SENATE PANEL, REPORTING ON C.I.A., ASSERTS U.S. AIDES WERE INVOLVED IN PLOTS TO KILL FOREIGN LEADERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 21, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

25X1A
?Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003800Q42._
? CONFIDENTIAL
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
21 NOVEMBER 1975
NO. 23
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
GENERAL
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WEST EUROPE
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CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2
THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1975.
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No Evidence That U.
Actions Resulted in
Deaths Is Found
By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
- seethe to The ter; York Times
WASHINGTON, Nov. 20?A
bipartisan, select committee of
the Senate reported today that
officials of the United States
Government instigated assassi-
nation plots against two foreign
leaders and became embroiled
in plotting that led to the.
deaths Of three others.
Fidel Castro of Cuba and Pa-
trice Lumumba of the Congo;
now Zaire, were the leaders
who were targets of plots said
to have been initiated by offi-
cials in Washington. The three
others were Ngo Dinh Diem of
'South Vietnam, Rafael Leonidas
Trujillo of the Dominican Re-
public and Gen. Rend Schneider.
of Chile.
IOf the five, all except Prime.
Minister Castro, were assassi-
nated, but the committee?the
Select Committee to Study Gov-
? ernmental Operations?found
no evidence that any foreign
leader was killed as a result of
assassination plots initiated by
officials of the United States.
? It was the first time that a
.formal Government investiga-
tion established that assassina-
tion had become part of United
States foreign policy. Several
Congressional sources said it
was the only instance, except
after a military defeat, in which
a modern nation had formally
acknowledged such behavior.
New Details Disclosed
The plots that were cited in
the document were sketched-in
reports attributed to intelli-
gence and other Government
sources in The New York Times
and other publications over the
last seven months, but there
was a vast amount of new de-
tail. The committee disclosed
that a wide !range of Federal
officials involved themselves in
plots such as hiring Mafia mem-
bers and making secret atms
deliveeies to Chilean military
officers.
The .committce's 347-page
'!report, made public today over
the strong opposition of Presi-
dent Ford and after four hours
of closed debate on the Senate
floor in which the Senate re-
fused to vote arid thus per-
mitted the committee to decide
on its release, made these other
points:
cit was unable 'to establish
that any former United States
President had directly. ordered
the killing of a foreign leader.
But it said that "whether or
not the President in fact knew
about the assassination plots,
Iand even if their subordinates
failed in their duty of full dis-
closure. it still follows that the!
President should have known
about the plots."
?1t said the plans to kill Mr.
Lumumba and Prime Minister.
Castro were initiated and fur-
thered by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
PIt found that American offi-
cials ',encouraged or were privy
to" coups .d'dtat that resulted
!in the deaths of -General Tru-
jillo, President Diem and Gen-
eral Schneider, chief of Chile's
?.general staff.
cit found that in the plot to
kill Mr. Lumumba "there was
a . reasonable inference" that
President- Eisenhower might
have authorized the operation.
This conclusion was based in
part on testimony by a former
official who recalled that Presi-
dent Eisenhower had appeared
to order the death at a Nation-
al Security Council meeting in
1960. The report established
that Allen Dulles. former C.I.A.
director, had ordered Mr. Lu-
mumba killed. -
Plt disclosed for the first
time that on the day President
Kennedy was assassinated in
Dallas, Nov. 22, 1963, the C.I.A.
was equipping a dissident offi-
cial in the Castro Government
with a ball point pen containing
a hypodermic needle to poison
the Cuban leader. It revealed
further that this coincided with
a meeting of a special envoy of
President Kennedy with Mr.
Castro in an effort to improve
relations between Cuba and the
United States.
'Pit disclosed that ranking
Government officials diseussedi
and may have authorized, thel
ei:ahlishment within the C.I.A.!
of a "generalized assas.imationi
capability," adding that during
these diseussion,; "the conceptt
of assassination was not af-
firmatively'. disavowed."
cit sharply condemned the!
APProv40,;VOLN8r640446/8 ?
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? icy and disclosed that the
C.I.A. had used Mafia figures
in the Castro plot and had em-
ployed two European soldiers
of fortune with criminal rec--
ords in the plot against Mr.,
Lumumba.
?The spectacle of the Gov-
ernment cc. sorting with crim-
inal elements destroys respect
? for government and law and
undermines the viability of?de-
mocratic institutions," it con-
cluded.
Sharpest Criticism
The committee saved its
harshest language for the con-
cept that the United States
;should ever have utilized as-
sassination as a tool. It said:
"We condemn the use of as-
-sassination as a tool of foreign
(policy. Aside from pragmatic
-arguments against the use of
.assassination supplied to the
committee by witnesses with
extensive experience in covert
,operationse we find that assas-
sination violates _moral pre-
"cepts. fundamental to our way
of life."
?? Not satisfied that future ad-
ministrations would eschew the
use of assassinations, as Presi-
dent Ford has done, the com-
mittee said it would submit a!
bill to make it unlawful for
anyone "subject to the juris-
diction of the United States" to
conspire, attempt to, or kill a
foreign leader. The proposed
,legislation will specifically cov-
er government officials acting
-under orders, the committee
said.
Late yesterday President
Ford made a final effort to halt
publication 1):? se??ig personal
letters to ..enate leaders. He
told them he opposed the re-
lease of information of alleged!
assassinations plots for thei
same reasons he cited in lettersl
to committee members 15 days
ago.
"Public release of these of-
ficial materials and information
will do grievous damage to our
country." the President said
in his earlier letter. "It would
be exploited by foreign nations
and groups hostile to the Unit-
!ed States in a manner designed
to do maximum damage to the
reputation and foreign policy
? of the United States."
The Senate apparently
spurned this argument and re-
fused to order the alteration or
suppression of the committee's
? report. In doing so, it also re-
jected a last-minute appeal by
William E. Colby, the Director
of ? Central Intelligence. who.
asked that. the names of some
13 individuals, some of them
ak-iiiigiao402.46Aeio
from possible acts of violence.
The 12 names were scattered
among dozens of others
throughout the report's 347
pages. and it appeared impos-
sible for the casual reader to
distinguish they names charac-
terized by Mr. Colby as esoe-
cially sensitive from any of the
others.
? A Potential Assassin
? The report .? more than
.120,000 words of text. distilled
from '60 days of hearings, the
testimony of some 75 witnesses
and 8,000 pages of transcript
? was pungent in its detail
and its depiction of- the men
involved .in the plots and their
moods. ??
In the Lumumba plot, for in-
stance, one of the potential as-,
sassins, code-named WI/1
ROGUE, is described by a
C.I.A. official this way:
"He is indeed aware of the
precepts of right and wrong, but
if be is given an assignment
which .may' be morally wrong
in the eyes' of the world, but
necessary because his case of-
ficer ordered him to carry it
out, then it is right, and he
will dutifully undertake appro-
priate action for its execution
without pangs of conscience."
Almost no fantasy of spy
movies was a tactical impos-
sibility in these dark covert
battles, the report confirms.
The planning against Mr. Cas-
tro, for instance, contemplated
poisoned cigars, poison sea
shells and poison pills.
- Individual officials of govern-
ment in three Administrations
came under criticism or ques-
tion in the report.
Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger and his deputy in the
White House in 1970, Gen.
Alexander M. Haig Jr., were
contradicted by C.I.A. officials
on parts of their testimony on
Chile.
In one instance, Mr. Kissin-
ger had said that the Nixon
Administration's policy of en-
couraging military coups d'etat
in Chile ended in the fall of
1970. Testimony by Thomas
Karamessines. the C.I.A. official
in charge of the Chile plotting,
contradicted this. He told the
committee that "as far as he
knew" this effort to foment an
uprising never ended.
. The committee stated that
although the Nixon Administra-
tion never ordered the C.I.A. to
!kill General Schneider, Presi-
dent Nixon had ordered a
scale, unsuccessful 2ffort to
pie-vent Salvador Allende Gas-
sens of Chile, a Min.xist. frcml
03800042
1 :
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : cIA-RpP77-00432R000100380004-2
THE NEW ?ORK TIMES. FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21. 1975
'Synecdoche' Looms Large in the Jeport
ever taking office as President.
. Richard Helms, then the
C.I.A. director, told the com-
mittee that "this was a pretty
all-inclusive order.. . . If I ever
carried a marshal's baton in
my knapsack out of the Oval
Office, it was this clay."
The committee did not inter-
view former President Nixon
prior to this report, but it has
said that it expects to.
More confusion about men
and motives was found in the
committee's investigation of the.
Castro plotting. It criticized the
late Robert F. Kennedy, then
the Attorney General, for not
'condemning assassination as a
technique and the use of un-
derworld elemettts by Govern-
ment agencies when he learned
some details of these matters
in May, 1962.
But it also said that there
was not evidence that either he
,or his brother, President Ken-
nedy, had ever ordered an as-
sassination attempt.
It criticized Mr. Helms, Rich-
ard Bissell, director of covert
actions in the early 19130's, and
several middle-level C.I.A. offi-
cials for either misleading their
superiors or not being fully can-
did with them.
Helms Held Not Candid
, At one point, the committee
called the withholding of infor-
mation from Presidents Eisen-
hower and Kennedy "inexcus-
able." At another point it found
"unpersuasive" Mr. Helms's ex-
planations of why he had not
been candid with then C.I.A.
director John McCone.
? Among those that the C.I.A.
officials ailed to inform about
their plots against Prime Min-
ister Castro, the report said,
were the members of the War-
ren Commission, which was
investigating President. Kenne-
dy's death. The committee said
,that even Mr. Dulles, who was
la member of the commission
land knew about early Castro
plots, did not inform his fellow
;commission members.
The commission did not spare
the policy makers from criti-
cism. It disclosed that early in
1961, McGeorge Bundy, then
President Kennedy's assistant
for national security affairs,
learned about development of
the capability to assassinate.
"Bundy raised no objection,"
the report said, quoting Mr.
Bissell's sworn testimony. In a
footnote the committee said:
"Bundy, as the national secu-
rity adviser to the President,
had an obligation to tell the
President of such a grave mat--
ter, even though it was only a
discussion of a capability to
assassinate. His failure to do so
was a serious error."
Striang Rejection
The report was strong and
unrelenting in stating the rea-
sons. both nractical and moral,
that it rejected assassination as
a techniaue.
"The witnesses who testified
before the committee uniformly
condemned assassination," the
report said. "They denounced
it as 'immoral. described it as
impractical, and 'reminded mei
that an open society. more;
/thany any other, is particularly
vulnerable to the risk that its,
'own leaders mav be assassin-
ated.. As President. Kennedy ee,`
'
By RICHARD D. LYONS.
Spee!sl to Tile New York Times
WASHINGTON, Nov. 20?
A potential fad word, synec-
doche, emerged today from
the Senate intelligence com-
mittee's report on alleged as-
sassination plots.
The word is the name for
a rhetorical shortcut n which
a complicated situation is
referred to as briefly as pos-
sible, sometimes leading to
misunderstandings about ex-
actly what is meant.
As an example, on Page
265 of its report, the commit-
tee cites the phrase "dispos-
ing of Castro." which may
mean either killing the Cuban
leader or dislodging his re-
gime. The point is that the
phrase can mean different
things to different people.
? Meeting Described ,
_
Synecdoche also may be
used in the reverse, with
a longer phrase taking the
place of one that is shorter.
One example cited was
"doing something about Cas-
tro," which could he taken
to mean killing him.
As the committee report
indicated, the use of synec-
doche ? it is pronounced
"sin-NECK-doe-key" ? com-
plicated the unraveling of
who said what to whom be-
cause of the ambiguities in-
herent in the rhetorical tech-
nique.
As an ominous example
Inortedly?said. 'We can't- atet.
;into that kind of thine, or we.
would all be trageted.'"
The committee provided thel
;most new information in jt
cdesceintion of the plot to kill
IMr. Ttimomba. It related bow'
',teen', concerned the United
,ea; t hi; emergence in i
ithf> '-?,r clays of the Belgian;
ineee,), t-te ey,s. the Eisenhower'
"?rlre'nIsteation felt, a threat ofl
almeet. the same marmitude as?
:me Castro becanse his leader-
thin tee.n losing valuable
Central African resources to
Communist influences. At one
point, moreover, the report
quotes an official who believed
that Mr. Lumumba was insane.
In August, 1960, Mr. Dulles
ordered the killing of Mr. Lu-
mumba. It was pursued later,
,although Mr. Lumumba was
out of power, because the
agency was convinced that his
charismatic political qualities
could spark the Congolese to
support the Soviet Union.
A great deal of the plotting
involved how the United States
would get Mr. Lumumba a way
from the protection of United
Nations forces and kill him.
Two main methods of killing
him were devised; one involved
giving him a biological toxin
selected from poisons stock-
piled by the C.I.A. at the Army
post at Fort Detrick, Md..
A substance was actually
flown to Africa. hut never ad-
ministered, according to the re-
port. in another plan, the
contemplated killing Mr. Lti-
2
--Approved-For Release 2001/08/08 :-CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2
of synecdoche, the report re-
fers to a meeting in 1960
of a subcommittee of the
National Security Council at
which a reference was made
to taking "direct positive ac-
tion" against Fidel Castro,
his brother Raul, and Che
Guevara, another of hisc hief
aides.
"The reference to 'direct
positive action' is ambiguous
and subject to different inter-
pretations, including a sug-
gestion that assassination be
explored," the report states
on Page 116.
Officials of the Central In-
telligence Agency were them-
selves aware that such ambi-
guities were causing prob-
lems. In 1967 the agency's
Insrector General, Lyman
Kirkpatrick, said in an inter-
nal report dealing with assas-
sination:
"The point is that of fre-
quent resort to synecdoche--
the mention of a part when
the whole is to be under-
stood, or vice versa. Thus,
we encounter repeated refer-
ences to phrases such as
`disposing of Castro,' which
may be read in the narrow,
literal sense of assassinating
him, when it is intended that
it be read in the broader
figurative sense of dislodging
the Castro regime.
"Reversing the coin, we
find people speaking vaguely
of 'doing something about
Castro' when it is clear that
what they have specifically
in mind, is killing him. In
ND/ YORK TIPSS
20 Nov. 1975
AGENT HELD ASSURED
IN PLOTS ON CASTRO
WASHINGTON, Nov. 19
(Reuters)?A Cuban agent for
the Central Intelligence Agency
who was a key figure in C.I.A.
plots to kill Prime Minister
Fidel Castro of Cuba was as-
sured the operations had the
backing of very high United
States Government officials,
Congressional sources said
itoday.
The sources said that investi-
gators for the Senate Select
!Committee on Intelligence had
mumba with' a high-powered I
rifle.
The Congolese leader died
early in 1961 at the hands of
enemies in Katanga Province,
and the report cited evidence
that the C.I.A. had not had a
role in his death.
According to staff members
who worked on the preparation
of the report, "dozens. of areas
are still under scrutiny or may
provide leads for further in-
vestigation. For instance, one
said, there was a report that a
svoinan friend of the late Sam
Giancana, the Mafia leader who
was involved ii, the plot against
Mr. Casire, also an ac-
quaintance; of President Ken-
nedy's..
a situation wherein those
speaking may not have ac-
tually meant what they
seemed to say or may not
be snrprised if their oral
shorthand is interpreted dif-
ferently than was Intended."
In the report, all the "nots"
are italicized.
McCone Memo
The Senate committee's re-
port noted that "differing
perceptions between super-
iors and their subordinates
were graphically illustrated
in the Castro context." It
said that John McCone, the
former C.I.A. director, wrote
in a memorandum of April
14, 1967: ?
"Through the years the Cu-
ban problem was discussed
in terms such as 'dispose
of Castro,' remove Castro.'
'knock off Castro,' etc., and
this meant the overthrow of
the Communist Government
in Cuba and the replacing
of it with a democratic re-
gime. Terms such as the
above appear in many work-
ing papers, memoranda for
the record, etc., and, as stat-
ed, all refer to a change
in the Cuban Government."
But the report went on
to state that another former
director, Richard Helms,
"who' had considerable ex-
perience as a covert opera-
tor, gave precisely the oppo-
site meaning to the same
words, interpreting them as
conveying authority for as-
sassination."
!discovered this in the course
of inquiries they had been pur-
suing for several months.
According to the sources, the
investigators had found that
the agent, a Cuban Army
colonel and senior adviser to
Mr. Castro, was given the as-
surance after he demanded'
verification of C.I.A. assertions
that the murder plots had been
authorized at top Government
levels.
This assurance was conveyed
-to the colonel by a man who
said that he was representing
Robert F. Kennedy, then At-
torney General, at a secret
meeting in Paris on Oct. 29,
1963, the sources said.
The sources would not i'den-
.tify the colonel, but said that
;he was now in a Cuban jail.
I A spokesman for the Senate
!committee refused to confirm
or deny the account given by
the sources.
,
" Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380'004-2 ?
THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDA 1,, NOVEMBER 21, 197S
p-fr-s, cr
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AL
"17
fi
'Specia: to The New lark Time,
? WASHINGTON, Nov. 20?Following ate the texts Of four sections of the
report on alleged United States involi:einc/ t in assassination plots against for-
eign leaders. It was relecIsed today by the Senate Intelligence Committee.
jko
Summary Findings
? and Conc'usions
-
1..The Questions
Presented
The Committee sought to answer four
broad questions:
Assassination plots. ? Did United
States officials instigate, attempt, aid',
and abet, or acquiesce in plots to assas-
sinate foreign leaders?
Involvement in other Did
United States officials assist foreign dis-e-
sidents in a way which significantly.
contributed to the killing of foreign.
leaders?
Authorization.?Where there was in-
volvement by United States officials in
assassination plots or other killings,'
were such activities authorized and if
so, at what levels of our Government?
Communication and cootrol.?Even if
not authorized in fart, were the assassi-
nation activities perceived by those in-
volved to be within the scope .of their
lawful authority? If they were so per-
ceived, was there inadequate control ex
ercised by higher authorities over thefl
agencies to prevent such misinterpre-
tation?
2. Summary of Findings.
and Conclusions
? on the Plots
The Committee investigated alleged
United States involvement in assassina-
tion plots in five. foreign countriesd
-Country
CUBA
Individual involved2
' FIDEL CASTRO.
CONGO (ZAIRE) PATIZICE LUMUMEA.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC..RAYAEI. TRUJILI.O,
CHILE GENERAL RENE SCHNEIDER.
SOUTH VIETNAM NGO DINH DIEM.
1 In addition to the plots discussed in the
body of this report, the Commitee received
some evidence of CA invokement hi plans
to assassinate President Sukarno et' Indone- ?
sla and "Papa Dori" Dtr.edier of Haiti. Former
Deputy Director ? for Piens Rich ad Bissell
testified that the a;sassinaton of Sukarno
had been "contemplated" by the CIA, but
that planning had proceeded no farther than
identifying an "asset" wl om it wit.; believed
might be recruited to kill Sukarno. Arms
were supplied to dissident groups in Indo-
nesia, but according to Bissell, those arms
were not intended ter assassination.
6/11/75. p. SOt
Walter Eltlet, Illxmmtive Assistant to CIA
Director John McCone, testified that the
Director authori:-ed the CIA to furnish arms
to dissidents Pianumn, ;he overthrow of
Hailits dictator, Duvalier. Eider told the
Committee that white the assassineion of
Duvalier was not contemplated by the CIA,
the arms were furnished "in beIe tthe dis-
sidents.] tale what in?-;iseres were deei?ed
necessary to taplare the govecornent", and
it waa.realized teat Dhvalier might he killed
in the course oit the (Elder,
8/13/75. p. 791
Asstetsination plots tur.ainst Ihe Cuban
leadership SOMCHITV'S Rill pia t action
against Raul Ci;stro Clic i.eir;iti
South Vietnam Diems brmeer Nw) 'mb Slim
was killed at the sante tune. us Diem
ApproVed For
? - The evidence concerning each alleged
assassination can be summarized as
follows:,
?Pratriee Lumumba (Conga/Zaire).?n1
the Fall of 1930. two CIA officials were
asked by superiors to assassinate Lti-
mumba. Poisons were sent to the Congo
and some exploratory steps were taken
toward gaining access to Lumumba.
Subsequently, in early -11;51, Lumumba
was killed by Congolese rivals. It does
not appear from the evidence that the
United States was in any way inVolved
in the killing.
, Fidel Castro (Cuba).--United States
Government personnel plotted to kill
Castro from 1960 to 1965. American
-
underworld figures and Cubans .hostile
to Castro were used in these plots, and
were%provided encouragement and ma-
terial support by the United States.
Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic).
?Trujillo was shot by Dominican dis-
sidents on May 31, 1961. From early
in 1960 and continuing to the time
of the assassination, the United State/
Government generally supported these
dissidents. Some Government personnel
were aware that the dissidents intended'
to kill Trujillo. Three pistols and three
carbines were furnished by American
officials, although a request for machine
guns was later refused. There is con-
flicting evidence concerning whether
the weapons were knowingly supplied
for use in the assassination and whether
any of them were present at the scene..
Ngo Dinh Diem (South Vietnam).?
Diem and his brother, Nhu, were killed.
.on November 2, 1963, in the course
of a South Vietnamese General's coup.
Although the United States Government
supported the coup, there is no evidence
that American officials favored the as-
sassination. Indeed, it appears that
the assassination of Diem was not part
.of the General's pre-coup planning but
was instead a spontaneous act which
occurred during the coup and was car-
ried out without United States involve-
ment or support.
General Rene Schneider (Chile).?On
October 25, 1970, General Schneider
died. of gunshot wounds inflicted three
days earlier while resisting a kidnap
attempt. Schneider, as Commander-in-
Chief of the Array and a constitutiona-
list opposed to military coups, was
considered an obstacle in efforts to
prevent Salvador Allende feorn assum-
ing the office of President of Chile.
The United States Government support-
ed, and sought to instigate a military
coup to block Allende. U.S. officials
supplied financjal aid.' machine guns
and other equipment to -carious nih airy
figures who opposed Allende. Although
the CIA continued to ,support coup
plotters up to Schneider's shooting, the'
record indicates that the Cl!. had witn-
drawn active supperi. of the group
which carried out he actual kisinap
Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP7
attempt on October 22, which resulted
in Schneider's death. Further, it does
not appear that any of the equipment
supplied by the CIA to coup plotters
in Chile was used in the. kidnapping.
There is no evidence of a plan to
kill Schneider or that United States
officials speciiicaily anticipated that
Schneider would be shot during the
abduction. \
Assassination capability (Executive
,action).?in addition to these five cases,
the Committee has received evidence
that ranking Government officials dis-
cussed, and may have authori-ied, the
establishment within the CIA of a gener-
alized assassination capability. During
these discussions, the concept of assas-
sination was not affirmatively disa-
vowed.
? Similarities and differences among
the plots.?The assassination plots all
involved Third World countries, most
of which were relatively small and
'none of which possessed great political
or military strength. Apart from that,
similarity, there were significant differ-
ences among the plots:
(I) Whether United States officials' ?
initiated the plot, or were responding,
. to requests of local dissidents for .
aid. ?
(2) Whether the plot was specifical-
ly intended to kill a foreign leader,
or whether the leader's death was
a resOnably foreseeable consequence
' of an attempt to overthrow the
government..
. The Castro and Lumumba cases are
examples of plots conceived by United
States officials to kill foreign leaders.
In the Trujillo case, although the
United States 'Government certainly op-
posed his 'regime, it did not initiate
the plot. Rather. United States officials
responded to requests for aid from
local dissidents whose aim clearly was
to assassinate Trujillo. By aiding them,
this country was implicated in the as-
sassination, regardless of whether the
weapons actoolly supplied were meant
to kill Trujillo or were only intended
as symbols of support for the dissidents.
The Schneider case differs -nom the
Castro and Trujillo cases. The United
States Government, with full knowledge
that Chilean dissidents considered Gen-
eral Schneider an obstacle to their
pians. sought a coup and provided sup-
port to the dissidents: However, even
though the support .inciuded weapons,
it appears that the intention of both
the .dissidents and the United States
officials was to abduct General Schneid-
er, not to kill him. Similarly, in the
Diem case, some United States officials
wanted Diem removed and supported
a coup to accomplish his removal, but
there is no evidence that any of those
officials sought the death of Diem him-
self.
3. Summary of Findings
and Conclusions on the
issues of Authority
and Control
To put the inquiry into assassination
allegations in context two points must
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that the United States Government op?
posed the various leaders in question.
Officials at the highest levels objected
to the- Castro and Trujillo regimes,
believed the accession of Allende to
power ? in Chile would be harmful to
American interests and thought of Lu- .
mamba as a dangerous force in the
heart of Africa. Second, the evidence
on assassinations has to be viewed
in the context of other, more massive
activities against the regimes in ques-
tion. For example, the plots against
Fidel Castro personally cannot be under-
stood without considering the fully au-
thorized comprehensive assaults upon.
his regime, such as thsa Bay of Pigs
.invasion in 1961 and Operation MON-
GOOSE in 1962.
Once methods of coercion and vi-
olence are chosen, the probability ? of'
loss of. life is aiweys present. There
is, however, a significant difference
between a coldblooded, targeted, intend
tional killing of an individual foreign
leader and other forms of intervening
in the affairs of foreign nations. There-
fore, the Committee has endeavored
to explore as fully as possible the
questions of how and why the plots
happened, whether they were author--
ized, and if So, at what level.
" The picture that emerges from the
'evidence is not a clear one. Thi S may
.be due to the system of deniability
'and the consequent state Of the evidence
which, even after our lona investigation,
remains conflicting andr inconclusive.
Or it may be that there were in fact'
.serious shortcomings in the system of
'authorization so that an activity such
as assassination could have been under-
taken by an agency of the United
States Government without express au-
thority.
The Committee finds that the system.
of executive command and control was
'so ambiguous that it is difficult to
be certain at what levels assassination
activity was known and .authorized..
This ? situation creates the disturbing'
prospect that Government officials
might have Undertaken the assassina-
tion plots without it having been uncon-
trovertibly clear that there was explicit
authorization from the Presidents. It is
also possible that there might have
been a successful "plausible denial"
'in which Presidential authorization was
issued but is now obscured. Whether
or .not p the respective Presidents knew
of or authorized the plots, as chief
executive officer of the United States,
each must bear the ultimate responsibi-
lity for the activities of his subordinates.
The Committee makes four other ma- -
jor findings. 1 The first relates to the
Committee's inability to make a finding
that the assassination plots were au-
thorized by the Presidents or other
persons above the governmental agency
or agencies involved. The second ex-
plains why certain officials ray have
perceived that, according to their judg-
ment and experience, assassination was
an acceptable course of action. The
.third criticizes agency officials far fail-
ing on several occasions to, disclose
their plans and activites to superior
authorities or for failing to do so with
sufficient detail and clarity. The fourth,
criticizes. Administration ,officials for.
not ruling out assassination, particularly
after certain Administration officials
had become aware of prior assassination
plans and the establishment of a general
assassination capability.
'The Committee's findings are elaborated'
in Section IV, infra.
There is admittedly a .tension among
the findings. This tension reflects a
basic conflict in the evidence. While
there are some conflicts over facts,
it may be more important that there
appeared to have been two differing
perceptions of the same facts. This
distinction may be the result of the
differing backgrounds of those persons.
experienced in covert operations as dis-
. -
tinauished from those who were not.
Words of urgency which may have
meant killing to the former, may have.
meant nething of the sort to the latter.
While we are- critical of certain in-
dividual actions, the Committee is also
mindful of the inherent problems in
a system which relies on secrecy, com,
partmentation, circumlocution, and the
avoidance of clear responsibility. This
system creates the risk of confusion
and rashness in the very areas where
clarity and sober judgment are most
necessary. Hence, before reviewing the
evidence relating tosthe cases, we brief-
ly deal with the general subject of
covert action.
IV. Findings and Conclusions
In evaluating the evidence and arriv-
ing at ,findings and conclusions the
Committee has been guided by the
*following standards. We believe these
'standards to be appropriate to the con-
stitutional duty of a Congressional com-
mittee. .
I. The Committee is not' a court...
Its primary role is not to determine
individual guilt or innocence, but rather
to draw upon the experiences of the
past to better propose guidance for
the future.. ?
? ? 2. It is necessary to he cautious in
reaching conclusions because of the
amount of time that has passed since
the events reviewed in this report, the
inability of three Presidents and many
other key figures to speak for them-
selves, the conflicting and ambiguous
.nature of much of the evidence, and
the problems in assessing the weight
to be given to particular documents
and testimony.
. 3. The Committee has tried to be'
fair?to the persons involved in 'the
events under examination, wh4le at the
same time responding to a need to
'understand the facts in sufficemt rtail:
to lay a basis for informed recommenda- ?
tions.
With these standards in mind, the
Committee has arrived at the following
findings and conclusions.
A. Findings
? Concerning the
Plots Themselves ?
1. Officials of the United States
Government Initiated Plots to
. Assassinate. Fidel Castro and..
? Patrice Lunrumba
The Committee finds that officials
of the United States Government initiat-
ed and participated in plots to assassi-
nate Patrice Lumumba and Fidel Castro.
The plot to kill Lumumba wae con-
ceive!l in the latter half of 1960 by
'officials of the United states Govern-
ment, and quickly advanced to the
point of 'sending poisons to the Congo
to be used for the assassination. .
The effort to assassinate Castro began
in, 1960 and continued until 1965. The
4
plans to assassinate Castro using poison
Cigars, exploding seashells, and a con-
taminated diving suit did not advance
beyond the laboratory phase. The plot
; involving underworld figures reached
the .stage of producing poison pills,
establishing the contacts necessary 'to'
send them into Cuba, procuring poten-
tial assassins within Cuba, and ap-
parently delivering the pills to the island
itself. One 1960 episode involved a
Cuban who initially had no intention
of engaging in- assassination, but who
finally agreed, at the suggestion of
the CIA, to attempt to assassinate Raul
Castro if the opportunity arose. In the
AM/LASH operation, which extended
from 1963 through 1965, the CIA gave
active _support , and encouragement to
a. Cuban whose intent to assassinate
Castro was known, and provided him
with .the means of carrying out an
'assassination.
2. No Foreign Leaders Were
Killed as a Result of Assassination
Plots Initiated by Officials
of the United States
? The poisons intended for use against
.Patrice Lumuinba were never admin-
istered to' him, and there is no evidence
that the United States was in any
way 'involved in Lumumba's death at
,the hands of, his Congolese enemies.
The efforts to assassinate Castro failed.
3. American Officials Encouraged
' or Were Privy to Coup Plots
Which Resulted in the Deaths of
Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider
American officials clearly desired the
'overthrow of Trujillo, offered both en-
couragement and guns to local dis-
sidents who sought his overthrow and
whose: plans included assassination.
American officials also supplied those
dissidents with pistols and rifles:
American officials offered encourage-
ment ,to the Vietnamese generals who
plotted Diem'g, overthrow, and a CIA
official . in Vietnam gave the generals
money after, 'the coup had begun.,
However; Diem's assassination was,
neither desired nor ? suggested by
officials of the United States.'
The record reveals that United
States officials offered encouragement
to the Chilean dissidents who plotted .
thekidnappindt' of General Rene.
Schneider, but American officials did
.not desire or encourage Schneider's
death. Certain high officials did know,
however, that the dissidents planned
to kidnap General Schneider.
As Director Colby testified before
.the Committee, the death of a foreign
leader is a risk foreseeable in any
coup attempt. In the cases we have
considered, the risk of death was in
fact known in varying degrees. It was
widely known that the dissidents in
the Dominican Republic intended to as-
sassinate Trujillo. The contemplation 'of
coup leaders at one time to assassinate
Nhu, President Diem's brother, was
communicated to the upper levels of
the United States Government. While'
the CIA and perhaps the White House
knew that the coup leaders in Chile
planned, to kidnap 'General Schneider,
it, was not anticipated that he would
be killed, although the possibility of
his death should have been recognized
. as a foreseeable risk of his kidnapping.
4. The Plots Occurred in a
? Cold War Atinosphe'e Perceived
to Be of Crisis .Pioportions
The Committee fuity appreciates the
importance of eva!itiatin;.; the .assassina-
tion plots in the h'storic.al conte::t
whh-
in which -aiey. occurred. In the preface,
to this report, w described the percep-
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;ion generally shared within the Unit-
ed States during the depths of the
Cold War, that our country faced a
monolithic enemy in Communism. That
attitude helps explain the assassination
plots which we have reviewed, although
it does not justify thorn. Those involved
nevertheless appeared to believe they
were advancing the best interests of
their country.
5. American Officials Had.
Exaggerated Notions About. Their
Ability- to Control the
Actions of Coup Leaders
Running throughout the cases consid-
ered in this report vias the expectation.
of American officials that they could
control the actions of dissident groups
which they were supporting in -foreign
countries. Events demonstrated that the
United ?States had .no such power: This ,
point is graphically demonstrated by
cables exchanged shortly before the
coup irt? Vietnam. Ambassador Lodge'
cabled Washington on October 30, 1963,
that he was unable to halt a coup;
a cable from William Bundy in response
stated that "we cannot accept conclu-
sion that we have no power to delay
or discourage a coup." The coup took
place three days later. .
Shortly after the experience of the
Bay of Pigs; CIA Headquarters request-
ed operatives in the Dominican Republic
to tell the dissidents to "turn off"
the assassination attempt, because the
United States was not prepared to "cope
with the aftermath." ? The dissidents
replied that the assassination was their
affair and that it could not be turned
off to suit the convenience of the United
States Government.
6. CIA Official Made Use of Known
Underworld Figures in
- Assassination Efforts
Officials of the CIA made use of
persons associated with the criminal
underworld in attempting to achieve
the assassination of Fidel Castro. These
underworld figures were relied upon
because it was believed that they had .
expertise and contacts that were not
available to law-abiding citizens.
. Foreign citizens with criminal back-
grounds were also used by the CIA.
in two other cases that we have re-
-viewed. In the development of he Execu-
tive Action capability, one foreign na-
tional with a criminal background was
used to "spot" other members of the
European underworld who might be
used by the CIA for a variety of purpos-
es, including assassination, if the need
should arise. In the Lumumba case;
two men with criminal backgrounds
were used as field operatives by CIA
officers in a volatile political situation
in the Congo.
B. Conclusions
Concerning the Plots
? Themselves
I. The United States Should Not
Engage in Assassination
We condemn the use of assassination
as a tool of foreign .policy. Aside from
pragmatic arguments against the use
of assassination supplied to the Commit-
tee by witnesses with extensive expe-
rience in covert operations, we find
that assassination violates moral pre-
cepts fundamental to our way of life.
In addition to moral considerations,
there were several practical reasons.
advanced for not assassinating foreign
leadei . These reasons are discussed:
in the section of this report. recommend-
Approved. For
ink a statute making assassination a
crime. ?
(a) Distinction Between Targeted
Assassinations Instigated by the
United States anti Support for
Dissidents Seeking to Overthrow
.Local Governments
Two of the five principal cases inves-
tigated by the Committee involved plots
to kill foreign leadere (Lumumba and
Castro) that were instigated by Ameri-
can officials. Thrae of the cases (Trujil-
lo, Diem, and Schneider) involved kill-
ings in the course of coup attempts
by local dissidents. These latter cases
differed in the degree to which assassi-
nation was contemplated by the leaders
of the coups and in the degree , the
coups were motivated by United States
officials. ? ?
The Committee concludes that target-.
ed assassinations instigated by the Unit-
ed States must be prohibited.
Coups involve varying degrecs of
risk of assassination. The pi.iss hilt ty
of assassination in coup attempts is
one of, the issues to be considered
in determining the propriety of United
States involvement in coups, particular-
ly in those where the assassination
of a foreign leader is a likely prospect.
This country was created by violent
revolt against a regime be4ved to
be tyrannous, and our founding fathers
(the local dissidents of that era) re-
ceived aid from foreign countries. Given
that history, we should not today rule
Out support for dissident groups seeking
to overthrow tyrants. But passing be-
yond that principle, there remain serious
questions: for example, whether the
national interest of the United States
is genuinely involved: whether any such
support should be overt : rather than
covert; what tactics should be used:
and how such actions should be author-
ized and controlled by the coordinate
branches of government. The Committee
believes that its recommendations on
the question of covert actions in support
of coups must await the Committee's
final report which will be issued after
a full review of covert action in general.
(h) The Setting in Which the
'Assassination Plots Occurred
Explains, But Does Not Justify
Them -
The Cold -War setting in which the
assassination plots took place does not
change our view that assassination is
unacceptable in our society. In addition
to the moral and practical problems
discussed elsewhere, we find three prin-
cipal defects in any contention that
the tenor of the period justified the
assassination plots:
First, the assassination plots were
not necessitated by imminent danger
to the United States. Among the cases
*studied, Castro alone posed a physical
threat to the United States, but then
only. during the period of the Cuban
missile crisis, and assassination was
not advanced by policymakers as a?
possible course of action. during the
. ?
Second. we reject absolutely any no-
tion that the United States should justi-
fy its actions by the standards of totali-',
tarians. Our standards must be higher,
and this difference is what the struggle
is all about. Of course, we must defend ?
our democracy. But in defending it,
we must resist undermining the very
virtues we are defending.
Third, such activities almost inevitably
become known. The damage to Ameri-
can foreign policy, to the good vi,me
and reputation of the United s.atea
REfferS 21) if/ otrf c rC PA?- ti -14120
and support of our government and
its foreign policy is incalculable. This
last point?the undermining of the
American public's confidence in its.
government?is the most damaging con-
sequence of all.
Two documents which have been sup-
plied to the Committee graohi..ehy dem-
onstrate attitudes which can Lid to
tactics that erode and could ultimately
destroy the very ideals we must defend.
The first document was written in
1954 by a special committee formed
to advise the President on covert activi-
ties. The United States may, it said,
have to adopt tactics "more ruthless
than (those) employed by the enemy"
in order to meet the threat from hostile
nations. The report concluded that "long
standing American concepts of Ameri-
can fair play must be reconsidered."1
'The full text of the passage is as follows:
"" another important requirement is an
aggressive covert psychological, pelltienl, and
paramilitary organization far more effectiyg,?
more unique, and, if necessary, more ruthless
than that employed by the eifenw. Na one
should he permitted to stand in the was, of
the prompt, efficient, and secure accomplish-
ment of this mission.
"Tite second consideration, it is new clear
that we are facing an implacable enemy
whose avowed objective is world domination
by whatever means at whatever cost. There
are no rules in such a game. Hitherto accept.
able norms of.human conduct do not apply.
If the U.S. is to survive, long standing Amer-
ican concepts of American fair play must
be reconsidered."
. Although those proposals did not in-
volve assassinations, the attitudes un-
derlying them were, as Director Colby
testified, indicative of the setting within
which the assassination plots were con,
ceiVed. (Colby, 6/4/75, p. 117).
We do not think ? that traditional
American. notions of fair play peed
be abandoned when dealing with our
adversaries. It may well he ourselves
that we injure most we adopt tactics
"more ruthless than the enemy."
A second document which represents
an., attitude which we find improper
was sent to the Congo ip- the fall
of 1960 when the assassination of Pa-
trice Lumumba was being considered.
The chief of CIA's Africa Division re-
commended a particular agent ? WI/
ROGUE?because:
He is indeed aware of the precepts of right
and wrong, but if he is given an assignment
which may be morally wrong in the eyes of
the world, but necessary because his case
officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is
right, and he will dutifully undertake appro-
priate action for its execution without pangs
of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize
all actions.
The Committee finds this rationaliza-
tion is not in keeping with the ideals of
our nation.
2. The United States Should Not
Make Use of Underworld Figures .
for Their Criminal Talents
We conclude that agencies of the
United States must not use underworld
figuures for their criminal talents-2 in
carrying out Agency operations. In addi-
tion to the corrosive effect upon our
government,3 the use of underworld
figures* involves the following dangers:
. a. The use of underworld figures for
"dirty business" gives them the power
to blackmail the government and to
avoid prosecution, for past or future
crimes. For example, the figures in-
volved in the Castro assassination
operation used their involvement* with
the CIA to avoid prosecution. The CIA
also contemplated attempting to quash
criminal charges brought in a foreign.
tribunal. against QS/VithI.
2 Pending our investigation of the use of
informants by the FBI and other agencks,
we reserve jwtgment on the use at hiny-u
criminals as intormants. We are concerned
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be actively engaged in criininal pursuits fort
their expertise in carrying out criminal acts.
'
The corrosive effect of dealing with un-
derworld figures is graphically demonstrated
by the fact that Attorney General Robert
Kennedy, who had devoted much of his pro-
fessional life to fighting organized crime,
did not issue an order against cooperating ?
with such persons when he learned in May
1961 that the CIA had made use of Sam
Giancana in a sensitive operation in Cuba.'
In May. 1962. the Attorney General iearned -
that the operation?which was described to
him as terminated?had involved assassina-
tion. According to a CIA witness, the Attor-
ney General was angered by the report
and told those briefing him that be must
be consulted before underworld figures were
Used again. Fie did not, however, direct that
underworld figures must never again be used.
b. The use of persons experienced
in criminal techniques and prone to
criminal behavior increases the likeli-
hood that criminal acts will occur.'
Sometimes agents in the field are neces-
sarily given broad discretion. But the
risk of improper activities is increased .
when persons oi' criminal background
are used, particularly when they are
selected precisely to take advantage
of their criminal skills or contacts?
? c. There is the danger that the United
States Government will become an un-
witting accomplice to criminal acts and
that criminal figures will take advan-
tage of their association with the
government to advance their -own
projects and interests.
d. There is a fundamental impropriety.
in ,selecting persons because they are'
skilled at performing deeds which the,
laws of our society forbid.
The use of underworld figures by
the United States Government for their
'criminal skills raises moral problems
comparable to those recognized by Jus-
'dee Brandeis in a different context
Este decades ago:
. Our government is the potent, the om-
nipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it
teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the Government be-
comes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for
law; it invites every man to become a law
?unto himself. To declare that in the admin-'
istration of the criminal law the end justifies:
the means?to declare that the Government.
may commit crimes in order to secure the'
conviction of the private criminal?e7ould4,
bring terrible retribution. Against that per-.
nicious doctrine this Court should resolutely
set its face. [Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 439
485 (1927)]
e. The spectacle of the Government
consorting with criminal elements de-
stroys respect for government and law.
and undermines the viability of demo-
cratic institutions.
C. Findings and
Conclusions Relating
to Authorization
and Control
In the -introduction to this report,
we set forth in summary form our
major conclusions concerning whether
the assassination plots were authorized.
The ensuing discussion elaborates and '
explains those conclusions.
The Committee analyzed the question -
of authorization for the assassination ?
activities from two perspectives. First,
the Committee examined whether offi-
cials in policymaking positions author,
ized or were aware of the assassination
activities. Second, the Committee in-
quired whether the officials responsible
for the operational details of the plots
perceived that assassination had the
approval of their s'uperiors, or at least
was the type of activity that their
superiors would not disapprove.
. No doubt, the CIA's general efforts
against the regimes discussed in this
report were authorized at the highest
'levels of the government. However the
record is 'unclear and serious doubt i
remains concerning whether assassina-
tion was authorized by the respective
Presidents. Even if the plots were not;
expressly authorized, it does not follow
that the Agency personnel believed they,
were acting improperly.
1. The Apparent Lack
of Accountability in the Command
and Control System Was Such That
the Assassination Plots Could Have
Been Undertaken-Without Express
Authorization
As emphasized throughout this report,
we are unable to draw firm conclusions
concerning who authorized the assassi-
nation plots. Even after our long investi-
gation it is unclear whether the conflict-
ing and inconclusive state . of .the
evidence is due to the system of-plausi-
ble deniai or there were, in fact, serious
shortcomings in the system of authori-
zation which made it possible for assas-
sination efforts to have been undertaken
by agencies of the United States
Government without express authority
from officials above those agencieaa-
lAs noted above, there? are also certain
inherent limitations in the extensive record,
compiled by the Committee. Many years
have paSsed, several of the key figures are
dead, and while we have been assured by
the present Administration that all the rele-?
vant evidence has been produced, it is al-
ways possible that other more conclusive'
material exists, but has not been found.
Based on the record of our investiga-
tion, the Committee finds that the sys-
tem .of Executive command and con-
trol was so inherently ambiguous that
it is difficult to be certain at what
level assassination activity was known
and authorized. This creates the disturb-
ing prospect that assassination -activity
might have been undertaken by officials
of the United States Government with-
out its having been incontrovertibly
. clear that there was explicit authoriza-
tion from the President of the United
States. At the same time, this ambiguity
and imprecision leaves open the possibl-
ity that there was a successful "plaus-
ible denial" - and that a Presidential
authorization was issued but is now
obscured. , ?
; 'Whether or not .assassination was
authorized by a President of the United.
States, the President as the chief execu-
tive officer of the United States Govern-
ment must take ultimate responsibility
for major activities during his Adminis-
tration. Just as these Presidents must
be held accountable, however, their
subordinates throughout the Govern-
ment had a concomitant duty to fully
disclose their plans and activities.
As part of their responsibility, these
Presidents had a duty to determine
the nature of major activities and to
prevent undesired activities from taking
place. This duty was particularly com-
pelling when the Presidents had reason
,to believe that major undesired activi-
ties had previously occurred or were
being advocated and might occur again.
Whether or not the Presidents in fact
knew about the assassination plots,
and even if their subordinates failed
in their duty of full disclosure, it still
follows that the Presidents should have
known .about the plots. This sets a
demanding standard, but One the Com-
mittee supports. The future. of democra-
cy rests upon such accountability.
2? Findings Relating to the Level
? at 4,Vhich the Plots Wcre
A(11..itt)11 (hrii;end
We find that neither the President '?
nor any other offisial in the United ,
States Government .authoriied the as-.
6 ni s ..es aneci. to .
saSsination. of Diem and his brother
NW. Both the the DCI and top State
Department officials did know, howev-
er, that the death of Nhu, at least'
at one point, had been contemplated
by the coup leaders. But when the
possibility that the coup leaders were
considering assassination was brought
to the attention of the DCI, he directed
that the United States would have no
part- in such activity, and there is
some evidence that this information
was relayed to the coup leaders.
(b) Schneider
We. find that neither the President
nor any other official in the United
States Government authorized the as-
sassination of General Rene Schneider.
The CIA, and perhaps the White House
did know that coup leaders contemplat-
ed 4 kidnapping, which, as it turned
out, resulted in Schneider's death..
- (c) Trujillo
The .Presidents and other senior offi-
cials: in the Eisenhower lind Kennedy
Administrations sought the overthrow
of Trujillo and approved or condoned
actions to obtain that end.
The DCI and the Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs
knew that the Dominican dissidents
viewed the removal of Trujillo as criti-
cal to any plans to overthrow his regime
and that they intended to assassinate
Trujillo if given th,e opportunity. It
is uncertain precisely when officials
at higher levels of government with
responsibility for . formulating policy
learned that the dissidents equated as-
sassination with overthrow. Clearly by
early May 1961 senior American offi-
cials, including 'President Kennedy,
knew that the dissidents intended to
aSsassinate Trujillo The White House
and State Department, as well as the
CIA, knew that the United States had
aovided the dissidents with rifles and
pistols and that the dissidents had
rquested machine guns which they in-
tended to use in connection with an
assassination effort. Thereafter, on
May 16, 1961 President Kennedy ap-
proved National Security Council re-
commendations. that the United States
not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo
until it was known what government
would succeed the dictator. That recom-
mendation was consistent with earlier
attempts initiated by the CIA to discour-
age - the planned assassination and
-thereby avoid potential problems from
a power vacuum which might arise.
After deciding to discourage the planned
assassination, the .DCI directed that
the machine guns not be passed to
the Dominican dissidents. That policy
was reconfirmed by the. State Depart-
ment, the Special Group, and, in a .
cable of May 29, 1961, by President
Kennedy himself.
The- day before the assassination,
President Kennedy cabled the State
Department representative in the Domi-?
nican Republic that the United States
"as [a] matter of general policy cannot
condone assassination." However, the
cable also stated that if the dissidents
planning the imminent assassination of
Trujillo succeeded, and thereby estab-
lished. a provisional government, the
United States would recognize and sup-
port them.
The: President's cable has been con-
strued in several ways. One reading
stresses the President's opposition to
assassination "as a metier of general ?
policy." Another stresses those portions
of the cable which discuss pragmatic
rilatsers, including the risk ? that the
'United St ,l tes involvement might be.
expos'ed, and " suggests that the last note te .egrarn wa
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a chai-ge that the United States shared
responsibility for the assassination. A
third ? construction would be that both
of the 'prior readings are correct and
that they are not mutually exclusive..
However the cable is construed, its
ambiguity illustrates the difficulty of
seeking objectives which can only be
accomplished by force?indeed, perhaps
only by the assassination of a leader?
and yet not wishing to take specific
actions which seem abhorrent.
(c1) Lumumba
The chain of events revealed by the
documents and testimony is strong,
enough to permit a reasonable inference
that . the plot to assassinate Lumumba
was authorized by .President Eisehhowe
er. Nevertheless, there is enough coon-
tervrtiling testimony by Eisenhower Ad--
ministration officials and enough ambi-
guity and lack Of clarity in the records.
of high-level policy meetings to preclude
the Committee from making a finding
that the President intended an assassin-
ation.effort against Lumumba.
Itis clear that the Director of Central
Intelligence, Allen Dulles, authorized
an assassination plot. There is, however,
no evidence of? United States involve-
ment- in bringing about the death of
Lumumba at the hands of Congolese
authorities.. ,
Strong expressions of hostility toward
Lumtimba from the President and his
National Security Assistant, followed
immediately by CIA steps in furtherance
of an assassination operation against
Lumumba, are part of a sequence of
events that, at the least, make it appear
that Dulles believed assassination was
a perinissible means of complying with
pressure from the President to remove
Lumumba from the political scene.
Robert Johnson's testimony that he
understood the President to have or-
dered Lumumba's assassination at ' an
NSC meeting does, as he said, offer
a "clue" about Presidential authoriza-.
tion: His testAmony, however, should
be read in light of the fact that NSC
records during this period do not make-
clear 'whether or not the President or- ?
dered Lumumba's assassination and the
fact- that others attending those meet-
ingS testified that they did not recall
hearing such a Presidential order..
Richard Bissell assumed that Pres-
idential authorization for assassinating
Lumumba had been communicated to
him by Dulles, but Bissel had no specific
recollection concerning when that com-
munication occurred. The impression
shared by the Congo Station Officer and
the DDP's Special Assistant Joseph
Scheider that the President authorized
an assassination effort against Lumumba
was derived solely from conversations
Scheider had with Bissell and Bronson
Tweedy. However, the impression. thus
' held by Scheider and the Station Officer
does not, in itself, establish Presidential
authorization because neither Scheider
nor the Station Officer had first-hand
knowledge of Allen Dulles' statements
'about Presidential authorization, and be-
cause -Scheider may have misconstrued
.Bissell's reference to "highest authority."
(e) Castro
There was insufficient evidence from
which the Committee could conclude
that Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy,
or Johnson, their close advisors, or
the Special Group authorized the assas-
sination Of Castro..
The assassination plots against Castro.'
were clearly authorized at ;east through
the ievel of DDP. We also find that.
DCI Allen Dulles approved "thorough
conaidendion" nf the "elimination" o;
Castro. Rh-titer, it is also likely that:
Dulles knew about and authr sized the '
actual plots that occurred nuring his
tenure. Bissell and Edwards testified
that they had briefed Dulles (and Cabell)
on the plot involving underworld figures
"circutnlocutiously," but that they were
certain that he had understood that
the plot involved assassination. Their
testimony is buttressed by the fact that
Dulles knew about the plot to assassi-
nate Lumumba which was being planned
at the same time, and which also in-
volved Bissell. We can find no evidence
that McCone was aware of the plots
which occurred during his tenure. His
DDP, Richard Helms, testified that he
never discussed the subject with Mc- .
Cone and was never expressly author-
ized by anyone to assassinate Castro.
The only suggestion of express Pres-
idential authorization for the plots
against Castro Was Richard Bissell's
opinion that Dulles would have in-,
formed Presidents Eisenhower and Ken-
nedy by circumlocution only after the
assassination had been planned and
was underway. The assumptions under-
lying this opinion are too attenuated
'for the Committee to adopt it as a
finding. First, this assumes that Dulles
himself knew of the plot, a matter
which is not entirely certain. Second,
it assumes that Dulles went privately
to the two 'Presidents?a course of
action. which Helms, who had far more
covert action experience than Bissell,'
testified was precisely what the doctrine
of plausible denial forbade CIA officials
from doing. Third, it necessarily as-
sumes that the Presidents would under-
stand from a "circumlocutious" descrip-
tion that assassination was being dis-
cussed.
In view of the strained chain of
assumptions and the contrary testimony
of all the Presidential advisors, the
men closest to both Eisenhower and
Kennedy, the Committee makes no find-
ing implicating Presidents who are not
able to speak for themselves.
Helms and McCone testified that the
Presidents under which they served
never asked them to consider assassina-
tion.
There was no evidence whatsoever
that President Johnson. knew about or
authorized any assassination activity
during his Presidency.
3. CIA Officials Involved in the
As.sascination Operations Perceived
. Assassination to Have Been a
Permissible Course of Action
The CIA officials involved in the
targeted assassination attempts testified
that they had believed that their activi-
ties had been fully authorized.'
'The lower level operatives, such as the
AM/LASH case officers, are not discussed
in this section. since they had clear orders
from their immediate superiors within the
CIA.
In the case of the Lumumba assassin-
ation operation, Richard Bissell testified
that he had no direct recollection of
authorization, but after having reviewed
the cables and Special Group minutes,
testified that authority must have
flowed from Dulles through him to
the subordinate levels in the Agency. .
In the case of the assassination effort
against Castro, Bissell and Sheffield
Edwards testified they be.lieved the
operation involving underworld figures
had been authorized by Dulles when
they briefed him shortly after the plot.
had been initiated. William Harvey testi
lied he believed that tire plots 'were
completely authorized at every appri,-
priate level within and beyond the
Agency." although he had "no irrsoiml
nels through which such authority may
have passed." Harvey stated that he
had been told by Richard Bissell that
the effort against Castro had been au-
thorized "from the highest level," and
that Harvey had discussed the plots
with Richard Helms, his immedate su-
perior. Helms testified that although
he had never discussed assassination
with his superiors, he believed:
* that in these actions we were taking
against Cuba and against Fidel Castro's gov-
ernment in Cuba, that they were what we
had been asked to do. * *" In other words.
we had been asked to get rid of Castro and
* * there were no limitations put on the
means, and we felt we were acting well
within the guidelines that we understood to
be in play at this particular time.
The evidence points to a disturbing
situation. Agency officials testified that
they believed the effort to. assassinate
Castro to have been within the parame-
ters-of permissible action. But Adminis-
tration officials responsible for formu-
lating policy, including McCone, testi-
.fied that they were net ,aware of the
effort and did not authorize it: The
explanation may lie in the fact that
orders concerning overthroiving the
Castro regime were stated in broad
terms that were subject to differing
interpretations by those responsible for
carrying out those orders.
The various Presidents and their sen-
ior advisors strongly opposed the re-
gimes of Castro and Trujillo, the acces-
sion ?to power of Allende, and the
potential influence of Patrice Lumumba.
Orders concerning action against thoSe
foreign leaders were given in vigorous
language. For example, President Nix-
on's orders to prevent Allende from
assuming power left Helms feeling that
"if I ever carried a marshal's baton
in my knapsack out of the Oval Office,
it was that day." Similarly, General
Lansdale described the Mongoose effort
against Cuba as "a combat situation,"
and Attorney General Kennedy empha-
sized that "a solution to the Cuba
problem today carries top priority."
Helms testified that the pressure to
"get rid of Castro and the Castro re-
gime". was intense, and Bissell testified
that he had been ordered to "get off
your ass about Cuba." ?
It is possible that there was a failure
of 'communication between policymak-
ers and the agency personnel who
were experienced in secret, and often
violent., action, Although policymakers
testified that assassination was not in-
tended by such words as "get rid of
Castro." Some of their subordinates
in the Agency testified that they per-
ceived that assassination was desired
and that they should proceed without
troubling their superiors.
The 1967 Inspector General's Report
on assassinations appropriately ob-
served:
The point is that of frequent resort to
synecdoche?the mention of a part when the
whole is to be uncierstOod, or vice versa.
Thus, we encounter repeated references to
phrases such as "disposing of Castro," which
may be read in the narrow, literal sense of
assassinating him, when it is intended that.
it be read in the broader figural sense of
dislodging the Castro regime. Reversing the
coin, -we find people speaking vaguely of
"doing something about Cask" when it
is clear that what they have specifically in
mind is killing him. In a situaticin? wherein
those speaking may not have actually meant
what they seemed to say or may not have
said What they, actuall4 meant, they should
not be surprised if their oral shorthand is
interpreted differently than was intended.
Differing perceptions. between supe-
riors and their subordinates were grr.,ph;-
catty illustrated iti the Castro contxt.'
McCone, in a memorandum dated April
14, 1967, reflected as follows:
Through the years the Cuban problen was
Icnowledge whatever of the aulaae;
discussed in terms such as ."dispose. of
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Castro," etc., and this meant the overthrow
of the Communist governmen in Cuba and
the replacing of it with a democratic regime.
Terms such as the above appear in many
working papers, memoranda for the record,
etc., and, as stated, all refer to change in
the Cuban government.2
. Senator MATHIAS. Let me draw an ex-
ample from history. When Thomas Becket
Was proving to be an annoyance, as Castro,
_the King said. "who will rid me of this
troublesome priest?" He didn't say, "go out
and murder him". He said, "who will rid
me of this man." and let it go at that.
Mr. HELMS. That is a Warming reference
to the problem.
Senator MATHIAS. You feel that spans
the generations and the centuries?
Mr. HELMS. I think it does, sir.
Senator MATHIAS. And that is typical of
the kind of thing which might be said,
which might he taken by the Director or
by anybody else as presidential authoriza-
tion to go forward?
Mr. HELMS. That is right. But in answer
to that. I realize that one sort of, grows
up' in tradition of the time and I think
that any 'of us would have found it very
difficult to discuss assassinations with a
,President of the U.S. I just think we all
had the feeling that we were hired out to
keep those things out of the oval office.
2 It should be noted, however, that this
memorandum was prepared several years
after the assassination plots when -a news-
paper article alleged CIA involvement in
attemeis on Castro's life.
Helms, who had considerable expe-
rience as a covert operator, gave pre-
cisely the opposite meaning to the same
words, interpreting them, as conveying'
authority for assassination.
.Helms repeatedly testified that he
felt that explicit authorization was un-
necessary for the assassination of Cas-
tro in the early 1960's, but he said
he did not construe the intense pressure
from President Nixon in 1970 as provid-
ing authority to assassinate anyone.
As Helms testified, the difference was
not that the pressure to prevent Allende
from assuming office was any less
than the pressure to remove the Castro
regime, but rather that "I had already
made up my mind that we weren't
going to have any of that business
when I was Director."
Certain CIA contemporaries of Helms
who were subjected to similar pressures
in the Castro case rejected the thesis
that implicit authority to assassinate
Castro derived from the strong language
of the policymakers. Bissell testified
that he had believed that "formal and
explicit approval" would be required
for assassination, and Helms' assistant
George McManus, testified that "it
never occurred to me" that the vigorous
,words of the Attorney General could
be taken as authorizing assassination.
The differing perceptions may have re-
sulted from their different backgrounds
and training. Neither Bissell (an acade-
mician whose Agency career for the
six years before he became DDP had
been in the field of technology) nor
McManus (who had concentrated on
intelligence and staff work) were expe-
rienced in covert operations.'
Of course, this analysis cannot be carried
too far. In the Lumumba case, for example,
Johnson and Dillon, who were Administra-
tion officials with no covert operation ex-
perience. construed remarks as urging or
permitting assassination, while other persons
who were not in the Agency did not so
interpret them.
The perception of certain Agency
officials that assassination was within
the range of permissible activity was.
reinforced by the continuing approval
of violent covert actions against Cuba
that were sanctioned at the Presidential
level, and by the failure of the succeS-
sive administrations to make clear that
assassination was not permissible. This
point is one of the subjects considered
in the next section. ,
4. The Failure in Communication
Between Agency Officials in
Charge of the Assassination
Operation and Their Superiors in
. the Agency and in the
Administration Was Due to:
(A) The Failure of Subordinates to.
Disclose Their Plans and Operations
to Their Superiors; and (B) the
Failure of Superiors in the Climate
of Violence and Aggressive Covert
Actions Sanctioned by the
Administrations to Rule Out
Assassination as a Tool of Foreign
Policy; to Make Clear to Their
Subordinates That Assassination
Was Impermissible; or to Inquire
Further After Receving Indications
That It Was Being Considered
. While we cannot find that officials
_responsible for making policy decisions
knew about or authorized the assassina-
tion attempts (with the possible excep-
tion of the Lumumba case), agency
operatives at least through the level
of DDP nevertheless perceived assassin-
ation to have been permissible. This
failure in communication was inexcus-
able in light of the gravity of assassina-
tion. The Committee finds that the
failure of Agency officials to inform
their superiors was reprehensible, and
that the reasons that they offered for
having neglected to inform their Supe-
riors are unacceptable. The Committee
further finds that Administration offi-
cials failed to be sufficiently precise
in their directions to the Agency, and
that their attitude toward the possibility
of assassination was ambiguous in the
context of the violence of other activi-
ties that they did authorize.
(a) Agency Officials Failed on
Several Occasions to Reveal the
Plots to Their Superiors, or to Do
so With Sufficient Detail and
Clarity
Several of the cases considered in
this report raise questions concerning
whether officials of the CIA sufficiently
informed their superiors in the Agency
or officials outside the Agency about
their activities.
(i) Castro
The failure of Agency officials to
inform their superiors of the assassina-
tion efforts against Castro is particular-
ly troubling.
On the basis of the testimony and
documentary evidence before the Com-
mittee, it is not entirely certain that
Dulles was ever made aware of the
true nature of the underworld operation.
The plot continued into McCOne's term,
apparently without McCone's or the
Administration's knowledge or appro-
val.
On some occasions when Richard
Bissell had the opportunity to inform
his superiors about the assassination
effort against Castro, he either failed
to inform them, failed to do so clearly,
or misled them.
Bissell testified that he and Edwards
told Dulles and Cabell about the assas-
sination operation using underworld fig-
ures, but that they did so "circumlocu-
tiously", and then only after contact
had been made with the underworld
and a price had been offered for Cas-
tro's death.
? Perhaps Bissell should have checked
back with Dulles at an earlier stage
after having received approval to give
"thorough consideration" to Castro's
"elimination" from Dulles in Deceinbc
1959.
Bissell further testified that he nevee.
raised the issue of assassination with"'
non-CIA officials of either the Eisen-
hower or Kennedy Administration. His
reason was that since he was under
Dulles in the chain of command, he
would normally .have had no duty to
discuss the matter with these Presidents.
or other Administration officials, and
that he assumed that Dulles would
have "circumlocutiously" spoken with
Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy
about the operation. These reasons are
insufficient. It was inexcusable to with-
hold such information from those re-
sponsible for formulating policy on the
unverified assumption that they might
have been "circumlocutiously" informed
by Dulles. I
'Even assuming that Bissell correctly per-
ceived that Dulles understood the nature of
the operation, it was also inexcusable for
Bissell not to have briefed Dulles in plain
language. Further, even if one accepts Bis-
sell's assumption that Dulles told the Presi-
dents, they would have been told too late
because Bissell "guessed" they would have
been told that the operalion "had been
planned and was being attempted."
The failure either to inform those
officials or to make certain that they
had been informed by Dulles was partic-
ularly reprehensible in light of the
fact that there were many occasions
on which Bissell should have informed
them, and his failure to do so Was
misleading. In the first weeks of the
Kennedy Administration, Bissell met
with. Bundy and discussed the develop-
ment of an assassination capability
within CIA?Executive Action. But Bis-
sell did not mention that an actual
assassination attempt was underway.
Bissell appeared before the Taylor-Ken-
nedy Board of Inquiry which was
formed to report to the President on
the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban situation,
but he testified that he .did not inform
the Board of the assassination opera-
tion. 2 As chief of the CIA directorate
concerned with clandestine operations
and the Bay of Pigs, Bissell frequently
met with officials in the Eisenhower
and Kennedy Administrations to discuss
Cuban operations, and his advice was
frequently sought. He did not tell them
that the CIA had undertaken an effort
to assassinate Castro, and did not ask
if they favored proceeding with the
effort. He was present at the meeting
with Dulles and President Kennedy at
which the new President was briefed
on covert action in Cuba, but neither
Dulles nor Bissell mentioned the assas-
sination operation that was underway.
Dulles himself may not have always
been candid. On December 11, 1959,
he approved the CIA's giving "through
consideration to the elimination of Fidel
Castro," but told the Special Group
in a meeting the following month that
"we do not have in mind the quick
elimination of Castro, but rather actions
designed to enable responsible opposi-
tion leaders to get a foothold."
2Dulles was also a member,of the Board.
The failures to make forthright disclo-
sures to policy-makers continued during
the time that Richard Helms was DDP.
Helms' failure to inform McCone about
the underworld operation (when it was
reactivated under Harvey and poison
pills were sent to Cnba) was a grave
error in judgment, and Helms' excuses
are unpersuasive. In May 1962 the At-
torney General was told that the CIA's
involvement in an assassination plot
had terminated with the Bay of Pies.
Not only did Edwards, who had briefed
the Attorney General, lcnow that the
operation had not been terminated, but
Helms did not inform the Attorney
General that the operation was still
active witen he learreci that the Attor-
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ney General had been. misled. Helms'
did not inform McCone of the plot
until August 1963, and did so then'
in a manner which indicated that the
plot had been terminated before McCone
became Director. Helms' denial that
AM/LASH had been involved in an
assassination effort in response to Sec-
retary of State Rusk's inquiries was,
as Helms conceded, not factual.
When Helms briefed President Johnson
on the Castro plots. he apparently de-
scribed the activities that had occuriaal
during prior administrations but did Mt
describe the AM/LASH operation which
had continued until 1965. Helms also
failed to inform the Warren Commission
of the plots because the precise question
was not asked.)
? Sohn McCone was Director of the CIA'
and at least knew about the pre-Bay of
Pigs plot during the Warren Commission's
Inquiry. McCort:: failed to disclose the. plot
to the Commission. Allen Dulles was on the
Warren Commission. He did not inform the
other members about the plots that had
? occurred during his term as DCI.
Helms told the Committee that he
had never raised the assassination oper-
ation with McCone or other Kennedy
Administration officials because of the
sensitivity of the matter, because he
had assumed that the project had been
_previously authorized, and because the
aggressive character of the -Kennedy
Administration's program against the
Castro regime led him to believe that
'assassination was permissible, even
though he did not receive an express
instruction to that effect. He added
that he had never been convinced that
the operation would succeed, and that
he would have told McCone about it
if he had ever believed that it would
"go anyplace."
Helms' reasons for not having told
his superiors about the assassination
effort are unacceptable; indeed, many
of them were reasons why he should
have specifically raised the matter with
higher authority. As Helms himself testi-
fied, assassination was of a high order
of sensitivity. Administration policyma-
kers, supported by intelligence esti-
mates furnished by the Agency, had
emphasized on several occasions that
successors to -Castro might be worse
than Castro himself. In addition, the
Special Group (Augmented) required
that plans for covert actions 'against
-Cuba be submitted in detail for its
approval. Although the Administration
was exerting intense pressure on the
CIA to do something about Castro and
the Castro regime, it was a serious
error to have undertaken so drastic
an operation without making certain
that there was full and unequivocal
permission to proceed.
? William Harvey, the officer in charge
of the CIA's attempt using underworld
figures to assassinate Castro, testified
that he never discussed the plot with
McCone or officials of the Kennedy
Administration because he believed that
it had been fully apthorized by the
previous Director, because he was un-
certain whether it had a chance of
succeeding, and because he believed
that it was not his duty to inform
higher authorities.
Nonetheless, the Committee believes
there were occasions on which it was
incumbent on Harvey to have disclosed
the assassination operation. As head
of Task Force W, the branch of the
CIA responsible for covert operations
in Cuba. Harvey reported directly to
General Lansdale and the Soecial Group
(AugmenZed). The Special Group (Aug-
mented) had made it known that covert
operations in Cuba should be first ap-
proved by it, both by explicit instruction
and by its practice tnat particular operas .
tions be submitted in "nauseating de-
tail." Yet Harvey did not inform either
General Lansdale or the Special Group
(Augmented) of the assassination opera-
tion, either when he was explicitly
-requested to report to McCone, General
Taylor, and the Special Group on his
activities in Miami in April 1962, or
when the subject of assassination was
raised in the August 1962 meeting and
McCone voiced his disapproval. Harvey
testified that a matter as sensitive as
assassination would never be raised in a
gathering as large as the Special Group
(Augmented).
The Committee finds the reasons ad-
vanced for not having informed those
responsible for formulating policy about
the assassination operation inadequate,
misleading and inconsistent. Some offi-
cials viewed assassination as too impor-
tant and seneitive to discuss with supe-
riors, while others considered it not
sufficiently important. Harvey testified
that it was premature to tell McCone
about the underworld operation in April
1962, because it was not ..uff'xiently
advanced; but too late to cell him
about it in August 1962, since by that
time Harvey had decided to terminate
it. On other occasions, officials thought
disclosure Was someone else's responsi-
bility; Bissell said he thought it was
up to Dulles, and Harvey believed it
was up to Helms.
The Committee concludes that the
failure to clearly inform policymakers
of the assassination effort against Cas-
tro was grossly improper. The Commit-
tee believes that it should be incumbent
on the DDP to report such a sensitive
operation to his superior, the DCI, no
matter how grave his doubts might
?be about the possible outcome of the
operation. It follows that the DCI has
the same duty to accurately inform-
his superiors. .
(ii) Trujillo
In the Trujillo case there were several
instances in which it appears that poli-
cymakers were not given sufficient in-
formation, or were not informed in
a timely. fashion.
At a meeting on December 29, 1960,
Bissell presented a plan to the Spe-
cial Group for supporting Dominican
exile groups and local dissidents, and
stated that the plan would not bring
down the regime without "some deci-
sive stroke against Trujillo himself."
At a meeting on January 12, 1961,
the Special Group authorized the pas-
sage of "limited supplies of small arms
and other materials" to Dominican dis-
sidents under certain conditions.
, At this time, the fact that the dis-
sidents had been contemplating the as-
sassination of Trujillo had been known
in the State Department at least through
the level of the Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs,
and by senior officials of the CIA,
including the DCI. Yet the internal
State Department memorandum which
was furnished to Undersecretary Living-
ston Merchant, and which was said
to have been the basis for the Special
Group's agreeing to the limited supply
of small arms and other material (i.e.,
explosive devices), did not mention as-?
sassination. Instead, it spoke of "sabo-
tage potential" and stated that there
"would be no thought of toppling the
[government] by any such minor meas-
ure Ens the supplying of small arms
and explosives3."
At a meeting ? of the Special Group
on February 14, 1961, representatives
of the CIA' briefed the new members
of the Group on outstanding CIA
projects. The Dominican Republic was
one of the briefing topics. The minutes
of that meeting indicate that Mr. b?indy
requested a memorandum for "higher
authority" on the subject of what plans
could be made for a successor govern-
ment to Trujillo. Bissell had no clear
recollection as to the details of the
February 14 briefing and was unable
to recall whether or not the method
of overthrow to be attempted by the
dissidents was discussed. It is not
known, therefore, whether the new
members of the Special Group learned,
at that time, of Bissel's assessment
that overthrow of the regime required
a decisive stroke against Trujillo him-
self. Robert McNamara recalled no men-
tion at that meeting of any dissident
plans to assassinate Trujillo.
On February 15 and 17, 1961, memo-
randa were prepared for the President
by Secretary of State Rusk and by
Richard Bissell respectively. Although
both the Department of State and the
CIA then had information concerning
the dissidents' intent to aseassinate Tru-
jillo if possible, neither memorandum
referred to such a contingency. Rusk
disclaimed any knowledge of the dis-
sidents, intent to assassinate Trujillo
until shortly before the event occurred,
but Bissell admitted personal awareness
of the assassination plans.
Bissell's February 17 memorandum
indicated that dissident leaders had
informed the CIA of "their plan of
action which they felt could be imple-
merited if they were provided with
arms for 300 men, explosives, and re-
mote control detonation devices." Vari-
ous witnessess testified that supplying
arms for 300 men would: standing alone,
indicate a "non-targeted" -use for the
arms. One possible method of assassin-
ating Trujillo which had long been
discussed by the dissidents and which
was the favored approach at the time
.of Bissell's memorandum envisioned as-
sassination by means of a bomb deto-
nated by remote control. but the mem-
orandum made no reference to the
use to which the explosive devices
might be put. (There is no record of
any query from recipients of the brief-
ing paper as to the nature of the
dissidents' "plan of action" or the uses
for which the arms and explosives were
intended.)
The passage of athe carbines was
approved by CIA Headquarters on
March 31, 1961: Although the State
Department's representative in the
Dominican Republic concurred in the.
decision to pass the carbines, he was
requested by the CIA not to communi-
cate this information to State Depart-
ment officials in Washington, and he
complied with that request. According-
ly, neither the State Department nor
the White House was aware or the
passage for several weeks. Similarly,
there was no contemporaneous disclo-
sure outside the CIA, other than to
the State Department representative in
the Dominican Republic, that machine
guns had been sent to the Dominican
Republic via the diplomatic pouch.
A mernorandum prepared by Adolph
Berle, ' the State Department official
from whom the CIA sought permission
to pass the machine guns, states that
"on cross-examination it developed that
the real plan was to assassinate Truijillo
and they wanted guns for that purpose."
(Berle, Memorandum of Conversation,
5/3/61) Berle's memorandum states that
he informed the CIA officials that "we
did not wish to have anything to do
with any assassination plots anywhere,
any time." The CIA official reportedly
said he felt the same way, even though
on the previous day he had been one
of the signers of a draft CIA cable
which would have permitted passage
of the machine guns to the disalogent.as
for ". . . their additional protaleceat
on their proposed endeavor.'' (Draft
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HQs to Station Cable, 5/2/61).
Although the report of a new anti-
Trujillo plot was discussed at a meeting
of the Special Group on May 4, 1961,
there is no indication that Berle, who
was the Chairman of the Inter-Agency
Task Force having responsibility for
contingency planning for Cuba, the Do-
minican Republic, and Haiti, disclosed
to higher authority the assassination
information which he discovered by
"cross-examination." The National Se-
curity Council met the next day and
noted the President's view that the
United States should not initiate the
overthrow of Trujillo before it was
known what government would succeed
him. That national Security Council
Record of Action was approved by
the President on May 16, 1961. There
is no record indicating whether Berle
communieated to the President, or to
members of the National Security Coun-
cil, his knowledge as to the lethal
intent of the dissidents who would
be carrying out the overthrow of Trujil-
lo.
(iii) Schneider
The issue here is not whether the objec-
tives of the CIA were contrary to those
of the Administration. It is clear that
President Nixon desired to prevent Al-
lende from assuming office, even if that
required fomenting and supporting a
coup in Chile. Nor did White House
officials suggest that tactics employed
(including as a first step kidnapping
General Schneider) would have been
unacceptable as a matter of principle.
Rather, the issue posed is whether
White House officials were consulted,
and thus given an opportunity to weigh
such matters as risk and likelihood of
success, and to apply policy-making
judgments to particular tactics. The rec-
ord indicates that up to October 15 they
were: after October 15 there is some
doubt.
The documentary record with respect
to the disputed post-October 15 period
gives rise to conflicting inferences. On
the one hand, Karamessines' calendar
shows at least one White House con-
tact in the critical period prior to the
kidnapping of General Schneider on Oc-
tober 22. However, the absence of any
substantive memoranda in CIA files?
when contrasted with several such
. memoranda describing contacts with the
White House between September 15 and
October 15?may suggest a lack of sig-
nificant communication on the part of
the CIA as well as a lack of careful
supervision on the part of the White
House.
The standards applied within the CIA
. itself suggest a view that action which
the Committee believes, called for top-
? level policy discussion and decision was
thought of as permissible, without any
further consultation, on the basis of the
initial instruction to prevent' Allende
from assuming power. ? Machine guns
were sent to chile and delivered to mill-
? lary figures there on the authority of
rhiddle level CIA officers without con-
sultation even with. the CIA. officer. in
charge of the program. We find no
.suggestion of bad faith in the action of
the middle level officers, hut their fail-
ur:e to consult necessarily establishes
that there Was no advance permission
from outside the CIA -for the passage
of machine guns. And it also suggests
an unduly lax attitude within the CIA
toward consultation with superiors. Fur-
ther, this case demonstrates the prob-
lems inherent in giving an agency a
"blank check" to engage in covert op-
erations' without specifying which ac--
tons - are permissible and wh'ch are.. !
, not, and without adequately supervising"
and monitoring these activities.
? I (b) Administration Officials
,Failed to-Rule Out Assassination
.-as a' Tool Of Foreign Policy, to
Make Clear to Their Subordinates
, . That Assassination Was
Impermissible or to Inquire.
Further After Receiving
Indications That, Assassination
Was Being Considered
? While we do not find that high Ad-
ministration officials expressly approved
of the assassination attempts, we have
noted that certain agency officials nev-
ertheless -perceived assassination to
have been authorized. Although those
officials were remiss in net seeking ex-
press authorization for their activitieso
their superiors were also at fault- for:
giving vague inseructions and for not
explicitly rul:ng ? out assassination. No
written order prohibiting assassination
was issued until 1972, and that order
was an internal CIA directive issued
by Director Helms.
(i) Trujillo
Immediately following the assassina-
tion of 'Trujillo, there were a number
of high-level meetings about the Domin-
ican Republic attended by the policy-
makers of the Kennedy Administration.
'All 'relevant facts concerning CIA and
State Department support of the Domin-,
ican dissidents were fully known. No di-
rective was issued by the President or
the Special Group criticizing any aspect
of United States involvement in the
Dominican affair. Similarly, there is no
record of any action having been taken
prohibiting future support or encourage-
ment of groups or individuals known to
.be planning the assassination of a for-
eign leader. The meetings and discus-
sions following the Trujillo assassination
..iepresent another missed opportunity to
establish ? art administration policy
against assassination and may partially
account for the CIA's assessment of the
'Dominican operation as a suctess a few,
?years later. They may also have encour-
aged Agency personnel, involved in both
:the Trujillo and the Castro plots, in
their belief, that the. Administration:
would not be unhappy if the Agency
were able to make Castro disappear. No
'euCh claim, .however, was made in tes-
timony 'hy, any Agency official.
OD Schneider
As explained above, there is no evi-
dence that assassination was ever pro-
posed -as a method of carrying out the
Presidential order to, prevent Allende
.from assuming office. The Committee
believes, however; that ?the granting of
carte blanche authority to the CIA by
the Executive in this case may have
contributed to the tragic and unintended
death of General Schneider. This was
also partially due to assigning an im-
practical task to be accomplished within
an unreasonably short time. Apart from
the question of whether any interven-
tion in Chile was justified under the'
circumstances of this case, the Commit-
tee believes that the Executive in any
.event should have defined the limits of,
permissable action.,
. -(iii) Lumumba
. We are unable to make a finding that
President Eisenhower intentionally au-
thorized an assassination effort against
.Lumumba due to the lack of absolute
.certainty in the evidence. However, it
.appears that the strong language used
in discussions at the Special Group and.
NSC, as reflected in minutes of relevant
meetings, led Dulle3 to believe tlmt as-.!
eassination was desired. The m.nutes
contain language concerning the r.-!ed; ,
to "disrose of' h Lumumlea, an "extrernelyi
10
:strong. feeling 'about the neceSsity for
..straightforward action," and a refusal
.rule out any activity that might con-
tribute t6-"getting rid of" Lumumba.
' ? ? ? (iv) Castro
,The efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro
tooloplace in an atmosphere of extreme
.pressure by Eisenhower and Kennedy.
':Administration officials to discredit and
i.overthrow the Castro regime. Shortly
halter Castro's ascendancy to power.
lAlleri :Dulles directed that "thorough
consideration" be given to the "elimina-.
tion' of 'Castro. Richard 'Helms recalled
.'th'at:' ? - ?
I remember vividly [that the* pressure) was
;verY intense. And therefore, when you go
"into the record,- you find a lot of nutty
',,schemps there and those nutty schemes were,
.borne of the. intensity .of the pressure. And
. -
we were quite frustrated,
:Bissell *ailed that:
During that entire period, the Administra-
tion was extremely sensitive about the defeat
.that had been inflicted, as they felt, on the
-U.S. at the Bay of Pigs, andcwere pursuing
every possible means of getting rid of Castro.
? :Another CIA Official stated that some-
. tiine in the Fall of 1961 Bissell was:
* * chewed out in the Cabinet Room in
the White House by both the President and.
'the Attorney General for, as he put it, sitting
on his ass and not doing anything about
,getting rid of Castro and the Castro Regime.
"General Lansdale informed the agencies
cooperating in Operation MONGOOSE
that "you're in a combat situation where
? we have been given full command."
Secretary of Defense McNamara con-
firmed that "we were hysterical about
Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs
and thereafter."
Many of the plans that were discussed
and often approved contemplated vio- ?
lent action against Cuba. The operation
which resulted in the Bay of Pigs was'
a major paramilitary onslaught that had
the approval of the highest government
officials, including the two Presidents. '
Thereafter, Attorney. General Kennedy
vehemently exhorted the Special Group
.(Augmented) that "a solution to the
Cuban problem today carried top prior-
ity .* no time, money, effort?or
manpower is to be spared."' &Apse;
quently, Operation MONGOOSE in-
volved propaganda and sabotage opera-
tions aimed toward spurring a revolt of
the 'Cuban people against Castro. Meas:
ures which were considered by the top
pblicymakers included incapacitating
sugar workers during harvest season by
the use of.chemicals; blowing up bridges
and production plants; sabotaging mer-
chandise in third countries?even those?
allied with -the United States?prior to
its delivery to Cuba; and arming 'in-
surgents on the island. Programs under-
taken at the urging of the Administra- ?
tion included intensive efforts to recruit
and arm dissidents within Cuba, and.
raids. ?on plants, mines, and harbors. .
Consideration and approval of these
measures may understandably have led
the CIA to conclude that violent actions
were an acceptable means of accom-,
plishing important objectives.
'The Attorney General himself took a pr-
sena! interest in the recruitment and deel-
opment of assets within Cuba, on occasion
recommending Cubans to the CIA as possible
recruits and meeting in Washington and
Florida with Cuban.exiles active in the covert
war against the Catstro Government.
,Discussions at the Special Group and
NSC meetings might well have contri-
buted to the perception of some CIA
officials that assassination was a per-
missible tool in the effort to overthrow
the Castro Regime. At a Special Group
meeting in. November 1960, Undersei. re-
tary Mercl,ant inquired 1:vhe.ther my
,Aannin,q- had been undertaken for "di-
rect positive action" against Che Guava-
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ra, Raul Castro, and Fidel Castro.sCabell
replied that such a capability did not
exist, but he might well have left the
meeting with the impression that assas-
sination was not out of bounds. Lands-
dale's plan, which was submitted to
the Special Group in January 1962.
aimed at inducinc, "open revolt and
overthrow of the inducing "open
regime."
Included in its final phase an ,''attack
on the cadre of -the regime, including
key leaders." The proposal stated that
"this should be a 'Special Target' opera-
tion a Gangster elements might
provide the best recruitment potential
against police " Although Lans-
dale's proposal was shelved, the type
of aggressive action contemplated was
not formally ruled out. Minutes from
several Special Group meetings contains
language such as "possible removal
of Castro from the Cuban scene." ?
On several occasions, the subject of
assassination was discussed in the pres-
ence of senior Administration officials;
Those officials never consented to ac-
tual assassination efforts, but they
.failed to indicate that :,ssassination
was impermissible as a matter of prin-
ciph.s.
. In early 1961, McGeorge Bundy was
informed of a CIA project described
as the development of a capability.
to. assassinate. Bundy raised no objection
and, according to Bissell, may have
been more affirmative.' Bissell stated
that he did not construe Bundy's re-
s./narks as authorization for the under-
world ;plot against Castro that was
then underway. But the fact that he
believed that the development of an
assassination capability had, as he sub-
sequently told Harvey, been approved -
by the White House, may well have
contributed to the general perception
that assassination was not prohibited.'
The Inspector General's Report states.
that Harvey's notes (which no longer exist)
quoted Bissell as saying to Harvey "The
White House has twice urged me to create
such a capability.'.'
2 Bundy, as the National Security Advisor
to the President, had an obligation to tell
the President of such .a grave matter, even
though it was only a discussion of a cap-
ability to assassinate. His failure to do so
was a serious error.
Documents received by the Committee
indicate that in May 1961, Attorney
General Kennedy and the Director . of
the FBI received information that the.
CIA was engaged in clandestine efforts
,against Castro which included the use
of Sam G?iancana and other underworld
-figures. The various documents referred
to "dirty business," "clandestine efforts,"
and -"plans" which were still "working"
and might eventually "pay off!' The
Committee is unable to determine wheth-
er Hoover- and the Attorney General
ever inquired into the nature of the
CIA operation, although there is no
evidence that they did so inquire. The
Committee believes that they should
have inquired, and that their failure
? to do -so was a dereliction of their
duties. ?
Documents indicate that in May 1962,
AttorneY General Kennedy was told
that the CIA had sought:to assassinate
Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs. Accord-
ing? to the CIA officials who were
present at the briefing, the Attorney
General indicated his displeasure about
lack of consultation rather than about
the impropriety of the attempt itself.
There is no evidence that the Attorney
General. told the CIA that it must not
engage in assassination plots in the
future.
At u meeting of the Special Group ?
(Augmented) in Aughst 1962, well after
the assaseination efforts were under-. ?
way, Robert McNamara is said to have
raised the question of whether the as-
sassination of Cuban leaders should
:be explored, and General Lansdale is-
sued an action memorandum assigning'
the CIA the task of preparing contin-
gency plans for the assassination of
Cuban leaders. While McCone testified
that he had immediately made it clear
that assassination was not to be
discussed or condoned, Harvey's testi-
mony and documents which he wrote
after the event indicate that Harvey
may have been confused over whether
McCone had objected to the use of
assassination, or whether he was only
concerned that the subject not be put
in writing. In any event, ?McCone went
no further. He issued no general order
banning consideration of assassination,
within the Agency. '
? One of the programs forwarded- to.
General Lansdale- by the Defense
Department in the MONGOOSE program:
was entitled "Operation Bounty" ? and'
envisioned dropping- leaflets in Cuba
offering rewards for the assassination
of Government leaders. Although the
plan was vetoed by Lansdale, it indi-
cates that persons in agencies other
than the CIA perceived that assassina-
tion might be permissible.
While the ambivalence of Administra-
tion officials does not excuse the mis-:
leading '-conduct by Agency officials
or justify their failure to seek explicit
permission, ? this attitude displayed an
insufficient concern about assassina-
tion 'which may have Contributed ? to
the perception that assassination- was
an acceptable tactic in accomplishing the
Government's general objectives.
Moreover, with the exception of the
tight guidelines issued by the Special
Group (Augmented) concerning Opera-
tion MONGOOSE, precise ? limitations.
were never imposed on the CIA requir-
ing prior, permission for the details
of. other proposed covert' operations
against Cuba.
No general policy banning assassina-
tion was promulgated until Helms' intra-
agency order in 1972. Considering the
number of times the subject of assassi-
:nation had arisen. Administration offi-
cials were remiss in not explicitly for-
bidding such activity.
The committee notes that many of
the occasions on which CIA officials
should have informed their superiors
of the assassination efforts but failed
to do so, or did so in a misleading
manner, were also occasions on which
Administration officials paradoxically
may have reinforced the perception
that assassination was permissible.
For example, when Bissell spoke with.
Bundy about an Executive Action capa-
bility, Bissell failed to indicate that
an actual assassination operation was
underway, but Bundy failed to rule out
assassination as a tactic.
.In May .1962, the Attorney General
was misleadingly told about the effort
to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay
of Pigs, but not about the operation
that was then going on. The Attorney'
General, however, did not state that
assassination was improper.
When a senior administration official
raised the question of whether assassi-
nation should be explored at a Special
Group meeting, the assassination opera-
tion should have been revealed. A firm
written order against engaging in assas-
sination should also have been issued
by McCone if, as he testified. he had
exhibited strong :'version to assassina,
tion.
5. Practices Current at the Time
i
? nWhich the Assassination Plots
-. Occurred Were Revealed by the
Record to Create the Risk of
Confusion, Rashness and
Irresponsibility in the Very Areas
Where Clarity and Solei
Judgment Were Most, Necessary
Various witnesses described elements
c;f the system within which the assassin-
ation plots were conceived. The Com-
mittee is disturbed by the custom that
Permitted the most sensitive matters
to be presented to the highest levels
of Government with the least clarity.
We view the folfowing points as particu-
larly dangerous:
(11 The expansion ? of the doctrine
of "plausible denial" beyond its intend-
ed purpose of hiding the involvement
of the United States from other coun-
ties- into an effort to shield higher
officials from knowledge, and hence
responsibility, for certain operations,
(2) The use of circuuilocution or
euphemism to describe serious matters
?such as assassination?when precise
meanings ought to be made clear.
(3) The theory that general approval
of broad covert action programs is
sufficient to justify specific actions such
as assassination or the passage of weap-
ons. " .
(4) The theory that authority granted,
or assumed to be granted, by one
DCI. or one Administration could be
presumed to continue without the neces-
sity for reaffirming the authority with
successor officials.
(5) The creation of covert capabili.
ties without careful review and authorf-
zation by policymakers, and the further
risk that such capabilities, once created,.
Might be used without speeific authori-
zation.. ?
(a) The Danger Inherent in- --
Overextending the Doctrine of
- 'Plausible Denial"
The original concept of "plausible
denial" envisioned implementing covert
actions in a manner calculated to con-
ceal American involvement if the ac-
lions were exposed. The doctrine was
at times a delusion and at times a
snare. It was naive for policymakers
to assume that sponsorship of actions
as .big as the Bay of Pigs invasion
could be concealed. The Committee's
investigation of assassination and the
public disclosures which preceded the
.inquiry demonstrate that when the Unit-
ed States resorted to cloak-and-dagger
tactics, its hand was ultimately exposed.
We were particularly disturbed to find
little evidence that the risks and conse-
quences of disclosure were considered.
We find that the likelihood of reckless
action is substantially increased when
policymakers believe that their deci-
sions will never be revealed. Whatever
can be said in defense of the original
purpose of. plausible denial?a purpose
which intends to conceal United States
involvement from the outside World?
the extension of the doctrine to the
internal decision-making process of the
Government is absurd. Any theory
which, as a matter of doctrine, places
elected officials on the periphery of
-the decision-making process is an invita-
tion to error, an abdication of responsi-
bility, and a perversion of democratic
government. The doctrine is the antithe-
sis of accountability.
(b) The danger of Using
"Circumlocution" and
"Euphemism"
According to Richard Bissell, the ex-
tension of "plausible denial" to inter-
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of circumlocution and etiphertilim in
speaking with Presidents and other sen-
ior officials.
. Explaining till's concept Only heightens,
its absurdity. On the one hand, it as-
sumes that senior officials should be
shielded from the truth to enable them
to deny knowledge if the truth comes'
out. On the other hand, the concept
assumes that senior officials must be
told enough, by way 'of double talk,
to grasp the subject. As a consequence,'
tthe theory fails to accomplish its
objective and only increases the risk
of misunderstanding. Subordinate offi-
cials should describe their proposals
in clear, precise, and brutally frank
language: superiors are entitled to, and
should demand, no less.
'Euphemism may actually have been
'preferred?not because of "plausible
denial"?but because the persons in-
-volved could not"?bring themselves to
state .in plain language what they in-
tended to. do. In some instances,,
moreover, subordinates may have as-
sumed, rightly or wrongly, that the
listening superiors . did not want the
isstie-squarely placed before -them.-"As-
sassinate," "murder" and "kill" are
words many people do not want to
speak or hear. They describe acts which
should not even be proposed, let alone.
plotted. Failing to call dirty business
by its rightful name may have increased
the risk of dirty business being done.
(c) The Danger of
Generalized Instructions -
Permitting specific' acts to be taken
on the basis of general approvals of
broad strategies (e.g., keep Allende from
assuming office, get rid of the 'Castro
regime) hitirs responsibility and account-
abilty. Worse still, it increases the
danger that subordinates may take steps
which would have been disapproved
if the policymakers had been informed:
A further danger is, that polic.ymakers
*might intentionally use loose general
instructions to evade responsibility fOr'
embarrassing activities.
In either event, we find that the
gap between the general policy objec-
tives and the specific actions under-
taken to achieve them was far too wide.
It is important that policymakers
review the manner in which their direc-
tives are implemented, particularly
when the activities are sensitive, secret,
and immune from public scrutiny.
? (d) The Danger of
"Floating Authorization"
One justification advanced by Richard
Helms and William Harvey for not
informing John McCone about the use
of underworld figures to attempt to
assassinate Fidel Castro was their asser-
tion that the project had already been
',.approved by McCone's predecessor, Al-
lan Dulles, and that further authoriza-
tion was -unnecessary, at least until
'the operation :had reached a more ad-
vanced stage.
We find that the idea that authority
might continue or "float" from one
administration or director to the next
and that there- is no duty to reaffirm
authority inhibits responsible decision-
making. Circumstances may change or
judgments differ. New officials should
he given the opportunity to review Sig-:
nificant programs. " - ?
(e) The Problems Connected With
Creating New Covert Capabilities'
The development of a new capability
raises numerous problems. Having a
capability to engage in certain covert.
activity increases the probability that
the activity will occur, since the capabil-
ity represents a tool available for use.
There is the further danger that authori?
zation for the mere creation of a capabil-
ity may be misunderstood as permitting
its use without-requiring further author-
ization:
? Finally, an assassination capability.
should never havebeen created.
?
Recommendations
The Committee's long investigation of
assassination has brought a number of
important issues into sharp focus. Above.
all stands the question of whether as-
sassination is an acceptable tool of
American foreign policy. Recommenda-
tions on other issues must await the
completion of our continuing investiga-
tion and the final report, but the Com-
mittee needs no more information to
be convinced that a flat ban against
assassination should be written into law.
We condemn assassination and reject
it as an instrument of American policy.
Surprisingly, however, there is presently
no statute making it a crime to assassi-
nate a foreign official outside the United
States. Hence,, for the reasons set forth
below, the Committee recommends the
prompt enactment of a statute making
it a Federal crime to commit or attempt
an assassination, or to conspire to do so.
A. General Agreement
That ihe United States
Must Not Engage in
Assassination
Our view that assassination has no*
place in America arsenal is shared by
the Ad mi nistra lion.
President Ford, in the same statement
in which he asked lids Committee to deal
with the assassination issue, s"!tted:
am opposed to political assassination..
This administration has not and will not use
such means as instruments of national policy.
(Presidential Press Conference, 6/9/75,
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu.'
ments, Vol. II, No. 24, p. 611.)
? The witnesses who testified before the*
Committee uniformly' condemned assas-
sination. They denounced it as immoral,
described it as impractical, and' reminded
us that an open society, more than any,
other, is particularly vulnerable to the
risk that its own leaders may be assassi-
nated. As President Kennedy.reportedly
.said: "We can't get into that kind of.
thing, or we would all be targets."
(Goodwin, 7/18/75, p. 4) ?
The current Director of Central In-
telligence and his two predecessors'
testified emphatically that assassination
should be banned.- William Colby said:
With respect to assassination, my position
is clear, I just think it is wrong. And I have
said so and made it very clear to my subor-.
dinates. " " 5/21/75, p. 89.). -
Richard Helms, who had been involved'
in an assassination plot before he be-
came DCI, said he had concluded assas-
sination should be ruled out for both
moral and practical :reasons:.
As a result of 'my experiences through
the years, when I became Director I had
made tip my mind that this option of
killing foreign leaders, was something that
I did not want to happen cm my watch. My;
reasons for this xere timse: .
' There arc not only momd reasons hut there
are also some other rather practical reason's:
It is almost impossible in a demecraey hi
keep anything like that secret r " ' Some-
body would go .to a- Congressman,. his Sen-
ator, he might go to a newspapc'r man, what- ,
ever the ,case may be. but it ?;itist is not a
12
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practical alternative:it seems to me,;in our'l
sociheetyn. .
there' is another consideration * .*
T
if ?you are going to try by this kind of
'means to remove a-foreign leader, then who
is going to take his place running that coon--
try, and are you essentially better off as a
matter of practice when it is over than you ?
were before? And I can give you I think a
very solid example of this Which happened
in Vietnam when *President Diem was Om-
mated from the scene.. We then had a re-
volving door of prime ministers after that for
quite some period of time, during which the
Vietnamese Government at a time in its
us-
tory when it should have been strong was
nothing but a caretaker government
In other word's,that whole exercise' turned
out to the disavantage of the United States:
there is no sense. in my sitting here
with all the experience I hav.e had And not.
sharing with the Committee my feelings this
day. It isn't because 1-have lost my cool, or
because I' have lost-my guts, it?sfmply is be-
cause I don't tthe United States of America these days.
hiqk it is a viable option in
Chairro' an -Church.. Doesn't it also follow,
Mr. Helms?I agree with what you have said
fully?but doesn't it also follow on the prac-
tical side, apart from the moral side, that
since these secrets are bound to come out, -
when they do, they do very grave political
damage to the?Unifed States in tie world at
large? I don't' know to what extent the Rus-
sians involved themselves in political assas-
sinations, but under their system they at
least have a better prospect of keeping it
concealed. Since we do like a free society
and since these secrets are going to come
out in due course, the revelation will then
do serious injury to the good name' and rep-
utation of the United States.
Would you agree with that?
? ? Mr. Helms. Yes, I would.
Chairman Church.- Alid finally, if we were
to reserve to ourselves the prerogative to:
assassiNate foreign 'leaders, we may invite
reciprocal action from foreign governments.
who assume that if it's our prerogative to
-do .so, it' is their prerogative as well, and
that is another danger that we at least in-
vite with this kind of action, wouldn't you.
agree?
pi,h.I7r.6'.7H8e)lms: Yes., sir.: (Helms, 6/13/75,
John McCone Said he was opposed to
assassinations because:
I didn't , think it was proper from the
standpoint of the U.S. Government and the
Central Intelligence, . Agency. (McCone,
6/6/75, p. 15 ? '
B. CIA Directives
Banning
Assassivation
Helms in 1972 and Colby in 1973 is-
sued internal CIA orders banning as-
sassination. Helms' order said:
.It has recently again been alleged in ,the
press that CIA engages in assassination. As
you are well aware, this is not the case, and
'Agency policy has long been clear On this
issue. To underline it,. however, I direct that
no such activity or operation be undertaken,
assisted or ?suggested by any of oar person-
ittoerls:3;6;72(11;lemo: Helms to Deputy Direc-
.
In one of a series-of orders arising-
out the- CIA's own review of ? prior
"questionable activity," Colby stated:
- CIA will not engage in assassination nor
induce, assist or suggest to others that as-
sassination be employed. (Memo, Colby to
Deputy Directors, 8/29/73)
C. The Need for
a Statute
Commendable- and welcome as they
are, these CIA directives are not suf-
ficient. Administrations change, CIA
directors change, and someday in the
future what was tried in the past may
once again become a temptation. As-
sassination plots dd happen. It would
,be irresponsible not to do all that can
be done to prevent their happening
,again. A law is needed. Laws express our
nation's values; they eleter those who
might be tempted to ignore those values
and Stiffen the will of those who want -
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to resist the temptation. ' ? ?
The Committee recommends a statute
which would make it a criminal .offense
for persons subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States (1) to conspire::
within or outside the United States, to
assassinate a foreign official; (2) to at-
tempt to assassinate a. foreign official,
or(3) to assassinate a foreign official.
Present law makes it a crime to kill,
or to conspire to kill, a foreign official
or foreign official guest while such a:
person is in the United States. (18
U.S.C. 1.116-1117). However, there is no
law which makes it a crime to assassi-
nate, to conspire to assassinate, or to
'attempt to assassinate a foreign official
while such offidial is outside the United
States. The Committee's proposed stat-
ute is designed to close this gap in the,
Subsection (a) of the proposed statute.
would punish conspiracies within the
United States; subsection (b) :would
punish. conspiracies outside the United
States. Subsection (b) is .necessary to
eliminate the loophole which would
Otherwise permit persons to simply
leave the United. States and conspire
abroad. Subsections (c) and (d), respec-
tively, wouls1 make it an offense to
? attempt to kill a foreign official, outside
the United States.
.
Subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) would
apply ? expressly to any ."officer or em-
ployee of the United States" to make
clear that the statute punishes conduct'
by United States Government personnel,
as well as conduct by private citizens.
In addition, subsection (a), which covers
conspiracies within the United States,.
would apply to "any other person,".
regardless of citizenship. Non-citizens.
who conspired within the United States
to assassinate a foreign official would
clearly conic within the jurisdiction
of the law. Subsections (b), .(c), and
(d), which deal with conduct abroad,
would apply to United States citizens,
and to officers or employees of the
united States, regardless of their cit-
izenship. Criminal liability for acts
committed abroad by persons who are
not American citizens or who are not
officers or employees . of the United
States is beyond the jurisdiction of,
the United States.
. "Foreign official" is defined in sub-
section (e). (2) to make clear that an
offense may be committed even though
the "official" belongs to an insurgent
force, an unrecognized government, or
a political party. The Committee's inves-
tigation?as well as the reality of inter-
national politics?has shown that offi-
cials in such organizations are potential
targets for assassination.2 Killing, at-
tempting to kill, or conspiring to kill
would be punishable under the statute
only if it were Politically motivated.
Political, motivation would encompass
-acts against foreign officials because
,of their political views, actions, or state-
.
ments.
'Tor example, Lumumba was not an offi-
cial of the Congolese government at the time
of the pints against his life, and Trujillo,
eyen though the dictator of the Dominican
Republic, held no official governmental posi-
tion in the latter period of his. regime.
The definition of "foreign official"
in section (e) (2) also provides that such
person must be an official of a foreign
government or movement "with which
the United States is not at war pursuant
to ea declaration of war or against
which the United States Armed Forces
have .not been introduced into hostilities
or situations pursuant to the provisions
of the War Powers Resolution." This
definition makes it clear that, absent
a declaration of war or the introduction
of United States Armed Force; pursuant
to ? the War . Powers.. Resolution, the
,killing of ? foreign officials on account
of -their ? political views would be a
.crintinal offense.
During the Committee's hearings,
some witnesses, while strongly. con-
demning assassination, asked whether
assassination shouid absolutely be ruled
out in a time of truly unusual national
emergency. Adolf Hitler was 'cited as
an example. Of course, the cases which
the Committee investigated were not
of that character. Indeed, in the Cuban
missile crisis?the only situation of true
national danger considered in this re-
port?assassination was not even con-
sidered and, if used, might well have
aggravated the crisis.
? In a grave emergency, the President
has a limited power to act, not in
violation of the law, but in accord
with his own responsibilities under the
Constitution to defend the Nation. AS
the Supreme Court has stated,. the Con-
stitution "is not a suicide pact." (Kenne-
dy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
160 (1963).) ?
During an unprecedented emergency,
Abraham Lincoln claimed unprecedent-
ed power based on the need to preserve
the nation:
* * * my oath to preserve the Constitution
to the best of my ability, imposed upon me
the duty of preserving, by every indispens.!
able means, that government?that nation?
of which .that Constitution was the organic
law. Was it possible to lose the nation, and
yet preserve the Constitution? By general
law, life and limb must be protected; vet
often a limb must be amputated to save a
life: but a life is never wisely given to save
a limb. I felt that Measures, otherwise un-
constitutional, might become lawful, by be-
coming indispensable to the preservation of
the Constitution, through the preservation
of the. nation * * (The Complete Works
of Abraham Lincoln. Vol. X, pp. 65-66.)
(Nicolay and Hay, Eds. 1894.)
Whatever the extent of the President's
own constitutional powers, it is a fan-
damental principal of our constitutional
system that those powers are checked
and limited by Congress, including the
inipeachment power. As a necessary
corollary, any action taken by a Pres-
ident pursuant. to his limited' inherent
powers and in apparent conflict with
the law must be disclosed to Congress.
Only then can Congress judge whether
the action trek represented,. in Lincoln's
phrase, an "indispensable necessity' to
the life of the Nation.
As. Lincoln explained in submitting
his extraordinary actions to Congress
for ratification:
In full view of his great resnotisiility he
has, .so far, done what he hae deemed his
.duly. You will now, according to your own
judgment perform yours. (Abraham Lincoln,
Message to Congress in Special Session,
July 4, I561.)
1711
ak.k. cee
irvii ee'
?
The Committee does not believe that
the acts which it has. examined repre-
sent the real. American character, They
do not reflect the ideals which- have
given the people of the. country and
..of the world hope for a better, fuller,
fairer life. We regard the assassination
plots as aberrations.
The United States must not adopt
the tactics of the energy. Means are
as important as ends: Crisis makes
it tempting to ignore the wise restraints
that make men free. But each time
we do so, each time the means we
use are wrong, our inner strength, the
strength which makes us free is less-
,ened. -
Despite our distaste for what we
have seen, we have great faith in this
country. The story is sad, but this
'country has the strength to hear the
story and to learn from it. We must
remain a people who confront our mis-
takes and .resolve not to repeat them.
If we do not, we will decline; but,
if we do, our future will be worthy
of the best of our past.
Panel Members Listed
? Special to The Nevc Yerk Times
? WASHINGTON, Nov. 29--The Senate
select committee whose report ori Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency activities was
Made Public today was composed of the
following 11 members:
Frank. Church, Democrat of Idaho,
chairman.
. John G. Tower, Republican of Texas,
vice chairman. ?
Philip A. Hart, Democrat of Michigan.
Walter F. Mondale, Democrat of Min-
nesota.
Walter D. Huddleston, Democrat of
Kentucky.
Robert Morgan, Democrat of Nod),
Carolina.
Gary Hart, Democrat of Colorado.
Howard H. Baker Jr., Republican of
Tennessee.
Barry Goldwater, Republican of
Arizona.
Charles McC. Mathias Jr., Republican
of Maryland.
Richard Schweiker, Republican of
Pennsylvania.
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NEW YORK TINEsApproved For Release 2001/08/08:
21 NAv. 1975
Kissinger-C.I.A. Conflict
In C-zile Hearings Cited
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
The Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence reported yester-
day that during its hearings
there had been conflicts in tes-
timony between Henry A. Kis-
singer and the Central Intel-
ligence. Agency about the ex-
tent of White House authoriza-
tion for the agency's role in
a Chilean kidnapping plot in
October 1970. ,
; Mr. Kissinger, who was then
president Nixon:s national se-
curity adviser, told Lie commit-
tee in secret testimony last
August that he and his deputy,
Gen. Alexander M. Haig, had
turned down a specific C.I.A.
proposal to organize a military
coup d'etat aimed at preventing
Salvador Allende from becom-
ing President of Chile.
Agency officials testified,
however, that their subsequent
involvement in the kidnapping
and assassination of a high-lev-
el Chilean general loyal to Mr.
Allende came, as the Senate
report put it, "with the know-
ledge and -approval of the
White House."
The Senate report concluded
that while the United States'
policy was to seek a military
collo, there was no -evidence
that any American official spe-
cifically planned an assassina-
tion or expected that a kidnap-
ring attempt would lead to a
shooting.
Two Attempts Failed
The Senate testimony re-
vealed that Richard M. Helms,
who was then Director ;of Cen-
tral Intelligence, and other
agency officials continued ? to
aid anti-Allende military fac-
tions even after it.became clear
that no military coup would
be possible without the removal
of Gen, Rene Schneider, the
army's commander in chief,
who was an Allende supporter.
The C.I.A. encouraged two
unsuccessful kidnapping at-
tempts in mid-October on the
general, supplying at least 870,-
000 to ? two Chilean officers
and three machine guns and
other weapons, the testimony;
showed. On the third attempt,
General Schneider was assas-
sinated after he allegedly
opened fire on his abductors.
The slaying took place cn
Oct. 22, 1970, two days before
Mr. Allenc'..e's victory in the
Sept. Sept. 4 election was to
be ratified by the Congress.
Mr. Allende, a Marxist who
was founder cf the Socialist
Party in Chile, de.,..4raated less
leftist eandid,:atno. had i
been covertly aided by the
,C.I.A.
1. On the previous Sept. 15,
ithe Senate report said, Pres-
lidera Nixon had summoned Mr.
!Helms to a White House meet-
!Mg with Mr. Kissinger and John
N. Mitchell, then the Attorney
.General, and ordered the C.I.A.
. to spend $10 million, and "more
-if necessary," to provoke a
military coup in an effort to
"save Chile,"
, Details of Mr. Nixon's sof::
in the plotting were initially
described last July by The New
York Times, but the Senate
assassinati report included the
first direct testimony on the
Operation as well as the first
account of the dispute between
Mr. Kissinger and the C.I.A.
over who authorized what.
During his Senate testimony,
Mr. Kissinger acknowledged
that -he was aware that the
'primary thrust of the White
House meeting "was to urge
Helms to do whatever he could
to prevent Allende from being
seated." Mr. Kissinger further
testified, '"It is clear that Pres-
ident Nixon wanted him
[Helms] to encourage the
Chilean military to cooperate
or to take ? the initiative in
preventing Allende from taking
office."
The Senate report describes
how the C.I.A. was authorized
to report on its efforts to Pres-
ident Nixon through Mr. Kissin-
ger, bypassing the Ambassador
in Chile, the Department -of
State, the Pentagon and the
40 Committee. At the time,
the 40 Committee which
oversees clandestine intel-
ligence efforts, was considered
one of the most secret units
in the Government.
This led to what the Senate
report called a two-track ap-
proach, with the 40 Committee
authorizing funds for anti-Al-
; lende propaganda activity and-
the White House seeking con-
tacts with Chilean military men
who would lead a coup.
By the end of September,
!the Senate report concluded,
i both tracks had the same goal:
the overthrow of the Allende
Government.
The Senate report notes that
the White House insisted that
economic ;pressure also be
brought against the Allende
'Government. The report in-
cludes the following warning
that Amabassodor Edward M.
Korry, sent to a Chilean politi-
cal moderate in an effort
encourage him to become in-
volved in the anti-Allende plan-
ning:
Not a nut or bolt will be
allowed to reach Chile under
Allende. Once Allende comes
to power we shall do all within
our power to condemn Chile
and the Chileans to utmost
deprivation and poverty, a poll-,
cy designed for a long time
to come to accelerate the hard
features of a Communist socie-
ty in Chile."
Thomas Karamessines, then
the C.I.A. deputy director in
charge of covert operations,
was placed in direct charge
of a special Chilean task. force.
He; told the Senate committee
of having been under pressure
from Mr. Kissinger to accom-
plish an overt hi-ow. Mr. Kissin-
ge. "left no doubt in my mind,"
Mn Karamessines testified,
"that he was under the heaviest
of pressure to get -this accom-
plished, and he in turn wa
placing us under the heaviest
. 14,
CIROONA-Opflq?000100380004-2
21 Nov. 1975
White House Not Linked
To Plots Against Castrc
By JOHN M.
special to The
WASHINGTON, Nov. 20?The
Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence reported today that
it had not found any evidence
of White House authorization
for repeated attempts by the
Central Intelligence Agency to
inspire a bizarre variety of
plots against the life of Prime
Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba.
, In the report issued by the
'committee today. nearly a third
of which was devoted to the
:agency's persistent but unsuc-
.cessfnl efforts to aarrange for
the deaths of Mr. Castro and
his, two principal associates,
the panel said that it had un-
covered "at least" eight sepa-
;rate plots conceived by C.I.A.
;officials in the Eisenhower,
!Kennedy and Johnson Adminis-
trations.
The death plots some of
' which never progresse d from
the planning stage, were aimed
variously at the Cuban leader,
his brother Raul and Ernesto
Che Guevara, the late Cuban
Finance Minister, the commit-
tee said, and spanned the per-
iod from 1960 to 1965.
There was no clear indication,
CREWDSON . -
New?Torlt Timet
according to the report, that
any of the plots, which in-
volved as prospective assassins
American underworld figures.
Cuban exiles and a C.I.A. agent
within the Castro Government?
had been apprcved in advance,
or even made known to,.
Government officials "outside
the C.I.A.
In addition, the committeel
said that there was no indispu-
table evidence that Allen W.
Dulles, the Director of Central
plotting that took place within
intelligence when the first plot
was conceived, had been made
aware of it in detail by his
subordinates, -and no evidence
at all that John A. IvIcCone,
his successor, was told of the
plotting that took place within
the agency in his tenure.
The Senate report conceded,
that to provide the United!
States with a "plausible denial"!
in the event the anti-Castro
plots were discovered, Pres-1
idential authorization might
have been subsequently "ob-
scured." It also declared that,
whatever the extent of their!
knowledge, Presidents Eisen-,
hower, Kennedy and Johnson.
should bear the "ultimate re-
sponsibility for the actions of,
their subordinates.
of pressures to -get it ? accom-
plished."
Mr. Kissinger, -in his testimo-
ny, said he knew of no specific
plan that involved the abduc-
tion of General Schneider.
He testified that on Oct. 15,
1970, he met in the White
House with Mr. Karamessines
to discus's a coup attempt to
be led by a retired Chilean
general, Roberto Viatex Maram-
bio. His chances were not rated
very high and it was decided
at the meeting to forestall any
further action by Mr. Viaux.
The basic dispute cited by
the Senate emerged from that
meeting. Mr. Kissinger, whose
testimony was supported by
General Haig, said that he had
turned "off the collo plans."
Mr. Karamessines told the Sen-
ate Committee that he had left
the meeting after Mr. Kissinger
s-aid that "the agency should
continue keeping the pressure
on every Allende weak spot
in sight." .
Mr. Karamessines further
testified that there never was
a White House order ending
the anti-Allende effort. ?
"I am sure that the seeds
that were laid. in that effort
in 1970 had their impact in
1973." he told the committee.
alluding to the coup that ousted
Mr. Allende in September 1973.
and led to his death.
. The Senate report noted that
;it had been unable to question
former President Nixon in this
;point and had been unable to
:lain access to the daily calen-
dars of Mr. Kissinger and Mr.
;Nixon to confirm that some
of the 'subsequent meetings on
a :military solution ir chile
alleged to have taken place
by C.I.A. officials had actually
. been held.,- .
The report termed "particu-
larly reprehensible" the ap-
parent failure of Richard Bis-1
sell, the C.I.A.'s chief of clan-
destine operations when he mi-1
tial attempts were made on;
Mr. Castro's life, to make cer-
tain that Mr. Dulles and Pres-
idents Kennedy and Johnson
knew what was afoot.
And the committee described
as "a grave error in judgment"
the failure of Richard Helms,
Mr. Bissell's successor and now
the American Ambassador to
Iran. to inform Mr. McCone
in early 1962 that piotting
against Mr. Castro's life was
continuing.
The initial planning for a
Cuban assassination, the report
said, involved an attempt to
arrange for a fatal accident
involving not Mr. Castro, but
his brother Raul. The pian was
aborted by Tracy Barnes, then
Mr. Bissell's deputy and now
deceased, shortly after he had
approved it, and the accident
never took place.
That effort was followed ;by
the preparationby C.I.A. scien-
tists of a box of cigars, of
the brand favored by the Cuban
Prime minister, that had been
impregnated with a poison. But
the Senate committee found
no evidence that the -cigars
had ever been delivered.
The attempt to arrange the
accident, the report said, was
little more than a response by
the C.I.A. to an opportunity'
that one of its Cuban agents
was to :nave for close access
to Raul Castro, and the pois-
oned cigars seemed almost an
afterthought.
But the plotting within the'
C.I.A. against Mr. Castro's life
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NEW' YORK =TES
20 Nov. 1975
began in earnest some eight
months before the 1961 invasion
of Cuba by an anti-Castro exile
foce trained by the agency.
The report .said that begin-
ning in August 1960, three
months before the election of
President Kennedy, the C.I.A.,
working through Robert A.
Maheu, a former F.B.I. agent
who later served as a top aide
to Howard R. Hughes, the
billionaire industrialist, asked
John RoseIli, a reputed organ-
ized-crime figure, to locate one
or more Cubans willing to make
an attempt on Mr. Castro's life.
Mr. Roselli eventually brought'
two other top underworld fig-
ures into the operation?Sam
Giancana, now dead but for
years ethe head of an important,'
Chicago cime syndicate, and
Santos. Trafficante, a Cuban
exile who has been associated
with criminal elements in
Tampa, Fla.
Mr. Bissell told the Senate
committee that be knew that
under-world figures had been
enlisted on behalf of the C.I.A.
to arrange for the murder,
which was to ? have coincided
with the Bay of Pigs invasion
the following April, and which
was to have involved the slip-
ping of pills containing toxin
into Mr. Castro's food by a
waiter in a Havana restaurant.
Mr. Bissell told the panel that !
he and another agency official
Col. Sheffield Edwards. hat
briefed Mr. Dulles "circumIci
cutiously-" about an "intelli
gence operation" then uncle
way against the Castro Govern
,ment, and that they believes
!he understood that it revolvet
around assassination, althougl
the word was never spoken.
Mr. Bissell also said that ft
assumed that Mr. Dulles hal,
informed General Eisenhowel
and Mr. Kennedy. On the basil
of that indirect briefing.
?? ? The Federal Bureau of In
vestigation became aware ii
May, 1962. more than a yeal
after the Cuban invasion?and
the assassination attempt?has
failed, that Mr. Giancana had
told associates of his involve
merit in a scheme to kill Mr
Castro.
The F.B.I., according to doo
uments obtained by the cons
mittee, also discovered that Mr
Maheu and Mr. Giancana had
been involved in tapping a tel
ephone in a Las Vegas, Nev.
hotel room, and learned upoi
investigating that the C.I.A.
apparently as a favor to Mr
Gianacana, had paid for tht
installation.
Robert F. Kennedy, the latt
President's brother who wai
Attorney General at the time
inquired about the details os
the relationship and was told
by Colonel Edwards in May
1972, that Mr. Giancana and
others had been involved in at
assassination plot against Mr
Castro that ended after thd
abortive invasion.
But the Senate. report said
that a second effort, also in.
volving poison pills designed
for Mr. Castro's food was at
that moment under way within
the C.I.A., that Colonel lOe,
wards, who knew about it, did
not tell Mr. Kennedy and Ina(
Mr. Helms, who had taken ever
front Mr. Bissell, did not came
!forward when he learned that
:the Attorney General had been
misled.
Mr. Helms's . reasons for not
having told Mr. Kennedy, Mr,
McCone or any other superior
!about the continuing assassina4
I tion efforts, according to his
;testimony, concerned his as-
:sumption that the efforts had
previously been authorized by
higher-ups. Also, he said that
'he assumed that the Kennedy
!Administration's internal ex.
pressions of antipathy toward.
the Castro Governmert amount*.
-ed to tacit apprOval.
In any event, -according to
!the Senate report, the plot in.
volving the underworld and the
;poison pills was subsequently
-I abandoned by the C.I.A. after
Iseveral of the Cuban operatives
I assigned to administer the
'poison to Mr. Castro got "cold
:feet."
Other schemes were hatched
at C.I.A. headquarters in 1963,
including one that suggested
placing an exploding seashell in
the water near Mr. Castro's fa-,
vorite bathing spot in the Carib-
bean, and another, equally bi-
zarre, designed to supply Mr.
.Castro with a skindiving suit
'that had been contaminated in
'advance by bacteria.
Neither of those schemes, the
report said, appears to have
been taken beyond the C.I.A..
-laboratory, but later in 1963 a
agent inside the Cuban
Government, known by the
agency cryptonym Am-Lash,
was offered a pen containing
a. poison needle after he ex-
pressed a willingness to take
Mr. Castro's life.
The agent, the report said,
rejected the device as too
amateurish. The Senate panel
noted that the offer was made
to him on Nov. 22, 1963, at
almost the precise moment time
Mr. Kennedy was assassinated
in Dallas.
It was ironic, the report said,
that almost at the same mo-
ment a special envoy from Mr.
Kennedy was meeting with Mr.
Castro 'to explore the pos-
sibility of improved relations."
? Warren Not Told
The Warren Commission,
which investigated the circum-
stances in the Kennedy assas-
sination, was never made aware
of the C.I.A.'s attempts on Mr.
Castro's life as an adjunct to
its inquiry, according to former
commission lawyers.
Mr. McCone, who was sub-
sequently told about the plot-
ting against Mr. Castro before
the Bay of Pigs invasion, never
told the Warren Commission,
of which be was a member. of
what be know, and Mr. Helms
did not volunteer his knowl-
edge the Senate report said,
"because the precise question
was not asked" of him.
I The C.I.A. continued to- en-
!courage Am-Lash, the report
said, by providing him with a
cache of weapons in Cuba and
,later by puttnig him in touch
with a group of anti-Castro ex-
iles in this country who could
also supply arms.
These effor s continued into
1965, the Senators found, and
said that Mr. Helms, who knew
about some or them, denied to
Secretary of State Dean Rusk
that Am-Lash had ever been ,
COLBY ASKS PANEL
TO DROP 12 NTS,
FROM PLOT REPORT
By JOHN M. CREWDSON
t,,se 'nNew Ycrk Timen
WASHINGTON, Nov. 19?Wil-
!ham E. Colby, the Director of
!Central Intelligence, appealed
today to a Senate committee,
!not -to make public the names
iof 12 individuals, some of them
'agency officials, who were al-
legedly involved in C.I.A. plots
against the lives of foreign
heads of state.
In a raee news conference at
the Central Intelligence _Agen-
cy's suburban Virginia head-
quarters, Mr. Colby said that
he feared that the individuals,
if named in a committee report
expeated to be released to-
morrow, might be subject to
retaliation from ."unstable and
extremist groups."
He said that while be op-
posed "in principle" publication
of the report on C.I.A. asses-,
sination plots, which must bel
approved by the full Senate in
order to be released, his im-
mediate concern was to protect
"the safety and livelihoods of
the individuals involved" in
those matters and also "the fu-
ture of American intelligence."
An All-Out Effort
Mr. Colby's unusual appeal,'
which seemed to have been
addressed as much to the full
Senate as to the 11 members
of the Select Committee on
Intelligence, which has voted
unanimously to approve the
report's release, marked an all-
out effort by the Ford Admin-
istration to block disclosurs of
the document on the Senate
floor.
. The Senate is scheduled to
begin a closed debate at 9
A.M. tomorrow on whether to
!approve cc i.,)rbid the release of
!the assassination report, a doc-
ument of neariy 400 pages that
!is based on a five-month inves-
tigation by the select corn-
!rnittee.
Senator Frank Church, the
committee's chairman, said that
his panel had considered care-
fully the C.I.A.'s arguments for
deleting the names of individ-
uals included in its report and
had done so where it believed
that was warranted.
"In the end," said Mr.
involved in such assassination
attempts.
Accoelmg to the report,
when Mr.. Helms later briefed
President Johnson on the early
,Castro plots, he did not de-
scribe for him the Am-Lash
operation, !the only one that
had eontinued into his preels
Church, an Idaho Democrat,
"the committee decided which
names must be included," and
he added, "We intend to pro-
ceed with the report."
According to Mr. CoIey, the!
C.I.A. provided the Church!
committee with about 30 nernes,
of agency employes arid Amer-
ican and fomign cellaborators
in connection with its inquiry
into the assassination plots, be-
cause it believed those names
were "important to an under-,
standing of the matter' by the
committee.
But, he said, the committee
had agreed to the agency's re-
quest to remove the names from
the final version of its report
in only "18 or 20" of the cases.
It -was not -a question, Mr.
-Colby added, of whether the,
assassination attempts werei
"good or bad," and he said thati
Mr. Ford's exliresseci disapprov-i
al of such activities "is shared!
by many of us."
"The real question," he con-
tinued, "is whether we will im-
pose an extra legal retaiiationl
upon people who, at one 'time,1
did what the general consensus
of people and the command
structure around them thought
was appropriate at the time."
At a news conference called
after Mr. Colby's, Senator
Church defended his intention
to seek the release of the -docu-
ment with a reference to a de-
cision -by a United States _dis-
trict judge here earlier this
week not to order the deletion
of one such name.
The judge, Gerhard A. Gesell;
ruled that while the identifica-
tion of a man described only
as a retired C.I.A. official might
endanger his life, he was com-
pelled to deny the former offi-
cial's request for anonymity be-
cause the "public interest" in
the report's contents "greatly
outweighs the right to privacy
of an individual."
The Senate committee agreed
yesterday, however, to excise
the name of the retired official,
who is understood to be Dr.
Sidney Gottlieb, the former
head of the agency's technical
services division, whose name
was reported prominently earli-
er this year after he was ques-
tioned in closed session by the
committee about other matters.
Mr. Colby, without naming
Dr. Gottlieb, acknowledged to-
day that some of the 12 names
remaining in the Senate report,
and possibly some of those de-
leted at the agency's request,
had been menticeed in news
accounts of the Senate commit-
tee's investigation.
But, he said, there is "a vast
difference in my mind between
their appearance in press star;
les and their official confirma-1
Con in a committee reptirt." Hel
also expressed concern that!
such confirmation might bring:
the individuals harm from un-1
named groups, "either domestic,
or !foreign, who might feel;
called upon to take some such;
action against these people. "
The C.I.A. director said that!
if neither the select commit-,
tee nig the Senate acceded to,
his wishes to preF?er.,.: their
anonymity, the C.I.A. would,
? pro',- ;de t he named inclividiw Is!
with what "limited Protection!
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21 NOV. 1975 19. NOV. 1975
. we can give in this country."
Mr. Colby said that hg had
expressed his concern in fetters
to Senator Church and other
members of Congress, and that
President Ford had written to
Mr. Church last month with a
request to keep the assassina-
tion report secret on the
ground that its publication
would "result in serious harm
to the national interest."
The Senate panel voted
unanimously to reject Mr.
Ford's request, and Mr. Church
.said at the time that his com-
mittee had undertaken to in-
vestigate ? the charges of C.I.A.
involvement in assassination
plot at the "urgings" of the
President himself.
The Senate committee's in-
quiry was foundd on informa-
tion gathered by a Presidential
commission on C.I.A. activities
set up by Mr. Ford last Janu-
ary. As far as is known, no
foreign leaders were killed in
C.I.A.-inspired plots, which
.were directed primarily against
Prime Minister Fidel Castro of
Cuba.
A White House official said
today that summaries of Mr.
Ford's arguments against the
release of the report had been
delivered to key Senators. '
WASHI NGTON STAR
20 NOV 1975
Speculation on CIA
agent is deplored
The Washington Star, as well as
other media, recently speculated as
to the identity of the former Central
Intelligence Agency officer who
?sought to have the Senate Select
Committee delete his name from the
committee's assassination report.
The President, Judge Gerhard A.
Gesell and I all found that there is a
real possibility of physical harm to
this man or to his family if his name
were revealed. Indeed, the Senate
Select Committee finally agreed to
delete his name from the report.
I have great difficulty in under-
standing what legitimate purpose
was served by the published specu-
lation concerning the identity, right
or wrong, of an individual whose
physical safety is thus endangered.
W. E. Colby,
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
8tory an Unhappy One INTELLIGENCE COSI
For 'Voice of America PUT Al $4 KIM
By LIND1VCHARLTON -
..spec,ial to The New York_ Tlenes
WASHINGTON, Nov. 20?
It wasn't the kind of story..
that anyone at the Voice
of America was very 'happy
about:
"It's 'a mean stOry,: not
at all ?Consistent with what. . .
we think of ourselves,-'." said- ?Administration or Congress.
the chief of the new divie Mr. Kamenske and his su-
sion. But at 6:30 P.M. They perior, Alan Heil, chief of
were ready to start broad- news and current affairs, at
casting it around' the world ' first yielded to the pressure
MI In, Enishnthe radio, script
begins this way: '"In Wash-.:
ingtorno a Senate investiga-
tion. reveals that the United
States Central' Intelligence
Agency Was involved in' sev-
eral plots to kill ,foreign lead-
ers." .
By midnight, it wmilebe
broadcast several times in
English and in Khmer, Thai,
Spanish, Hindi,' Arabic, Urdu,
Ukrainian and, at what will
be dawn in Moscow, Russian.
As the 24-hour broadcast
cycle turns, the story?modi-
fied by time change and ex-
panded wit:h reaction, back- ,
ground and analysis?will' be
broadcast in all the 35 '
gbages in which the 'Voice?
the broadcast arm of the
United States Information
Agency?is fluent.
Differences in Content -
voices have prevailed.. Last
spring, under the direction
of. the State Department, in-
formation about the United
States. evacuation from Sai-
gon was restricted to "offi-
cial - statements" from the
. There would .be modifica-,
firths for different regions.
To be included in brbadcastS
to. SoutheastAsia was amore ?
detailed look at 'the assassin-,-
ation of Ngo Dinh ,diem. the.
South. Vietnamese President.
For Africa,' the plota to
kill the. first Prime Minister ?
of' the Congo, now Zaire,
Patrice.. Lumumba were de-
tailed, along with the' fact
that Mr. Lumumba was in
fact, 'apparently murdered''
by his rivals,"- not by, the,
C.I.A. - -
For the 'Latin - American
service, the plots. against Fi-:
del Castro of --Cuba,- Rafael
Trujillo of the Dominican Re-
public and Gen: Rene Schned
of 'Chile ? were' -given prern-?
inence.
"If you're caught not tell-
ing it straight," said Bernard
H. Kamenske, .chief of the
news division, "you lose any
sense of trust with your-liste-
ner."
He acknowledged that this
is not a universal view in
government circles, that
there are those who think
the United States should not
be paying good money to
advertise its own faults. But
he insisted, "There is no al-
ternative to it. 'What we at
tempt to. provide is reality. ?
And any diplomat who thinks.
that they're, hurt by. reality, '
they're mistaken."
Sometimes those oi oar
to go along with the hmit4-
tion, then they broke With
i i t' n a memorandum to dile
Voice staff. "It is important
to remember that we strive
to know the truth and tell
it," the memo said.
Mr.' Kamenske; a big, -be?
spectacled 'man of 48; said
that the . C.I.A. story .did
cause many at the broadcast
service a sense of "personal
embarrassment" because "we
are- an American abroad:2!
Kenneth R. Giddens, .:the
Alabama businessman who
heads the agency, was perso-
nally regretful: "I think, it's
a very tragic thing that we're
confronted with this situa-
tion, which I doubt -does this
nation any good. 'Everybody
knows we live in a jungle
world, and activities take
,place by almost all nations,
when their interests are
threatened. But most of them
have laws, such as official
secrets 'laws, So that some
of the More distastefial things'
they've done' aren't spread"
on the record."
He added, "lavish we were.:
smart enough and our system'.
permitted, some way legally.:
?legally?so we could clean ,
dirty linen in . private."
Playing It Straight
Public laundering being the
way things are done, howeV-
er,.Mr.'Giddens said he had'
not even discussed the C.I.A..
report with the news staff;
and assumed, "The, men
down ? there in charge are
going to play this .thing.
straight." He was asked. if
there had been any pressure
to handle the story ginerger-
ly, or to downplay it: "Not,
on. this," he said, in a studio
?with a smile. , - '
Down the hall, at 3:30 P.M.',
Anatol Petrov was broadcast-
ing to the Soviet Union about
the Senate committee's deci-
sion to disregard the Pres-
ident and publish a ,"report
about participation of C.I.A.
in plots to kfll foreign state
leaders."
A few hours later, in time'
for early-rising Muscovites
to listen with their morning
tea, the Russian service
would be saying something.
very much like, "In Washing--
ton. a Senate im?dstigation
reveals ..."
16
By LESLIE H. GELB
Special to The New 'Lark Tintei
? WASHINGTON, Nov. 18?The
developing debate over the na-
tional intelligence community
has forced disclosure for the,,
first time of total appropriations
for the "national intelligence
program." This year's figure,
'knowledgeable officials said, is
$4 billion?hidden away in the
$90 billion Pentagon spending
bill approved by the Senate to-
day.
These officials said that id
was covered by such specific
budget title* as "other procure-
ment, Air Force," "contingen-
cies, defense," and "procure-
ment, defense agencies."
? Last September Representa-
tive Robert N. Giaimo, Demo- .
crat of Connecituct,? made the
first move toward forcing dis-
closure of the real size and
nature of these items. Senator
Alan Cranston, Democrat of
California, pressed the issue
again in a Senate floor speech
last Friday.
The knowledgeable officials
who today disclosed the over-
all intelligence total for the
first time said they had done
so in the hope of forcing closer
Congressional scrutiny of va-
guely worded multimillion dol-
lar budge titles and to bring
about an open debate on the
secret intelligence budget.
$2 Billion in Tactical plan
The $4 billion figure, covering
'the "national intelligence pro-
gram" and known only to a
; few dozen legislators,d oes not
include $2 billion additional for
what is ppreferred to as tactical
, intelligence spending by the
Army, Navy and Air Force. - ?
Details of the $4 billion ap-
propriation, for what is called
the national intelligence pro-
gram, are known onld to a
few dozen legislators. The ap-
propriation does not include
$2 billion for what is referred
to as tactical intelligence
spending by the Army, Navy
and Air Force.
It has long been known that
the national intelligence pro-
gram?estimated in the past
as running as high as $8 billion
?has been mixed in with the
Pentagon budget without iden-
tification, but the specific hid-
ing places in that budget have
never been disclosed authorita-
tively.
While the House of Repre-
sentatives tritruned the program
budget this year by about $250
million, it could not be ascer-
tained whether the program
ever reached $8 billion or
whether it has been reduced
substantially 'in recent years.
The program, according to
officials in Congress and the
Administration. 'includes $750'
million for the Central Intel-
ligence agency tucked inside
.a $2.1 billion budget it2m iden-
tified ont, as "other procure-
ment, Air 'Torce," ?
Other agencies included in
this program and the funds
deshmated are as follows:
A01376iii6d7f 6FReledi'd 2001/081.08i : CM-RDP-7777004'32R00010038q0042':
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2
Christian Science Monitor
3 November 1975
gThe National Security
Agency, a semi - autonomous
communications and cryptolog-
ical agency under the Penta-
gon's umbrella, budgeted for
about $1.2 billion.
gTh e National Reconnaissance
Office, another semi-autono-
mous unit under the Air Force
that runs the satellite photog-
raphy program, set to , spend
under $2 billion. ?
gThe Defense Intelligence
Agency, which pulls together
intelligence for the armed ser-
vices and the Secretary of De-
fense, scheduled to spend about;
$100 million.
Since 1974. most Congress-1
men have been vcting billions:
for intelligence each year,
knowing only that they were,
approving military hardware
described no more precisely
than "electronic control equip-
ment," "communications equip-
ment" or "erection of struc-
tures and. acquisition of lamd."
Now, however, some Con-
gressional and. Administration,
officials are so convinced that
the intelligence budget ? at
least, in one ,over-all total?
should be subject to a debPte
on national priorities, that they'
are providing ? this information!
to the press.
Others, including Representa-
tive Giaimo and Senator Cran-
ston are using various legisla-!
live techniques to get these
Intelligence expenditures into
the open without technically 1
violating Congressional rules on
secrecy.
. Vote Neededlor Disclosure ?
The general rule is that clas-!
sified information can be ma(le,
public only by vote of either
the Senate or the House of
Representatives. Certain com-
mittees, however, have official-
ly disclosed classified material'
by a majority vote of their.
own members. Individual legis-
lators who take this responsi-
bility on themselves ,face cen-
sure, sl
The Administration has op-
posed any budget disclosures
on the ground that other na-
tions, then, would be more able
..to counteract American pro-
grams.
Those pressing for disclosure
know that the sentiment is
decidedly against them. In Sep-
tember, the House Appropria-
tions Committee voted 30 to
19 not even to receive intel-
ligence budget figures from its
own subcommittee, and thel
whole House voted 267 to 1471
not to make the budget public.
By Clayton Jones
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
stands on the threthold of being held in
contempt of Congress for withholding State
'Department information.
The House Intelligence Committee is due to
consider a contempt citation Tuesday (Nov.
4).
But the clash between the White House and
Capitol Hill may be averted, as with so many
recent battles over access to secret docu-
ments, in a rush to clean up U.S. spy activities
quickly.
Because chairman Otis G. Pike (D) of New
York is unsure of House backing for a
contempt measure, he may accept a com-
promise with Dr. Kissinger, committee
sources say. "I'm not sure Congress wants to
face up to its responsibilities," Mr. Pike said.
Dr. Kissinger yielded a bit on Oct. 31 when
he went before the House panel that has
subpoenaed a State Department document
critical of the Secretary's handling of the 1973
Cyprus crisis.
Weighing the threats of contempt, Dr.
Kissinger said he would hand over the
document, which is a lower-echelon memo-
randum, on the Cyprus issue, but the memo
would be "amalgamated" with others and
would not contain the names of working-level,
foreign-service officials who authored them.
To allow Congress access to every State
Department official and memo could destroy
the anonymity of officers' recommendations
and even lead to a resurgence of McCarthy-
'ism, Dr. Kissinger said.
He referred to Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy
who in the early 1950s blamed foreign-service ?
officers for policy setbacks in China, some-
times destroying their careers.
"What I am concerned about is that junior
officers not slant their reports in a direction
that is fashionable . . and be able to write
their memoranda without worrying how they
would look in five or ten years," Dr. Kissinger
testified.
But Rep. Les Aspin (D) of Wisconsin
believes that "whistle blowers" in the State
Department should be able to tell their stories
to Congress without fear of persecution. And
minority chairman Robert McClory of Illinois
said Congress should not be barred from
hearing testimony from employees who are
willing to provide information to Congress.
Aathor of the Cyprus memo, foreign officer
Thomas Boyatt, is one who wants to disclose
all but is being held back by Dr. Kissinger.
The House unit has dug step-by-step into
major spy operations with a call for specifies
from each intelligence agency on its risks,
costs, and forecasting abilities.
I have become unhappy and alarmed as this
investigation continues about the cynical,
hypocritical, and evil acts we turn up." said
Representative Pike. "In one case, the State
Department said the CIA opposed a covert
operation and it went ahead anyway."
Dr. Kissinger revealed that during his six
years in the White House under Presidents
Nixon and Ford all covert plans were person-
ally approved by the President, and most
likely that was the case for previous presi-
dents. .
His disclosure ties a closer link between
past questionable CIA activities and presiden-
tial responsibility.
But the Secretary refused to shed light on
the "40 committee" composed of four high
government officials ? the President, Vice-
President, secretaries of Defense and State
Department. The Pike panel probe of this
group uncovered 40 covert operations ap-
proved between 1972 and 1974 without one
meeting of the committee.
YE NEW YORK TIMES, 'FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21;-1975
House Panel Firm on Kissinger Citation
WASHINGTON, Nov. 20 (AP)
The House Select Committee on
votedIntelligence d y to
move ahead with at least one
contempt citation against Sec-
retary of tSate Henry A. Kis-
singer despite President Ford's
protest that the action "invol-
ves grave matters affecting our
conduct of foreign policy."
Otis G. Pike, the New York
Democrat who is committee
chairman, said the committee
would not press two other con-
tempt citations if Mr. Ford's
advisers delivered promised doc-
uments.
The three citations voted by
the committee last week must
be approved by the full House
of Representatives before they
can be turned over to a. United
States attorney for prosecution.
The President sent a letter
to each committee member
protesting against all three ci-
tations. He said he personally
invoked executive privilege to
prevent Mr. Kissinger's turning
over state Department requests
for covert intelligence opera-
tions abroad. :17
ApPrOvece-'-'201771108408 : CIA-RDP77429432R000100380004-2
"Thus, in declining to comply
with the subpoena, Secretary
of State Kissinger was acting
on my instructions as President
of the United States," Mr. Ford
said.
Mr. Ford said the National
Security.Council staff has been
making "a substantial effort"
and will continue to work to
provide the committee with the
documents it seeks.
"This issue involves grave
matters affecting our conduct
of foreign policy and raises
questions which go to the abili-
ty of our republic to govern
itself effectively," he said.
The White House released
the letter, dated Yesterday, as
presidential aides were turning
over documents subpoenaed by
the panel before it voted to
cite Mr. Kissinger for contempt
of Congress.
But a committee ,draft report
said new material handed over
to the panel was not enough
to quash the contempt citation.
NEW
Approved
YORK TIMES, MON OV ForReleEMBEase 2Q01/08/? 0_8 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380004-2
DAY, NR 10, 1975.
C.I.A.'s Work Unimpeded
By Inquiries and Reports,
Officials of Agency Assert'
By SEYMOUR
Special to The New
M. HERSH
York Times
tell you a wonderful story."
"But it's hard to say that
we've lost much because of.
tnat," the official said. ,
Sources cited the following
areas, in which there has been
some impairment of operations:
? kiSome 'American companies
that provided -cover jobs for
agents in the United States
have curtailed their coopera-
tion.
49.A small number of the large
American corporations that
permitted the C.I.A. to use for-
eign offices and branches for
cover jobs have become less
enthusiastic about permitting
the agency to have direct ac-
cess to employees overseas. The
companies have requested that
the agency conduct all its busi-
ness with employees through
a designated contact man.
clSome of the agency's per-
sonnel still on clandestine as-
signments overseas haVe suf-
fered from lowered morale and
a confusion about what is per-
missible in the field. Everyone
now has to check back home
With his field officer, and this
is taking away operational in-
itiative in spot developments,
one source said. Some agency
officials said; however, that
they did not think it was a bad
idea to have men in the field
checking in with superiors in
such cases. ?
gThere has been some re-
luctance by various officials
and operatives in foreign in-
telligence services to cooperate.,
"Some of our old-line contacts
don't want to show up in our
hearings or in our press;" one
source said. "But it just means
that it's 'a little bit more diffi-
cult to undertake an operation
with friendly operatives." He
added that such operations
were still feasible.
gThere have been scattered
instances of less cooperation at
high-level government-to-gov-
ernment interchanges of infor-
mation. One high-level Ford
Administration official said that
some British intelligence offi-
cials "no longer tell us where
they got information so we can
evaluate the source, but only
pass on the information. The
Boston Globe reported last
month that American officials
were treating top-secret British
information as being ',!-on loan"
to avoid the possibility of, its
being subpoenaed by Congress
or the courts as "property" of
the C.I.A. ?
But all the sources agreed
that intelligence information,
including the most sensitive
material available, was ? still
flowing in.
"Things are tougher, that's
true," one official said. "But I
haven't seen any evidence that
things are compromised in
terms of being able to tune.
tion."
One 'high-leel intelligence' ofei
WASHINGTON, Nov. 9?Offi-
cials of the Central Intelligence
Agency, despite repeated public
avowals of diminished prestige
and operational ability because
of the various inquides into in-
telligence operations, are con-
vinced that the agency will suf-
fer no serious loss of authority
and no erosion of its ability to
produce professional intelli-
gence estimates and reports.
Key agency oficials do not
expect either the Senate or
House Select Committee on In-
telligence to recommend a ban
on clandestine intelligence activ-
ities. Instead, they believe the
committees will seek to impose
more stringent controls on such
operations, a compromise they
feel will be welcomed by the
agency.
In a series of recent inter-
views, a number of agency of-
ficials also expressed 'surprise
at what they said was the in-
ability of the ? Senate commit-
tee, headed by Senator Frank!
Church, Democrat of Idaho, to
generate public support for its
inquiry.
? "Frank Church was the first
TV show to close this fall," one
senior agency aide said. ?
ee Mr. Church and his senior
!aides took sharp exception to
,these views. They said that
much of the committee's most
important work was proceed-
ing now in executive hearings
and would, if consistent with
national security requirements,
be made public after the inves-
tigation ends next February.
All the agency officials in-
terviewed agreed that the.
public criticism and official
investigations following the
published reports last December
of widespread domestic spying
by the. agency had failed to
hamper seriously its main func-
tion?the collection of worth-
while intelligence. ?
At one point last February,
William E. Colby, the recently
ousted Director of Central In-
telligence, testified that what
he called "exaggerated" charges
of improper conduct had
"placed American intelligence
in danger."
"We've been looking for ap-
parent, observable effects," one
intelligence official said last
week. "There are none."
? He added, however, -that
agency officials were concerned
about "the intangibles, that you
don't knew. v.,tiat: you're miss-
ng?the defector who doesn't
.defect, someone who doesn't.
ficial staid that the United
States and other intelligence
serices occasionally held back
things from each other, but
that that was was nothing new.
One senior Ford Administra-
tion official, asked for his as-
sessment of potential damage
to intelligence operations, com-
plained about the continued
disclosure to Congress of in-
ternal documents relating to
agency plots to assassinate
foreign leaders and other clan-
destine operations. The official
said he was concerned that fu-
ture Presidents and intelligence
chiefs might be restricted be-
cause of the fear that succes-
sors would make certain data
public.
Aside from that, however,'
the Official said he knew of.
na instance in which the agen-
cy's ability to produce intelli-
gence had been adversely, af-
fected by the Congressional
hearings.
One high-level agency source
did say that one European
politician had recently turned
down covert financing of a
political campaign. The official
refused to supply further in-
formation, and it was impos-
sible to gauge how widespread
such refusals of secret aid were.
A Frequent Question
One agency official conceded
that a factor in the dispute over
how much, if any, damage had
been done to C.I.A. operations
in the last 10 months was that
Congress had repeatedly asked
the same question in recent
hearings.
Last Wednesday, William
Nelson, the C.I.A.'s director of
operations, was asked for his
views on the matter by Repre-
sentative David C., Treen, Re-
publican of Louisiana, during
House hearings.
Mr. Nelson ,said that some
American citizens and agents
abroad had refused to cooperate
for fear of being exposed. He
said that "there has been a
good deal of apprehension" in
foreign intelligence services
about continuing their relation-
ships with the C.I.A.
"I don't want to overexag-
gerate this, however," Mr. Nel-
son added. "The agency is still
functioning abroad, and I think
functioning rather effectively."
A number of agency officials
said that a major concern did
develop over the publication
earlier this year of "Inside the
Company," a book by Philip
Agee, a former agency opera-
tive, describing clandestine
agency activity in Latin Amer-
ica and naming C.I.A.. covert
agents and their undercover
contacts.
The book led to serious prob-
lems for some operatives, intel-
ligence officials said. They
added, however, that no similar
information had leaked from
the Congressionel intelligence
committees.
If a central complaint did'
'emerge during the interviews,
which were initiated before the
ouster of Mr. Colby last week-
end, it was repeated concern
about a loss of moral within
the egency because of the
widesperad public criticism of
its domestic spying and some,
lof its clandestine overseas ac-
I. Some etfieiale, though, dis-
18
counted the' -significance of
morale inside any bureaucracy.
One high ? level Administra-
tion official said that morale
had been bad. inside the State
Department for 25 years) "but-
they still do their job." '
But those officials who were
bothered by a loss of morale
said that President Ford's sum-
mary dismissal of Mr. Colby,
who had been Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence since ' 1973,
had created a uniting surge of
sympathy for Mr. Colby in ,the
agency.
? One Colby associate said that
the director initially planned to
leaye the pest last Wednesday
? he later agreed to stay
through the end of the year ?
after signing 70 supergrade pro-
motions that had been author-
ized and to award the promo-
tions at a ceremony.
? More than 500 senior C.I.A.
officials gatheied Wednesday
for the ceremony in the audi-
torium on the agency's grounds
near Washington.
"Colby walks in," one eye-
'witness recalled, "and all of
a sudden everyone jumps up
and applause begins. It lasted
five minutes, with Colby trying
to shut it off. Now everyone
[inside the agency] is saying.
that Colby died for our sins."
Colby Praised .
Mr. Colby has been 'widely
praised for his consistent ef-
forts to coorperate with the
various investigating commit-
tees that were set up this year,
although his approach is known
to have angered many associ-
ates and friends of Richard
Helms, who was director of the
C.I.A. When it was engaged in
domestic spying.. ?
One 'mild- demurral to the
general praise for Mr. Colby's
candor came from Representa-
tive Otis G. Pike, Democrat
of Suffolk, whb is chairman
of the House intelligence com-
mittee. Mr. Pike told Mr. Colby
during .a hearing: "It has been
my own experience that if you
are asked the right question.
you will give an honest answer.
You. do not make it easy for
us* to ask the right question."
When the House and Senate
committees began summoning
agency witnesses, one Colby
.admirer said: "You had the
making of -a potentially disas-
trous situation. And yet by
playing it straight, and by try-
ing to get the material out.
the .agencv has finally come
into the -20th century. They
now know that acts of wrong-
doing must be turned over to
the Department of Justice."
A number of agency men
praised Mitchell Rogovin, a
Washington lawyer hired by
Nr. Colby, to . aid the agency
in its presentations before Con-
gress.
Sources said that Mr. Rogovin
constantly and successfully
urged Mr. Colby and others
to- turn over voluntarily
evidence of wrongdoing as a
means of keeping the Congres-
sional investigations on the de-
fensive.
"Part of the problem cr! being
in. our culture," one middle-lev-
el agency official said in ex-
plaining why many in the agen-
cy were reluctant to in ke any
information public, ":3 that
compartmentaliLation is. one of
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the fundamental disciplines?
the idea is to limit the damage
in case the K.G.B. [the Soviet
Secret intelligence service] pe-
netrates the agency. This be-
comes part of the ritual, and
some of the things we thought
would be abhorrent to the
American public" [upon disclo-
sure] "are things the people
have to put up with day after
day."
Raw Files Provided
One official said in an inter-
view two weeks ago that Jus-
tice Department officials were
being provided with direct ac-
cess to the agency's raw files.
At least one Justice Depart-
ment inquiry, into allegations:
that Mr. Helms commiettd per-
jury while testifying bfore!
Congress, is known to still be
under review.
Other agency officials also
expressed the view that the
relatively few new issues raised
thus far by the Congressional
committees were based entirely
on docnments and evidence
supplied by the agency.
Nothing has been unearthed
by the committee that hasn't
been discovered by the agency
and stopped," one source said
Senator Church said today
in a televised interview that
his committee's report would
contain "some new inform
about the agency's assassina-
tion plot.
The official Added that the
basic working document uti-
lized by the blue-ribbon com-
mission set up by President
,Ford and headed by Vice Pres-
jident Rockefeller for its investi-
gation and report in June was
the internal -C.I.A. dossier on
?domestic abuses assembled in
.May 1973 at the request of
;James R. Schlesinger, then the
'C.I.A. director, who was dis
missed last week as Secretary
of Defense. ?
Some agency officials specu-
lated that the Schlesisger re-
port did not include all the
agency's domestic wrongdoing,
but they doubted that the intel-
ligence committees would be
able to develop significant new
material.
tine operatives, the Schlesinger
report has been denounced as
the "vomit report," a reference
to the fact that agency em-1
ployees volunteered much of!
the information about the'
domestic violations ' to Mr.:
Schlesinger's office. There are
still some men in the agency,
.a highly reliable source said,
twho pride themselves on "hav-
ing stronger stomachs."
There is ? no evidence that
Mr. Colby or any other official
has authorized further inquiries
into domestic wrongdoing, al-
though the existence of such
attitudes is reported to be wide
throughout the agency.
Two middle-level C.T.A. offi-
cials who are now serving in
key managerial positions in the
agency expressed disappoint-
ment in the public proceedings
of the Church committee.
"A lot .of basic questions
about intelligence and its need
haven't been aired, and that's
too bad," one said. The other
complained that the , Church
committee had not begun to
exam inc. publicly the "fun-
damental" issue of covert oper-
ations.
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!
A more senior intelligence
official wondered whether what
?he felt was the failure of the
Congressional investigations to
deal with the more substantial
issues would not provoke yet
another inquiry into intel-
ligence in . some future Con-
gress.
"The Senate had the staff,"
one agency source said, "but.
it got too bogged down in
the assassinations."
He said that thus far the
Church committee had yet to!
fix firmly a schedule for public!
hearings on the agency's covert
activities in Chile, where at!
least SS million was spent to.
prevent the election of Salva'
dor Allende Gossens in 1970:
and, failing that, to attempt
to make it more difficult for.
.Mr. Allende's regime to govern.
Mr. Allende was overthrown
by a military junta in Septem-
ber 1973 and was either ?killed
or committed suicide.
A number of agency men
believe that the House. intel-
ligence committee has publicly I
examined more basic questions!
dealing with the capability of
;the C.I.A. to make accurate
intelligence assessments.
! One former agency official
said: "The House goes after
the arteries, 'while the Senate
goes after the capillaries."
The Senate committee was
known to be engaged in an
intense dispute over Senator
Church's desire to stage exten-
sive public hearings on the
C.I.A.'s role in Chile.
? Opposition on Panel
Sources close to the commit-
'tee said that opposition from
Republicans and some Demo-
crats on the nine-member panel
had prevented Mr. Church from
going forward this week with
full-scale public hearings. As
of last Friday, the sources said,
the Senators had been unable
to agree how long the hearings,
if public, should last and which
witnesses should be summoned.
Defenders of the Senate com-
mittee, including M. Church,
concede that the public hear-
ings have failed to arouse
strong public interest, but they
{insist that the committee
'should not be judged until it
I completes its work.
A number of sources said
' that the assassination report,
scheduled to be released in
two weeks, reaches no definite
conclusions about who author-
ized what in Cuba, Chile, the
Congo and the Dominican Re-
public. The report, however,
is said to contain the most
detailed information ever as-
sembled outside the C.I.A. on
how covert operations are ini-
tiated and carried out.
Mr. Church is known to be
sensitive to the Charges that
he sought to obtain personal
!publicity by publicly investigat-
ing such seemingly ,dramatic
but less significant issues as
the failure of some low-level!
!agency official to destroy lethal!
'toxin stocks after a direct IPres-
idential order to do so in late'
1969. 1969.
Senator said In a recent
'telephone interview ? that such
accusations were "groundless"
and added: "The assassination
matter would have been unpre-
cedented box office. It would
have been the most sensational
hearings held in this century.
I was against bringing ?this out
because I. thought it would have
caused damage" to the nation.
'Headline-Grabbing' Denied
"It's just unconscionable to
'turn around and say that the
committee is headline -grab-
bing," Mr. Church added.
Similarly, William -G. Miller,
staff director of the Church
committee inquiry, said in a
telephone interview that 30 in-
vestigators and attorneys had
been working since early this
year on what he said was one
of the central issues in the
investigation: Are you* going
to have covert operations and
!under what conditions and
what'controls?
Thus far, Mr. Miller said,
the staff dealing with that issue
has been meeting privately and,
may be forced to conclude its,
work with relatively little in-
formation made public.
Mr. Miller conceded that "the
things that have been made
public are .not as important
in the long run, but it takes
a lot of maturity and strength
to realize that the way you
get to the gut issues is to
handle them, in executive ses-
sion."
He added that the Senators
on the committee had to mak
'decisions and attempt to ba-
lance "what the public should
know against national securi-
ty."
"In every major area of in-
quiry," he said, "the more in-
formation there is, the greater
the sense 'of .having to weigh
PHILAD D. ELH-i.
29 October 1975
C Threat?
?
.To the.Editon-
'really; incrediblef Our' clvi-.
lized world is--.slo.Nly crumbling
.before the assault of revolutionar-
ies
.
.in .all -parts of the-globe.and
here? at. home,' Sen...-Cnurcli-is
iii-
vestigating the CL.1,1 ....? ?
,:-
"?:::-Does? anyone really .believe that
the-enemy and threat to our lives::
? the FBI or. CIA? -I -believe- We-
i.Vould..be-in.,re