidden
truth; (2) the newsman who verifies the
story, fits it together with other informa-
tion and publishes it; and (3) the official in-
vestigation that is thereby forced into
being.
As we understand Senate One, it would
nullify or impair each step in this process.
First, it makes it a crime for public
employees to reveal classifed information.
Second, the bill in its present form would
make it a crime for a reporter to receive or
publish "national defense information."
The government would have the power,
with some limitation, to define national
defense information. Thus, the govern-
ment could attach this classification to
OMAHA WORLD HERALD
5 OCTOBER 1975.
erties'
almost anything it didn:t want the people to
?
know.
Third, the bill provides a loophole for of-
ficials who break the law in line of duty if
they believe they were acting lawfully,
thereby weakening the incentives for of-
ficial probes.
Our professional estimate is that this
package would shut down the investigative
press quite effectively. Remember how
President Nixon tried to invoke the CIA and
"natidnal security" to cover up the
Watergate scandal? Under Senate One, he
would have gotten away with it.
The're are legitimate defense secrets, as
Colby suggests, which the government
ought to be able to protect. Codes, nuclear
secrets,: plans for military operations, the
identity of undercover agents, crucial data
on weapons systems ? all have a just claim
to secrecy if they are not already known to
the enemy. I.
But instead of defining narrowly the
types of information that must not be
revealed, instead of writing into Senate?
One the standards set by the Supreme Court
for justifying news suppression ? that the
disclosure must pose "direct, immediate
and irreparable arm to the security of the
United States" ? the bill relies on a long-
discredited classification system. .
The decision as to which parts of the
people's business could not be divulged
would be left to the caprice of innumerable
bureaucrats, such as a gentleman of our ac- '
quaintance who used to spend his days
clipping articles out of newspapers and
pasting them on stiff paper which he would
Alien stamp with a secret classification.
Millions of documents have been
classifed, some legitimately, some willy
nilly, some under criteria designed More
for hiding mistakes than for protecting
valid secrets.
Senate One does not discriminate suf-
ficiently between the yellowed newspaper
clippings and the latest weapons designs.
And so, instead of being a safeguard for
national defense, it is an assault on
American liberties.
. (0:4975 by United Feature Syndicate
Retired General: CIA Is Nearly Paralyzed
By Michael Holmes the government) at the time much more secure."
Congressional investigations
of the American intelligence
cOmmunIty "have practically
paralyaxi the CIA," a former
deputy director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, said Sat-
urday.
Retired It. Gen. Alva R.
Exe/said: "Virtually no one in
Weiligence does anything now
because they don't know that
tomorrow they might be ques-
tioned about it," he said.
Acknowledging that "the in-
telligeoot community, like oth-
er institutions, has some inter-
nal problems and occasional
policy errors," Fitch said the
present investigations "are
raising a moralistic fuss about
things that were approved (by
they occurred."
He also lashed out at critics
Partly because of the Water- who have accused the in.
gate scandals, he said, "there's telligence agencies of formulat-
e different morality now. But ing "assassination plots."
the investigations have passed "I know thed I
the point where they're doing
good for the country. I think
they're doing us .a great dis-
service."
Fitch said that certain prac-
tices which have come under
fire, such as monitoring phone
calls, opening mail and keeping
dossiers on U.S. citizens, are
important.
Fitch, who for 21/2 years di-
rected Army intelligence activ-
ities, said that when in-
telligence agencies are denied
the controversial methods, "if
a man wants to sell out to a for-
eign government, he feels
know why they did things," he
Said. "1 know of no single case
where there was an assassina- --
tion plot. There's a great differ-
ence between a plot and a con-
tingency plan.
"When you plan how to get
students out of a high school in
case of fire," he said, "that is a
contingency plan ? it's not a
plot to set the school on fire."
.Fitch, in Kearney, Neb., for a
50-year high school reunion,
told The world-Herald in a
phone interview that the need
for a strong intelligence oper-
ation is "just as great as it eve,
was."
Fitch, a native of Arnhem.
Neb., was held prisoner by the
Japanese in World War 11. He
began his career in Army in-
telligence in 1947, retiring from
the service in 1966.
26
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FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL
October 1975
BCOKSHaF
- inside the
Intelligence System
THE CIA AND THE CULT OF IN-
TELLIGENCE, by Victor !Marchetti and
John D. Marks. Dell ( Knopf). 51.75.
(S8.95).
ISSIDE THC COMPANY: CIA Di A RV, by
Philip Agee. Stonehill, 59.95..
IF THE CIA had been able to impose
its will on, and enforce its employ-
ment contract with, Marchetti and
Agee, these books would not have
been published. The Agency obvi-
ously believes that parts of these
books are injurious to intelligence
and covert political operations.
After a complex Federal Court
battle, the CIA was able to enforce
some censorship, and so "The
CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"
contains sone .163 blank spaces
representing material suppressed
by the CIA. Other material has
been printed in boldface type em-
phasizing material that a 'Federal
judge, over CIA objections, would
not permit to be censored.. Mar-
chetti worked for The CIA for 14
years.. serving in poSitions near the
executive leadership. This gave
him an overview of CIA ?aetivitie.s
which few have had. Marks .was
Foreign Service officer and former
assistant to the Director of the
Bureau of Intelligence and Re-
search in the State Department and
later a Senatorial aide on Capitol
Hill. Their joint ? efforts expose a
substantial amount of new informa-
tion about the US intelligence sys-
tem. Their book is strongest in
muckraking details about the or-
ganization, procedures and at-
titudes of intelligence profession-
als. It is weaker .as an analytic
work; indeed rather thin when if
comes to the tough problems of pol-
icy, organization and control of se-
cret services in a democracy. Much
of the book is currently being up-
staged by the various official inves-.
tigations of the CIA problem.
Agee's "Inside the Company" is
a more radical and revealing book,
if taken at face value. Its substance
seems authentic, but who on the
outside can say? Agee confesses
that.as a covert operator "you get
so used to lying that after a while
it's hard to remember what the
truth is" (p. 9). Given Agee's cur-
rent motives to further a world rev-
olutionary, ? socialist cause, the
reader is bound to be curious about
how he was able to reconstruct
- from memoty hundreds of pages of
a "diary." And what, exactly, dogs
Agee mean when he acAPFILlitOsF
STAR, Indianapolis
25 Sept. 1975 ?
TRANSATLANTIC'
CIA Probe Boggles British
BynthonyLeine
IYILiiUS
. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, the leader of Brit-
ain's conservative opposition, and her predeces-
ser, Edward Heath, have both been visiting the
United States during the past few days.- (Separ-
ately, not together:? .there's ?
an icy coolness between
them.) Despite the European
Common. Market, despite the'
-resurgence of isolationist sen-
timent in America, there has
perhaps never been a ? time
when the two nations had.
more to learn from one?anoth-
f
er.
Much of. what needs to be .
learned fats - into the Awful -
Warning category.
NO ONE 'RETURNING "to the United States.
after an absence of several years could fail to
notice the strong. mirrent which has set in
tdwards Federal, collective or, in plain Eng-
li,
eh Socialist solutions_to social and economic
problems..
?
?
The sheer growth Of ,Washington, which
means the growth of central- government and
its attendant bureaucracy,, of politicians and
their para,sites, proclaims what has been hap,-
pening..And one 'has only to read the newspa-
pers or watch television to meet a continual
.sream of demands for government interven-
tion; demands based on political assumptions
which not long ago would have been consid-
ered, at the very least,' highly Controversial....
? Everything from Medical care to. car seat-
belts, from housing to consumer' protection; is
treated as ,a proper subject for the passing?of
laws and the spending of taxpayers! money.
Government and business are becoming more
and Inore - intertwined, and a lot ,of business-
men *.longer really . want to left alone,
whatever 'they may say. ?
? ?
The labor unions tea seek to gain what they
want through government action, and are
clambring for new welfare schemes and for
? more public expenditure in order to create
, jobs.. The school system ha S become flagrantly
a political- battleground.
-
that the Com-munist Party. of Cuba
"gave the !important encourage-
ment at a tithe when I doubted that
I would be ab.le to find the addi-
tional information I needed" (p.
639)? ?
? Agee's tedious book is unique in
that it describes CIA covert opera-!
tions in Ecuador. Uruguay and I
Mexico in which the author was in-
volved. Pointlessly, he cites the
names of numerous agents, foreign
and 'American; lists .secret organi-
zations and Code names; and in
general "blows the cover" from a
THE COROLLARY of this process ? high.
taxation, refueled inflation, a. jungle of con-
trols and a habit of. mind which looks always
to the government for help ? renders people
le'ss able and less willing to look after them- '
selves, and therefore makes, the wellarists'
predictions self-fulfilling. So the current flovAng
towards Socialism ? b e c.6 m es. cumulatively.
stronger. .
All this will have seemed very' familiarto
Mrs. Thatcher. It is exactly the road down
which Britain ,has travelled since World War 11
? with consequences which ? are. only- now 'be-
coming unmistakably clear.,
On. the Other hand, any British ;visitor is
likely to ,be startled by. certain attitudes toward
government which are ouite unfamiliar. It is
taken for granted in Europe that governments
do not; and cannot, act only,in ways which
would: satisfy the moral code of' Sunday
Sunday
School teacher.
THE IN into the activities
of the CLA are, from a British .or European
point of view; truly mind-boggling ? not be-
cause- of what they reveal but because the
politicians involved, and indeed the press,"
seem to have no, qualms about revealing it.
Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, on whica
to a considerable 'extend, the CIA was original-
' ly modelled, has-endured seVeral major scan-
dals since the wan' but they were not scandals
of this kind. - .
On the. contr.*, the whole sting of them.
was that secrets had been penetrated or endan-
gered, and that the 'efficiency of operations
was therefore lessened and agents' lives put in
pertl.
-.Nobody in Britain doubts that a Secret In-
telligence Service ought to be secret. Only-
quite extreme left-wingers doubt the necessity
or propriety of covert operations overseas
scruples which seem not to worry theft unduly
with regard to the. activities of the Soviete
. - ?
. 'Each day's news from-Washing,tOn Must setI-
. the walls of the Kremlin racking with merry.
laughter: America's allies find it less enjoyable
and not at all reassuring.
- t, (North -American Newspaper Alliance): ? -
theme is that the CIA provides a,
secret police for Americani
capitalism-. His book. is substan-
tially revealing; his theme is appall-
ingly overstated and simplistic. Un-
intentionally, parts of the .booki
suggest a script fora Marx brothers:
movie, which is to say that many
US covert operations abroad were
amateurish, outrageous and fool-
ish. Smaller woridtr that the CIA
would have suppressed this book,
first published in Great Britain. had
it been able to do so.
-,? .
?HARRY HOWE RAN.SOM
or PtieWttgeo 0111003150 it*A-Iftrin-00432R0001003694/054ilt Universify
27
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"TIMES OF 7.1iM131.1l." Lerseticn ?r, Septeember 11175
IIICTIMMISIEZeitteetetn
NV-
OVER the past couple
? Of - months, we have
:Written considerably on
the chronic shortages of
essential commodities.
We hope we are not
boring our regulzir
-.readers if we make
:6ine"_ fresh . revelations
? on this -same topic.
\krhiler: these snortages?
have, not. brought a great
deal. of joy in this country
and . have been -a cause of
severe inconveniences to the
sort of life We were trying
to get used to, they ha?ve
brought a great deal of
happineas to many parts of
the world, particularly those
near our borders where
photos of our women queue-
ing for essentials and fighting
over them, have become a
regular feature on the front
pages of their national
newspapers.
Armchair economists are
writing haughtly about
what we should have done
and where we went wrong.
Zambia has suddenly be-
come a household word in
most parts of the world not
because of our commendable
efforts to sort out the mess
In southern Africa, but be-
cause of our failure to pro.
vide the basic essentials to
the common man.
A couple of nights ago, I
Was having i few t1uickoneg
with my mentor tuld good
friend Cortiracie Bonzo. I
think it was during our
second refills when Bonzo
caught sight of the collars
of my shirt and expressed
,grave indignation. He wori.
.dered loudly if I had prob-
lems in my household.
. I assured him that all was
well and that the lady of the
house was given ample
-
housekeeping allowance bui
there was just no soap
powder to be had for love
or money. I then complairo
-ect t Bonzo and wondered
if this country! was serious-
ly tackling the supply dilU
-distribution problem or
essential commodities.
in ciesperation anti mil u.
emotion, charged ants
blamed our shortages on
congestion at ports and ex-
pressed the hope that it they
'operated .. more efticientiy,
we would get most of tne
essential raw materials h.
'good time;
"Nonsense," said Bonzo.
"You have been reading too
much of the 'Daily Noise'
which is deluding the people
about what is actually hap
pentng to the economy of
this - country.".
? -"But it's a fact, comrade,"
-1 exclaimed, . 'that .most of
the essential raw materials
have been -stuak at the ports
tor years."
"But it's a fact, comrade,"
Bora?. "that any Importer
anc manufacturer who' has
essential commodities stuck
at the port of entry can get
these moved in no time at
all by approaching the right
authority. What do you
think is the reason for the
establishment of the Direc-
torate or Contingency Plan-
ning?"
"Then would you blame it
on low productivity of the
Zambian workers?"
"That's another rubbish
propagated by the 'Daily
Noise'," retorted BortZo.
"The Zambian worker works
just as hard as any other
worker anywheie where they
have no shortages. In face
we have had these shortages
with us for the past thiee
years only. You can't Con-
vince me that the Zambian
worker has suddenly become
lazy and less productive.
That's nonsenee, if anything,
he has become a better anti
etticient worker."
"Would you blame the
Ministry of Commerce then
for not granting import
licences tor essentials or
that there le an absence or
an effective supply, tied dis-
tribution policy oz essential
commodities?"
"That again is not true.
The Ministry of Commerce
is very generous in its issue
of import licences for essen-
tial commodities and there
I s in this country institu-
tionalised machinery for the
importation, supply and dis-
tribution Of all essentials."
Failed
"Then, tell me comrade,
what is the cause,, where
have we failed, where have
We gona wro'ng?".1;erlt
"I win tell yew,. said
Bonzte as- 'he ? reached. for
his large glass of the fluid
that Is never in short supply
and drained it in one
breath, "it's the CIA".
"You don't mean the Can-,
tral intelligence Agency?"
"It's the one; comrade, at
the root of all our current
problems. I see a CIA touch
on what is happening in
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
23 October 1975 ?
CIA- efficiency .
this country. They' are very
good at this sort of thing
and no one else in the world
could have convinced and
effected It. Don't you ever
under-estimate the CIA?"
"Comrade you are not
serious," I Said in disbelief.
"Of course I ain,
don't Imagine foe any
moment that becaeme the
CIA is under investigation
and is having problems with
the American Senate anti
Congress it has been deter-
red from exporting confu-
sion, unrest, assassinations,
anarchy, and coups to
the Third World. The
problems we are going
through over supplies of es-
sential commodities are not
of bur own making, that is
? why we are unable to bring
it under control."
"Bet how do they do it?"
'"That we shall never
know. That's why they're
an Intelligence organisation.
I imagine they ? have in-
filtrated the entire manu-
facture, supply and distri-
bution sector.
"I certainly would like
to know what they have
done to these men involved
ln this sector.
"What other explanation
could there be for failure to
supply to the common man
the basic essentials like salt,
soap powder, cooking oil,
beans etc unless he was
being paid by someone like
the CIA not 'to d-cr -job .
properly otherwise you ex-
pect him to discharee -his
duties well, after all he gets
paid for it."
"But why should they
employ this crude method of
bringing frustration and un-
rest to this country?"
"Probably they realise that
the people in this country
are so politically united that
we have to be tackled from
a different angle."
"What do they stand to
gain out of all this?"
? asked.
"Maybe: for the fun of it.
There is usually no apparent
reasons for most .things the
"CHICAGO?The CIA should not' be
criticized .for hiring gangsters as assas-
sins. It should be complimented for try-
ing to do a jell in a .more_ efficient. man-
ner:. lzeee eel
Forty'years ago,-far poseibly-lese-than?
millicn dollars;: we could have ,hired'.
the Mafia to bump off Hitler, , Goerieg,...?
Goebbels, and a feev"- other key' Nazis
?Instead,e-,ve? permitted those dangerous'
men to strut around while' shouting
'about oureideals-of morality,' assassinat-
28
CIA gets involved in."
"But surely they shdtild
have better teings tO do," I
said.
"1 don't know. Probably
they don't like the Chinese."
"What has their dislike of
the Chinese got to do with
us?"
"They may think we are
getting too much under the
Chinese influence. They see
a lot of Chinese goods in our
shops, a Chinese built rail-
way and we owe the Chinese
a great deal of money. So
I suspect they say to them-
selves that if they can't have
us under their sphere of
influence, they damn well
won't let the Chinese have
us either."
"What do you think is the
cause of all this?" I de-
manded to know.
"Its simple really," said
Bonzo,' "a great deal of
American money was used
to lay the economic founda-
tion of this country."
"I thought it was the
British money," I reminded
him. .
. Unhappy
"No, but American money
using British personnel. The
British have no money.
Naturally, the Americans
are not at all happy that
their money will be used to
finance the Chinese. Neither
are they pleased that they
are losing a potentially
profitable market to the
Chinese."
"There may be something
in what you have said com-
rade, but I don't think .you
will find many people
accepting your explanation."
"But the people have no
choice but to believe the CIA
theory. So far, every reason
has been given as the cause
of the shortages arid nothing
has been done about it and
nobody believes anything
anymore on the supply
situation. It is time, I think,
we blamed it on the CIA, its
the only thing, left ..." .
-ed .htnadieds e of : thOusands, of' innocent.
womeri and children. -In doing so:
? we' spent., billions _of-, dollars,- killed' and..
rippled 'vast :armieieof our own men,
men,
and devastated hundreds of cities: ;**'
ee-13efore we get involved in another in-'
-ternational'iconflict we, should: take--a
'long hard look at our -system 'of inorali:
'ty.?We might find that the most virtuous,
:way of waging a war. would be to take
.the- contract from.our star-spangled gen-
'erals andegiye, it to the Mafia_
????,1 e-oe-e; ee. Otto Boutin
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1
THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY; OCTOBER 22;1975
Andrei rnalrik, on '-D?nte
The writer of the following article,
a 37-year-old historian and dissident,
is best known in the West for his book
"Will the U.S.S.R. Survive Until
.1984?" in which he postulates that
hostility among various ethnic groups
an4 an eventual war with China could
tear the Soviet Union apart. Last May,
? he returned to Moscow after five
years' imprisonment and internal exile
on charges arisieg from his writings.
Barred from residence in Moscow last
month, he now Lives in a nearby town
and is permitted to visit the city two
and three days at a time. This was
translated from the Russian by The
New York Times. ?
MOSCOW?Assessing the advan-
iages of d?nte over the cold war,
We don't have the right, it seems, to
'say that detente is the alternative to
ewer. The cold war, being a form of
.
sublimation of hot war, was not less
effective than "d?nte" in averting
a real war, because peace depended,
and still depends, on the balance of
-nuclear power. Therefore, _even a
mutual 'reduction of weapons, should
'it' ever be achieved, would not reduce
'an'd. would not increase the risks of
- ' The rise in armaments is ' a con-
sequence of confrontation, not its
cause, and to a certain degree is a
.
consequence of scientific-technical
'progress. Inasmuch as an accord about
reductions in these or those areas will
not end either confrontation or prog-
ress, the arms race if suppressed in
'one area will merely emerge in
another. A reduction in arms may be
,a result of d?nte but it is not its
esole nor basic content. Therefore, it is
'better:to look upon d?nte as an in-
strument not for the safeguarding of
peace but rather for the improvement
of the world. Otherwise, there would
be no sense in, detente.
- An impression is growing, however,
that, the objective of the U.S. in
detente is precisely the safeguarding
of the existing situation. It seems to
be striving to entangle the U.S.S.R. in
a web of treaties and mutual coin-
..mitments, and thereby deprive it of
.the ability to disrupt world stability
without concern that these ties might
be severed. .
'Soviet Union's Aims-
:For the U.S.S.R. the side still on
':the offensive, the-objectives of d?nte
are much broader. The U.S.S.R. is
-Striving to emerge-from isolation for
rat- -least three reasons.: first, to use
detente with the West to manipulate
:the Western countries one by one
rather than in a group, and this is
.already happening to a certain extent;
:second, to assure itself of a secure
rear. in view of the hostile relations
,with China; third, to overcome the
economic backwardness deriving from
the isolation.
?
needs technological and organiza-
tional .modernization, and this is im-
possible without assistance from the
West. In addition, the backward state
of agriculture compels the U.S.S.R. to
buy grain regularly in the West. Two '
.bad harvests in succession without
such purchases could shake the Soviet
economy and even provoke mass
upheavals.
Further, d?nte is explained, as I
see it, by two not fully clear but real
circumstances: first, by the fact that
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. regard each
other as the only equal partners;
second, that they along with other
developed countries are beginning to
consider themselves not only rivals
,but also to a certain degree as allies
._?somewhat like a group of well-fed
in a crowd of hungry.
I speak of these tendencies recog-
nizing that opposing tendencies are
at work and that the U.S.S.R remains
In the eyes of the U.S., as before, a
destructive force. Whether or not the
American leaders recognize it, a fun-?
damental change in the foreign policy
of the U.S.S.R. is impossible without
a change in its internal situation.
It is difficult to imagine- a state
combining constant, suppression and
violence internally with peaceful be-
havior and accommodation externally.
Such "peaceful behavior" could' only.
'be the consequence of military weak-
ness or of deceptive camouflage.
Therefore, any relaxation in .the in-
ternal policies of the U.S.S.R. should
be desirable to the Americans not
only out of humanitarian considera-
tions. It is also vitally important to
them for reasons of their own secu-
rity, and therefore can be regarded as
one of the objectives of U.S. policy.
Since the U.S., in working out its
political strategy, chose cooperation
with the U.S.S.R rather than its isola-
tion, two tactical variations were
possible:
1. To move toward rapprochement
expecting that the cooperation of the
U.S. and the West in general would
gradually "soften" the U.S.S.R.
2. To tie every step toward the
U.S.S.R. to a demand for a particular
change in both internal and external
policies, understanding their inter-
dependency.
An impression has been created
that Richard M. Nixon and Henry A.
Kissinger chose the first path as the
one seemingly requiring less effort
and giving visible results promptly.
Mr. Kissinger sought to resolve in
-barely two years the challenge of rap-
prochement with the U.S.S.R., a task
-requiring, let us say, two. decades.
Such haste possibly reflects not only
the mentality of Mr. Kissinger him-
self but also the features of American
mentality in general-e-the mentality
of businessmen who want to see at
once the tangible results of their
Despite important military-indust- efforts.
to the hasty signing of a series of-
agreements only for the purpose of
presenting them to the citizens. on
television and saying: "Look! We have
done this and this and this!" But the
U.S. is dealing with a partner with
which it is dangerous to make haste.
Even if the Soviet leaders no not
possess the many brilliant qualities
of Mr. Kissinger, they are able to a
superlative degree to set themselves
distant goals and also to wait
patiently.
American policy differs from Soviet
policy in two other features. Foreign
policy in a way is a pupil of internal
policy. The mentality of government
officials rising to foreign policy leader-
ship has been shaped for years by
dealing with internal political prob-
lems, and all the methods they have
mastered inside the country are ap-
plied abroad.
American domestic policies are
based on a play of free farces, settled
by compromise, while Soviet domestic
policies are based- on a ncecompro-
mise implementation of instructions.
And while the U.S. may sit down at
the negotiating table consciously or
subconsciously thinking of compro-
mise, the U.S.S:R. sits down with the.
intention of achieving its objectives
in full, agreeing only' to fictitious
concessions.
The other strange feature of Ameri-
can policy, as with the policy of the
West in general, is the treatment of
the U.S.S.R. like a .small child who
must be allowed everything and not
be irritated because he might start
screaming?all because, they say,
when it grows up it will understand
everything.
.?Dr. Spook' Methods
This prolonged "upbringing" Of the
U.S.S.R. by the methods of Dr. Spock
is reflected not only in an endless
number of minor concessions by the
U.S. but also in actions that are
simply humiliating for its prestige as
a big power:- This was most clearly
illustrated by the reluctance of Presi-
dent Ford to invite Aleksandr I. Solz-
henitsyn to the White House because
Mr. Kissinger feared this ? would in-
furiate Leonid. I. Brezhnev.
-Such behavior in general is very
typical for representatives of the
American Government. Thus, an
American diplomat with whom I have
been acquainted for more than 10
years and who recently returned' to
Moscow declined for the same reasons
to meet with me, although he did send
expressions of his sympathy via an
intermediary.
Knowing the character of those
whom the Americans are trying to
play up to by such behavior, I believe
that even though it wins approval .
from their side it also arouses a
degree of contempt.
As I get older, it becomes
Ale Pcf6'- inPflMease12100}M)81/08tmCiPIRrEfPrigtilM32fitiVi18112te0abvie best in
rial achievementcp
29 .
ever
the
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world finds its expression in simple
human relationships: the love of a
husband for his wife and parents for
their children, the comradeship Of
men, compassion, patience and simple
decency; while any ideology and doe-.
trine, if not used with care as a work--
? Ing hypothesis, may lead to the chop-
ping off of heads or, in the best of
cases, to the stuffing of money bags.
The fact that two persons who were
able to meet more than 10 years ago ?
without any interference and now, in
. the period of "d?nte," are unable
to meet does not speak in favor of
d?nte's humanitarian aspects. !
It does not seem to me correct, in
light of the long-range problems of
, the U.S. rather than the immediate
ones, that there is a desire "not to''
overload" d?nte, as Mr. Kissinger
has said, with humanitarian problems,'?
and to yield on humanitarian issues
as politically unimportant and annoy-
ing to the U.S.S.R, all in order to pro-
mote the sale of Pepsi-Cola.
The Basis of Stability - - -
If the U.S. sets itself the objective
of establishing truly friendly relations
with the U.S.S.R and wants to be as-
sured of their durability, then it must,
? strive for the transformation of the
closed Soviet system to an open one.'
The awakening of the Soviet people-.
, to human rights is a force working in
this direction. ?
Inasmuch as the movement? for
'human rights has no troops, the poli-
tician-policemen and the politician-
businessmen are inclined to slight it.
But it seems to me that it is pre-
cisely the world movement for human
rights that will become a world-trans-
forming force that will overcome both
Inhumanity based on violence and in-
humanity ?based on indifference. ? .
Genuine stability comes only in a
process of movement, only. in the ex-
pansion of influence. The U.S. must
strive for a transformation of the
world if it wants it to be more stable.
A .system that does not set expan?
sionist goals for itself contracts and
dies away. The world has experienced
many forms of expansion?military,
economic and cultural. If the U.S. can
become the center of a .new expan-
sion, a humanitarian expansion based
on human rights throughout the
world, its future 'would be assured
for a long time. .
. It is interesting that this idealistic
element has already, to -a, lesser or
greater degree, been felt in. American
politics during the entire history of
the U.S. The old-fashioned European
political mentality?without an under-
standing of historical perspective and
without interest in higher. goals?is
not., likely to long dominate the
foreign policy of the U.S. No ?matter
how much more Mr. Kissinger wants
to cast aside humanitarian problems
they come to the surface by one
means or another. This is particularly
evident in the differences between the
Administration and the Congress over
the question of trade and of emigre- .
tion from the U.S.S.R.
These differences, although' restrict-
ing the Administration, also do give it
certain benefits. The triangle of Mr.
Kissinger, Mr. Brezhnev and Henry
M. Jackson reminds me somewhat of
the situation when a criminal is being
induced to confess by two interroga-
tors, one of whom?Senator Jackson
? ?shouts and beats his fist on the
table, and the other?Secretary of
State Kissinger?who smiles and
gently promises leniency. So the heart
of the criminal, faced with such con-
trasts, opens up to the kind smile.
The U.S. Govermitent evidently is
feeling the pressure of business cir-
cles. headed by makers of soft drinks,
interested in cooperation with the
U.S.S.R. because they consider it a
gigantic potential market for their'
products and a source of raw,
materials and cheap labor. One can
.only welcome economic cooperation
if it is one of the elements of the
policy of d?nte, but not a 'force
shaping this policy. ? ?
Without doubt, businessmen have
made an enormous contribution to the ?
creation of modern America, but
when they became the, leading poli-
tical force they led the U.S. to the,
brink of disaster?to the Great De-
pression of the 1930's.
Americans are a people easily car-
ried away. When they were carried
away by the cold war, I don't know,
whether there were sober voices pro-
posing some kind of alternative. Now
the Americans are carried away by
"cleterfte," and it is good that warn-
ing voices are being heard. The warn-,
ing is that detente requires restraint
and determination?not merely a will-
ingness to compromise?and that
meek concessions will only lead to
demands for more concessions. Per-
haps the voices will be heeded. " ?
? The alternative to d?nte, which its
supporters have, demanded to hear
from its critics, is detente carried out
differently, d?nte in which long-
range goals are not sacrificed to short-
term goals; and- one must learn to
wait for what is desired.
Foreign policy does not exist by it-
'self'. It is an integral part of a coun-
try's internal condition, which in turn
. depends. upon external conditions. If
,one accepts the premise that without
rpprochement with the U.S.S.R. the
U.S. cannot exert influence on it, then
one must say that if this influence is
not in a constructive direction the
rapprochement will be even danger-
ous for the U.S. When the U.S.S.R.
must pay for every bushel of grain
and for every technological secret not
so much with gold as with a step to-
-ward democratization of its society,
-,only then -will its foreign policy cease
to ,present a. threat to the West.
However, this exchange, this
"gentle pressure" should not have the
character of wounding the self-respect
of theJU.S.S.R. tet it proceed under
the banner of demanding fulfillment
from the U.S.S.R. of the international
declarations it has signed. And every
concession should be looked upon not
as a "victory for the West" but rather
30
' as a step toward' common good.
In the' emerging triangle of powers,
the relationship of the U.S. toward
, the U.S.S.R. , and China, amid some
similarities, is very different. China ?
has not developed yet to the level of
true partnership with the U.S. eco-
nomically, socially or politically; and
militarily it presents much less of a .
danger, , to the. U.S. than does the
U.S.S.R. Further, the mainspring of
- revolution still has not unwound in
China. Any attempt to put pressure
on China for the purpose of internal
change most probably will yield no
results. China is still so far from the
West that everything that happens
there is regarded almost like &time- ?
-thing on the moon. China is still too
' "alien" for public opinion in the West
to reach out a hand to those who are
subjected to persecution.
. Pressure From the West ?
It is a different matter with the
.
'From the circumstances' of
its tragic. Eurasian "geographic situa-
tion, _Russia has. always been both
more sensitive to the West and more
dangerous to the West than has China.
The mainspring of the Russian Revolu-
tion has completely unwound. And
moving now only by the force of
inertia, the U.S.S.R, will be highly.
responsive to pressure from the West,
all the more so because of a hostile..
? China at its back. And it is fully clear
that the more the relations of the:
U.S.S.R.. with the West expand, the
more it becomes "familiar" to the
West, the more public opinion in the
West will keep an alert watch on
events in the U.S.S.R.
If , the rivalry, of the U.S.S.R. and,
China becomes ever sharper, and I
, believe -that. it will. then the ties of '
the U.S. to the U.S.S.R. and China
"will become like two sets of reins in
the hands of ?the American leaders,
, which they can use to ,guide the
' course of world history.
But the question is, will they?
Let us assume that a state or a
group of states, working out long-
range policies, should define the goals,
strategy and tactics. As viewed from
here in Russia, one might say that
the political strategy of the U.S. is
correct, but that its tactics in effect
Pare ? undermining that strategy. But'
what is more important, the policies -
of the U.S.?and even more so of the
We.st in general?reveal very dim ob-
.
jectives or even the absence of ob-
jeatives; the preservation of the status
quo and, economic growth are not
really objectives.
Perhaps the dissent and lack of
confidence that have seized the West
and have found partial reflection in
"d?nte" will open the way to a ,
perception of the- significant objec-
tives?the objectives of reshaping the
world, at the basis of which will be ,
the human personality, a personality -
in its broad human, not egoistic, es-
sence. Then the West, sure of itself,
will begin to speak in a different voice. ,
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CHR1S11AN SCiENCE MONITOR WedneSclai, -October 22, 1975
Schlesinger's risky 'empty strategy' -
By Herbert Scoville Jr.
When his "counterforce" strategic policy Furthermore, the military are strongly
came under fire in the Congress, Secretary of opposed to placing any mechanism in the
Defense James Schlesinger claimed the Rus- missile so that it can be destroyed or aborted
sians had nothing to fear since they had "a in flight. They fear that this would make it
capability to launch their strategic force on vulnerable to countermeasures and provide
warning of an impending attack." the enemy a self-installed ABM (anti-ballistic
This tactic, known as "launch on warning," missile) system.
would place ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic Therefore to reduce the chance of calam-
missiles) on a hair-trigger alert so that they itous accident, extraordinary measures are
could be launched in the interval between the taken to ensure that no missile will be
firing of a hostile counterforce attack (an inadvertently fired without authorization. The
attack of one country's ICBMs against those of United States has adopted tight command and
the other) and the arrival of the warhead at control procedures, which require author-
the targeted silo. It takes 30 to 40 minutes for ization from the President, and positive action
an ICBM to travel between Russian and by at least three independent persons to
American sites, and radars or satellite in- launch any ICBM. Our deterrent forces are
frared systems can provide at least 20 mm- designed to survive an attack so as not to have
utes' warning that an attack is under way, to be fired hastily. Fail-safe mechanisms are
With modern technology, defending missiles installed on all launch systems to ensure
could easily be launched during that 20-minute against an accident which could unleash such
period so that the attacking warheads would catastrophic destruction.
only be destroying empty silos. A counter-
force strike thus becomes an empty strategy. We have no specific knowledge of Russian
"Launch on warning" would appear an ideal
tactic were it not for other fatal flaws.
Strategic missiles, unlike bombers, cannot
be recalled or destroyed once they have been
launched. Yet each packs the punch of many
Hiroshima bombs?the Minuteman HI ICBM ? ens; in 1971 they negotiated several agree-
carrying three warheads aimed at separate
preordained targets and the Poseidon missile
carrying ten warheads. Thus, a single missile
is capable of destroying three to ten cities and
,of killing millions of people.
procedures to prevent accidental launches,
but there are strong indications of their
understanding of the hazards involved and
their interest in avoiding such an occurrence.
They have exercised even greater control than
we over people with access to nuclear weap-
ments with the United States to provide
safeguards against accidental or unauthorized
use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, all
their land-based ICBMs have been deployed in
costly, hardened silos to increase their probe-
Tuesday,Ottober28.1975 N THE WASHINGTON POST
bility of survival in the event 7t. an ettack: and
avoid the need of rapid launch on warning.
Apparently, Mr. Schlesinger feels that im-
proving U.S. ability to knock out Soviet ICBM
silos overrides the substantially increased
chance that millions of Americans will be
incinerated in an accidental nuclear strike.
Actually, the Secretary was providing telling
support for what critics of Ms counterforce
policy have long been warning ? that we
cannot risk the acquisition of a more effec-
tive anti-silo capability, which meld push the
Soviet Union-toward a "launch on warning"
' posture. Putting the Soviet ICBMs on hair-
trigger alert is even more risky fcr us than for
them.
To make matters worse, Mr. Schlesinger
has threatened to launch strategic nuclear
weapons in a "selective" strike at military
targets in the Soviet Union in response to
aggression with conventional weapons in
Europe. If the Russians follow Schlesinger's
advice and "launch on warning," the selective
strike will hit only empty silos while Soviet
warheads may be killing millions of Amer-
icans. It is time for the Secretary to con-
template the implications of his own pro-
grams, and recognize that they are seriously
increasing the risk of a nuclear catastrophe.
Mr. Scoville is former Assistant Direc-
tor of the Arms Control and Disarmament
_ Agency and Deputy Director of the CIA:
ae By MichaelGetler ,-
1.1?itrostttriotOrt Post tiptcityriter ? '
Bt*W",?dat: Soviet.
Union appears to ,heve. opt-
smarted the.WeitemallieS on
a key provision of the 35-- "
nation. agreement ? on
Etirepe.ari Security signed last
au/Timer in Helsinki. , - ?
T.!?!.c'prGvisionrqufte
advance notice "major?
.military. Maneuvers" by'
Oitticipating.cottiitries when
ihe maneuver! are within. a;
ttrtain distance of another
aluntry's border.
I!
p_Before the new agreement
Ilas signed, the question of
IlMat size maneuvers would
require advance notice and
t47 far away from borders
Aley could be held without the
notice was a major stumbling
rock and the last issue to be
?Aresolved before the wide-
ranging pact would be con-
eluded. ?
As matters turned out, the
e numbers arrived at match the
t: recent pattern of Soviet
military maneuvers, in effect
: allowing the Soviets to con- .
Untie doing what they have
been doing for the past few
. years without giving prior
eotice. Approve
; The provision, for prior'
notification of tmajor military
Maneuvers is included in a
section of the 60-page
agreement devoted to
'confidence-building
measures."
The idea was to ease fears
that it country could launch a
massive surprise attack
?against another country and.;
use the .pretext of a big,
military exercise to disguise
the - massing of troops in
border areas.
Thus, the agreement, in
rather vague language,
requires that countries give
notice three weeks in advance
of military maneuvers in
Europe involving more than
25.000 troops.
However, a key provision is .
that "in the case of a par-
ticipating state whose
territory extends beyond
Europe, prior notification
need be given only of
maneuvers which take place
in an area within 250
kilometers (153 miles) from
its frontier facing or shared
with any other European
participating state."
.Since the Soviet Union's
territoey e.xtends beyond
dg-1960.eierl?er?9A1/08/98
Soviets do not have to an-
nounce large-scale maneuvers
that are more than 153 miles
inland from its European
borders, .
The agreement does limit
the size of Soviet and Warsaw
Pact exercises clese to
Western European borders to
the 25,000-troop level, but
informed American and West
German militaneofficials say
that for the past few years at
least the Soviets have been
holding down their maneuvers
'in border areas to that size
anyway.
Since the signing of the
Helsinki accords Aug. I, there
have been a number of
Western news reports that
NATO governments had
evidence of the Soviets and
their Warsaw Pact allies
"Circumventing a clause" in
the Helsinki agreement by
holding down the size of their
maneuvers to escape the
requirement to announce
them in advance.
In fact, Western intelligence
officials say the Soviets ape
patently knew that they could
stay under the 25,000-man
ceiling when they agreed to it
in Helsinki.
rqn PenrlinfitlIrt? 1
NATO- di i vance
that while the Soviet general
staff conceives of its military
maneuvers on a very large
scale, they generally have ?
been carried out in the last -;
year or two in concentrated:
form near border areas, using
perhaps two or three 8,000-toe
10.000-man divisions.
The la rgersca le exercises,.
in which perhaps 60,000 Soviet
troops are airlifted aboard .
planes of the Soviet airline
Aeroflot, take place further
inland, where ? no
an-
nouncement is required.
The Western alliance
generally does not have this/
luxury since the high {tensity.:
urban part of central Europe'
is not the best for military'
maneuvers...
Similarly, Western exer-
cises in border areas:
generally use bigger divisions;
and several thousand extra:
troops who serve as "referees
and umpires." Virtually all
NATO exercises exceed the
tai lirnit and thus
uarnbunced in ad-
3i
v 5 ons. Sources say,,
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?. One West German official
likened the Soviet tactics at
-Helsinki to the techniques
used by the Soviets in the
. Strategic Arms Limitation
...Talks with the United States.
Moscow's representatives, in
. this view, are not overt
_cheaters but skillful
negotiators who ignore vague
unilateral statements by other
countries that are ?not
precisely spelled out in treaty
form.
Failure of the United States
to insist on specific limits to
size increases it atomic-
warhead missiles in the first
WASHINGTON POST Monday,October27;103
S viet
uildup
Dis uted
Colby Sees
No Massive
Arms Increase
By Laurence Stern
, Washington Post Staff Writer
'Newly disclesed
testimony by top in-
telligence officials con-
tradicts claims by Pen-
tagon spokesmen that
steady increases in Soviet
military spending threaten
to reduce the United States
to subordinate power
status.
the current "Battle of the
Pentagon Budget" there have
been warnings from Defense
Secretary James R.
.-Schlesinger and other officials,
of massive Soviet military
buildups and "gaps" adverse
? to t he United States.
. Centre! Intelligence
Agency Director William E.
..Colby. in' testimony made
SALT accord, for example, IS
now producing problems in
trying to get a second one.
In the long bargaining at
Helsinki over the maneuver
? limits, the United States
wanted originally to require
notification of exercises ex-
? ceeding 8,000 troops. . The
Public yesterday by Sen.
William Proxmire (D-Wis.),
-said Soviet spending was
increasing at a steady 3 per
cent annual rate it has
maintained over the past
decade.
colby also said that a
substantial portion of Soviet
defense costs was absorbed by
defensive missions for which
there was no comparable U.S.
outlay?such as the 10,000
surface-to-air missiles
deployed around Soviet
borders as well as the
positioning of forces along the
Chinese-Soviet frontier.
-. Summarizing the testimony
by Colby and Lt. Gen. Daniel
0. Graham, director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency;
Proxmire said, "The U.S.
leads the Soviet Union in
'virtually every area of ad?
vanced military, technology."
He acknowledged, however,
that the dollar costs of Soviet
military programs exceed
those of the United States on
the basis of estimating
ivehniques used by the CIA.
Colby and Graham testified
June HI and July 21 before the
Joint Economic Committee's
Subcommittee on Priorities
and Economy in Government
of which Proxmire is 'chair-
man. The sanitized transeript,
was issued yesterday.
. A strong element in Soviet
Military planning and ex-
penditures, said Colby. was
NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1975
proposed " a 50,000.:
troop limit. The 25,000 would,
appear to be a compromise,
but West German and.
American sources point out.
' that the Soviets undoubtedly
knew all along that they were:
able to do what they wanted to
with 25,000 men or fewer.
defense against the pLoss- ibility
of attack from aircraft
deployed throughout the
NATO countries. ?
-They are very concerned
about their vulnerability to
aircraft. .The Soviets, of
course, have a national
historical fixation on the
problem of invasion...," the
CIA director observed. Aside
from the deterrent capability
arrayed against NATO forces
the Soviet Union is deploying
40 divisions along its border
with China together with some
1,000 tactical aircraft, half of
them nuclear-armed, Colby
said. .
Colby and Graham agreed
that the dollar basis of
estimating Soviet military
costs tended to inflate Russian
expenditures because of
noncomparable factors in the
U.S. and Soviet economies.
Nonetheless the estimated
dollar costs of Soviet defense
programs have exceeded U.S.
expenditures every year since
1971, according to Colby.
During 1964-1974 Soviet
military costs, in dollar terms,
were estimated to be 90 per
cent of the U.S. level.
?
In the course of the hearing
Proxmire complained to Gen.
Graham that threats of a new
Soviet capability seem to
blossom "just like the flowers
Personal Diplomacy
BY James Reston
WASHINGTON, Oct. 23?Personal
diplomacy is very fashionable these
days. We have pictures of Henry Kis-
singer shaking hands with Chairman
Mao Tse-tung in Peking, of the Em-
peror of Japan and President Ford on
the White House lawn, and next week
, it will be President Sadat of Egypt
and his "dear friend" Henry dominat-
ing the social and diplomatic news.
Sometimes these personal contacts
are vital to the relations between na-
tions, and they have always fascinated
Mr. Kissinger, who spent years at Har-
vard studying and writing about the
perscinal diplomacy of nineteenth-cen-
tury Europe. But his own years in
Washington illustrate the fragility of
human life and power.
He established a remarkable degree
of respect with Chou En-lai, which
helped to end the long break in Sine-
American relations, but when he got
to Peking this time, Chou En-lai was
too ill to see him and it is doubtful
that they will ever meet again.
Likewise, it was thought here that
negotiations with Spain for the use
of military and naval facilities in that
country ought to keep in mind the
pride, and prejudices, of Generalissimo
Francisco Franco; but before negotia-
tions could be completed, Franco was
stricken and the judgment here is that,
his long domination of Spain is over.
Mr. Kissinger counted on the philo-
sophic and economic influence of King
Faisal of Saudi Arabia to help mod-
erate the demands of the Middle East-
ern oil states, but Faisal was murdered
in March of this year. The Secretary
had hoped to get help in the Cyprus
crisis from Bulent Ecevit, who had
once been a Kissinger student at
Harvard. but Mr. Ecevit was thrown
out of office on Nov. 17, 1974.
This is not to say that personal
diplomacy does not have its uses or
that Mr. Kissinger's own personality,
32
bloom in the spring"
whenever the defense budget
reaches the Appropriations
Committee action stage.
"During a debate over a U.S..
ABM we begin hearing about a
Soviet MIRV or a Chinese
ICBM," the senator observed.
Proxmire asked Graham
whether he agreed that the
United States "leads the
Russians in almost every high
technology base in terms of
bombers, submarines,
computers, missiles and other
categories."
Graham answered: "I think ?
that in almost all military
technologies we lead them.'
He added, without
elaboration, "I am worried
about several that are rather
important, such as (deleted)
the application of lasers." -
Proxmire concluded that it
would improve public un-
derstanding of defense
spending controversies if
? reports on Soviet military
outlays were made at regular
intervals by the "civilian
side" of the intelligence
community.
"It would also help avoid
confusion if Pentagon officials
would refrain from using the
estimates of the intelligence
agencies prematurely,
selectively, or out of context,"
he said.
character and wide-ranging mind have
not made great contributions to some
of the more positive events of recent
world history. It is doubtful, for ex-
ample, that Egypt would have taken
even its limited step toward an ac-
commodation with Israel unless Mr.
Kissinger had won the confidence of
Mr. Sadat.
In contrast, Mr. Kissinger also felt
that he had established mutual trust
with Le Duc Tho, the principal Hanoi
negotiator at the Vietnamese peace
talks, but the agreements arranged be-
tween them fell apart when they no
longer supported the interests of the
parties concerned.
Aside from the accidents of politics,
the accidents and mortality of life
make personal diplomacy a risky busi-
ness. Since Mr. Kissinger came to
Washington as the principal security
adviser in the White House in January
of 1969, President Nixon and Vice
President Agnew have been forced out
of office,, and his principal ally- in
2061706/08 :-CIA-RDP77-00432k0-80100380005-1
?
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1
Cin*res-, Chairman William Fulbright
of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, was defeated at the polls. ?
Meanwhile, in these six and three-
quarter years, the obituaries of world
leaders have dotted the front pages.
They include: Charles de Gaulle and
. President Pompidou of France; Chiang
Kai-shek of Nationalist China; Gamal
Abdel Nasser of Egypt; Antonio Oh-
' veria Salazar of Portugal; Juan Peron
of Argentina; Prime Minister Norman
Kirk of New Zealand and Premier Car-
rero Blanco of Spain.
, And this does not take into account
key political figures like Chancellor
Willy Brandt of West Germany, who
- left office at the height of his influ-
ence in world politics. ?
One does not dwell on the past to
be morbid but to question the domina-
Washington Post
26 OCT 1975
SALT Pact .
May Slip to
Early 1977
By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer
? The United States and the.
Soviet Union soon must decide
if they are prepared to risk a
free in the nuclear arms
talks that can extend to 1977,
American strategists
acknowledge privately.
This is the most
troublesome foreign policy
? issue inside the. Ford ad-
ministration, insiders agree.
-.The problem is compounded
by continuing differences
between the State Department
and the Department of
' Defense over the price that
should be paid for U.S.-Soviet
detente.
? It is the Kremlin, however,
rather than the-White House,
? U.S. sources say, which now
News Analyses
holds the controlling decision
on whether any accord will
emerge from the strategic
arms limitation talks in 1976.
The summit meeting bet-
ween President Ford and
Soviet leader Leonid I.
Brezhnev, which has been
delayed repeatedly, is tied to a
SALT accord. Secretary of
State Henry A. Kissinger's
recurringly extended dates for
producing a SALT agreement
now have reached "early
This is the Ford ad-
ministration's actual deadline
for any accord, it was learned.
The United States has in-
formed the Soviet Union
privately that it will be
politically impractical to
pursue SALT negotiations _
beyond early 1976, to avoid the
contentious atmosphere of the
American p r e?kipttived
election campaign.
If this cutoff is adhered to, it
WASHINGTON
'tion of personality in political affairs
and to point to the instability of almost
all the major political leaders at the
present time.
Mao Tse-tung is 81, Chou En-Iai is
, 77, both in poor health, as is Leonid
Brezhnev, the Communist party chief
in Moscow. Also, President Ford's
term of office is assured only until
the end of next year, and Mr. Kis-
singer will be leaving then, in any
event, so that enduring agreements
between nations must rest on national
interests and not on personalities?a
rule almost all world leaders accept
in principle but defy in practice.
Harold Nicolson, still perhaps the
best student of diplomacy of this can-
means that if SALT
negotiations are inconclusive
in the, next four months, they
would go over to 1977.
With this limitation on
negotiations, administration
sources concede, the
prospects diminish for any
SALT accord in 1976 without
major Soviet or American
concessions soon.
As a political reality; the'
pressures will grow inside the
administration even during
this period to resist com-
promises that could expose
President Ford to new attacks
from the Republican right on
his detente policy,- U.S.
planners anticipate.
Defense Department par-
tisans initiated 'a flurry of
attacks across the Potomac
two weeks ago against
Kissinger's SALT diplomacy,
although Defense Secretary
James R. Schlesinger last
week strongly disavowed any
attempt to frustrate
Kissinger's strategy.'
Schlesinger personally
shares some of Kissinger's
concern about the need to
"bind Brezhnev's successors"
to agreed nuclear-force,
ceilings. But Kissinger and
Schlesinger* long have
disagreed about the terms the
United States should settle for
in the projected 10-year SALT
agreement.
A failure to reach a SALT
agreement in 1976, many
Defense ? Department
strategists and other
specialists contend, still would
leave in force the five-year
limit on American and Soviet
strategic weapons that runs to
October, 1977.
This would allow adequate
time, these sources say, for
resuming SALT negotiations
after the presidential
inauguration in January, 1977.
Kissinger's associates label
this an invitation for "panic
negotiations," in contrast to
chbeiRetteaset00114/08108
critics charge Kissinger with
tury, went even further and argued
, in "Peacemaking" that even when
the great men are well and secure in
office, the habit of personal diplomacy
' is dubious and maybe even dangerous.
"Diplomacy," he said, "is the art of
negotiating documents in a ratifiable
and therefore dependable form. It is
by no means the art of conversation.
. . . Nothing could be more fatal than
the habit of personal contact between
statesmen of the world. It is argued
in defense of this pastime that the
foreign secretaries of nations `get to
? know each other.'
"This is an extremely dangerous
cognizance. Personal contact breeds,
inevitably, personal acquaintance and
,that, in its turn, leads in many cases
to friendliness. There is nothing more
damaging to precision in international
relations than friendliness between
contracting parties. . . . Diplomacy, if
. it is ever to be effective, should be a
disagreeable business. And one
. recorded in hard print."
conducting. Beyond that
hazard, such a delay runs the
risk of a "totally uncontrolled
nuclear arms race,"
Kissinger associates caution..
By 1977, these sources say
there is almost certain to be a
new leader in the Kremlin,
even if President Ford
remains in the White House. A
change in either leadership, it
is argued, could provide
justification for cancelling the
Ford-Brezhnev agreement
made at Vladivostok last
November, which is the basis
for the present SALT
negotiations.
Kissinger, therefore, is
described as being deter-
mined to continue his drive for
a SALT accord until the last
possible moment, in the hope
of inducing the Soviet Union to
reach even a partial nuclear
compromise.
Time will run out, U.S.
specialists now estimate,
before the convening 'of the
Soviet Communist Party's
25th congress, scheduled to
open in Moscow Feb. 24.
This is where Brezhnev
planned on displaying a
completed SALT agreement,
capped at a Washington
summit conference, as the
climax of his detente
strategy?and, it was
speculated, perhaps his
political career.
The ailing Brezhnev,
however, now may lack the
power to produce any new
concessions on SALT. In
addition, the administration's
political timetable for cutting
off SALT negotiations may be
construed as a deliberate
pressure tactic, although U.S.
officials have tried to
eliminate that suspicion.
The two most intractable
obstacles in the path of a
: tAllg-ROFTP00432ROOD1
be offsetting demands for
33
dealing with -two weapons not
discussed at Vladivostok last
year.
One is the latest Soviet
bomber, known in the West as
the Backfire B; the ether is
the. American-initiated long-
range cruise missile, yet to be
test-fired, but already
regarded as a major.
technological breakthrough to
a new class of weapon!.
Of the two, weapons
American cruise missile is,
overwhelmingly the most
significant.
The Defense Department is'
pressing the Soviet Union to
count Backfire bombers in its
force level of 2,400 strategic ,
land, sea or air missiles or
long-range bombers. The
Soviet Union insists the plane
is not an intercontinental
bomber, but a medium-range
bomber.
The Soviet Union, in turn,
demands that the United
States count long-range cruise
missiles in its total of 2.400'
strategic weapons. The United
States refuses on grounds that
the cruise missile is the
equivalent of a low-flying
pilotless plane, not a ballistic
missile.
In the latest American
counterproposal, submitted
Sept. 21, which is now the
critical offer in the
negotiations, the United States
proposed a trade-off formula
for counting the Backfire and
cruise missile in equal
numbers. above the force
levels set at Vladivostok.
There is little, if any, ex-
pectation on the U.S. side that
this offer will be accepted as it
stands. The question is,
whether it will be rejected,
deadlocking the negotiations
long before February, or as
110384005-l1opes, it will
stimulate an encouraging
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1
counterproposal.- strategists regard as
Kissinger is prepared to A meriea n 'advantages
bargain. Schlesinger repor- bargained away in earlier
tedly is too, but to a lesser SALT agreements.
extent. The Defense Depar- The ultimate test of whether
tment has no intention of there win be any SALT
abandoning what it sees as the agreement in ma, many U.S.
.technological lead it now can experts believe, will turn less
gain to offset what Pentagon on the. pursuit of detente than
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
9 October 1975
LIONEL BLOCH looks sadly at the Western
nations' inadequacies in dealing with the Arabs
_ .
on the level of Soviet concern
that American technology will
end up with an uncontrolled
advantage - in nuclear
weapons.
This was the decTsive factbr
in the first, disputed, SALT
accord .in 1972, which
Kissinger justified primarily
THE preparatory meeting far a
world conference on energy
and raw materials due to
-open in Paris on Monday, is a
icharacteristic tour de force of that
great illusionist President Giscard
d'Estaing. .
His ambitious .project started in
fact last April but promptly col-
lapsed following the demand of
the Third World's representatives
to include the question of raw
anaterials on the agenda?a thinly i
veiled way of claiming that any- I
thing OPEC could do with oil,
they could do better with their
own !commodities. For once, the
advanced industrial Powers de-
cided to draw the line there and
Oen but, having made their
gesture, they are now back at the
bargaining table after receiving a
prolonged kiss of life from the
' Elysee. This is no mean tribute
even to a man with the President's
,
celebrated talents. -
Since April, the plight of the
poorer developing countries has
grown more desperate, the budgets
of the " older " consuming coun-
tries have become even more un-
balanced and OPEC has resent-
fully settled for a " mere " 10 per
cent.- increase in oil prices.
? Against this sombre background,
the basic aim of the oil-consuming
countries is to eliminate or limit
attempts to wreck their economies
by the ruthless manipulation of
fuel supplies and to ensure that
normal market mechanisms func-
tion ? free from cartel . pressures.
These objectives are common to
both the developed and undeve-
loped consumer nations, but can
- they be attained by rational argu-
ment, diplomatic skill or appeals
to the 0 P E C's , enlightened self-
interest? There are many reasons
for doubt. -
- Firstly, the oil-consuming coun-
tries do not pursue a common
policy. The Ford Administration
is divided. An influential section
, of its economic establishment
? favours high prices which benefit
America's own oil producers and
stimulate the massive investments
in alternative sources of energy.
Not so long ago, at the time when
Dr Kissinger uttered pious hopes
; that oil prices would come down
, a little, the Assistant Secretary in
charge of energy problems,
Thomas Enders, argued publicly in
favour of a high floor price for oil.
This conflict is not merely one of
emphasis?it is similar to the
,current divergences between the
Secretary of State and the Pen-,
tagon on supplying Israel with
Pershing missiles and undermines
34
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oil
ad
arty
racewar-1,....pt
America's credibility and standing
in international negotiations.
When we turn to Britain's posi-
tion, we note that her will to resist
the crippling effects of high oil
prices has been paralysed by -three
trends.'
There is in the air a general
feeling that financial expediency is
all that matters. OPEC in gen-
eral and its Arab members in
particular must not be upset if we
want to have their business and
keep their sterling balances.
' Beyond this' crude 'and short-
sighted opportunism, there- are
other forces at work. The rot has
spread into the Conservative party,
whose experts on energy can now
only think of how best to recycle
the excess oil profits of OPEC
without even considering ways and
means of reducing them. Given
this sort of defeatism, who can
blame the coal miners doing their
own "recycling "? After all, they,
too, could argue that any increases
in wages paid to them are put
back into our economy.
Even the ,Economist (Sept. 20)
discerned something humiliating
but " healthy" in seeing "the West
so busy today appealing to OPEC,
please not to put prices up too
much" and shows sympathy for
OPEC's use of oil power for dent-
ing "the arrogance of the West."
With such friendly support, who
needs enemies?
Of course, there -remains the
question of our vested interest in
high oil prices for the sake of our
North Sea bonanza. The most
obvious criticism of this point of
view is that this country's invest-
ment in the new oil fields should
net have to depend on artificially.
high OPEC prices that, for a
variety of reasons, could be
brought down as arbitrarily as
they were put up..
Pulling out
As to whether all our efforts
-to placate OPEC are useful, the
answer is not reassuring. In 1974
OPEC invested ?3,700 million in
Britain. In the first six months
of 1975, . these investments
dropped to ?370 million. Having
on grounds that it Checked a
more dynamic Soviet missile-
building program.
.41-1,NY
attees
shattered our precarious economic
balance, OPEC is now letting us
down because our economy no
longer inspires confidence !
Is France faring differently?
After all, with her well-established
tradition of renversement des alli-
ances, she has been leading
- -Europe in cultivating 0.P E C's
benevolence to the extent of turn-
ing some of her leading statesmen
into commercial travellers. On the
face of it, charm and servility
have paid. In the first six months ,
of this year French exports to the
Middle East have increased by 76
per cent. But, for all this, France
still pays for her oil as much as
anybody else and her export re-
cords are a shade less gratifying
when it is remembered that ,to a
large extent they are paid for by- ,
her own money. To put-it differ-
ently,- the amount of oil that
France could purchase in 1973 by
exporting one tank to Libya could
be bought a year later only by
exporting five tanks. The price
of French tanks and other exports
Were- duly marked 11D, but not by
500 per cent, and the remaining
gap still hurts: thus in her current
Budget there are provisions for a
"little deficit" of ?4,500 million,-.
and it is likely to be higher?as ?
Germany is clamping down on
Common Market agricultural sub-
sidies.
Even when France's hell-bent
export drive achieved records, its
very success created new prob-
lems, as in the case of Algeria
where?after a French trading
surplus of $650 million in the first
six months of this year?a budding
"special relationship" turned into
acrimonious controversy culminat-
ing with the Algerian regime buy-
ing space in the French Press to
berate the economic policy of
Paris.
The weaknesses underlying all
these strains and stresses among
and inside the leading industrial
countries do not escape ? 0 P E C's
leaders, and inevitably they con-
clude that the consumer's goose
can be made to lay many more
golden eggs before the game is
over.
The case of Patricia Hearst has
prompted some general discussion
on whether a kidnapping victim
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can really make common cause
with his tormentors. If one con-
templates great Powers doing pre-
cisely that, why wonder when a
helpless individual succumbs
under pressure?
The true meaning of 0 P E C's
frenzied overdevelopment is still
only dimly perceived. It is a pro-
cess generating its own uncontrol-
lable momentum to such an extent
that, against its better judgment,
OPEC may be forced to press
on and on for higher prices, even
if this means growing inter-depen-
dence with the West, stimulating
the West's reserve stocks and its
drive for alternative sources of
- energy, crushing the poorer
nations and going against the
weight of market forma.
It is this last factor that worries
the oil producers. To counter it,
they encourage the notion of inter-
national economic egalitarianism
which offers the richer countries
of the world an opportunity to
expiate the sins of past im-
perialism and present affluence.
The modus operandi of this new
ideology is the transfer of wealth
to the underprivileged countries of
the Third World by paying the
earth for their produce and raw
materials.
Possibly, this new egalitarian
concept is an adaptation of the old
Cargo Cult of the Pacific?a belief
among some of its islanders that
a large ship full with everything
NElek YORK TIMES, MONDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1975
? With Fertilizer Shortage Past,
Poor Countries Are S till Hungry
BY ANN C
The worldwide fertilizer
shortage of last year is now
past. But left in the wake is a
dectine in fertilizer usage?and
therefoT in potential.food pro-
duction?in the world's poorest
countries. Furthermore, fertil-
izer manufacturers, who in-
creased prices during the short-.
age far above production costs,
are expecting huge profits.
. These price increases ? as
much as 1,000 per cent be-
tween 1972-and 1974.for some
of the most commonly used
fertilizers ? had a particularly
severe impact on the less de-
veloped countries, which de-
pend on expensive fertilizer im-
ports for most of their needs.
RITTENDEN
to pay their iScalating fertilizer
t? The impact of the shortage
:h been been broad:
girt some of the poorest na-
tions, such as India and the
Philippines, fertilizer consump-
tion has fallen as much as 30
or 40 per cent, according to the
International Fertilizer Devel-
opment Cerrter, a private, non-
profit organization that was
established in Muscle
Shoals, Ala. ? ? ? -
9The world's major donor of
fertilizer aid, the United States,
reduced its aid from 631,000
tons in 1973-74 to 487,000 tons
in 1974-75, and had to spend
more than' twice as much for
the lower amount.
igAs a result of these devel-
opments, some observers- fear
that food production has not
been so high as it might have
been in the hungriest areas.
The Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization or the United Na-i
tions has calculated that the 1
current shortfall of fertilizer in;
43 of the world's poorest coun-i
tries is equivalent to the loss'
of about 2.7 million tons of
grain--enough to spell the dif-I
ference between subsistence!
and starvation for millions ofj
people.
(iThe steep price increases
have also meant, that poor
countries have hadApiagoweed)
much scarce foreign exchange d
they ever dreamt of and more
would appear one day on the coral
reef, wrecked and abandoned, its
contents available to enable them
to live forever after in lilssfel
opulence. For all their weaknesses,
contradictions and generosity, the
time is nearing when the advanced
industrial coun.tries will have to
inform OPEC and Co that,
although during the post-1973
storms some cargo had to he
thrown into the sea?at least ?for
the time being?they are neither
shipwrecked nor willing to aban-
don their cargoes.
Alas, such candour is not the
stuff of international conferences.
Nevertheless:- the poor ria-
1"but we're .also generating
tions will still need to import funds to build the additionat
some 3 million tons of fertil- capacity that will be needed in
izers in the 1975-76 growing the next five or 10 years.
season, by F.A.O. calculations. "The poor do a pretty 'good
They will probably be unable to
job of exploiting us when the
finance more than two-thirdsj shoe is on the other foot," he
added. "Look at oil."
Or one might look at fertil-
izer, for now that prices are
tumbling, it is the international
trients?nitrogen, phosphorus I customers turn -to break con-
and potash?the most common- tracts.
ly used fertilizers in the third India has renegotiated sev-
world are those based on nitro-. eral major contracts with
gen. The world's major food American producers, and Indo-
grains heavily depend on an- nesia has recently cancelled
nual doses of artificial nitrogen outright huge purchases of fer-
fertilizer, which is largely based tilizer made when the price was
on ammonia, derived from oat- over $300 a ton. It is now near-
ural gas. naphtha or coal. er half that.
Anhydrous ammonia can be "The sanctity of contracts
anplied directly to crops. but doesn't exist in this business.
its derivatives are more signif- because of the wild price flue-
icant in world trade, and one. tuations," said Emil S. Finley,
urea. is the most widely used president of a fertilizer-expori:-
fertilizer in the developing ing firm. the International
world. Commodities Export Company
of New York.
Part of the instability might
also result from 'much of the
export trades being handled by
brokers, who frequently split
their sizable sales commissions
with key purchasing agents in
less developed countries, ac-
cording to widespread trade
reports.
as potash. began to soar. From Referring to this practice,
the (depressed levels of 1971-72 Mr. Finley said, "Our company
could have made twice as much
money last year if we had been
greedy and willing to ,in the
bills that "they were forced to of these requirements, leaving
defer expenditures in other vi- a shortfall equivalent to about
tal sectors, thereby slowing 10 million tons of grain.
their already sluggish economic Of the three basic plant nu-
growth rates," according to
Martin M. McLaughlin of the
Overseas Development Council,
a research organization in
, Washington.
I Although there were many
reasons for the sharp price in-
creases of the last two years
(primarily a real fertilizer
shortage in the face of explod-
ing demand) aggressive profit-
maximizing on the part of the
producers played a significant
part, according tb a number of
industry analysts.
These analysts point out that
although the juin!) in energy
prices in 1973-74 did increase
fertilizer-productio costs, fer- Next in imnortance are the
n Ph
tilizer price movements in most phosphate fertilizers, such as
cases far exceeded cost in- triple sunerphosnhate and the ammonium phosphates. based
creases. As a result. fertilizer-
nroducing companies enjoyed on phosphoric acid, and normal superphosphate produced from
unprecedented earnings last ,
year. ? phosphate rock. When the fertilizer shortage
e
' "There was a big rin-off last merged in late 1973. prices for
'ear." said Robert?
T Eastman all of these Products. as well
Af RlYth EastmPri ninon & Co..
a brokerage fi-n. "The retail
dealers and distribotors took
advantage of the shortage to
rin-off the farmers in this cram-
try. and the prodiicers sold to sop to Loon Per cent, and dirty busOess."
countries like todia and Brazil I nhosphate rock jumped 470 per. t
This chaotic situation in the
at inflated prices."cent.
fertilizer trade has worked far
Buyers Show Resistance
In the process. producers and l more to the advantage of the
This process ended a few suppliers scrambled to renego-i producers; however, than to
months ago, as the ? inflated tiate contracts signed at lower the purchasing countries.
world prices ran into buyer re-' prices. . ccot. g j ? Last year the largest Ameri-
sistance and as purchasers: Roher, an industry analys,t, with: can companies that primarily
many of whom panicked and Goldman Sachs SE Co., Com- produced fertilizer?the Inter-
overbought last year, pulled out panics would call, their cus- national Minerals and Chemical
of the market to work off their tomers and say, Because of Corporation. Reker Industries.
Corpora-
excess inventories. the shortage, we can, guaran- the First Mississippi Corpora-
fertilizer. We tion and the Williams Compa-
For these and other reasons.. tee any _more
,the fertilizer shortage turned don't want to break this con- nies?enjoyed an average re-
:around to a glut, and the prices. tract, but if you want any of I turn ort equity of 31.6 per cent,
iof many commonly used fertil- the product after this shipment. I in contrast to 14.6 ner cent for
izer products have tumbled to you'll have to pay more for it
Standard & Poor's index.
the 425 companies listed in the
i one-half to one-fourt of ii,.e w
to the neak earlier this year.
urea went up Loon per cent,
nhosnhate chemicals were un

thy are still well above the tries of Greenwich, Conn.
.. of tWo .?rs g ? broke the same contract withlow I
The major producers are India twice, although the corn-
culp.tions
for the 425, according to cal-.
holding large inventories, and I nanY says that after India made by Investors
? ? threatened legal action. Bakerl 1?1Pnagement Sciences.
!peak levels of -1974-2althotia,h One company,. Baker Indus-
they
The fertilizer industry's pre-
tax profit was 18.3 per cent.
compared with 11.15 per cent
according to orld BanK o
cials many governments in de.: agreed to sell at the original
veloping countries have huge! price. ?
stockpiles, which they are und "You might say we're goug-
es/plielIllftV9.".?8166?:ubi0EtarPOW
35
ka a*
The leading producer, I.M.C.,
which sells one-third of its
product internationally, had a
182 ner rent increase in profits
80006-liscal year ended June
- ? ? ? - ? or -e -ase is I: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1
PO. following a 123 per. cent(
iumn in net income for the t'
previous year.
Commenting on the prices{
that made such gains possible,1
I.M.C.'s president and chief ex- '
ecutive officer, Richard A. Len-
on, said, "We were meeting a
market opportunity?that was
what the buyers were willing
to pay. It follows," he contin-
ued, "that to avoid a repetition
.of the shortage periods, prices
Will have to move forward. Au
.ctirrent prices you could not
build a plant from scratch to-
day."
The most dramatic enrich-
melt was reflected in the in-
come statement of Beker In
dustries. In the first six months
of 1975, the company, which
has $157-million in sales, had
a sales increase of 118 per
cent and in increase in pretax
income of 160 per cent, follow-
ing a jump in income of 249
per cent last year. To a large
extent the numbers reflect prof-
its earned abroad, for foreign
sales accounted for 55 per cent
of Beker's total tonnage in
1974.
Ultimately, however, the
farmers in the third world re-
fused to pay the higher prices
NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1975
U.S. Arms-Sale Rise
Stirs Capital Concern
.Greater Control Is Sought by Congress
As Nation Takes Lead in Munitions Sal
By. RICHARD D. LYONS
? . Special to The New York Time'
VVASHINGTON, Oct: 18?The' two areas, which account for
emergence of the United States more than half of American
as munitions king of the world arms sales overseas, there have
'and almost daily reports of
new arms deals with foreign
Governments are generating a
fresh sense of uneasiness among
policy makers and Congress-
men over the impact of the
weapons on global affairs.
Sales of American-made
weapons have risen from about
$2-billion a year in 1967 to
about $11-billion in the last
fiscal year, abetted by Federal
policies of liberal credit, a be-
nign attitude toward the ship-
ping of arms overseas, the pre-
eminent state of American
military technology, the rapid
obsolescence of weapons and
an almost limitless world-wide
demand for more guns.
Congress has become in-
creasingly embroiled in the
specifics of such arms deals
as tanks for Turkey, missiles
for Jordan, rockets for Israel
and jet fighters for Egypt; at
the same time Congress is con-
sidering the general idea that
the Senate and the House of
Representatives should have
greater control over interna-
tional shipments. of munitions
made in this country.
During the last decade there
has been a complete reversal
of United States arms policy
from one of giving the weapons
away to one of selling them,
either for spot cash or on lib-
eral credit supplied by the Fed-
eral Government.
The demand for American
Weapons has been spurred by
arms races in the Middle East
and the Persian Gulf because
of the quadrupling of the price
of oil and the desire of the
petroleum producing nations
to defend their enormouslyi
amplified wealth with steel.
_In recent months, in these
been reports of Pershing mis-'
siles to Israel, radars to Egypt,
fighters to Saudi Arabia, Hawk
missiles to Jordan, destroyers
to Iran, antitank missiles to
Oman, bombers to Kuwait and
tanks to Yemen.
While orders for American-
made arms appeared to have
peaked last year, the probable
effect of Congressional ap-
proval of the Sinai accords,
which would provide arms to
both Egypt and Israel, would
be to push still higher the sales
of American arms, spare parts
and training services.
Increasingly vocal critics of
American arms policy, which
some complain is a lack of
policy, note that this country
seems only too willing to sell
to all sides.
Over the last generation a
dozen nations in conflict have
battled one another in Central
-American jungles, Middle East-
ern deserts, East Indian islands
and Asian 'plateaus in wars
having one common denomi-
-nator?they were fought with
arms made in America.
Guerrilla Actions
In thousands of guerrilla ac-
tions spanning four continents
:from Northern Ireland to the
:Philippines, hordes of people
'have been killed and maimed
:by weapons whose production
translated to salaries for Amer--
-can workmen and profits for
.American corporations.
In Asia, Africa and Latin
.rAmerica,' military dictatorships.
:have power and keep power
'with munitions sold, lent and
f.given away with the endorse-
vent?indeed even the enthusi-
?astic approval?of the last six
.Presidents and 16 Congresses.
.Since the end of World War II
'the United States has shipped
8100-billion worth of weapons
:to 136 nations, making this
*country the munitions king of
The globe with arms sales equal,
to those of all the rest of thel
jwas clear. price do partly explain lagging
and the impact on consumption !ever, that factors other than I
Consumption Declines fertilizer usage in developing
,countries. These include.- low
usage dropped 40 per cent in
In the Philippines, fertilizer pgralaninting, and prices which discourage
the first six months of 1974. In the lack of ade- Indonesia, normally a growth quate marketing storage and
credit facilities in many coun-
market of 10 to 12 per cent a
triMesoreover. India in particular
inant last Year and in India it
year, consumption was stag-
wa '
w.ould be completely self-suffi-
"It was pure and simply her
, s down 25 to 30 per cent. cient in fertilizer if her own
ted
inability to protect herself from
plants opera lv, international more efficient-
world price increases," Dr. Paul J. Ste u because of power failures
Stengel of the International and inadequate maintenance,
iFertilizer Development Center
Sid of India. Indian factories operate at only
Observers do point out, how 60 or 70 - Per cent of capac ty
.7 noIrld.th
t quarter-century'
:the United States has trans-
ferred to foreign Governments
166 Phantom jets, 2,375
vopters, 185 destroyers and de-
stroyer escorts, 1,500 landing
craft, 5,000 Hawk anti-aircraft
missiles, 25,000 Sidewinder air-j
tto-air missiles, 28,000 antitanki
Missiles, 16,000 armored per-I
'sonnet carriers, 25,000 pieces;
:Of artillery and 28,000 tanks,c
plus enormous stocks of other'
Weapons, spare parts and
'services.
f' Virtually no public debate
-has accompanied the increasing
:flow of American-made arma-
.'ments throughout the world,
,and only in the last year have
,members of Congress begun to
express concern over the poten-
-tial danger lurking in overseas
'arms sales, even to friendly
'nations.
'A Real Tragedy' .
"I think it's a real tragedy!
?:for us to end up being the arms1
:Merchants of the world," Sena-
tor Edward M. Kennedy told a
'Congressional hearing on arms
''sales a few months ago.
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey.
-has likened the American mu-
-initions industry to "a kind of
''.arms supermarket into which
Any consumer can walk and.
laick up whatever he wants."
, Defenders of overseas arms,
t'sales say, however, that theyj
:are necessary to counter Corn-j
munist threats: that if thej
:United States did not provide'
uthe weapons, other cottntries1
:would, and that weapons pro-
eduction translates not only into!
'national security but also prof,
Its and jobs.
In Congress, members of
lioth houses are increasingly
questioning what the arms
Sales policy of the Ford Admin-
istration is, if' indeed there is.
:one, and whether the nation
:should adopt a different course.1
Among the questions they
have raised about arms sales
are these: Are they moral? Will
the arms sold trigger wars?
Could the arms eventually be
,used against the United States?
Should the United States seek
a treaty with the Soviet Union
limiting the supply of conven-
tional arms? Would other na-
tions increase munitions sales
if the United States chose to
curtail shipments? What would
be the impact on the American.
economy if the United States
drastically reduced foreign
arms sales? _...
36
"Merchant of Death" .
In discussing such issues be-
fore a Congressional commit-
tee, Thomas Stern, deputy di-
rector of the State Depart-
ment's Bureau of Politico--Mili-
tary Affairs, said: "These are
valid questions for Americans,
who are troubled at seeing
their country in the arms sup-
ply business. The image of,
'Merchant of Death' dies hard.")
Arms experts here are also.
expressing doubt that it would
even be politically possible to
curtail the production of
weapons for sales overseas be-
cause of the increasing strength:
of the loosely allied arms lobbyt
in the United States.
"The economy now is sad-
dled with a self-perpetuating
munitions industry that is bad
for long-term economic policy,"
said one knowledgeable Senate
staff aide.
In addition to the increase in
sheer volume of arms being
produced for other countries,
the United States in recent
years has radically changed its
policy on the method of trans-
fer. Until a decade ago most
of the arms were given away.'
Now they are sold for cash,
generating fat profits. "
Financing Methods
Most arms transfers are' fi-1
nanced in the following ways:
Wirect give-aways of mate.;
riel and services to foreign Gov-
ernments under the military
assistance program. About $500-
million was earmarked in 1975.
firoreign military sales in
;which contracts for the arms
are arranged by the Defense
Department, with credit terms
secured through the Treasury
Department's Federal Financing
Bank. Current rates of interest
and terms of repayment, about
8.7 per cent over six years, are
slightly below the going mar-
ket rate for international loans.
In the fiscal year 1975 about
89.5-billion in orders were
placed in this manner.
qCommercial cash sales with
, the foreign Government dealing
directly with the American
Imanufacturer. Export licenses
for the material, about 81-bil-
lion of which was sold in the
fiscal year 1975, must he issued
by the State Department.
One of the very reasons used
recently by White House lobby-
ists in imploring Congress to
lift the ban on arms shipments
j to Turkey was that the Turks
thad already paid 8184-million
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In cash for the undelivered
weapons.
Boon to Grumman
The sale of 80 F-14 jet fight-
ers to Iran has shored up the
troubled Grumman Aerospace
Corporation and helped to brake
the unemployment rate on Long
Island.
Throughout the world, Amer-
ican munitions agents are hus-
tling for new contracts with
the covert, if not total, approval
of the Federal Government.
Military assistance advisory
groups, composed of 2,000
American military personnel,
are stationed in more than 40
ed th
served n e advisory groups
overseas say that the units have
and are working intimately with
the sales representatives ot
American companies. One fot?
mer Army colonel, who now it
a staff aide on Capitol Hill,
said the groups "do their best
to convince foreign Govern-
ments to buy American weap-
ons."
? While serving in such a group
in Europe, he said, the over-
seas agents of American arms
companies "attended all the so-
cial events at the American
Embassy." He added that even
the air, naval and military at.
countries aiding in the purchase tach?,ave them aid by such
and maintenance of American- things as setting up interviews
made weapons, as well as the with high-ranking officers of
training of those who man other Governments.
them.
"Munitions sales is the big-
gest floating crap game in the
world," said one arms specialist
in the State Department. "The
amount of money involved is
enormous and everyone is try-
ing to get a piece of the ac-
In addition to pushing the
hon.
The United States and the sale of arms through the De-
Soviet Union are the world's fense Department, American
biggest arms dealers, with the weapons makers are also con-
former outselling the latter by fronted by other Governments
a margin of 2 to 1. But France, whose agents "walk in the front
Britain, China, Italy, Sweden door demanding to be sold the
and Canada also make major stuff," as one State Department
overseas arms sales. !official put it.
During' a Senate subcommit- He cited the almost un-
tee hearing in ?June, Senator noticed arms race now going
Humphrey, a Minnesota Dem-: 'on in South America in which
ocrat, asked Lieut. Gen. H. MJ Ithe Peruvians bought tanks and
Fish, director of the Defense! ijet fighters, prompting demands
Assistance Agency, if the De-. from Chile, Argentina and Bra-
fense Department was ?hus- zil that they be sold similar
tling" overseas sales. equipment.
'No Huckstering' For over a decade the State'
General Fish replied that Department had a tacit policy
there was "no hustling, no' of forbidding the sale of
huckstering. Sales will be made, sophisticated weapons to Latin-
only if it serves our national, American countries- on the
interests and meets a valid mil-, ground thatey were not
itary requirement." ,needed there since there was
This prompted S ena tot ' no outside threat to the security,
Humphrey to ask, "What kind ,of the area.
of security do you get out of "It's hard to say no to the'
giving something to Haiti, or to requests," said Representative
Paraguay?"Lee H. Hamilton, Democrat of
I Indiana, who is chairman of a,
Yet former officers who havei
subcommittee of the House In.
"I thought some of the rela-
tionships were clearly unethi-
cal," he added of the links be-
tween the agents for American
arms and United States military
officers stationed overseas.
? Buyers 'Walk In'
NEW YORK TIMES
29 Oct. 1975
French Nuclear Spread
=
By deCiding to sell South Korea equipment and tech-'
nology to produce weapons-grade plutonium;.the explo-
sive material. for . atomic. bombs, France has taken man-
kind a: long step toward, worldwide spread ..of . nuclear
weapons?and ultimate disaster. ? , -
For thirty years,. the United States: and other advanced "
nuclear countries have refused to .sell, such.:.eqUipment..
? Then West Germany broke ranks in June by. agreeing to
sell Brazil a similar pilot reprocessing plant. - ?
Apart from the threat to non-proliferation "palici?and
violation ? of the spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation..
Treaty, which 'both West Germany and France have
pledged to honor ? the Koreati deal' poses special ?
dangers.-
Divided Korea is the??tinder box of Asia, with Massive
artnies of the Communist North and e? American-backed
South facing' each 'other across the .38th Parallel.. North..
Korean ambitions to reunify the country- by :force; as ?
was attempted in the . 1950-53 - war,. have been' -re-
awakened by AnAiSiSilaaja*oraw
South Korean. nucidar move co-in
from Indochina; The
PAW*:
ternational Relations Commit- I lattempt to reach a joint mora-
tee that is investigating over-i'torium on arms shipments to
;seas sales.
I "I don't take the position "We are told that if we do
I 1 the area. .
!
that we ought not to have armst_
sales," he added, "but there has not sell arms other nations will
I
been a disproportionate atten- no so, yet we have never tried to get common agreement,
on pad to arms and not to
t i "
.
the economic and political Mr. Kennedy said. "We have
s Can the never asked the British, French,
aspects of the ales.
countries 'afford them? Will the the Scandinavian countries, as
sales only spur new demands well s the Soviet Unon
for more weapons?" whether they are interested in
any kind of moratorium.
Better Mousetrap'"
One arms expert here said
the military cliques "are always
looking for a better mousetrap.
The Senator said he was par-
ticularly irked by the fact that
shipments of American-made
arms to the Middle East are
If one country gets a new being paid for in part by the
weapon its neighbor wants it higher prices Americans are
too. In t'..e Middle East it 'nay paying for oil, so that "We are
be a question of national sur? in effect funding the whole
vival, but in Latin America it's arms race in that part of the
more a matter of national pride. world."
'
There's a macho attitude to- The intent of the Kennedy
ward weapons too." emendment would be to force
An American representative the Administration to explain
for a European munitions corn- what its arms sales policy is,
pany, who is based here, said not only in the Middle East
hut also elsewhere in the world.'
This is basically the aim of a
bill introduced by Senator Gay-
be buying new weapons. lord Nelson, Democrat of Wis-'
"Is it really up to the United' consin, to force the Adminis-
States to tell other sovereign' tration to disclose target fig-
nations what they may or may' ures on arms sales at the be-
not be allowed to buy?" he; ginning of each year.
asked. "This is the sort of At present Congress may
patronizing that third world na-1 overrule the Administration and
tions detest. They want to make: deny the right to export arms
their own decisions, and in a: costing over $25-million to a
laissez-faire market how can toreign country, but ;t has sel-
we say, 'No'?" dom done so.
'Have Never Asked' But the arms lobby both in
Congress and the rest of the
nation is bound to attacks both
measures:
A warning about the power
lof this group was sounded 14
!years ago by President Eisen-
hower during a farewell speech
in which ' he offered parting
words of advice to the nation.
sored by eight other Senators, He spoke of the "grave impli-
to suspend arms sales to the cations" of weapons making'
Middle East, which is the major that posed a threat to "the very:
'American market. F.tructure of our society." Yet'
i Senator Kennedy originally, his warning of the dangers of1
;had sought to gdad the Ford, rhe "military-industrial.. corn-
!Administration into approach- plex" has been all but forgotten
ling the Soviet Union in an in the intervening years.
the best incentive to the sale
of arms is the knowledge that a
rival nation is also known to
But one attempt is being
made to curtail overseas sales.
In taking up the foreign as-
sistance bill later this month.
the Senate will have to consid-
er an amendment put forth by
Senator Kennedy, Democrat of
Massachusetts and co-spon-
a Northern attack?or lead to theeven morp
nuclear arming of North Korea, stimulating dormant:
pressure for nuclear weapons in Japan.
The prolonged efforts of American officials to dis-
courage France' and West Germany from their nuclear
deals undoubtedly would have had a far better chance
of success if ? Secretary Kissinger and President Ford,
had not over-peisimistically refused to engage their own'
personal prestige, and the full influence of the United
States, for fear of a profitless crisis with major
allies. .
After an overly cautious approach to the issue,
Secretary of State Kissinger has belatedly underscored
the awesome risks, involved, when he told the United
Nations General Assembly last month: "The greatest ..
single danger of unrestrained nuclear proliferation resides
in the spread under national control of reprocessing
facilities for .the atomic materials in nuclear- power _
plants." .?
."..? ? ??*
? ?.? ?
One urgent need is so step up American efforts to
establish multi-national regional nuclear fuel centers.
COP-41;01b1717.4614321ftitptyph30ritl_s1 could thus be
37
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securely stored for possible future use, if reprocessing'
ever becomes safe and commercially feasible.
More important Would be:a genuine effort to provide
the world with-an assured-..supply_enriched uranium,
a far cheaper fuel than plutonium would be. even if the '
breeder reactor proved safe and commercially feasible
by the 1990's. Neither this country nor the world can
afford further delays in expanding uranium enrichment
capacity.
: Finally, it is essential that? the United States hold firm
in its thirty-year policy of refusing to spread nuclear
weapons capability around the world, whatever the
French and Germans do now. The pressures undoubtedly
will be intense. A. $7.-billion reactor order from Iran- is
hung up right now on. Washington's insistenee.-that the.
? site and form -of plutOnium reprocessing, if 'eVer eco-"-
? nomic, be subject to joint agreement. To hold. firm. on.
this position and the American refusal to, sell power.
reactors to Egypt?unless there is a guarantee that the
spent fuel rods will be processed abroad?will be diffi-
cult unless a? more vigorous effort is made .to reverse
French and West?German policy or, at the very least,
to obtain 'assurances that no further such, sales will'
be, made.
The alternativeis a world of a croieii or More states
brandishing their nuclear arsenals within the next .
decade; in such a circumstance, .the' threat, of .nuclear
holocaust would be.' immeasurable. ?
THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, OCTOBER'17, 1975
U.S. Confirms '66 Diego Garcia Deal
By JOHN W. FINNEY
Spedal to The New York Than
WASHINGTON, Oct. 16?The
State Department said today
that the United States had en-
tered into a secret agreement
in \ 1966 under which it reduced
the cost of the Polaris missile
to Britain in return for British
establishment of a military
base on the island of Diego
Carcia in the Indian Ocean.
In a report to the Senate,
the State Department said the
United States had agreed to
share the cost of establishing
?the BritishIndian Ocean Terri-
tory on a group of islands
with the understanding that
the territory would be used
to meet future defense needs
of the two nations.
- As its contribution, the Unit-1
NW YORK TIMES
28 Oct. 1975
ed States, according to the re-'
military construction bill call-
- mg for a complete report by
port, agreed to waive some
$14-million in research costs
that had been charged to Bri-
tain in the purchase of the
Polaris missile for her nuclear.
powered submarines.
The agreement also specified
that Britain would assume re-
sponsibility for removing some of contract laborers with ties
1,000 residents of the Chagos in the Seychelles or Mauritius,
Archipelago, of which Diego .and totally dependent on the
Garcia is a part. .. ;coconut plantations for their
There have been published ,Iiveliho0d.
reports in the past that awl "It appeared that most of
United States and Brtiain had the inhabitants would accept
made such an agreement. The work elsewhere if given the
A U.S. Study Finds
Mexico the Source
For Most of Heroin
WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 (UPI)
,?Mexico has replaced Europe
as the major source of heroin
that is smuggled into the Unit-
ed States, according to a Feder-
al study released today.
During the first six months
of this year, 90 per cent of
the samples of confiscated her-
oin in 13 cities were Mexican.
processed, according to an an-
alysis of the Drug Enforcement
Administration that was re-
leased today by Senator
Charles H. Percy, Republican
of Illinois.
In 1972, only 40 per cent
of heroin sold on the street
was the "Mexican brown" va-
riety, so-called because of its
impurities. Fort 1973 and 1974.
the figures Were 63 and 76
percent.
Senator Percy said that the
report, which he had requested
from the agency "confirms the
virtual severing of the 'French
connection." Only 2 per cent
of confiscated' heroin that was
analyzed between January. and
June came from Europe or the
Middle East, compared with
the Administration on steps ta-
ken to estabish a military base
on Diego Garcia.
The report said that the pop-
ulation of the Chagos Archipe-
lago was "essentially migrato-
ry, almost entirely comprised
report made public today by
Senators John C. Culver, Demo-
crat 'of Iowa, and Edward M.
t Kennedy, Democrat of Massa-
chusetts, was the first official
confirmation.
Senator Kennedy is the spon-
sor of an amendment to ai sible, providing adequate reset-
opportunity," the report said.
"Thus, the removal of the
workers and their families from
the Chagos Archpelago?for
reasons taat were considered
compelling ? seemed at that
time both reasonable and fea-
44 per cent in 1972.
The film "French Connection"
popularized the description of
the movement of heroin from
poppy fields overseas to Amen-
can streets.
"In many ways the current
situation is more difficult to
control than in the days of
the now-dormant 'French Con-
nection,'" Senator Percy wrote
in letters to Secretary of State
Kissinger and Attorney General
Edward H. Levi. The Senator
urged them to take immediate
diplomatic action "to dam u
this international stream pollut-
ed with deadly granules. of
brown heroin."
Among the 13 cities in which
illegal heroin was analyzed by
narcotics agents, nine had a
greater percentage that came
from Mexico in the first six
months of this year. three had
slightly less and in Chicago
all the heroin during both pe-
riods came from Mexico.
Boston Percentage Greatest
In Boston, 100 per cent of
the confiscated samples came
from Mexico?up from 50 per
cent in 1974. In New York,,
83 per cent of the samples
were Mexican-processed and 10
per cent were European-
processed in the first half of
1975. Last year, 21 per cent
of the samples were Mexican
and 67 per cent, European. ?
38
tIement funds were made avai;:
lable."
The British Government in
1973 paid Mauritius $1.4-mil-
lion for relief and relocation
of the persons removed from
the Chagos Archipelago. The
report acknowledged that thus
far most of the resettlement
funds had not been spent by
the Mauritius Government.
. In separate statements, the
two Senators said the report
made clear that Defense De-
partment officials were dissem-
bling when they told Congress
earlier this year that Diego
Garcia was an unpopulated is-
land with no indigenous popu-
lation. What Congress was not
told, they said, was that the
island was unpopulated because
the United States had secretly.
colluded with Britain to remove
the inhabitants.
"It is one more classic ex-
ample of military objectives;
riding roughshod over basic
humanitarian consideration,'_1
Senator Culver said. , ,
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Sunday, October 26, 197S THE V/ASPILNGTON POST
nc Exec S fry Says
nit lotted Murders
By Bernard Kaplan
seed& to The Washington Post
PARIS, Oct. ?During the
1960s the French government
eperated a high-level
"assassination" committee
whose task was to pinpoint
enemies of the regime for
termination, according_ to a
newly published book by a
former senior French secret
agent..
In ? his book "The Com-
mittee," ex-agent Philippe
Thiraud De Vosjoii also
claims that the De Gaulle
government systematically
opened foreign embassies'
diplomatic mail, including
that of the United States. On
one occasion during an in-
ternational conference in
Cannes in 1961, according to
De Vosjoli, a French agent
entered the hotel room of U.S.
Under Secretary of State
George Ball in the middle of
the night and rifled it for
secret documents.
Although De Vosjoli's book
contains many alleged
revelations about the inner
workings of France's in-
telligence U services, it is
principally a defense of a
former colleague, Marcel
Leroy-Finville, who was
cashiered and imprisoned for
his supposed involvement in
the kidnap-slaying here of a
leftist Moroccan politician,
-Mehdi Ben Barka, in 1965. The
Ben Barka affair erupted into
.a major scandal of the De
Gaulle regime and led to a
diplomatic crisis between
France and Morocco. '
THE ECONOMIST OCTOBER 11, 1975
De Vosjoli insists that
Leroy-Finville. considered
one of the top agents of the
French intelligence agency'
was actually framed by his
own government. ? The real
reason for his official
disgrace, he says, was his
refusal to obey or-
ders?emanating from the
"Committee" ?to kill a
number of French Algerian
-dissidents living in exile in
Portugal and Spain just after
the Algerian war.
Leroy-Finville, now in
retirement in southern
France, backed up De
Vosjoli's allegations in a
telephone conversation.
"Nothing has escaped him,"
Leroy-Finville said. "He
followed my personal tragedy
closely."
According to the book, the
committee consisted of senior
intelligence officials and civil
servants and was sometimes
presided over by the then-
prime minister, Georges
Pompidou. De Vosjoli im-
plicates Pompidou, later
president of France, in the
Leroy-Finville case, claiming
that the orders to kill the
French Algerian exiles came
from a senior official in the
prime minister's office. ?
The Committee kept no
notes or records, De Vosjoli
says. It had a "permanent"
list of assassination "os
jectives," among them
Presidents Sekou Toure of
Guinea and Habib Bourguiba
of Tunisia, both at the time
considered antagonists of
Charles De Gaulle.
Spanish guide rouge
FROM OUR SPAIN CORRESPONDENT
Reading his censored newspaper and
watching his government-operated box
the average Spaniard is left with the
impression that Spain's terrorist foes are a
hydra-headed lot. In reality only two
-serious terrorist groups?Eta and Fran?
are now active in Spain. and more than
half of their active militants are either in
prison or on the safe side of the French or
Portuguese frontier.
Eta is the Basque separatist organisa-
tion which assassinated Admiral Carrero
Blanco, General Franco's first prime
minister, a little under two years ago. Its
name is an acronym standing for Basque
Country and Freedom. It began life in
1959 as a mainly C ataqiipmeemp:14 Olt
If *De Vosjoli Is to be
believed, one successful
target of the committee was
the Italian state oil tycoon
Enrico Mattei. French agents
were responsible for
sabotaging Mattel's airplane
in 1963 because, according to
him, France believed he was
seeking to oust French oil
interests in Algeria.
The book offers an ex-
,planation of why Leroy-
Finville was abruptly released
from prison after four months
and never tried. According to
De Vosjoli's account, a group
of the accused man's former
associates, including himself,
sent a warning to De Gaulle
and .PomPidou that unless
he was freed, they would
reveal the existence of the
special committee. He was
released less than a, week
later.
Ironically, in view of the
recent allegations of CIA
involvement in foreign
assassination plots, De Vosjoli
in the mid-1950s was the
French intelligence service's
liaison man with the
American agency. He was
fired by De Gaulle for
becoming too closely iden-
tified with the CIA. Some time
afterward, he asserted that
the French leader's entourage
had been infiltrated by a
Soviet agent?an allegation
that served as the basis for the
plot of the bestselling novel
"Topaz" by Leon Uris. While
De Gaulle was in power, the
novel was banned in France.
In the more relaxed at-
mosphere under President
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, a
rejected the moderation of the traditional
"bourgeois" Basque nationalist move-
ment. In the 1960s Eta drifted to the left,
though since its fifth assembly in
December, 1968, its doctrinaire marxists
have flaked away, in successive schisms,
to join ? non-activist trotskyite groups
such as the Revolutionary Communist
League. Today its most able leaders are
dead or in prison, and fewer than 100
experienced militants are still at liberty.
The - Revolutionary Anti-Fascist
Patriotic Front, or Frap, was founded in
the spring of 1973. It is a mainly maoist
group, though it is aot thought to be
backed by the Chinese embassy in Madrid,
whose officials have been at pains to
eletilieit2GtOckia81iQliwts Gat- ROB/3134W
39
French edition of "The
Committee" is expected to he
published here shortly.
Meanwhile, a French-
language version has ap-
peared in Montreal.
De Vosjoli says that the
diplomatic pouches of vir-
tually all foreign embassies in
Paris were regularly opened
by French agents in the
Gaullist era. Agents operated
from a specially equipped van
at Orly Airport, where the
incoming and outgoing
diplomatic mail was in-
tercepted. They even had the
chemistry equipment to
reconstitute the fibers of
paper that might be inad-
vertently torn in the process.
American diplomatic mail
could not be intercepted in this
way because it was invariably
carried by State Department
couriers. But, says De Vosjoli,
French intelligence
discovered that copies of most
U.S. documents usually were
sent to the American em-
bassies in neighboring
countries under less stringent
security. So, according to De
Vosjoli, Leroy-Finville set up
an organization in Morocco to
open U.S. dipliomatic mail
there.
The burglarizing of Ball's
hotel room was ordered after
a bugging device failed to pick
up enough information, ac-
cording to De Vosjoli. That
'operation was, also conducted
under Leroy-Finville. He
stood poised as at the hotel's
fuse box,. ready to plunge it
into darkness in case the agent
was discovered. He was not,
De Vosjoli says, but was able
to photograph the contents of
? Ball's briefcase and replace
them while the under
secretary slept.
?
authorities. Frap may, like Eta, have
received a little Cuban advice and
assistance. It operates mainly in Madrid.
Its honorary president was the former
Republican foreign minister, Sr Alvarez
del Vayo, who died in Geneva last May
aged 84. Most of its militants, like Eta's,
are students and semi-skilled workers. In
July a secret meeting of representatives of
Eta, two anarchist groups and some IRA
Provisional visitors criticised Frap's "half-
hearted attitude to direct action". This
may have goaded it into the operations
that have recently enabled the police to
capture some of its leading militants.
Frap has safe houses in Portugal that
correspond to Eta's bases in France; but
even in Madrid, Barcelona and Valencia,
OtOltg. ? ? Osaknow best, it lacks
? vTfill Eta can count on
Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1
1 - in the Basque country, and will find it
harder than the Basque group to re-
organise and resume co-ordinated opera-
tions. But even scattered groups of
determined terrorists can find sufficient
targets to maintain political tension.
Other potential activist groups exist
but, by comparison with Eta and Frap,
their immediate significance is slight.
Some belong more to folklore than to
politics. In General Franco's native
Galicia, whose language is similar to
Portuguese, Eta has found an occasional
ally in Upga, the small but growing pro-
Portuguese and pro-marxist Union of the
' Gallego People. In Catalonia, whose
nationalism is at the moment more cul-
tural than political, Eta has some admirers
but few imitators: the Front for the
Liberation of Catalonia is alleged to have
carried out a few dozen guerrilla-style
actions, including the murder of a civil
guard, in the early 1970s, but it now
contents itself with issuing leaflets.
Spanish anarchists occasionally sur-
face violently in groups such as Mil
(Iberian Libertarian Movement), Gari
(International Revolutionary Action
Groups) and 011a (Organisation for the
NW YORK TIMES
28 Oct. 1975
Armed Struggle). Some of them have
links with the big Spanish libertarian
community in and around Toulouse?
although, as anarchists dislike organisa-
tion, there is little serious co-ordination
between them. One unpublicised attempt
on General Franco's life, by means of
radio-detonated explosives, was prepared
and carefully rehearsed by an anarchist
cell near Toulouse. Gari, said to consist
of five "commando groups", was alleged
last year to have tried to kidnap Don
Juan de Borbon. the liberal father of
General Franco's named successor, Prince
Juan Carlos, but has not been heard of
lately. Ten Catalans alleged to be
members of 011a will soon go on trial
in Barcelona: the prosecutor is asking for
prison sentences totalling 500 years. The
only guerrilla-minded trotskyite group
appears to be the ineffective Revolu-
tionary Communist party.
Most of these groups, and others, are
well known to the police. The Spanish
security police are the most experienced
in western Europe in dealing with political
subversion and their reports on opposi-
tion movements contain detailed accounts
of the opinions and personal habits of
-DISSIDENTS ACTIVE with us," one
illiSPAttISHFORCES
is ?
Clandestine Group Warns of
;
CMI War if Fascism
.Survives 'Franco
4 By MALCOLM W. BROWNE
Soerial to The NfVt York Times
.a MADRID, Oct. 25?A clan-
destine association of Spanish
Military officers believes that
givil war could follow the Fran-
co era "if it becomes apparent
that the only alternative is 40
More years of fascism."
This view was expressed in
:a. meeting arranged outside
Madrid by two repesentatives
of the underground group
known as the Democratic Mill-
lary Union. The interview, in
Spanish, was understood to be
the first the group had ever
permitted in Spain proper with
/a representative of any foreign
.news organization. Extreme
precautions were observed in
:its arrangements.
The two representatives,
whose identity was not dis-
'clbsed are both captains in
active command of troops.
rhey said that the DemoCratic
,Military Union had 900 mem-
ber's or supporters in the armed
ibrces and was counting on
at ?least the sympathy of thou-
sands of others.
-4 :Me personally know a num-
bet of colonels who will be
of the captains
Active Commands Involved
? ' Although in numbers the
group constitutes a small mi-
nority of the armed forces, the
?fact .that many of its members
are understood to hold active
commands?some of them re-
portedly sensitive?lends, it im-
portance..
"We are all moderates in
our goal," one captain said.
"Our group does not believe
the army should initiate politi-
cal change in Spain, or in any,
way influence the future demo-
cratic political life of the coun-
try. Furthermore, we believe
in peaceful change and seek
;no confrontations with anyone.
? "But if, after Franco is gone,
some new fascist seizes power,
someone like Angel Campana,
whom Franco appointed as
?
commander of the civil guard
a few weeks ago, then it would
be different. .
"In that case, armed confron-
tation between various army
factions would be likely, if it
becomes apparent that the only
alternative is 40 more years
of fascism."
He said that most of Spain's
generals would probably op-
pose liberal change, adding that
"they all owe their careers?in
corruptsome cases very
careers?to the . present sys-
tem."
, But younger officers are rap-
idly spreading the doctrine
of change in their contacts with;
fellow officers, he added.
Both of the officers spokei
contemptuously of Generalissi-
mo Francisco Franco and as-
serted that "our People will
political militants and their families. Even
Eta's internal discussions are reported,
though with some delay, in detail. Some
of this material is supplied by informers,
some is obtained by the intimidation and
torture of detainees. A source who was
recently in contact with an imprisoned
Eta militant who goes by the name of
"Wilson" (Pedro Perez Beotegui), and was
able to observe him during confrontations
with other suspects, reports that he
appeared crushed and said whatever the
police required of him.
There are grounds for believing that
pseudo-leftist grouplets have on occasion
been sponsored by the police?for politi-
cal reasons and in order to infiltrate a
more important organisation?and that
one such grouplet, having obtained advice
from Eta and arms from a Mafia supplier,
went into business on its own account
and carried out an embarrassing opera-
tion. As any security man knows, in cir-
cumstances like those prevailing in Spain,
subversive activities proliferate in direct
proportion to the number of manhours
devoted to keeping tabs on them.
be bathing in Champagne"
on hearing of his death.
Elections a Goal
The two captains interviewed
said they were acting as
spokesmen for the Democratic
Military Union with the knowl-
edge of the group's leaders.
They said the constitutional
succession of Juan Carlos as
Chief of State would be suc-
cessful only if he quickly
brought democracy to the coun-
try with the assistance of quali-
fied civilian political figures.
The dissident group calls for
the convocation of a constit-
uent assembly to write a new
national constitution, which
would guarantee a referendumF
to determine the future form'
of government and subsequent
free elections.
The group's manifesto has'
also demanded immediate re-
lease of all political prisoners,
"redistribution of wealth," the
right of workers to organize'
and strike, and other social
changes.
"We are in contact with
every political party in Spain,"
one of the officers said, "in-
cluding the Communist party.
But I can tell you that we
are not Communists, and we
neither advocate nor imagine
possible the kind of situation
that has developed In Portugal.
We also insist that in the fu-1
ture, the army be controlled
completely by a democratically
elected civilian government."
He added: "Every possible
political tendency from conserv-
ative to far left is represented
among us, but we ail agree,
on the basic aims."
The two army career men,
40
said that in recent years young-
er men, "mainly from the new
Spanish industrial bourgeoisie
like ourselves, were coning out
of the military academies, 400
of them a year."
"Most of us," he said. "fit
into the age bracket of 30
to 45 years old. Instead of
wasting all our spare time we
have been studying, studying
everything, not only military
subjects.
"The effect was to open our
doors to new ideas, and those
ideas are antifascist in es-
sence."
Arrests Last Year ?
The first of the dissident
officers got into trouble and
were arrested in September last
year, they said. Since, others
have been arrested, and many
reecived such "nonjudicial" pun-
ishment as pay reductions.
One of the dissidents sharply
criticized the United States for
its friendly relations with the
Franco regime.
He said the officers realized
that Washington had a vested
interest in Spain because of
its need for military bases.
"But there were thousands
of ways Washington could have
brought pressure on Franco to
liberalize the government, with-
out actually breaking with
him," he said. "Washington
never seemed willing to capital-
ize on the fact that Franco
needed American aid and
friendship at least is much as
Washington needed those
bases."
"We hOpe America will
change its policy in the critical
time ahead, and choose the?
right side in Spain while there
is still a choice open to Wash-
ington."
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"THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY ,.00TOBER 24, 1975.
Egypt's Top Editor Attacks Sinai Pact
And Says a War Is 'Highly Probable'
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN '
Special to pie New yorii: Times
WASHINGTON, Oct. 23?
Egypt's best-known journalist
has come to Washington to
make clear his view that
? President Anwar el-Sadat's
agrement with Israel were "a
tragic mistake" and that a
new Middle East war was ?
highly probably.
Mohammed Hassanein Hey-
kal, sitting in his room at
the Madison Hotel this morn.-
mg, was his usual provoca-
tive, garrulous self, seemingly
unconcerned about the effect
his jabs at Mr. Sadat's policies
might have only three days
before the Egyptian President
arrives for a 10-day visit. ?
Once regarded as , the
spokesman for the Egyptian
Government, Mr. Haykal in
the last two years has be-
come a sharp critic of Mr.
Sadat's policies, although he
.has been permitted to travel
widely and publish his views
outside Egypt. Mr. Haykal
. has been in this country for
10 days. He said his visit was
not connected with Mr.
Sadat's trip. ?
Discusing the Sinai agree-
ments, Mr. Heykal said they
were "nothing, worse than
nothing." He said they
"divided the Arab world,
which is a horrible thing"
and made the Soviet Union'
more mischievous.
New Class Emerging -
Even mere damaging to
Mr. Sadat's image on the
eve of his visit here was Mr.
Heykal'S description of Egyp-
tian society today. He said:
"You have seen how many
new cars there are in Cairo;
a new class is emerging."
"Some people from the
West and from here think
this is a healthy sign," he
said, gesturing with his ex-
pensive Corona. "This is not
a middle class emerging, un-
fortunately. This is a pare-
site class emerging."
These, he said. are "para-
sitical elements, who are liv-
ing on parasitic activities,
black-marketeering, illegal
trade, commissions, bribery
sometimes, and it is creating
a very high . pattern of con-
sumption, vulgar consump-
tion, and a very difficult
strain economically and so-
cially."
"Where is the ordinary
man?" he asked. "What is he
getting in all this he asked,
"in the form of services, pro-
duction, wages?" The implied
answer was very little.
Confident of Nasser
The 52-year-old' Mr. Heykal
has been Egypt's best-known
journalist for two decades.
He was a close political con-
fidant of the late Gamal Ab-
del Nasser, who made him
head' of Al Abram, Cairo's
leading morning paper and
publishing house.
He wrote a weekly column,
"Speaking Frankly." that was
widely read throughout the
Arab world and in foreign
capitals as an authoritative
insight into Mr. Nasser's
thinking. Mr, Nasser also ap-
pointed him as Minister for
National Guidance, in effect
the official Government
spokesman.
After Mr. Nasser's death
on Sept. 28, 1970, Mr. Heykal
remained at his journalistic
posts under Mr. Sadat. But
his criticism of Mr. Sadat's
interim accord with Israel .ii
January, 1974, led to his de-
parture from Al Abram, al-
though he continued to draw
his $500-a-month salary until
last week when, in another
rift with Mr. Sadat, he was
dismissed altogether.
Explaining the reasons for
his break with Mr. Sadat in
1974. Mr. Heykal said this
morning that he thought in
the aftermath of the October,
1973, war, that "we had the
historical moment for a real
agreement."
'A Moment in History'
"Why?" he asked himself
aloud. "For one simple pys-
choloaical ' reason. After
October. T thought there is
a moment in history when
the psychology of all parties
was reedy. I thought simply
that the Arabs to a certain
extent were cured, not corn-
pletely cured, cured from
their inferiority complex and
the Israelis were more or
less cured from their super-
iority complex and the
American element was there.
The Agreement of the super-.
powers was there for the
first time and there was a
certain sort of Arab unity.
These elements are very
necessary for an agreement."
But, he said, by going for
a limited Israeli-Egyptian
. accord, "I think we destroyed
most of the 'chances; instead
e of pushing to a real settle-
ment. we left all the real is-
sues aside."
"I expressed these views
strongly and the President
thought they were embar-
rassing to him," Mr. Heykal
said. .
As a result, he was forced
to give up his editorship and -
column in Al Ahram.
Mr: Sadat, he said, "asked
me to be his press adviser,
. and I apologized; he asked
'me to be his political adviser,
. and I apologized; and lately,
he asked me to, be deputy ,
prime minister for informa-
tion and then director of his.
office for political affairs.
And I said 'No.' :This is not
my job."
"I told the President I want
to be a friend and help as
much as I can but I don't
Want to accept a governmen-
-tal post and I prefer to keep
my freedom as a writer,"
Mr. Heykal said.
Mr. Heykal said that Mr.
?
Sadat was coming here in
part to seek a vast amount
of arms from the United
States, but he said he doubted
that,the United States would
give- the President anything
substantial.
When asked for, an alter-
native to the current step-
by-Step diplomatic approach '
on the Middle East, Mr. Hey-!
kal had no easy solution. At
one point he said that such
accords were a mistake, but
then he said the Syrians and
Palestinians had 'to get
"something."
"We are moving, but sub-
stituting motion for pro-
gress," he said.
Asked whether this didn't
mean the prospects were
very grim, he said he saw
"no other probability" but
war. Noteonly was the chance
of war great, he said, but the
Arab world, including Egypt,
was liable to a social, class
explosion similar to what he ?
Lebanon. The conflict there,
he said, the result of differ-
ences between Christians and
Moslems bet but between the
rich and the poor.
At. the moment Mr. Haykal
writes a column from Cairo
thas is syndicated in Beirut,
But most of the money that
allows him to wear expen-
sive suits and smoke expen-
sive cigaes ecenes from royal-
ties from his books and. art-
icles published in the West.
On the coffee table was
his latest book, "Road to
Ramadan," about the October
war, being published in this
country by Quadrangle Books.
Mr. Heykal said he had
been invited to adress the.
- annual meeting of Arab grad-
uates of American universi-
ties last 'week, in Chicago
and was just passing through
Wahington. but while here -
he was seeing many impor-
tant people.
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NEll YORK TIMES
26 Oct. 1975
U.S. Turns
Cheek and
? Checkbook
To Zaire
By COLIN LEGUM
United States policy is once again focusing more
sharply on Zaire, the former Belgian Congo, which
became synonymous with chaos after its ill-prepared
independence irt 1960. Secretary of State Kissinger
is urging on a reluctant Congress the importance of
voting $60-million of emergency aid to the regime
of President Sese Seko Mobutu, who was helped to
power by United States policy but who nevertheless
expelled the United States Ambassador last June
after alleging that the Central Intelligence Agency
was behind an attempted military coup.
General Mobutu would appear to be an unthankful
and unpredictable ally; why is Mr. Kissinger, who
has shown so little interest in African affairs, trying
to persuade Congress to enlarge the United States
role in Zaire?
The answer is that more than 15 years after the
United States- first began to assert a major role in
the Congo region of Equatorial Africa, Washington's
evaluation of its interests in' Africa has not changed
very much.
In the late fifties and early sixties, Washington
decided that the precipitate withdrawal of Belgian /
colonial rule from the Congo threatened to open the
immensely rich heart of Africa to the Communist
powers. The United States saw the first Prime Min-
ister of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, as a possible
vehicle for the Russians. Washington intervened to
help the President, Joseph Kasavubu, and, later, the
young army leader, Colonel Mobutu, to oust Mr.
Lumumba.
Recently, a former top scientist for the Central
Intelligence Agency, -Sidney Gottlieb, told a Senate
committee that a dose of lethal poison was shipped
'to the Congo intended for the assassination of Mr. .
Lumumba, who was killed by his enemies before the
agency's agents could put their plan into effect.
Mr. Mobutu's control over his army was finally
established through the joint support of the Ameri-
cans, the Belgians and the Israelis. Through his
dynamic, and authoritarian, rule he brought the
country back from economic ruin and anarchy. The
country's enormous wealth, which had previously ?
been monopolized by the Belgians, was thrown open
to other foreign investors as well. By the end of
' 1973 United States private investment had reached
$100-million, with a further $100-million in the pipe-
? line. Bilateral aid totaled $500-million between 1960
and 1973, second only to Belgian official aid.
However, as his power increased, Mr. Mobutu
began to chafe at his reputation of being so closely tied
to Washington. His natural xenophobic tendencies.
assumed strong nationalistic overtones at home. In
? his foreign relations he decided to repair his broken-
bridges with Moscow and, especialy, with .Peking.
This realignment demanded that he should also ,
1
1.
i?
V.
adopt a more critical attitude toward United States
policies in Africa. When Mr. Kissinger earlier this
year replaced Donald Easum as Assistant Secretary
of State in the Africa Bureau with the former Chilean
Ambassador, Nathaniel Davies, President Mobutu
took the lead in criticizing the change.
Mr. Davies recently resigned the Africa post,
largely because Mr. Mobutu refused to admit him
into Zaire. ?
These developments occurred at a time when the
emergence to independence of Zaire's neighbor, the.
Portuguese colony of Angola, again threatens the
peace. Washington decision-makers see in Angola a
close. parallel to.`the earlier situation in the Congo
at the end of Belgian rule.
. In Angola, too; three rival movements were vying
for power. One of the groups, the Movement for
Popular Liberation of Angola, led by Agostinho Neto,
has many similarities to the Lumumba movement..
As was true of the Congo, Angola is a desirable and
wealthy trading ally; and, strategically, its govern-
ment can expect to wield considerable influence
in the area. ?
? The interests of the United States and Mr. Mobutu
appear once again to coincide, since the Zaire leader
is also bitterly opposed to the Neto organization, and
to a possible Russian-influenced neighbor.
; Mr. ?Mobutu has backed the rival Front for the
National Liberation of Angola and, to a lesser de-
gree, the Union for the Total National Independence
of Angola. Zaire also hopes to get control over the
!oil-rich enclave of Cabinda, whose fields Are worked
plainly by United States multinationals.
The Threat of Civil War
However, the Neto movement has successfully en-
trenched itself in the capital of Luanda and the rival.
movements have promised to fight back. The pros-
pects are that when independence comes on Nov. 11
there will be a civil war.
Zaire needs United States military aid to back up
the national front, and the United States needs
Zaire as a channel for its sub rosa support for the
anti-Soviet movement.
'?? 'However, the fall in the price' of copper' has
plunged Mr. Mobutu's economy into deep trouble. To
survive politically he needs Washington's help: thus
Mr. Kissinger's request to Congress for emergency *id.
The American identification with , Mr. Mobutu
means the United States can expect to find itself in
conflict with the Organization for African Unity
and with many influential African leaders who back
the pro-Soviet movement:
There are at least two lessons in this history of
U.S.-Zaire relations:
. ? So long as Washington believes it has an interest
in blocking what it sees as Russian-backed govern-
ments from coming to power in strategic areas like
Aifgola or Zaire, the United States is bound to be-
come a party to escalating foreign entanglements.
? While leaders of developing countries welcome
the aid of the major foreign powers while such
leaders are engaged in a struggle for power, they
always end up deeply resentful of a too-heavy de-
pendence on their supporters once the leaders have
power.
A key, and unanswerable, question is whether
the big powers serve their own best interests by
deep involvement in such struggles. As long as any
one of the super-powers elects to play a leading role
in such situations, the others, under present condi-
tions, are almost certain to react.
Colin Legum is associate editor of The Observer
of London and editor of The Africa Contemporary
Record. ? 1
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Monday,October20,1975 N THE
WASHINGTON POST
Tribesmen
Still Fight
Pathet ao
By Lewis M. Simons
Washington Post Foreign Service
VIENTIANE, Oct:-
19?Thousands of Laotian
tribal guerrillas, many of
whom fought for years as U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency
mercenaries, are staging an
intensive armed struggle
against the Communist Pathet
Lao.
Confirmed by a ranking:
Pathet Lao government of-,
ficial here, the fighting is-
going on northeast of
Vien-
tiane in the Long Tieng Valley,
until just six months ago the
stronghold of Brig. Gen. Vang'
Pao, the CIA-backed Mei),
leader.
The struggle, described as a
"sizable insurrection" by
Western military sources and
"scattered fighting" by a
Foreign Ministry official, is
the only known serious
resistance to the gentle Pathet
Lao revolution that has swept
the Communists into power
since last spring.
The guerrillas are members
of the Meo _tribe, a fiercely
independent people spread
? across the mountainous
regions of Laos, North Viet-
nam, -Thailand and southern,
China. `
'Growers and heavy users of
opium, the Meo are most
easily 'recognized by the
distinctive, colorfully em-
broidered black dresses and
pendulous silver jewelry of
their women. The name
"Meo," applied to them by the
'Chinese centuries ago, is
despised by the tribesmen,
who refer to themselves as
Sunday, October 19, 1975
Hmong. There are some
200,000 Meo among Laos'
three million people.
Armed by the CIA, the Meo
reportedly have salted away
huge stocks of arms and
ammunition. According, to one
informed Western source,
"They've got enough to let
them carry on the fight at this
rate for a least a few years." -
There have been no claims
by the Pathet Lao that the CIA
is continuing to support the,
Meo. However, Meo sources
hint that ,they are receiving
food and medical supplies
from neighboring Thailand.
These sources suggest that
Thai air force pilots, possibly
acting on their own without
the knowledge of their com-
manders in Bangkok, are
making air drops to them.
Asked about this, a senior
Pathet ,Lao government of-
ficial said he knew nothing of
such supply drops. If the Meo
claims were substantiated,
they could seriously
aggravate the already
strained relations between the
new Pathet Lao leadership
and the government of Thai
Prime Minister Kukrit
Pramoj.
Kukrit, whose multi-faceted
coalition government is none
too steady, is striving to im-
prove relations with his
Communist neighbors in Laos,
Cambodia and Vietnam. He
admitted recently that he was
limiting Meo refugees in
Thailand to meager rations in
an effort to drive them back to
Laos.
The Meo, -some 35,000 of
whom have taken refuge in
Thailand, openly express their
hopes that Kukrit will be
overthrown by a military
coup. A Thai military
-government, the tribesmen
believe, would come to their
assistance against the Pathet
Lao.
With travel by journalists
and non-communist
TheWashiiigton Star
-diplomatie observers sharply
restricted, there is little first-
hand information available on
the extent of the Meo in-
surrection.
According to a top Pathet
Lao official, the fighting is
"small-scale." The official,
respected by Western
diplomats as one of the most
powerful Pathet Lao figures in
Vientiane, said a number of
former followers of yang Pao
were "attempting to subvert"
the Pathet Lao revolution by
"stealing from villages" in
scattered areas of the
territory known as Military
Region II.
"Villagers and soldiers of
.the Lao People's Liberation
Army are collaborating to
smash these small, scattered
:groups," the official said.
Western military -sources
claim that the insurrection is
far more widespread and
serious. "Not a night goes by
without a major firefight
between the Meo and the
Pathet Lao," said one source,
who based his information on
reports from Meo tribesmen
who recently traveled from
Long Tieng to Vientiane.
This source claimed that
some 5,000 Meo are engaged in
the struggle. They are said to
be armed with CIA-supplied
M-16 rifles and M-79 grenade
launchers as well as Chinese-
and Soviet-built AK-47 assault
rifles captured over the years
from Pathet Lao and North
Vietnamese troops.
The Meo are reportedly
operating in small raiding
parties, striking at Pathet Lao
units only at night, and
claiming heavy casualties
among the Communist troops.
A number of Western
sources claim that the Pethet
Lao are receiving armed
support from elements of
North Vietnamese army units
that have remained in Laos
since the end of the fighting in
Indochina.
Pathet Lao officials deny
the specific claim of North
Vietnamese assistance
against the Meo as well as the
widely held general allegation
that some 40,000 North-
Vietnamese army regulars
are spread throughout Laos.
According to Western
sources who had been in the
Long Tieng Valley area when
the Pathet Lao took control of
the country away from the
right-wing elements of the
Laotian coalition government,
the Pathet Lao are unable to
guarantee security in the
region.
The insurrection flared up -
soon after the Pathet Lao
revolution took root
throughout the country, these
sources said:
According to one Westerner
who lived among the Meo for'
several years, the trouble is
directly traceable to yang
Pao. This source noted that
the Meo have been split into
pro- and anti-Communist
elements since the French
Indochina war in the 1940s and
1950s.
Following the Vientiane
peace agreement of 1973,
mixed teams of Pathet Lao
and rightist government
census takers began a survey
of displaced persons
throughout Laos. In most
parts of the country, the
census had the side effect of
showing villagers that Pathet
Lao and rightists could work
together in peace.
"But Vang ,Pao sealed off
the second military region
from the census," the source
said, "and the effect was that
the rightist Meo continued to
live in fear of the Pathet Lao
and the pro-Communist Meo.
Those who didn't follow yang
Pao to Thailand felt they had
no choice but to fight for their
lives."
By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer .
The U. S. Embassy in Saigon chose
to believe Communist assurances
that a truce would be arranged last
April, rather than its own intelli-
gence reports that the North Viet-
namese intended to capture the city,
according to official sources.
This acceptance of what appears to
have been a deliberate Communist
deception was a major element in the
embassy's failure to make adequate
preparations for the evacuation.
Thousands of Vietnamese who had
been promised that they would be
taken out, as well as dozens of Ameri-
cans, were left behind.
432R000400080008e1. which seemed to
originate in Hanoi. said that the
'143
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United States would be' 'giVen a
chance for an orderly withdrawal
from Vietnam during a halt in fight-
ing.
THE MESSAGE came through the
Hungarian and Polish delegations, to
the International Commission of Con-
trol and Supervision (ICCS), which
'._was created by the ineffective 1973
Vietnam cease-fire agreement. At-
tempts to confirm it through the Sovi-
et Union yielded ambiguous answers
that were taken by many officials as
confirmation.
Officials in Washington made final
preparations for a helicopter evacua-
tion of Saigon on the basis of the
intelligence reports. But they also
gave some credence to the assur-
ances, if not so much as Ambassador
Graham A. Martin in Saigon did.
. Secretary of State Henry A. Kiss-
- inger said when the evacuation ended
that until 24 hours before it started,
"We thought there was some consid-
erable hope that the North
Vietnamese would not seek a solution
by purely military means . . .We
thought a negotiated solution in the
next few days was highly probable."
But then, "The North Vietnamese
..'obviously changed signals," Kissing-
er said.
Intelligence reports showed, how-
ever,*that there was no change of sig-
nals. The Communists never intended
to make any kind of deal. Those re-
ports were substantiated by
independent means more than a week
before the final attack on Saigon and
have since been verified by Commu-
nist statements.
THE PICTURE which emerges
from a lengthy investigation of the
last days of an American presence in
-South Vietnam is one of confusion
compounded by wishful thinking.
Martin in Saigon as well as officials
in Washington wanted to believe that
the assurances of a dignified, arrang-
ed ending were true.
Martin was so convinced that right
up to the final air raid and rocket at-
- tacks on Saigon, he was operating as
if the war was about to halt.
. Even after the 4-am. bombard-
ment of Tan Son Nhut air base on the
outskirts of Saigon which triggered
the evacuation order from Washing-
ton, Martin told members of his staff
that he could not understand what
went wrong.
?" But all along, reports from intelli-
gence agents of proven veracity had
. said the Communist high command
intended to smash Saigon militarily.
It planned to destroy any vestige of
the Nguyen Van Thieu regime, rather
. than making any sort of deal with it
or with the Americans whom the
? Communists linked with Thieu in
undifferentiated hatred.
The confusion which surrounded
the last American days was the kind
of failure of intelligence evaluation ?
not collection, because the
.raw material was there ?
which had occurred many
.times earlier in the Vietnam
and Cambodian wars. This
time it had the excuse of the
Communist deception about
intentions.
44
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THE ROLE of the Hun-
garians and Poles is un-
clear. It is impossible to
learn whether they were de-
ceived themselves by the
Vietnamese Communists
into thinking a deal might
be arranged, or were in-
formed parties to a plan to
throw U. S. officials off bal-
ance by putting out a false
story.
Some Americans who
were involved in the high-
level exchanges during the
last few weeks of April be-
lieve the- two Communist
delegations were in on the
plan. They also believe that
the Soviet Union was a
Party to deceit, although
several senior officials re-
fuse to accept this.
? Despite the initial furor
in this country after the Sai-
gon evacuation left many
persons behind, there has
been little public discussion
of what happened. This
suits the Ford administra-
tion. There. has been a
strong official desire just to
forget about the whole
mess. .
President Ford set the
tone at a news conference
May 6, a week after the
evacuation of Saigon ended.
He was asked if he would
welcome "a congressional
inquiry into how we got in
and how we got out of Viet-
nam."
"It would be unfortunate
for us to rehash" what hap-
pened, Ford replied. "I
think a congressional in-
quiry at this time would
only be divisive and not
helpful . . .The lessons of
the past in Vietnam have al-
ready been learned.., and
we should have our focus on
the future."
- THERE HAVE BEEN
half-hearted congressional
attempts to probe the last
days. Up to now they have
been fended off by the una-
vailability of Martin, who
has been ill, but now he has
recovered and is on leave
while the administration
tries to figure out what to
do with him.
Other officials who were
in Saigon at the end have
been dispersed to other
jobs. The State Department
and the Agency for Interna-
tional Development say
they wanted to get them set-
tled in new jobs, but there is
a strong suspicion among
many officials that Kissing-
er wanted to separate them
in order to prevent too
much comparing of recol-
lections and mutterings
about the way things were
handled.
The sequence of events
which led to the American
retreat from Saigon has no
clear starting point. The
1968 Tet offensive might be
one point, since it caused
the halt of continuing U.S.
escalation of the war. But
the final phase started last
?January in Phuoc Long
Province along the Cambo-
dian border north of Saigon.
What the Communists
called "the People's Libera-
tion Armed Forces"
(PLAF), and were in fact
North Vietnamese Army
(NVA) units with some sup-
port from troops raised in-
side South Vietnam, launch-
ed an offensive in Phuoc
Long about New Year's
Day. They encountered lit-
tle resistance.
Martin had been arguing
that the reduction of U. S.
military aid for South Viet-
nam had so weakened the
southern army that it was
unable to hold outlying
areas. Ford asked Congress
in January for a $300 mil-
lion supplement to the $700
million already appropriat-
ed for military aid in the fis-
cal year ending last June
30.
WHATEVER THE rea-
son for the loss of Phuoc
Long ? and some observers
have argued that it was cor-
ruption and a lack of will,
rather than a shortage of
American aid, which caus-
ed the Vietnamese army to
fight poorly ? the Commu-
nists drew important con-
clusions.
They stepped up the flow
of troops and supplies
southward, adding to a
fighting strength and logis-
tical base that had been
built up as part of both
sides' violations of the 1973
Paris Agreement. Hanoi de-
cided that it would strike at
other provinces on the bor-
der of Cambodia, where
adjacent regions were
being used as NVA staging
areas.
An offensive began
March 5 in the Central
Highlands, which run along
the western side of central
South Vietnam. Ban Me
Thuot fell five days later. In
a panicky decision made
without considering all its
ramifications or 'consulting
the United States, President
Thieu decided to shorten his
logistical lines and reduce
his battlefront by withdraw-
ing troops from the high-
lands.
Inadequately prepared
and incompletely executed,
that withdrawal touched off
a general collapse in the
northern and central re-
gions. On March 26 the
psychologically important
old imperial capital of Hue
fell to the NVA almost with-
out a fight, and on March 29
Communists took over
South Vietnam's second-
largest city, Danang.
The Communists then de-
cided to finish the war by
capturing Saigon, not by ne-
gotiating from their new ,
position of strength.
fense minister, Vo Nguyen
Giap, and its army chief of
staff, Van Tien Dung, pub- .
lished an article jointly in
the four main Hanoi publi-
cations on June 30 recount-
ing how the final victory
was achieved. They made it
clear that the Communists
had never had any intention
of making a deal.
After the collapse in the
highlands and the Hue-Da
nang area, they wrote, "the
time was ripe for our armed
forces and people.. .striking
directly at the enemy's last
lair in Saigon, completely
annihilating the puppet
army, totally overthrowing
the puppet administration
and achie,-iag complete
victory
"By late March, when the
Huabattle was going to end
in victory, we had already
officially taken the decision
to launch a historic cam-
paign of decisive
significance . . .bearing
the name of the great Presi-
dent Ho Chi Minh."
This article in effect con-
firmed that the leadership
in Hanoi had always consid-
ered Vietnam as one entity,
despite the 1954 division of
the country, and was in
command of both parts
while using the PLAF as a
fiction to obscure its con-
trol. Western analysts have
generally felt that the Viet
Cong's National' Liberation
Front (NLF) had a signifi-
cant southern appeal but
was ultimately a creation of
the unified leadership of
northerners and southern-
ers in Hanoi.
The Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review, a weekly
news magazine published in
Hong Kong, carried on Aug.
8 an interview with the
chairman of the NLF's cen-
tral committee presidium,
Nguyen Huu Tho. Although
he was a figurehead whose
insignificance has been
emphasized by his invisibil-
ity since the fall of Saigon,
Tho's account added de-
tails.
"BY ABOUT THE begin-
ning of the last week of
March, the determination to
launch the historic
campaign . . .was official-
ly laid down," Tho said. He
did not mention who laid it
down, since that would have
exposed Hanoi's control.
"At that time, we defi-
nitely reaffirmed that the
total collapse of the puppet
army and administration
was unavoidable: the
United States was com-
pletely incapable of rescu-
ing their agents in Saigon,"
Tho said.
American analysts noted
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001'00380005-1
that in early -April the
NLF's Liberation Radio
stopped referring to the
Paris Agreement's provi-
sion for the establishment
of a three-part National
Council of National Recon-
ciliation and Concord of
Thieu representatives,
Communists and so-called
neutralists as a transition
away from the Thieu re-
gime. The radio had been
using Thieu's reluctance to
agree to this as a propagan-
da weapon, but the signifi-
cance of its being dropped
was not appreciated at the
time.
In fact, the Communists
had decided to abandon a
negotiated settlement as an
unnecessary encumbrance
now that total victory was
in sight. The Paris Agree-:
ment, which was nibbled to
death by both Hanoi and
Saigon, had been ignored on
one more section.
Within two weeks'of the
Communist decision, word
on it had filtered through to
the Central Intelligence Ag-
ency's offices on the sixth
floor of the U. S. Embassy
in Saigon.
? THE INFORMATION
came from what Americans
called the Communists'
-Central Office for South
-Vietnam, or COSVN. This
was the elusively mobile
military and political head-
quarters for the war in the
southern part of South Viet-
nam which U S. troops had
tried unsuccessfully to cap-
ture in the May 1970
invasion of Cambodia.
COSVN was directed by
Pham Hung, a member of
the politburo of the Lao
Dong Party the Commu-
nist organization based in
Hanoi that rules Vietnam?
who outranked even Gen.
Giap. Since the fall of Sai-
gon, Pham Hung has
emerged as the man in
charge of South Vietnam,
taking precedence in offi-
cial lists over Tho and lead-
ers of the apparently
powerless Provisional
Revolutionary Government
' (PRG).
- Contrary to recent con-
gressional testimony about
a lack of American intelli-
gence agents inside the Viet
Cong apparatus, the CIA re-
ceived occasional reports
from within COSVN. Over
the years, these reports had
repeatedly been proven
accurate.
The first report on the
ate-March decision to
smash over Saigon was
brief. Coming at a time of
rapid developments and
numerous intelligence re-
ports of varying degrees of
reliability, it seems not to
have gotten much attention
in either the Saigo*PPTAY-ed
sy or in Washington.
?
A FACTOR contributing
to this neglect was the mes-
sage which the Hungarians
and Poles were beginning to
whisper in American ears.
When the ICCS was set up
in 1973 supposedly to insure
respect for the ceasefire
agreement, it was generally
assumed by Westerners
that delegates from the two
East European countries
would be sympathetic to the
Vietnamese Communists
while the other two ele-
ments, Canadians and In-
donesians, would be more
neutral or even sympathetic
to Saigon's problems. Cana-
da quit the commission
when it became impossible
to overcome Communist ob-
struction and do a meaning-
ful supervision job, being
replaced by Iran.
With the ICCS moribund,
the Hungarians and Poles
took on a new role of inter-
mediaries, passing mes-
sages between the Commu-
nists and Americans. The
Hungarians in particular
came to be briefed regular-
ly on April's rapid develop-
ments by the CIA station
chief, Thomas Polgar, who
is of Hungarian origin.
This relationship seemed
to have developed because
of Washington's desire to
get word through to the
Vietnamese Communists
that would avoid any misun-
derstanding of U. S. inten-
tions. The Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review quoted an
official in Hanoi in another
Aug. 8 article as saying,
"The question we had to
deal with was whether the
United States could dis-
patch troops for the second
time." .
WHATEVER THE rea-
son, the Hungarians "were
being told far more than
they (U. S. officials in Sai-
gon) were telling anyone
else at that point," accord-
ing to one source.
The message -which the
Hungarian and Polish ICCS
delegations gave Polgar
was that it would be possi-
ble to arrange a truce for
the purpose of an orderly
evacuation of Americans
and some South Viet-
namese. A safe corridor
from Saigon to the South
China Sea for the overland
movement of refugees to
Vung Tau or some other
seaport was mentioned
The message also con-
tained or implied ? it is not
clear which one ? that the
Communists would negoti-
ate an end of the war with
some acceptable adminis-
tration in Saigon. That
meant somone other than
Thieu with the _preference
Eptrt e4V MigafPaga
Minh, the general known
'-'from his large stature for a
Vietnamese as "Big Minh."
He had been a weak and
ineffectual South Viet-
namese chief of state for 14
months after President Ngo
Dinh Diem was overthrown
and murdered in November
1963.
The French embassy in
Saigon was active behind
the scenes at the same time.
Ambassador Jean-Marie
Merillon was told by his
contacts that the Commu-
nists were willing to com-
promise an end to the war
with Minh, once Thieu was
removed from power. This
information supported the
Hungarian and Polish mes-
sage and seemed to confirm
it.
The military situation
was looking desperate as
NVA troops closed in on the
Saigon area. On April 10,
Ford asked Congress for an
emergency allocation of
$722 million in arms aid to
Saigon, plus $250 million as
an "initial" amount of eco-
nomic and humanitarian
aid. This was presented as
a possibility of saving South
Vietnam, although Kissing-
er conceded later a lesser
goal which he had only
implied at the time.
THE COURSE then being
pursued, Kissinger said
April 29, "was designed to
save the Americans still in
Vietnam and the maximum
number of Vietnamese
lives, should the worst come
to pass." The prospects for
salvaging the military
situation even with massive
new aid were "somewhat
less than 50-50," he added.
But there were hopes of
negotiating an orderly end-
ing.
Then on April 17 the CIA
received a more detailed
account of the late-March
decision. A source in
COSVN reported that there
definitely would not be any
truce or negotiations with
any governmental entity in
Saigon, whether headed by
Minh or anyone else.
Instead, the report said,
plans were being made to
attack Saigon as soon as
preparations were com-
pleted and to capture it. de-
stroying any semblance of
organized opposition to
Communist rule. One detail
offered to substantiate this
was that radar units were
being put on Black Virgin
Mountain to direct captured
American-made planes for
an attack on Tan Son Nhut.
Black Virgin Mountain is
a volcanic cone that rises
3,235 feet above the Mekong
River plain 55 miles north-
northwest of Saigon. A site
for American cornmunica-
CM*8307-srainttoctitloo
war, it ha een capture
)45 ?
657 NVA troops on Jan. 9. .
Within two days after the
COSVN report was re-
ceived, photc reconnais-
sance had confirmed that
radar was being emplaced
on the mountain. But de-
spite this and the very high ?
rating given the report's
probable reliability, it got a
mixed reception in Saigon
and Washington.
THE MILITARY reaction
was quick.
The U. S. Navy and civil-
ian American vessels had
been on alert in the South
China Sea since Ford mobi-
lized ships for the evacua-
tion of Danang and other
coastal towns at the end of
March. A higher stage of
alert for an emergency
evacuation of Americans
from Saigon by helicopter
was put into effect April 18
as a result of the new intel-
ligence.
The U. S. aircraft carrier
Enterprise sailed into Mani-
la harbor April 18 for an an-
nounced five-day visit. It
abruptly left a few hours
later. The carrier Hancock,
which had arrived at Singa-
pore April 16 for a sched-
uled seven-day visit, also
sailed April 18. All over
East Asian waters, Navy
ships were marshalled for
impending collapse in Sai-
gon, with most of them
arriving off the South Viet-
namese coast between April
19 and 21.
The State Department
sent a cable to Ambassador
Martin which seems to have,
been triggered by the intel-
ligence, although this con-
nection cannot be confirm-
ed. It asked him about
evacuation plans.
EVERY U. S. embassy in
a hazardous situation is
?supposed to have an up-to-
date plan to evacuate
embassy personnel and
other Americans. But the'
Saigon plan was out of date
and inadequate to the situa-
tion in mid-April. Martin
had always taken the atti-
tude that Thieu's regime
would last indefinitely, and
therefore his subordinates
? most of them hand-pick-
ed for loyalty rather than
competence.? had not been
pressed to follow State De-
partment regulations on
this.
Some administrative divi-
sions of the huge embassy
had been asked to turn in
lists not only of Americans
but also of Vietnamese
whose lives might be in dan-
ger if the Communists took
over and therefore should
be evacuated. These were
tossed into a box and when
01944ion finally fell
r`f They could not be
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1
found in the panicky chaos
of embasssy administra-
tion.
Martin's answer to the
State Department's query '
was that he had no plan to
evacuate local Vietnamese
employes because there
were too many of them and
besides an evacuation
would induce panic in Sai-
gon, possibly causing Thieu
to fall. At the same time,
Martin's deputy, Wolfgang
J. Lehmann, was telling
embasssy division heads at
staff meetings that plans
were being made to take
care of their high-risk em-
ployes, for whom many of
the other diplomats felt
great personal responsibil-
ity.
One officer in the embas-
sy says flatly that Martin
lied to some embassy per-
sonnel about evacuation
? plans, but others report
only evasions.
U. S. Air Force planes
were evacuating some per-
sons from Saigon at the
? time. They were mostly em-
ployes of the U. S. Army,
while others were waiting
for further word from the
embassy.
KISSINGER CABLED
back after getting Martin's
answer, saying it was
inadequate. Under pressure
from the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and
other congressional units,
the secretary of state asked
Martin to speed up the
reduction of airplane evacu-
ations so the number of per-
sons who might need to be
lifted out by helicopter
would be manageable.
But Martin felt no great
urgency. On the basis of the
Hungarian and Polish mes-
sage, he did not think a heli-
copter lift would be neces-
sary.
The evaluation in
Washington was complex.
Every morning a number of
groups met around town to
review the latest develop-
ments, and late every after-
noon a meeting was con-
vened at the State
Department. Chaired by
Philip C. Habib, assistant
secretary of state for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, it
was attended Most of the
time by Kissinger's No. 2
man, Deputy Secretary
Robert S. Ingersoll.
Representatives of State,
the National Security Coun-
cil, the Pentagon, the CIA
and other branches of gov-
ernment met with Habib to
try to make plans. But they
were almost overwhelmed
by the mass of sometimes
conflicting and often confu-
sion reports, according to
one participant in the meet-
ings.
Commenting on the April
17 report from COSVN, this
source said that the CIA
usually failed to indicate
clearly which reports out of
a mass of intelligence de-
served more credence than
others. A desire to protect
?
CIA agents obscured the
fact that this particular re-
port came directly from
COSVN, the source added.
APPARENTLY reflect-
ing the intelligence, Ford
said in an interview April 21
that he had the impression
in the previous few days
that Hanoi was seeking a
The Washington Star Monday, October 20, 1975
MOSCOW a Party to Deceit'
ri Last Iays of Saigon?
By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer
With the North Vietnamese Army
(NVA) massing troops around Sai-
gon late last April, the United States
did not know whether to expect the
? city to be overrun militarily ? forc-
ing an emergency helicopter evacua-
tion of remaining Americans ? or an
imposed but peaceful ending that
I would establish Communist predomi-
. twice while permitting an orderly
. U.S. withdrawal.
The situation was confused, the
evidence conflicting.
On April 21, Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger said that the
Ford administration was seeking
a "controlled situation" which
permit a negotiated end to the long
war and an orderly transition from
the regime of President Nguyen Van
Thieu, who resigned that day, to
Communist control. ?
"Various negotiating efforts are
going on," Kissinger added, "but it
would be inappropriate for me to dis-
? cuss them at this moment."
ONE CHANNEL was through the
French ambassador in Saigon, Jean-
Marie Merillon. Heplayed a key role
in convincing Thieu to resign be-
cause of Merillon's understanding
from Communist contacts that with
Thieu removed it might or would be
possible to reach a compromise.
peace arrangement.
But more important was
the word from Hungarian
rand Polish delegates on the
International Commission
,of Control and Supervision
(Second of two articles).
(ICCS), established by the
moribund Paris cease-fire
agreement of January 1973.
They were telling the U.S.
Embassy in Saigon that a
deal was possible. It would
include a truce and a corn--
dor to the sea for the evacu-
ation of Americans and
.some Vietnamese.
On the other hand, the
Saigon station of the CIA
had received reports from
agents of proven reliability
,in the Communists' Central
Office for South Vietnam,
or COSVN, which were con-
'tradictory. A report of April
17 in particular said that in
late March the Communists
?,,had decided not to compro-
mise ? that, instead, they
would overrun Saigon and
,smash any semblance of
organized resistance.
A detail of that report
added that radar was being
put on Black Virgin Moun-
tain 55 miles north-north-
west of Saigon to guide
warplanes for an air raid as
part of the attack on the
city. U.S. aerial reconnais-
sance confirmed the radar
installation.
This report triggered the
abrupt diversion of U.S.
Navy ships to evacuation
duty off the South Viet-
namese coast. But it did not
convince Ambassador
quick military takeover, but
there was "no way to tell
what the North Vietnamese
will do." He noted that a
lull in fighting had set in
around Saigon earlier that
day.
This turned out to be a
five-day lull, beginning as
Martin, Polgar and the
French ambasssador,
Merillon, finally convinced
Thieu that he should resign
for the good of South Viet-
nam. The lull seemed to
substantiate the Hungarian
and Polish message of an
evacuation truce, but
evacuation went ahead only
fairly slowly while high-risk
Vietnamese remained in
their jobs.
Officials here decided
that, because of the conflict
between intelligence and
diplomatic reports, the
possibility of an arranged
end needed to be checked
with North Vietnam. The
Soviet Union was asked to
inquire in Hanoi.
Tomorrow: The denoue-
ment.
Graham A. Martin in Sai-
gon or senior officials in
Washington that the
Hungarian-Polish hope of
an orderly end were false.
THE NEGOTIATING
-possibility was closely held
in Washington by President
Ford and. a handful of offi-
cials around Kissinger. The
secretary of state was, as
usual, playing an almost
lone hand in the tightest
secrecy in apparent hope of
pulling off a diplomatic
miracle out of a hopeless.
looking situation.
He decided to ask the
Soviet Union ? in the spirit
of detente ? to see if it
could learn from Hanoi
what Vietnamese Commu-
nist intentions were. This
might resolve the conflict in
available information.
According to several sen-
ior officials, the Soviet
,reply was ambiguous.
Asked if it were true that
a truce and orderly evacua-
tion were possible, Moscow
came back ? ostensibly
after contacting Hanoi ?
with a reply to the effect
that the United States could
proceed on that assump-
tion. One official called it
"ambiguous," and another
said it was "vague and
uncertain."
Kissinger said in an
46
Approved-t- or Release AlCf1705708 :-CIA:RDP7T-D11432RUII010p380-095--.1 ?
interview. May '5,* "The
.:Soviet Union played, in the
-last two weeks, a moder-
ately constructive role in
enabling us to understand
? the possibilities there were
for evacuation, both of
Americans and South Viet-
namese, and for the possi-
bilities that might exist for
a political evolution."
SOME LOWER officials
feel that Moscow was a
:party to the deceit of get-
ting the United States to be-
lieve it could get out of
Vietnam smoothly and re-
spectably. But other offi-
cials refuse to accept this,
suggesting that the Soviets
were kept in the dark by the
Vietnamese Communist
Jeadership arid put off with
-a deliberately uninform-
ative answer when they
tried to aat as intermedi-
-aries for Washington.
Apparently referring to-
the Soviet channel and
messages coming from the
Hungarian and Polish ICCS
delegations in Saigon, and
maybe the French as well,
Kissinger said April 29 as
the evacuation ended that
"we did deal with Hanoi
and with the PRG (Provi-
sional Revolutionary Gov-
ernment) through different
intermediaries and we were
in a position to put our
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001'00380005-1
'views and receive re-
sponses." - . _
The secretary of state
...added that until ISunday
'night, April 27, Washington
time, which was Monday
morning, April 28, in Sai-
gon, "we thought there was
some considerable hope
that the North Vietnamese
would not seek a solution by
purely military
means. . . ." Duong Van
Minh had then become
president, and "we thdught
a negotiated solution in the
. next few days was highly
probable.
"Sometime Sunday night
the North Vietnamese obvi-
? ously changed signals. Why
? that is, we do not yet
know . . . What produced
This sudden shift to a mili-
tary option or what would
seem to us to be a sudden
? shift to a military option, I
have not had sufficient
- opportunity to analyze."
Until Sunday, Kissinger
said, "the battlefield situa-
tion suggested that there
was a standdown of signifi-
cant military activity and
the public pronouncements
were substantially in the
direction that a negotiation
would start with General
Minh. There were also
other reasons which led us
to believe that the possibil-
ity of a negotiation remain-
ed open."
SOME INFORMED oh-
servers think the five-day
lull or standdown was
mainly a preparatory peri-
od for the NVA, although it
began when Thieu resigned
April 21. But it fit with the
whisperings of a truce and
orderly American with-
- drawal, and also with the
analysts of U.S. Hanoi-
watchers in Saigon.
Ignoring the absence of
further references in
Communist propaganda to
carrying out the Paris
agreement's provisions,'
which had significantly
'disappeared by early April,
these analysts felt that it
was in North Vietnam's
interests to bring the war to
a negotiated end.
The. analysts reasoned
? that by making a deal with
Minh which left some sem-
blance of a continuing Sai-
.gon administration, al-
though it would be
subordinated in 'a
Communist-controlled
superstructure, the
Communists would be able
to claim the legitimacy of
the, agreement which had
been endorsed by world
powers. They also would
have some claim to Ameri-
can aid for reconstruction.
There were other ele.-
? A piess report from Mos-
cow April 18 said Soviets in
contact with North Viet-
namese and the Viet Cong
did not expect them to try
to achieve all-out victory
by conquest. And on April
19 the PRG's representative
stationed at Tan Son Nhut
air base on the outskirts of
Saigon under Paris agree-
ment arrangements, Col.
Vo Dong Giang, hinted at a
peaceful arrangement
rather than an attack.
ALL OF THESE rein-
forced the Hungarian-Pol-
ish message, creating a
conviction by Martin and
some others in the Saigon
embasssy that a deal was
being struck. Apparently
after some further detail
from the ICCS Communists,
and with receipt of a Soviet
reply, the word went
around in top embassy; cir-
cles that "the fix is in."
On Thursday, April 24,
Martin's deputy ambassa-
dor, Wolfgang J. Lehmann,
telephoned his wife Odette
in Bangkok, where she had
been evacuated with other
embassy dependents. Leh-
mann told her to come back
and bring a long list of per-
sonal supplies, because a
deal had been made and
they would be in Saigon for
some time to come. .
This was at a time when,
the White House said, Ford
had ordered American per-
sonnel reduced "to levels
that could be quickly
evacuated during an emer-
gency." Martin's embassy
was operating on its own
interpretations, with what
looked in retrospect like
wishful thinking strongly
affecting analysis of the
situation.
Another embassy official
who had just made ar-
rangements to pack up and
ship out his valuable an-
tiques and oriental objects
d'art halted the arrange-
ments. He had been told he
was on the short list of per-
sons who would stay. support equipment," ac-
The word in the embassy cording to the wording of
was that an agreement for the citation when Secretary
a truce and orderly evacua- of Defense James R.
tion also included the Schlesinger gave him the
Vietnamese Communist ac- Pentagon's ighest civilian
ceptance of a small award.
continuing U.S.. Embasssy That afternoon, Monday,
in Saigon. The fact that this April 28, the radar on Black
was in flat disagreement Virgin Mountain went into
with Liberation Radio and action.
Hanoi media denunciations
of any American presence On April 8, a South Viet-
was overlooked in the coin- na mese pilot named
cidence of this idea with the ? Nguyen Thanh Trung had
analytical assumption that defected and bombed
Hanoi would want an Thieu s Independence Pal-
American misson in Saigon ace before flying north. He
to handle reconstruction was later revealed to have
aid. ' been a longtime Communist
agent
ments contributing to hopes KISSINGER'S BELIEF -According to the Far
for a truce or creation of that the situation changed Eastern Economic Review
IDOHMIkatts1601001116800131 OIASIROPi97-110.4412R860(1
time ? showed a -lag in
American perceptions.
The Giap-Dung article
said that the final offensive
began at 5 p.m. Saturday,
April 26 -- early Saturday
morning in Washington. By
early the next morning in
Vietnam, rockets were
being dropped into Saigon
and attacks had started on
QLI5, the road from Saigon
to Vung Tau. The hope of an
agreed evacuation had in-
cluded the Communists'
leaving open that Corridor
to the sea.
The big American-built
military logistical complex
at Bien Hoa, 15 miles north-
east of Saigon, was also
under attack. On Sunday a
team led by Erich F. von
Marbod, a principal deputy
assistant secretary of de-
fense in charge of military
aid to Indochina, recovered
some valuable aid equip-
ment from Bien Hoa while
under artillery fire.
Von Marbod had gone se-
? cretly to Vietnam to try to
get back as much U.S. aid
supplies as possible before
?the Communists captured
it., The Pentagon was
worried about congression-
al criticism of losing more
than the approximately $800
million worth of military
equipment which had al-
ready been abandoned in
northern South Vietnam.
After being shot out of
Bien Hoa on Sunday, Von
Marbod went to see Martin
on Monday morning. Mar-
tin. advised him that it was
unnecessary to take
chances because there
would shortly be a halt in
fighting during which sup-
plies as well as personnel
could be evacuated by ar-
rangement with the
Communists.
VON ,MARBOD WENT
back to Bien Hoa anyway.
Again under fire, he
"supervised activities for
the distribution and recov-
ery of critical high-value
a deception. Approved
. 147
North' Vietnamese-pilots to
fly American-made war-
planes which had ,been cap-
tured in Da ,Nang. Tseer A37
Dragonfly light bombers.
Tan Son Nhut late Monday,
causing surprise and a ris-
ing sense of panic.
Panic peaked at 4 a.m.
Tuesday when a rocket and
artillery barrage hit the air ;
base. It was the beginning
of the final Communist
offensive. But Martin found
.that hard to believe.
AFTER DAWN HE went.
out to see for himself where
the shells had landed, kill-
ing two U.S. Marine guards
and others. Back at his
embassy, Martin told staff-
ers that he could not under-
stand it. He still refused to
believe that the Commu-
nists would persist in a
military takeover, but in-
stead thought there could or
would be a political settle-
ment.
Washington never seem-
ed to understand, much less
accept, the degree of cer-
tainty which had gripped
Martin and some others in
his embassy. The barrage
at Tan Son Nhut led ,to
Ford's ordering the final
helicopter evacuation. Mar-
tin strung it out as long as
possible, getting the maxi-
mum possible number of
Vietnamese removed at the
last minute after having
failed to provide for them
earlier.
Martin had been a con-
troversial figure in Saigon
since Nixon sent him there
in 1973. He 'had sought to
distort reports to Congress
and in the press so as to put
the best possible face on the
situation. In. the final
month, he seemed unre-
sponsive to the realities as
viewed from Washington.
It was not just Congress
which was exasperated
with him during the delay
in reducing the embassy
staff, to easily evacuated
limits. Persons who attend-
ed the crisis meetings
chaired by Habib reported
very critical comments
about Martin by Habib and
others, at least in part re-
flecting the distress of
embassy personnel in Sai-
gon about the lag in ar-
? ranging for the safety of
Vietnamese for whom they
felt responsible.
But the degree to which
Martin was being led as-
tray by the Hungarians and
Poles as well as his own
wishful thinking was never
properly appreciated here.
While Kissinger and others
allowed theft- hopes for a
peaceful settlement to rise
about April 21, officials
here kept in sight the need
for a final col-
00t438601118ri
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1
lapse Martin apparently
' did not.
THE ULTIMATE result
of the Communist decision
in late March to smash all
resistance came on
\ Wednesday, April 30, in
Saigon ? late Tuesday
here. After the last Ameri-
can helicopter had gone,
leaving behind panicky
thousands who felt aban-
doned, NVA troops march-
ed into the capital with little
resistance. The Giap-Dung
article said that "at exactly
11:30 on 30 April our army
planted the flag of the
F'RGRSV (PRG Republic of
South Vietnam) atop the
puppet presidential palace
and the Ho Chi Minh cam-
paign achieved complete
victory."
At 10:24 a.m., Minh had
broadcast an order for
WAS} NGTON STAR
October 1975
rammusgmamataminess
OPTIGIAlfaMolthIgrAle...
southern soldiers to stop
fighting. He said he was
waiting at the palace to
meet PRG representatives
"to discuss the ceremony to
hand over power. . . ."
But that meant Minh
claimed to head a still.
functioning regime which
could deal with the
Communists. They would
have none of that. His offer
was ignored.
At 3:22 p.m., some hours
after he had been captured,
Minh came on the air
again. "The president of
the Saigon administration
calls on the Army of the
Republic of (South) Viet-
nam to lay down their arms
and to surrender uncondi-
tionally to the South Viet-
nam Liberation Army,"
Minh said. "I declare that
the Saigon administration
from the central to the local
echelons must be complete-
ly dissolved and turned
over to the PRGRSV."
? A Communist voice then
came on and said the
unconditional surrender
was accepted. Nothing was
left of the Thieu regime's
structure or the Paris
agreement concept of a
three-part shared transi-
tional arrangement.
TWO CONGRESSIONAL
subcommittees have sub-
mitted letters to the State
Department asking that
Martin testify about those
last days. They are the
legislation and national se-
curity subcommittee of the
House Government Opera-
tions Committee arid the
House International Rela-
tions Committee's special
subcommittee on investiga-
tions.
Martin had been in the
United States for medical
treatment late last winter
and has been sick again
since he was taken by heli-
copter off his embassy's
roof. The subcommittees
have been told orally that
he could not appear be-
cause of illness.
He was discharged from
a hospital almost two weeks
ago and now, while on
leave, is haunting the State
Department asking when
he will be given a new
ambassadorial posting.
The White House has not
decided what to do with
him. Senior officials want to
avoid any reopening of the
Saigon' sore and therefore
doubt that Martin's name
will ever be put before the
Senate Foreign Relations
Committee for another ap-
pointment to ambpssador.
OUP
ie4i:kmdf- -'01-
'Get him to tell you the one about the big oil and wheat deal with Russia!'
48
Approved kir Release 2001/0'8/08 :-CIA-ROP77:06432RODOT003-800'05:1?
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380005-1
Friday, October 24, 1975
TheWashington Star
By Jeremiah (Leary
Washington Star Stall Writer
The Ford administration
will slow down on treaty ne-
gotiations with Panama and
the movement toward re-
sumption of normal rela-
tions with Cuba until after
the 1976 U.S. elections.
The "freeze" on progress
toward eventual restoration
of political and commercial
relations with Cuba is gear-
ed to the March 9 primaries
in Florida, where there are
many Cuban-American
voters, as well as the No-
vember elections. The nego-
tiations with Panama for a
new treaty on the canal and
the Canal Zone will drag
until after Americans vote
next year.
Officials say the Panama
decision must be regarded
as practical as well as po-
litical. The administration
and Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger are firm
in their desire for a new
treaty with Panama that
will result in eventual relin-
quishment of control of the
strategic waterway and the
10-mile-wide Canal Zone to
the Republic of Panama.
WHAT THEY have in
mind is a treaty that would
leave the United States in
control of the canal until the
early 21st century but with
gradual sharing of func-
tions with Panama and an
end to the Canal Zone as an
Ti-E CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
U.S. and
By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
The United States and Cuba are, in a sense,
shadow boxing as they inch toward rapproche-
ment.
Both have in recent days set up conditions
that on the surface might seem to preclude an
early movement toward some sort of new
U.S.-Cuba relationship.
But these conditions are, in the view of long-
time observers, merely bargaining points.
Cuba last week reiterated its demand that
Puerto Rico be granted independence and
warned Washington that it would not give up
its position for the sake of rapprochement.
Earlier State Department officials had said
that the Cuban position on Puerto Rico was a
stumbling block in the path of normalizing
relations.
American enclave from the
outset.
But the administration
realizes that any attempt to
obtain congressional ap-
proval for a new treaty
poses risks in an election-
year atmosphere. If the
Senate rejects the treaty, or
if the House exercises its
prerogative to bar transfer
of any property acquired
with government funds, the
forecasts of experts are that
there will be violence on a
heavy scale by the Pana-
manians against the zone
and the canal.
Administration analysts
do not wish to thrust a
treaty on Congress in a na-
tional election year when
senators and representa-
tives are most susceptible
to both lobbying and voter
reaction. There are con-
gressmen who might vote
for the treaty in 1977 who
would not in 1976. And
rejection of the-treaty in ei-
ther House will be enough
to thrust the United States
into a potential emergency
that might require military
intervention.
Since the last thing Wash-
ington wants is any repeat
of the 1964 riots, in which
the U.S. Army faced Pana-
manian mobs in pitched
battle, Ambassador Ells
.
worth Bunker and ne
gotiating team will go into
low gear until the election
period is past
]
11stt , .,,,,b0 ?te,, fa._
.,,ge . A's - ' ? 14 ''- '
,, s,
INFORMED sources
'here believe that Panama's
strongman, Brig. Gen.
Omar Torrijos, well under-
stands the U.S. domestic
problem. While Torrijos has
? tight control in Panama
through his well-trained
Guardia Nacional force of
more than 7,000 military
and police units, even he
could not restrain a violent
surge of nationalistic reac-
tion should the treaty reach
Capitol Hill and be defeated
there.
Torrijos cannot afford to
publicly acknowledge
acquiescence with a slow-
down in treaty negotiations,
since he has made far too,
many flaming speeches on
the subject of the Canal
Zone and Panamanian
sovereignty there. But
pri-
vately, it is believed Torri-
jos and his foreign minister,
Juan Tack, will go along
In general, the United
States has acknowledged
that the 1903 treaty needs
revision so that Panama's
sovereignty and control of
the zone is realized; that
many U.S. functions in the
zone must be transferred to
Panama; that Panama
should share in control,
operation and defense of the
isthmian waterway for a
period of years and then
obtain full control.
The main differences re-
maining to be settled lie in
the time span for the hand-
ing over of the zone and the
canal to Panama.
BUNKER WILL continue
to travel periodically to
Panama for negotiating ses-
sions, but the administra-
tion no longer contemplates
completion of the treaty or
signing of the document by
President Ford for at least
13 months
The Cuban issue poses
problems for any candidate
in the Florida primaries
where many anti-Castro
Cubans are now American
citizens and registered
voters. The administration
has made clear that it is
prepared for a return to
normal relations with Cuba
if Premier Fidel Castro
wishes this. But it also
recognizes the explosive-
ness, of the Cuban issue in
Florida.
Cuba actually made it
easy for the State Depart-
ment to reduce the pace of
restoration of ties. When
the Cubans made a big
show at the United Nations
General Assembly recently
of attacking U.S. "coloni-
alism"in Puerto Rico and
supporting independence
for the island common-
wealth, the United States
was handed an excuse.
Only a minority of Puerto
Ricans favor independence.
The major issue in Puerto
rico is whether the island
should opt for statehood or
continue as a common-
wealth.
Tuesday, October 21, 1975
Cu .a inch towar
impediment to lifting the embargo on Cuba
and smoothing the way to relations was the
estimated $1.6 billion in claims against the
Cuban government by U.S. citizens and
companies whose interests were expropriated
in the early 1960s. Cuba has rejected these
claims.
As far as Puerto Rico is concerned, Cuba
knows that the majority of the Puerto Rican
people have rejected independence, although
many would like some changes in the present
commonwealth status. Cuba will continue its
support for independence, however, in spite of
Washington's objections.
And as far as the claims of U.S. citizens and
companies are concerned, Washington is
aware that there is little likelihood of any
compensation being paid, although some
token payments might well be forthcoming in
a few cases. Yet the U.S. will continue to
The United States, for its part, has on
emphasize this issue.
several recent occasions**ItutelbleRmiReleanca0001/4808ealGiA-RDP7M.S4024k
achieve its goal on these points and its position
therefore is not implacable.
Meanwhile, Washington has acknowledged
that the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba has
become less and less effective. The Commerce
Department in a report last week said that
higher sugar prices have given Cuba more
money to spend.
"Unilateral continuation of the Cuba em-
bargo becomes a bit more costly to the United
States, though that economic cost is still
relatively small," the report said.
The U.S. in August eased the embargo by
allowing foreign subsidiaries and affiliates of
U.S. companies to do business with Cuba. The
value of this business is relatively small, but it
is seen as a sign of the time.
There are other signs: Cuba recently
returned $2 million to Southern Airways from
a 1972 skyjacking and it granted a permit for
the parents of Boston Red Sox pitcher Luis
Tiant to visit their son during the conclusion of
015010138110065siason? j9.